

# PROTECTING AID FUNDS IN UNSTABLE GOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENTS: TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED STRATEGY

Lisbon, 18-19 May 2010

Sedas Nunes Hall, Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon

The Tension between Aid Flows, State Capacity and Development Needs

João Fernandes, Director of OIKOS



The Tension between Aid Flows, State Capacity and Development Needs

Instituto Ciências Social – Universidade de Lisboa ANCORAGE-NET

João Fernandes <u>jifernandes@oikos.pt</u> Executive Director



# Index

- 1. First is First: The Reality of Aid
- 2. Aid Flows to Forgotten States
- 3. 21<sup>st</sup> Century Aid: Recognising Success and Tackling Failure
- 4. Turn the Picture Upside Down

## The 0, 7% GNP: a 45 Year's Old Target

- The donor governments promised to spend 0.7% of GNP on ODA at the UN General Assembly in 1970—some 40 years ago.
- The deadline for reaching that target was the mid-1970s.
- By 2015 (the year by when the Millennium Development Goals are hoped to be achieved) the target will be 45 years old.

## What was to be the form of aid?

«Financial aid will, in principle, be **untied**. While it may not be possible to untie assistance in all cases, developed countries will rapidly and progressively take what measures they can ... to reduce the extent of tying of assistance and to mitigate any harmful effects [and make loans tied to particular sources] available for <u>utilization by the recipient countries for the purpose of buying goods and services from other developing countries.</u>

... Financial and technical assistance should be aimed exclusively at promoting the economic and social progress of developing countries and should not in any way be used by the developed countries to the detriment of the national sovereignty of recipient countries. Developed countries will provide, to the greatest extent possible, an increased flow of aid on a long-term and continuing basis. »

— <u>International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade</u>, UN General Assembly Resolution 2626 (XXV), October 24, 1970, para. 45-47


## Almost all rich nations fail this obligation

- Even though these targets and agendas have been set, year after year almost all rich nations have constantly failed to reach their agreed obligations of the 0.7% target. Instead of 0.7%, the amount of aid has been around 0.2 to 0.4%, some \$100 billion/year short.
- Although rich countries have given an enormous \$2.98 trillion dollars in aid since 1970, the accumulated total shortfall in their aid since 1970 (when the target of 0.7% was set) amounts to \$4.01 trillion (at 2008 prices).


**Source**: Shah, Anup. "Official global foreign aid shortfall: \$4 trillion." *Global Issues*, Updated: 25 Apr. 2010. Accessed: 16 May. 2010.


<a href="http://www.globalissues.org/article/593/official-global-foreign-aid-shortfall-over-4-trillion">http://www.globalissues.org/article/593/official-global-foreign-aid-shortfall-over-4-trillion</a>















## Shortfall is more than what has been given so far

The total ODA delivered so far has been less than half of the agreed targets: With total official foreign aid since 1970 (when the 0.7% target was set) being just over \$2.98 trillion, *less than half* of what has been promised has been delivered:








## And who gets what?


Since 1970, on average, Sub-Saharan Africa has received about **25% of actual ODA**:






#### TOTAL DAC COUNTRIES

Gross Bilateral ODA, 2007-08 average, unless otherwise shown



Source: OECD - DAC; www.oecd.org/dac/stats





Source: OECD - DAC ; www.oecd.org/dac/stats



#### **PORTUGAL**

Gross Bilateral ODA, 2007-08 average, unless otherwise shown


Net ODA	2007	2008	Change 2007/08	ByInc	ome Gro	up (USD m)	_ c	lockwise from top
					36			
Current (USD m)	471	620	31.8%				■LD(	OS
Constant (2007 USD m)	471	576	22.4%	31			■ Oth	er Low-Income
In Euro (million)	344	430	25.1%			133	-011	iei Low-income
ODA/GNI	0.22%	0.27%					Lov	ver Middle-
Bilateral share	57%	60%			1		Inc	ome
Top Ten Recipients of Gro							oer Middle- ome	
(USD million)				`			□Una	allocated
1 Cape Verde	59			1	28			
2 Morocco	48							
3 Timor-Leste	43							
4 Mozambique	24			By F	Region (U	SDm)		
5 Angola 19				21.		,	■Sub-S	Saharan Africa
6 Bosnia and Herzegovina 17					29		■Sout!	n & Central
7 Guinea-Bissau 17		35			144 Asia			
8 Serbia 16								r Asia and
9 Sao Tome & Principe 13				5 🧶			Ocea	inia le East and
10 Afghanistan . 12								n Africa
Memo: Share of gross bilate	ral ODA							America and
Top 5 recipients	59%			60				bean
Top 10 recipients	82%						□Euro	pe
Top 20 recipients	88%				44	12	□Unsp	ecified
		D. C.			44	12		
		вузе	ector					
100/ 100/ 200/	30%	4007	500/		700/	000/	000/	4000/
0% 10% 20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
■Education, Health & Pop	Other Social Infrastructure			■ Economic Infrastucture				
■Production	■Multisector			□ Programme Assistance				
■Debt Relief	■ Humanitarian Aid			□Unspecified				


Source: OECD - DAC; www.oecd.org/dac/stats



When broken down by region over time it seems the poorest countries do not necessarily receive most of the aid:

Of the aid that has been delivered, just under a quarter has gone to the poorest regions for all DAC aid since 1970:








While aid to the wealthier developing countries has reduced somewhat, the portion going to the poorest countries has hardly changed.

