

Practicae resolutiones morales: cum summa
 resolutionum practicae. Pars undecima, tota miscellanea,
 Quæ in duobus Tractatibus in calce operis additis
 continentur (*Practical Moral Resolutions: with a Summary
 of Practical Resolutions, Part Eleven, Entirely
 Miscellaneous, and which are contained in the two
 Treatises added at the end of the work*)

by Antoninus Diana Panormitanus (Antoninus Diana of Palermo), 1655

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Sectio II, Tractatus II, Resolutio VI

Latin

RESOLVT. VI.

*Ad confirmationem eorum, quæ pro nostra
 sententia superius adducta sunt, proponitur
 quæstio: An sit omnino de fide, verbi gratia
 hunc numero Innocentium X. esse verum
 Pontificem, & verum Petri successorem.*

HÆc quæstio est quidem necessaria pro
 confirmanda nostra sententia, quòd decreta
 Pontificis extra Concilium sint infallibilia; nam
 aliquis posset sic arguere, non est de fide hunc
 Pontificem esse verum Pontificem: ergo
 numquam eius determinationes erunt de fide.
 Probatur antecedens, quia non est de fide,
 neque aliter omnino certissimo constat ipsum
 verè esse baptizatum, adeòque nec an capax sit
 dignitatis Episcopalis; sequela probatur;

English

RESOLUTION VI.

*To confirm those things which have been
 adduced above in favor of our position, the
 following question is proposed: Whether it is
 altogether a matter of faith that, for example,
 this particular Innocent X is the true Pontiff and
 the true successor of Peter.*

THIS question is indeed necessary for
 confirming our position that the decrees of the
 Pontiff outside of Council are infallible; for
 someone could argue thus: it is not a matter of
 faith that this Pontiff is the true Pontiff;
 therefore his determinations will never be
 matters of faith. The antecedent is proved
 because it is not a matter of faith, nor is it
 otherwise established with complete certainty,
 that he is truly baptized, and consequently

quando enim dubitare possumus de antecedente, etiam de consequente possumus dubitare.

Itaque cùm saltem non sit de fide hunc Pontificem electum verum esse Petri successorem; siquidem non est de fide certum esse baptizatum, aut nullum in eius electione defectum substantialem habitum esse. Ergo non poterat esse de fide certum errare non posse, quia impotentia errandi annexa est (vt dixi) vero Christi Vicario, non simulato. Et confirmari potest exemplo Eucharistiæ; licet enim de fide sit in Hostia ritè consecrata adesse Corpus Christi; non tamen de fide est in hac numero Hostia adesse, quia non est de fide consecrantem esse Sacerdotem baptizatum, habentemque intentionem consecrandi; solùm enim id creditur morali certitudine. Ergo similiter esto verum sit, & de fide certum, verum Christi Vicarium, & Petri successorem errare non posse in rebus fidei proponendis, at non videtur esse de fide certum, hunc numero errare non posse, quia non videtur esse de fide certum, esse verum Pontificem.

Sed respondendo ad quæsitum immediatè: Prima opinio asserit, non esse de fide, Innocentium, v.g. Decimum verè feliciter regnantem esse verum Pontificem; & ita tenet Bannes in 2.2. *D. Thomæ quæst. 1. art. 10. dub. 2. ad 2.* vbi affirmat hanc propositionem. Hic Pontifex numero est verus Papa, esse solùm certam certitudine morali; cui speculativè potest subesse falsum. Probant primò, quia non est de fide nunc electum in Pontificem esse baptizatum. Ergo neque esse verum Pontificem. Secundò potest definire res fidei, & vniuersalem Ecclesiam regere, quin sit verus Pontifex; sufficit enim, si vt talis existimetur, & reputetur; si enim Prætori incapaci confert Respublica iurisdictionem, quando vt legitimus existimatur, ne ex actibus nullis gravia

neither whether he is capable of Episcopal dignity. The inference is proved thus: when we can doubt the antecedent, we can also doubt the consequent.

Therefore, since it is at least not a matter of faith that this Pontiff who has been elected is the true successor of Peter—given that it is not certain as a matter of faith that he has been baptized, or that no substantial defect has occurred in his election—therefore it could not be certain as a matter of faith that he cannot err, because the inability to err is attached (as I have said) to the true Vicar of Christ, not to a counterfeit one. And this can be confirmed by the example of the Eucharist: although it is indeed a matter of faith that in a Host properly consecrated the Body of Christ is present, nevertheless it is not a matter of faith that it is present in this particular Host, because it is not a matter of faith that the one consecrating is a baptized priest having the intention of consecrating; for this is believed only with moral certainty. Therefore, similarly, even if it is true and certain as a matter of faith that the true Vicar of Christ and successor of Peter cannot err in matters of faith to be proposed, yet it does not seem to be certain as a matter of faith that this particular one cannot err, because it does not seem to be certain as a matter of faith that he is the true Pontiff.

But responding directly to the question at hand: The first opinion asserts that it is not a matter of faith that Innocent—for example, the Tenth—who is truly and felicitously reigning is the true Pontiff; and thus holds Domingo Báñez in 2.2. *[Summa] D. Thomæ quæst. 1. art. 10. dub. 2. ad 2.* where he affirms this proposition: “This Pontiff in particular is the true Pope” is only certain with moral certainty, under which speculatively falsehood may lie. They prove this first, because it is not a matter of faith that one now elected to the Pontificate is baptized. Therefore neither that he is the true Pontiff. Secondly, he can define matters of faith and govern the universal Church without being the true Pontiff; for it suffices if he is esteemed and

inconvenientia sequantur. Quare idem non dicemus in Pōtifice incapaci, qui vt legitimus reputatur, conferre illi Christum omnem iurisdictionem, & auctoritatem, sicuti si verè Pontifex esset. Idem tenet Caietanus *in 2. 2. quæst. 1. art. 3. ad 4. Castrus aduersus hæreses lib. 1. cap. 9. & plures alij.*

Sed affirmatiuæ sententiæ ego adhæreo, pro qua suppono Summum Pontificem posse considerari, quando eligitur, & adoratur illegitimè, vel cum suspitione illegitimitatis: in hoc sensu non est quæstio, quia dum est probabile fundamentum de illegitimitate Pontificis, non potest fide Diuina credi eum esse successorem Petri, quia fides diuina non potest exerceri, quando est locus hæsitationi prudenti, vt sæpius ostendi: probabile autem fundamentum occasionem præbet hæsitationi prudenti: Quapropter non quiescit Ecclesia, antequam eruto omni dubitandi fundamento, tollantur schismatum occasiones.

