

Cursus Theologicus, Tomus XI, Tractatus XVII, De Fide (*Theological Course, Volume XI, Treatise XVII, On Faith*)

by Salmanticenses (The Carmelites of the College of Salamanca), 1679

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Tract. VII, Disp. IV, Dub. II

Whether, given the legitimate election of the Supreme Pontiff, it is a matter of immediate faith that this particular person, e.g., Innocent XI, is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church.

From what has been said in the preceding doubt, we understand that it pertains to the Roman Bishop and Supreme Pastor of the Church to decide *ex Cathedra* controversies of faith, and to define what must be believed, and consequently to establish the Symbol of Faith, which St. Thomas intended [to address] *in this article 10*. But since definitions of this kind do not emanate from the Pontiff taken in general, in a confused manner, or disjunctively, but from a determinately existing Pontiff, the Catholic resolution laid down in the preceding doubt would not significantly contribute to deciding these controversies unless we further resolve whether, by the same faith by which we believe Peter's successor or the Roman Bishop to be the Supreme Pontiff of the Church, we must believe that this specific man, e.g., Innocent XI, who happily reigns, is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church; which therefore we must immediately examine. But in order that the terms placed in the title may be correctly understood, it is necessary to presuppose certain things.

§ 1. The state of the controversy is explained.

23. Not every election of a man as Pontiff is legitimate, but only that which the Church approves and accepts as legitimate. For, setting aside for now other conditions of a legitimate election, it must be conducted freely, that is, without fear that would affect a steadfast man, as established by the Council of Constance, session 39, and without simony, as decreed by Julius II in his constitution which begins *Cum tam divino*. When, due to the absence of these or other conditions, the Church suspends its acceptance and approval, the election of a man as Pontiff is either null or at least doubtful, and is not considered certainly legitimate. Nor does Sixtus V teach the opposite in his Constitution

50, where, speaking of Cardinals, he seems to expressly indicate that the Holy Spirit assists them so that they never err in the matter of election: “In that sacred election,” he says, “they are truly to be considered interpreters and intermediaries of the divine will, by whose spirit, just as the entire body of the Church is sanctified and governed, so it is most certain that this entire work of election is completed by the same inspiration and instinct.” But as we have said, he does not teach the opposite: both because, as observed by Joannes a Sancto Thoma [John of St. Thomas], who will be referred to below, Sixtus does not speak definitively, but narratively to extol the dignity of the Cardinals; and because he speaks of an absolute election, and thus perfect and legitimate, but does not deny that some election could be illegitimate and doubtful. And since where it is established that the election of a Pontiff is null, or a reasonable doubt arises in the Church concerning its validity, no person of sound mind would say that the faithful are bound to believe that the elected man is the Supreme Pontiff; therefore, the case of the present doubt is restricted to the hypothesis that the election is legitimate, and this is what we signify by those words in the title, *supposita legitima electione* [supposing a legitimate election], etc.

24. The election of the Pontiff is carried out by the Cardinals, who in this function representatively constitute the whole Church, which has given them the power to elect and declare the elected: just as Bishops gathered in a General Council under the Pontiff represent the whole Church. There is, however, a notable distinction between this example and the present matter, in that those things which Bishops resolve in Council concerning difficulties in matters of faith do not have perfect strength before they are confirmed by the Pope; but the election made by the Cardinals does not depend on the elected Pontiff, but receives its ultimate strength from the common acceptance of the Church, which they represent. Wherefore when doubt arises concerning the validity of an election, the Church itself can correct the election, or elections made by the Cardinals, as the Council of Constance declared in session 41, indeed even practice confirms this, for when the three considered Pontiffs—Gregory XII, Benedict XIII, and John XXIII, who, having been elected by different factions of Cardinals, continued the schism—were either abrogated or deposed, it elected Martin V, as is evident from the cited session. For although a headless universal Council cannot definitively settle matters of faith, but must await confirmation from the head, namely the Supreme Pontiff: it nevertheless has the power to elect a head, and can subject itself to someone by electing, or declaring someone to be the legitimate and Supreme Pontiff of the Church itself. Indeed, in this event there is no recourse to the Pontiff, because either there is none, or he is doubtful before the determination and acceptance of the Church; wherefore this duty falls to the Church itself. This is perfectly accomplished when the elected one consents to the election by accepting the Pontificate; for then there exists a mutual consent mutually strengthening itself, and the spiritual marriage between the Church and the Pope is perfected; between the members and the head; between the sheep and the shepherd. From which it is sufficiently clear that by the phrase *supposing a legitimate election*, we mean an election legitimately conducted, and about which there is no doubt in the Church, but which is, as it were, in peaceful possession of its validity.

25. For understanding the other terms, it should be observed that a proposition can be “of faith” in two ways: in one way immediately, when indeed we must assent to it through an assent elicited by faith, which occurs when the proposition is immediately revealed by God, either separately or within some universal truth: and such is the nature of this truth, *Christ is man*. In the other way, when the proposition is not revealed by God, yet is necessarily deduced from another that is revealed by God, in which it is included as an effect in its cause; and to this proposition we do not assent through faith, but through Theology: and such is the nature of this truth, *Christ is capable of laughter*. This distinction we have extensively considered and explained in disputation 1, doubt 4. From this difference it arises that to dissent from a proposition which is immediately of faith is heresy; but to dissent from a proposition which is only mediately of faith is not heresy, but an error in faith, according to the common censure of Theologians, about which we treat below in disputation 9, doubt 4, § 2. Therefore, when in the title we inquire whether it is *immediately of faith, etc.*, we are not investigating just any kind of assent, but that which is elicited by the virtue of faith and is due to an object immediately revealed by God, and in this lies the crux of the difficulty: for that this matter pertains to faith in some way, all Catholics easily admit, since they do not free the opposite doctrine from some censure.

26. But further observe that these two statements differ greatly: *This proposition is of faith*: and, *It is of faith that this proposition is of faith*. For since, in order for any proposition to be of faith, it is required among other things that the definition of the Church should be clearly established and sufficiently known to all, but when it remains under some doubt whether the proposition has been defined or not, then although the proposition may be in itself of faith, and many who understand the Church’s definition may assent to it through faith; nevertheless, it is not of faith that it is of faith, wherefore it can happen that some of the faithful do not give their assent of faith to it. And hence it proceeds that among theologians there is customary controversy concerning the certainty of some proposition, and concerning the quality of censure which the contrary doctrine deserves. For example, this proposition, *Christ has two wills*, is not merely defined by the Church, but so manifestly that not only is it itself of faith, but it is also of faith that it is of faith: and not only would he be a heretic who denied it, but also he who denied that it is of faith. On the contrary, although the Church may perhaps have already defined against the Pelagians and Massilians that *the efficacy of grace is from within, and not from its effect*; nevertheless, because this definition is not evidently established, it is not of faith that the aforementioned proposition is of faith, and therefore the Apostolic See has commanded that no one should brand the contrary doctrine with censure; and he who denies that the aforementioned proposition is of faith does not act against faith, nor is he to be considered a heretic.

