

# A Specification for the Unchained Index

trueblocks-core@v0.51.0

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## Introduction

Immutable data, such as that produced by blockchains, and content-addressable storage, such as IPFS, have gotten married, and they've had a baby called the "Unchained Index."

Immutable data and content-addressable storage are deeply connected.

Without a suitable storage medium for immutable data, how can it possibly be immutable? Additionally, if one modifies immutable data, (1) it's not immutable, and (2) its location on IPFS will change. The two concepts are as tightly connected as the front and back sides of a piece of paper. You can try to pull them apart—but you'll only end up with two, slightly thinner, pieces of paper. That's just the way it is.

This document describes the Unchained Index, a computer system that purposefully takes advantage of this tight coupling between immutable data and content-addressable storage.

The mechanisms described in this paper apply to all immutable data (for example, time-ordered logs), but the examples herein focus on the Ethereum blockchain's mainnet.

## The Format of the Paper

This document begins by reviewing the Unchained Index. Following are detailed descriptions of the binary file formats used in the system. The paper concludes by describing the algorithms to create, read, write, and query the Unchained Index.

## The Unchained Index

The Unchained Index is a naturally-sharded, easily-shared, reproducible, and minimally-sized immutable index for EVM-based blockchains. See this website (<https://unchainedindex.io>) for more information.

By querying a smart contract on the Ethereum mainnet, the system obtains the IPFS hash of a manifest that points to the entirety of the index database. End users may subsequently query this index to obtain a list of "everything that ever happened" to an address on a given chain. This allows a user to reconstruct the history of the account(s) without the need for a third-party API (assuming they are running their own Ethereum and IPFS nodes). Furthermore, the manifest includes enough information to rebuild the index from scratch (in the form of a hash to this specification).

In the following sections of the paper, five binary file formats are described:

- 1) The Manifest – a JSON object that carries enough information to reconstitute the index;
- 2) Index Chunk – a single portion of the entire index consisting of approximately 2,000,000 appearance records and covering a certain block range;
- 3) Bloom Filter – a Bloom filter encoding set membership of each address in the associated Index chunk covering the same block range;

- 4) Names Database – a somewhat unrelated collection of named address labels used to better articulate the query results. This small subset of known accounts contains about 13,000 records; and
- 5) Timestamp Database – a flat-file binary database used to optimize timestamp lookups.

You may skip ahead to the File Formats section below if you wish.

...

As mentioned, the Unchained Index is a naturally-sharded, easily-shared, reproducible, and minimally-sized immutable index for EVM-based blockchains. What does that mean?

#### *Naturally Sharded, Easily Shared*

Unlike a traditional database, the Unchained Index is not stored in a single monolithic file. Instead, it is a collection of much smaller files (“chunks”) and their associated Bloom filters. Breaking the index into smaller chunks is by design and allows us to take advantage of content-addressable storage systems such as IPFS. This design allows for a natural distribution of the index while requiring no “extra effort” from the end user. We call this aspect of the system, “naturally sharded and easily shared.” The design also imposes a near-zero cost of publication on its “publishers,” of which there may be many.

Because the index consists of chunks, end users are able to acquire only those portions of the index they need. A user’s “need” is expressed naturally as a direct result of his/her queries. As the end-user explores the history of an address—that is, he exhibits his own natural interest in an address—the Unchained Index delivers only that portion of the index required to fulfill specific queries.

This has the happy consequence that “light” users (i.e., users interested in only a few, lightly-used addresses—most of us) carry a light burden, while “heavy” users (those interested in large smart contracts or doing data analytics, for example) require a larger number of chunks to satisfy their queries. As a result, heavy users are able to share more chunks, thereby carrying a heavier burden. This is by design, and we think, fair.

The system goes one step further and pins these queried chunks (and Blooms) by default. As a side-effect, the system enlists the end-user in sharing the downloaded chunks with others without having to make an “extra effort”. Over time, the system becomes distributed as each chunk becomes increasingly more available.

As the system matures, the index becomes shared fully among community members making it (a) more resilient, (b) higher-performing as more copies are available throughout the system, (c) more resistant to censorship, (d) more difficult to capture, and (e) imposing a lessening burden on the publisher as the end users themselves are sharing in the burden of publication.

## *Reproducible*

The content-addressable nature of the storage also aids in making the Unchained Index reproducible. A primary data structure in the system is called the Manifest (the JSON format of which is described below). As each chunk is produced, the block range covered by that chunk, the IPFS hash of the chunk, and the IPFS hash of the chunk’s Bloom filter are appended to the manifest and the manifest itself is written to IPFS. The IPFS hash of the manifest is then enshrined in the Unchained Index smart contract (which is also detailed below).

The manifest contains enough information to make the Unchained Index “reproducible” in the following sense:

1. The manifest records the version of this specification (“trueblocks-core@v0.51.0-beta”).
2. The manifest also records the IPFS hash of this exact PDF document. In this way, end-users who have access to the manifest have a full specification of the system used to create it. It is expected this specification will not change frequently. The publisher of the index cannot argue that some other algorithm was used to create it.
3. The keccak\_256 of the version is inserted into each binary chunk of the index prior to publishing it to IPFS. In this way, if the user obtains any portion of the index, he/she knows exactly which specification under which the portion was written.
4. The IPFS hash of the manifest is periodically posted to the Unchained Index smart contract, thereby enshrining it forever on the blockchain. Once published, the publisher (either TrueBlocks or anyone else) may no longer recant the information. The manifest, and as a result the entire index, is accessible to anyone for as long as the blockchain exists. This illustrates the need for pinning by default.
5. At a later point, if a user wishes to verify the contents of a portion of the index (or all of it), they may read the smart contract, download the manifest, download this document and the tagged commit of the source code, and re-run the code itself against their own blockchain node. This, presumably, will produce the exact same index.
6. We consider it the responsibility of the end-user to satisfy themselves as to the veracity of the data in the index. We make it easy for them to get the data, we do not claim it’s correct.

Because the manifest contains enough information to reproduce the index, there is no need for end users to trust our data, and we do not expect them to. Nor do we feel the need to “prove” the data or provide for “watchers” or “fishermen” to verify that the data is correct. It seems obvious to us that if “fishermen” are needed, then “fishers of fishermen” are needed ad-infinitum. If the end user wishes to have proven data, she has all the tools she needs to prove the data herself.

## *A Further Note on Reproducibility*

TrueBlocks creates the Unchained Index data for our own purposes. We desire that our end-user-focused software work properly. In this sense, we are highly motivated to produce accurate data, and we are quite certain that the data we produce is accurate.

While we do purposefully allow others to use the data by exposing it in the smart contract, we reject any sense of responsibility to vouch for the data. The data is correct because our software demands that it be correct. Others may use it if they wish—but beyond that, we make no other representations.

### A Short Digression on the Use of Bloom Filters

Please see [this excellent explainer on Bloom filters](#). A Bloom filter is “a space-efficient probabilistic data structure...used to test whether an element is a member of a set.” This fits perfectly in our design. For each chunk, the system produces an associated Bloom filter. Upon first use of the system, the end user may download only the Bloom filters (about 3 GB). Alternatively, they may choose, if they wish, to download both the Bloom filters and all of the index chunks (about 80 GB). As a final alternative, the end user may choose to create the index themselves.

These three methods are explained briefly below and [more fully here](#).

#### *chifra init: downloading only the Bloom filters from IPFS*

Disc footprint:	Small, 2-3 GB
Download time:	15-20 minutes
Query speed:	Slower the 1 <sup>st</sup> time one queries an address, subsequently as fast as other methods
Hard drive space:	In direct proportion to the user’s query patterns
Sharing:	The user may share the Bloom filters and downloaded index chunks
Security:	Data is created by TrueBlocks, less secure than producing it oneself
RPC endpoints:	Works with remote RPC endpoint, but a local RPC endpoint is much preferred
Ongoing burden:	The end user must run ‘chifra scrape’ to maintain ‘front of chain’ index

When initialized with chifra init, TrueBlocks downloads only the Bloom filters for the given chain. Generally, this takes less than 15 minutes. When a user later queries an address (using chifra list or chifra export), the Bloom filters are consulted and only those portions of the full index that hit the Bloom filter are downloaded.

