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INCIDENT MANAGEMENT AND FORENSICS COURSEWORK 2

CMM519

INDEX

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CWRAM.DD

BASIC ANALYSIS FINDINGS

Operating system – Windows XP

Service Pack – 2 / 3

System Architecture – x86 (32 bit)

Image date and time – 2020-11-09 23:33:29

```
C:\Coursework2>volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f cwRAM.mem imageinfo
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
INFO      : volatility.debug      : Determining profile based on KDBG search...
           Suggested Profile(s) : WinXPSP2x86, WinXPSP3x86 (Instantiated with WinXPSP2x86)
           AS Layer1           : IA32PagedMemoryPae (Kernel AS)
           AS Layer2           : FileAddressSpace (C:\Coursework2\cwRAM.mem)
           PAE type            : PAE
           DTB                  : 0x31c000L
           KDBG                 : 0x8054c2e0L
           Number of Processors : 2
           Image Type (Service Pack) : 2
           KPCR for CPU 0       : 0xffdf000L
           KPCR for CPU 1       : 0xf892a000L
           KUSER_SHARED_DATA    : 0xffdf000L
           Image date and time   : 2020-11-09 23:33:29 UTC+0000
           Image local date and time : 2020-11-09 23:33:29 +0000
```

Figure 1

RUNNING TASKS ON THE SYSTEM

```
C:\Coursework2>volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f cwRAM.mem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 pslist
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
```

Offset(V)	Name	PID	PPID	Thds	Hnds	Sess	Wow64	Start	Exit
0x823c6830	System	4	0	61	256	-----	0		
0x822fc020	smss.exe	572	4	3	21	-----	0	2020-11-09 21:32:36 UTC+0000	
0x821ab9d8	csrss.exe	636	572	11	387	0	0	2020-11-09 21:32:37 UTC+0000	
0x82248020	winlogon.exe	660	572	21	638	0	0	2020-11-09 21:32:38 UTC+0000	
0x81e98650	services.exe	704	660	16	352	0	0	2020-11-09 21:32:38 UTC+0000	
0x8213f650	lsass.exe	716	660	25	367	0	0	2020-11-09 21:32:38 UTC+0000	
0x8220f6d0	vmacthlp.exe	888	704	1	24	0	0	2020-11-09 21:32:38 UTC+0000	
0x820dc020	svchost.exe	904	704	18	197	0	0	2020-11-09 21:32:38 UTC+0000	
0x821e55c8	svchost.exe	968	704	10	284	0	0	2020-11-09 21:32:39 UTC+0000	
0x82067c08	svchost.exe	1088	704	58	1243	0	0	2020-11-09 21:32:39 UTC+0000	
0x81fd9b28	svchost.exe	1192	704	4	57	0	0	2020-11-09 21:32:39 UTC+0000	
0x81ff2da0	svchost.exe	1244	704	14	208	0	0	2020-11-09 21:32:39 UTC+0000	
0x82059978	spoolsv.exe	1364	704	10	136	0	0	2020-11-09 21:32:40 UTC+0000	
0x81ffe020	explorer.exe	1672	1612	14	460	0	0	2020-11-09 21:32:46 UTC+0000	
0x8224b780	VGAuthService.e	180	704	2	61	0	0	2020-11-09 21:32:46 UTC+0000	
0x81f33020	vmtoolsd.exe	320	1672	5	134	0	0	2020-11-09 21:32:47 UTC+0000	
0x81e7cda0	vmtoolsd.exe	384	704	7	246	0	0	2020-11-09 21:32:50 UTC+0000	
0x82095b88	alg.exe	1296	704	5	103	0	0	2020-11-09 21:32:51 UTC+0000	
0x81e41da0	wscntfy.exe	552	1088	1	27	0	0	2020-11-09 21:32:51 UTC+0000	
0x82274558	wmiprvse.exe	764	904	13	308	0	0	2020-11-09 21:32:51 UTC+0000	
0x81e28748	IEXPLORE.EXE	1024	1672	7	311	0	0	2020-11-09 23:20:57 UTC+0000	
0x81fe5408	puttytel.exe	1564	1672	2	46	0	0	2020-11-09 23:22:04 UTC+0000	
0x81e2c650	Tetris.exe	1276	1672	1	13	0	0	2020-11-09 23:27:37 UTC+0000	
0x81fee6f8	msimn.exe	524	1672	12	323	0	0	2020-11-09 23:27:57 UTC+0000	
0x81ef4da0	msmsgs.exe	1984	904	3	167	0	0	2020-11-09 23:27:57 UTC+0000	
0x82119020	notepad.exe	1516	1672	1	33	0	0	2020-11-09 23:31:25 UTC+0000	
0x81fbec08	RamCapture.exe	1164	1672	2	31	0	0	2020-11-09 23:33:12 UTC+0000	

Figure 2

PROCESS TREE ON THE SYSTEM.

```
C:\Coursework2>volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f c:\RAM.mem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 pstree
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
```