The difficulty of the present doubt is not primarily about the quality of certainty with which one must hold that it is immediately of faith that the Pope now reigning is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church—that is, whether it is of faith that this is immediately of faith. This indeed presupposes the truth of the prior proposition, which is subject to this controversy. Rather, setting aside this kind of reflection, the entire controversy consists in whether it is immediately of faith that the Pope now reigning is the legitimate and supreme Pontiff of the

Church, regardless of the certainty of the affirmative position and the censure of the opposing view. And in this sense we shall treat the difficulty absolutely. But it will not be irrelevant if we first examine whether it is of faith that it is immediately of faith that the Pope now reigning is the Supreme Pontiff, and consequently whether asserting the contrary is heretical. To this question, Johannes a Sancto Thoma in disputation 8, article 2, in response to the last 1st objection, and Suarez in disputation 10, section 5, in solution 2 to the 4th objection, along with others, respond affirmatively. Their resolution can be confirmed (leaving aside other foundations to be weighed by us below) from the fact that, *“this opinion,”* (says Petrus Hurtado in disputation 37, section 2) *“was greatly strengthened by Clement VIII, who imprisoned certain Doctors because they maintained the opposite view, and ordered them to go to Rome to give an account of that opinion, which seemed to that See worthy of punishment.”* Bonaspei in *disputation 4, doubt 5, number 62* indicates who these men were, and Jacques Auguste de Thou more openly relates the same in *volume 3 of the histories of his time, book 131, year 1604, page 1015*, to which we refer the reader.

27. However, this historical account and admonition against those Doctors does not seem to prove that this proposition is *de fide*, namely: *It is immediately de fide that the Pope now reigning is the supreme and legitimate Pontiff of the Church*, and that the denial of this assertion is heretical. Firstly, because for Clement to most justly punish the aforementioned Doctors, it was not necessary that their doctrine be heretical and immediately contrary to the faith; it was sufficient that it be either temerarious, or scandalous, or erroneous; especially if it was promulgated with the purpose that someone might evade the ultimate sentence of the Pontiff in some then-imminent matter of faith. Secondly, because perhaps the aforementioned Doctors were not denying that proposition with the qualification *immediately*, but were saying absolutely and without restriction that it was not *de fide* that Clement was Pontiff; and consequently they were teaching that the opposite assertion was neither heretical nor erroneous: hence it does not follow that one who, with moderation and restriction, affirms that it is not immediately *de fide* that the Pope now reigning is the legitimate and supreme Pontiff of the Church deserves the same admonition; for he still concedes that it is at least mediately *de fide*, and that the opposite is erroneous or worthy of some other censure. Moreover, because perhaps what provoked Clement’s most just indignation was not that assertion taken precisely or separately, but taken comprehensively with other assertions, as Thuanus indicates in *the cited passage*. Thus it does not follow that Clement would conceive the same indignation against those who would precisely assert that it is not immediately *de fide* that he is the Supreme Pontiff.

28. Therefore, as long as the Church does not define this matter, we hold that this modal proposition, *“It is immediately of faith that Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff,”* is not a matter of faith; and that one who denies it would not be a heretic. We are moved especially because we observe Catholic men, most learned and most ardent defenders of Pontifical dignity, who deny that it is a matter of faith, at least immediately, that the man who at a given time holds the Pontificate is the legitimate and Supreme Pontiff of the Church. And this has occurred both before and after the time of Clement, in the previous century and in the present one. Yet we do not see that the Supreme Pontiff, or the Holy Tribunal of the

Inquisition, has taken action against them or subjected their writings to expurgation. This appears incredible if the assertion of the aforementioned men were heretical. And because some Authors so interpret others that they do not seem to have taught the opposite, and thus eventually maintain that one who denies the reflexive proposition stated above is a heretic, it seemed appropriate to transcribe the words of some authors, so that the prudent Reader may judge what opinion they held in this difficult matter.

Torquemada, in *book 4 of his Summa, part 2, chapter 9, at the end*, states: “An eighth category can be distinguished of those truths which, although not absolutely Catholic in themselves, nevertheless savor of Catholic truth; for they are closely related to Catholic truths. Hence, a truth savoring of Catholic truth can be defined thus: A truth savoring of Catholic truth, or of faith by consequence, is one which, when joined with some other truth not pertaining to faith, but which nevertheless cannot reasonably be denied, becomes a Catholic truth. For example, because Master Thomas of Sarzana now sits in Apostolic dignity, this proposition, ‘Thomas of Sarzana is Pope,’ is a proposition savoring of Catholic truth, etc.” And although the argument, which he immediately extends, seems to conclude something more; nevertheless, he intends only that the aforementioned proposition is of faith mediately, and by consequence in the manner of a theological conclusion, as is evident from the words quoted.

Cajetan, in *his Commentary on the Summa Theologica, Second Part of the Second Part, Question 1, Article 3, Reply to Objection 4*, challenging certain individuals who assert that the host offered for adoration in the Church should not be adored absolutely but conditionally (if it is consecrated), states: “We clearly adore the Supreme Pontiff absolutely, and similarly other Bishops. And yet according to the fear of these individuals, they ought to be venerated conditionally, for who knows whether this man was baptized? And whether the one who baptized him had the intention of conferring the Sacrament of Baptism?” Here he supposes that, due to a defect in this condition, or certainty regarding it, it does not pertain to faith to elicit assent by which we believe this man to be the Supreme Pontiff.

Castro, in *his work Against Heresies, Book 1, Chapter 9*, states: “Although we are bound by faith to believe that the true successor of Christ is the supreme pastor of the entire Church, we are nevertheless not bound by that same faith to believe that each of them individually was elected properly and canonically.” And from this he infers that one who would deny this is not a heretic, but a schismatic.

Cano *lib. 6, de locis, cap. 8, in resp. ad 10, pag. nobis 236*, states: “That the Pastor who succeeded Peter in the Church possesses the ordinary power of Peter and the other privileges granted to Peter for the sake of the Church, this is found in the Gospel. But that the one whom Christ appointed after Peter’s death was the Roman Bishop, this is gathered from the historical fact.” And he explains this with an example: “That the Councils,” he says, “of Nicaea, Chalcedon, and Ephesus, were legitimately convened is not believed from divine revelation; it is believed, however, from human faith and from the tradition of trustworthy history. Yet he would be a heretic who denied the decrees and decisions of

these Synods, just as if he denied the Gospel.” Thus he discusses the certainty of those things which the Pontiff defines, and he concludes something more than is required for the present controversy.

Cordoba, in *book 1, question 17, § 2*, after addressing propositions that are matters of faith, discusses that which “savors of faith,” and defines it thus: “That which can be necessarily inferred through sound reasoning from something that is simultaneously of faith and from another premise which, although not of faith itself, nevertheless cannot be reasonably denied.” He offers this example: “If one were to say that Christ is present in the consecrated host, or that it is to be adored, this is certainly a matter of faith. But to say merely that Christ is present in the host which is elevated by the Priest, or that it is to be adored, savors of faith, etc.” Finally, presenting a last example, he concludes: “Blessed Gregory was Pope: therefore everyone canonically elected is Pope. Or conversely, Everyone canonically elected is Pope: therefore Blessed Gregory was Pope. Both logical conclusions are evident, because he was canonically elected, which cannot be reasonably denied, and for no other reason is anyone Pope. And such a proposition savoring of faith is also called approaching and pertaining to faith.” And below in § 8, after discussing heretical propositions, when treating propositions that savor of heresy, he gives these examples: *Blessed Gregory was not Pope: Christ is not present in the host which is elevated by the celebrating Priest.*

Bannez, in *2, 2, question 1, article 10, doubt 2, § Quapropter, page 142*, says: “To the main argument we can respond fourthly, that even after the definition made by the Supreme Pontiff and the Council, we know only from human, prudent, and evident inquiry, or even from infused prudence (to which falsity can underlie speculatively), that this man is the Supreme Pontiff, and that this is a Council rightly convened and confirmed. Nevertheless, the proposition thus defined is to be held as certain according to faith.” And below: “We say that faith and the Holy Spirit immediately incline us to believe that this, which is now called the Roman Church, is the true and Catholic Church of Christ, whether or not this particular individual is truly the Roman Pontiff. For this depends on certain circumstances that can be deficient, as for example, it is necessary that he be baptized, and perhaps he is not baptized.” And further he adds: “Nevertheless, it should never be admitted that the whole Church errs in accepting such a definition of a Council; rather, if the whole Church has accepted it, it will be a most certain sign that the defined proposition is true and pertains to the faith, even if the one who was held to be the Supreme Pontiff were not the true Pontiff. Notwithstanding all the aforementioned, it would be highly reckless and scandalous if, after the Church has accepted someone as the Supreme Pontiff, anyone were to deny that he is the true Supreme Pontiff, unless they could demonstrate that he was not baptized, etc.”

