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# INFANT INCUBATOR SECURITY REVIEW

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CSGY 6803

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## Overview

This report details the different aspects of the simulated medical device- infant incubator. Section 0 briefly introduces the product and emphasizes the importance of proper security. Section 1 describes the security requirements of the product. Section 2 provides data-flow diagrams for the product. Section 3 contains the asset list for the product. Section 4 details potential threats to the assets covered in Section 3. Section 5 analyzes the risk level of each threat covered in Section 4. Section 6 covers the software analysis performed, detailing some of the vulnerabilities within the code. Section 7 provides a detailed conclusion on the product's release based on the analysis Group 13 has performed.

## 0. Background

This security analysis report focuses on the infant incubator product. An infant incubator is a specialized medical device used in hospitals to control the temperature, light, humidity, and oxygen levels for newborns. It is typically employed to aid sick or premature babies who require extra time and medical support for their organs to develop properly. The incubator features a plexiglass chamber that encloses the newborn and includes various technological components to create and maintain the optimal environment.

The hardware components of the infant incubator include:

- An onboard access control station
- A network interface
- An internal oxygen concentrator and humidifier
- An internal heater
- An internal light
- An internal thermometer
- An external thermometer

The incubator can be accessed in two ways: through the onboard access control station, which requires physical presence, or remotely via the network interface. Users with remote access can check the device's current temperature. The heater inside the incubator operates based on the readings from both internal and external thermometers, turning on and off as needed.

Group 13 was tasked with performing a security analysis of the infant incubator simulator. It is a Python-based simulator that models a simplified infant incubator. The code written in the simulator will be used within the final infant incubator product in production. It should be noted that the simulator does not contain the implementation code for the light or the oxygen concentrator/humidifier. The simulator only covers the implementation code for the heater and thermometers which are used to regulate the temperature within the incubator.

Security is a critical part of the safety of the infant incubator product. The infant incubator is a medical device used to aid newborns; therefore, the device must function correctly, or the newborn's life may be put at risk. Inaccurate sensor readings, wrong environment conditions, or a nonoperational device may result in a dangerous or possibly deadly environment for the newborn. Security measures are vital in lowering the risks to the incubator from tampering or misuse. The incubator also sends critical device information, temperature readings, over the network. The device must have proper security to ensure these measurements are accurate and tamper-free during data transfer. Inaccurate measurements may result in healthcare professionals taking incorrect actions based on poor information. Safety is the number one priority, and security helps provide this safety. Our product cannot be a success without carefully addressing security issues.

## 1. Security Requirements for the Infant Incubator

Req. No.	Requirement System applies to	Responsible Party	Validation Method	Requirement Description	Is this requirement met in the final product?
1	Authentication Mechanism	System Architect/Developer	Penetration testing, code review	Prevent unauthorized access to critical functions.	Yes
2	Data Encryption	Network Engineer/Developer	Code review, network traffic monitoring	Protect confidentiality of transmitted data.	No
3	Secure Communication Channel	Network Engineer/Developer	Network analysis tools, protocol compliance checks	Mitigate risks of eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle attacks.	No
4	Authorization Controls	System Architect/Developer	Code review, access logs analysis	Restrict operations based on user roles (e.g., admin, user).	No
5	Secure Storage of Data	Database Administrator/Developer	Security audits, encryption implementation	Ensure data integrity and prevent unauthorized access.	Yes
6	Input Validation	Developer	Automated testing, code review	Prevent injection attacks and malformed input.	Yes
7	Logging and Monitoring	System Administrator/Developer	Log analysis tools, real-time monitoring	Detect and respond to security incidents promptly.	No
8	Patch Management	System Administrator/IT Operations	Patch management system, vulnerability scanning	Ensure timely updates to mitigate known vulnerabilities.	Yes

9	Physical Security Measures	Facility Manager/Security Team	Security audits, access controls	Protect physical access to hardware and infrastructure.	Yes
10	Disaster Recovery Plan	IT Manager/Disaster Recovery Specialist	Testing, documentation review	Ensure system availability and data integrity in case of failures.	Yes
11	Compliance with Regulations	Legal/Compliance Officer	Compliance audits, legal review	Meet legal and regulatory requirements (e.g., GDPR, HIPAA).	Yes
12	Vendor Security Assurance	Procurement Manager/Security Team	Vendor assessments, contract review	Ensure third-party products and services meet security standards.	Yes

## 2. DFD for the Infant Incubator

The following diagrams show how data flows between the different entities and elements of the infant incubator and the medical personnel. Figure 1 shows the components of the infant incubator and how the components interact and share data. Figure 2 shows a client connecting to the infant incubator server within the same hospital network.




Figure 1: Infant incubator components showing how different components interact and share data.




Figure 2: Example of a client connecting through the browser to the infant incubator.

### 3. Asset List

The following table lists the infant incubator product's important assets.

Asset #	Asset Name	Asset Description	Concrete or Abstract Asset?	Critical Asset or no?
1.	Remote access system	Login/password for network access	Abstract	Yes
2.	Local user credentials	Login pin for local access	Abstract	Yes
3.	Incubator	The physical incubator including hardware to function	Concrete	Yes
4.	Thermometers	Internal and external thermometers to make temperature readings	Concrete	Yes

## 4. Threat List

The following table lists some threats associated with one or more of the infant incubator product's assets described in Section 3.

Threat #	Affected Component	STRIDE Threat Category	Attacker	Threat description	Threat Severity	Recommended Control
1.	Remote access system	Spoofing	Malicious process on user's system	Steals log in credentials from remote system	High	Properly store and secure credentials. Ability to revoke and reassign credentials.
2.	Remote access system	Denial of service	Flood the incubator's network receiver with traffic	Prevent valid commands from reaching the incubator	High	Distinguish between valid and invalid requests. (Difficult to remediate)
3.	Remote access system	Information disclosure	Captures and decrypts network traffic (assuming it is encrypted)	Exposes system information to unauthorized people	High	Encrypt network traffic for authentication and data transfer.
4.	Local user credentials	Repudiation	Finds the shared local PIN	If a shared PIN is used for local access of the incubator, no audit trail of users	Low	Ability to revoke and reassign local pin numbers.
5.	Local user credentials / Remote access system	Repudiation	Tamper or deletes logs after performing actions	No reliable audit trail of actions performed by the attacker	Medium	Properly implement logs and audit trails.
6.	Incubator	Denial of service	Unplugs device from the network	Prevent valid commands from reaching incubator	Low	Responsibility of health staff to protect devices.
7.	Incubator	Tampering	Damages the incubator	Prevents the incubator from functioning properly	Medium	Responsibility of health staff to protect devices. Hardware needs to have routine health checks.
8.	Thermometers	Tampering	Damages one or both thermometers' functionality to read temperature correctly	Prevents the incubator from functioning properly as it has incorrect or missing temperature readings	High	Responsibility of health staff to protect devices. Hardware needs to have routine health checks.