Name	Pid	PPid	Thds	Hnds	Time
0x823c6830:System	4	0	61	256	1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC+0000
. 0x822fc020:smss.exe	572	4	3	21	2020-11-09 21:32:36 UTC+0000
.. 0x82248020:winlogon.exe	660	572	21	638	2020-11-09 21:32:38 UTC+0000
... 0x81e98650:services.exe	704	660	16	352	2020-11-09 21:32:38 UTC+0000
.... 0x81e7cda0:vmtoolsd.exe	384	704	7	246	2020-11-09 21:32:50 UTC+0000
.... 0x82067c08:svchost.exe	1088	704	58	1243	2020-11-09 21:32:39 UTC+0000
..... 0x81e41da0:wscntfy.exe	552	1088	1	27	2020-11-09 21:32:51 UTC+0000
.... 0x820dc020:svchost.exe	904	704	18	197	2020-11-09 21:32:38 UTC+0000
..... 0x81ef4da0:msmsgs.exe	1984	904	3	167	2020-11-09 23:27:57 UTC+0000
..... 0x82274558:wmiprvse.exe	764	904	13	308	2020-11-09 21:32:51 UTC+0000
.... 0x82095b88:alg.exe	1296	704	5	103	2020-11-09 21:32:51 UTC+0000
.... 0x8224b780:VGAuthService.e	180	704	2	61	2020-11-09 21:32:46 UTC+0000
.... 0x821e55c8:svchost.exe	968	704	10	284	2020-11-09 21:32:39 UTC+0000
.... 0x82059978:spoolsv.exe	1364	704	10	136	2020-11-09 21:32:40 UTC+0000
.... 0x81ff2da0:svchost.exe	1244	704	14	208	2020-11-09 21:32:39 UTC+0000
.... 0x81fd9b28:svchost.exe	1192	704	4	57	2020-11-09 21:32:39 UTC+0000
.... 0x8220f6d0:vmacthlp.exe	888	704	1	24	2020-11-09 21:32:38 UTC+0000
... 0x8213f650:lsass.exe	716	660	25	367	2020-11-09 21:32:38 UTC+0000
.. 0x821ab9d8:csrss.exe	636	572	11	387	2020-11-09 21:32:37 UTC+0000
0x81ffe020:explorer.exe	1672	1612	14	460	2020-11-09 21:32:46 UTC+0000
. 0x81fee6f8:msimn.exe	524	1672	12	323	2020-11-09 23:27:57 UTC+0000
. 0x81fe5408:puttytel.exe	1564	1672	2	46	2020-11-09 23:22:04 UTC+0000
. 0x81e28748:IEXPLORE.EXE	1024	1672	7	311	2020-11-09 23:20:57 UTC+0000
. 0x81e2c650:Tetris.exe	1276	1672	1	13	2020-11-09 23:27:37 UTC+0000
. 0x81fbec08:RamCapture.exe	1164	1672	2	31	2020-11-09 23:33:12 UTC+0000
. 0x81f33020:vmtoolsd.exe	320	1672	5	134	2020-11-09 21:32:47 UTC+0000
. 0x82119020:notepad.exe	1516	1672	1	33	2020-11-09 23:31:25 UTC+0000

Figure 3

TCP CONNECTIONS ON THE SYSTEM

```
C:\Coursework2>volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f c:\RAM.mem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 connscan
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
```

Offset(P)	Local Address	Remote Address	Pid
0x021a73f8	192.168.1.11:1040	192.168.1.251:80	1024
0x022494e8	192.168.1.11:1041	192.168.1.250:23	1564
0x0224e3d8	192.168.1.11:1044	192.168.1.250:110	524
0x02348ab8	192.168.1.11:1039	192.168.1.251:80	1024
0x02389228	192.168.1.11:1042	192.168.1.250:110	524
0x038f0228	192.168.1.11:1042	192.168.1.250:110	524
0x1264fab8	192.168.1.11:1039	192.168.1.251:80	1024
0x14ca53d8	192.168.1.11:1044	192.168.1.250:110	524
0x17456228	192.168.1.11:1042	192.168.1.250:110	524
0x1cdd03d8	192.168.1.11:1044	192.168.1.250:110	524
0x1dff8228	192.168.1.11:1042	192.168.1.250:110	524

Figure 4

OPEN CONNECTIONS ON THE SYSTEM

```
C:\Coursework2>volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f c:\RAM.mem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 connections
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Offset(V)  Local Address          Remote Address          Pid
-----
0x820494e8 192.168.1.11:1041      192.168.1.250:23      1564
```

Figure 5

OPEN PORTS ON THE SYSTEM WITH CONNECTION PROTOCOL

```
C:\Coursework2>volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f c:\RAM.mem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 sockscan
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Offset(P)  PID  Port  Proto Protocol  Address  Create Time
-----
0x01bee3e0 1148 1026 6 TCP 127.0.0.1 2020-11-09 17:02:20 UTC+0000
0x02042338 1088 123 17 UDP 192.168.1.11 2020-11-09 21:32:50 UTC+0000
0x020424d0 1244 1900 17 UDP 127.0.0.1 2020-11-09 21:32:51 UTC+0000
0x020a73e0 716 0 255 Reserved 0.0.0.0 2020-11-09 21:32:47 UTC+0000
0x020bec20 1296 1029 6 TCP 127.0.0.1 2020-11-09 21:32:51 UTC+0000
0x020c4e98 1088 123 17 UDP 127.0.0.1 2020-11-09 21:32:50 UTC+0000
0x020fc008 4 445 6 TCP 0.0.0.0 2020-11-09 21:32:36 UTC+0000
0x02135c20 1088 1025 17 UDP 127.0.0.1 2020-11-09 21:32:50 UTC+0000
0x0219b978 4 138 17 UDP 192.168.1.11 2020-11-09 21:32:36 UTC+0000
0x021d4440 716 500 17 UDP 0.0.0.0 2020-11-09 21:32:46 UTC+0000
0x021d79c0 1564 1041 6 TCP 0.0.0.0 2020-11-09 23:24:21 UTC+0000
0x021d7b78 1024 1037 17 UDP 127.0.0.1 2020-11-09 23:21:00 UTC+0000
0x0223f3d0 4 139 6 TCP 192.168.1.11 2020-11-09 21:32:36 UTC+0000
0x02259e98 4 445 17 UDP 0.0.0.0 2020-11-09 21:32:36 UTC+0000
0x02310ce8 1244 1900 17 UDP 192.168.1.11 2020-11-09 21:32:51 UTC+0000
0x02319290 716 4500 17 UDP 0.0.0.0 2020-11-09 21:32:47 UTC+0000
0x0233fe98 968 135 6 TCP 0.0.0.0 2020-11-09 21:32:39 UTC+0000
0x024801d8 4 137 17 UDP 192.168.1.11 2020-11-09 21:32:36 UTC+0000
0x10fb63d0 4 139 6 TCP 192.168.1.11 2020-11-09 21:32:36 UTC+0000
0x123fbe98 1088 123 17 UDP 127.0.0.1 2020-11-09 21:32:50 UTC+0000
0x1251b440 716 500 17 UDP 0.0.0.0 2020-11-09 21:32:46 UTC+0000
0x126071d8 4 137 17 UDP 192.168.1.11 2020-11-09 21:32:36 UTC+0000
0x12683008 4 445 6 TCP 0.0.0.0 2020-11-09 21:32:36 UTC+0000
0x12ab5c20 1296 1029 6 TCP 127.0.0.1 2020-11-09 21:32:51 UTC+0000
0x12b66c20 1296 1029 6 TCP 127.0.0.1 2020-11-09 21:32:51 UTC+0000
0x12fcf008 4 445 6 TCP 0.0.0.0 2020-11-09 21:32:36 UTC+0000
0x13327ce8 1244 1900 17 UDP 192.168.1.11 2020-11-09 21:32:51 UTC+0000
0x137411d8 4 137 17 UDP 192.168.1.11 2020-11-09 21:32:36 UTC+0000
0x137e2978 4 138 17 UDP 192.168.1.11 2020-11-09 21:32:36 UTC+0000
0x1462e3e0 716 0 255 Reserved 0.0.0.0 2020-11-09 21:32:47 UTC+0000
0x14c853e0 716 0 255 Reserved 0.0.0.0 2020-11-09 21:32:47 UTC+0000
0x15e0dce8 1244 1900 17 UDP 192.168.1.11 2020-11-09 21:32:51 UTC+0000
0x1cea5008 4 445 6 TCP 0.0.0.0 2020-11-09 21:32:36 UTC+0000
0x1f735c20 1296 1029 6 TCP 127.0.0.1 2020-11-09 21:32:51 UTC+0000
```