Malderus, in *the present article 10, disputation 5*, having raised this argument against himself (which, with changed terms, is the very same one used by John of St. Thomas, Suarez, Ferre, and others): “It is not a matter of faith that this Pontiff is the true Pontiff; therefore, his determinations will never be matters of faith,” says: “I respond to the solution of this argument that it is not necessary to say that it is a matter of faith that this

Pontiff is the true Pontiff. For if this were necessary, it would also be necessary to confess not merely that it is probable that this is a matter of faith, but that it is most certain; otherwise, the same difficulty would return. For if it is only probable that it is a matter of faith that this man is the true Pontiff, it would likewise be said that his definition would be only probably a matter of faith. I respond therefore by rather denying the consequence. For in order that what the Pope determines be a matter of faith, it is not required that it be a matter of divine faith that he who determines is the true Pontiff; but it suffices that this be most certain. And it is most certain that he whom the universal Church receives as Pontiff is the true Pontiff. For it pertains to God's providence to prevent the Church from being deceived in this kind of judgment. Therefore, in vain do new men, certain blasphemous apostates, raise doubt about the legitimate election of the Pontiffs of this age, whom they have found opposed to themselves. Those received by the Catholic Church are beyond the scope of this calumny. And I prove that it suffices that it be entirely certain, even if it were not a matter of faith: because the certainty of faith depends on the truthfulness of God saying that which is believed; the Pope, however, does not create new articles of faith, but only proposes that God said this or that at some time. It has been said above that in those things which contribute to the proposition and credibility of faith, one should not demand a certainty equal in all respects to the certainty of faith, but it suffices that credibility be made evident through arguments of such a kind that cannot deceive, even though they are not believed by divine faith. For this suffices not only for the infallibility of faith, but also for obligation, so that one who does not believe incurs the sin of heresy or infidelity."

Arauxo, *in praes. dub. 5, concl. 2*, states: "I say secondly, that this Roman Pontiff existing for the time being, e.g., Urban VIII, is the legitimate Vicar of Christ and successor of Peter, is certain according to faith: not immediately, however, but only mediately in the manner of a Theological conclusion." And again in *concl. 3*, he says: "I say thirdly, that Urban VIII, for example, is the legitimate successor of Peter, is not immediately of faith, but only mediately, in the manner of a Theological conclusion." Which he proves, and finally responding to the argument by which the contrary opinion is commonly proven, he says: "Just as in natural and artificial things an effect can exceed its instrument and condition in perfection and nobility; so in our case the certainty of defined truths can exceed the instrument and condition with respect to the certainty which is held about them. By this reasoning also in intellectual matters, in which category are the assents of which we speak, the assent to a scientific conclusion is more excellent than the syllogistic disposition in mode and figure, on which nevertheless it depends per se as on a condition. Therefore, although concerning the truth and legitimate election of the head who defines" (which does not function as the formal reason for the assent of faith, but as a condition regulating what is to be believed) "only theological certainty is possessed, it is entirely possible to have formal certainty of divine faith concerning the matters defined, and consequently from this principle it is not proven that the same or equal certainty must be held concerning the truth of the head in particular, as concerning the truth of the matter defined by him."

29. Finally, among the authors who defend our common assertion to be proposed in number 33, Azor, in *Book 4, Chapter 5, § In this controversy*, teaches that it is probable that

to deny that this man, Clement or Leo, is the legitimate successor of Peter and Supreme Pontiff, is not heretical, but erroneous and scandalous. And Gonet, in *the present disputation 4, article 4, number 117*, having related the opinion of those who teach that it is heretical, adds: "This solution is not without probability. Nevertheless, others commonly respond that one who would deny that this particular Roman Pontiff is the true Pope would not be considered a heretic, but only a schismatic: because it is not established among all Catholics that this is a matter of faith, but many deny this, considering it to be established only with moral certainty."

30. From these opinions of such grave Theologians, it seems to be inferred rather clearly, first, that the common opinion, which we shall immediately defend, is not so certain as to be a matter of faith; nor is the opposite opinion so repugnant to the faith as to be heretical. Especially since its proponents respond to the arguments of the contrary opinion not without some plausibility, and they have foundations not entirely weak, but which usually create considerable difficulty for respondents, as will be evident from what will be said in § 3. It is inferred *secondly*, that it is hardly credible that those Doctors, whom we mentioned in *number 26*, were imprisoned or punished by order of Clement VIII precisely because they denied it was immediately of faith that Clement himself was the legitimate Pontiff of the Church. For before Clement, this had been taught by Torquemada, Cajetan, Castro, Cano, Corduba, and Bañez, and after Clement, and after the rebuke of those Doctors, Malderus and Arauxo affirmed the same, without any action being taken against them or their doctrine being condemned. Therefore, there was another and quite different reason for the punishment of those Doctors, which I neither wish to investigate nor make public.

31. It is inferred *thirdly* that the reasoning by which Suárez and John of St. Thomas prove the common opinion, and which Gonet, Ferre, and others expound upon after them, is rather ineffective and can be turned against them. It is of this sort: "It is impossible to believe something defined by the Pope unless we believe the definition to be legitimate and therefore to proceed from a legitimate Pope; but we are bound to believe through assent immediately elicited from faith what has been defined by this Pope; therefore, we are bound to believe with the same assent that this man who is defining is a legitimate Pope." However, the same propositions can be arranged in this manner: "It is impossible to believe something defined by the Pope unless we believe the definition to be legitimate and consequently to proceed from a legitimate Pope; but we are not bound to believe through assent immediately elicited from faith that this man who is defining is a legitimate Pope; therefore, we are not bound to believe with the assent of faith immediately the matters defined by this Pope." Since the consequence is legitimate, and the consequent is heretical, it is necessary that one of the premises be false; but not the minor premise, since as is evident from what has been said thus far, the Church has not yet defined that men are bound to the aforementioned assent, and to deny it is not heretical; therefore, the major premise, which the Adversaries assume, is false or doubtful.

Consider Bellarmine as cited by Suárez in *disputation 5, section 8, number 11*, who holds that not only a true Pontiff, but even one who is merely considered as such by the Church, cannot err in defining matters of faith. If this is true, it completely undermines the

foundation of these Authors' arguments; for it preserves the infallible certainty of the Church's faith, regardless of the certainty concerning the legitimacy of the Pontiff.

Furthermore, God's revelation relates more intimately to what is to be believed than the Pope's definition; indeed, the latter is only a condition for Catholic faith, while the former is the formal motive of faith. But it is possible to believe with the assent of faith something immediately revealed by God, without believing in the revelation itself, or in God who reveals it. Therefore, it is possible (as far as concerns the nature of the form) to believe something defined by the Pontiff, without believing that the defining Pontiff is a legitimate Pontiff. The consequence is established by parity of reasoning. And the minor premise is clear from what was said in the preceding disputation, doubt I, where, following the more common opinion of Theologians, we established that faith concerning a revealed object can coexist with evidence of the revelation, such that one may know with evidence that it is God who speaks; and yet the thing spoken by God is believed through faith. Why, therefore, would it not be possible for someone to assent not through faith, but through an assent of moral evidence excluding all prudent doubt, that this man defining is the legitimate Pontiff, and yet believe by the assent of theological faith the matters defined by him?