Alio modo consideratur Pontifex, quando tam legitimè eligitur, & adoratur, vt tota Ecclesia illum suscipiat, vt nunc Dominus noster Innocentius X. sine vllo controuersię vestigio tenet Christianæ Reipublicæ clauum, clauisque Petri: est igitur quæstio vtrum credendum sit fide Diuina Innocentium X. & alios Pontifices pacificè susceptos esse legitimos successores Petri; Et vt dixi, puto credendum esse fide diuina omnes, & singulos eiusmodi Pontifices esse legitimos successores Petri. Hæc conclusio non inuenietur expressa in auctoribus antiquis, quia fortè de illa numquam dubitauerunt, eam supponentes.

reputed as such; for if the Republic confers jurisdiction upon an incapable Praetor, when he is esteemed as legitimate, lest grave inconveniences follow from null acts. Therefore we shall say the same regarding an incapable Pontiff who is reputed as legitimate—that Christ confers upon him all jurisdiction and authority, just as if he were truly Pontiff. The same position is held by Cardinal Cajetan [Thomas de Vio] *in 2. 2. quæst. 1. art. 3. ad 4. Alfonso de Castro aduersus hæreses lib. 1. cap. 9. and many others.*

But I adhere to the affirmative opinion, for which I presuppose that the Supreme Pontiff can be considered, when he is elected and acknowledged illegitimately, or with suspicion of illegitimacy: in this sense there is no question, because while there exists a probable foundation regarding the illegitimacy of a Pontiff, one cannot believe with Divine faith that he is the successor of Peter, since divine faith cannot be exercised when there is room for prudent hesitation, as I have often shown: but a probable foundation gives occasion for prudent hesitation. Therefore the Church does not rest until, having removed every foundation for doubt, the occasions for schisms are eliminated.

In another way a Pontiff is considered when he is elected and acknowledged so legitimately that the entire Church receives him, as now our Lord Innocent X,¹ without any trace of controversy, holds the helm of the Christian Republic and the keys of Peter: therefore the question is whether it should be believed with Divine Faith that Innocent X and other Pontiffs peacefully received are legitimate successors of Peter; And as I said, I think it should be believed with divine faith that each and every such Pontiff is a legitimate successor of Peter. This conclusion will not be found expressed in ancient authors, because perhaps they never doubted it, taking it for granted.

¹ Pope Innocent X (1644-1655)

Illam tamen tenent ex Neotericis Cardinalis Lugo *de fide disp. 5. sect. 1. §. 5. n. 316.* Suarez *de fide disp. 5. sect. 8. n. 12.* Ouiedo *de fide contr. 4. punct. 7. n. 86* Hurtado de Mendoza *de fide disp. 37. sect. 3. cum seq.* Arriaga *in cur. Theol. to. 5. disp. 7. sect. 8. num. 50. cum seq.* Tannerus *to. 3. disp. 1. q. 1. dub. 5. n. 146.* Castrus Palaus *t. 1. tr. 4. disp. 1. punct. 5. §. 2. n. 9. cum seqq.* Amicus *in cur. Theol. to. 3. disp. 6. sect. 5. n. 152.* Gerunda *de Episcopo, to. 2. l. 5. disp. 3. n. 56.* Comitulos *resp. l. 1. q. 99.* Valentia *tom. 3. disp. 1. q. 1. punct. 7. in qu. 5. §. 39.* omnes ex Societate Iesu, qui intrepidè hanc sententiam pro Summis Pontificibus sustinent; Quibus adde Syluium *in controuersiis fidei lib. 4. quæst. 2. art. 8.* Pueronum *de Reg. Aristocratia tom. 2. cap. 8. per tot.* Verricelli *in qq. mor. tr. 8. q. 24. n. 7.* Poncium *in cur. Theol. disp. 28. q. 1. concl. 9. n. 14.* & ex Dominicanorum familia sapientissimum Ioannem de Sancto Thoma *in 2. 2. q. 1. disp. 8. art. 2. per tot.* Adrianum, & Petrum de Vvalenburch *in examine princip. fidei p. 2. contr. 7. n. 50.* Ioannem Poncium *in cur. Theol. disp. 28. q. 1. concl. 9. n. 13. & 14.* Bordonum *in sacro tribunali c. 5. q. 6. n. 16.* Bonacinam *de cens. disp. 1. q. 2. punct. 1. n. 9.*

Et huic sententiæ magnum robur dedit Clemens VIII. qui teste Puente Hurtado, *vbi sup.* carcerauit nonnullos Doctores, qui tunc oppositum censuerunt, eosque iubens adire Romam, rationem reddituros illius sententiæ.