## 5. Risk Analysis

The following table calculates the risk level of each threat described in Section 4 based on the likelihood and impact of the threat. Some threat level is justified below the table.

		Impact				
		Minimal	Low	Medium	High	Critical
Likelihood	Critical	Minimal	Low	Medium	High	Critical
	High	Minimal	Low	Medium	High	Critical
	Medium	Minimal	Low	Medium	Medium	High
	Low	Minimal	Low	Low	Low	Medium
	Minimal	Minimal	Minimal	Minimal	Low	Low

Risk #	Risk Name	Related Threat #	Likelihood	Impact	Risk
1.	Remote User Spoofing	1.	Medium	High	Medium
2.	Network Denial of Service	2.	Medium	Medium	Low
3.	Network Snooping (Information Disclosure)	3.	Medium	Low	Low
4.	Local User spoofing / local access	4.	Medium	High	Medium
5.	Non-repudiation	5.	Low	Medium	Low
6.	Physical Denial of Service	6.	Low	High	Medium
7.	Damage Incubator	7.	Medium	Critical	High
8.	Damage Thermometers	8.	Low	Critical	Medium

### Threat Justification:

1. User Spoofing (Authentication Bypass): Steals login credentials from remote system. Likelihood is medium because the attacker has to be able to take over the client machine to snoop on the credentials. Impact is high because the attacker can get full control over the incubators remotely with this information. Risk is rated by the table as medium. It can be highly impactful if the credentials are stolen, but the process of doing so is typically not straightforward.
2. Network Denial of Service: Prevent valid commands from reaching the incubator Likelihood is medium because to conduct a Denial of Service attack, the attacker has to have already breached the network elsewhere. Impact is low as it will not affect the ability of the incubator to function, only for it to be monitored remotely. Risk is rated by the table as low. While remote monitoring of these systems is helpful, hospital staff could oversee the units until the Denial of Service is stopped.



3. Network Snooping (Information Disclosure): Exposes system information to unauthorized people Likelihood is medium because the attacker has to take over the client machine or another system to snoop on the network traffic and decrypt it. Impact is low as it will not affect the ability of the incubator to function, and there should be no sensitive information in the data being passed to and from the incubator. Risk is rated by the table as low. The data going to and from the incubator should contain the state of the machine and not any sensitive PII. The attacker capturing this data will not affect system usage or compromise the baby's and/or their family's privacy.
4. Local User spoofing / local access: If a shared PIN is used for local access of the incubator, no audit trail of users Likelihood is medium because the local access PIN is likely posted in numerous places or can be observed by watching the staff. Impact is high because being able to adjust the settings on an incubator could have a significant impact. 15 Risk is rated by the table as medium. The attacker would need physical access to the units and would also have to bypass other layers of security, including physical security systems and cameras.
5. Non-repudiation: No reliable audit trail of actions performed by the attacker Likelihood is low because the attacker would already have non-repudiation using a shared PIN. Impact is medium because it would help shield the attacker's action from future review once they were discovered. Risk is rated by the table as low. Logging is essential, but not having complete logs does not affect the functionality of the incubator.

## 6. Software Analysis

The following table lists vulnerabilities found within the infant incubator product's code. The recommendations section at the end of this report describes each vulnerability in depth with potential approaches to patching. The recommendations section is written in technical terminology to better support developers in making these fixes. It is essential to note that the patches suggested within the recommendations section should be taken as potential approaches to resolving these vulnerabilities, not as comprehensive fixes. Our team recommends resolving these vulnerabilities before the product is released to production.

Vulnerability #	Affected Component	Description	Affected Requirement # (if known)	Recommended Fix
1. Hardcoded Password Vulnerability	Access Control Station (Smart Network Thermometer)	Passwords are stored in plaintext within code	Requirement #10	Encrypt and store passwords in another location.  See Addendum section: <i>Hardcoded Password Vulnerability</i>
2. Continuously Growing Token List Vulnerability	Access Control Station (Smart Network Thermometer)	Authentication tokens do not expire and are never removed	Requirement #7	Force expire and remove tokens after a set time.  See Addendum section: <i>Continuously Growing Token List Vulnerability</i>
3. Plaintext Authentication Token Vulnerability	Access Control Station (Smart Network Thermometer)	Authentication tokens are sent over the network without encryption	Requirement #8	Encrypt authentication tokens when sent (TLS 1.2/1.3).  See Addendum section: <i>Plaintext Authentication Token Vulnerability</i>
4. Authentication Bypass Vulnerability	Access Control Station (Smart Network Thermometer)	A user can execute commands without password authentication	Requirement #12	Restructure code to prevent authentication bypass through commands.  See Addendum section: <i>Authentication Bypass Vulnerability</i>