It will not help to say that one who believes things which he evidently sees are spoken by God still, through the very assent of faith, apprehends divine revelation, at least as the means (*quo*), and in the manner of an exercised motive. For even if this is so, he still does not believe the revelation itself as the object (*quod*), nor God in His capacity as speaker, since he knows these things evidently. Therefore, similarly, from the fact that someone believes matters defined by the Pontiff, it does not follow that he must believe as the object (*quod*) that the person defining is the legitimate Pontiff, but he can be certified of this through another light. Thus, that reasoning by which the common opinion is most frequently proven is not particularly compelling.

32. What seems more compelling is that Martin V, in the forty-fifth and final session of the Council of Constance, issued a special bull in which he enumerated forty-five errors of John Wycliffe and thirty errors of John Hus, and afterwards arranged interrogations to be made of those suspected in faith, to determine whether they believe legitimately, of which one is this: "Likewise whether he believes that the canonically elected Pope, whoever he may be at the time, with his proper name expressed, is the successor of Blessed Peter, having supreme authority in the Church of God." Therefore, it is a matter of faith that the present Pontiff is the legitimate Pontiff, such that to deny this would be heretical.

But although this decree adds considerable force to the common opinion, it nonetheless does not approve it to such an extent as to place the contrary opinion in the state of heresy, as the cited Authors intend. First, because those interrogations are not directed solely toward identifying heretics, but also those suspected in the faith and those who seem to connive with Wycliffe; for which it is not required that the aforementioned articles pertain immediately to the faith, but it suffices that they be deduced from principles of faith; and therefore it does not follow that its denial is immediately against the faith and heresy; rather, it suffices that it be an error against the faith. Second, because *to believe* is

said not only of assent elicited immediately from faith, but also of theological assent, which rests upon faith and participates in its obscurity: hence the term *believes* positioned in the bull can be applied both to the immediate assent of faith and to mediate or theological assent. Finally, because the Pontiff in the aforementioned bull endeavored to overturn the doctrines of those heretics and directed that suspects be examined: for which reason he first enumerated their errors, and therefore the censure that is drawn from the aforesaid bull ought to correspond to those doctrines. Not all of their assertions, however, were manifest heresies and immediately contrary to the faith, as is clear from the eighth session of the aforementioned Council, where, after relating Wycliffe's assertions, all are condemned respectively; for certain of his articles, as is stated there, were notoriously heretical, others erroneous, others scandalous and blasphemous, others offensive to pious ears, and still others rash and seditious. Hence, from that bull it can indeed be concluded that one who would deny that the present Pontiff is the legitimate successor of St. Peter would deserve some, and indeed very grave, censure, but not that it would determinately be heresy.

With these matters concerning the state of this controversy somewhat elaborately, but necessarily set forth, let us proceed to its resolution.

II. *The true and common opinion is established.*

33. It must be stated that this proposition, *Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church*, pertains immediately to faith, such that the assent owed to it is directly drawn from faith. This conclusion is not found expressly in the Scholastics and more ancient Theologians, because they did not treat this difficulty in these specific terms; nevertheless, it is deduced from what they openly taught. Among the Moderns, however, it is very common; for besides Suárez, John of St. Thomas, and Gonet in the places cited above, it is defended by Labat *disp. 1, dub. 3, § 4*, Ferre *quaest. 11, § 6*, Our Father Dominic of the Most Holy Trinity *tom. 3, Bibliot. Theol. lib. 2, sect. 4, cap. 10*, Valencia *disp. 1, quaest. 1, punct. 7, § 38*, Lugo *disp. 1, sect. 13, § 5*, Pedro Hurtado *disp. 37*, Ripalda *disp. 8, sect. 5, num. 79*, and others.

The foundation of this assertion must be drawn from what we said in *disputation 1, doubt 4, § 3*, and it can be reduced to this form: since a particular proposition contained in a universal proposition revealed to the whole Church is immediately of faith, just as the universal proposition itself; but this proposition, *Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church*, is contained in a universal proposition revealed to the whole Church; therefore, this proposition is immediately of faith, and thus it is owed assent immediately elicited from faith. Both consequences are evident, and the major premise is certain; for a universal proposition is equivalent to all particular propositions contained in it. Hence, it is the same thing for God to reveal some universal proposition and to reveal all singular propositions, unless an exception is established elsewhere. It is fitting, however, that God does not reveal each one in particular, nor dwell on this matter, but rather comprehends all under some universal proposition, as actual parts of it. For this reason, since God revealed that all men sinned in Adam, it is immediately of faith that Solomon, Peter, John,

and so on for others, sinned in Adam. For it cannot happen that a universal proposition is true and of faith, without the particular proposition also being true and of faith; otherwise, two contradictory propositions could be simultaneously true, as will be evident to anyone who considers it carefully, and as we showed in *the cited place* where we extensively examined this doctrine, from a more laborious explanation of which we now desist, especially since our Adversaries do not deny it.

The minor premise, however, in which lies the difficulty, is proven; because this universal proposition, “*Every man rightly elected by the Church as successor of Peter is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church*”, is a proposition revealed by God to the whole Church. But in this universal proposition is contained this particular proposition, “*Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church*”. Therefore, this particular proposition is contained in a universal proposition revealed by God to the whole Church. The consequence is clear; the major premise is also established from what was said in *the previous doubt, number 4*, and none but a manifest heretic can deny it. The minor premise, finally, is evident, because the particular propositions contained in that universal proposition can be none other than these: “*This one and that one rightly elected as successor of Peter is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church*”. Therefore, since we are presently speaking about Innocent XI, not in any manner whatsoever, but presupposing his legitimate election, as is clear from the title of the doubt, it follows that this proposition, “*Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church*”, is a particular proposition contained in that universal proposition. This containment is declared in this syllogism: “Every man rightly elected by the Church as successor of Peter is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church; But Innocent XI is rightly elected by the Church as successor of Peter; therefore, Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church.”

This is confirmed and further explained: the particular proposition, “Solomon sinned in Adam,” is immediately of faith for no other reason than because it is contained in the universal proposition, “All sinned in Adam.” This containment is explained thus: “All sons of Adam sinned in him; Solomon is a son of Adam; therefore he sinned in him.” No one can deny this particular proposition without falsifying that universal proposition revealed by God. For this reason also, one who was certainly aware that a particular infant had been properly baptized could and should believe that the infant is in a state of grace, because God has revealed this universal proposition: “Every properly baptized infant obtains grace.” For one would be convinced by this reasoning: “Every baptized infant is in a state of grace; this infant is properly baptized; therefore this infant is in a state of grace.” One could not deny assent of faith to this particular proposition without denying it to the universal proposition. And precisely the same reasoning applies in our case, since God has revealed to the whole Church this universal proposition: “Every man properly elected as successor of Peter is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church.” Moreover, it is certainly established that Innocent XI was properly elected as successor of Peter, since this is presumed and is sufficiently evident from the universal consent of the Church itself. Therefore, this particular proposition, “Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff,” is immediately of faith. Accordingly, anyone who, having accepted these truths—“Every man properly elected by the Church as successor of Peter is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church” and “Innocent XI is

properly elected by the Church as successor of Peter”—would deny this conclusion: “Therefore Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff,” could not help but deny that former universal proposition and act immediately against the faith. Indeed, no suitable basis for differentiation appears between this matter and the examples just adduced.

34. You will respond first, that it is contrary to the nature of an immediate proposition of faith that its truth should be gathered through a process of reasoning; since faith is not discursive but rests immediately upon divine revelation. Therefore, since it is not established that Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church except through reasoning, as is clear from what we have set forth above, it follows rather from our foundation that the aforementioned proposition and assent to it do not pertain immediately to faith.

