

Chinese Economic Sanctions 1949-2020: Introducing the China TIES Dataset Codebook

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1 The Data

The data collection proceeded in five stages. First, and emulating the original TIES process, cases were selected for candidacy through a time-limited (1949-2020) key-word search of *NexisUni*, *New York Times Index* and London Times Index.¹ Second, the research assistants were then tasked with researching the cases using secondary literature² and assembling short written summaries of the episodes identified, including key identifying features such as the 'start date', 'target', and 'general typology' of the event. Third, after assembling a list of candidate cases, the review team was tasked with (1) reconciling the candidate cases with the original TIES cases (1949-2005) and (2) identifying 'new' or 'missed' candidate cases. We also cross-referenced all episodes with the other prominent sanctions data sets such as the GSDB, PIIE, TSC, and EUSANCT. After this reconciliation, the research assistants were tasked with writing an episode narrative following a standardized template (see Appendix) and citing secondary sources for key information for the set of CEC data set episodes. These written episode summaries were then used as the baseline or ground truth for our coding by the authors based on the code book from TIES v4. Finally, two other graduate research assistants who did not write the narratives or participate in the coding but were trained in TIES v4 were tasked with checking the coding with the narratives. Mistakes and inconsistencies identified in this quality control process were then reconciled by the authors.

A case of economic coercion begins either by threat or initiation. A threat can be rhetorical and come from an agency or government head capable of carrying out a threat (Heads of State, Heads of Government, Ministers of State or Treasury, etc.) or can be initiated through legislation, wherein the legislation eventually passes and becomes actionable.³ Sanctions might have multiple senders, as in the case of multilateral UN sanctions, but can only have a single target for the purposes of case listing.

Coercive episodes end when one of the following conditions are met: (1) a sender(s) indicates a lack of interest in implementing a threatened action; (2) a sender announces an end (or fails to reinstate) an economic coercion package; or (3) the sender and target reach a mutually understood 'end' to the episode. Ongoing sanctions episodes are left with the final outcome missing.

The result of this effort is the Chinese Economic Sanctions (CES) data base which contains 131 episodes where China is the sender and 88 episodes where it is the target from 1949 to 2020. The data set is fully compatible with TIES and includes all original TIES variables, but we also add a number of China-specific new variables such as who the paramount leader is, measures for

¹The keyword search included the following terms: "China, sanction, restrict, tariff, threat, embargo, and consequence.

²Useful sources included the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the US Department of Commerce, reports by think tanks such as CNAS ASPI, and books by ??

³The legislation much pass and become actionable for one key reason: hundreds of China-related pieces of legislation are passed yearly and most are empty threats and do not result in any policy change

assertiveness, and an alternative measure for severity. We assign new case names and descriptions to each verified case but also retain the original TIES caseID for overlapping cases. We keep 18 unverifiable TIES episodes in the data for the sake of compatibility and because these constitute a significant portion (35%) of original TIES episodes involving China but identify these with a new variable.⁴ Each remaining episode is documented with a narrative that allows users to verify, dispute, or alter our coding as they see fit. Since many of the important categorical variables such as outcome and cost are somewhat subjective, we believe this transparency is important.

We add a binary variable of "confidence" to address concerns about whether or not certain implicit sanctions episodes occurred at all (?) and also cite these concerns directly in the narrative. Cases where Chinese involvement is clear and well-documented such as participation in UNSC sanctions against North Korea are coded as 1 confidence while implicit and debated cases are coded as 0. Of the 131 cases of sanctions initiated by China, we are confident about 101 cases and flag 30 cases as 'low confidence' either because they are unverifiable or because the nature of the sanction threat or imposition was not explicit. Thus, a quarter of China as sender episodes is ambiguous in some way, much higher than the EUSANCT data set which relies on explicit threats and imposition of sanctions by US and EU governments to be sure, but a far cry from the claim that Chinese economic coercion cannot be studied systematically because they lack documentation.

