

L'évolution homogène du dogme catholique (*The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma*)

by Fr. Francisco Marin-Sola, 1924

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- Translation of the original text performed by Antonio T. Piñón.
- Last Edit: April 3, 2025.
- Version: 1.0
- Selection pages: 485–490, 505–507, 616–617

Chapter V, Section III - THE ECCLESIASTICAL FAITH AND DOGMATIC FACTS (Page 485)

252. — WHETHER DOGMATIC FACTS ARE OF DIVINE FAITH.

All theologians agree with St. Thomas that nothing can be the object of *divine faith* unless it is really and truly *revealed by God*. “For the faith of which we speak, does not assent to anything except on account of its *being revealed by God*.”¹ This is the foundation laid down by St. Thomas from the very first article of his immortal treatise on divine faith.

Thus, if dogmatic facts, or any other of the objects of the so-called ecclesiastical faith, are to be held by truly *divine* faith, it is indispensable that they should have been truly *revealed by God*. But have dogmatic facts been truly revealed by God? If the answer be affirmative, in what manner have they been revealed, or in what manner are they truly contained in the revealed deposit?

Such is the object of this section. The importance of the subject should be obvious to any theologian.

253. THREE KINDS OF FACTS. — In the first place, let us say something very briefly about what is meant by *dogmatic facts*.

There are three kinds of facts: (a) *expressly revealed* facts; (b) merely *particular* facts; (c) *dogmatic* facts. The problems or questions concerning these different facts are respectively denominated by theologians as: (a) the question of the *revealed fact*; (b) the question of the *particular fact*; (c) the question of the *dogmatic fact*.

¹ {org. 52} ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, 2-2, q.1, a.1.

By *expressly revealed* facts we understand, as the name itself indicates, those facts that the Apostles expressly bequeathed to the Church in the deposit of the Holy Scripture or Divine Tradition. Examples of such facts are the facts that our beloved Saviour was born in Bethlehem or the fact that His most Holy Mother remained always a virgin.

By *particular* facts we understand all those facts that are neither expressly contained in the revealed deposit nor have any *necessary relation* with it. These facts are either totally unrelated to the *doctrine* of faith or morals, or if related, concern only *particular* persons, and not the whole Church, and consequently, are not absolutely necessary for the preservation or explication of the revealed deposit. Instances of these facts, aside from exclusively *profane* facts, are the fact whether such a marriage is valid or not, or whether such a person committed or not the crime with which he is charged or whether this piece of property belongs to this or the other individual. "As when it is a question" says St. Thomas, "of possessions or crimes, or some such other things."²

In between these two extremes — the expressly revealed facts on the one hand, and merely particular facts on the other hand — there is the third kind of facts which, since the time of Jansen, have been termed *dogmatic* facts. These facts are not expressly contained in the revealed deposit, and in this they are like the particular facts; however, they differ from these in that they do have a necessary relation with the preservation, explication, or application of the *revealed doctrine*, and thus they concern not only one or several particular persons, but the *whole* Church. Such facts, among others, are the facts relative to the *orthodoxy* or *heterodoxy* of passages or books, as e.g., whether the book of Jansen is or not heretical, or whether it contained or not the notorious five heretical propositions that the Church declared were contained in it.³

254. WHAT IS CERTAIN AND WHAT IS DEBATABLE.

² {org. 53} Quodlibetum 9, a.16.

³ {org. 54} We cite as examples of dogmatic facts "the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of texts", e.g., of Jansen's book, omitting the facts of whether such a council is infallible, or such a version of the Bible is authentic, or such a pope is a true pope, etc., etc., in order to avoid the impression that with such examples as are accepted by everybody as instances of *divine* faith, we seek to prejudge the very same question we are going to deal with. But, in reality, both the former and the latter are equally dogmatic facts, and nothing more than dogmatic facts. Modern authors, when dealing with dogmatic facts, ordinarily cite Jansen's fact and not the fact of whether such a council is infallible, etc., because otherwise they would be equivalently making obvious the inconsistency or incoherence into which they later fall by accepting certain facts as of divine faith, and certain others as of ecclesiastical faith. As we shall see, the *dogmatic* character of all those facts is exactly the same. There is but one *atom species of dogmatic facts*, just as there is but one atom species of *theological conclusions*. To say otherwise is, in our view, pure empiricism.