Figure 6

OPEN SOCKETS ON THE SYSTEM

```
C:\Coursework2>volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f c:\RAM.mem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 sockets
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Offset(V)      PID    Port  Proto Protocol      Address      Create Time
-----
0x81f9b978      4     138    17  UDP      192.168.1.11  2020-11-09 21:32:36 UTC+0000
0x81f35c20    1088    1025    17  UDP      127.0.0.1     2020-11-09 21:32:50 UTC+0000
0x81fd4440     716     500    17  UDP      0.0.0.0       2020-11-09 21:32:46 UTC+0000
0x81e42338    1088     123    17  UDP      192.168.1.11  2020-11-09 21:32:50 UTC+0000
0x81efc008      4     445     6  TCP      0.0.0.0       2020-11-09 21:32:36 UTC+0000
0x81fd7b78    1024    1037    17  UDP      127.0.0.1     2020-11-09 23:21:00 UTC+0000
0x8213fe98     968     135     6  TCP      0.0.0.0       2020-11-09 21:32:39 UTC+0000
0x81ebec20    1296    1029     6  TCP      127.0.0.1     2020-11-09 21:32:51 UTC+0000
0x81ea73e0     716      0    255  Reserved 0.0.0.0       2020-11-09 21:32:47 UTC+0000
0x81ec4e98    1088     123    17  UDP      127.0.0.1     2020-11-09 21:32:50 UTC+0000
0x82110ce8    1244    1900    17  UDP      192.168.1.11  2020-11-09 21:32:51 UTC+0000
0x8203f3d0      4     139     6  TCP      192.168.1.11  2020-11-09 21:32:36 UTC+0000
0x822801d8      4     137    17  UDP      192.168.1.11  2020-11-09 21:32:36 UTC+0000
0x81e424d0    1244    1900    17  UDP      127.0.0.1     2020-11-09 21:32:51 UTC+0000
0x82119290     716    4500    17  UDP      0.0.0.0       2020-11-09 21:32:47 UTC+0000
0x81fd79c0    1564    1041     6  TCP      0.0.0.0       2020-11-09 23:24:21 UTC+0000
0x82059e98      4     445    17  UDP      0.0.0.0       2020-11-09 21:32:36 UTC+0000
```

Figure 7

SYSTEM HIVES WITH KEYS

```
C:\Coursework2>volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f c:\RAM.mem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 hivelist
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Virtual  Physical  Name
-----
0xe25a4410 0x0d341410 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\networkuser\Local Settings\Application Data\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat
0xe24fdb60 0x0c77db60 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\networkuser\NTUSER.DAT
0xe193c578 0x0aa04578 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\LocalService\Local Settings\Application Data\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat
0xe198a758 0x0b188758 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\LocalService\NTUSER.DAT
0xe1967758 0x0ad64758 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\NetworkService\Local Settings\Application Data\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat
0xe195c008 0x0ae40008 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\NetworkService\NTUSER.DAT
0xe140d758 0x08879758 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\system32\config\software
0xe15cb368 0x085a6368 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\system32\config\default
0xe179eb60 0x05808b60 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\system32\config\SAM
0xe17bdb60 0x08400b60 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\system32\config\SECURITY
0xe13c5008 0x02e5b008 [no name]
0xe1037008 0x02aea008 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\system32\config\system
0xe102f008 0x02ae3008 [no name]
```

Figure 8


```

C:\Coursework2>volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f c:\RAM.mem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 printkey
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Legend: (S) = Stable (V) = Volatile

-----
Registry: \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\networkuser\NTUSER.DAT
Key name: $$$PROTO.HIV (S)
Last updated: 2020-11-09 21:33:14 UTC+0000

Subkeys:
(S) AppEvents
(S) Console
(S) Control Panel
(S) Environment
(S) Identities
(S) Keyboard Layout
(S) Printers
(S) Software
(S) UNICODE Program Groups
(S) Windows 3.1 Migration Status
(V) SessionInformation
(V) Volatile Environment