Most ODA aid does not appear to go to the poorest nations like we might naturally assume it would:





## Are numbers the only issue?

The changing definition of Aid reveals a much deeper decline than what numbers alone can show

## Donors are putting a broader interpretation on what constitutes ODA

- Debt relief;
- Subsidies on exports to developing countries;
- Food aid which disposes of agricultural surpluses resulting from government subsidies;
- Provision of surplus commodities of little economic value;
- Administrative costs of donor countries;
- Payments for care and education of refugees in donor countries;
- Payments to universities from donor countries hosting student from DC partner countries; and
- Technical co-operation grants which pay for the services of nationals of the donor countries.




# **Technical Assistance and the Phantom Aid**

The technical co-operation grants are also known as technical assistance. *Action Aid*, has been very critical about this and other forms of this broader interpretation which they have termed "phantom aid":

«This year we estimate that \$37 billion—roughly half of global aid—is "phantom aid", that is, it is not genuinely available to poor countries to fight poverty. »

— <u>Real Aid: Making Technical Assistance Work</u>, Action Aid, July 5, 2006, pp.5-6





# **Aid Money Often Tied to Various Restrictive Conditions**

*IPS* noted that aid tied with conditions cut the value of aid to recipient countries by some 25-40 percent, because it obliges them to purchase uncompetitively priced imports from the richer nations.

*IPS* was citing a <u>UN Economic Council for Africa study</u> which also noted that just four countries (Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) were breaking away from the idea of "tied aid" with more than 90 percent of their aid "untied".


— Thalif Deen, <u>Tied Aid Strangling Nations</u>, <u>Says U.N</u>, Inter Press Service, July 6, 2004




Difficult partnership countries (DPCs) are countries with weak policies and institutions – some of the most difficult environments for aid programs, although they are also amongst the poorest countries.

Source: Dollar, D., Levin, V., (2005), *The Forgotten States: Aid Volumes and Volatility in Difficult Partnership Countries (1992-2002)*. Paper prepared for the DAC Learning and Advisory Process on Difficult Partnerships.

#### **Comparison of Study Groups on MDG Indicators**






DPC – Difficult Partnership Countries


LIC – Low Income Countries

MIC – Middle-Income Countries



## **Comparison of Study Groups on MDG Indicators**








## **Basic Comparative Analysis of Aid Allocation**

How much have DPCs been receiving in aid in the last decade? Disbursements of aid flows in the past 10 years have not tended towards this group of recipients. Not only has the largest amount of aid gone to middle-income countries, but the **gap between LICs and DPCs has widened recently**.





## Differences within the DPC Group

**Table: Country Groupings based on Actual and Predicted Aid/Capita Levels (2002)** 

Darlings	Orphans					
Cambodia	Burundi					
Guinea	Central African Republic					
Laos	Democratic Republic of Congo					
Papua New Guinea	Republic of Congo					
Sierra Leone	Niger					
	Nigeria					
	Sudan					
	Togo					
	Uzbekistan					
Small States: Dar	lings or Orphans?					
Con	noros					
Guinea-Bissau						
Solomon Islands						

- •"Darlings" are those DPCs which received at least \$2.50 more in aid/capita terms than what was predicted
- •"orphans" are those DPCs, which received at least \$2.50 less in aid/capita terms than what was predicted


## What characteristics separate the "darlings" from the "orphans"?


- •One obvious characteristic of the "orphans" is that all except Uzbekistan are located in Africa, and the majority is francophone.
- •Donors do take into account the institutional and policy environment in allocation aid among DPCs.
- •Donors give significantly less aid per capita to DPCs with larger population size



## Comparative Analysis of Aid Volatility

High aid volatility makes budget policy more difficult in developing countries.







## **Recognising Success**

Where financing has been galvanised and aid delivered effectively, it has resulted in some **breathtaking successes** over the past decade:

- There are 33 million more children in the classroom, partly as a result of increased resources to developing country governments over the past decade resulting from aid and debt relief.
- There has been a ten-fold increase in the coverage of antiretroviral treatment (ART) for HIV and AIDS over a five-year time span.

Source: Oxfam International, 21<sup>st</sup> Century Aid: Recognising Success and Tackling Failure. Oxfam Briefing Paper no 138, April 2010.



Fig.: Increases in primary and secondary net enrolment rate







Fig.: Increases in treatment for those living with HIV





# Make all policies work for development; don't dilute the poverty focus of aid


Aid financing alone however, will not be enough to end global poverty and inequality. **Reform of the global economy** is needed to **promote long-term sustainable investment** in developing countries to lift the poorest people out of poverty. Reforms could include **fairer trade rules** to permit **greater access to life-saving medicines** or to **stabilize the price of food**. Reining in tax havens would permit developing countries to manage their domestic finances and oblige businesses to pay their fair contribution. Upholding **global standards for decent working** conditions could help poor people to raise themselves and their families out of poverty.