Probatur hæc opinio primò, quia *in Bulla Martini V. apud Concilium Constantiense* disponitur, vt hæretici ad Ecclesiam redeuntes credant Papam canonicè electum, qui pro tempore fuerit (expresso eius nomine) esse successorem Petri, &c. Ergo supponit Concilium nunc determinatè de moderno, v.g. Innocentio X. expresso eius nomine debere credi esse Petri successorem; Secundò, quia multa Concilia determinatè agnouerunt pro tali eum, qui tunc præerat; non est autem maior

However, among the more recent theologians, the following hold this opinion: Cardinal Juan de Lugo *de fide disp. 5. sect. 1. §. 5. n. 316.* Francisco Suárez *de fide disp. 5. sect. 8. n. 12.* Antonio de Oviedo *de fide contr. 4. punct. 7. n. 86* Hurtado de Mendoza *de fide disp. 37. sect. 3. cum seq.* Rodrigo de Arriaga *in cur. Theol. to. 5. disp. 7. sect. 8. num. 50. cum seq.* Adam Tanner *to. 3. disp. 1. q. 1. dub. 5. n. 146.* Castro Palao *t. 1. tr. 4. disp. 1. punct. 5. §. 2. n. 9. cum seqq.* Bartholomeo Amico *in cur. Theol. to. 3. disp. 6. sect. 5. n. 152.* Francisco de Gerunda *de Episcopo, to. 2. l. 5. disp. 3. n. 56.* Comitoliis *resp. l. 1. q. 99.* Gregorio de Valencia *tom. 3. disp. 1. q. 1. punct. 7. in qu. 5. §. 39.* all from the Society of Jesus, who boldly uphold this opinion in favor of the Supreme Pontiffs; to whom should be added Silvius *in controuersiis fidei lib. 4. quæst. 2. art. 8.* Puerorum *de Reg. Aristocratia tom. 2. cap. 8. per tot.* Verricelli *in qq. mor. tr. 8. q. 24. n. 7.* Pontius *in cur. Theol. disp. 28. q. 1. concl. 9. n. 14.* and from the Dominican family, the most learned John of St. Thomas *in 2. 2. q. 1. disp. 8. art. 2. per tot.* Adrian and Peter van Walenburch *in examine princip. fidei p. 2. contr. 7. n. 50.* John Pontius *in cur. Theol. disp. 28. q. 1. concl. 9. n. 13. & 14.* Bordonus *in sacro tribunali c. 5. q. 6. n. 16.* Martin Bonacina *de cens. disp. 1. q. 2. punct. 1. n. 9.*

And Clement VIII gave great strength to this opinion, who, as Puente Hurtado testifies in the place cited above, imprisoned certain Doctors who then held the opposite view, and ordered them to go to Rome to give an account of that opinion.

This opinion is proved first, because in the Bull of Martin V at the Council of Constance it is established that heretics returning to the Church should believe that the Pope canonically elected, whoever he may be at the time (his name being expressed), is the successor of Peter, etc. Therefore the Council supposes that now, specifically concerning the present one, for example Innocent X, his name being expressed, it must be believed that he is Peter's

ratio de vno, quàm de altero. Tertiò, quia si non constat de fide fuisse verum Papam Pium IV. neque constabit Concilium Tridentinum esse validum, quia à Papa Concilium accipit totam suam vim. Id autem est ferè hæreticum.

Et tandem quia alioquin quidquid de Iudice controuersiarum in Ecclesia, vt certum de fide creditur, esset planè ridiculum; quomodo enim deo credere de fide dari Iudicem talem, si non possum ex fide dicere quis ille sit? Ad quid enim, quæso, deseruiet pro praxi talis assensus de eius quasi vaga Iudicis existentia? Sanè non teneremur ex fide adire Papam in eis controuersiis: quia quilibet diceret, fides solùm docet me teneri adire Iudicem controuersiarum; at non dicit mihi, illum esse Ioannem Baptistam Pamphilium, seu Innocentium X. Ergo non teneor ex fide illum adire, aut decidenti credere.

Deinde probatur, quia omnis propositio de fide potest inferri ex duplici præmissa de fide, vel vt aliis placet, altera de fide, altera contenta lumine naturali; sed ista propositio Papa definiens non potest errare, est certa de fide. Ergo potest inferri ex duplici præmissa modo dicto; quod tamen nulla ratione fieri potest, vt patebit discurrenti, nisi propositio ista sit de fide. Hic Pontifex definiens est verus Papa; nam in quocumque syllogismo inferatur conclusio illa, Papa definiens non potest errare, debet assumi, vt minor, hic Pontifex definiens est verus Papa, quæ cùm non sit nota lumine naturali, necessariò debet esse de fide, aliàs conclusio non esset de fide.

Huic argumento respondet Bannez *loco cit.* non

successor. Second, because many Councils have specifically acknowledged as such the one who was then presiding; but there is no greater reason for one than for another. Third, because if it is not established as a matter of faith that Pius IV was a true Pope, neither will it be established that the Council of Trent is valid, because a Council receives all its force from the Pope. But this is almost heretical.

And finally, because otherwise whatever [we hold] concerning the Judge of controversies in the Church, as something certain to be believed by faith, would be plainly ridiculous; for how ought I to believe as a matter of faith that such a Judge is given, if I cannot state from faith who that person is? For what purpose, I ask, would such assent concerning his quasi-vague existence as Judge serve in practice? Surely we would not be bound by faith to approach the Pope in those controversies: because anyone could say, “faith only teaches me that I am bound to approach the Judge of controversies; but it does not tell me that he is Giovanni Battista Pamphilj, or Innocent X. Therefore I am not bound by faith to approach him, or to believe his decisions.”

Furthermore, it is proven because every proposition of faith can be inferred from a double premise of faith, or as it pleases others, one [premise] of faith, the other contained in natural light; but this proposition “The Pope defining cannot err” is certain as a matter of faith. Therefore it can be inferred from a double premise in the manner stated; which nevertheless can be done by no reasoning, as will be evident to one examining it, unless this proposition be a matter of faith: “This Pontiff defining is the true Pope.” For in whatever syllogism that conclusion “The Pope defining cannot err” is inferred, there must be assumed, as the minor [premise], “This Pontiff defining is the true Pope,” which, since it is not known by natural light, must necessarily be a matter of faith, otherwise the conclusion would not be a matter of faith.

To this argument, Báñez responds *loco citato*

requiri, vt conclusio aliqua de fide inferatur, vtramque præmissam de fide esse, vel vnam de fide, & alteram euidentem; sed sufficere vnam esse de fide, & alteram moraliter certam; quia tunc conclusio non sequitur ex illa propositione moraliter certa, tamquam ex causa, sed tamquam ex conditione, sine qua non, siue vt applicante. Et exemplo Prædicatoris illustrat, qui si ritè tibi proponat doctrinam Euangelicam, teneris fide diuina veritatibus propositis assentiri: cùm tamen non sit fide diuina certum, hunc Prædicatorem esse infallibilis veritatis.

