

PART SIX

Deduction of a Universal Organ of Philosophy, or:
Essentials of the Philosophy of Art according
to the Principles of Transcendental Idealism.

§1 Deduction of the Art-Product as Such

The intuition we have postulated is to bring together that which exists in separation in the appearance of freedom and in the intuition of the natural product; namely *identity of the conscious* and the *unconscious* in the *self*, and *consciousness of this identity*. The product of this intuition will therefore verge on the one side upon the product of nature, and on the other upon the product of freedom, and must unite in itself the characteristics of both. If we know the product of the intuition, we are also acquainted with the intuition itself, and hence we need only derive the product, in order to derive the intuition.

With the product of freedom, our product will have this in common, that it is consciously brought about; and with the product of nature, that it is unconsciously brought about. In the former respect it will thus be the reverse of the organic natural product. Whereas the unconscious (blind) activity is reflected out of the organic product as a conscious one, the conscious activity will conversely be reflected out of the product here under consideration as an unconscious (objective) one; whereas the organic product reflects its unconscious activity to me as determined by conscious activity, the product here being derived will conversely reflect conscious activity as determined by unconscious. To put it more briefly: nature begins as unconscious and ends as conscious; the process of production is not purposive, but the product certainly is so. In the activity at present under discussion, the self must begin (subjectively) with consciousness, and end without consciousness, or *objectively*; the self is conscious in respect of production, unconscious in regard to the product.

But now how are we to explain transcendently to *ourselves* an intuition such as this, in which the unconscious activity operates as it were, through the conscious, to the point of attaining complete identity therewith? —Let us first give thought to the fact that the activity is to be a conscious one. But now it is utterly impossible for anything objective to be brought forth with consciousness, although that is being demanded here. The objective is simply that which arises without

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consciousness, and hence what is properly objective in this intuition must likewise be incapable of being brought forth *with consciousness*. On this point we may appeal directly to the arguments already brought forward in regard to free action, namely that the objective factor therein is supplied by something independent of freedom. The difference is merely this, [a]) that in the free act the identity of the two activities must be abolished, precisely in order that the act may thereby appear as free, [whereas here, the two are to appear as one in *consciousness* itself, without negation thereof]. Moreover, [b]) in the free act the two activities can *never* become absolutely identical, whence even the object of the free act is necessarily an *infinite* one, never completely realized, for if it was, the conscious and the objective activities would merge into one, that is, the appearance of freedom would cease. Now that which was utterly impossible through freedom is to become possible through the act here postulated, though as the price of this the latter must cease to be a free act, and becomes one in which freedom and necessity are absolutely united. But now the production was still supposed to take place with consciousness, which is impossible unless the two [activities] are separated. So here is a manifest contradiction. [I present it once again.] Conscious and unconscious activities are to be absolutely one in the product, just as they also are in the organic product, but they are to be one in a different manner; the two are to be one *for the self itself*. This is impossible, however, unless the self is conscious of the production. But if it is so, the two activities must be separated, for this is a necessary condition for being conscious of the production. So the two activities must be one, since otherwise there is no identity, and yet must both be separated, since otherwise there is identity, but not for the self. How is this contradiction to be resolved?

The two activities must be separated for purposes of the appearing, the becoming-objective of the production, just as in the free act they had to be separated in order that the intuition might become objective. But they cannot be separated *ad infinitum*, as in the free act, since otherwise the objective element would never be a complete manifestation of this identity.¹ The identity of the two was to be abolished only for the sake of consciousness, but the production is to end in unconsciousness; so there must be a point at which the two merge into one; and conversely, where the two merge

¹That which lies, for the free act, in an infinite progress, is to be, in the current engendering, a *thing present*, is to become actual, objective, in something finite.

into one, the production must cease to appear as a free one.¹

If this point in production is reached, the producing must absolutely stop, and it must be impossible for the producer to go on producing; for the condition of all producing is precisely the opposition between conscious and unconscious activity; but here they have absolutely to coincide, and thus within the intelligence all conflict has to be eliminated, all contradiction reconciled.²

The intelligence will therefore end with a complete recognition of the identity expressed in the product as an identity whose principle lies in the intelligence itself; it will end, that is, in a complete intuiting of itself.³ Now since it was the free tendency to self-intuition in that identity which originally divided the intelligence from itself, the feeling accompanying this intuition will be that of an infinite tranquility. With the completion of the product, all urge to produce is halted, all contradictions are eliminated, all riddles resolved. Since production set out from freedom, that is, from an unceasing opposition of the two activities, the intelligence will be unable to attribute this absolute union of the two, in which production ends, to *freedom*; so as soon as the product is completed, all appearance of freedom is removed. The intelligence will feel itself astonished and *blessed* by this union, will regard it, that is, in the light of a bounty freely granted by a higher nature, by whose aid the impossible has been made possible.