Finally, we also add a number of China-specific time series that are important for identifying the dogs that did not bark in China's sanctions behavior. We know that China has had a consistent position in opposing Taiwan arm sales and Dalai Lama visits. However, it has responded to these episodes with sanctions only some of the time such as in 1991 to protest French arms sales to Taiwan or in 2002 to punish Mongolia for hosting the Dalai Lama. At other times sanctions are threatened implicitly but not followed through such as against US arms sales to Taiwan in 2010. And yet other times, no threats of economic sanction were detected as in the numerous times the Dalai Lama visited the United States, United Kingdom, Germany in the 2000s.

2 Variables

2.1 Case ID

Variables receive a CaseID if they meet the conditions of (1) the case was not present in the original TIES (2014). Each case which was present in the original TIES retains the original CaseID variable.

⁴We tried to verify each episode in TIES based on the dates and target state, searching through newspaper archives as well as secondary sources. Cases flagged as unverifiable by one research assistant were always assigned to a second research assistant to independently verify and confirmed by a graduate student researcher. We also relaxed the dates to search for possible episodes in the surrounding years. Since TIES does not provide any documentation of cases, this is the best we can do to verify cases they include in the data set by retracing their methodology of identifying cases.

The CaseID variable is generated through an amalgamation of: startyear + startmonth + sender1 + ccodetarget.

2.2 Narrative Link (CES)

Each episode has a unique linked narrative to a separate GoogleDoc, containing all of the information used to justify the coding of each episode.

2.3 Caseidname (CES)

Each episode has received a unique name to signify the episode both separate from each other episode as well as (2) relative to other episodes. For example, some episodes receive “II” and “III” markers next to the case name to signify that the episode’s characteristics have similarly occurred in another episode.

2.4 Cross Referenced Cases (CES)

Our data relies upon three existing data sets for comparison and justification: The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions Dataset (TIES), The Peterson Institute for International Economics Sanctions Database (PIIE), and the Global Sanctions Database (GSDB). For cross-referencing, we both included and matched cases across all three data sets relative to our contribution. We identify (1) the case ID in the peer data set; and (2) the case’s presence in the companion data set.

2.5 Ccodetarget (TIES)

This variable is coded to correspond to the Correlates of War (COW) project unique country ID variable for the target country, as well as the country’s name.

2.6 Senders (TIES)

The three sender variables identify three important parameters: (1) sender1 signifies who the coding team identifies as the sender in the dyadic pairing (always China 710, in our contribution); (2) sender2 signifies the presence of a partnered sender or China (710) as a partnered sender; and (3) primarysender identifies which state led the policy of economic coercion (largely important in multi-lateral cases, and for our purposes: UN Security Council sanctions). Each of the sender variables correspond to the Correlates of War (COW) project unique country ID variable for the sender country.

2.7 Institution (TIES)

Mirroring the TIES project codebook, "This variable is coded as 1 if the sanctions were conducted through an international institution. To determine if the sender(s) were applying sanctions as part of a multilateral effort, some evidence must exist that a motion for the application of sanctions is considered through an international institution. The motion need not have been passed, but at least one member of the institution must threaten or propose that the body as a collective adopt sanctions against the target. The threat must be specifically mentioned to qualify, and threats from the leadership of an international institution qualify as threats from the institution. Note - formal alliances are also considered international institutions." (TIES User Manual, pp. 2-3).

2.8 Start Date (TIES)

The start date variables separately record the day, month, and year of the episode's start date.

2.9 End Date (TIES)

The end date variables separately record the day, month, and year of the episode's end date.

2.10 Ongoing (TIES)

The ongoing date variables separately record the day, month, and year of the episode's most-recent evidence of the episode remaining unresolved.

2.11 Verifiable (CES)

A decision was made to code both unaccountable original TIES cases as well as other cases identified by ? as 'unclear' instances of sanctions. Episodes receive a 1 if the coding team determined a clear threat and/or sanction occurred based on the availability of at least three credible sources documenting the sanction.

2.12 Duration (CES)

This variable is calculated as the time passed (in days) between the onset of the first action within the episode (either threat or sanction) and either the end date (if present).