Sed hæc solutio facillimo negotio præcluditur, argumento ducto ab inconuenienti: si enim vera esset, sequeretur hanc propositionem esse de fide: sub hac numero Hostia consecrata est Corpus Christi, quia reuera infertur per euidentem consequentiam ex vna de fide; qualis est ista: In omni Hostia debite consecrata est Corpus Christi, & insuper infertur tamquam ex conditione, & vt applicante ex altera certa moraliter, scilicet hæc Hostia est debite consecrata; ergo sub hac Hostia est Corpus Christi, erit propositio de fide? Idem argumentum formari potest de his propositionibus. Hic paruulus baptizatus recipit gratiam; Iste, qui ordinatur est Sacerdos, & de aliis similibus, quas compertum est apud omnes non esse de fide; cùm possit illis subesse falsum ex defectu intentionis baptizantis, ordinantis, & consecrantis. Neque exemplum de Prædicatore obstat, quia licet Prædicator aliis in rebus non sit infallibilis veritatis: at pro vt hic, & nunc prædicat, credere debes infallibilis veritatis esse, siquidem obligaris eius dictis fide diuina assentiri.

Et ita nostra sententia videtur esse sententia

that it is not required, in order for some conclusion of faith to be inferred, that both premises be matters of faith, or that one be of faith and the other evident; but it suffices that one be of faith and the other morally certain; because then the conclusion does not follow from that morally certain proposition as from a cause, but as from a condition sine qua non, or as from something that applies it. And he illustrates this with the example of a Preacher, who, if he properly proposes evangelical doctrine to you, you are bound to assent by divine faith to the truths proposed: even though it is not certain by divine faith that this Preacher is of infallible truth.

But this solution is precluded by the easiest of arguments, drawn from the inconvenient consequence: for if it were true, it would follow that this proposition would be a matter of faith: “Under this particular Host is the consecrated Body of Christ,” because it is truly inferred by evident consequence from one matter of faith—such as this: “In every Host duly consecrated is the Body of Christ”—and is moreover inferred as from a condition, and as applied from another proposition that is morally certain, namely “this Host is duly consecrated”; therefore, would the conclusion “under this Host is the Body of Christ” be a proposition of faith? The same argument can be formed concerning these propositions: “This little child being baptized receives grace”; “This man who is being ordained is a priest”; and concerning other similar propositions, which it is established among all are not matters of faith, since there can underlie them something false due to a defect of intention on the part of the one baptizing, ordaining, or consecrating. Nor does the example of the Preacher pose an objection, because although a Preacher in other matters may not be infallibly truthful, yet insofar as he preaches here and now, you ought to believe that he speaks infallible truth, since you are obliged to assent to his statements with divine faith.

And thus our opinion appears to be the opinion

Augustini t. 6. in epist. contra potest. Donat. & t. 2. epist. 115. Irenæi l. 3. c. 3. Basilij, Ambrosij, Hieronymi, quos refert Bannez 2. 2. q. 1. art. 10. de authorit. Papa ad 5. Fauent sacra Concilia; nam V I. Synodus nominatim respicit Agathonem, confitendo illum verum Pontificem, Concilium Chalcedonense Leonem, Concilium Mileuitanum Innocent. III. ac tandem in cap. de libellis dist. 20. approbantur tamquam veri, & legitimi Pontifices Siluerius, Sozimus, Innocentius, & alij.

Respondetur ad argumenta contraria sententiæ.

RESOLVT. VII.

AD argumentum, quod neq; ex Scriptura, neq; ex traditione, neque ex definitione constare potest hunc esse legitimum Pontificem; ergo non est de fide eum esse talem.

Et ad illud, quod docet Bannez *vbi sup.* non esse de fide hunc hominem esse baptizatum: non enim constat de voluntate baptizantis, neque est de fide eum esse legitime Sacerdotem, quia non constat ex fide de voluntate conferentis, aut recipientis ordines; ergo non potest constare ex fide eum esse Pontificem.

Respondetur negando antecedens; constat enim hunc esse legitimum Pontificem ex illis Scripturæ testimonijs, quibus solet Petri confirmari primatus; quia illa est promissio vniuersalis, qua immediatè continentur omnes legitimi successores Petri, quos Deus singillatim vidit, & de illis loquutus est; & qui nobis noscendi erant per euidentiam moralem ex legitima illorum electione, & acceptatione pacifica. Quemadmodum quando Deus reuelauit omnem hominem conceptum iri in peccato originali, loquutus est Deus immediatè de Petro, & Paulo, quos Deus clare cognouit, & à nobis erant cognoscendi per euidentiam physicam ortam ex sensibus, & quemadmodum cognito Petro, & cognita vniuersali reuelatione

of Augustine vol. 6, in his epistle against the power of the Donatists & vol. 2, epistle 115, of Irenæus book 3, chapter 3, of Basil, Ambrose, and Jerome, whom Domingo Báñez cites *Summa Theologica* 2-2, question 1, article 10, on papal authority, argument 5. The sacred Councils favor this view; for the Sixth Synod specifically acknowledges Agatho, confessing him to be the true Pontiff; the Council of Chalcedon acknowledges Leo; the Council of Milevis acknowledges Innocent III; and finally in the chapter “de libellis,” distinction 20, Silverius, Zosimus, Innocent, and others are approved as true and legitimate Pontiffs.

Response to arguments contrary to this opinion.

RESOLUTION VII.

TO the argument that neither from Scripture, nor from tradition, nor from definition can it be established that this one is the legitimate Pontiff; therefore it is not a matter of faith that he is such.