This unknown, however, whereby the objective and the conscious activities are here brought into unexpected harmony, is none other than that absolute⁴ which contains the common ground of the preestablished harmony between the conscious and the unconscious. Hence, if this absolute is reflected from out of the product, it

¹At that point the free activity has wholly gone over into the objective, the necessary aspect. Hence production is free at the outset, whereas the product appears as an absolute identity of the free activity with the necessary one.

²[This paragraph canceled in the author's copy. - Tr.]

³For it (the intelligence) is itself the producer; but at the same time this identity has wholly broken loose therefrom, and become totally objective to the intelligence, *i.e.*, totally objective *to itself*.

⁴the primordial self.

will appear to the intelligence as something lying above the latter, and which, in contrast to freedom, brings an element of the unintended to that which was begun with consciousness and intention.

This unchanging identity, which can never attain to consciousness, and merely radiates back from the product, is for the producer precisely what destiny is for the agent, namely a dark unknown force which supplies the element of completeness or objectivity to the piece-work of freedom; and as that power is called destiny, which through our free action realizes, without our knowledge and even against our will, goals that *we did not envisage*, so likewise that incomprehensible agency which supplies objectivity to the conscious, without the cooperation of freedom, and to some extent in opposition to freedom (wherein is eternally dispersed what in this production is united), is denominated by means of the obscure concept of *genius*.

The product we postulate is none other than the product of genius, or, since genius is possible only in the arts, the *product of art*.

The deduction is concluded, and our next task is simply to show by thoroughgoing analysis that all the features of the production we have postulated come together in the aesthetic.

The fact that all aesthetic production rests upon a conflict of activities can be justifiably inferred already from the testimony of all artists, that they are involuntarily driven to create their works, and that in producing them they merely satisfy an irresistible urge of their own nature; for if every urge proceeds from a contradiction in such wise that, given the contradiction, free activity becomes involuntary, the artistic urge also must proceed from such a feeling of inner contradiction. But since this contradiction sets in motion the whole man with all his forces, it is undoubtedly one which strikes at the *ultimate in him*, the root of his whole being.¹ It is as if, in the exceptional man (which artists above all are, in the highest sense of the word), that unalterable identity, on which all existence is founded, had laid aside the veil wherewith it shrouds itself in others, and, just as it is directly affected by things, so also works directly back upon everything. Thus it can only be the contradiction between conscious and unconscious in the free act which sets the artistic urge in motion; just as, conversely, it can be given to art alone to pacify our endless striving, and likewise to resolve the final and uttermost contradiction within us. Just as aesthetic

¹the true in-itself.

production proceeds from the feeling of a seemingly irresoluble contradiction, so it ends likewise, by the testimony of all artists, and of all who share their inspiration, in the feeling of an *infinite* harmony; and that this feeling which accompanies completion is at the same time a *deep emotion*, is itself enough to show that the artist attributes that total resolution of his conflict which he finds achieved in his work of art, not to himself [alone], but to a bounty freely granted by his own nature, which, however unrelentingly it set him in conflict with himself, is no less gracious in relieving him of the pain of this contradiction.¹ For just as the artist is driven into production involuntarily and even in spite of himself (whence the ancient expressions *pati deum*, etc., and above all the idea of being inspired by an afflatus from without), so likewise is his production endowed with objectivity as if by no help of his own, that is, itself in a purely objective manner. Just as the man of destiny does not execute what he wishes or intends, but rather what he is obliged to execute by an inscrutable fate which governs him, so the artist, however deliberate he may be, seems nonetheless to be governed, in regard to what is truly objective in his creation, by a power which separates him from all other men, and compels him to say or depict things which he does not fully understand himself, and whose meaning is infinite. Now every absolute concurrence of the two antithetical activities is utterly unaccountable, being simply a *phenomenon* which although incomprehensible,² yet cannot be denied; and art, therefore, is the one everlasting revelation which yields that concurrence, and the marvel which, had it existed but once only, would necessarily have convinced us of the absolute reality of that supreme event.