2.13 Issue Variables (TIES)

We implement the original TIES coding scheme for identifying the issue1 (primary) and issue2 (secondary and subsequent) issue variables in each episode:

"Issue: These variables are intended to capture as best as possible the issue(s) involved in the threat/imposition of sanctions. The issue variable borrows heavily from Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot. The issue categories are not mutually exclusive. The following three fields list up to three separate issues that are involved in the sanctions case. If there are more than three issues, the field labeled "other issue" lists the additional issues in dispute. The issue categories are as follows:

1. Contain Political Influence: Sanctions are threatened/imposed in an effort to prevent the target from exercising non-military power over a third state, a set of states, or an international institution.

2. Contain Military Behavior: Sanctions are threatened alone or in conjunction with other measures for the purposes of preventing military actions by the target state or in response to target military behavior.

3. Destabilize Regime: Sanctions are threatened/imposed alone or with other measures for the purposes of overthrowing a regime in power.

4. Release Citizens, Property, or Material: Sanctions are threatened/imposed in response to the seizure of citizens, property, or material by the target state. The seizure need not involve the citizens, property, or material of the sender, but the sender must declare that the sanctions are imposed as a result of the target's seizure.

5. Solve Territorial Dispute: Sanctions are threatened/imposed in an effort to resolve conflicts stemming from territorial disputes between the sanctioning state and the target state, or the target state and a third party. If sanctions are used in an effort to terminate a territorial dispute, the issue is coded as 5.

6. Deny Strategic Materials: The goal of the sanctioning state in threatening/imposing sanctions is to deny the target access to all or a particular set of strategic materials. For an incident to qualify under this category, the goal of the sender must be to prevent the target from enhancing its political or military capabilities through the acquisition of a certain good. Examples of strategic materials include, but are not limited to, uranium, advanced weaponry, rocket technology, or supercomputers.

7. Retaliate for Alliance or Alignment Choice: Sanctions are threatened in response to the possibility or the actual joining of an alliance or alignment between the target state and a third party.

8. Improve Human Rights: Sanctions are threatened in order to induce the target state to end repressive laws, policies, or actions. Sanctions may also be taken in an effort to compel the target state to respect individual rights.

9. End Weapons/Materials Proliferation: Sanctions are threatened/imposed in an effort to prevent the target state from supplying weapons or materials to a third party client.

10. Terminate Support of Non-State Actors: Sanctions are threatened/imposed in an effort to compel the target state to end its support for a non-state actor. Examples may include ending support for a transnational terrorist organization or ending support for a faction in a civil war.

11. Deter or Punish Drug Trafficking Practices: Sanctions are threatened/imposed in an effort to compel the target to adopt alternative drug policies, stricter drug policies, stricter drug enforcement of the drug trade, or as a punishment for failing to adopt acceptable drug policies or practices.

12. Improve Environmental Policies: Sanctions are threatened/imposed in an effort to compel the target to adopt more stringent environmental controls. Examples of environmental issues include, but are not limited to, protection of wildlife, reduction of emissions, adoption of cleaner technology, or control of acid rain.

13. Trade Practices: Sanctions are threatened to compel the target state to alter a trade practice or to punish a target state for engaging in a particular practice. Examples may include sanctions to end protectionist measures, tariffs, trade restrictions, or devaluations. If the goal of the sender is to affect trading between the sender and the target, the issue should be coded as Trade Practices.

14. Implement Economic Reform: Sanctions are threatened to compel the target state to enact specific economic reforms. Examples may include the implementation of IMF reforms, liberalize a controlled economy, or enact specific economic legislation.

15. Other" (TIES User Manual, pp. 3-4).

2.13.1 Trade/Economy (TIES)

This variable receives a 1 if the primary issue in the episode relates to the economy or trade.

2.13.2 Issue: Non-Trade/Non-Economy (TIES)

This variable receives a 1 if the primary issue in the episode relates to something other than either the economy or trade.