In this way, the end user only acquires index chunks that “matter to him.” In other words, the system places a burden in proportion to the user’s behavior. Users who interact infrequently with the chain, get only a small amount of data. Queries against addresses that interact very frequently with the chain—such as popular smart contracts—hit on nearly every Bloom filter. In this case, the user downloads a much larger percentage of the entire index.

In this first mode, a query for a never-before-queried address takes longer because the index chunks that hit the Bloom filter must be downloaded during the query. Subsequent queries for the same address, however, are as fast as other methods. Unless one is querying a large collection of different and quickly-changing addresses, the cost of a slower initial query may be worth the benefit of a smaller disc footprint.

### *chifra init –all: downloading Bloom filters and the full index from IPFS*

Disc footprint:	Large, ~75 GB at the time of writing
Query speed:	Very fast queries on all addresses as there is no additional downloading
Download time:	~1-3 hours depending on connection speeds
Burden size:	The full index is stored on the end user's machine
Sharing:	The user may share the entire index (good citizen award!)
Security:	Data is created by TrueBlocks, less secure than producing it oneself
RPC endpoints:	Works with remote RPC endpoint, but a local RPC endpoint is much preferred
Ongoing burden:	The end user must run 'chifra scrape' to maintain 'front of chain' index

If the user chooses to initialize with chifra init –all the entire Unchained Index (including all of the chunks and all of the Bloom filters) is downloaded. This process may take several hours to complete depending on the end user's connection and the size of the chain. This is the recommended way to run if you have available disc space.

While, in this second method, the Bloom filters are still consulted during the query (because it's much faster to avoid reading the chunk if possible), there are no further downloads during the query. All index chunks are already present on the machine. If one is studying an address that appears frequently on the chain or many different addresses with varying usage patterns, this method is preferred.

### *chifra scrape: building the index from scratch*

Disc footprint:	Large, ~75 GB at time of writing – same size as method 2
Query speed:	Fast queries – same as method 2
Download time:	2-3 days depending on speed of node software and machine
Burden size:	Full burden – same as method 2
Sharing:	Full sharing possible – same as method 2
Security:	Most secure, but not as secure as reviewing the open-source code first
RPC endpoints:	Generally, will not work with shared endpoints – you will be rate limited
Ongoing burden:	The end user must run 'chifra scrape' to maintain 'front of chain' index

The third and final method, building the index yourself, is the most secure, particularly if you review the source code first. One accomplishes this third method by running chifra scrape (which is the same command one must use to stay up to the head of the chain). If you've reviewed the source code and concluded that it does what it says it does, and you're running the scraper in a secure environment against your own locally running node, this is the most secure method to obtain the index. Running against a remote RPC endpoint will most likely not work. TrueBlocks hits the node as hard as it possibly can. This method has the same disc usage and query characteristics as method 2. The only benefit is that you build the index yourself.

### Pinning by Default

In the currently available version of the Unchained Index, the system does not pin the downloaded or produced index by default, although you may enable pinning if you wish.

In future versions, pinning will be enabled by default, as will running an embedded IPFS node. This will be an important day for TrueBlocks as it will allow TrueBlocks to finally become a truly decentralized method to produce, publish, and share an immutable index.

Pinning by default has the happy consequence that as users acquire and retain portions of the index for their own selfish reasons, they are sharing those portions with others. This happens without “extra effort” on the part of the end user—an important consideration in distributed systems. In other words, sharing happens as a by-product or “off-fall” of the system. This is by design. It is our belief that requiring “extra effort” from an end user almost guarantees the long-term failure of the system.

Obviously, the user will retain those portions of the index they need for their own purposes. And, while each chunk contains the user’s own appearance records, they contain many additional records as well. Pinning by default takes advantage of this fact. It is a perfect example of “You scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours.”

We purposefully built this system to naturally distribute the Unchained Index (which, remember, is available to anyone through the smart contract). We wanted to create a system with positive externalities—that is, we wanted to design a system in which each new user makes the system better as opposed to placing an increasing burden on the system.

#### Conclusion of this Section

We’ve spent time explaining the Unchained Index because this may explain some of the engineering decisions we’ve made in the data.

In the next sections of the document, we detail, first, the Unchained Index Smart Contract, then the file format of the Manifest, then the file formats for each of four binary databases. Each format is presented in a separate section.

We present the following information as stylized Solidity or GoLang source code to ease explanation. The code presented most likely will not run. Please see our GitHub repos for the actual source code.

## Smart Contracts

### The Unchained Index Smart Contract

The Unchained Index smart contract has been deployed on Ethereum Mainnet at address 0x0c316b7042b419d07d343f2f4f5bd54ff731183d. The in-line comments explain its operation.

It is important to note that this smart contract is purposefully permissionless. This is by design. The reason for this is explained in the comments.

The contract has not changed since the previous version of this specification, and it should not remain unnoticed that by placing the contract's address in this document and the hash of this document into the produced data, we are purposefully making the data reproducible.

```
pragma solidity ^0.8.13;

// The Unchained Index Smart Contract
contract UnchainedIndex_V2 {
    // The address of the account that deployed the contract.
    // Used only as the recipient for donations. May be modified.
    address public owner;

    // A map pointing from the address that wrote a record to the record
    // itself. A record is an entry in a map pointing from a chain to
    // the current IPFS hash of the manifest representing the index
    // of addresses for that chain. End users are encouraged to query
    // this map for a publisher that they themselves trust. Any publisher
    // may write any number of records.
    mapping(address => mapping(string => string)) public manifestHashMap;

    // The contract's constructor preserves the deploying address for the
    // contract as the owner. It also initializes a single record for the
    // mainnet chain pointing to the manifest hash of an empty file.
    // Two events are emitted.
    constructor() {
        // Store the deployer address for later use (see below)
        owner = msg.sender;
        emit OwnerChanged(address(0), owner);

        // Store a record, published by the deployer, indicating that the
        // manifest for mainnet is the empty file.
        manifestHashMap[msg.sender][
            "mainnet"
        ] = "QmP4i6ihnVrj8Tx7cTFw4aY6ungpaPYxDJEZ7Vg1RSNSdm"; // empty file
        emit HashPublished(
            owner,
            "mainnet",
        );
    }
}
```

```

        manifestHashMap[msg.sender]["mainnet"]
    );
}

// The primary function of the contract, this routine allows anyone to
// publish a record to the smart contract. End users may choose to use
// any record they desire. TrueBlocks makes no representation as to the
// quality of any data published through this smart contract, however,
// because this data is used by our own applications, it satisfies us.

// The publishHash function is purposefully permissionless. Anyone
// willing to spend the gas may publish a hash pointing to any IPFS
// file. Anyone may also query the contract for records published
// by any publisher. This is by design. End users must determine for
// themselves who to believe. We suggest it's us, but who knows?
//
// This function writes a record to the map and emits an event. Note that
// any data published by any publisher is permitted.
function publishHash(string memory chain, string memory hash) public {
    manifestHashMap[msg.sender][chain] = hash;
    emit HashPublished(msg.sender, chain, hash);
}

// We are happy to accept your donations in support of our work.
function donate() public payable {
    // Only accept donations if there's an address to accept them
    require(owner != address(0), "owner is not set");
    payable(owner).transfer(address(this).balance);
    // Let someone know...
    emit DonationSent(msg.sender, msg.value, block.timestamp);
}

// The 'owner' address serves only the purpose of accepting donations.
// If, at a certain point, we decide to disable or redirect donations
// we can set this to a different address.
function changeOwner(address newOwner) public returns (address oldOwner) {
    // Only the owner may change the owner
    require(msg.sender == owner, "msg.sender must be owner");
    oldOwner = owner;
    owner = newOwner;

    // Let someone know...
    emit OwnerChanged(oldOwner, newOwner);
    return oldOwner;
}

// Emitted each time a manifest hash is published

```

```

event HashPublished(address publisher, string chain, string hash);

// Emitted when the contract's owner changes
event OwnerChanged(address oldOwner, address newOwner);

// Emitted when a donation is sent
event DonationSent(address from, uint256 amount, uint256 ts);
}

```

While we do plan to eventually automate the process, note that currently, we publish the hash of the manifest (and other databases) to the smart contract at our own expense. We do this as another sign that our data is correct. Why would we spend money to publish inaccurate data?