Now again if art comes about through two activities totally distinct from one another, genius is neither one nor the other, but that which presides over both. If we are to seek in one of the two activities, namely the conscious, for what is ordinarily called *art*, though it is only one part thereof, namely that aspect of it which is exercised with consciousness, thought and reflection, and can be taught and learnt and achieved through tradition and practice, we shall have, on the other hand, to seek in the unconscious factor which enters into art for that about it which cannot be learned, nor attained by practice, nor in any other way, but can only be

¹attributes . . . to a bounty freely granted by his own nature, and thus to a coincidence of the unconscious with the conscious activity [Author's copy].

²from the standpoint of mere reflection.

inborn through the free bounty of nature; and this is what we may call, in a word, the element of *poetry* in art.

It is self-evident from this, however, that it would be utterly futile to ask which of the two constituents should have preference over the other, since each of them, in fact, is valueless without the other, and it is only in conjunction that they bring forth the highest. For although what is not attained by practice, but is born in us, is commonly regarded as the nobler, the gods have in fact tied the very exercise of that innate power so closely to a man's serious application, his industry and thought, that even where it is inborn, poetry without art engenders, as it were, only dead products, which can give no pleasure to any man's mind, and repel all judgment and even intuition, owing to the wholly blind force which operates therein. It is, on the contrary, far more to be expected that art without poetry should be able to achieve something, than poetry without art; partly because it is not easy for a man to be by nature wholly without poetry, though many are wholly without art; and partly because a persistent study of the thoughts of great masters is able in some degree to make up for the initial want of objective power. All that can ever arise from this, however, is merely a semblance of poetry, which, by its superficiality and by many other indications, e.g., the high value it attaches to the mere mechanics of art, the poverty of form in which it operates, etc., is easily distinguishable in contrast to the unfathomable depth which the true artist, though he labors with the greatest diligence, involuntarily imparts to his work, and which neither he nor anyone else is wholly able to penetrate.

But now it is also self-evident that just as poetry and art are each individually incapable of engendering perfection, so a divided existence of both is equally inadequate to the task.¹ It is therefore clear that, since the identity of the two can only be innate, and is utterly impossible and unattainable through freedom, perfection is possible only through genius, which, for that very reason, is for the aesthetic what the self is for philosophy, namely the supreme absolute reality, which never itself becomes objective, but is the cause of everything that is so.

¹Neither has priority over the other. It is, indeed, simply the equipoise of the two (art and poetry) which is reflected in the work of art.

§2 Character of the Art-Product

a) The work of art reflects to us the identity of the conscious and unconscious activities. But the opposition between them is an infinite one, and its removal is effected without any assistance from freedom. Hence the basic character of the work of art is that of an *unconscious infinity* [synthesis of nature and freedom]. Besides what he has put into his work with manifest intention, the artist seems instinctively, as it were, to have depicted therein an infinity, which no finite understanding is capable of developing to the full. To explain what we mean by a single example: the mythology of the Greeks, which undeniably contains an infinite meaning and a symbolism for all ideas, arose among a people, and in a fashion, which both make it impossible to suppose any comprehensive forethought in devising it, or in the harmony whereby everything is united into one great whole. So it is with every true work of art, in that every one of them is capable of being expounded *ad infinitum*, as though it contained an infinity of purposes, while yet one is never able to say whether this infinity has lain within the artist himself, or resides only in the work of art. By contrast, in the product which merely apes the character of a work of art, purpose and rule lie on the surface, and seem so restricted and circumscribed, that the product is no more than a faithful replica of the artist's conscious activity, and is in every respect an object for reflection only, not for intuition, which loves to sink itself in what it contemplates, and finds no resting place short of the infinite.