With respect to the first category of facts, viz. those *expressly revealed*, all theologians are agreed — the thing being obvious of itself — that they are objects not only of infallibility or ecclesiastical faith, but also of divine and Catholic faith, at least when the Church defines them either through solemn or ordinary magisterium. “All those things are to be believed with *divine* and *Catholic* faith that are contained in the word of God whether written or handed down and are by the Church proposed for belief as divinely *revealed*, either through its solemn pronouncement or through its ordinary and universal magisterium.”⁴ If *all* things that are divinely *revealed* can be the object of divine faith, then the same is doubly true of that which is *expressly* revealed. Where it is a case of divine revelation or inspiration, the same faith is due to doctrines and facts. The word of God possesses divine and equal authority with respect to *anything*.

With regard to the second category, viz. the *particular* facts, all theologians are likewise agreed in affirming with St. Thomas that they can neither be the object of divine faith, nor even of ecclesiastical faith or of the infallibility of the Church. “But in the other pronouncements, which relate to *particular facts*, as when it is a question of possessions, or crimes, or some such other things, *it is possible for the Church’s judgement to be mistaken*.”⁵

Lastly, with respect to the third category, the so-called *dogmatic* facts — and it is with these that we are now concerned — there is a point on which all theologians are agreed since the Jansenist debates, and there is a point on which they disagree. They agree on affirming that such facts can be *infallibly* defined by the Church and that to such infallible definitions must be given, at least, the assent of an absolutely certain and unconditional faith, which they denominate *ecclesiastical* faith. But they disagree on whether this ecclesiastical faith is truly a *divine* faith or, on the contrary, a new species of faith lying midway between divine and human faith.

As we have said, nothing that is not divinely revealed can be of divine faith. The issue then depends on whether these dogmatic facts are truly revealed by God or not. If they are, then they can become an object of divine faith, and not merely of ecclesiastical faith. We shall attempt to make it clear that the dogmatic facts are truly revealed and to show the manner in which they are revealed.

255. THE IMPLICIT REVELATION OF THE PARTICULAR IN THE UNIVERSAL.

The first and most essential division of divine revelation is its division into *explicit* and *implicit* revelation. It is obvious that dogmatic facts have not been explicitly revealed. If, then, they have been revealed, they can only have been revealed implicitly.

What is meant by implicit revelation or what is the scope of the implicitness of divine revelation is a question on which, since Molina up to the present, the theologians are not in

⁴ {org. 55} VATICAN COUNCIL, sess.3, c.3; Denz-Schon. 3011.

⁵ {org. 56} ST. THOMAS, *Quodlibetum* 9, a.16.

accord. However, there is one point on which all or almost all theologians are in agreement, viz., that when a *universal* proposition is explicitly revealed, all the particular propositions certainly contained in it are by the same token implicitly and truly revealed and are consequently definable as of divine faith.

Thus, if it is revealed that *all* things have been created by God, it is *implicitly* revealed, and definable as of divine faith, that *this* particular thing, e.g., the angels, have been created. If it is revealed that *all* men have been redeemed by Christ, it is implicitly revealed, and definable as of divine faith, that *this* man has been redeemed. If it is revealed that *all* ecumenical councils are infallible rules of faith, it is implicitly revealed, and definable as of divine faith, that *this ecumenical council*, e.g., *the Tridentine*, is an *infallible rule of faith*. If it is revealed that all the popes accepted by the universal Church are successors of St. Peter, it is implicitly revealed that this pope, e.g., our Most Holy Father Pius XI, is a successor of St. Peter, or a true pope. On this point all, or almost all, theologians are today agreed. But precisely because it is admitted by almost all theologians, it becomes necessary to tarry awhile in its analysis in order to be able later to pass on from what everybody admits to what everybody should admit if he were logical.

It is said, and said truly, that it is implicitly revealed that the Tridentine is infallible, that the Vulgate is authentic in matter of faith and morals, that the actual pope is a true pope. Now, then, we all know that the deposit of divine revelation was closed upon the death of the last of the apostles and that no new public or Catholic revelation was thenceforth possible. How then, is it possible for such facts as the Vulgate, the Tridentine, or the actual pope, to have been truly revealed by God when they took place many centuries after the apostles? Do not such facts constitute a true *addition* to the revealed deposit? Is this not tantamount to an admission that the Church is capable of giving us *new dogmas*?