But this evasion is easily forestalled by what has been said in *the place cited above*. First, because although faith does not rely upon discourse, at least properly so-called (namely that in which there is a process from one thing to another), nevertheless it is not contrary to its nature to premise purely explanatory discourse, or rather applicative discourse, which applies universal revelation to a particular matter. Of this kind is that discourse which we use to establish *that Innocent XI placed himself* on the side of the subject in that universal proposition: *Every man duly elected by the Church as successor of Peter is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church*. Therefore, the construction of such a discourse in no way prevents that particular proposition from being immediately of faith. Secondly, because if the argument advanced in this response were of any significance, it would likewise suggest that these particular propositions—*Solomon sinned in Adam, this infant duly baptized is in grace*—are not immediately of faith. For in order to establish that they are of faith, it is necessary to use explanatory or applicative discourse of the universal propositions which God has revealed, namely: *All have sinned in Adam: Every infant duly baptized is in grace*—by showing that the subject of the particulars is contained in the subject of the universals, in the manner described above. The consequent is entirely absurd; therefore, the fact that in the present case we need some discourse by no means removes the possibility that this particular proposition, *Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church*, which in the aforementioned discourse has the character of a conclusion, is immediately of faith.

35. You will respond secondly with Arauxo, that for the aforementioned particular proposition to be immediately of faith, both premises would need to be matters of faith. This does not occur in the aforementioned argument; for although the proposition: *Every man duly elected by the Church as successor of Peter is the Supreme Pontiff*, is a matter of faith; nevertheless, the other particular proposition which is subsumed, namely: *But Innocent XI is duly elected by the Church as successor of Peter*; is not a matter of faith, but pertains to another light. Therefore, it is necessary that the conclusion follow the weaker part; and thus that it is not immediately of faith, but at most mediately in the manner of a Theological conclusion.

However, neither does this response satisfy, but it is refuted almost in the same way; for although the doctrine proposed in it is true when the discourse is properly such, and one

premise together with another constitutes the adequate cause of the conclusion, nevertheless it is falsified in a purely applicative discourse in which, although the premise that serves as an application may be purely natural, it is possible that the conclusion is immediately of faith: but such is the discourse we have used; since that proposition: *Innocent XI is rightly elected*, serves as an application, by which this individual *Innocent* is shown to be included under the subject of the major premise, and thus to participate in its predicate: therefore, the fact that the aforementioned particular proposition, *Innocent XI is rightly elected*, is not of faith, but is reached through another light, in no way prevents the conclusion, namely *Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church*, from being immediately of faith. The major premise and the consequence are evident. The minor premise, however, is demonstrated and simultaneously clarified by several examples. The first is what we proposed above; for Adam, for example, assenting through faith to this universal proposition, *All have sinned in me*, could subsume this particular proposition: *But Abel is my son*, and infer: *Therefore he sinned in me*. In this discourse, that minor and particular proposition, *Abel is my son*, was not known through faith, but through natural light; for Adam evidently knew that he had begotten that man; and yet the conclusion was of faith, as is clear by itself. Therefore, the fact that some premise in a purely applicative and explanatory discourse is not of faith, in no way prevents the conclusion from being immediately of faith. The second, and even more evident example is this: this proposition: *All true bread can be transubstantiated into the body of Christ*, is immediately of faith, as is the possibility of the aforementioned transubstantiation. Let the faithful therefore subsume: *But this bread is true bread*, and infer: *Therefore this bread can be transubstantiated into the body of Christ*. In this discourse, the conclusion is immediately of faith; and yet the minor premise is not of faith, but purely natural; for a person can evidently know and judge that this bread is true bread. Therefore, the fact that in a purely explanatory and applicative discourse some premise, which serves as an application, is not of faith, in no way prevents the conclusion from being immediately of faith.

36. Nor does the motive adduced in this response conclude anything; for that axiom, "*The conclusion follows the weaker part*," holds only in discourse properly so-called, in which both premises constitute the adequate cause of the consequent as regards knowledge; for it is contradictory that an effect should exceed its adequate cause. However, it cannot be applied to purely applicative reasoning, of the kind we have just proposed; because in these the universal proposition is not compared as a cause to the particular proposition, since it is nothing other implicitly than all those particular propositions themselves, as we said above; and the natural proposition, which is subsumed, is a pure explanation of the universal proposition, and its application to a determined and particular subject. Hence, if once the universal proposition is immediately of faith, the natural proposition, by means of which it is applied and explained, in no way prevents the particular proposition, which has the nature of a consequent, from also being immediately of faith.

From which the reason given above is more strongly confirmed, and the immediate response is demolished; because from this universal proposition of faith, *All have sinned in Adam*, is inferred the particular proposition which is of faith, *Abel sinned in Adam*: and from this universal proposition of faith, *All true bread is valid matter for consecration*, is

inferred this particular proposition of faith, *This bread is valid matter for consecration*; and from this universal proposition of faith, *Every infant not yet baptized is capable of receiving the grace of Baptism*, is inferred this particular proposition of faith, *This infant is capable of receiving the grace of Baptism*. Although other propositions, by which universal propositions are applied to particular cases, are known only by natural light, just as Adam knew Abel to be his son, a person knows this bread to be genuine, and a woman giving birth knows that her infant has not been baptized. Therefore, likewise from this universal proposition, which is immediately of faith, *Every man rightly elected by the Church as successor of Peter is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church*, can be inferred this particular proposition which is also immediately of faith, *This man Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church*; although the other particular proposition, which applies the universal to this specific subject, is not of faith, but natural, as happens when someone naturally knows with certainty that this man Innocent XI was rightly elected by the Church as successor of Peter. And indeed, that it is not required that both premises be of faith for the conclusion to be of faith is finally clear in this reasoning: *All the dead will rise again; Peter was a man; therefore Peter will rise again*. For Arauxo did not deny that the conclusion is of faith, although one of the premises is natural and evident.

37. Finally, you will respond that this doctrine is indeed true when the natural proposition being applied is evident and entirely certain; for then it infallibly places the subject of the conclusion under the subject of the universal proposition, which is immediately of faith; and this occurs in the examples just adduced. However, when the minor premise being applied is not certain, it cannot infallibly place the subject of the conclusion under the subject of the universal proposition of faith in order to participate in the same predicate, and consequently the conclusion cannot be entirely certain, nor of faith. This is illustrated in this reasoning: *Every host properly consecrated contains the body of Christ; but this host, which I see being adored, is properly consecrated; therefore, this host contains the body of Christ*. The conclusion, indeed, is not of faith, because although that universal proposition is immediately of faith, the minor premise is nevertheless not entirely certain. And the same occurs in our case, because even though the universal proposition: *Every man properly elected by the Church as successor of Peter is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church*; is immediately of faith; nevertheless, the minor premise that is subsumed, namely: *but this man, Innocent XI, has been properly elected by the Church as successor of Peter*, is not entirely certain, since it is not evident that the Church has properly elected him. Therefore, the conclusion: *Therefore, Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church*, will not be of faith, but will be deficient in its certainty because of the minor premise, which cannot infallibly place the subject of the conclusion under the subject of the major premise.

But this response can in no way be sustained, and is effectively overturned. *First*, because it clearly follows from it that not only is it not immediately of faith that *Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church*; but indeed that this is not in any way a matter of faith, nor even certain, and consequently, that one who would deny this proposition would neither be a heretic, nor temerarious, nor scandalous, nor worthy of any censure. This is contrary to the common understanding of the Church, and is not admitted by our Adversaries; since

although they deny that the aforementioned proposition is immediately of faith, they nevertheless concede that it is at least mediately of faith, and so certain that to deny it would be erroneous, temerarious, and scandalous: therefore the aforementioned response is false, and cannot be sustained among Catholics. The consequence is manifest; because the aforementioned response on one hand affirms that the consequent is not certain unless the minor premise is certain; and on the other hand denies the certainty of the minor premise: therefore it holds that the consequent is not only not immediately of faith, but not even certain. And since denying that which lacks certainty merits no censure, it follows from such doctrine that to deny that *Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church* would not only not be heretical, but neither temerarious nor worthy of any other censure. And this is further pressed against the person by turning back the example adduced in this response; for because it is not certain that this particular host has been rightly consecrated, it is not certain that this particular host contains the body of Christ. Therefore, if it is not certain that *Innocent XI was rightly elected by the Church as the successor of Peter*, it will not be certain that *Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church*, and thus one who doubts this, or denies this, would merit no censure. Which, as we have said, is unheard of among Catholics.

