



# **Protecting Aid Funds in Unstable Governance Environments: Towards an Integrated Strategy**

Lisbon, 18-19 May 2010

Sedas Nunes Hall, Institute of Social Sciences, University of  
Lisbon

**Can aid to anti-corruption work? Lessons in effective aid delivery**

**Harald Mathisen, U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre**




Can aid to anti-corruption work

lessons in effective aid delivery

**Harald Mathisen, Senior Program Coordinator**

**CM** **CHR.**  
**MICHELSSEN**  
**INSTITUTE**


# U4: Promoting an informed approach to anti-corruption



- » **AusAID – Australian Agency for International Development**
- » **BTC/CTB – Belgian Technical Cooperation**
- » **CIDA – Canadian International Development Agency**
- » **DFID – Department for International Development**
- » **GTZ – German International Cooperation Agency**
- » **MinBuza – Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs**
- » **Norad – Norwegian Agency for Cooperation and Development**
- » **Sida – Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency**


**In brief:**

**Promote an informed approach to corruption and  
serve donors as a knowledge source**



**[www.u4.no](http://www.u4.no)**

# The anti-corruption business in action





# Why are we here?

## Consequences of corruption

Aid financed new hospitals and schools...



# Objectives of this talk

- Introduce the world of anti-corruption
- Give a critical review of progress and pitfalls of anti-corruption reform at the international and national levels
- To identify some opportunities for AC-reform

# What are we trying to do?






# Donors engagement in anti-corruption

International initiatives
International anti-corruption conventions Money laundering, asset recovery, judicial cooperation Donor home country initiatives – private sector, e.g.

Partner country integrity systems
Support to governance, accountability, transparency & anti-corruption initiatives of government, parliaments, civil society, private sector

Interface: donor funds – partner country implementation
Public finance management system strengthening Procurement, evaluation, auditing strengthening Participation, external oversight & scrutiny


Donor agency level
Ethics management & internal integrity Codes of conduct, complaints mechanisms, whistle blower Disclosure policies & information management



## **Missing:**


Do-no-harm to include corruption

Assess impact of donor interventions for impact on corruption



## **Apparently missing:**

Greater consistency with practice what is preached




# Thinking like economists and lawyers :

- **Reduce number of transactions vulnerable to corruption**
  - Reduce public sector size, liberalize financial sector, competition for service provision
- **Reduce gains from corrupt transactions**
  - Raise public sector wages, scale down individual projects
- **Increase probability of being caught**
  - Asset declaration, investigative journalism, protection of whistle blowers, financial management, civil society watchdogs, judicial independence, budget transparency, Supreme Audit Institutions and Anti-Corruption Agencies
- **Increase magnitude of penalties**
  - Bureaucratic penalties, prosecution

**Current objectives: efficiency, transparency, accountability, and integrity**

# Current anti-corruption thinking



# Current anti-corruption thinking

- 1) An anti corruption strategy which covers all the said integrity “pillars” of the country, combined with an awareness raising campaign in order for the population to back the effort.

## The alternative?

- 2) A strategy which prioritises 1/2 key corruption risk areas (e.g. military, customs, police, construction, natural resources, health).

# Contested Notions

- Law enforcement  $\Leftrightarrow$  prevention
- Explicit  $\Leftrightarrow$  implicit
- The public must be sensitized and convinced that corruption is evil  $\Leftrightarrow$  real changes in the public's daily lives will make a difference on their actions and beliefs

# Contested Notions

- Anti corruption can destabilise a government  $\Leftrightarrow$  corruption can destabilise a state
- Technical solutions have a greater chance of succeeding  $\Leftrightarrow$  corruption is a political problem and demands political solutions
- High level political will is an absolute pre condition for success (of an AC strategy)  $\Leftrightarrow$  an analysis of the context, of competition, of incentives



# The rise of an effective AC-reform agenda?



# Interventions and policies Implemented with no Supportive Evidence of Efficacy


Type of reform
1. Raise awareness of public through seminars
2. Raise awareness of public officials through seminars and training
3. Establish anti-corruption agencies
4. Appoint a enlightened leader
5. Raise public sector wages
6. Reduce wage compression
7. Fry a big fish
8. Zero tolerance policy
9. Free elections
10. Policy conditionality