Any student of theology knows the answer – and a good answer it is – given to these questions. The revealed deposit was closed with the last of the apostles with respect to *new Catholic revelation*; however, it was not closed, but remains and will remain open, with respect to the infallible *explication* or *application* of the old revelation. The Church cannot give us *new dogmas* in the sense of being *new unqualifiedly* (simpliciter), or new in *substance*; but she can give us new dogmas in the sense of being *new only somehow* (secundum quid, i.e., in some manner), i.e., new as to their *explication*, provided that such explication is not done through new revelations, as was the case until the death of the last of the apostles, but only through mere infallibility or *assistance* of the Holy Spirit.⁶ Now,

⁶ {org. 57} “The Apostles and their successors are God’s vicars as regards the government of the Church already constituted by faith and the sacraments of the faith. Hence, just as they are not allowed to constitute *another Church*, so neither are they allowed to teach *another faith* or to constitute *other sacraments*.” (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.3, q.64, a.2, ad 1) “There are two ways of *opposing* [or *adding*]: either [by *affixing*] something that is *contrary or diverse*, and this is erroneous or presumptuous; or by *expounding* something that is *implicitly* contained, and this is praiseworthy.” (ST. THOMAS, *In I Sent.*, divisio textus prolog.) “Consequently, by no human authority can *new things* be introduced *for belief*, but

this, and only this, is what the Church does when she applies a proposition that has been revealed in a *universal* form to a *particular* proposition.

256. CONDITIONED PROPOSITIONS.

To see clearly that such particular propositions are merely the *explication* or *application* of the revealed *universal* we need only consider the nature or meaning of such universal propositions. They are *conditioned* universals. The universal proposition, “every *ecumenical council is a rule of faith*” means to say that *every council is a rule of faith if it is ecumenical*”. Thus, it is true that no *particular* council, e.g. the Tridentine, was celebrated until many centuries after the apostles, or after the revealed deposit was closed. But it is no less true that, before the revealed deposit was closed, and while the apostles were still alive, it was already truly *revealed* that “*any council, e.g., the Tridentine, is a rule of faith if it is ecumenical*”. Merely by *purging* or infallibly verifying that condition, the conditioned proposition, “it is revealed that the Tridentine Council is a rule of faith, *if it is ecumenical*”, is converted into this *absolute* proposition, “it is revealed that the Tridentine Council is a rule of faith”.

Hence, without any *new* revelation, and simply by the purging or verifying of a *condition*, any particular proposition contained in a universal or conditioned proposition can become a proposition of divine faith. This is the case at least when infallibility exists in order to verify or remove the condition. Such infallibility exists in the Church, according to *all* theologians.

Even at the risk of being called redundant and tedious, we will reduce the foregoing considerations to the form of reasoning, for once this is grasped it will be easy to understand the nature of *any and all* truly dogmatic facts. Let the reasoning be as follows:

It is revealed that *every ecumenical council is infallible*”, or what amounts to the same thing, it is revealed that “*every council is infallible if it is ecumenical*”.

Now, *such a Council* is certainly ecumenical.

Therefore, *such a Council* is infallible.

We ask the reader to pay attention to the conclusion, which is precisely the fact with which we are now concerned. It will be clear that it is simply a particular case of the revealed universal major, the only difference being that the *condition* has disappeared. If he now

only an *explication* of what has been revealed to the *Apostles and Prophets* by the Word of God.” (CAJETAN, *In Epist. ad Romanos*, c.10) “Neither the Supreme Pontiff nor the whole Church can allow a *new article* or a *new dogma as regards its substance*. Whence it follows then when we ask whether the Supreme Pontiff can err in *defining* matters of faith, we understand this to mean the *explication* of matters of faith by his definition.” (BAÑEZ, *In 2-2*, q.1, a.10)

looks at the minor, he will see that it neither adds nor subtracts anything *doctrinal* from the major; the minor merely verifies or purges the *condition*.