And to that argument which Domingo Báñez teaches in the place cited above, that it is not a matter of faith that this man is baptized: for it is not established regarding the will of the one baptizing, nor is it a matter of faith that he is legitimately a priest, because it is not established by faith regarding the will of the one conferring or receiving orders; therefore it cannot be established by faith that he is Pontiff.

The response is given by denying the antecedent; for it is established that this one is the legitimate Pontiff from those testimonies of Scripture by which Peter’s primacy is customarily confirmed; because that is a universal promise, by which all legitimate successors of Peter are immediately contained—those whom God saw individually, and concerning whom He spoke; and who were to be known by us through moral evidence arising from their legitimate election and peaceful acceptance. Just as when God revealed that every man would be conceived in original sin, God spoke immediately concerning Peter

de conceptione omnis hominis in peccato, video ex sola apprehensione terminorum Deum loqui de Petro, & Paulo; Ita visa promissione vniuersali Dei de omnibus successoribus Petri, & visa euidenter legitima electione, & approbatione Pontificis; video hunc esse legitimum successorem Petri, & de ipso loquutum esse Christum.

Respondetur secundò distinguendo antecedens; si enim intelligatur de reuelatione, qua hæc propositio, Innocentius X. est verus Pontifex illis terminis fuerit reuelata; verum est, sed consequentia non est bona: potest enim aliquid esse fidei, quod etsi non sit in se, vel in suis terminis expressè reuelatum, habetur tamen, & cognoscitur ex reuelatione, sicut hæc propositio: Petrus, Paulus, Ioannes, & alij singulares homines, qui modò via generationis ordinaria nascuntur, concepti sunt in peccato originali, & sunt mortis necessitati obnoxij, fide certa est, quamuis non sit in illis terminis reuelata, eò quòd sit reuelata in sua vniuersali, ex qua per inductionem quandam deducitur nimirum in hac, omnes in Adam peccauerunt; Item in illis; Per peccatum mors, quis est homo, qui viuet, & non videbit mortem? statutum est hominibus semel mori.

Similiter autem est in proposito: nam prædicta propositio, de qua nunc disseritur, licèt expressè reuelata non fuerit in suis terminis, est tamen reuelata in sua vniuersali, in qua continetur, & ex qua per quandam inductionem deducitur, nimirum in ista, omnes Petri successores in Romana Sede, sunt Vicarij Christi, & veri Pontifices Summi. Ex hac enim inductione quamdam consequitur, & hunc, & illum singularem hominem, qui ab Ecclesia Catholica est electus, receptus, & assumptus in

and Paul, whom God clearly knew, and who were to be known by us through physical evidence arising from the senses; and just as, having known Peter, and having known the universal revelation concerning the conception of every man in sin, I see from the mere apprehension of the terms that God speaks concerning Peter and Paul; so, having seen God's universal promise concerning all successors of Peter, and having clearly seen the legitimate election and approbation of the Pontiff, I see that this one is the legitimate successor of Peter, and that Christ spoke concerning him.

The response is given secondly by distinguishing the antecedent; for if it is understood concerning revelation by which this proposition "Innocent X is the true Pontiff" would have been revealed in those terms, it is true, but the consequence is not valid: for something can be a matter of faith which, even though it may not be expressly revealed in itself or in its own terms, is nevertheless held and known from revelation, just as this proposition: "Peter, Paul, John, and other individual men who are now born by the ordinary process of generation were conceived in original sin and are subject to the necessity of death" is certain by faith, although it has not been revealed in those terms, because it is revealed in its universal principle, from which it is deduced by a certain induction, namely in this: "all have sinned in Adam"; likewise in those passages: "through sin came death," "what man lives and shall not see death?" "it is appointed for men to die once."

Similarly, however, it is in the present case: for the aforesaid proposition, which is now being discussed, although it may not have been expressly revealed in its own terms, is nevertheless revealed in its universal principle, in which it is contained and from which it is deduced by a certain induction, namely in this: "all successors of Peter in the Roman See are Vicars of Christ and true Supreme Pontiffs." For from this induction it follows that both this

Summum Pontificem (eiusmodi hodie est Innocentius X.) verè esse Summum Pontificem.

Ad argumentum Bannesij respondeo, licet illa propositio: hic homo, qui dicitur Innocentius X est homo virilis sexus, vel est baptizatus, considerata secundum se, non sit certa, prout tamen substat divinæ revelationi absolutè, certa est; itavt iuxta hanc considerationem nec possit, nec potuerit esse falsa, quæ responsio in B.Thomæ fundatur, quatenus 2.2. quæst. 1. artic. 3 ad 2. scribit, quòd Deum non incarnari secundum se consideratum fuit possibile, etiam post tempus Abrahæ; sed secundum quod cadit sub præscientia Divina, habet quamdam necessitatem infallibilitatis, vt in prima dictum est (scilicet 1. part. quæst. 14. artic. 13. & 15.) & hoc modo cadit sub fide: Vndè prout cadit sub fide non potest esse falsum. Loquimur namque de hac propositione: Innocentius X. est legitimus Pontifex, prout cadit sub divinam præscientiam, & revelationem: dicimusque quod sic spectata, sit ex fide certa. Vndè quòd ipse sit sexus virilis; ac etiam quòd ritè baptizatus fuerit, omninò certi sumus, & quidem ex fide propter revelationem, ex qua cognoscimus, quòd ipse sit Summus Pontifex. Quia enim fide Catholica credimus eum, quem Ecclesia recipit, & habet pro Summo Pontifice (qui modò non alius est, nisi Innocentius X.) esse verum Christi Vicarium, & legitimum Pontificem Summum; necessaria consecutione sequitur, quòd sit masculus, quòd baptizatus, quòdque id omne habeat, sine quo potestas Pontificia nequit consistere. Providentiæ enim Divinæ est, quæ nec vult nec potest Ecclesiam fallere, vt Christi Vicarius, quem suo gregi vult esse præpositum, nulla re careat, quam necessariò exposcit potestas, quam gerit, & munus, quod debet exequi.

