



# Ship Happens: The Stormy Seas of Supply Chain Security

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Solution Architect, Endor Labs



# Our voyage today

- Why talk about the software supply chain?
- What is a software supply chain?
- Why are they under attack?
- How software is built
- What can go wrong
- Securing your Source, Build, (Dependencies), Packages
- Resources
- Q & A





# Before we set sail


```
-----  
/ This talk is not a critique of open-  \  
| source software. Most open-source    |  
| projects rely on the hard work of    |  
| volunteers, whose valuable contributions |  
| are often overlooked. The best way to  |  
\  
\ help open-source is to fund it!      /
```

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  \      ^__^  
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            ||     ||
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Cowsay, courtesy of Tony Monroe



# Why a talk about “software supply chain”?



solarwinds 

 Codecov




log4shell™

 Progress  
MOVEit

  
Kaseya



# Not all heroes wear capes



XKCD r/ProgrammerHumor





# Why is this happening?

## Economic Factors


- Higher rewards
- Detection is difficult
- Many attacks are inexpensive

## Human Factors

- “Trusting” mindset
- Rapid transition to remote work
- Pressure and burnout

## Technological Factors


- Complex and interconnected supply chains
- Rapid adoption of open source
- Easy target?






# What is a software supply chain?

Anything used to deliver software to production






# High level: How is software built?








# What's in your threat model?






# Where are our trust boundaries?





# Developers like shiny things!





# Developers: navigating the risks

## Threats

- Compromised device (malware)
- Credential theft/exposure
- Coding mistakes
- Malicious insider
- Social engineering
- Copy/paste!

## Controls

- Access controls
- Endpoint protection
- Verify software integrity
- (SSC) Security training
- Commit signing
- SCA/\*AST
- Web IDEs(!)
- **Code reviews**

CircleCI incident report for  
January 4, 2023 security incident

Malicious VSCode extensions with millions of installs discovered


Cybercriminals pose as "helpful" Stack Overflow users to push  
malware

**The Octopus Scanner Malware:  
Attacking the open source  
supply chain**

**This Week in Malware - Over 70  
packages discovered**




# Code Reviews? Ain't Nobody Got Time for That!



95% of vulnerabilities are in transitive dependencies  
(from the perspective of an application)


Program analysis techniques can determine reachability of vulnerable code





# CVEs: Not the only sharks in the water!


What else  
should I be  
concerned  
about?



See the [Risk Explorer](#) and [Backstabber's Knife Collection](#) for more!



# Dependency bumps are harder than you think



Source: Moderne, June 2023



Journal of Systems and Software

Volume 183, January 2022, 111097



## Can we trust tests to automate dependency updates? A case study of Java Projects ☆

Joseph Hejderup  , Georgios Gousios 

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### Highlights

- Developers perceive tests as unreliable for automated dependency updating.
- Mutation testing reveal gaps in test coverage of dependencies.
- Static analysis can reduce gaps where tests are unable to reach in dependencies.
- Toolmakers should introduce an adequacy score for automated updating.
- Static analysis is useful and improves the reliability of automated updating.

<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0164121221001941>






# Meet your new crew mates!

*“The modern software supply chain is both miraculous and terrifying”*

- Seth Michael Larson, core maintainer of urllib3



*Dependencies you won't find in  
your requirements.txt*




# Smooth sailing with shipshape dependencies!

## Is it secure?

- Unfixed vulnerabilities
- Potential Malware
- Calls sensitive APIs
- Obfuscated code
- Binaries in the repo

## Is it popular?

- Is it forked
- Stars
- Subscribers
- Dependant projects
- Many downloads



openssf scorecard 9

## Does it meet your standards?


- Documentation
- % Test code in the repo
- Verified commits
- Major releases
- Automated builds

## Is it being well maintained?

- Reputable contributors
- Regular commits
- Frequent releases
- Merged PRs
- Issues raised/closed




# Securing your bounty




## SCM Org

- Access Control
- Audit Logging
- Security Policies
- Integrations
- Verify organisation



## Repo

- Secret scanning
- Multiple (but limited) admins
- Restrict visibility



## Branch

- Branch protection
- Signed commits
- PR Checks
- Forced push restrictions
- Codeowner reviews



Review CIS Benchmark (GitHub/GitLab) for more details!












# Beware: Untrusted tools can sink your ship

**build**  
failed 2 weeks ago in 50s

Search logs



- >  Run actions/checkout@v4
- >  Setup JDK 17
- >  Obtaining access to your secrets, code and cloud environment
- >  Downloading a bunch of dependencies from around the world
- >  Running a few random GitHub actions that your developers chose
- >  Running this maven plugin that claims to make your code faster
- >  Run some linter that some dude in Birmingham wrote
- >  Saving the binary, good job y'all





# Anchoring security: critical build controls

## Pipeline/Workflow

- Secure secrets, duh
- Limit token scope
- Detect script injections
- Separate the build stage and isolate binaries
- Require run approval for all outside collaborators
- Don't run external scripts!




## Actions/Plugins

- **Gain visibility!**
- Pin to version hashes
- Understand the provenance
- Prevent PR approvals
- **Undertake code reviews** or consider limiting actions via a policy
- Fork actions

## Build runners


- Use cloud-hosted runners if you can
- Don't run self-hosted runners for public repos
- Isolate self-hosted runners and limit network connections



**ALMOST... THERE!**



# Sealing your cargo





# Navigating integrity with artifact signing

## Inputs



Package

+



Provenance  
(commit, SBOM,  
pipeline)

## Signing Provider e.g. Sigstore or Endor Labs

Establish identity via OIDC



Generate short-lived signing  
certificate




Sign artifact digest



Store signature, certificate and  
public key in immutable log


## Verification



- ✓ Valid certificate
- ✓ Signature verified
- ✓ Timestamp matches validity
- ✓ Signature not revoked
- ✓ Provenance data matches



## Frameworks/ Resources



Including:

- Supply Chain Threat Model
- Supply Chain Risks/Compromises
- Best Practices/Standards
- OWASP resources
- Hardening guides
- Free SSCS Developer training
- Tools/Utilities
- Blogs
- Research

# Thank you!

ENDOR  OWASP

Join us at Global AppSec Lisbon for Happy Hour drinks!