In the next section we define the binary file formats for the various databases used in the system.

## File Formats

### The Manifest File

The manifest file is produced each time a new index chunk (and Bloom filter) is produced. It is a simple JSON object that stores five things:

- 1) the version of this document that describing everything one needs to build the index from scratch;
- 2) the name of the blockchain that this manifest indexes;
- 3) the IPFS hash of this document;
- 4) the configuration settings used to create the index; and
- 5) a list of chunks and associated Bloom filters detailing the entire index.

Note that the version string stored in the Manifest is of this document, not the TrueBlocks/trueblocks-core repo.

The JSON format of the Manifest file is shown on the next page.

```
{
  "version": "trueblocks-core@v0.40.0",
  "chain": "mainnet",
  "schemas": "Qmart6XP9XjL43p72PGR93QKytbK8jWWcMguhFgxATTya2",
  "databases": "Qmart6XP9XjL43p72PGR93QKytbK8jWWcMguhFgxATTya2",
  "chunks": [
    {
      "range": "015013585-015016368",
      "bloomHash": "QmREw5qaoucbVvEQzF71D44rXKzax9YgKuEEhZYHAYFZF5",
      "indexHash": "QmTbFshRSdBFoC6AvBgzdRJ6Vgb9cVL3yTprYQ24XqHTqx"
    },
    {
      // and so on...
    }
  ]
}
```

The Manifest is produced each time a new chunk is produced. The algorithm to produce the chunks is described in the section called *Building the Index and Bloom Filters*.

The Manifest is stored in a text file that is added to IPFS, and the IPFS hash of that file is (periodically due to cost) published to the Unchained Index smart contract. (We publish the hash using the `trueblocks.eth` wallet, which is also the contract's deployer.)

Once published, a number of important things become true:

- 1) The publication record cannot be unpublished—the IPFS reference to that Manifest will be on-chain forever readable by anyone with access to the chain;
- 2) Anyone who reads the Manifest may download all the chunks *and* this specification which contains enough information to faithfully reproduce the index if desired;
- 3) The publisher (that is, TrueBlocks) has no further ongoing cost of publication other than pinning the files on IPFS (which carries a near-zero cost). We do not have to run a Web 2.0 API to deliver this data. IPFS handles data delivery.


Over time, as more and more users download and pin more and more parts of the index—which happens through usage alone—the resiliency and speed of the system increase. This increase in resiliency is in proportion to the number of users. The more users—the more resilient the system becomes. This is the essence of Web 3.0. It's a classic case of a positive sum externality and an “If we all build it, we can all come” type of system.

As mentioned, the Manifest lists the hashes of each individual chunk whose file format is described next.

## The Index Chunk File

We describe the format of the index chunk file graphically as well as GoLang structures. Following that, we detail the algorithm one might use to read this file. There are approximately 2,800 chunks covering the 15,000,000 Ethereum mainnet blocks at the time of this writing and the same number of associated Bloom filters.

The binary Index Chunk file consists of a single fixed-width header followed by two fixed-width tables. Graphically, it looks like this:



The same file format expressed as a Golang structure is here:


```
// Binary format of the Index Chunk file.
type IndexChunk struct {

    // A fixed-width record containing versioning information and two record
    // counts (nAddresses and nAppearances) one each for each of two tables.
    Header        HeaderRecord

    // A fixed-width table containing nAddresses rows
    AddressTable []AddressRecord

    // A fixed-width table containing nAppearances rows
    AppearanceTable []AppearanceRecord
}
```

The HeaderRecord, which contains versioning information and counters for two tables, is expressed graphically as:



and rendered in Golang as follows:

```
// The structure of the Header record (44 bytes)
type HeaderRecord struct {


    // '0xdeadbeef' indicates that this is a known file format
    Magic      [4]byte

    // The version string of the specification used to create this file.
    // This value ensures that anyone receiving this file knows how to
    // read it. For all chunks up to and including block 13,000,000, the
    // value of this field contains all zeros. For chunks covering blocks
    // ranges after 13,000,000, this value is the keccak256 hash of the
    // version string of this specification.
    Version     [32]byte

    // A count of the number of records in the AddressRecord table
    nAddresses uint32

    // A count of the number of records in the AppearanceRecord table
    nAppearances uint32
}
```

The AddressTable, which follows immediately after the Header, contains header. nAddrs fixed-width records of type AddressRecord. Each record relates into the AppearanceTable via the Offset field which points to the position in the AppearanceTable of this address's appearances.



For each address found in the block range, the AddressRecord table stores the address and two unsigned integers. The first integer is the Offset into the AppearanceRecord table where this address's appearance records begin. The second integer, Count, is the number of appearance records to read.

In Golang code, the AddressRecord looks like this:


```
// The AddressRecord structure
type AddressRecord struct {

    // a 20-byte Ethereum address
    Address [20]byte

    // The offset into the appearance table to the address's first record
    Offset uint32

    // Number of records in the appearance table to read
    Count uint32
}
```

The AppearanceTable, which follows immediately after the AddressTable, consists of an array of header.nApps fixed-width AppearanceRecords. The records consist of two 32-bit unsigned integers representing the blockNumber and transactionIndex of the appearance. The structure is graphically presented here:



and rendered in Golang code here:

```
// An appearance is a <blockNumber><tx_id> pair. One for each time an address
// appears anywhere in the chain data.
type AppearanceRecord struct {

    // The block number for the appearance
    BlockNumber uint32

    // The transaction id for the appearance
    TransactionIndex uint32
}
```

The algorithm for reading an Index Chunk file is presented next. Note, that we've removed error processing for clarity.

```

// Search a single chunk for an address
func GetAppearances(addr address, chunkFilename string) []AppearanceRecord {

    // Open the file
    fp := os.Open(chunkFilename)

    // Read the header
    header := HeaderRecord{}
    binary.Read(fp, binary.LittleEndian, &header)

    // Where do the tables start?
    offsetToAddrTable := os.Seek(fp, io.SeekCurrent)

    // Conduct a binary search on the address table
    found := binarySearch(fp, addr, offsetToAddrTable)
    if found == nil {
        // Address not found, return empty array
        return []AppearanceRecord{}
    }

    // Where the appearance table resides
    offsetToAppsTable := offsetToAddrs +
        (header.nAddresses * os.Sizeof(AddressRecord))

    // Go to the start of this address's appearance records
    fp.Seek((offsetToAppsTable + found.Offset, io.SeekStart)

    // We know how big the results array has to be...
    apps := make([]AppearanceRecord, found.Count)
    binary.Read(fp, binary.LittleEndian, &apps)

    return apps
}

```

**Performance Note:** In the actual implementation of the function, it accepts an array of addresses as opposed to a single address at a time. We do this to avoid spinning through the chunks repeatedly for multiple addresses. In the actual implementation, we return a corresponding array of arrays of Appearances instead. We've removed that feature here to ease explanation.

**Performance Note:** Because the GetAppearances function reads from disc, it is desirable to avoid running the function if at all possible. Thus, the reason why the system requires Bloom filters...

## The Bloom Filter File

As described above, the Unchained Index is a collection of binary files called “chunks”. Taken as a whole, the chunks can be seen as an everyday database file. Each chunk contains a near-equal number of records. In this way, we ensure a fair distribution of the index via content-addressable storage such as IPFS while imposing a minimal cost of publication on publishers.

In order to optimize searching the chunked index, we produce a second collection of binary files, called Bloom filters. One Bloom filter file for each chunk file.

A Bloom filter is a probabilistic data structure that encodes set membership in a very compact way. On average, each chunk is around 25 megabytes big and contains approximately 2,000,000 appearance records. The associated Bloom filters are, on average, one megabyte big. 25 times smaller.

The algorithm we use to build the chunks and Bloom Filters is described in the section *Building the Index and Bloom Filters*. In the current section, we detail how to read the Bloom filter and document the Bloom filter’s file format.

Note that each Bloom filter (as well as each chunk) is independent. This means that queries against the Bloom filters (and the chunks) may proceed concurrently. In the code below, we’ve removed concurrency in order to make the discussion easier to understand.