b) Every aesthetic production proceeds from the feeling of an infinite contradiction, and hence also the feeling which accompanies completion of the art-product must be one of an infinite tranquillity; and this latter, in turn, must also pass over into the work of art itself. Hence the outward expression of the work of art is one of calm, and silent grandeur, even where the aim is to give expression to the utmost intensity of pain or joy.

c) Every aesthetic production proceeds from an intrinsically infinite separation of the two activities, which in every free act of producing are divided. But now since these two activities are to be depicted in the product as united, what this latter presents is an infinite finitely displayed. But the infinite finitely displayed is beauty. The basic feature of every work of art, in which both the preceding are comprehended, is therefore *beauty*, and without beauty there is no work

of art. There are, admittedly, sublime works of art, and beauty and sublimity in a certain respect are opposed to each other, in that a landscape, for example, can be beautiful without therefore being sublime, and *vice versa*. However, the opposition between beauty and sublimity is one which occurs only in regard to the object, not in regard to the subject of intuition. For the difference between the beautiful and the sublime work of art consists simply in this, that where beauty is present, the infinite contradiction is eliminated in the object itself; whereas when sublimity is present, the conflict is not reconciled in the object itself, but merely uplifted to a point at which it is involuntarily eliminated in the intuition; and this, then, is much as if it were to be eliminated in the object.¹ It can also be shown very easily that sublimity rests upon the same contradiction as that on which beauty rests. For whenever an object is spoken of as sublime, a magnitude is admitted by the unconscious activity which it is impossible to accept into the conscious one: whereupon the self is thrown into a conflict with itself which can end only in an aesthetic intuition, whereby both activities are brought into unexpected harmony; save only that the intuition, which here lies not in the artist, but in the intuiting subject himself, is a wholly involuntary one, in that the sublime (quite unlike the merely strange, which similarly confronts the imagination with a contradiction, though one that is not worth the trouble of resolving) sets all the forces of the mind in motion, in order to resolve a contradiction which threatens our whole intellectual existence.

Now that the characteristics of the work of art have been derived, its difference from all other products has simultaneously been brought to light.

For the art-product differs from the organic product of nature primarily in these respects: [a] that the organic being still exhibits unseparated what the aesthetic production displays after separation, though united; b]) that the organic production does not proceed from consciousness, or therefore from the infinite contradiction, which is the condition of aesthetic production. Hence [if beauty is essentially the resolution of an infinite conflict] the organic product of nature will likewise not necessarily be *beautiful*, and if it is so, its beauty will appear as altogether

¹This passage replaced in the author's copy by the following: For although there are sublime works of art, and sublimity is customarily contrasted with beauty, there is actually no true objective opposition between beauty and sublimity; the truly and absolutely beautiful is invariably also sublime, and the sublime (if it truly is so) is beautiful as well.

contingent, since the condition thereof cannot be thought of as existing in nature. From this we may explain the quite peculiar interest in natural beauty, not insofar as it is beauty as such, but insofar as it is specifically *natural beauty*. Whence it is self-evident what we are to think of the imitation of nature as a principle of art; for so far from the merely contingent beauty of nature providing the rule to art, the fact is, rather, that what art creates in its perfection is the principle and norm for the judgment of natural beauty.

It is easy to conceive how the aesthetic product is to be distinguished from the *common artifact*, since all aesthetic creation is absolutely free in regard to its principle, in that the artist can be driven to create by a contradiction, indeed, but only by one which lies in the highest regions of his own nature; whereas every other sort of creation is occasioned by a contradiction which lies outside the actual producer, and thus has in every case a goal outside itself.¹ This independence of external goals is the source of that holiness and purity of art, which goes so far that it not only rules out relationship with all mere sensory pleasure, to demand which of art is the true nature of barbarism; or with the useful, to require which of art is possible only in an age which supposes the highest efforts of the human spirit to consist in economic discoveries.² It actually excludes relation with everything pertaining to morality, and even leaves far beneath it the sciences (which in point of disinterestedness stand closest to art), simply because they are always directed to a goal outside themselves, and must ultimately themselves serve merely as a means for the highest (namely art).