Hence the minor does not enter the reasoning as the *formal motive* or as the cause of the conclusion, but only as a *condition*. Now, then, it is a commonplace among theologians that in any case where the minor enters the reasoning, not as the formal motive, but simply as the condition to explicate or apply the revealed major, the conclusion is also revealed and definable as of *divine* faith. Thus theologians commonly admit that the Church can define as of divine faith, and not only as of ecclesiastical faith, that such a Council, e.g. the Vatican, is infallible, or that such a pope, e.g. the actual pope, is a true pope.⁷

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Now then, how is it possible that Billuart, who clearly appears to deny that theological conclusions can be defined as of divine faith, could have gone so far as to admit that dogmatic facts are definable as of divine faith? For it must be noted — and this is the funny part — that Billuart's admission of the definability of divine faith of dogmatic facts is grounded, and grounded well, on the argument that "the Church's infallibility with respect to every dogmatic fact has been truly revealed", without adverting to the fact that it is likewise revealed that the Church is infallible with respect to *everything* truly *connected* with the revealed deposit, and therefore with respect to every truly theological *conclusion*, as almost every theologian concedes today. (212)

273. Billuart's oversight has a very simple explanation. It is common knowledge that Billuart frequently does little else but summarize, albeit with characteristic French clarity, the teachings of John of St. Thomas and the Salmanticenses. These two eminent theologians failed to discern the Suarezian muddle relative to the revealed *virtual* or theological conclusion, and thus denied, and did well in denying, that the *mere* virtual (*virtuale tantum* — connexive *tantum*) was definable as of faith since it is not a rigorous theological conclusion, but a merely physical conclusion. However, they employed such a

⁷ {org. 58} "Whenever a *universal* proposition is of faith, the *singular* propositions that are contained in it pertain likewise to faith; and the natural proposition that is necessary is only a condition for assenting by faith to such a singular proposition... The minor is only a required condition, not the formal reason of the conclusion." (DIDACUS NUNO, O.P., *Expositio in 3.am D. Thomae partem*, q.20, a.3, Vallisoleti 1609, pg. 627) "For we say that it has been *revealed* by God that *this* individual man, to wit, Our Most Holy Lord Urban VIII, is the Supreme Pontiff, by the *universal* revelation whereby He revealed that the Church would not err in acknowledging this individual as true head." (LUGO, *De Fide*, d.1, n.330) "That *particular* truth is sufficiently contained in the *universal* dogma of faith." (SUÁREZ, *De Fide*, d.3, s.5, n.10) "And the subsumed natural proposition is a *mere explication* of the *universal* proposition and its *application* to a determinate and *particular* subject." (SALMANTICENSES, *De Fide*, d.4, n.36)

phraseology as to seem to deny the definability of faith of every true virtual, including the identical or *implicit* virtual, and consequently of every truly and rigorously theological conclusion. In this matter, as in almost everything else, Billuart simply summarized these two theologians.

On the other hand, neither John of St. Thomas nor the Salmanticenses dealt with the issue of dogmatic facts since theologians had no cause to deal with the subject until it was raised by the evasions of the Jansenists. This made it possible for Billuart to do his own thinking on the subject of dogmatic facts which led him, as it ought to lead every Thomist, to the conclusion that dogmatic facts are implicitly revealed as particular instances in the universal, and that consequently they are definable as of divine faith. Thus on the two occasions that he touches on this problem,⁸ he places the view which holds that dogmatic facts are of *divine* faith alongside the other then rather current view that held them to be of ecclesiastical faith, and takes pleasure in providing extensive solutions to whatever objections were marshalled by the Jansenists against it.

274. If John of St. Thomas and the Salmanticenses had lived somewhat later and had dealt with this subject, they would certainly have come to the same conclusion. On the question whether it is of *divine* faith that “the present pope is a true pope” or that “the Council of Trent is a legitimate council” – these were the only *facts* then commonly discussed in connexion with faith – both give an affirmative answer on the ground that such facts are truly contained in divine revelation as the particular in the universal.⁹

But every dogmatic faith is contained in just the same manner, and hence it is definable as of *divine*, and not only as of ecclesiastical, faith.

275. If such early Thomists as Torquemada, Cajetan, Cano, etc., denied that certain dogmatic facts, including the fact that “such a pope is a true pope,” were of divine faith,

⁸ {org. 68} *Loc. cit.* Also *De Incarnatione*, d.4, digressio secunda de Euthichianismo, s.5, solvuntur objectiones.