We will start by describing the algorithm used to read the Bloom filter. Following that, we describe the file format.

```
// Optimize address queries by consulting a Bloom filter for set membership of
// an address prior to reading the much larger Index Chunk.
func GetAppearancesUsingBblooms(addr []address) (apps [][]AppearanceRecord) {

    // Get a list of all Bloom filters
    listOfBloomFilters := <list of bloom filter files>

    // For each Bloom filter...
    for _, bloom := range listOfBloomFilters {

        // Prepare a place to store a list of hits
        hits := make([]address)

        // For each address...
        for _, addr := range addrs {

            // Check if the address is in the Bloom filter
            if bloom.Contains(addr) {
                hits = append(hits, addr)
            }
        }

        // Add the hits to the overall list of appearances
        apps = append(apps, hits)
    }
}
```

```

    // ...if the address hits the Bloom filter...
    if bloom.IsElementOf(addr) {
        // ...take note...
        hits = append(hits, addr)

    }

}

// Did any addresses hit on this Bloom filter?
if len(hits) > 0 {
    // Yes. We've hit at least one bloom. This indicates that the
    // address "may be" in the chunk. We must explicitly check...

    // ...make sure the chunk is local (i.e., download from IPFS if not)
    establishChunk(bloom.Filename)

    // For each address, get that address's appearances (if any)
    for _, addr := range hits {
        apps = append(apps, GetAppearances(addr, bloom.FileName))
    }
}

// Return the results
return apps
}

```

**establishChunk** consults the local hard drive for the chunk. If the chunk is not present (because the user used `chifra init`, for example), the routine consults the Manifest in order to decide which IPFS hash to download. The full binary chunk is then downloaded from IPFS.

TrueBlocks uses a multi-part Bloom filter that we call an *Adaptive Bloom Filter*. The “parts” of the multi-part filter are bit arrays encoding the set membership of addresses in the chunk. Each bit array is 1/8 of one megabyte wide (an arbitrarily chosen width balancing file size with the filter’s effectiveness). The method by which we insert addresses into the Bloom filters is described in the section called *Purposeful Sloppiness* below.

The word “Adaptive” refers to the fact that we grow the Bloom filter as we populate it, making it as large as it needs to be in order to maintain a pre-defined “maximum expected false positive rate.” Different block ranges contain a varying number of addresses. This means that if we did not use an adaptive Bloom filter, the Bloom filters would either be under-populated or over-saturated—in fact, this is exactly what happened in the Ethereum node software where the Bloom filters are ineffective.

We “grow” the Adaptive Bloom filter by adding additional bit arrays (parts) to ensure a consistent false positive rate. Consult the source code for further information.

As the expected number of false positives becomes larger due to inserting additional addresses and finally overtakes the pre-determined rate, we add an additional bit array to the Bloom. In this way, the expected false positive rate of the Bloom never exceeds the pre-determined value. We do this in an effort to ensure that each address is as likely to hit an arbitrary Bloom filter as any other. This promotes a more even distribution of the downloaded chunks.

A Golang version of the Bloom filter data structure is presented here:

```
// The structure of one Bloom filter
type BloomFilter struct {

    // The number of bit arrays in this file
    Count      uint32

    // An array of bit arrays, the first Count-1 of which are "full"
    BitArrays  []BitArray

}
```

The *Count* field at the head of the file records the number of BitArrays in the file. A single BitArray structure look like this.

```
// An arbitrarily chosen width of each bit array - 1/8 of a megabyte
type BitArrayWidth ((1024 * 1024) / 8)

// A Bloom filter consists of one or more BitArrays. A BitArray stores the
// actual bit-by-bit array as well as an unsigned 32-bit integer (nInserted)
// used for data analysis and debugging. The actual bit array is BitArrayWidth bytes
// wide.
type BitArray struct {

    // The number of addresses inserted into Bits
    nInserted  uint32

    // The bit-by-bit array representing the set membership in this chunk
    Bits       [BitArrayWidth]byte
}
```

A careful reader will notice a number of things:

- 1) There is no versioning information in the Bloom file. This is a conscious choice made to keep the file as small as possible. Versioning can be found in the associated chunk.
- 2) The *Count* field is redundant as the BitArray structure is fixed width. We could have deduced the *Count* value from the file's size divided by the record size.
- 3) The *nInserted* field increases the size of the BitArray and serves no direct purpose other than debugging / data analysis. It could have been removed and will be in the future.

The **IsElementOf** function now becomes easier to understand.

```
// Consult the Bloom filter for set membership of an address.
func (bloom *BloomFilter) IsElementOf(addr address) bool {

    // Convert the address into a bit array using the same function used to
    // convert addresses into bit arrays during construction
    bitsLit := addressToBitArray(addr)

    for _, bitArray := range bloom.BitArrays {
        // If all bits are lit, the address "may be" a member
        if (bitArray & bitsLit) {
            return true
        }
    }

    // The address is not present in the chunk
    return false
}
```

The construction of the Bloom filter and index chunks remains to be described. This is done in the section below called *Building the Index Chunk and Bloom Filter*.

### Summary

In summary, the algorithm to query the Unchained Index for appearances of a given address is:

*for each address of interest  
for each bloom filter...  
    consult the bloom filter to see if the chunk may contain the address  
    if yes,  
        download the chunk if it's not already present  
        extract the appearances in this chunk for the given address (if any)*

In the next section, we describe a few ancillary databases used by the TrueBlocks system. Technically these databases are not required for the operation of the Unchained Index, but are published to the Unchained Index smart contract, and they greatly improve the performance of the system, so we describe them next.

## The Names Database File

The names database is not technically part of the Unchained Index, per se, but it is useful. Periodically, we publish the IPFS hash to the Unchained Index smart contract, thus its inclusion here. It is very useful when presenting information about the history of an address.

Publishing the namesDB hash to the smart contract allows our end-user software to acquire the database relying on a third party. This lowers the cost of publication. The names database file is a binary file consisting of fixed-width records. The number of records in the file is easily calculated from the file's size.

The binary format of the names database follows. (Note: this format may change in the future.)

```
// An array of fixed-width name records
namesDb := []NameRecord

// The number of records can be calculated using the file's size
nRecords := fileSize(<path to names database>) / sizeof(NameRecord)
```

Each NameRecord takes on the following fixed-width format:

```
type NameRecord struct {
    // A user defined tag
    Tags          [31]byte

    // The address to which this name resolves
    Address       [43]byte

    // A name or label for the address
    Name          [121]byte

    // The symbol (if any) for the token (automatically assigned if found on-chain)
    Symbol        [31]byte

    // An attempt to record where the name was first acquired
    Source        [181]byte

    // An arbitrary description of the address, including perhaps a URL
    Description   [256]byte

    // For ERC-20 tokens, the decimals for the token
    Decimals      uint16

    // An internal, opaque bit array used for flags including deletion status
    Flags         uint16
}
```

## The Timestamp Database File

In addition to the names database, the IPFS hash of a second ancillary data is published to the Unchained Index smart contract. We call this database the Timestamps Database.

The need for a timestamp database becomes apparent as soon as one tries to query a block by date (or, equivalently timestamp). The RPC does not include such a query resulting in the need to scan the chain for the result. An external database of timestamps speeds up that query significantly. This Timestamps Database is created during the process of scraping for the index, and its location is published to the smart contract as mentioned above.

The structure of the binary timestamps database is:

```
// An array of fixed-width timestamp records
timestampDb := []TimestampRecord

// The number of records can be calculated using the file's size
nRecords := fileSize(<path>) / sizeof(TimestampRecord)
```

A single `TimestampRecord` structure looks like this:

```
type TimestampRecord struct {

    // The block number for this timestamp
    BlockNumber uint32

    // The timestamp at that block
    Timestamp   uint32
}
```

The following invariant is true for every record in this database:

```
bn == timestampDb[bn].BlockNumber
```

Finding a timestamp given a block is accomplished as follows:

```
ts := timestampDb[bn].Timestamp
```

Finding a block number given a timestamp is accomplished using a binary search:

```
bn := binarySearch(&ts, timestampDb, nRecords, sizeof(TimestampRecord))
```

**Implementation Note:** We note that the Timestamps Database could have been half as big if we had removed the block number from the file. The block numbers are sequential, start with zero, and contain no gaps—a self-contained index. We choose, however, to include block numbers in the database as an aid for debugging and checking the database’s integrity. We reserve the right to change the format of this file in future versions.