```

Figure 7 (does not cover whole hive and key section)

NAME OF THE SYSTEM

```

C:\Coursework2>volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f c:\RAM.mem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 printkey -o 0xe1037008 -K "ControlSet001\Control\ComputerName\ComputerName"
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Legend: (S) = Stable (V) = Volatile

-----
Registry: \Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\system32\config\system
Key name: ComputerName (S)
Last updated: 2019-12-03 13:39:22 UTC+0000

Subkeys:

Values:
REG_SZ ComputerName : (S) CSDM ←

```

Figure 10(Process Described in Appendix)

DEVICES ATTACHED

```
C:\Coursework2>volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f c:\RAM.mem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 printkey -o 0xe1037008 -K "ControlSet001\Enum\USBSTOR\Disk&Ven_USB2.0&Prod_Flash_Disk&Rev_2.60\2015051116580671&0"
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Legend: (S) = Stable (V) = Volatile

-----
Registry: \Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\system32\config\system
Key name: 2015051116580671&0 (S)
Last updated: 2020-11-09 23:26:55 UTC+0000

Subkeys:
(S) Device Parameters
(S) LogConf
(V) Control

Values:
REG_SZ DeviceDesc : (S) Disk drive
REG_DWORD Capabilities : (S) 16
REG_DWORD UIINumber : (S) 0
REG_MULTI_SZ HardwareID : (S) ['USBSTOR\DiskUSB2.0_Flash_Disk____2.60', 'USBSTOR\DiskUSB2.0_Flash_Disk____', 'USBSTOR\DiskUSB2.0_', 'USBSTOR\USB2.0_Flash_Disk____2', 'USB2.0_Flash_Disk____2', 'USBSTOR\GenDisk', 'GenDisk', '', '']
REG_MULTI_SZ CompatibleIDs : (S) ['USBSTOR\Disk', 'USBSTOR\RAW', '', '']
REG_SZ ClassGUID : (S) {4D36E967-E325-11CE-BFC1-08002BE10318}
REG_SZ Service : (S) disk
REG_DWORD ConfigFlags : (S) 0
REG_SZ ParentIDPrefix : (S) 8&314855ab&0
REG_SZ Driver : (S) {4D36E967-E325-11CE-BFC1-08002BE10318}\0001
REG_SZ Class : (S) DiskDrive
REG_SZ Mfg : (S) (Standard disk drives)
REG_SZ FriendlyName : (S) USB2.0 Flash Disk USB Device
```

Figure 11 (Process Described in Appendix)

LAST SHUTDOWN TIME OF MACHINE

```
C:\Coursework2>volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f c:\RAM.mem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 printkey -o 0xe1037008 -K "ControlSet001\Control\windows"
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Legend: (S) = Stable (V) = Volatile

-----
Registry: \Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\system32\config\system
Key name: Windows (S)
Last updated: 2020-11-09 21:32:20 UTC+0000

Subkeys:

Values:
REG_DWORD CSDVersion : (S) 512
REG_DWORD CSDReleaseType : (S) 0
REG_EXPAND_SZ Directory : (S) %SystemRoot%
REG_DWORD ErrorMode : (S) 0
REG_DWORD NoInteractiveServices : (S) 0
REG_EXPAND_SZ SystemDirectory : (S) %SystemRoot%\system32
REG_DWORD ShellErrorMode : (S) 1
REG_BINARY ShutdownTime : (S)
0x00000000 84 d8 31 ce df b6 d6 01<.....
```

Figure 12 (Process Described in Appendix)

The shutdown time of the system is - Mon 9 November 2020 21:32:20 UTC

TIME ZONE OF THE SYSTEM SET WHILE INSTALLATION

```
C:\Coursework2>volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f c:\RAM.mem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 printkey -o 0xe1037008 -K "ControlSet001\Control\TimeZoneInformation"
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Legend: (S) = Stable (V) = Volatile

-----
Registry: \Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\system32\config\system
Key name: TimeZoneInformation (S)
Last updated: 2019-12-03 14:08:11 UTC+0000

Subkeys:

Values:
REG_DWORD Bias : (S) 0
REG_SZ StandardName : (S) GMT Standard Time
REG_DWORD StandardBias : (S) 0
REG_BINARY StandardStart : (S)
0x00000000 00 00 0a 00 05 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
REG_SZ DaylightName : (S) GMT Standard Time
REG_DWORD DaylightBias : (S) 4294967236
REG_BINARY DaylightStart : (S)
0x00000000 00 00 03 00 05 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
REG_DWORD ActiveTimeBias : (S) 0
```

Figure 13 (Process Described in Appendix)

USERS ON THE SYSTEM "

```
C:\Coursework2>volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f c:\RAM.mem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 printkey -o 0xe179eb60 -K "SAM\Domains\Account\Users\Names"
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Legend: (S) = Stable (V) = Volatile

-----
Registry: \Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\system32\config\SAM
Key name: Names (S)
Last updated: 2019-12-03 14:08:11 UTC+0000

Subkeys:
(S) Administrator
(S) Guest
(S) HelpAssistant
(S) networkuser
(S) SUPPORT_388945a0

Values:
REG_DWORD : (S) 0
```

Figure 14

TETRIS.EXE

```
C:\Coursework2>volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f c:\RAM.mem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 filescan | findstr Tetris
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
0x00000000021d68a0 1 0 R--r-d \Device\DP(1)0-0+5\Tetris.exe
0x0000000002295450 1 0 R--rw- \Device\DP(1)0-0+5\Tetris.exe
```

Figure 8

UNDERSTANDING AND FINDING INTERESTING THINGS

When working on Windows system, recovering Tetris.exe automatically got deleted by the system. This made a file suspicious to the investigator as the file must be malicious.