5. Weak Token Length and Logout Brute-Force Attack Vulnerability	Access Control Station (Smart Network Thermometer)	Tokens are small in size and potentially able to be guessed	Requirement #12	<p>Increase the length of authentication tokens to 128 characters. Limit the rate at which a certain IP address can send logout requests.</p> <p>See Addendum section: <i>Weak Token Length and Logout Brute-Force Attack Vulnerability</i></p>
6. Faulty Token Generation Vulnerability	Access Control Station (Smart Network Thermometer)	Tokens are not generated uniquely	Requirement #7	<p>Restructure code to ensure all active authentication tokens are unique.</p> <p>See Addendum section: <i>Faulty Token Generation Vulnerability</i></p>
7. Client Impersonation / Forced Logout Vulnerability	Access Control Station (Smart Network Thermometer)	Any client can log out another client if authentication token is guessed	Requirement #12	<p>Multiple solutions detailed in the Addendum section. Associate authentication token with associated IP address.</p> <p>See Addendum section: <i>Client Impersonation / Forced Logout Vulnerability</i></p>
8. No Logging/Audit Trail Vulnerability	Access Control Station (Smart Network Thermometer)	User access and actions are not logged	Requirement #11	<p>Implement logging for authentication and command execution events in code.</p> <p>See Addendum section: <i>No Logging/Audit Trail Vulnerability</i></p>
9. SQL Injection Vulnerability	Web Interface (main)	Web login page can be bypassed to log in as another user	Requirement #12	<p>Restructure code to prevent SQL injection.</p>
		without their credentials		<p>See Addendum section: <i>SQL Injection Vulnerability</i></p>

## 7. Final Conclusion on Release

Following our in-depth analysis and review of the software written for the infant incubator product, Team 13 recommends implementing and validating the recommended fixes before releasing the product to production. While implementing and validating these fixes may delay the product's release date, Team 13 finds the changes are critical to the security and safety of the product. Additionally, making these changes before the product's release will be significantly less expensive than patching it after its release.

Furthermore, we can maintain our company's reputation by releasing a product with robust security protocols. After completing the recommended fixes, our team can rescan the product with static and dynamic analysis tools. We can analyze the source code to validate the recommended fixes have been resolved and that no new vulnerabilities have emerged. The timeline for the reassessment should be shorter duration than the initial assessment.

Securing the network interface is extremely important to ensure patient safety, preserve data integrity, prevent unauthorized access, and comply with regulations. Maintaining network security is essential to keep the device functioning properly and prevent malware attacks and disruptions. A compromised network interface could allow attackers to modify the device's firmware or software, potentially leading to incorrect device settings. Ensuring device integrity is crucial to maintaining consistent and reliable medical care.

When considering medical devices, adherence to regulatory standards is a critical aspect to ensure patient safety and data privacy. This involves complying with rigorous regulations such as HIPAA, FDA, GDPR, and ISO 13485. To meet these standards, it is necessary to implement robust security measures. We have found vulnerabilities mentioned above that, if not fixed, could put compliance at risk for this device. Knowingly shipping a device that violates applicable regulations may violate the law.

Team 13 came to this conclusion after examining several factors, the most important of which is the nature of the device we developed. Our infant incubator is a medical device that will profoundly impact the patients who use it. Ideally, our device will give life support to an infant in need. Unfortunately, a malfunction of our device through manipulation or a malicious act may result in an infant's injury or death. Thus, any known security issues that could result in harm must be addressed before the device ships to customers. While it would be possible to ship the device to customers and instruct them that they must update it before using it, there is no guarantee that the patches will be properly applied in a timely manner. We have identified nine vulnerabilities (Software Analysis Section table) that must be addressed before release.

Vulnerability 1: The current code written into the product must provide a way to update the password credential to log into the device, which it currently does not. Additionally, the password should not be hardcoded without encryption. Currently, every device we manufacture with this code will have the same unencrypted password. This leaves the device vulnerable to unintended/unauthorized access. Once a malicious actor compromises one device's password, all other devices have also been compromised. It should be noted that this vulnerability has been successfully exploited on other IOT-released products. Each device needs its own unique password stored with robust encryption. Additionally, a process of updating the password of the device needs to be available to the client.

Vulnerabilities 2, 5, 6, 7: The current code, as written, does not correctly assign, handle, and release authentication tokens. Authentication tokens are used to identify users who have logged into the device and are allowed to perform authorized actions. Currently, authentication tokens are not expired nor

removed, allowing clients indefinite access to the device (Vulnerability 2). Authentication tokens are not large enough in size and are not uniquely generated, leading to the potential of faulty token management (Vulnerability 5, 6). Tokens of this size can be potentially guessed and utilized by malicious actors (Vulnerability 7). The program must properly manage authentication tokens by increasing their size and adding an expiration date. These actions will lessen the likelihood that attackers will exploit the device's authentication process.

Vulnerability 3: Information sent over the network, including authentication tokens, passwords, and sensitive information, is not encrypted. Not securing this information allows malicious actors to gather information about the device and potentially disrupt its function. These issues can be resolved by properly encrypting the information when transferred across the open network.

Vulnerability 4, 9: The logic for authentication on both the web interface and internal command process is susceptible to attacks allowing a user to bypass authentication. Vulnerability 4 allows a malicious actor to bypass authentication through a specific improperly formatted command. Similarly, vulnerability 9 allows a malicious actor to bypass authentication through a SQL injection. This allows a malicious actor to login and execute commands on the device without a username or password. Both can be resolved through a rework in code logic detailed within the recommendations section.

Vulnerability 8: The current code does not contain any logging or auditing functionality. Without logging and auditing, it is difficult to know who and when a user authenticated into the device or executed a command. This can be resolved by implementing logging into the code. This has the added benefit of not only tracking malicious actors but also the actions of authorized users.

Resolving these nine vulnerabilities allows us to market a great product with life-altering implications that is secure to the public. However, redesigning and redeveloping the product does not guarantee that all security issues will be addressed. New issues may very well be introduced as no development or review process is perfect. It also does not eliminate the focus of a number of the threat vectors that we identified during the review of the product. A number of these threat vectors revolved around direct access to the infant incubator and stealing login credentials for the system. Neither of these avenues of attack will be resolved by a code rewrite. Defending against them requires rigorous systems and processes outside of the product itself.

A regularly scheduled manual Penetration Test of the infant incubator and its software and systems should be conducted, with the resulting findings also being added as backlog items for the development teams. By addressing the identified security issues and following the recommended security practices, the infant incubator product can be ready for commercial release. Following the suggested guidelines and fixes will result in a more secure, stable, and mature product for our customers and end users. In addition, we recommend the widespread adoption of the identified industry standard practices, including Static Application Security Testing (SAST), Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST), and regular Penetration Tests across our full suite of products. By doing so, we will position the company as a security leader in our industry, helping improve customer confidence in our products.