Itaque dicendum est spectare ad specialem providentiam Dei in Ecclesiam non permittere

man and that particular man who has been elected, received, and assumed as Supreme Pontiff by the Catholic Church (such today is Innocent X) is truly the Supreme Pontiff.

In response to the argument of Báñez, I reply that although that proposition: “this man, who is called Innocent X, is a man of the male sex, or is baptized,” considered in itself, is not certain, yet insofar as it rests upon divine revelation absolutely, it is certain; so that according to this consideration it neither can be, nor could have been false. This response is founded in Blessed Thomas, insofar as in *Summa Theologica II-II, question 1, article 3, ad 2* he writes that God’s not becoming incarnate, considered in itself, was possible, even after the time of Abraham; but according as it falls under Divine foreknowledge, it has a certain necessity of infallibility, as was said in *the First Part* (namely *I, question 14, articles 13 & 15*), and in this way it falls under faith: Whence, insofar as it falls under faith, it cannot be false. For we speak of this proposition: “Innocent X is the legitimate Pontiff,” insofar as it falls under divine foreknowledge and revelation: and we say that thus regarded, it is certain from faith. Whence that he is of the male sex; and also that he was properly baptized, we are entirely certain, and indeed from faith on account of revelation, from which we know that he is the Supreme Pontiff. For because we believe by Catholic faith that he whom the Church receives and holds as Supreme Pontiff (who now is none other than Innocent X) is the true Vicar of Christ and legitimate Supreme Pontiff; it follows by necessary consequence that he is male, that he is baptized, and that he has all that without which pontifical power cannot subsist. For it belongs to Divine Providence, which neither wills nor is able to deceive the Church, that Christ’s Vicar, whom He wills to be set over His flock, should lack nothing which the power he bears and the office he must execute necessarily requires.

Therefore, it must be said that it pertains to the special providence of God in the Church not to

eligi, & admitti pacificè eum, qui non possit esse legitimè Pontifex. Quare ex evidenti cognitione legitimæ electionis, & acceptationis pacificæ colligimus certò eum hominem nullo carere ex requisitis ad Pontificatum, eique Deum contulisse Pontificium Sancti Petri. Itaque ex applicatione per se nota deducimus actum fidei, quo credimus illi successori Petri collatam ipsius Petri potestatem quemadmodum ex evidenti cognitione Petri colligimus eius conceptionem in peccato. Quæ asseruntur de privato Sacerdote non vrgent: quia non promisit Deus eam specialem providentiam in hos casus privatos, quia res est levioris momenti, & quæ absque præiudicio fidei potest contingere, secus autem electio Pseudo Pontificis.

Ad id verò, quod dicitur, quòd qui recederet à moderno Summo Pontifice, esset quidem schismaticus, & non hæreticus; ergo non est de fide, quòd ipse sit Summus Pontifex, quia recedere ab aliquo dogmate ad fidem pertinente est hæresis, & non solùm schisma.

Respondeo, quòd licet schisma, & hæresis differant ratione formali, non est necesse, vt omnis schismaticus sit hæreticus, ne quidem is, qui à Summi Pontificis obedientia recedit : si quis tamen recederet cum errore intellectus ; quo non crederet eum,quem Ecclesia pro Summo Pontifice recepit, ac retinet,esse Summum Pontificem,verè esset hæreticus,posito quòd supradicta propositio certò,& immutabili pertineret ad fidem.

Et omnia superius dicta docent Hurtadus de Mendoza,Sylvius,Arriaga,& alij Doctores,*ubi supra*, pro nostra sententia adducti contra Bannez, Caietanum,& alios.

Alia argumenta, quæ contra nostram sententiam adduci possunt,inuenies soluta penès citatos Authores,& ex *superius* adductis,

permit the election and peaceful admission of one who cannot legitimately be Pope. Wherefore, from evident knowledge of a legitimate election and peaceful acceptance, we conclude with certainty that this man lacks none of the requirements for the Pontificate, and that God has conferred upon him the Pontificate of Saint Peter. Therefore, from an application that is known per se, we deduce an act of faith by which we believe that the power of Peter himself has been conferred upon that successor of Peter, just as from evident knowledge of Peter we conclude his conception in sin. What is asserted concerning a private priest does not press the point: because God did not promise that special providence in these private cases, because the matter is of lighter moment and can occur without prejudice to the faith, but the election of a pseudo-pontiff is otherwise.

But to that which is said, that whoever would withdraw from the modern Supreme Pontiff would indeed be schismatic and not heretical; therefore it is not a matter of faith that he himself is the Supreme Pontiff, because to withdraw from some dogma pertaining to the faith is heresy, and not merely schism.

I respond that although schism and heresy differ in their formal nature, it is not necessary that every schismatic be a heretic, not even one who withdraws from obedience to the Supreme Pontiff. If, however, someone were to withdraw with an error of understanding, whereby he would not believe that the one whom the Church has received and retains as Supreme Pontiff is truly the Supreme Pontiff, he would indeed be a heretic, provided that the aforementioned proposition certainly and immutably pertains to the faith.

And all the matters stated above are taught by Hurtado de Mendoza, Sylvius, Arriaga, and other Doctors, *as cited above*, who are adduced in favor of our position against Báñez, Cajetan, and others.

Other arguments that can be adduced against our position you will find resolved in the cited

patet etiam solutio ad argumenta in contrarium adducta à Caramuele *in sua seuera disputandi methodo part. 1. fol. 59.*

An stando in opinione, quòd non sit de fide hunc numero Innocentium X. esse verum Pontificem: An, inquam, adhuc eius decreta circa res fidei haberent infallibilitatem.

RESOLVT. VIII.