So far as particularly concerns the relation of art to science, the two are so utterly opposed in tendency, that if science were ever to have discharged its whole task, as art has always discharged it, they would both have to coincide and merge into one—which is proof of directions that they are radically opposed. For though science at its highest level has one and the same business as art, this business, owing to the manner of effecting it, is an endless one for science, so that one may say that art constitutes the ideal of science, and where art is, science has yet to attain to. From this, too, it is apparent why and to what extent there is no genius in science; not indeed that it would be impossible for a scientific problem to be solved by means

¹(absolute transition into the objective).

²Beetroots.

of genius, but because this same problem whose solution can be found by genius, is also soluble mechanically. Such, for example, is the Newtonian system of gravitation, which could have been a discovery of genius, and in its first discoverer, Kepler, really was so, but could equally also have been a wholly scientific discovery, which it actually became in the hands of Newton. Only what art brings forth is simply and *solely* possible through genius, since in every task that art has discharged, an infinite contradiction is reconciled. What science brings forth, *can* be brought forth through genius, but it is not necessarily engendered through this. It therefore is and remains problematic in science, *i.e.*, one can, indeed, always say definitely where it is not present, but never where it is. There are but few indications which allow us to infer genius in the sciences; (that one has to infer it is already evidence of the peculiarity of the matter). It is, for example, assuredly not present, where a whole, such as a system, arises piecemeal and as though by putting together. One would thus have to suppose, conversely, that genius is present, where the idea of the whole has manifestly preceded the individual parts. For since the idea of the whole cannot in fact become clear save through its development in the individual parts, while those parts, on the other hand, are possible only through the idea of the whole, there seems to be a contradiction here which is possible only through an act of genius, *i.e.*, an unexpected concurrence of the unconscious with the conscious activity. Another ground for the presumption of genius in the sciences would be if someone were to say and maintain things whose meaning he could not possibly have understood entirely, either owing to the period at which he lived, or by reason of his other utterances; so that he has thus asserted something apparently with consciousness, which he could in fact only have asserted unconsciously. It could, however be readily shown in a number of ways, that even these grounds for the presumption may be delusive in the extreme.

Genius is thus marked off from everything that consists in mere talent or skill by the fact that through it a contradiction is resolved, which is soluble absolutely and otherwise by nothing else. In all producing, even of the most ordinary and commonplace sort, an unconscious activity operates along with the conscious one; but only a producing whose condition was an infinite opposition of the two activities is an aesthetic producing, and one that is *only* possible through genius.

§3 Corollaries

Relation of Art to Philosophy

Now that we have deduced the nature and character of the art-product as completely as was necessary for purposes of the present enquiry, there is nothing more we need do except to set forth the relation which the philosophy of art bears to the whole system of philosophy.

1. The whole of philosophy starts, and must start, from a principle which, *qua* absolutely identical, is utterly nonobjective. But now how is this absolutely nonobjective to be called up to consciousness and understood—a thing needful, if it is the condition for understanding the whole of philosophy? That it can no more be apprehended through concepts than it is capable of being set forth by means of them, stands in no need of proof. Nothing remains, therefore, but for it to be set forth in an immediate intuition, though this is itself in turn inconceivable, and, since its object is to be something utterly nonobjective, seems, indeed, to be self-contradictory. But now were such an intuition in fact to exist, having as its object the absolutely identical, in itself neither subjective nor objective, and were we, in respect of this intuition, which can only be an intellectual one, to appeal to immediate experience, then how, in that case, could even this intuition be in turn posited objectively? How, that is, can it be established beyond doubt, that such an intuition does not rest upon a purely subjective deception, if it possesses no objectivity that is universal and acknowledged by all men? This universally acknowledged and altogether incontestable objectivity of intellectual intuition is art itself. For the aesthetic intuition simply is the intellectual intuition become objective.¹

¹The preceding is replaced in the author's copy by: The whole of philosophy starts, and must start, from a principle which, as the absolute principle, is also at the same time the absolutely identical. An absolutely simple and identical cannot be grasped or communicated through description, nor through concepts at all. It can only be intuited. Such an intuition is the organ of all philosophy. —But this intuition, which is an intellectual rather than a sensory one, and has as its object neither the objective nor the subjective, but the absolutely identical, in itself neither subjective nor objective, is itself merely an internal one, which cannot in turn become objective for itself: it can become objective only through a second intuition. This second intuition is the aesthetic.