### *Conclusion*

This ends the section of the paper describing file formats. Next, we describe how the system builds each of the binary files it produces.

## Building the Index and Bloom Filters

Above, we defined the various binary file formats of the databases that make up the Unchained Index, as well as a number of algorithms used to read and query the index.


In this section, we describe the algorithms used to create and publish the index itself. We start with a discussion of the primary data structure in the index: the AppearanceRecord. We then proceed to discuss how we extract appearances from the raw blockchain data. We conclude by justifying a few engineering decisions we've made that were forced upon us due to our desire to preserve data immutability, preserve reproducibility, and take advantage of content addressability stores such as IPFS.

### Definition: Address Appearances

We define an *Appearance* broadly to mean any location in a blockchain's history where a particular byte pattern is encountered that "appears" to be an address. More specifically, an *appearance* is a <blockNum, txId> pair.

The algorithm we use to identify appearances is "purposefully sloppy" (for reasons similar to the reason why bloom filters permit false positives). We would rather include a byte pattern that "appears" to be an address but is not, rather than not include an actual appearance. Unfortunately, it turns out that finding every address appearance is not even theoretically possible, which leads to the idea of "baddress" which is described below.

Looking closely at a typical Ethereum transaction, one may identify up to  $16^1$  different locations where an address may "appear."



<sup>1</sup> 14 locations are shown in the image, however, in actuality, the block data includes two additional locations—the uncle miner and the block miner. Thus, the total is 16 not 14 as shown.

The pink items shown above are what we would call “easy-to-find” or explicit. These locations are labeled in the data definition as addresses (such as **to**, **from**, **miner**, and **log addresses**). These locations are trivial to extract. We simply copy them out.

Other obvious locations, such as certain log topics, are easily inferred. For example, ERC20 *Transfer* and *Approve* logs (identifiable by topic 0xddf252ad1be2c89b69c2b068fc378daa952ba7f16 3c4a11628f55a4df523b3ef) contain known locations for addresses.

While this method may seem effective, it requires specific knowledge about the format of the data. This is fine for well-established standards such as ERC20, it is not practical for arbitrary smart contracts. As new smart contract protocols appear, this type of specific knowledge is best avoided. Even if it were possible to maintain this knowledge (it’s not), this methodology precludes recognizing addresses in the long tail of unknown protocols. (Something we specifically did not want to do.)

Looking at other areas of the data (colored green above), one encounters the true reason why identifying appearances is difficult. In these green areas of the data, which frequently contain appearances of addresses, the appearances are *implicit*. These appearances are “obscured” inside the byte data, and we do not, and cannot, know the format.

Our desire to capture as many appearances as possible forces our scraping process to operate with minimal “external knowledge” about the byte stream. While *it is not even theoretically possible* to identify every appearance in the general case (every 20-byte pattern from *0x000...000* to *0xffff.ffff* is a valid address), we can take advantage of two aspects of the byte stream<sup>2</sup> that help us help make the process tractable:

- 1) In Ethereum, addresses are 20 bytes long and (for the most part) are left-padded with zeros to 32 bytes;
- 2) Most numeric values encountered in the byte stream are smaller than most addresses (this observation touches on the idea of a “baddress”, which is discussed below).

The above comments are obscure and require a better explanation. Please see the *Purposeful Sloppiness* section below. For the *implicit* locations of the byte stream, we are forced to use certain heuristics when identifying appearances. The *Purposeful Sloppiness* section explains those heuristics.

## Notes on Per Block Data

**Performance Note:** We note that the appearance data buried in a given canonicalized block is independent of the appearance data contained in any other block. In the following discussion, we describe how the Unchained Index processes a single block. The reader is encouraged to

---

<sup>2</sup> Yes – this contradicts the previous comment mentioning that we want to avoid “outside knowledge” of the byte stream. We justify this choice by noting that this second version of “outside knowledge” is not relative to particular smart contract protocol such as ERC20—this outside knowledge is specific to the way the Ethereum blockchain itself operates. For this reason, it works across any protocol and thereby avoids destroying the long tail.

consider the obvious opportunities to make this processing concurrent. (We do this heavily in our implementation. Concurrency considerations have been removed below to make the discussion easier to understand.)

The processing described in the current section of the paper is at the heart of the Unchained Index. The chunking algorithm requires per-block processing in order to build chunks. On top of this per-block processing is a process called the Consolidation Loop. We describe the process of consolidation after describing the per-block processing.

**Performance Note:** These algorithms are very aggressive in the way they query the node’s RPC endpoints. They work against any RPC, but are significantly more effective when running against a locally-running node. This is for three reasons:

- 1) Most node providers do not support delivering Ethereum’s trace data. Of those that do, the cost is prohibitive;
- 2) If you’re using a remote node, you will almost certainly get rate limited even if you’re paying for access;
- 3) Why should you have to pay for access to globally available data?

We highly recommend running the node software called Erigon. It is fast at syncing to the chain, fast at delivering RPC requests locally, takes up a lot less hard drive space, and is easy to install and maintain.

#### Extracting Addresses Per Transaction Per Block

The following algorithm is contained in the Blaze section of our codebase. Blaze is a “pipeline” in the GoLang sense of the word (i.e., that is, it uses channels and is highly concurrent).

Blaze is dependent only on the node’s RPC endpoints. The processing “shoves” block numbers into one end of the pipe and, as if by magic, AppearanceRecords emerge from the other end of the pipe.



While conceptually Blaze is a single pipeline, internally there are two distinct channels. The first channel processes block numbers, queries the node’s RPC, and produces a stream of “traces and logs” for further processing by the second channel. The second channel considers (using the heuristics mentioned above) each byte of the byte stream parsing out appearances. The overall effect of the pipeline is that block numbers go in end and address appearances come out the other.

A discussion of Blaze begins on the next page.

At its topmost level, the Blaze algorithm begins by creating two channels:

```
// Blaze – process a range of blocks to extract address appearances
func Blaze(br BlockRange) []AppearanceRecord {

    // Create a pipe to process block numbers and query the node.
    blockChannel := make(chan uint64)

    // Create a second pipe to process the retrieved data which is stored
    // in a structure called ScrapedData which contains the block number, the
    // block's timestamp and the Log and Trace data from the block.
    addressChannel := make(chan ScrapedData)
```

Next, we create as many go routines as the user instructs us to create in order to process the data being inserted into the pipeline. Different blockchains have different characteristics, therefore, the software allows the end-user to provide the number of go processes to use on the command line.

```
// Set a number of processor pipelines
var blockWg sync.WaitGroup
blockWg.Add(opts.nBlockProcessors)
for i := 0 ; i < opts.nBlockProcessors ; i++ {
    go processBlocks(blockChannel, addressChannel, &blockWg)
}

// Set a number of address processor pipelines
var addrWg sync.WaitGroup
addrWg.Add(opts.nAddressProcessors)
for i := 0 ; i < opts.nAddressProcessors ; i++ {
    go processAddresses(addressChannel, &addrWg)
}
```

Now that we have the pipeline set up, the next step is to insert block numbers into the top of the pipeline. The caller specifies which blocks to start and stop at.

```
// Shove the blocks into the block pipeline
for bn := opts.Start ; bn < (opts.Start + opts.Count) ; bn++ {
    blockChannel <- bn
}
```

And finally, we close the channels (flushing them) and wait until the pipeline finishes processing. During processing, Blaze writes individual files containing the AppearanceRecords found in each block. The Consolidation Loop post processes this data upon return.

```
// When we're finished shoving blocks, close the channels and wait for
// them to finish processing.
blockChannel.Close()
blockWg.Wait()

addressChannel.Close()
addrWg.Wait()


// return to caller
return nil
}
```

The Blaze process takes as input a block range. It is the responsibility of the caller to determine which block range to process. During regular processing, the caller of Blaze is the Consolidation Loop which is described below.

The output of Blaze is written to a file inside the address pipeline—that is, the algorithm “streams” the results choosing not to return the data in an array. This allows us to process a very large number of blocks at a time (including a single block—a feature we use for debugging). This is one of the primary reasons that the algorithms continue to operate on small machines.