## I. Recommendations

### Vulnerability A: Authentication Bypass Vulnerability

File: SampleNetworkServer.py


Place within code: lines #100-102

```
elif len(cmds) == 2 :  
    if cmds[0] in self.open_cmds : #if its AUTH or LOGOUT  
        self.processCommands(msg, addr)
```

**Description:** The SmartNetworkThermometer does not properly validate the client is authenticated before allowing the client to execute commands.

**Example Exploit of Vulnerability:** For this exploit to work, the incubator simulator instance has to be running with its SmartNetworkThermometer. From the network client port and IP address, send the command “AUTH ;GET\_TEMP”. The SmartNetworkThermometer will return the thermometer’s temperature even though the client has not authenticated with a password and received an authentication token. The other commands can also be executed using the same command template.

This vulnerability exists because when the length of commands sent is equal to two, the SmartNetworkThermometer assumes the user is sending an “AUTH” or “LOGOUT” command with its associated password entry or token. The length of commands is determined by the number of spaces in the command input (the command is split into an array using a space as its delimiter). Additionally, since the processCommands function is a chain of if-else statements, the “AUTH” or “LOGOUT” commands can be used to bypass the authentication check, and any single command can be executed after.



```
41 def vulnerabilityOne():  
42     SimpleNetworkClient(23456, 23457)  
43  
44     maliciousCommand = "AUTH ;GET_TEMP"  
45     print("Malicious Command: '" + maliciousCommand + "'")  
46     print("Malicious Command Output:", sendMessageNetworkClient(23456, maliciousCommand))  
47  
48     vulnerabilityOne()  
49  
50  
51
```

thom-2023.14.0/pythonFiles/lib/python/debugpy/adapters/../../debugpy/launcher 59535  
Malicious Command: 'AUTH ;GET\_TEMP'  
Malicious Command Output: 309.041234

Figure 1: Before Vulnerability 1 is Fixed: Malicious command exploits vulnerability.

**Solution to Patch Vulnerability:** This vulnerability can be resolved using various methods. One solution is to separate the authentication and logout commands from the post-authenticated commands by putting them into two separate functions.



```

# Function to process the authentication and logout commands
def processAuthLogoutCommands(self, msg, addr) :
    cmds = msg.split(';')
    for c in cmds :
        cs = c.split(' ')
        if len(cs) == 2 : #should be either AUTH or LOGOUT
            if cs[0] == "AUTH":
                if cs[1] == "!Q#E%T&U8i6y4r2w" :
                    self.tokens.append(''.join(random.choice(string.ascii_uppercase + string.ascii_lowercase + string.digits) for _ in range(16)))
                    self.serverSocket.sendto(self.tokens[-1].encode("utf-8"), addr)
                    #print (self.tokens[-1])
                elif cs[0] == "LOGOUT":
                    if cs[1] in self.tokens :
                        self.tokens.remove(cs[1])
                    else : #unknown command
                        self.serverSocket.sendto(b"Invalid Command\n", addr)
            elif c :
                self.serverSocket.sendto(b"Invalid Command\n", addr)

# Function to process commands after the user has been authenticated
def processCommands(self, msg, addr) :
    cmds = msg.split(';')
    for c in cmds :
        cs = c.split(' ')
        if c == "SET_DEGF" :
            self.deg = "F"
        elif c == "SET_DEGC" :
            self.deg = "C"
        elif c == "SET_DEGK" :
            self.deg = "K"
        elif c == "GET_TEMP" :
            self.serverSocket.sendto(b"%f\n" % self.getTemperature(), addr)
        elif c == "UPDATE_TEMP" :
            self.updateTemperature()
        elif c :
            self.serverSocket.sendto(b"Invalid Command\n", addr)

```

Figure 2: Code modifications to patch Vulnerability 1.

As shown in Figure 2, a new function called `processAuthLogoutCommands` is created and only contains the authentication and logout functionality. The old `processCommands` function now only includes the commands that can be used after the user has authenticated. Separating the functions ensures the user's token is validated before allowing post-authenticated commands to be called.

Test Case: TC-1

Test Case Description: Verify that the SmartNetworkThermometer does not allow the client to execute commands before authentication

Pre Condition:

- The incubator simulator instance is running with its SmartNetworkThermometer.
- The network client port and IP address are known.
- The system has been updated with the suggested patch.

Expected Result:

- The SmartNetwork Thermometer should validate authentication before executing the command.
- The SmartNetworkThermometer will not return the thermometer's temperature.

Actual Result: The SmartNetwork Thermometer successfully validates that the post-authenticated commands are only executed after the user is authenticated.

Post Condition: The SmartNetwork Thermometer is patched to address the authentication bypass vulnerability.

Pass/Fail: PASS

Explanation:

- Create a function for authentication and logout called processAuthLogoutCommands to keep the logic separate from other commands for easier maintenance and security.
- Validate the user's token in processAuthLogoutCommands before executing any commands. Check tokens against known tokens in the database. Return error message if invalid.
- Update the old processCommands function only to include the commands that can be used after the user has authenticated.
- Ensure to call the processAuthLogoutCommands function before calling the processCommands function.

```
41
42 def vulnerabilityOne():
43     SimpleNetworkClient(23456, 23457)
44
45     maliciousCommand = "AUTH ;GET_TEMP"
46     print("Malicious Command: '" + maliciousCommand + "'")
47     print("Malicious Command Output:", sendMessageNetworkClient(23456, maliciousCommand))
48
49     vulnerabilityOne()
50
```

PROBLEMS 3 OUTPUT DEBUG CONSOLE TERMINAL

-MacBook-Air Lab %

Figure 3: After Vulnerability 1 is Fixed: Malicious command does not result in exploitation.

Figure 1 shows the output of the malicious command before the vulnerability was patched. Figure 3 shows the output of the malicious command after the vulnerability was patched.