Downloading and using volatility on Linux platform made it possible to recover expected file without getting deleted. Because Linux Kernel do not execute .exe file and made the file stable even after retrieving.

```
[tryhard@Kushal]~[~/volatility_2.6_lin64_standalone]
$ ./volatility_2.6_lin64_standalone -f cwRAM.mem profile=WinXPSP2x86 dumpfiles -Q 0x00000000021d68a0 --name file -D ~/volatility_2.6_lin64_standalone
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
ImageSectionObject 0x021d68a0 None \Device\DP(1)0-0+5\Tetris.exe
DataSectionObject 0x021d68a0 None \Device\DP(1)0-0+5\Tetris.exe
```

Figure 16 (Process can be accessed in Appendix)

```
C:\Coursework2>volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f cwRAM.mem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 -p 1276 dlllist
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
*****
Tetris.exe pid: 1276
Command line : "E:\Tetris.exe"
Service Pack 2

Base          Size    LoadCount Path
-----
0x00400000    0x16000      0xffff E:\Tetris.exe
0x7c900000    0xb0000      0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\ntdll.dll
0x7c800000    0xf4000      0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\kernel32.dll
0x77c10000    0x58000      0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\MSVCRT.dll
0x77dd0000    0x9b000      0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\ADVAPI32.dll
0x77e70000    0x91000      0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\RPCRT4.dll
0x71ad0000    0x90000      0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\WSOCK32.dll
0x71ab0000    0x17000      0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\WS2_32.dll
0x71aa0000    0x80000      0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\WS2HELP.dll
0x77d40000    0x90000      0x6 C:\WINDOWS\system32\user32.dll
0x77f10000    0x46000      0x5 C:\WINDOWS\system32\GDI32.dll
0x5ad70000    0x38000      0x2 C:\WINDOWS\system32\uxtheme.dll
```

Figure 17

From the figure 16, the file has been retrieved and it can be seen in the folder.

```
[tryhard@Kushal]~[~/volatility_2.6_lin64_standalone]
$ ls -la
total 538956
drwx----- 1 tryhard tryhard      276 Apr 17 02:13 .
drwxr-xr-x 1 tryhard tryhard      566 Apr 17 01:59 ..
-rwx----- 1 tryhard tryhard      778 Dec 27 2016 AUTHORS.txt
drwx----- 1 tryhard tryhard       20 Apr 17 02:01 Coursework2
-rwx----- 1 tryhard tryhard     3917 Dec 27 2016 CREDITS.txt
-rw-r--r-- 1 tryhard tryhard 536870912 Apr 17 01:57 cwRAM.mem
-rw-r--r-- 1 tryhard tryhard    73728 Apr 17 02:13 file.None.0x822f54b0.Tetris.exe.img
-rwx----- 1 tryhard tryhard       698 Jul 7 2016 LEGAL.txt
-rwx----- 1 tryhard tryhard    15127 Jul 7 2016 LICENSE.txt
-rwx----- 1 tryhard tryhard    31879 Dec 24 2016 README.txt
-rwx----- 1 tryhard tryhard 14937576 Dec 27 2016 volatility_2.6_lin64_standalone
```

Figure 18

The file size is 73728 bytes confirms the file is perfectly retrieved. Checking file on VirusTotal. It confirms the file is a strong Malware.




Figure 19

Following figure shows the mutex created by the IEXPLOR.exe file.

```

C:\Coursework2>volatility_2.6.win64_standalone.exe -f c:\RAM.mem handles -p 1024 -t Mutant
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Offset(V)      Pid      Handle      Access Type      Details
-----
0x81fa45e0     1024      0x3c      0x1f0001 Mutant      _IMSFTHISTORY!_
0x81f26ce8     1024      0x44      0x1f0001 Mutant      c:\documents and settings\networkuser\local settings\temporary internet files\content.ie5\
0x81e3b168     1024      0x138      0x100000 Mutant      c:\documents and settings\networkuser\cookies\
0x81fd3550     1024      0x140      0x1f0001 Mutant      c:\documents and settings\networkuser\local settings\history\history.ie5\
0x8206a588     1024      0x148      0x1f0001 Mutant      WininetStartupMutex
0x81e31558     1024      0x150      0x1f0001 Mutant      WininetConnectionMutex
0x8204e748     1024      0x170      0x100000 Mutant
0x822f9270     1024      0x178      0x1f0001 Mutant
0x822f2750     1024      0x17c      0x1f0001 Mutant
0x81e50aa8     1024      0x180      0x100000 Mutant      WininetProxyRegistryMutex
0x822f5b88     1024      0x198      0x120001 Mutant      ShimCacheMutex
0x81e31910     1024      0x1a4      0x1f0001 Mutant
0x82110228     1024      0x1b4      0x1f0001 Mutant
0x820da4a8     1024      0x1c0      0x1f0001 Mutant
0x82259688     1024      0x1c8      0x1f0001 Mutant
0x81fd3450     1024      0x28c      0x1f0001 Mutant
0x8214afe0     1024      0x294      0x100000 Mutant      RasPbFile
0x81ef3270     1024      0x420      0x1f0001 Mutant      CTF_LBES.MutexDefaults-1-5-21-1614895754-261478967-839522115-1003
0x81e31998     1024      0x424      0x1f0001 Mutant      CTF_Compart.MutexDefaults-1-5-21-1614895754-261478967-839522115-1003
0x81e2c600     1024      0x428      0x1f0001 Mutant      CTF_Asm.MutexDefaults-1-5-21-1614895754-261478967-839522115-1003
0x81e2c5b0     1024      0x42c      0x1f0001 Mutant      CTF_Layouts.MutexDefaults-1-5-21-1614895754-261478967-839522115-1003
0x8206a410     1024      0x430      0x1f0001 Mutant      CTF_TMD.MutexDefaults-1-5-21-1614895754-261478967-839522115-1003
0x820d3d08     1024      0x438      0x1f0001 Mutant      HGFSMUTEX
0x81eec100     1024      0x488      0x1f0001 Mutant      _SHMSFTHISTORY!_
0x8221f170     1024      0x490      0x1f0001 Mutant      _SHuassist.mtx
0x81f9e3f0     1024      0x4c0      0x1f0001 Mutant
0x81ff5880     1024      0x4c4      0x1f0001 Mutant
0x82147f18     1024      0x4c8      0x1f0001 Mutant
0x820d8fa0     1024      0x4d4      0x1f0001 Mutant
0x81e83f48     1024      0x4dc      0x1f0001 Mutant      MidiMapper_Configure
0x81fe6670     1024      0x4e0      0x1f0001 Mutant      MidiMapper_modLongMessage_RefCnt
0x8223f608     1024      0x508      0x1f0001 Mutant      c:\documents and settings\networkuser\local settings\history\history.ie5\mshist012020110920201110\