### The Block Processor

Next, we look into the block processor (the **processBlocks** routine). The block processor queries the node for trace and log data given a block number. It then collates that data into a more useful structure (called **ScrapedData**) and “shoves” the collated data into the address processor (the **processAddresses** routine).



The block processor ranges over the block channel, waiting until a block number appears. Once a block number appears, the block processor makes three RPC calls and combines the result into a **ScrapedData** structure. It then shoves this combined data into the address processing channel. When the **blockChannel** is closed, the loop exits and the WaitGroup is marked as done. Blaze then returns control to the caller.

```

// Wait until block numbers appear in the block channel and then query
// the node for the block's timestamp, its logs, and its trace data. Combine
// the results into a structure for easier processing and pass the combined
// result into the address processor channel.
func processBlocks(blockChannel chan int, addressChannel chan ScrapedData,
                    blockWG *sync.WaitGroup) {

    // Range over the block channel. Note that these values will be
    // non-sequential and may be processed concurrently.
    for bn := range blockChannel {

        // Query the node and combine results for further processing
        combined := ScrapedData{
            BlockNumber: bn
            TimeStamp: client.GetBlockTimestamp(bn)
            Traces: client.GetBlockTraces(bn)
            Logs: client.GetBlockLogs(bn)
        }

        // pass it on to the next piece of the pipeline...
        addressChannel <- combined
    }
}

```

### Implementation Notes:

- 1) This code is concurrent-aware. Any number of go routines may process this data concurrently and independently of other blocks;
- 2) In future implementations, we intend to process groups of blocks at a time as opposed to individual blocks. This would allow us, for example, to use **eth\_getLogs** with a block range instead of a single block. This would be much faster. Processing multiple blocks at a time would require us to insert block ranges as opposed to block numbers into the block processor channel.
- 3) **Possible EIP:** It would be beneficial if the node software provided timestamp information with the **trace\_block** response. This would eliminate one third of all queries against the node.

Next, we detail the ScrapedData structure (called “combined” in the above code). This structure combines the received information from the RPC commands (**trace\_block** and **eth\_getLogs**). This convenience structure makes further processing easier.

```

// The ScrapedData structure
type ScrapedData struct {

    // The block number for the data stored in this structure
    BlockNumber    uint32

    // The timestamp at that block
    Timestamp      uint32


    // The trace data as returned by the RPC's 'trace_block' routine
    Traces         []Trace

    // The log data as returned by the RPC's 'eth_getLogs' routine
    Logs           []Log
}

```

### *The Address Processor*

The block processor passes the above data on to the address processor which we describe next. Conceptually, this step in the pipeline looks like this:



The address processor accepts ScrapedData structures as they are inserted into the channel, `addressChannel`, and finds “every appearance of every address anywhere in that byte stream.”

For each identified address, three values are written to disc for later processing by the Consolidation Loop. These three values are a 20-byte address, a 32-bit integer representing the block number, and a 32-bit integer representing the transaction index. In other words, an `AppearanceRecord`.

When the channel is closed, the wait group is marked as being done.

```

// The Address processor
func processAddresses(addressChannel chan ScrapedData, addrWg *sync.WaitGroup) {

    // range across the scraped data in the channel
    for scrapedData := range addressChannel {

        // provide a map to store unique addresses used when building
        // the Index Chunk
        addressMap := make(map[AppearanceRecord]bool)

        // extract address appearances from the trace data, store in the map
        extractFromTraces(sc.blockNumber, sc.Traces, addressMap)

        // extract address appearances from the log data, store in the map
        extractFromLogs(sc.blockNumber, sc.Logs, addressMap)

        // write the map (i.e., the Index Chunk) to the output medium
        writeAddresses(sc.blockNumber, addressMap)
    }
}

```

We describe the processing of trace and log data below.

### eth\_AddressesPerBlock

**Possible EIP:** It does not escape our notice that the above routines could be a very useful addition to the RPC specification. If the node software itself had a routine called eth\_AddressesPerBlock, anyone could easily build a full index of every appearance of every address anywhere on the chain. We encourage anyone with the wherewithal to write such an EIP to do so.

#### Extracting Addresses from Traces

The trace data returned by **trace\_block** contains a field called *Type*. The *Type* field distinguishes between various types of trace data. For example, traces related to one smart contract calling another, traces related to self-destruct activity, traces related to mining. The address processor uses these trace types to figure out where to look for Explicit addresses which are very easy to find. It then proceeds to process locations in the byte stream where Implicit address appearances are found.

In our Go code, we define the various types traces can take on:

```

// Possible values for a trace's Type field
type TraceType uint8

const (
    // Generated when one smart contract calls another
    Call TraceType = iota

    // Generated for mining rewards (there are three subtypes of this
    // type with values of "block", "uncle", and "external")
    Reward

    // This trace type is generated during a self-destruct transaction
    SelfDestruct

    // This trace is generated during the creation of a smart contract
    // (CreateFailed is identified if the deployment fails but the tx does not.)
    Create
)

```

The differing traces carry information that contains addresses appearances in differing locations. In some cases, those locations are *explicit*—in the sense that these values are stored in locations that are explicitly documented as being addresses. These addresses are “easily-found” (pink in the above image).

For other trace types, such as smart contract interactions, addresses may appear *implicitly* in raw byte data such as the *input* and *output* fields of a trace. When an *explicit* address appearance is found, we easily add it to the growing appearance map. When the addresses appearance is *implicit*, we must be creative—using heuristics to find appearances as we’ve described in the section below called *Purposefully Sloppy*.

The Trace data structure is made up of two sub-structures called Trace.Action and Trace.Result (see the RPC documentation). We summarize the various trace types, address locations, and *explicit / implicit* aspect of the trace in this table.

Type	Location	Aspect
Call	Action.From Action.To	<i>explicit</i> <i>explicit</i>
Reward		
Block	Action.Author	<i>explicit</i>
Uncle	Action.Author	<i>explicit</i>
External (Gnosis?)	Action.Author	<i>explicit</i>
SelfDestruct	Action.Address Action.Refund	<i>explicit</i> <i>explicit</i>

Create	Action.From Result.Address	<i>explicit</i> <i>explicit</i>
CreateFailed	Receipt.ContractAddr	<i>explicit</i>
Create	Input (contract byte data)	<i>implicit</i>
Any	Input (function call data)	<i>implicit</i>
Any	Output (function output data)	<i>implicit</i>

The address appearance extraction carried out for the rows in the table labeled *implicit* are described in the section called *Purposeful Sloppiness*. Because the log data contains a similar distinction between *explicit* appearance locations and *implicit*, we explain the processing of the Log data first.

### Extracting Addresses from Logs

Ethereum's Log data is far simpler than its Trace data.

Ignoring the fact that the log data contains smart contract-specific information, which we want to avoid using for the reasons mentioned above concerning the long tail, every Ethereum Log has the same format.

Every Log has an *address* field which is the address of the smart contract that generated the log. Every log has between one and four 32-byte *topics*. The first topic never contains addresses—it is the hash of the generated event signature.

The remaining three topics may contain address appearance but always in an *implicit* way, never *explicitly*. The remaining field, *data*, contains an arbitrarily long byte stream (whose length is modulo 32 bytes). This field may contain *implicit* appearances, but never *explicit* appearances.

Location	Aspect
Address	<i>explicit</i>
Topic[0]	-
Topic[1:3]	<i>implicit</i>
Data	<i>implicit</i>

For the *explicit* appearance in the *Address* field, we add it to the map. For the remaining *implicit* fields, like the *implicit* fields in Traces, we can now explain the processing necessary to extract appearances from this more complicated data.

## Purposeful Sloppiness

Did you ever wonder why it's literally impossible to do accurate off-chain accounting on the Ethereum blockchain? Wouldn't it make sense that an 18-decimal place accurate ledger that comes to perfect agreement every 12 seconds, should be able to be accounted for automatically? Shouldn't tax reporting be trivial?

We (at TrueBlocks) know why it doesn't work—other systems do not extract address appearances from the implicit locations.