REspondeo, quòd stando etiam in opinione illorum Doctorum,asserentium non esse de fide hunc Pontificem esse verè Pontificem, non ex hoc sequeretur decreta ab ipso facta non esse infallibilia. Ita præter Bannez *ubi supra*, tenet Malderus Episcopus Antuerpiensis, & olim professor publicus in Inclyta Academia Louaniensi *in 1. 2. D. Thomæ quæst. 1.art.10.disp.5.in fine*,sibi sic ait: Vt enim sit fidei id,quod Papa determinat,non requiritur, vt sit fidei id,quod Papa determinat,non requiritur, vt fit fidei Diuinæ, hunc qui determinat, esse verum Pontificem, sed sufficit hoc esse certissimum. Est autem certissimum eum, quem vniuersa Ecclesia pro Pontifice recipit esse verum Pontificem. Hoc enim vt promissum Dei pertinet impedire, ne in eiusmodi iudicio fallatur Ecclesia. Frustrà ergo noui homines blasphemi quidam Apostatæ dubium mouent de legitima electione Pontificum huius æui, quos sibi aduersos experti sunt. Ab Ecclesia Catholica recepti extra huius calumniæ aleam sunt; sufficere autem, quòd omninò certum sit, etiamsi non fuerit si dei: probo: Quia certitudo fidei pendet ex veracitate Dei id dicentis, quod creditur; Papa autem non facit nouos articulos fidei, sed solum proponit, Deum aliquando hoc, aut illud dixisse. Dictum autem est *supra*, in illis, quæ concurrunt ad propositionem, & credibilitatem fidei, non esse exigendam certitudinem per omnia æqualem certitudini fidei, sed sufficere credibilitatem fieri euidentem per eiusmodi argumenta, quæ fallere quidem non possint,non tamen fide Diuina credantur. Hoc enim sufficit non solum ad infallibilitatem fidei, sed etiam obligationem; itaue non credens, hæreteos, aut infidelitatis peccatum incurrat. Ita Malderus.

Authors, and from what has been adduced *above*, the solution to arguments brought forward to the contrary by Caramuel *in his strict method of disputation, part 1, folio 59* is also evident.

Whether, standing in the opinion that it is not a matter of faith that this particular Innocent X is the true Pontiff: Whether, I ask, his decrees concerning matters of faith would still possess infallibility.

RESOLUTION VIII.

I respond that, even standing with the opinion of those Doctors who assert that it is not a matter of faith that this Pontiff is truly the Pontiff, it would not follow from this that the decrees made by him are not infallible. Thus, besides Domingo Báñez *in the place cited above*, Johannes Malderus, Bishop of Antwerp and formerly public professor at the renowned Academy of Louvain, holds this view *in Summa Theologica I-II, question 1, article 10, disputation 5, at the end*, where he speaks thus: “For in order that what the Pope determines should be a matter of faith, it is not required that it be a matter of Divine faith that he who makes the determination is the true Pontiff, but it suffices that this be most certain. Now it is most certain that he whom the universal Church receives as Pontiff is the true Pontiff. For this pertains to God’s promise to prevent the Church from being deceived in such a judgment. Therefore, certain blasphemous new men and apostates vainly raise doubts about the legitimate election of the Pontiffs of this age, whom they have found to be opposed to themselves. Having been received by the Catholic Church, they are beyond the reach of this calumny. Moreover, that it suffices for something to be entirely certain, even if it were not a matter of faith, I prove as follows: Because the certitude of faith depends upon the veracity of God saying that which is believed; but the Pope does not make new articles of faith, but only proposes that God at some time said this or that. Now it has been said *above* that in those things which contribute to the

Hoc etiam docet Episcopus Araujo Dominicanus, & in celeberrima Academia Salmanticensi Theologiæ Professores 1.2. Diui Thomæ quæst. 7. dub. 2. num. 4. vbi forma contra se hoc argumentum: Per fidem assentimur veritatibus definitis à Summo Pontifice, in quantum ab illo sunt definita: ergo: Si de eius potestate non haberemus certitudinem fidei, nec illam haberemus de veritatibus ab illo definitis: siquidem nequit esse maior certitudo de definito, quàm de definiente, cum illa innitatur huic.

Sed postea respondemus ad hoc argumentum, sic ait Et eo quòd fides, & certitudo Diuina, quæ habetur de veritatibus definitis à Summo Pontifice, vt à capite Ecclesiæ non innititur illi, vt rationi formali, & regulæ principali, nisi dumtaxat, vt instrumento, per quod prima veritas, quæ est regula principalis, & ratio formalis obiecti fidei, loquitur, & reuelat, vel vt conditioni, & regulæ quoad nos, sine qua Diuina reuelatio de huiusmodi veritatibus definitis nobis non communicaretur, nec applicaretur: quemadmodum autem potest in naturalibus, & artificialibus effectus perfectione, & nobilitate excedere instrumentum, atque conditionem: Ita & in nostro casu potest certitudo veritatum definitarum excedere instrumentum, & conditionem quoad certitudinem, quæ de ipsis habetur: qua ratione etiam in intellectualibus, in quo genere sunt assensus conclusionis scientificæ præstantior est dispositione syllogistica in modo, & figura, à qua tamen per se, vt à conditione dependet. Igitur quamuis de

proposition and credibility of faith, it is not required to demand certitude equal in all respects to the certitude of faith, but it suffices that credibility be made evident through arguments of such a kind that, while they indeed cannot deceive, they are nevertheless not believed by Divine faith. For this suffices not only for the infallibility of faith, but also for obligation, so that one who does not believe incurs the sin of heresy or infidelity.” Thus says Malderus.

This is also taught by Bishop Araujo, a Dominican, and by the Professors of Theology in the most celebrated Academy of Salamanca in 1-2 of *St. Thomas, question 7, doubt 2, number 4*, where they formulate this argument against themselves: Through faith we give assent to truths defined by the Supreme Pontiff, insofar as they are defined by him: therefore, if we did not have the certainty of faith concerning his power, neither would we have it concerning the truths defined by him: since there cannot be greater certainty about what is defined than about the one who defines, given that the former depends upon the latter.