```

Figure 20

Mutex of msimn.exe

```
C:\Coursework2>volatility 2.6.win64_standalone.exe -f c:\RAM.mem handles -p 524 -t Mutant
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Offset(V)      Pid      Handle      Access Type      Details
-----
0x821452c0     524      0x38      0x1f0001 Mutant      OutlookExpress_InstanceMutex_101897
0x81efc3e0     524      0x78      0x1f0001 Mutant
0x8206dd68     524      0x80      0x1f0001 Mutant
0x81e3b168     524      0xb4      0x100000 Mutant      [MSFTHISTORY]
0x81fd3550     524      0xbc      0x100000 Mutant      c:\documents and settings\networkuser\local settings\temporary internet files\content.ie5\
0x8206a588     524      0xc4      0x100000 Mutant      c:\documents and settings\networkuser\cookies\
0x81e31558     524      0xd0      0x100000 Mutant      c:\documents and settings\networkuser\local settings\history\history.ie5\
0x8204e748     524      0xf0      0x100000 Mutant      WininetStartupMutex
0x822f9270     524      0xf8      0x100000 Mutant      WininetConnectionMutex
0x8224f2b0     524      0xfc      0x1f0001 Mutant
0x81e50aa8     524      0x100     0x100000 Mutant      WininetProxyRegistryMutex
0x81fea690     524      0x17c     0x1f0001 Mutant      MSIdent Logon
0x821452c0     524      0x1a4     0x1f0001 Mutant      OutlookExpress_InstanceMutex_101897
0x81fc0a48     524      0x1b4     0x1f0001 Mutant
0x82099dd8     524      0x1bc     0x1f0001 Mutant
0x81ef5dd8     524      0x1c0     0x1f0001 Mutant
0x821ed770     524      0x1f0     0x1f0001 Mutant      microsoft_thor_folder_notifyinfo_mutex
0x81ef5268     524      0x1fc     0x1f0001 Mutant      c:\documents and settings\networkuser\local settings\application data\identities_{7ac41542-893c-40b2-9083-1dbbbb22a
af3}\microsoft_outlook_express_folders.dbx_directdbmutex
0x820dc8c8     524      0x200     0x1f0001 Mutant      c:\documents and settings\networkuser\local settings\application data\identities_{7ac41542-893c-40b2-9083-1dbbbb22a
0x8206b1f8     524      0x228     0x1f0001 Mutant      c:\documents and settings\networkuser\local settings\application data\identities_{7ac41542-893c-40b2-9083-1dbbbb22a
af3}\microsoft_outlook_express_offline.dbx_directdbmutex
0x821eb280     524      0x244     0x1f0001 Mutant      MPSSwabDataAccessMutex
0x821e3a20     524      0x24c     0x1f0001 Mutant      MPSSWABOLkStoreNotifyMutex
0x822475e0     524      0x278     0x1f0001 Mutant      Toolbar Notificationsmutex
0x821ed770     524      0x284     0x1f0001 Mutant      microsoft_thor_folder_notifyinfo_mutex
0x822f99d8     524      0x298     0x1f0001 Mutant      Outlook Express Outlook Bar Notifymutex
0x821e3a20     524      0x30c     0x1f0001 Mutant      MPSSWABOLkStoreNotifyMutex
0x81f2c268     524      0x334     0x1f0001 Mutant
0x81ef3270     524      0x350     0x1f0001 Mutant      CTF.LBES.MutexDefaults-1-5-21-1614895754-261478967-839522115-1003
0x81e31998     524      0x354     0x1f0001 Mutant      CTF.Compart.MutexDefaults-1-5-21-1614895754-261478967-839522115-1003
0x81e2c600     524      0x358     0x1f0001 Mutant      CTF.Asm.MutexDefaults-1-5-21-1614895754-261478967-839522115-1003
```

Figure 21


CWIMAGE.DD

DOCUMENTS FOUND

CARVED FILES

Carved files are the files recovered from the system.

Browsing files in the \$CarvedFiles folder received one file shown in the figure 19




The screenshot shows a file browser interface for the path /img_cwimage.dd//CarvedFiles. It displays a table with columns for Name, S, C, O, Modified Time, Change Time, Access Time, Created Time, Size, Flags(Dir), Flags(Meta), Known, and Location. A single file, f0000000.xls, is listed with a size of 25600 and various flags.

Name	S	C	O	Modified Time	Change Time	Access Time	Created Time	Size	Flags(Dir)	Flags(Meta)	Known	Location
f0000000.xls			0	0000-00-00 00:00:00	0000-00-00 00:00:00	0000-00-00 00:00:00	0000-00-00 00:00:00	25600	Unallocated	Unallocated	unknown	/img_cwimage.dd

Figure 22

The file contains data shown in the figure 20



The table contains four rows of bank account data, including bank names, account numbers, login IDs, PINs, and values.