⁹ {org. 69} “Since the *particular* proposition contained in the *universal* revealed to the whole Church is immediately of *faith*, as the universal itself; but *this proposition*, ‘Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church’, is contained in a *universal* proposition revealed to the whole Church; therefore this proposition is immediately of faith... The containment is declared in this syllogism: ‘Every man duly elected by the Church to succeed Peter is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church; but Innocent XI is duly elected by the Church to succeed Peter; therefore Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church...’ The subsumed natural proposition [i.e., the *minor* of such reasoning] is a pure *explication* of the universal proposition, and its *application* to a determinate subject. Hence, if the universal proposition is but *once* taken to be immediately of faith, the middle natural proposition whereby it is *applied* and *explicated*, will not in the least hinder the *particular* proposition, which has the nature of a consequent, from being also immediately of faith.” (SALMANTICENSES, *De Fide*, d.4, nn.33 and 36)

this is explained by taking into account that the *revealed* status of the Church's infallibility with respect to those facts was *not yet clear* at the time. Those great Thomists have never been guilty of the glaring inconsistency involved in admitting the *revelation* of the Church's infallibility with respect to something and denying that that same thing is of *divine* faith once it has been defined. Since today both Thomists and non-Thomists concede the *revealed* status of the Church's infallibility with respect to dogmatic facts, everybody should concede that such facts are of *divine* faith once they have been defined.

276. THE ATTITUDE OF THE CHURCH.

There has been progress in Catholic theology in the matter of dogmatic facts as in so many others. As it almost always happens, the practice or attitude of the Roman Church has been a principal factor of this progress. Clement VIII's forceful attitude, at the beginning of the 17th century, against the supporters of Alcalá's notorious thesis ("It is not of faith that this individual man, e.g., Clement VIII, is a true Pontiff"), oriented the thinking of theologians in the study of that dogmatic fact in particular, and since then almost everybody admits that the fact is of divine faith.¹⁰

Subsequently, the no less forceful attitude of Popes Innocent X, Alexander XII, and Clement IX against the resistance and the interminable quibbles presented by the Jansenists, similarly oriented Catholic theology in the study of the dogmatic fact in general. Since then there is almost no theologian who does not admit that it has been revealed that the Church is infallible with respect to every dogmatic fact. For every Thomist this is equivalent to saying that *every dogmatic fact* has been *revealed*, and consequently that it has been *revealed* that this dogmatic fact is infallibly true once it has been defined. Or in other words, that it is of *divine* faith since divine faith extends itself not only to *what God reveals* but also to *what God reveals as true*. However, although such a fact is of *divine faith* inasmuch as it is contained as a particular in a revealed universal, nonetheless *it is*

¹⁰ {org. 70} "This view was given *great weight* by Clement VIII, who incarcerated some teachers for maintaining the contrary, and commanded them to go to Rome to give an account of the opinion which that See considered *deserving of punishment*," (PETRUS HURTADO, *De Fide*, d.3) Confronted by this attitude of Rome the theologians of the Society as well as the Thomists made such haste to support the papal directives that presently Lugo writes that "our later teachers commonly" teach this doctrine (*De Fide*, n.326); and the Salmanticenses, after quoting for their view almost all the Thomists posterior to Clement VIII, qualify it as "the *common opinion*" (*loc. cit.*, n.30) Thus, to argue for the view that dogmatic facts are of divine faith once they have been defined by the Church, the modern theologian needs do no more nor less than apply to dogmatic facts in general exactly the same principles that have been applied by almost all theologians since Clement VIII to the fact of "whether it is of divine faith that such a pope is a true pope once he has been accepted by the Church", or "whether it is of divine faith such a council is a rule of faith once it has been accepted by the Church as ecumenical". Neither more nor less.

not of divine faith that such a fact is of divine faith inasmuch as the revelation of the universal has not yet been *defined*. Hence, *no one who denies it is a heretic*.

We beg the reader's indulgence for so much insistence and repetition, but all of it is necessary in order to uproot ideas that are so widespread as that of the modern and heterogeneous *ecclesiastical* faith. In our opinion the term *ecclesiastical* faith would have perfectly described the kind of faith or *human* – not divine – *religious* assent given by us to the *non-infallible* teachings of the Church.