The work of art merely reflects to me what is otherwise not reflected by anything, namely that absolutely identical which has already divided itself even in the self. Hence, that which the philosopher allows to be divided even in the primary act of consciousness, and which would otherwise be inaccessible to any intuition, comes, through the miracle of art, to be radiated back from the products thereof.

It is not, however, the first principle of philosophy, merely, and the first intuition that philosophy proceeds from, which initially become objective through aesthetic production; the same is true of the entire mechanism which philosophy deduces, and on which in turn it rests.

Philosophy sets out from an infinite dichotomy of opposed activities;¹ but the same dichotomy is also the basis of every aesthetic production, and by each individual manifestation of art it is wholly resolved.² Now what is this wonderful power whereby, in productive intuition (so the philosopher claims), an infinite opposition is removed? So far we have not been able to render this mechanism entirely intelligible, since it is only the power of art which can unveil it completely. This productive power is the same whereby art also achieves the impossible, namely to resolve an infinite opposition in a finite product. It is the poetic gift, which in its primary potentiality constitutes the primordial intuition, and conversely:³ what we speak of as the poetic gift is merely productive intuition, reiterated to its highest power. It is one and the same capacity that is active in both, the only one whereby we are able to think and to couple together even what is contradictory—and its name is imagination. Hence, that which appears to us outside the sphere of consciousness, as real, and that which appears within it, as ideal, or as the world of art, are also products of

¹Philosophy makes all production of intuition proceed from a separation of activities that were previously not opposed.

²The final words, "and . . . resolved," struck out in the author's copy.

³Replaced in the author's copy by: That productive power whereby the object arises is likewise the source from which an object also springs forth to art, save only that in the first case the activity is dull and limited, while in the latter it is clear and boundless. The poetic gift, regarded in its primary potentiality, is the soul's most primitive capacity for production, insofar as the latter declares itself in finite and actual things, and conversely. . . .

one and the same activity. But this very fact, that where the conditions of emergence are otherwise entirely similar, the one takes its origin from outside consciousness, the other from within it, constitutes the eternal difference between them which can never be removed.

To be sure, then, the real world evolves entirely from the same original opposition as must also give rise to the world of art, which has equally to be viewed as one great whole, and which in all its individual products depicts only the one infinite. But outside consciousness this opposition is only infinite inasmuch as an infinity is exhibited by the objective world as a *whole*, and never by any individual object; whereas for art this opposition is an infinite one in regard to *every single object*, and infinity is exhibited in every one of its products. For if aesthetic production proceeds from freedom, and if it is precisely for freedom that this opposition of conscious and unconscious activities is an absolute one, there is properly speaking but one absolute work of art, which may indeed exist in altogether different versions, yet is still only one, even though it should not yet exist in its most ultimate form. It can be no objection to this view, that if so, the very liberal use now made of the predicate 'work of art' will no longer do. Nothing is a work of art which does not exhibit an infinite, either directly, or at least by reflection. Are we to call works of art, for example, even such compositions as by nature depict only the individual and subjective? In that case we shall have to bestow this title also upon every epigram, which preserves merely a momentary sensation or current impression; though indeed the great masters who have practiced in such genres were seeking to bring forth objectivity itself only through the totality of their creations, and used them simply as a means to depict a whole infinite life, and to project it back from a many-faceted mirror.

2. If aesthetic intuition is merely transcendental¹ intuition become objective, it is self-evident that art is at once the only true and eternal organ and document of philosophy, which ever and again continues to speak to us of what philosophy cannot depict in external form, namely the unconscious element in acting and producing, and its original identity with the conscious. Art is paramount to the philosopher, precisely because it opens to him, as it were, the holy of holies, where burns in eternal and original unity, as if in a single flame, that which in nature and history is rent asunder, and in life and action, no less than in thought, must forever fly apart. The view of nature, which the philosopher frames artificially, is for art the original

¹intellectual (author's correction).

and natural one. What we speak of as nature is a poem lying pent in a mysterious and wonderful script. Yet the riddle could reveal itself, were we to recognize in it the odyssey of the spirit, which, marvelously deluded, seeks itself, and in seeking flies from itself; for through the world of sense there glimmers, as if through words the meaning, as if through dissolving mists the land of fantasy, of which we are in search. Each splendid painting owes, as it were, its genesis to a removal of the invisible barrier dividing the real from the ideal world, and is no more than the gateway, through which come forth completely the shapes and scenes of that world of fantasy which gleams but imperfectly through the real. Nature, to the artist, is nothing more than it is to the philosopher, being simply the ideal world appearing under permanent restrictions, or merely the imperfect reflection of a world existing, not outside him, but within.