38. It is challenged *secondly*, because the aforementioned response destroys the status of the present controversy; for it proceeds on the supposition of the legitimate election of Innocent XI as successor of Peter, and that he is in peaceful possession, and that the Church does not contradict him; if indeed his election had been null, or were doubtful, the controversy as to whether it is a matter of faith that Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff would not even be subject to debate. But the negative position concerning the controversy must be held, as we established above in *number 24*. With this hypothesis of our discussion, it is not at all coherent to deny the certainty of the minor premise in the argument set forth above, and thereby cause uncertainty of the conclusion. For if that minor premise is uncertain, then the election is not presumed to be determinately legitimate, nor is there an absence of doubt regarding its validity in the Church; or conversely, if there is no doubt in the Church concerning the aforementioned election, then it is certain that Innocent XI was rightly elected by the Church; it indeed stands as certain that which is not subject to doubt.

It is refuted, *thirdly*; for that election is certainly established to have been properly, or canonically, performed by the Church, which is certainly established to have been conducted, approved, and received by the whole Church: but this latter point is certainly established; therefore the former is as well. The major premise seems self-evident, because since the power of electing the Supreme Pontiff resides with the Church, that election is done properly and canonically which is conducted and approved by the whole Church; for no other laws are required for this purpose except those which the Church herself has established, which therefore in electing and approving fulfills all that is required for the true and canonical election of a Pontiff. The minor premise is also certain, because the Church has given to the Cardinals the power of electing the Supreme Pontiff, who therefore with respect to this office represent the whole Church. They themselves elected Innocent XI, and after the election was completed (although this is not even

necessary for the proof of the minor premise which we intend), no doubt concerning its validity arose; otherwise, some of them would have protested. Furthermore, the elected person himself, having been presented by the Cardinals to the whole Church, was accepted and approved by the universal Church as if considered in its own person: and this universal approval would supply for defects, if any existed, in the election as conducted by the Cardinals. All these things are almost experimentally evident, and no one except a madman could deny them. Therefore, it is absolutely certain that the election of Innocent XI was conducted, received, and approved by the whole Church; and consequently the argument made above is not weakened on this account, but perseveres in its strength.

39. Nor does it matter if you still say that these arguments indeed prove that we are entirely certain about the election of Innocent XI as properly conducted from the active perspective and on the part of the Church, but not regarding his election taken passively and on the part of the elected. For although the whole Church elected him and confirmed the election by common approval, nevertheless it could have elected someone incapable; *for who knows*, says Cajetan, cited in number 28, *if this man was baptized? and if the one who baptized him had the intention of conferring the Sacrament of Baptism?* This defect the Church cannot supply. Yet certainty about this latter point would be necessary for the minor premise of the above argument, namely, *This man Innocent XI is properly elected by the Church as successor of Peter*, to be simply certain, and for the conclusion depending on it, at least as on an application, to be immediately of faith.

This, I say, does not matter: since by the very fact that complete certainty is given concerning the election actively considered, and properly carried out by the Church, certainty is also given concerning the passive election, and therefore concerning the election adequately accepted. But in our case, that first certainty is given, as is evident from what was just said, and without evasion; therefore the latter certainty is also given, and consequently nothing is lacking for the conclusion of the preceding discourse to be immediately of faith. The minor premise and both consequences are evident. The major premise, however, is demonstrated: for the whole Church cannot err in matters pertaining to faith and morals, as is sufficiently clear from what was said in *the previous doubt*, § 1, number 6. But the whole Church elected and approved Innocent XI as the successor of Peter, and this kind of election and approval pertains to faith and morals, since through it is committed the authority to define controversies of faith and to rightly govern the faithful. Therefore, the Church did not err in this; therefore it elected a subject capable of such dignity. This reasoning is so effective that it renders both consequent propositions either immediately certain by faith (concerning which below *in the response to the 2nd objection*), as John of St. Thomas and Ferre maintain in the passages cited above (whom the Reader may consult if he seeks such certainty), or at least certain with the certainty of a theological conclusion, which cannot be subject to falsehood, as Arauxo concedes from among our opponents. And this latter suffices for the strength of the discourse made above; for from this universal proposition, *Every man properly elected by the Church as successor of Peter is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church*, which is immediately of faith; and from this particular proposition, *But Innocent XI is properly elected by the Church as*

successor of Peter, which serves as an application and is certain at least with the certainty of a theological conclusion, it is inferred that *Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church*, which is immediately of faith, being included in that universal proposition as an actual part in the whole. Hence, to one asking, *Who knows whether he is baptized, etc.*, it must be responded that this condition, and others which are required for passive election, or for the capacity of the one elected, are established with complete certainty from the active election itself and the approval of the universal Church.

40. Add firstly, that in that universal proposition which is immediately of faith, namely: *Every man duly elected by the Church as successor of Peter is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church*; the phrase *duly elected*, which serves as a condition, only signifies an election actively understood as conducted by the whole Church; for God gave to the Church this power, that whomever she elects as Pontiff, he himself is the legitimate and Supreme Pontiff; and thus, given such a condition, it is certain that all other essential requirements are present; otherwise God would not have sufficiently provided for His Church, contrary to that statement: *Upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it*. Hence in that minor premise, *But Innocent XI is duly elected by the Church as successor of Peter*, the phrase *duly elected* must be understood in the same sense, namely actively and on the part of the Church. In this sense it is most certain, and as it were sensibly and experimentally known. And this suffices for the subject of the consequent to be contained in the subject of the major premise, and to participate in the same predicate: and consequently for the concluding proposition to be of faith, just as the major premise of the aforesaid argument.

Add secondly, that this evasion falls back into the immediately preceding response, which stated that the minor premise was uncertain: which, if it were true, would entail that the consequent proposition, namely, *Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church*, would have the same uncertainty, and consequently, that to deny it would be neither heretical, nor erroneous, nor temerarious, nor worthy of any other censure. And since no Catholic could admit this, and the authors of the contrary opinion openly deny it, it follows, on the contrary, that the minor premise is certainly not uncertain, whatever may be said about the type of certainty. It suffices, however, that it is certain, so that the subject of the consequent is contained in the subject of the major premise, and participates in the same predicate, and hence the consequent is immediately of faith, as is evident from what was said above.

§ III. *The Arguments to the Contrary are Addressed.*

41. The authors cited in number 28 defend the opinion opposed to ours. For which it is argued firstly: for a proposition to be immediately of faith, it must fall directly under divine revelation, which becomes known to us either through Sacred Scripture or through Apostolic tradition; but such is not the proposition, *Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church*; since no passage of Scripture can be assigned in which there is mention of this specific individual, nor do we have any Apostolic tradition that he is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church: therefore, the aforementioned proposition is not immediately of faith.