That's not quite true—some of them do—but they do so by using ABI files which are sparsely available at best. This is the long tail problem we mention above. The use of specific ABI files for specifically chosen “popular” smart contracts is a mistake in our opinion for a number of reasons:

- 1) Who's to choose which smart contracts are popular and should be included;
- 2) Over time adding new smart contracts to the list becomes more and more onerous as many, many systems depending on this “list of known addresses” must be maintained;
- 3) How is maintaining such a list done fairly and how does the entire ecosystem resist the inevitability of this list being “captured” and made “pay-to-play”.

**Hint:** Keeping a list of popular smart contracts will never work. We need a different solution.

In this section, we discuss the method by which we avoid creating a list of known smart contracts in aiding us extracting address appearances. A few notes before we start:

- 1) A perfect algorithm not possible. Every 20-byte string is a valid Ethereum address. For example, the value “true”, as a 20-byte string is 0x0000...0001. This is also a valid Ethereum address—albeit an unusual one (and a reserved one, but this can be ignored). Likewise, the value of -1, when represented as a 20-byte string (0xffff.ffff) is also a valid address.
- 2) In order to avoid relying on external information (and therefore information that can be censored and perhaps captured), we desire an algorithm that relies on only locally available information—that is information that is directly in the byte stream.
- 3) It is possible (and quite effective) to do this if one has a few heuristics at hand.
- 4) It is better to be over-inclusive than under-inclusive. While it is not possible to create a perfect algorithm, one can get arbitrarily close if one is willing to trade off the size of the index on disc. A smaller index will include less appearances. A more inclusive index will be larger. We've chosen to be rather more inclusive than less.

- 5) Being more inclusive allows the Unchained Index to reconcile about 5% more transactions than any other system we know of. This is enough to reconcile nearly every address we've tested. The results of these tests will be presented in a separate report.

### Heuristics for Identifying Appearances

Knowing that a perfect solution is impossible, what heuristics might we use to accomplish our task as best we can? (Reminder: our task is to find every appearance of every address in order to reconcile every address's accounting off-chain.)

Below is a list of considerations and heuristics we use to identify appearance in those locations in the Ethereum data we've labeled *Implicit* above.

- 1) A large part of the Ethereum byte stream is aligned to 32-byte boundaries. This happens for various reasons and becomes quite handy;
- 2) Addresses, at least presently, are 20 bytes long. Because the data is frequently aligned on 32-byte boundaries and are left padded with zeros, this means an address has at least 12 leading zeros. Any 32-byte chunk of *implicit* data that does not start with 12 zeros is considered not to be an address appearance.
- 3) Much of the Ethereum byte stream that contains numbers is four eight-byte integers packed in a 32-byte string or a single eight-byte integer packed into 32 bytes.
- 4) Boolean values are (oddly) packed on their left with 31 zeros.
- 5) Addresses less than 0x00000....ffff (65,5350) is reserved for pre-compiles.

We use these observations to produce an admittedly odd but quite effective algorithm for identifying address appearances. In a forthcoming paper (*How Accurate is TrueBlocks*), we discuss the results of using these methods when compared to other sources of Ethereum data, such as popular web-based APIs, including Covalent and EtherScan. **Hint:** TrueBlocks identifies about 15% more appearances than either of these methods and of those, about 5% are material. Material means that one or more asset balance changes. This is why other methods find off-chain reconciliation so difficult. They are missing transactions. As you might surmise—it's not possible to reconcile an accounting if one is missing transactions.

While running the two routines detailed above (**extractFromTraces**, and **extractFromLogs**) our processing may encounter many “potential” locations for an address appearance (these are the locations labeled as *implicit* above).

For any *explicit* location, we simply add the address to the growing appearance map. For *implicit* locations (all of which are 32-bytes wide), we pass the 32-bytes value to a routine called **isPotentialAddress** (which is named to indicate that it is impossible to be sure if this is an address or not.)

That routine is detailed next:

As we noted, this is an admittedly odd algorithm. Yes—it uses a seemingly arbitrary set of heuristics to identify addresses. No—it's not terribly future-proof given that the packing algorithms that produce this data may change—unlikely, but they may evolve. We acknowledge these shortcomings, but we re-iterate that this method is “purposefully sloppy.” The task at hand

is impossible—even in the theoretical sense—but this doesn’t stop us from producing data that can be reconciled off-chain.

Instead of arguing against the efficacy of this algorithm, we should be exploring ways to make these *implicit* address appearance—of which this algorithm identifies a massive number—not needed. The problem stems from a lack of recognition by the core developers that the problem of identifying appearances even exists. This, at least, is a start to identify this problem.

## Baddresses

We mentioned above the idea of a “baddress,” which we briefly define here. A “baddress” is any 20-byte string that could potentially be a valid address (which is every 20-byte string) but which we choose to exclude from our index. We do this for consideration of the size of the index on disk. We want to be inclusive enough to find the great majority of addresses but not so inclusive as to explode the size of the index unnecessarily.

We identify a “baddress” as any 20-byte string that is less than “`0x00000000000000000000000000000000` `000000000000ffffffffff0000ffffffff`” or ends with eight zeros (“`00000000`”). This is an arbitrarily selected definition.

## The Consolidation Loop

This section discusses the consolidation phase of the algorithm, that is, how the system determines when to consolidate a new index chunk, how we best choose differing configuration values for different chains, and how the algorithm creates our enhanced, adaptive Bloom filter files.

As a very meager first pass at explaining this important process, we can say that it is a continually running process that periodically wakes up and processes any new blocks that may have appeared since the process last ran.

During the initial phase of scraping a new chain, the process runs continually with no delay between runs. Once caught up to the head of the chain, the process sleeps as long as the block time for the chain so as to place as small a burden on the machine as possible.

The process remembers, each time it runs, where it last left off. In this way, the algorithm can pick up where it left off the next time it starts. The process calls Blaze with the pre-configured (or user-supplied) number of blocks to process. Once Blaze is finished, the Consolidation Loop decides if it's time to create a chunk. This decision is different for each chain. On mainnet, we've chosen to use a certain number of appearance records (2,000,000) as the break-off point for a chunk (not forgetting the snap-to-grid feature mentioned below). This produces a new chunk about twice a day.

On the Gnosis, 2,000,000 records would take many days to produce (due to its much lower usage). On some private chains, 2,000,000 appearances may never happen. Each chain must be evaluated separately.

A decent approximation of how often to create a chunk is to divide the number of seconds in a day by the block time and create a chunk after that many blocks. Be careful, though—this does not always work. During the 2016 dDos attack on the Ethereum mainnet, millions of appearances were created in very few blocks.

The consolidation loop is described on the next page.

```

func ConsolidationLoop(start, end uint64, outputLocation string, pin bool) {

    // Run forever...
    for (true) {

        // Call Blaze to process a range of blocks. Blaze will write the results
        // into a "staging" folder if the blocks are more than six blocks old
        // and those blocks will no longer be consulted. If the blocks are
        // less than six blocks old, Blaze writes them into an "unripe" folder
        // where they may be used, but the user is cautioned that the blocks
        // blocks may re-organize.
        Blaze(start, end, outputLocation)

        // Check to see if one of two conditions are true:
        // 1) enough (2,000,000) appearances have been written
        // 2) check to see if we've crossed the snap-to marker
        if <enough records are present> or <snap-to-grid> {

            // write the Chunk to the hard drive, produce the Bloom filter
            // and optionally pin the chunk and the Bloom filter to IPFS,
            // update the Manifest and pin that as well.
            writeChunk(outputLocation, pin)

            // Remove written appearance records from the stage
            removeWrittenRecords()

            // Pin chunks and Bloom filters, update Manifest, pin
            // Manifest and optionally push IPFS of Manifest to smart contract
            pinAndPublishManifest()

        }
    }
}

```


“Enough records are present” and “snap-to-grid” are chain dependent and are left to be described elsewhere.

The writing of the data to a chunk is carried out in a way opposite to that described above for reading. In essence, open the file, write the header, write the address table, and finally write all the appearance records after relating the values to the address records.

The creation of the Bloom filter is rather simple as well. Simply spin through the list of addresses being written to the chunk, convert each address to a bit array as describe below in the **address2BitArray** function remembering to add a new bit array to the Bloom filter each time

the expected false positive rate overtops the pre-selected value (also a per-chain configuration item), and proceed.

