



Privacy in Practice: The Feasibility of Differential Privacy for Telemetry Analysis

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Introduction

Research Question: How effective is differential privacy when it is applied in *practice*?

We replicated 4 papers implementing Differential Privacy (DP) in order to assess the utility lost from adding noise.

Privacy of user data is guaranteed by adding randomness into algorithms to

ensure that results match the data patterns yet are indistinguishable between datasets with and without a specific datum.

Telemetry data is diagnostic information collected by devices such as CPUs or OSes. This data can paint a vibrant picture of a user given appropriate analysis.

Methods

Conditional Probabilities

Description
Probability of uncorrected error based on number of corrected errors

Non-Private

Histogram creation for event occurrence

Private

Laplace Mechanism

Log. Regression Coefficient Test

Do corrected errors cause uncorrected errors?
Testing 29 different errors

Wald test on logistic regression coefficient

Noisy Gradient Descent during LR training

Lasso Regression

Find features which best predict pack power usage

Coordinate Descent & Frank-Wolfe

Noisy Frank-Wolfe (Exponential Mechanism)


K-Means Clustering

Cluster devices based on usage counts

K-Means via Lloyd's algorithm



Noisy mean computation during centroid updates

Results at Privacy $\epsilon = 1$





DP-KMeans centroids are near lower L1 distances given the skewed distribution.

Private Wald test errantly found that 40% of cases that should've been significant were insignificant.



Privatized Lasso reaches near optimal performance for small max iterations K=200, not as competitive for large K.

Corrected error (19) counts vs the uncorrected error (41 & 1001) percents with and without noise.



Normalized utility is a range from 0-1 of the accuracy of each model, relative to a baseline (non-private model)

Epsilon determines the trade-off between utility and privacy

Discussion

Epsilon of 1 is generally considered to be **highly private**. In our tests, high privacy results in somewhat unusable and highly-incorrect analyses. Further, for some methods such as DP-GD, compute scales linearly with epsilon making meta-analysis more costly for higher values of epsilon.

Epsilon of 10 or more is typically considered very poor, however interpreting is vague. For most tasks utility is usable (near the non-private baseline) only at large epsilon.

Adding noise using python can be simple, scaling and tracking budgets requires following theorems from research.

Key Takeaways

- Even with large amounts of data, **strong privacy** guarantees $\epsilon < 0.1$ suffer from grave **utility loss**
- Privately selecting *hyperparameters* either requires vast domain knowledge or taking from the privacy budget
- Practical application of DP may require loosening which agents are protected against
- Epsilon* is a poor quantification of privacy for *non-expert practitioners*