But now what may be the source of this kinship of philosophy and art, despite the opposition between them, is a question already sufficiently answered in what has gone before.

We therefore close with the following observation. —A system is completed when it is led back to its starting point. But this is precisely the case with our own. The ultimate ground of all harmony between subjective and objective could be exhibited in its original identity only through intellectual intuition; and it is precisely this ground which, by means of the work of art, has been brought forth entirely from the subjective, and rendered wholly objective, in such wise, that we have gradually led our object, the self itself, up to the very point where we ourselves were standing when we began to philosophize.

But now if it is art alone which can succeed in objectifying with universal validity what the philosopher is able to present in a merely subjective fashion, there is one more conclusion yet to be drawn. Philosophy was born and nourished by poetry in the infancy of knowledge, and with it all those sciences it has guided toward perfection; we may thus expect them, on completion, to flow back like so many individual streams into the universal ocean of poetry from which they took their source. Nor is it in general difficult to say what the medium for this return of science to poetry will be; for in mythology such a medium existed, before the occurrence of a breach now seemingly beyond repair.¹ But how a new

¹The further development of this idea is contained in a treatise *On Mythology*, already sketched out a number of years ago.

mythology is itself to arise, which shall be the creation, not of some individual author, but of a new race, personifying, as it were, one single poet—that is a problem whose solution can be looked for only in the future destinies of the world, and in the course of history to come.

General Observation on the Whole System

If the reader, who has followed our discussion attentively up to this point, now considers once more the interconnection of the whole, he will doubtless remark as follows:

That the whole system falls between two extremes, of which one is characterized by intellectual, the other by aesthetic intuition. What intellectual intuition is for the philosopher, aesthetic intuition is for his object. The former, since it is necessary purely for purposes of that special direction of the mind which it takes in philosophizing, makes no appearance at all in ordinary consciousness; the latter, since it is nothing else but intellectual intuition given universal currency, or become objective, can at least figure in every consciousness. But from this very fact it may also be understood that, and why, philosophy as philosophy can never become generally current. The one field to which absolute objectivity is granted, is art. Take away objectivity from art, one might say, and it ceases to be what it is, and becomes philosophy; grant objectivity to philosophy, and it ceases to be philosophy, and becomes art. —Philosophy attains, indeed, to the highest, but it brings to this summit only, so to say, the fraction of a man. Art brings *the whole man*, as he is, to that point, namely to a knowledge of the highest, and this is what underlies the eternal difference and the marvel of art.

That moreover the whole sequence of the transcendental philosophy is based merely upon a continual raising of self-intuition to increasingly higher powers, from the first and simplest exercise of self-consciousness, to the highest, namely the aesthetic.

The following are the powers through which the object of philosophy takes its course, in order to bring forth the entire edifice of self-consciousness

The act of self-consciousness in which that absolute identical first divides itself, is nothing else but an act of *self-intuition as such*. By this act, therefore, nothing determinate can as yet be posited in the self, since it is only first through it that any determinacy is posited at all. In this primary act the identical first becomes at once both subject and object, i.e., becomes a self at all—not for itself,

though certainly for philosophical reflection.

(What the identical may be, abstracted from and, as it were, *prior* to this act, simply cannot be asked. For it is that which can *only* reveal itself through self-consciousness, and cannot anywhere part company from this act.)

The second self-intuition is that whereby the self intuits that determinacy posited in the objective of its activity; and this takes place in sensation. In this intuition the self is an *object for itself*, whereas in the preceding one it was object and subject only for the philosopher.

In the third self-intuition the self also becomes an object to itself *qua* sensing, that is, even what has hitherto been subjective in the self is carried over to the objective; thus everything in the self is now objective, or the self is *wholly* objective, and *qua* objective is subject and object at once.