2.14 Threat (TIES)

Mirroring TIES, "This variable identifies whether or not a threat was issued in this sanctions case. The variable is coded as 1 if a threat was made, and 0 if no threat was identified." (TIES User Manual, p. 4).

2.15 Threatsancttype (TIES)

Mirroring TIES, "This variable presents several categories of sanctions types threatened by the sender in string format. Using the definitions below, we identified the types of sanctions that best

fit the threat issued in the case. Note that in several cases, there are several types of sanctions threatened.

1. Unspecific: Sender threatens to impose sanctions on the target state, but does not specifically mention what type of sanctions the target state will face.

2. Total Economic Embargo: The sender(s) stop the flow of all economic exchange to and from the target state.

3. Partial Economic Embargo: The sender(s) stop the flow of certain commodities or services to and from the target state. For example, a sender may ban all exchanges in military goods to and from a target. For a case to qualify as a partial embargo, some exchange must still be allowed while a sector's trade must be frozen.

4. Import Restriction: The sender(s) refuses to allow or places a restriction on a certain good or set of goods to be imported from the target state. Import restrictions differ from partial embargoes in that import restrictions only restrict the flow of goods into the sender(s). While the sender does not restrict the flow of goods to the target, the sender may prevent target commodities from being traded in its home markets or impose tariffs or duties on target commodities.

5. Export Restriction: The sender(s) refuses to allow certain goods or services to be exported to the target state. Export restrictions differ from partial embargoes in that export restrictions only restrict the flow of goods to the target from the sender(s). Although the sender places no restriction on goods from the target for import, the sender does not allow a certain good or set of goods to flow out of the sender(s) firms to the target. An example of such a restriction is an export control on dual use technology.

6. Blockade: The sender(s) threatens to prevent all states from engaging in economic transactions with the target state. Such a threat may be enforced physically by the sender(s) military. An alternative is for the sender to threaten any state that engages in transactions with the target with similar economic sanctions.

7. Asset Freeze: The sender(s) threatens to partially or completely seize all assets of the target state under the sender(s)'s jurisdiction. The sender cannot threaten to seize assets outside of its territorial reach. For example, if Country A threatens B with sanctions, A cannot threaten to seize B's assets in Country C.

8. Termination of Foreign Aid: The sender(s) threaten to reduce or end foreign aid or loans if the target state does not comply with the sender(s) demands.

9. Travel Ban: The sender(s) threaten to cease allowing an individual, group, or citizenry of the target country to enter the territory of the sender(s).

10. Suspension of Economic Agreement/Protocol: The sender(s) threaten to partially or completely cancel or void previous economic arrangements or contracts between the sender(s) and the target state." (TIES User Manual, pp. 5-6).

2.16 Imposesanct (TIES)

Mirroring TIES, "This variable identifies whether or not sanctions were imposed in this case. The variable is coded as 1 if sanctions were imposed, and 0 if sanctions were not imposed" (TIES User Manual, p. 9).

2.17 Imposesancttype (TIES)

Mirroring TIES, "This variable is a string that identifies several categories of sanctions types. Using the definitions provided, choose the types of sanctions that best fits the incident in the case. If the sanctions imposed by the sender(s) does not match any of the categories, choose other.

1. Total Economic Embargo: The sender(s) stop the flow of all economic exchange to and from the target state.

2. Partial Economic Embargo: The sender(s) stop the flow of certain commodities or services to and from the target state. For example, a sender may ban all exchanges in military goods to and from a target. For a case to qualify as a partial embargo, some exchange must still be allowed while a sector's trade must be frozen.

3. Import Restriction: The sender(s) refuses to allow or places a restriction on a certain good or set of goods to be imported from the target state. Import restrictions differ from partial embargoes in that import restrictions only restrict the flow of goods into the sender(s). While the sender does not restrict the flow of goods to the target, the sender may prevent target commodities from being traded in its home markets or impose tariffs or duties on target commodities.

4. Export Restriction: The sender(s) refuses to allow certain goods or services to be exported to the target state. Export restrictions differ from partial embargoes in that export restrictions only restrict the flow of goods to the target from the sender(s). Although the sender places no restriction on goods from the target for import, the sender does not allow a certain good or set of goods to flow out of the sender(s) firms to the target. An example of such a restriction is an export control on dual use technology.