But afterwards we respond to this argument, thus he says: And inasmuch as the faith and divine certitude which is held concerning truths defined by the Supreme Pontiff, as from the head of the Church, does not rest upon him as upon a formal reason and principal rule, but only as upon an instrument through which the first truth, which is the principal rule and formal reason of the object of faith, speaks and reveals, or as upon a condition and rule with respect to us, without which the divine revelation concerning such defined truths would not be communicated to us, nor would it be applied: just as in natural and artificial things an effect can exceed the instrument and condition in perfection and nobility, so also in our case the certitude of defined truths can exceed the instrument and condition with regard to the certitude which is held concerning them: for which reason also in intellectual matters, in which genus the assent of a scientific

veritate,& electione legitima capitis definientis tantum habeatur certitudo theologica,optimè potest de rebus definitis haberi formalis certitudo Diuinæ fidei,ac proindè ex hoc capite non conuincitur eamdem, vel æqualem de veritate capitis in singulari, atque de veritate rei ab ipso definitæ fore habendam certitudinem.Hucusque Araujo.Et vt scriptoribus Dominicanis Auctores Iesuitas adiungamus, hanc sententiam ex Bellarmino docet Ouiedo *de fide contr. 4. pun. 7. n. 87.* Fr. Ioannes Poncius *in cur. theol. disp. 28. q. 1. concl. 9. num. 13.*

Itaque dicendum est, quòd res proposita esset fide diuina certa, esto proponens non sit diuina, sed humana dumtaxat fide certus constat primò exemplis ; nam primò quod hoc sit legitimum Concilium à legitimo capite congregatum,sola fide humana constat;non enim nobis immediatè applicatur per ipsam Pontificis definitionem, sed id tantum habetur per testimonium Ecclesiæ,quæ illud accepit,vt legitimum Concilium, quod testimonium non excedit fidem humanam ; & tamen fide diuina tenemur credere,quæ de orthodoxa fide hoc Concilium docet.

Secundò,quòd hæc scriptura sit declarata vt canonica, nobis non constat immediatè testimonio Pontificis definientis, & declarantis hanc esse canonicam scripturam,sed solo testimonio hominum qui illam vt talem acceptant:cùm tamen fide diuina teneamur credere,illam esse canonicam,& quidquid in ea continetur esse à Deo reuelatum.

Tertiò tenemur fide diuina credere Christianæ Religionis mysteria esse vera, & à Deo reuelata, cum tamen signa, quibus illa nobis proponuntur, vt euidenter credibilia, quòd sint à Deo reuelata, non credamus fide Diuina, sed

conclusion is more excellent than the syllogistic disposition in mood and figure, upon which nevertheless it depends per se as upon a condition. Therefore, although concerning the truth and legitimate election of the head who defines, only theological certitude is had, most properly can formal certitude of divine faith be had concerning the things defined, and consequently from this point it is not proven that the same or equal certitude must be held concerning the truth of the head in particular as concerning the truth of the matter defined by him. Thus far Araújo. And so that we may join Jesuit authors to Dominican writers, Francisco de Oviedo teaches this opinion from Bellarmino *de fide contr. 4. pun. 7. n. 87.* Fr. Johannes Poncius *in cur. theol. disp. 28. q. 1. concl. 9. num. 13.*

Therefore it must be said that the matter proposed would be certain by divine faith, even though the one proposing it is not known by divine, but only by human faith. This is established first by examples; for first, that this is a legitimate Council congregated by a legitimate head is established by human faith alone; for it is not immediately applied to us through the Pontiff's own definition, but this is held only through the testimony of the Church, which has accepted it as a legitimate Council—which testimony does not exceed human faith; and yet we are bound by divine faith to believe what this Council teaches concerning orthodox faith.

Second, that this scripture is declared to be canonical is not established to us immediately by the testimony of the Pontiff defining and declaring this to be canonical scripture, but only by the testimony of men who accept it as such: although we are nevertheless bound by divine faith to believe that it is canonical, and that whatever is contained in it is revealed by God.

Third, we are bound by divine faith to believe that the mysteries of the Christian Religion are true and revealed by God, although we do not believe by divine faith, but by human faith, the signs by which these are proposed to us as

humana. Ergo pari modo possumus fide diuina credere, quæ hic Pontifex nobis credenda proponit, esto eadem fide diuina non credamus ipsum esse verum Pontificem.

Cùm igitur Pontifex solùm se habeat vt proponens res fidei, ad hoc, vt res ab ipso propositæ sint fide diuina credendæ necessum non est, vt ipse etiam fide diuina credatur, quòd sit verus Pontifex, sed sufficit, si tantùm credatur fide humana, quia nimirum cum iis signis Pontificiæ autoritatis rem credendam proponit, vt moraliter sit certum, quòd ipse sit verus Pontifex; nam tunc res proposita credenda est fide diuina, & tamen ipse credi potest fide tantùm humana.

Nam possum fide diuina esse certus, quòd hoc sit legitimum Concilium, quòd hæc sit canonica scriptura, quòd hæc sit Apostolica traditio, etiam si eadem fide diuina non sum certus quòd proponens sit legitimus Pontifex, sed sufficit si tantùm sum certus fide humana.

Et hæc doctrina est valdè notanda, quia apud paucos autores inuenies.

evidently credible—namely, that they are revealed by God. Therefore, in like manner, we can believe by divine faith what this Pontiff proposes to us for belief, even though we do not believe by that same divine faith that he is the true Pontiff.

Since, therefore, the Pope holds himself only as one who proposes matters of faith, it is not necessary—in order that the matters proposed by him should be believed with divine faith—that he himself also be believed with divine faith to be the true Pope. Rather, it suffices if he is believed only with human faith, because indeed he proposes the matter to be believed with such signs of pontifical authority that it is morally certain that he is the true Pope. For then the matter proposed must be believed with divine faith, and yet he himself can be believed with only human faith.

For I can be certain with divine faith that this is a legitimate Council, that this is canonical Scripture, that this is Apostolic tradition, even if I am not certain with that same divine faith that the one proposing is the legitimate Pope—rather, it suffices if I am certain only with human faith.

And this doctrine is very noteworthy, because you will find it among few authors.