BANK	ACC NUMBER	LOGIN	PIN	Value
RBS	557799	459454	4632	£15,600
Lloyds	468746168	67651	1188	£3,05,000
NatWest	874654	3146	6254	£2,57,766

Figure 23

The figure 20 clearly states the file contains sensitive data. The data is about bank names, account numbers, login ids, pin and bank balance. According to the Metadata of the Autopsy, following information can be seen.

1. Author of the file is Harris
2. File was created at 2020-10-13T23:49:26
3. The file was last accessed by the same author that is Harris
4. The file was last modified at 2020-10-13T23:52:51
5. The file was last saved at 2020-10-13T23:52:51
6. The file was created by Harris

UNALLOCATED FILES

Unallocated Files are stored in Unalloc folder. The folder contains data from unallocated blogs of the system which are organised and can be found in folder Unalloc.

The file is large. In some readable texts, a file is containing information very similar to the information which was contained by CarvedFiles. The information can be seen in figure 21

BANK	ACC NUMBER	LOGIN	PIN	Value
RBS	557799		459454	4632
15,600				
Lloyds	468746168	67651	1188	
305,000				
NatWest	874654		3146	6254
257,766				

Figure 24

The file is 1057243136 bytes which is around 1057.243136 MB. To check the file whether it is a malware or not, the file was converted to SHA256 which can be seen in figure 22

```
C:\Coursework2>certutil -hashfile "Unalloc_Recovered" SHA256
SHA256 hash of Unalloc_Recovered:
38cff0ced34198fc09de59f44480f7936abe829b0aaefe034a13a3e3f5bca575
CertUtil: -hashfile command completed successfully.
```

Figure 25

Uploading the hash on the <https://virustotal.com> I found the following result. Hash used to find is **38CFF0CED34198FC09DE59F44480F7936ABE829B0AAEFE034A13A3E3F5BCA575**





Figure 25

The hash wasn't found which can be confirmed as the file is not malware or any other virus.

EXECUTABLES FOUND ON IMAGE

There is only one executable found on the system. The file is shown in following figure 24



Name	S	C	O	Modified Time	Change Time	Access Time	Created Time	Size	Flags(Dir)	Flags(Meta)	Known	Location
Tetris.exe			0	2020-11-09 23:25:50 GMT	0000-00-00 00:00:00	2020-11-09 00:00:00 GMT	2020-11-09 23:25:51 GMT	73802	Allocated	Allocated	unknown	/img_

Figure 26

As the file executable, the file seems suspicious. The name Tetris refers to one of the greatest and legendary computer games ever made. The game renders as figure 25




Figure 27

As the file is executable, it grabs some interest as it has high chances of being a virus or any malware. And the name must be given a person to trick and run the executable.

To check the file, the SHA256 of the file was searched on virustotal and it was found that the file is strong virus.

It can be seen in the figure 26




Figure 28

The file is a highly malicious.

The specifications of the file as follow

1. The file was created on 2020-11-09 23:25:51 GMT
2. The file was accessed on 2020-11-09 00:00:00 GMT
3. The file was modified on 2020-11-09 23:25:50 GMT
4. The file contains information related to Apache and also the usage is shown. For reference figure 27 can be referred.

```
Copyright 1996 Adam Twiss, Zeus Technology Ltd, http://www.zeustech.net/
This is ApacheBench, Version %s
2.3 <$Revision: 655654 $>
-h          Display usage information (this message)
-r          Don't exit on socket receive errors.
-e filename Output CSV file with percentages served
-g filename Output collected data to gnuplot format file.
-S          Do not show confidence estimators and warnings.
-d          Do not show percentiles served table.
-k          Use HTTP KeepAlive feature
-V          Print version number and exit
-X proxy:port Proxyserver and port number to use
-P attribute Add Basic Proxy Authentication, the attributes
             are a colon separated username and password.
-A attribute Add Basic WWW Authentication, the attributes
             Inserted after all normal header lines. (repeatable)
```

Figure 29

INTERESTING FILES

There is total three files in the Deleted Files. All the three files share the same contents. The files can be referred from figure 28. Interesting to know that the files are deleted files on the system

Name	S	C	O	Modified Time	Change Time	Access Time	Created Time	Size	Flags(Dir)	Flags(Meta)	Known
GreenAccounts.txt				2020-10-18 23:45:40 BST	0000-00-00 00:00:00	2020-11-09 00:00:00 GMT	2020-11-09 22:52:32 GMT	140	Unallocated	Unallocated	unknown
GreenAccounts.xls				2020-10-14 00:52:52 BST	0000-00-00 00:00:00	2020-11-09 00:00:00 GMT	2020-11-09 22:52:32 GMT	25600	Unallocated	Unallocated	unknown
f0000000.xls			0	0000-00-00 00:00:00	0000-00-00 00:00:00	0000-00-00 00:00:00	0000-00-00 00:00:00	25600	Unallocated	Unallocated	unknown

Figure 30

The contents of the file are as same as shown in the figure 21

1. GreenAccounts.txt

The file contains same information as shown in figure 21. The details are as same as figure 20.

2. GreenAccounts.xls

The file contains same information as shown in figure 21. The details are as same as figure 20.

3. f0000000.xls

The file contains same information as shown in figure 21. The details are as same as figure 20

Other than this, there are pdf, images, power point presentation but nothing is interesting.