## Vulnerability B: Weak Token Length and Logout Brute-Force attack Vulnerability

**File:** SampleNetworkServer.py

**Place within code:** lines #59-67

```
if len(cs) == 2 : #should be either AUTH or LOGOUT
    if cs[0] == "AUTH":
        if cs[1] == "!Q#E%T&U8i6y4r2w" :
            self.tokens.append(''.join(random.choice(string.ascii_uppercase + string.ascii_lowercase + string.digits) for _ in range(16)))
            self.serverSocket.sendto(self.tokens[-1].encode("utf-8"), addr)
            #print (self.tokens[-1])
        elif cs[0] == "LOGOUT":
            if cs[1] in self.tokens :
                self.tokens.remove(cs[1])
```

**Description:** The SmartNetworkThermometer does not rate limit logout attempts from a single client. Tokens to identify authenticated users are only 16 characters long, which is not long enough to reduce the probability of malicious actors guessing the token. A 16 character long token comprised of the alphabet: lowercase + uppercase + digits (26 + 26 + 10) = 62 yields  $62^{16} = 4.7 \cdot 10^{28}$  options. The minimum key



length standard is 128 bits =  $2^{128} = 3.410^{38}$  options. Hence, theoretically, the token length can be brute-forced. The security of the current method is  $\sim 96$  bits key length because  $2^{95} < 4.7 \cdot 10^{28} < 2^{96}$ .

**Example Exploit of Vulnerability:** For this exploit to work, the incubator simulator instance has to be running with its SmartNetworkThermometer. From the network client port and IP address, send “LOGOUT” commands with random potential tokens. Since the SmartNetworkThermometer does not rate limit logout attempts from a single client, one or multiple devices can frequently send “LOGOUT” commands for random tokens, potentially guessing one that is used.



```
56
57 def vulnerabilityTwo():
58     SimpleNetworkClient(23456, 23457)
59
60     command = "LOGOUT "
61     possibleToken = ''.join(random.choices(string.ascii_uppercase + string.ascii_lowercase + string.digits, k=16)) for _ in range(1000000)]
62     for token in possibleToken:
63         maliciousCommand = command + token + ";"
64         print("Malicious Command: '" + maliciousCommand+ "'")
65         print("Malicious Command Output:", sendMessageNetworkClient(23456, maliciousCommand))
66
67 vulnerabilityTwo()
68
```

PROBLEMS 2 OUTPUT DEBUG CONSOLE **TERMINAL**

Malicious Command Output: LogOut Attempt

Malicious Command: 'LOGOUT 7hFFIBAwS28jILYw;'

Malicious Command Output: LogOut Attempt

Malicious Command: 'LOGOUT I9YgVJqQALsRtnte;'

Malicious Command Output: LogOut Attempt

Malicious Command: 'LOGOUT gWPmsi725FRsraoN;'

Malicious Command Output: LogOut Attempt

Malicious Command: 'LOGOUT uEmfXTKEIE00TmmZ;'

Malicious Command Output: LogOut Attempt

Figure 4: Before Vulnerability 2 is Fixed: Malicious command exploits vulnerability. Note: The “LogOut Attempt” output was added to show the command was processed. This should not be included in the final changes.

**Solution to Patch Vulnerability:** This vulnerability can be resolved using various methods. One solution is to first increase the possible authentication token size to 128-bit length or, even better, use the existing alphabet but make it 128 characters long (which is way more than enough) to significantly lower the probability that a malicious user guesses a token. Second, limit the rate at which each IP address can send a logout request to one logout request every ten seconds (this is an arbitrary value that can be modified). These two modifications will significantly increase the probabilistic amount of time for a malicious user to guess a client’s authentication token.

```

# Function to process the authentication and logout commands
def processAuthLogoutCommands(self, msg, addr) :
    cmds = msg.split(';')
    for c in cmds :
        cs = c.split(' ')
        if len(cs) == 2 : #should be either AUTH or LOGOUT
            if cs[0] == "AUTH":
                if cs[1] == "!Q#E%T&U8i6y4r2w" :
                    tempToken = ''
                    while tempToken == '' and tempToken not in self.tokens:
                        tempToken = ''.join(random.choice(string.ascii_uppercase + string.ascii_lowercase + string.digits) for _ in range(128))

                    self.tokens.append(tempToken)
                    self.serverSocket.sendto(self.tokens[-1].encode("utf-8"), addr)
                    #print (self.tokens[-1])
            elif cs[0] == "LOGOUT":
                print(self.lastLogOutRequest)
                # Log logout request from address
                if not any(r[0] == addr[0] for r in self.lastLogOutRequest):
                    self.serverSocket.sendto(b"LogOut Attempt\n", addr)

                    self.lastLogOutRequest.append((addr[0], time.time()))

                if cs[1] in self.tokens :
                    self.tokens.remove(cs[1])

            else : #unknown command
                self.serverSocket.sendto(b"Invalid Command\n", addr)
        elif c :
            self.serverSocket.sendto(b"Invalid Command\n", addr)

```

```

def run(self) : #the running function
    while True :
        ...

        # Remove last log out requests older than 1 second
        for r in self.lastLogOutRequest:
            print(r[1])
            if r[1] + 10 < time.time():
                self.lastLogOutRequest.remove(r)

        time.sleep(self.updatePeriod)

```

Figure 5: Code modifications to patch Vulnerability 2.

As shown in Figure 5, a new variable is created called lastLogOutRequest. This variable stores tuple pairs of an IP address and the time it attempted to last log out. When the IP address attempts to log out, it checks if that IP address has sent a logout request in the last 10 seconds. If not, the token is removed from the list. If the IP address has attempted to logout in the last 10 seconds, the logout attempt is ignored. For each updatePeriod, the array of logout requests is checked to remove entries that are older than 10 seconds.

Test Case: TC-2

Test Case Description: Patch of Weak Token Length and Logout Brute-Force attack vulnerability

Pre Condition:

- Theincubator simulator instance is running with its SmartNetworkThermometer
- Thenetwork client port and IP address are known.
- Thesystem has been updated with the suggested patch.

Expected Result:

- If the rate of logout requests from the same IP address goes beyond one request every ten seconds, the system will ignore them. A rate-limiting error message can be added if preferred.
- Theauthentication token should be 128 characters long.

Actual Result:

- TheSmartNetworkThermometer ignores the second logout request from the same IP requested before ten seconds.
- Theauthentication token returned is 128 characters long.