5. Blockade: The sender(s) attempts to physically prevent all states from engaging in economic transactions with the target state. Such actions may be enforced physically by the sender(s) military. An alternative is for the sender to threaten any state that engages in transactions with the target with similar economic sanctions.

6. Asset Freeze: The sender(s) partially or completely seize all assets of the target state under the sender(s)' jurisdiction.

7. Termination of Foreign Aid: The sender(s) reduces or ends foreign aid or loans if the target state does not comply with the sender(s) demands.

8. Travel Ban: The sender(s) ceases allowing an individual, group, or citizenry of the target country to enter the territory of the sender(s).

9. Suspension of Economic Agreement: The sender(s) threaten to partially or completely cancel or void previous economic arrangements or contracts between the sender(s) and the target state.

10. Other" (TIES User Manual, p. 10).

2.18 Diplomatic (TIES)

Mirroring the spirit of the original TIES, this variable is designed to capture whether or not a diplomatic penalty was levied/threatened by the sender against the target. The dummy variable received a '1' if the episode threatens/actually expels (a) an ambassador; (b) recalls an ambassador; (c) temporarily closes an embassy; or (d) ends diplomatic contact. (TIES User Manual, p.7).

2.19 Democracy (CES)

This variable uses imported Polity IV scores, normalized to the current date of the episode, and then transformed to a dummy (0/1) to whether or not the target is a democracy.

2.20 China Specific Issue Variables (CES)

Each of the Issue Variables are binary variables coded to reflect their presence during a given episode:

2.20.1 Tibet (CES)

We catalog all official state visits made by the Dalai Lama from 1959-present. We use the official travel record of the Dalai Lama public website to code the variable.⁵ The binary variable is coded as '1' if the Dalai Lama made a state visit to the state/territory in a given year. India is always coded as '1' after 1959 because of the Dalai Lama's residence in Himachal Pradesh. We count 480 cases of Dalai Lama foreign visits in the data set, of which China responded with a threat or imposition of economic sanctions in 25 cases.

2.20.2 Taiwan (CES)

We code all country years that a given China trade partner also sells weapons to Taiwan as '1' regardless of the weapon sale size and scope. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 'Arms Transfers Database' documents all international arms transfers since 1950, and

⁵<https://www.dalailama.com/>

most-recently updated in March 2021.⁶ We count 160 episodes of Taiwan arms sales, the vast majority involving the United States, and China responded with a threat or imposition of economic sanctions in only 11 cases.

2.20.3 Human Rights (CES)

This variable is designed to capture sanctioning activity involving a perceived threat to human rights or the presence of human rights as an issue in the sanctioning issue space. Episodes receive a '1' code if the issue is present, and a '0' if not.

2.21 SeverityTWL (CES)

A team of 10 research assistants were tasked with rating the severity of a sanctions episode on a 1 to 10 scale, with 1 being 'extremely minor' and 10 being 'catastrophic'. The scores were then averaged and reviewed to the nearest whole number.

2.22 Anticipated and Real Costs (CES)

Mirroring the strategy of the KUTWLseverity variable, a team of 10 research assistants were tasked with rating sanctions episodes on a scale, relative to (A) Anticipated Sender costs; (B) Anticipated Target costs; (C) Real Sender Costs; and (D) Real Target Costs. Variables received a 1 if the damage was either predicted to be (anticipated) or actually (real) minor⁷, 2 if the damage was either predicted to be (anticipated) or actually (real) significant⁸, and 3 if the damage was either predicted to be (anticipated) or actually (real) catastrophic⁹:

2.22.1 AnticSenderTWL (CES)

This variable analyses the perceived costs to the sender prior to the initiation of an economic coercion episode:

1 'minor'

2 'significant'

3 'catastrophic'

⁶SEE: <https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers>

⁷'minor' damage is denoted as limited or low-impact

⁸'significant' damage is denoted as disruptive, or inflicting notable damage to the economy