<u>Aid can play a vital role in contributing to systemic reforms, but only if it is given for the right reasons</u>, and does not have its goals sabotaged by other, non-development policies.



## Make Aid it predictable, put it in the budget

Fig.: Budget support increases spending on education





## Aid without onerous conditions, aid that is transparent

The use of 'conditionality' – linking aid disbursements to conditions to induce policy change, particularly on economic policies such as trade liberalisation, elimination of subsidies or privatisation – has been the subject of intense debate. Much evidence indicates that **donors often attach far too many conditions to their aid, and frequently the wrong type of conditions**, obliging developing countries to follow identikit policies of economic reform that may not address their particular situations.

**Transparency is another crucial aspect of good aid.** To help citizens pressure their governments to be open and transparent, **donors need to be clear about what they provide, and when**. Aid transparency is particularly important for budget transparency in countries which receive high levels of aid.

**Transparency also goes hand in hand with predictability** in that it enables governments to plan, prioritise, and communicate their spending decisions to the public.



## Countering the argument that aid fuels corruption


Corruption persists because there is both supply and demand for it, but donors can do much to address the supply side. In 2004 the World Bank estimated that over 60 per cent of multinational corporations paid undocumented bribes in non-OECD countries to procure contracts – and this has nothing to do with aid. Regulating international tax practices to reduce the availability of hideaways for stolen assets is an integral part of tackling corruption. Donor governments could fully implement the UN Convention Against Corruption and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.

Challenging corruption also means **tackling demand** for it. There are numerous ways to do this, and a**id has an important and catalytic role to play** in many of them. Independent **audit institutions**, **parliaments**, and an **independent press** are essential for creating accountable, **participative societies**, where it is much harder for corruption to flourish



# Countering the argument that aid undermines accountability and tax collection

Fig.: Tax levels in top ten per capita aid recipients





## **Useful Recommendations**


- Ensure aid is **channelled to help support active citizens** and build effective states as a pathway to reducing poverty and inequality.
- Ensure that all aid is **aimed at meeting poverty reduction** goals, including supporting developing country governments to deliver strong, effective public services.
- Ensure that aid supports **diverse forms of financing** to contribute to development.
- Dramatically improve the predictability of aid, by providing it on a three-year rolling basis or longer; by increasing the proportion of aid that is general budget support where possible and by sector support where general budget support is not an option.
- **Reduce administrative delays** and minimise the difference between what is committed and what is disbursed.



## **Useful Recommendations**

- **Deliver aid through a mix of models**, including increasing budget support wherever possible, and ensure that a percentage of aid flows are channelled to civil society organisations, to enable people to better hold their governments to account.
- Make aid transparent by ensuring timely and accurate disclosure and dissemination of information on financial decisions, conditions, negotiations, and procedures.
- Untie all aid, including food aid and technical assistance, and give preference to local procurement in developing countries when they are purchasing services and goods.
- **Give at least 0.7** per cent of GNI in aid by 2015 and set out how this target will be reached, with legally binding timetables.





The key to making progress in the short-to-medium term may not be direct external intervention to orchestrate and support rules-based reform, but more indirect strategies to shift or influence the incentives and interests of local actors.





Source: Institute of Development Studies, *An upside down view of governance*. London, 2010.



The research suggests a list of questions that seem particularly salient in understanding causes of bad governance and identifying ways of supporting more constructive bargaining between public and private actors.

- What is shaping the interests of political elites? (Sources of revenue are likely to be critical.)
- What is shaping relations between politicians and investors, and might they have common interests in supporting productive investment?
- What might stimulate and sustain collective action by social groups to demand better services?
- What informal local institutions are at work, and how are they shaping development outcomes?
- Where does government get its revenue from, and how is that shaping its relationships with citizens?

Source: Institute of Development Studies, 2010.



This paper has argued that donors cannot make significant progress in improving development outcomes and aid effectiveness without changing their mental models of how development happens.

For example they could do much more to:

- Value country knowledge and invest in acquiring it;
- empower local actors at all levels through good-quality research and support for data collection and policy analysis;
- play a role in facilitating local dialogue and debate;
- Prioritise action on things that external actors can directly influence, and that are fundamental to shaping elite interests in poor countries. In particular, they should prioritise a small number of strategic global initiatives that are central to **regulating global financial flows**, oil revenues and the narcotics trade;
- Ensure they are alert to ways in which all their actions can impinge (positively or negatively) on opportunities for constructive state-society bargaining. Issues around tax reform and aid dependency are particularly salient and are already on the DAC agenda;

Source: Institute of Development Studies, 2010.



- Reassess their strategies for supporting civil society, <u>extending engagement</u> to a broader range of actors, who may not share a conventional view of governance and development but who have overlapping interests, for example in promoting economic growth;
- Overall, show less concern with micromanaging aid, and much more with the political dynamics that influence its effectiveness.

Source: Institute of Development Studies, 2010.



muito obrigado

João Fernandes jjfernandes@oikos.pt