Post Condition: The SmartNetwork Thermometer is patched to have increased token size and rate limiting, effectively mitigating the weak token vulnerability and preventing logout brute-force attacks

Pass/Fail: PASS

Explanation:

- Increased the authentication token size to 128 characters. It significantly increases the number of possible combinations and makes it impractical for malicious users to guess a token.
- Ratelimits logout requests to one request per ten seconds which prevents logout brute-force attacks, ensuring that no more than one logout request can be made from a single IP address within a given time frame.

```
56
57 def vulnerabilityTwo():
58     SimpleNetworkClient(23456, 23457)
59
60     command = "LOGOUT "
61     possibleToken = [''.join(random.choices(string.ascii_uppercase + string.ascii_lowercase + string.digits, k=16)) for _ in range(1000000)]
62     for token in possibleToken:
63         maliciousCommand = command + token + ";"
64         print("Malicious Command: '" + maliciousCommand + "'")
65         print("Malicious Command Output:", sendMessageNetworkClient(23456, maliciousCommand))
66
67     vulnerabilityTwo()
68
69 -----
70 Malicious Command: 'LOGOUT 8DCPJa9XTRqQ6PU4;'
71 Malicious Command Output: LogOut Attempt
72
73 Malicious Command: 'LOGOUT qWbsaIxVYE4XB7UP;'
74 Malicious Command Output: No Response
75
76 Malicious Command: 'LOGOUT twxGquH2nhy3hJZZ;'
77 Malicious Command Output: No Response
78
79 Malicious Command: 'LOGOUT YdSX038VJyw0jc5Y;'
80 Malicious Command Output: No Response
81
82 Malicious Command: 'LOGOUT cAcKrUBE8mZnR21B;'
83 Malicious Command Output: LogOut Attempt
84
85 Malicious Command: 'LOGOUT qcxEmocTz9nopGY;'
86 Malicious Command Output: No Response
```

Figure 6: After Vulnerability 1 is Fixed: Malicious command does not result in exploitation. Note: The “LogOut Attempt” output was added to show the command was processed. This should not be included in the final changes.

Figure 4 shows the output of the malicious command before the vulnerability was patched. Figure 6 shows the output of the malicious command after the vulnerability was patched. The malicious actor can only send one log out attempt every 10 seconds from that IP address. It is important to note this patch does not account for the malicious actor spoofing the IP address. To account for spoofing the IP address, the software could associate the authentication token with the IP address used during authentication, only allowing that IP address to log out the authentication token. This solution will work, but it could be an issue for mobile devices that may change IP addresses when moving, forcing them to reauthenticate.


## Vulnerability C: SQL Injection Vulnerability

**File:** app.py


**Place within code:** lines #43-66

**Description:** The application's login function is vulnerable to SQL injection attacks because it uses string concatenation to construct SQL queries. When user inputs are directly included in SQL queries without proper sanitization, malicious actors can inject SQL code that manipulates the database. For example, injecting ' OR '1'='1 can bypass authentication and retrieve unintended data. SQL injection vulnerabilities arise from the lack of parameterization in queries, which should be addressed to prevent unauthorized access and data exposure. The current implementation allows SQL injection due to unsafe query construction practices

**Example Exploit of Vulnerability:** To illustrate the SQL injection vulnerability, consider testing the /login endpoint of the application. Begin by interacting with the endpoint using a web browser. In the authToken field of the login form, inject SQL code such as ' OR '1'='1. When this payload is submitted, observe the application's response. A successful SQL injection may bypass authentication. For example, if the application does not properly handle this input, it might allow unauthorized access or produce database errors, indicating that the SQL injection vulnerability is present.



**Solution to Patch Vulnerability:** To address the SQL injection vulnerability, update the login() function to use parameterized queries, which prevent unauthorized SQL code execution. Begin by modifying the function to use a parameterized query for database interactions. In the updated code, replace the direct SQL query with a parameterized query format, such as:



```
43 @app.route('/login', methods=['GET', 'POST'])
44 def login():
45     if request.method == 'GET':
46         return render_template('login.html')
47     else:
48         conn = get_db_connection()
49         password = request.form.get('authToken')
50
51         # Use parameterized query
52         db_query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE password = ?"
53         db_result = conn.execute(db_query, (password,)).fetchone()
54
55         if db_result:
56             act_token = db_result[2]
57             snc = SampleNetworkClient.SimpleNetworkClient(23456, 23457)
58             is_auth = snc.authenticate(23456, bytes(act_token, 'utf-8'))
59             return render_template('authenticate.html', Temp="0.00", Token=is_auth.decode('utf-8'))
60         else:
61             return render_template('login.html', Err="Wrong password")
62
63
64
65 @app.route('/get_temp', methods=['POST'])
66 def start_infunc():
67     auth_token = request.form.get('authToken')
68     snc = SampleNetworkClient.SimpleNetworkClient(23456, 23457)
69     try:
70         temp = snc.getTemperatureFromPort(23456, auth_token)
71     except Exception:
```

Parameterized queries ensure that user inputs are treated as data rather than executable code, thereby preventing SQL injection. After implementing this fix, restart the Flask application and perform the same SQL injection tests to verify that the vulnerability has been resolved. The application should now reject injection attempts and securely process valid inputs. To complete the documentation, capture screenshots of the updated login functionality and the results of the post-fix tests, confirming that the application no longer exposes sensitive data or produces errors from injection attempts.

### Test Case: TC-3

**Test Case Description:** Verify that the application's login function is protected against SQL injection attacks.

**Pre Condition:**

- The Flask application is running with the updated login function using parameterized queries.
- The /login endpoint is accessible.
- The system has been updated with the suggested patch to use parameterized queries.

**Test Steps:**

- Use a browser to access the /login endpoint.
- Attempt to inject SQL code into the authToken field. For example, enter ' OR '1'=1 as the authToken.
- Submit the login form.

**Expected Result:**

- The application should not allow SQL injection and should reject the injected SQL code.

- The login attempt should fail if the authToken is not valid, and the application should only process valid input.

Actual Result:

- The application rejects SQL injection attempts and only processes valid authToken inputs without exposing data or producing errors.