⁹'catastrophic' damage is denoted as intended to or actually grinding economic activity to a halt or ending the trading relationship between two countries

2.22.2 AnticTargetTWL (CES)

This variable analyses the perceived costs to the target prior to the initiation of an economic coercion episode:

- 1 'minor'
- 2 'significant'
- 3 'catastrophic'

2.22.3 SenderCostTWL (CES)

This variable analyses the real costs to the sender due to the initiation of an economic coercion episode:

- 1 'minor'
- 2 'significant'
- 3 'catastrophic'

2.22.4 TargetCostTWL (CES)

This variable analyses the real costs to the target due to the initiation of an economic coercion episode:

- 1 'minor'
- 2 'significant'
- 3 'catastrophic'

2.23 Targeted 'Smart' Sanctions (CES)

? identify sanctions which target: 'business, regime, or military interests' as 'targeted'. However, the expansive measure of 'smart' sanctions undersells China's transformation between the two periods. We implement a stricter definition of 'smart' sanctions, excluding particular 'whole of government targeting' approaches the original TIES coded as 'smart' (ex: China's 1967 embargo of Burma) more inline with what the literature suggests. As a result, we identify 14 episodes which meet the ? expansive definition (of 98), but fail to meet ours, resulting in a total of 84 'smart' episodes of Chinese economic coercion—64% of the universe of Chinese episodes are 'smart' in character.

2.24 Sanction Imposition Start Date (TIES)

The sanction imposition start date variables separately record the day, month, and year of the episode's sanction start date.

2.25 Finaloutcome (TIES)

Mirroring the original TIES, "This variable is designed to capture the nature of the termination of the sanctions incident. The coder should choose from among the categories listed. If the outcome does not match the categories listed, the coder should code the variable as other and fill in the outcome in the blank field at the bottom. The categories are:

1. Partial Acquiescence by Target to threat: The target state agrees to some of the demands of the sender(s) and adjusts only these behaviors accordingly while continuing the engage in some of the offensive behavior prior to imposition of sanctions.

2. Complete Acquiescence by Target to threat: The target state agrees to all of the demands of the sender(s) and adjusts its behavior accordingly prior to the imposition of sanctions.

3. Capitulation by the Sender(s) in threat stage: Although the sender threatens sanctions, the sender refuses to impose sanctions despite the refusal of the target to alter its behavior. 4. Stalemate in the Threat Stage: Although the issue remains unresolved following the sender's threat, the target does not alter its behavior and the sender does not impose sanctions.

5. Negotiated Settlement: The target state agrees to alter some of its behavior in exchange for actions taken by the sender(s) prior to the imposition of sanctions. The sender(s) must perform some action in exchange for the target state's compliance for this variable to be coded as 1.

6. Partial Acquiescence by the Target State following sanctions imposition: The target state agrees to some of the demands of the sender(s) and adjusts only these behaviors accordingly while continuing the engage in some of the offensive behavior after sanctions are imposed.

7. Total Acquiescence by Target State following sanctions imposition: The target state agrees to all of the demands of the sender(s) and adjusts its behavior accordingly after sanctions are imposed.

8. Capitulation by Sender after Imposition: The sender state removes sanctions despite the refusal of the target to alter its behavior.

9. Stalemate after Sanctions Imposition: Sanctions are imposed by the sender(s), but the target does not alter its behavior.

10. Negotiated Settlement following sanctions imposition: The target state agrees to alter some of its behavior in exchange for actions taken by the sender(s) following the imposition of sanctions. The sender(s) must perform some action in exchange for the target state's compliance for this variable to be coded as 1" (TIES User Manual pp. 12-13).