# Some effects of AC-reform

- Perceived progress
  - International legal framework (conventions)
  - International corruption more in limelight
  - Formal legal and institutional reforms
  - Awareness and knowledge has deepened
  - Multiple stakeholders involved → no taboo
- Pitfalls
  - Context matters, but...
  - Politics matter, but...
  - Little focus on behavioural change
  - Lack of linkage: prevention and enforcement
  - Lack of matching awareness with capacity

# Status from a generation of AC reform


**Changes in control of corruption in selected countries, 1996–2005**



# Why are we failing?



# Our partners: incentives for change



# What counties do not want:

- Industry-specific transparency initiatives that help reduce the risks of the "resource curse" (publishing oil company contracts, for example)
- Political finance – introduction of disclosure systems for political party finance, governance reform
- Independent monitoring of large procurement/concession awards




# Traditional critiques of donor approaches:

- Weak accountability of donors to partners, poor coordination
- Interventionist
- Too little attention on the “supply side” – developed country firms
- Corruption perceived as a generic problem – recommendations vary little from one society to another
- Approaches imposed from outside – lack of local ownership

## Technical assistance – aim:

### ***effective and sustainable transfers of knowledge and skills to recipient countries***

- Much is need, but increasingly contested:
  - Difficult to measure success
  - Tied to donor country, making it expensive!
    - Difficult to quantify, up to 50% of all aid
  - “No exit in sight - consultants just keep coming”
  - TA supply driven, weakly coordinated and aligned



## **The assumption:**

If it works for us, it'll work for you

Countries can quickly be modernized and rationalized

## **The experience:**

Not understanding that the root causes of corruption is unique to every country, sector and institution – has a consequence”.

# Getting it right on the donor side

*“There are limits to how far outsiders can really understand how another country and society work.”*

- Locally accepted versus unaccepted practice?
- Petty corruption part of grand systemic corruption?
- Interplay of formal and informal institutions
- Incentives for reform?

# How to empower the recipient side

## Goal:

- To build local capabilities for development research and policy-making
  - Independent and well resourced indigenous knowledge centres of high calibre on anti-corruption
  - Promote South-South research and collaboration on anti-corruption

# What Can we Learn for Future Efforts?

- Avoid “simple” import of prescriptive models from elsewhere
- Need for long-term approaches and engagement
  - Identify plausible partners
  - Focus on building trust and long term partnership
- Indirect measures are often best for AC – integrity....
- Focus needs to shift away from adoption of new laws and regulations to implementation.
  - responsive to incentives (rewards/sanctions) for compliance



# Possible entry points

- Supply side issues → to be credible
  - Influence policies of home government institutions and private sector
  - Donors need to lead by example → donor integrity, donor transparency
- Be strategic and opportunistic
  - Many entry points for reform
  - Develop strategic approach
  - Identify most damaging forms of corruption - systemic or not, networks, winners and losers
  - Layer integrity and anti-corruption dimensions into relevant key/core reforms and programmes
  - Create islands of integrity – Customs? Or the health sector?
- Entry point might be bottom-up participatory reform, such as community-driven development.
  - Build in strong local accountability/transparency mechanisms – bring people in
  - Partnerships with non-state actors – but make them domestically accountable

# Possible entry points

- Improvement of monitoring, evaluation and lessons learned
  - Practitioner friendly research – local perspectives, attitudes, what is there
  - Gather more information on strategic opportunities rather than corruption or governance ‘problems’
  - Synthesize and analyze country level AC reform experience, incl. comparative studies
  - Share and publish results of monitoring and evaluation → transparency
- Support to economic diversification – strengthening small and medium-sized enterprises, promoting business associations, etc.

# What to do?

- Road was 30% narrower than specifications
- No road surfacing, contrary to specifications
- Contractor was paid in full



# AC fighter – realistic and fearless