It is answered by denying the minor premise; for as we have declared above, the aforementioned proposition is immediately revealed in another proposition, which is immediately of faith, namely: *Every man rightly elected as successor of Peter is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church*; which is found in those passages of Scripture in which the power of binding and loosing is committed to Peter, the authority to confirm the brothers in faith, and the authority to feed the sheep, which we presented in the previous question, number 2. For these powers, just like the Church, did not end with Peter, but pertain to each and every one who succeeds Peter through election, as Innocent XI has succeeded. And Scripture harmonizes with Apostolic and Catholic tradition, which the Church, taught by the Apostles, observes; for it venerates the one elected by itself as successor of Peter and its Supreme Pontiff. The proof inserted in the minor premise has no strength, because although Scripture does not make formal and explicit mention of this particular man, it nevertheless does so implicitly and equivalently; for the universal propositions of Scripture do not refer to some generic degree or common concept, but to particular individuals, which it comprehends under a single universal sign; and all fall immediately under divine revelation. Just as God, when revealing, for example, *All have sinned in Adam*, does not have knowledge in general or in confusion, but judges in particular that Peter, John, Francis, and others similarly sinned in Adam; and this He expresses and signifies, and this is the meaning of His speech: hence this proposition, *Peter sinned in Adam*, is no less immediately of faith than that one, *All have sinned in Adam*. Thus in our case, God, by declaring that *every man rightly elected by the Church as successor of Peter is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church*, revealed that *Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church*.

42. You may say that it follows from this that every proposition contained in some universal [proposition] of faith is also a matter of faith. The consequence is false, since it is a matter of faith that *every properly consecrated host contains the body of Christ*; and yet it is not a matter of faith that *this particular host contains the body of Christ*. Therefore, the containment of a particular proposition within a universal one is not sufficient for the particular [proposition] to be a matter of faith.

Nor does it avail to say that due to the lack of certain and undoubted consecration, it is not a matter of faith that this particular host contains the body of Christ, the opposite of which occurs in our case. For against this is the fact that just as it is so certain that Innocent XI was elected as the successor of Peter that it excludes all prudent fear [of error], so too is it certain that this host, which we see being elevated by the Priest, is consecrated, to the extent that it excludes prudent fear [of error]; otherwise, to adore the aforementioned host would not be an act of religion but of idolatry.

It is answered by conceding the consequence when a particular proposition is certainly contained in a universal one, as happens in our case. And to the objection against this consequence, it must be said that it is not a matter of faith that this particular host contains the body of Christ because it is not certain that this host has been consecrated and is contained in the subject of the universal proposition; however, it would be immediately a matter of faith if the aforementioned consecration and inclusion were

certainly established. Nor is this response overturned by what is added; for the fact that Innocent was rightly elected by the Church is so certain that it absolutely excludes all doubt, as we declared from number 38: whereas the fact that this host was rightly consecrated is not absolutely and positively certain, but rather negatively and relatively certain with respect to the act of adoration, because no specific reason arises for us to doubt that it was consecrated. And this suffices to prevent its adoration from being an act of idolatry, but rather one of religion; for this virtue it is sufficient that a probable and prudential judgment concerning the existence of the object of its acts precedes.

43. But you will object (and this forms the second argument), because for this proposition, *Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church*, to be immediately of faith, it should be certainly established that *Innocent XI was duly elected as successor to Peter*, otherwise Innocent XI cannot be included in the subject, nor participate in the predicate of this universal proposition, *Every man duly elected etc.* However, it is not certainly established for us that Innocent was *duly elected*. Therefore, it is not immediately of faith that he is the *Supreme Pontiff of the Church*. The minor premise is proven, because for him to have been duly elected, it is required that he was and is a man, and baptized: but these facts are not known to us, neither by the light of faith, nor by evident natural light, as is clear in itself: therefore, etc.

This is confirmed because, granting that we have some certainty or evidence of this legitimate election; nevertheless, this kind of certainty and evidence is purely natural: but natural certainty and evidence are insufficient to draw the conclusion that it is immediately of faith; therefore, it is not immediately of faith that Innocent the Supreme Pontiff is the legitimate Pope. The minor premise is proven, because in this reasoning, *Every man is capable of laughter: but Christ is a man: therefore Christ is capable of laughter*, the conclusion is not immediately of faith, for no other reason than that it is deduced from one natural premise, albeit certain and evident: therefore natural certainty and evidence are insufficient to draw a conclusion that is immediately of faith.

The response to the objection is to deny the minor premise, because as we said in n. 38, the active election, which comes from the Church, is known to us with certainty through evidence that is almost sensible and experiential; and to this corresponds infallibly the passive election, or the capacity on the part of the elected, as we explained in *number 39*. Hence, concerning the proof of the minor premise, it must be said that the aforementioned conditions are certainly established from the active election of the Church itself. For although these conditions are contingent in themselves, they are rendered infallible through their relation to the universal judgment of the whole Church, and to the promise of Christ. They are known through this reasoning: “The Church does not err in matters pertaining to faith and morals; but the universal Church has elected Innocent XI as Pontiff, for which it is required that he be a man and baptized; therefore Innocent possesses these conditions.” Whether this conclusion pertains immediately to faith or to theology matters little, so long as it is entirely certain and excludes doubt concerning the aforementioned conditions. It seems more probable to us, however, and more consistent with what has been said thus far, that the essential and quasi-intrinsic conditions of the Pontiff, such as

being a man and baptized, are grasped immediately through the very act of faith by which we believe Innocent XI to be Pontiff—not precisely apart from the dignity and prior to the active election, but presupposing this election and concretely in relation to the dignity itself. Just as because it is of the nature of man to consist of body and soul, and we believe Christ to be man, by the same act we believe that Christ consists of body and soul. And in this way, just as from these premises, *Everyone duly elected by the Church as successor of Peter is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church; but Innocent has been duly elected by the Church as successor of Peter*, it is concluded that Innocent XI is the supreme Pontiff of the Church: so it is also concluded that he is a man, and baptized, and has other essential conditions for being Pontiff; and all of this taken comprehensively is immediately of faith, and is contained implicitly in that universal proposition, *Everyone duly elected by the Church, etc.*

To the confirmation, we respond by omitting the major premise and denying the minor; it is indeed certain that a natural proposition suffices to explain a universal proposition of faith, and to derive a consequence that is immediately of faith, as is clear from the examples brought forward earlier, as in this reasoning: *For every idle word that men shall speak, they shall give account thereof in the day of judgment: but this word which I speak is an idle word: therefore for this word I shall give account in the day of judgment*; in which reasoning the minor premise is purely natural, and indeed in itself is contingent; and yet the resulting proposition is immediately of faith, no less than the universal major premise in which it is contained, which is revealed in Scripture. The proof of the minor premise, however, establishes nothing, because it assigns as a cause what is not the cause. For the fact that in that reasoning the conclusion is not immediately of faith does not stem from one of the premises being natural; but because the reasoning proceeds from cause to effect, and therefore from a principle that is immediate, but through the mediation of that principle.

44. It is argued thirdly that it is not immediately of faith that Leo V, Stephen I, John X, and so forth, were Supreme Pontiffs of the Church: therefore it is not immediately of faith that Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church. The consequence is evident from parity, and the antecedent is proven because it is not certainly established that those men were duly elected by the Church as successors of Peter; rather, this is known only from human history, which can be subject to error.

It is answered, setting aside the antecedent, by denying the conclusion. And the argument itself provides the reason for the disparity; for we know with certainty that Innocent XI was duly elected by the Church as the successor of Peter, as we demonstrated above; which is sufficient for him to participate in the predicate of that universal proposition of faith, *Every man duly elected by the Church as the Successor of Peter is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church*, as we have thus far declared. If, however, we do not know with certainty that John X was duly elected by the Church as the successor of Peter, which the arguer supposes, it is not surprising that it is not immediately a matter of faith that he was the Supreme Pontiff of the Church. And if the argument were valid, it would establish that this proposition, *Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church*, is not a matter of faith even mediately;

because it does not attribute such certainty to this proposition, *John X was the Supreme Pontiff of the Church*, but only a certain human historical knowledge.