EXPLAINING FORENSIC TECHNIQUE USED

SOFTWARES USED

1. RAM Image Processing (.mem)

- volatility 2.6 win64 standaloneFile

2. Disk Image Processing (.dd)

- Autopsy 4.19.3

QUERIES RUN

ID	Refer to	Query Fired	Result
1	Figure 1	volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f cwRAM.mem imageinfo	The result shows the information of an image. Contains basic information like time, date, architecture, profile, and basic system information
2	Figure 2	volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f cwRAM.mem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 pslist	The result shows the list of the tasks going on the system when the image was captured.
3	Figure 3	volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f cwRAM.mem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 pstree	The result shows the tree structure of the process going on the system. It shows the parent and child process behind every process
4	Figure 4	volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f cwRAM.mem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 connscan	Shows the incoming and outgoing connections on the system at a time
5	Figure 5	volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f cwRAM.mem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 connections	Shows the current ongoing connectivity on the system
6	Figure 6	volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f cwRAM.mem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 sockscan	Scans the connections and displays the protocol of connections as well
7	Figure 7	volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f cwRAM.mem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 sockets	Shows active connections with protocol on the system connectivity
8	Figure 8	volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f cwRAM.mem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 hivelist	Shows the hives captured on the system
9	Figure 9	volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f cwRAM.mem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 printkey	Shows the keys on the system

10	Figure 10	<code>cvolatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f cwRAM.mem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 printkey -o 0xe1037008 -K "ControlSet001\Control\ComputerName\ComputerName"</code>	Shows the name of the system
11	Figure 11	<code>Volatility_2.6_win64.exe -f cwRAM.mem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 printkey -o 0xe1037008 -K "ControlSet001\Enum\USBSTOR\Disk&Ven_USB2.0&Prod_Flash_Disk&Rev_2.60\2015051116580671&0"</code>	Shows the Devices attached to the system
12	Figure 12	<code>volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f cwRAM.mem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 printkey -o 0xe1037008 -K "ControlSet001\Control\Windows"</code>	Shows the last time the system was shutdown
13	Figure 13	<code>volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f cwRAM.mem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 printkey -o 0xe1037008 -K "ControlSet001\Control\TimeZoneInformation"</code>	Shows the time zone of the system
14	Figure 14	<code>volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f cwRAM.mem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 printkey -o 0xe179eb60 -K "SAM\Domains\Account\Users\Names"</code>	Shows User accounts on the system
15	Figure 17	<code>>volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f cwRAM.mem handles -p <PID_of_file> -t Mutant</code>	Finding Mutex of the executable files
16	Figure 16	<code>./volatility_2.6_lin64_standalone -f cwRAM.mem profile=WinXPSP2x86 dumpfiles -Q 0x00000000021d68a0 --name file -D ~/volatility_2.6_lin64_standalone</code>	Recovered Tetris.exe successfully from the system image.

From figure 4 PID 1024, 1564 and 524 are dealing with network activities and with the help of figure 2, we can see that the process is IEXPLORE.exe, PuTTYtel.exe and minmn.exe. Going to the figure 3, IEXPLORE.exe, PuTTYtel.exe and msimn.exe are the child process of explorer.exe.

As these processes are showing network activities, digging down in the mutual exclusion objects (mutex) created by these processes have possibility to reveal infection. While gathering the mutex of three processes, there were no mutex found for PuTTYtel.exe.

From figure 5 and 2, its puttytl.exe which has open connection between these two IP addresses. This can be matched with the PID. PuTTYtel.exe is used for connectivity between two computers specially on windows PC.

From the mutex caught of PID 1024 that is IEXPLORE.exe, there are two suspicious mutex found which are ShimCacheMutex and WininetProxyRegistryMutex and there was no suspicious mutex found on PID 524.

Understanding ShimCacheMutex and WininetProxyRegistryMutex

1. ShimCacheMutex

Searching ShimCacheMutex on <https://virustotal.com> has given the following output. The SHA256 of ShimCacheMutex is as follow
5789793b9e2d83a895edace975cf5f970858b17b19166f4cacaf7b8719f286ab.




Figure 31

2. WininetProxyRegistryMutex

Searching WininetProxyRegistryMutex on <https://virustotal.com> has given the following output. Which ultimately confirms that the mutex WininetProxyRegistryMutex is a malware.




Figure 32

CONCLUSION

Considering all the above evidence, a conclusion can be formed.

A user named Harris has been read, write and accessed a file containing critical information called as GreenAccounts.txt. The file contains information related banking having account number, pin and bank balance as well. The file GreenAccounts appears in two formats which are .txt and .xls. The files are recovered from the Deleted file sections. There is also on executable file named Tetris.exe which is running on the system. The file Tetris.exe is a malware according to the <https://virustotal.com>. Tetrix.exe contains an Apache Interactive flags which leads to the a confusion. Understanding the Text content of the file Tetris.exe it can also be said that the file is a backdoor. A user has been tricked to click and run the Tetris.exe on a system to establish a backdoor. Here the name Tetris.exe is given purposely because Tetris is the name of one of the legendary computer games ever created in the early stage of gaming.

Here the IP of the system is 192.168.1.11 and the connections going to the IP address of 192.168.1.251 and 192.168.1.250. From the Memory Image, the process called as PuTTYtl.exe is running. The PuTTYtl.exe is nothing but the connectivity between two computers using SSH or Telnet tunnelling. Here the connectivity under PuTTY can be see on IP address 192.168.1.11 and 192.168.1.250. Therefore it can be possible that the user has established a backdoor with the help of Tetris.exe or PuTTY is used to backdoor as well. But the PuTTY was not flagged as a malware in the system, the entire doubt goes on Tetrix.exe only.

Beyond Tetrix.exe and PuTTY, there are two malicious process going on the system which are IEXPLORE.exe and msimn.exe. Both the process are managing the network connectivity from the system to both the external IP addresses mentioned above.

Understanding the IEXPLORE.exe, this executable file is an malware according to the TotalVirus. This executable file is having multiple mutual exclusion objects. Two of them are highly dangerous. One belongs to the Malware and one as an Adware. This can be concluded as the Tetrix.exe has downloaded this IEXPLORE.exe and the file is malicious.

Another executable file called msimn.exe also has the mutex, but none of them belongs to any suspicious behaviour.

Therefore, it can be said that, the user Harris has tricked a user to download and run Tetrix.exe which allowed him to enter in the victim's machine unauthorisedly. Then the user Harris accessed critical information that is GreenAccounts.txt from the victim's machine and deleted all the files having same data from the users system as well.

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