Of this stage of consciousness, nothing else will be able to remain behind, therefore, save what will be found, after consciousness has arisen, as the absolute objective (the external world). — This intuition, which is already raised to a higher power, and is for that very reason productive, contains, apart from the objective and subjective activities, which are *both* objective in the present case, yet a third, the truly intuitant or *ideal* activity; this it is which afterwards comes to light as the *conscious* activity, but which, since it is merely the third derived from these two, can neither be separated from them nor opposed to them. — Thus in this intuition a conscious activity is already implicit, or the unconscious objective is determined by a conscious activity, save only that the latter is not distinguished as such.

The intuition that follows will be that whereby the self intuits itself as productive. But now since the self is at present *purely* objective, this intuition too will be *purely* objective, *i.e.*, once more without consciousness. There is indeed present in this intuition an ideal activity, having as its object that intuitant, equally ideal activity involved in the preceding intuition; here, therefore, the intuitant activity is an ideal activity of the second order, *i.e.*, a purposive, albeit an unconsciously purposive one. That which remains of this intuition in consciousness will thus indeed appear as purposive, but not as a product purposively brought forth. Such a product is *organization*, in its whole extent.

By means of these four stages, the self as an intelligence is completed. It is evident that up to this point nature keeps wholly in step with the self, and hence that nature undoubtedly lacks only the final

phase, whereby all these intuitions acquire for it the same meaning as they have for the self. But what this final phase may be, will appear from what follows.

If the self were to continue to be *purely* objective, self-intuition could go on rising to higher powers *ad infinitum*, but the process would merely lengthen the series of products in nature without ever giving rise to consciousness. The latter is possible only if that purely objective element in the self becomes objective *to the self itself*. But the ground of this *cannot* lie in the *self itself*. For the self is absolutely identical with this *purely* objective element. The ground can therefore lie only outside a self which, by progressive limitation, has gradually been restricted into an intelligence, and even to the point of individuality. But *outside* the individual, *i.e.*, independent of him, there is only the *intelligence itself*. But [according to the mechanism deduced] the intelligence itself, where it exists, must restrict itself into individuality. Hence the ground we are looking for outside the individual can only lie in *another individual*.

The absolutely objective can only become an object to the *self itself* through the influence of other rational beings. But the intention of such influence must already have been present in these beings. Hence, freedom is always presupposed in nature (nature does not engender it), and where it is not already there from the first, it cannot arise. It therefore becomes evident here, that although up to this point nature is entirely similar to the intelligence, and traverses with it the same sequence of powers, freedom, *if* it exists (though *that* it does so, cannot be theoretically demonstrated), must be superior (*natura prior*) to nature.

From this point onwards, therefore, we begin a new sequence of acts, which are not possible through nature, and in fact leave it behind.

The absolutely objective, or the law-governed nature of intuiting, becomes an object to the self itself. But intuiting becomes an object to the intuitant only through willing. The objective factor in willing is intuiting as such, or the pure lawfulness of nature; the subjective factor, an ideal activity directed upon this lawfulness as such. The act in which this occurs is the *absolute act of will*.

The absolute act of will itself in turn becomes an object to the self, in that the objective element in willing, directed to something external, becomes an object to the self in the form of a natural urge, while the subjective, directed to lawfulness as such, is objectified in the form of absolute will, *i.e.*, as a categorical imperative. But this, too, is impossible without an activity superior to them both. This

activity is *choice*, or free activity accompanied by consciousness.

But now if this consciously free activity, which in acting is opposed to the objective, although required to be one with it, is intuited in its original identity with the objective—a thing utterly impossible through freedom—we finally obtain by this the highest power of self-intuition; and this, since it already lies out beyond the *conditions* of consciousness, and is indeed itself the consciousness that creates itself *ab initio*, must appear, where it exists, as absolutely contingent; and this absolute contingency in the highest power of self-intuition is what we designate by means of the idea of *genius*.

These are the phases, unalterable and fixed for all knowledge, in the history of self-consciousness; they are characterized in experience by a continuous stepwise sequence, and they can be exhibited and extended from simple stuff to organization (whereby unconsciously productive nature reverts into itself), and from thence by reason and choice up to the supreme union of freedom and necessity in art (whereby consciously productive nature encloses and completes itself).