45. You may say that from our response it follows that the definitions of preceding Pontiffs are not matters of faith, which can by no means be admitted. The consequence is proven thus: for such definitions to be matters of faith, they must have emanated from a man whom it is a matter of faith was the Supreme Pontiff of the Church; for they cannot be definitions of faith unless they proceed from the Supreme Pontiff of the Church. Therefore, having conceded that it is not a matter of faith that those men were Supreme Pontiffs of the Church, it must be conceded that their definitions are not matters of faith.

It is answered by denying the consequence, which the adduced proof by no means demonstrates. For when we admit, or rather omit, that it is not a matter of faith that certain men, who are mentioned in the argument, were Supreme Pontiffs of the Church, we admit or omit this on the supposition that there is not absolute certainty about their existence and legitimate election, but precisely a certain historical knowledge; thus we directly counter the argument, which establishes precisely this knowledge. But when the Church proposes certain definitions of faith made by ancient Pontiffs, from this very tradition and approval of the Church, it is certain to us that these men were at one time duly elected and accepted by the Church as successors of Peter. With this presupposed, and adding that universal principle, *Every man duly elected*, etc., it is concluded that, for example, Clement III, John X, and so of others, were Supreme Pontiffs of the Church.

It must be added, however, that for the definitions of those Pontiffs to be matters of faith, it is not required that it be a matter of faith that those men, under whose name and authority these definitions circulate, were Supreme Pontiffs of the Church; but it suffices that the whole Church, or the present Pontiff, accepts and confirms those definitions; for approval by the current Pontiff is equivalent to a definition.

46. It is argued fourthly, that it is not immediately a matter of faith that the Council of Trent was a legitimate Council; therefore, it is not immediately a matter of faith that Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church. The consequence is evident because, just as the Church accepts Innocent XI as the Supreme Pontiff, so too it accepts the Council of Trent as a legitimate Council. Therefore, if despite this common acceptance by the Church, it is not immediately a matter of faith that the Council of Trent was a legitimate Council, similarly, the common acceptance of the Church does not prove that it is immediately a matter of faith that Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church. The antecedent is proven because it is of the essence of a legitimate Council that it be composed of true bishops. But it is not certain that the bishops assembled at the Council of Trent were true bishops, since one could doubt whether they were baptized and properly consecrated. Therefore, it is not immediately a matter of faith that the aforementioned Council was legitimate.

This is confirmed: just as the universal Church accepts Innocent XI as Supreme Pontiff, so too it accepts this canonized man, e.g., St. Isidore, in the number of saints existing in glory. But it is not immediately a matter of faith that this canonized man is a saint and exists in

glory. Therefore, it is not immediately a matter of faith that Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church.

To the argument, we respond by denying the antecedent, and to the proof the minor premise must be denied, because although it is not certain that all the Bishops of the Council of Trent, considered separately and individually, were true Bishops, it is absolutely certain that they, taken collectively, were true Bishops: firstly because it is entirely incredible that none of them were true Bishops; secondly because the Church assembled them, and the Church cannot err in these matters; thirdly because the Supreme Pontiff confirmed the aforementioned Council, and he cannot be deceived in such an approval. Thus, although the fact that those men were true Bishops is in itself a contingent matter and subject to falsity, it nevertheless becomes entirely infallible in relation to the principles just assigned: just as an object that is in itself indifferent and fallible becomes determinately certain and infallible insofar as it is the object of God's decree and knowledge.

In response to the confirmation, the major premise must be denied, because this proposition, *Every person duly canonized and accepted by the Church into the number of Saints is a Saint and exists in glory* (from which, following canonization and acceptance by the Church, it is inferred that St. Isidore is truly a Saint and exists in glory), is not immediately of faith, as Ferre correctly demonstrates in *question 13, § 5, number 12*. Hence the consequence that is deduced, namely that St. Isidore is truly a Saint and exists in heaven, is not immediately of faith. Nevertheless, it is so certain that to deny this would be erroneous, rash, and scandalous. See St. Thomas, *Quodlibet 9, article 16*, where he distinguishes between the judgment of the Church concerning matters of faith, which cannot err, and concerning particular facts or affairs, which can err; and after this he resolves that "The Canonization of Saints is intermediate between these two. However, since the honor which we show to the Saints is a kind of profession of faith by which we believe in the Saints' glory, it must be piously believed that not even in these judgments can the Church err." But if the contrary supposition is made, and it is said that the universal proposition, *Every person duly canonized, etc.* is immediately of faith, then consequently it must be said that it is immediately of faith that St. Isidore is truly a Saint and exists in glory. But if this is asserted, the minor premise must be denied, and nothing is concluded. Yet that this universal proposition, *Every person duly elected by the Church as successor of Peter, etc.* is immediately of faith, is entirely certain, and therefore by adding the certain minor premise, namely: *But Innocent was so elected*, this consequence is inferred: *Therefore Innocent XI is the supreme Pontiff of the Church*, which pertains to faith in the same way as the universal proposition from which it is deduced, or in which rather it is included.

47. It is argued fifthly that although someone may be rightly elected as Pontiff, he can nevertheless fall into heresy, and by that very fact ceases to be Pontiff, since he no longer remains a member or part of the Church through faith. But it is not immediately a matter of faith that Innocent XI, after his election, did not lapse into heresy, since this is contingent and does not contradict the principles of faith, as is sufficiently clear from what was said in

the previous doubt, number 7. Therefore, although we may be certainly aware of the legitimate election of Innocent XI as Pontiff, it is still not immediately a matter of faith that he is in fact the Supreme Pontiff of the Church. The rest of the argument is established, and as for the second part of the major premise, in which there could be difficulty, it is taught by Sylvester, Castro, Paludanus, Augustine of Ancona, Driedo, Torquemada, and Simancas, who by their authority seem to make it probable.

It is confirmed because a legitimate election of a Pontiff, with common acceptance by the Church, has sometimes occurred in the case of an incapable person. Therefore, from the fact that Innocent was duly elected and is commonly accepted by the Church, it does not follow with certainty, and much less is it immediately a matter of faith, that he is truly the Supreme Pontiff of the Church. The consequence is evident, and the antecedent is proven because John VIII, who succeeded Leo IV and preceded Benedict III, was duly elected as Pontiff and peacefully accepted by the Church. Yet he was incapable of this dignity, since he was a woman, as reported by Martin of Poland [Martinus Polonus], Marianus Scotus, Sigebert [of Gembloux], Platina, and others. Therefore, etc.

To the argument, we respond by denying the second part of the minor premise. To prove this, it must be stated that although the Pontiff may become a heretic, he does not immediately lose his dignity until he is deposed by the Church. And this is the true and common opinion of the Doctors, as can be seen in John of St. Thomas *disp. 8, art. 3*, Castillo *disp. 16, quaest. 11*, and others. If we admit, without conceding, that the opposite opinion is not improbable, it would only follow that it is not improbable to hold that the proposition “*Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church*” is not immediately of faith; and that one who denies that this entire modal proposition is of faith would not be a heretic. But it does not follow from this that it is false to say that the proposition “*Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church*” is immediately of faith, especially according to those who believe that a Pontiff who has fallen into heresy is not deposed ipso facto before he is deposed by the Church.

To the confirmation, we deny the antecedent, the proof of which is nothing other than an old wives’ tale proposed by Martin of Poland [Martinus Polonus], a most simple man (who abounds in many other such tales), and copied by certain idle authors, as clearly demonstrated by Bellarmine in *Book 3, On the Roman Pontiff, chapter 24*, Baronius in *year 853*, Labat in *the aforementioned work, § 5*, and others. Hence it is unworthy that we should dwell on refuting this fiction. Those who now transcribe or narrate that history ought to be sharply punished, were they not excused by ignorance, failing to notice how this demeans the majesty of the Church, and thinking they are completing the narration of other histories.