The **address2BitArray** function “chops” the 20-byte address into five 4-byte sections, which produce five 32-bit integers modulo the width of the bit array.



The unsigned 32-bit integers are in the range  $[0, \text{BitArrayWidth}]$ . The algorithm “lights” those five bits in the current bit array. If more than the pre-determined number of addresses have been added to the current bit array (for Ethereum mainnet, this number is an arbitrarily chosen 50,000 addresses), a new bit array is appended, and subsequent addresses light bits in that array. The number of addresses chosen to determine when to adapt the size of the Bloom filter requires further study.

After picking off “enough records” as many times as necessary (depending on the busyness of the chain, multiple chunks may be encountered in a single loop), the `ConsolidationLoop` removes those addresses from the stage, leaving the remainder of the appearances for the next run. The consolidation loop also pins the new Index Chunk and its associated Bloom filter to IPFS, updates the Manifest, pins the Manifest to IPFS, and, finally, posts the IPFS hash of the Manifest to the smart contract.

### Snap-to-Grid and Correcting Errors

We mentioned above a snap-to-grid configuration item. This value is present primarily to aid in debugging, and our wish is that in a future version, it will be removed. The purpose of this function is to provide break points in the data. Because the data is produced against a continuing stream of data, and because we name the chunks by block number to ease processing, we find that if an error occurs early in the list of chunks and we wish to correct that error, we must reproduce the entire stream of chunks.

If, instead, we break the stream of chunks periodically at a snap-to-grid block, we can correct only that portion of the data up until the next snap. On the mainnet, we find a value of 100,000 blocks produces a reasonable breaking point without creating too many extra files.

The snap-to-grid feature serves no other purpose.

### A Justification for Chunking

We've been asked why we choose to chunk our data and whether it wouldn't be more efficient to store the entire index in a regular Web 2.0 database. The answer to this is more complicated than it might seem, therefore, a short explanation is in order.

The TrueBlocks system, and in particular chifra, is primarily a command line tool. While it does support an API server that matches all of the command line options, its first and most important use case is as a command line tool to aid in data science.

It is also designed, from its first principles, to run locally—that is, on the end user's machine. It is possible to run very specific performance enhancements on an application if one is building a purely local application. Choices one might never make for a web server application.

A perfect example of this is opening and reading local binary files directly. In any web 2.0 web server environment, one would never read local binary files with each invocation, and, in fact, in our server version, we have plans to avoid exactly this situation. When one is running on a command line against local files, however, the performance bottleneck becomes opening large files. In the web server environment, this cost is amortized over every request. In the local command line environment, this cost applies to every invocation.

Additional to the above, another important consideration is that we wanted to create a “naturally sharded and easily shared index.” Breaking the index into chunks, inserting those chunks into IPFS, and storing references to those IPFS files in a Manifest, makes this possible. As each end user expresses interest in different parts of the index through their own usage, the chunked Unchained Index is capable of delivering only those portions of the index the end user needs. And, once downloaded to the end user's machine—where the speed of local data becomes apparent—the end user can be “enlisted” in sharing the data through pinning by default.

For this and many other more subtle reasons, we create the index in a chunked manner.

### Conclusion of This Section

Thank you so much for reading this far. This project has taken a massive amount of effort, and your simple act of reading goes a long way to make it all worth it.

Please do us the great courtesy of giving us your feedback and helping us to improve this document. Anything from issue creation suggested edits, ideas to improve the processes

described, all the way up to suggestions to fund our work, and/or donations would be greatly appreciated.

## Querying the Index

### chifra list

This section describes the algorithms used to query for a list of appearances for a particular address: **chifra list <address>**. We leave this section to be completed later.

### chifra export

This section describes the algorithms used to extract full transactional histories for a particular address: **chifra list <address>** as well as all the options available for this very powerful tool. We leave this section to be completed later.

## Conclusion

Thank you for reading this far in our document. We've tried our best to describe the TrueBlocks Unchained Index system as best we can. The primary goal of this document is to describe the indexing process well enough for others to implement it themselves. The best source of information about the system is the source code itself which is fully open-source and available for review at our GitHub repositories (see below).

*Fin*

There's one thing left to explain. Why did we build it? Unfortunately, a sixty-page paper devoted to this question would be reasonable, but suffice it to say that we want to "re-change" the world. One of us (Rush) played a vanishingly small part in "changing the world" back in the 1990s during the birth of the world-wide-web. He wishes to make amends.

Humans have more than 25 years of experience living in a world dominated by websites. We are only now coming to understand the effects of decisions made in the 1990s when the web stack was being formed. Back then, everyone was wildly enthusiastic about the architectural decisions being made, but we missed something that now seems obvious. We missed the fact that censorable, capturable worldwide information systems are—not surprisingly—censorable and capturable. And—again, not surprisingly—that at this point, these systems have been fully captured.

By who? Q-Anon? An evil cabal of evil people? Advertisers? Who cares? It doesn't matter. What does matter is that the web has been captured by people with incentives opposite to those of us all. The web has been captured by *non-sheeple*. It's time for the sheeple to take back their own system.

The architectural decisions made in the 1990s and early 2000s were constrained by the capabilities of the hardware that was then available. Website rate limiting was born out of a necessity to protect servers from overuse. Logging in to websites was born out of a necessity to

rate limit. The first websites we ever used had no concept of “logging in.” Privacy invasion is a natural, unintended consequence of logging in. Only retroactively does this seem obvious.

Since that time—25 years ago—the capabilities of computer hardware advanced by 10 orders of magnitude. The software stack—consisting of web servers and user-based web clients—has not changed at all. Except for the fact that it’s gotten more and more invasive. The massive gains in computer hardware capability have gone almost exclusively toward deeper and deeper privacy invasion. Not surprisingly—they own the machines.

It is our belief that the advent of distributed blockchain node software (such as Bitcoin) which, literally, allows any user to see anything was a first example of a system that takes advantage of the 10 orders of magnitude increase in hardware capability on behalf of the end user.

Blockchains pull back power from the massive worldwide information and privacy invasion machine known as the Internet...supposedly.

TrueBlocks is an attempt to show by example that indexing and searching this already decentralized data may also be fully decentralized. We believe that the only reason existing blockchain data access systems, such as EtherScan, Covalent, QuickNode, Dune, and The Graph, exist is that people are lazy. They don’t yet realize that it is possible to avoid web-based APIs. They don’t yet understand that it is possible to build a system that is not capturable.

We tried to show in this document that if indexing were part of the node’s processing and if the indexing were natively produced to be distributed through a content-addressable data store such as IPFS, the cost of publishing the same would be negligible, particularly if the system automatically invites end users to share in the burden of carrying the data. TrueBlocks does this by “pinning by default” and creating a “naturally sharded and shared chunked index.”

We look forward to continuing our work and expanding our understanding of the new paradigm. Help us by contributing to our repos and/or donating to our GitCoin grant (see below).

Hopefully, this time we can all build a worldwide information system that doesn’t suck.

*/Fin*

## Appendix A: GitHub repositories

### Core

- <https://github.com/TrueBlocks/trueblocks-core>

### Explorer

- <https://github.com/TrueBlocks/trueblocks-explorer>

### SDK

- <https://github.com/TrueBlocks/trueblocks-sdk>

### Documentation

- <https://trueblocks.io/docs/chifra> [command line]
- <https://trueblocks.io/api> [api]
- <https://github.com/TrueBlocks/trueblocks-docs>

### Docker

- <https://github.com/TrueBlocks/trueblocks-docker>

## Appendix B: Social Media and Websites

### TrueBlocks Home

- <https://trueblocks.io>

### Twitter

- <https://twitter.com/trueblocks>

### Discord

- <https://discord.com/invite/kAFcZH2x7K>

### GitCoin grant

- <https://gitcoin.co/grants/184/trublocks>

### Tokenomics

- <https://www.tokenomics.io/gitcoin>

## References

### Adaptive Bloom Filters

- <https://trueblocks.io/papers/2017/enhanced-adaptive-bloom-filters-for-identifying-transactions-of-interest.pdf>

### Bloom Filters

- [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bloom\\_filter](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bloom_filter)

### RPC Documentation

- <https://ethereum.github.io/execution-apis/api-documentation/>