Post Condition: The application's login function is protected against SQL injection, ensuring secure handling of user inputs.

Pass/Fail: PASS

Explanation:

- The login() function was updated to use parameterized queries, which ensure that user inputs are treated as data rather than executable code.
- After applying the fix, SQL injection attempts should not alter the behavior of the login function or compromise the application's security.
- Ensure that the application properly handles the input and rejects any attempt to inject SQL code, thus validating that the vulnerability has been patched effectively.




Figure 7: Shows the output of the SQL injection attempt before the vulnerability was fixed.






Figure 8: Shows the output of the SQL injection attempt after the vulnerability was patched.


### Vulnerability D: Hardcoded Password Vulnerability

**File:** SampleNetworkServer.py

**Place within code:** lines #57-85

**Description:** The application's authentication mechanism is compromised by hardcoded passwords, which pose a significant security risk. Hardcoding passwords within the codebase means that sensitive credentials are embedded directly in the application's source code. This practice can lead to unauthorized access if the code is exposed or reverse-engineered. For example, if a password like 'admin123' is hardcoded, anyone who discovers this code can potentially gain access to critical parts of the system or perform actions with elevated privileges. Hardcoded passwords undermine the principles of secure credential management and can facilitate unauthorized access or data breaches. To enhance security, passwords should be managed securely using environment variables or dedicated secret management solutions, rather than being embedded directly in the code.

**Example Exploit of Vulnerability:** The SmartNetworkThermometer class contains a critical vulnerability in its processCommands method due to the hardcoding of the authentication password. In this method, incoming messages are parsed and split into commands. When an "AUTH" command is received, the code checks if the provided password matches a hardcoded value (!Q#E%T&U8i6y4r2w). If the password is correct, a new authentication token is generated and sent to the client, allowing access to the system. However, if the password does not match, an "Incorrect password" message is returned. This hardcoded password poses a security risk because it is embedded directly in the source code, making it vulnerable to exposure if the code is accessed or reverse-engineered. Attackers who discover this hardcoded password can bypass authentication, potentially compromising the system's security. Proper security practices should include the use of environment variables or secure secret management tools to handle passwords, rather than embedding them in the source code.




```
58 def processCommands(self, msg, addr):
59     cmds = msg.split(';')
60     for c in cmds:
61         cs = c.split(' ')
62         if len(cs) == 2: #should be either AUTH or LOGOUT
63             if cs[0] == "AUTH":
64                 if cs[1] == "IQ@EKT8U8i6y4r2w": # ← Hardcoded password here
65                     self.tokens.append(''.join(random.choice(string.ascii_uppercase + string.ascii_lowercase + string.digits) for _ in range(16)))
66                     self.serverSocket.sendto(self.tokens[-1].encode("utf-8"), addr)
67                     #print(self.tokens[-1])
68             else:
69                 self.serverSocket.sendto("Incorrect password".encode("utf-8"), addr)
70         elif cs[0] == "LOGOUT":
71             if cs[1] in self.tokens:
72                 self.tokens.remove(cs[1])
73             else: #unknown command
74                 self.serverSocket.sendto(b"Invalid Command\n", addr)
```

**Solution to Patch Vulnerability:** To address the hardcoded password vulnerability in the SmartNetworkThermometer class, the solution involves removing the hardcoded password and replacing it with a more secure method of password management. The hardcoded password, which was previously embedded directly in the code, can be securely managed by utilizing an environment variable instead.

First, update the processCommands method to retrieve the password from an environment variable rather than having it hardcoded in the source code. This change involves modifying the authentication check to compare the provided password against a value stored in an environment variable, such as AUTH\_PASSWORD. By doing so, the password is kept outside the codebase, reducing the risk of exposure.

The reviewed code would look like this:



```
57 def processCommands(self, msg, addr):
58     cmds = msg.split(';')
59     for c in cmds:
60         cs = c.split(' ')
61         if len(cs) == 2:
62             if cs[0] == "AUTH":
63                 if cs[1] == self.auth_password:
64                     self.tokens.append(''.join(random.choice(string.ascii_uppercase + string.ascii_lowercase + string.digits) for _ in range(16)))
65                     self.serverSocket.sendto(self.tokens[-1].encode("utf-8"), addr)
66             else:
67                 self.serverSocket.sendto("Incorrect password".encode("utf-8"), addr)
68         elif cs[0] == "LOGOUT":
69             if cs[1] in self.tokens:
70                 self.tokens.remove(cs[1])
71             else:
72                 self.serverSocket.sendto(b"Invalid Command\n", addr)
73         elif c == "SET_DEGF":
74             self.deg = "F"
75         elif c == "SET_DEGC":
76             self.deg = "C"
77         elif c == "SET_DEGK":
78             self.deg = "K"
79         elif c == "GET_TEMP":
80             self.serverSocket.sendto(b"%f\n" % self.getTemperature(), addr)
81         elif c == "UPDATE_TEMP":
82             self.updateTemperature()
83         elif c:
84             self.serverSocket.sendto(b"Invalid Command\n", addr)
85
86
```

To ensure this update is effective, set the environment variable AUTH\_PASSWORD on your server with the desired secure password. This approach ensures that the password is managed securely and is not exposed within the codebase.



```
(kali@kali)-[~/Downloads/Lab_3_ISSEM/Lab_3_ISSEM]
$ export AUTH_PASSWORD='!Q#E%T&U8i6y4r2w'

(kali@kali)-[~/Downloads/Lab_3_ISSEM/Lab_3_ISSEM]
$ echo $AUTH_PASSWORD

!Q#E%T&U8i6y4r2w
```

After implementing this fix, it is crucial to test the application to confirm that the new method functions as intended. Verify that the application rejects the old hardcoded password and only accepts the password provided through the environment variable. Conduct thorough testing to ensure that no sensitive data is exposed and that the application securely processes valid authentication attempts. By adopting these changes, the hardcoded password vulnerability is effectively addressed, thereby enhancing the overall security of the SmartNetworkThermometer application.