277. APPLICATIONS.

Everything that has been said in this section about dogmatic facts applies equally to such facts as whether this law, discipline or custom of the universal Church, or this Rule or these Constitutions of this religious order are *morally right* (the fact in question is the fact of their *morality*, not of their timeliness or prudence), or to any other truly *dogmatic* fact, to wit, one that is necessarily *connected* with the divine deposit or *necessary for its* preservation, explication or application, and has been *infallibly* defined or approved by the Church. The morality of such a fact is not only of ecclesiastical, but of *divine*, faith.

Chapter VI, Section III - OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE SCOPE OF DOGMATIC EVOLUTION WITH THE SCOPE OF THE CHURCH'S INFALLIBILITY (Page 616)

337. TENTH OBSERVATION.

“The certainty of divine faith has to be infinitely superior not only to physical, but also to metaphysical certainty. Consequently, the metaphysico-inclusive conclusion is as far removed from divine faith as the physico-connexive conclusion.”

Reply. — A conclusion necessarily has to be metaphysico-inclusive if it is to be definable as of divine faith, not because metaphysical *certainty* has anything to do with the certainty of faith, which is infinitely superior to it, but because where metaphysical connexion is present the conclusion is identical with, or objectively *included* in the revealed major, which is of faith. The conclusion is definable, not on account of its metaphysical connexion, but on account of its *inclusion*. Thus, metaphysical certainty has nothing to do with the certainty of faith, but the *inclusion* or implicitness of the conclusion in the premise of faith, not only has something to do with its definability as of faith, but it is the *only* thing that is required and suffices to render it definable, if its inclusion can be evidently known without new revelation.

338. ELEVENTH OBSERVATION.

What is really identical with the revealed is contained therein *quoad se*, but it is not contained therein *quoad nos*.

Reply. — If our reason cannot evidently deduce it without the aid of a new revelation, then it is contained therein *quoad se*, but not *quoad nos* as, e.g., the Trinity of Persons in the

Unity of God. But if our reason is capable of deducing it evidently by its own resources, then it is contained therein also with respect to our reason.

339. TWO LAST OBJECTIONS. TWELFTH OBSERVATION.

“Nothing exists but pure connexion between what is said by God and its theological conclusions.”

Reply. — In theology, as well as in metaphysics, taking these sciences in the rigorous sense, there can never be *pure connexion*, but connexion together with inclusion. Theological and metaphysical conclusions, considered *objectively*, are not connected but identical to their principles. They are connexive only when they are considered *subjectively*. The whole distinction, upon which they are based, is not in the object, but in the *subject*.

THIRTEENTH OBSERVATION.

No fact can be defined as of divine faith, and consequently as *revealed*, if it has taken place after the Apostles and, thus, after the closure of the deposit of revelation.

Reply. — It is false to say that contingent facts that took place after the Apostles cannot be truly revealed facts and definable as of divine faith. The celebration of the Council of Trent, the drafting of the present Canon of the mass, the Vulgate translation, the election of such a pope, the begetting of this man... are contingent facts that have taken place after the Apostles.

Nonetheless, it has been defined, or it is definable as of divine faith and, hence, it is *revealed*, that the Tridentine Council is ecumenical or a rule of faith, that the Canon of the mass is free from error, that the Vulgate is authentic with respect to fundamental matters of faith and morals, that our Holy Father Pius XI is a true pope, that this man has been redeemed by Christ.

It is true that it was possible for the Tridentine not to have been celebrated; and in this sense it is a contingent fact; but having been celebrated *as it was celebrated*, it is not contingent but necessary that it should be ecumenical or a rule of faith. Similarly, it was possible for Jansen's *Augustinus* not to have been written, and it is only in this sense that it is a contingent fact; but once it was written *as it was written*, its formal opposition to the revealed deposit, i.e., its heretical nature, is not contingent but absolutely necessary.

Now then, upon the death of the last of the Apostles the Church remained in possession not only of a doctrinal deposit, but also of a dogmatic authority to determine, by means of that deposit, the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of every doctrinal formula. We call attention to the term “every”. It means that the Church has authority to pass judgment not only on doctrinal formulae stated orally, but also on those set down in writing; not only on those that are brief, but also on those that are extensive, even if they be so extensive as to make up a whole book; not only on those that had been spoken or written before the closure of the revealed deposit, but also on those that might be spoken or written in the future.