2.26 CostsTWL (CES)

The Costs variables build upon the original TIES effort to capture a scaled (1-3) measure of how well the costs of the episode are anticipated by the sender. Both variables, however, were significantly under-coded in the original TIES due to a lack of available information (real monetary costs) related to the economic impacts of the episode. For example, a coding of '2' or 'Major' in the original TIES sought to measure a 5% economic impact. Instead, we task coders to take a general cursory overview of the case and measure Minor(1), or "anticipated to have little-to-no impact on the overall trading relationship"; Major(2), or "anticipated to have an impactful and measurable impact on the overall trading relationship"; and Catastrophic, or "designed to destroy the trading relationship and/or overall economy" (3) impacts.

2.27 SettlementNatureTWL (CES)

The Settlement Nature variables build upon the original TIES effort to capture a scaled (1-10) measure of how well senders and targets fared at the end (or during ongoing) episodes: however we see the episode space as a consequence of a bargaining interaction, meaning each state gains at the cost of the other. A 'neutral' interaction between the two states would thus begin with a 5-5 coding for both the settlementnature sender and settlementnature target variables, to be modified by the result of the interaction. The higher the discrepancy between these two variables, the more favorable the result of the episode is for the state with the higher proportion out of ten.

Mirroring the effort of the original TIES, we task coders to conceptualize factors such as (1) the meeting of overall goals; and (2) the general environment post-episode to give a score from 1-10 to each side. However, departing from the original TIES, these scores are subtracted from a 'bank' of ten—if a sender/target receives a score out of ten, the opposing state must receive the residual score.

2.28 TargetCapitulateTWL (CES)

Did the target of the sanction change its behavior in response to the initiation of an episode? The variable receives a 1 if the target changed behavior, and a 0 if not.

2.29 ChinaOutcomeTWL (CES)

We extend this effect to the PRC specifically, subtracting the PRC's 'sender' nature from its 'target' nature, arriving at a scaled -10 to 10 score for the result of the episode for the PRC. Cases can be considered as "successful" if the value of the variable for the sender is greater than the value of the variable for the target.

2.30 PRCleader (CES)

This variable lists both the name and a categorical code for the Paramount Leader of China in a given year of the episode.

2.31 China MID Data (CES)

This variable imports data from the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset. We use a dummy variable coding the existence of a militarized interstate dispute initiated either by China against the opposing dyadic pair, or with China on the receiving end during each episode year.

CASE ID: 199108710220**China sanctioned France for its arm sales to Taiwan**

On 27 September 1991, France announced its approval of the sale of 16 unarmed frigate hulls to Taiwan. China, on 28 September, expressed "strong dissatisfaction" over France's decision by summoning French Ambassador Claude Martin. France finally sold the six frigates to Taiwan for \$2.8 billion in 1991, causing a freeze in diplomatic relations between Paris and Beijing.

On 18 November 1992, France signed the contract to sell Taiwan 60 Mirage fighter jets regardless of China's strong opposition and threats of "retaliatory measures". China closed the French consulate in Guangzhou in December 1992. In January 1993, France officially confirmed the sale of 60 Mirage jet fighters to Taiwan and 1,500 missiles for \$3.8 billion (Dawkins 1993). In March 1993, French companies in China reported that many contracts had been frozen and all negotiations for future business deals had stopped (Cohen 1994). In November 1993, the German government secured approximately \$4 billion in new contracts in China, including for the Guangzhou subway project, from which French companies were excluded (Cohen 1994). Finally, in January 1994, China signed an agreement with France to end sanctions and restore friendly relations: 'In view of the concerns of the Chinese side, the French government has undertaken not to authorize any French enterprises to participate in the arming of Taiwan' (Cohen 1994, 11).

In April 2020, Taiwan would buy the Dagaie MK2 decoy launcher from a unit of French group DCI to upgrade the 25-year-old missile interference system of French-built Lafayette frigates. On Tuesday (May 12) 2020, Beijing demanded that France cancel an arms deal with Taiwan and warns Paris that it could harm diplomatic relations between the two countries. The French foreign ministry on Wednesday (May 13) responded to China's complaint by first reiterating its adherence to the "one China policy." France dismissed Chinese warnings and said it was implementing existing deals with Taiwan and that China and other countries should focus on battling the coronavirus pandemic instead.

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Figure 1: Sample CEC Narrative