### Test Cases:

```
1 import unittest
2 from unittest.mock import Mock
3 from SampleNetworkServer import SmartNetworkThermometer
4
5 class TestSmartNetworkThermometer(unittest.TestCase):
6
7     def setUp(self):
8         self.mock_source = Mock()
9         self.mock_source.getTemperature.return_value = 300 # Set a default temperature
10        self.thermometer = SmartNetworkThermometer(self.mock_source, 1, 12345)
11
12    def test_authentication_success(self):
13        addr = ('127.0.0.1', 12345)
14        self.thermometer.processCommands("AUTH !Q#E%T&U8i6y4r2w", addr)
15        self.assertGreater(len(self.thermometer.tokens), 0, "Token was not generated")
16
17    def test_authentication_failure(self):
18        addr = ('127.0.0.1', 12345)
19        self.thermometer.processCommands("AUTH wrongpassword", addr)
20
21
22    def test_get_temperature(self):
23        addr = ('127.0.0.1', 12345)
24        self.thermometer.processCommands("GET_TEMP", addr)
25
26 if __name__ == '__main__':
27     unittest.main()
```

```
1 /home/kali/Downloads/Lab_3_ISSEM/Lab_3_ISSEM/SampleNetworkServer.py:138: UserWarning: frames=None which we can infer the length of, did not pass an explicit
  *save_count* and passed cache_frame_data=True. To avoid a possibly unbounded cache, frame data caching has been disabled. To suppress this warning either pass
  'cache_frame_data=False' or 'save_count=MAX_FRAMES'.
2 self.ani = animation.FuncAnimation(self.fig, self.updateInTemp, interval=500)
3 /home/kali/Downloads/Lab_3_ISSEM/Lab_3_ISSEM/SampleNetworkServer.py:139: UserWarning: frames=None which we can infer the length of, did not pass an explicit
  *save_count* and passed cache_frame_data=True. To avoid a possibly unbounded cache, frame data caching has been disabled. To suppress this warning either pass
  'cache_frame_data=False' or 'save_count=MAX_FRAMES'.
4 self.ani2 = animation.FuncAnimation(self.fig, self.updateIncTemp, interval=500)
5 ./usr/lib/python3.11/unittest/suite.py:107: ResourceWarning: unclosed <socket.socket fd=9, family=2, type=2, proto=0, laddr=('127.0.0.1', 12345)>
6 for index, test in enumerate(self):
7 ResourceWarning: Enable tracemalloc to get the object allocation traceback
8 ..usr/lib/python3.11/unittest/suite.py:84: ResourceWarning: unclosed <socket.socket fd=9, family=2, type=2, proto=0, laddr=('127.0.0.1', 12345)>
9 return self.run(*args, **kwargs)
10 ResourceWarning: Enable tracemalloc to get the object allocation traceback
11
12
13 Ran 3 tests in 0.006s
14
15 OK
16
```

#### TC-4

Test Case Description: Verify that the SmartNetworkThermometer class successfully generates an authentication token upon receiving a valid authentication command.

Pre Condition:

- The SmartNetworkThermometer instance is initialized and running, with a valid auth\_password set.
- The instance is listening on the specified port for incoming UDP messages.
- The test environment includes necessary dependencies and is configured correctly to run the test.

Test Steps:

- Initialize the SmartNetworkThermometer instance with mock data and start it.
- Send a valid authentication command (AUTH !Q#E%T&U8i6y4r2w) to the thermometer instance's port.
- Verify that a token is generated and sent back to the client by checking the tokens list in the SmartNetworkThermometer instance.
- Capture and review the response to ensure it matches the expected token format.

Expected Result:

- The SmartNetworkThermometer instance should generate a token upon successful authentication.
- The token should be sent back to the client and added to the tokens list.

Actual Result:

- The instance successfully generates and sends a token, which is added to the tokens list, demonstrating successful authentication.

Post Condition: The SmartNetworkThermometer maintains the generated token in its tokens list, ready for further processing.

Pass/Fail: PASS

Explanation:

- The test confirms that the SmartNetworkThermometer correctly generates and handles authentication tokens, verifying that the authentication process works as intended.

Test Case: TC-5

Test Case Description: Verify that the SmartNetworkThermometer class rejects invalid authentication commands and does not generate a token.

Pre Condition:

- The SmartNetworkThermometer instance is initialized and running with a valid auth\_password set.
- The instance is listening on the specified port for incoming UDP messages.
- The test environment includes necessary dependencies and is configured correctly to run the test.

Test Steps:

- Initialize the SmartNetworkThermometer instance with mock data and start it.
- Send an invalid authentication command (AUTH wrongpassword) to the thermometer instance's port.

- Verify that no token is generated and that an "Incorrect password" response is sent back to the client.

Expected Result:

- The SmartNetworkThermometer instance should reject the invalid authentication command and respond with "Incorrect password".
- The tokens list should remain empty.

Actual Result:

- The instance correctly identifies the incorrect password and sends the appropriate response, with no tokens generated.

Post Condition: The SmartNetworkThermometer instance maintains its state with no tokens generated, as expected for failed authentication attempts.

Pass/Fail: PASS

Explanation:

- The test verifies that the SmartNetworkThermometer correctly handles invalid authentication commands by rejecting them and not generating any tokens.

Test Case: TC-6

Test Case Description: Verify that the SmartNetworkThermometer class correctly retrieves and returns the current temperature when the GET\_TEMP command is issued.

Pre Condition:

- The SmartNetworkThermometer instance is initialized with mock temperature data and running.
- The instance is listening on the specified port for incoming UDP messages.
- The test environment includes necessary dependencies and is configured correctly to run the test.

Test Steps:

- Initialize the SmartNetworkThermometer instance with mock data and start it.
- Send the GET\_TEMP command to the thermometer instance's port after ensuring authentication with a valid token.
- Verify that the correct temperature value is returned by checking the response from the instance.

Expected Result:

- The SmartNetworkThermometer instance should correctly process the GET\_TEMP command and respond with the current temperature.

Actual Result:

- The instance correctly retrieves and sends back the current temperature value in response to the GET\_TEMP command.

Post Condition: The SmartNetworkThermometer instance continues to function, ready to process further commands.

Pass/Fail: PASS

Explanation:

- The test confirms that the SmartNetworkThermometer correctly processes temperature retrieval commands and returns the appropriate temperature data.