Popular Perspectives on Dynastic Politicians in Taiwan

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Dynastic politicians are fairly common in Taiwan. In global perspective, Taiwan might be considered as having a moderately high level of dynastic politicians. Children, spouses, siblings, and other relatives of already established politicians are not as common as in Japan or the Philippines, but they are more common than in the USA, Belgium, Argentina, or Norway. In this paper we find evidence that, while Taiwanese voters have consistently put dynastic candidates into office, they are somewhat uneasy about the combination of democratic ideals and political dynasties. Moreover, almost no Taiwanese express a positive preference for dynastic candidates; if they are not ambivalent, they harbor a negative preference. However, these negative evaluations of the democratic fairness of dynastic politicians and clear preference for non-dynastic candidates are broad but shallow. Most respondents are also open to arguments that political dynasties are, in fact, compatible with democratic norms, and the bias against dynastic candidates is not necessarily so strong that an otherwise attractive candidate cannot overcome it. Put bluntly, most Taiwanese dislike political dynasties, but they are generally more worried about other problems.

We also find evidence that Taiwanese citizens expect dynastic politicians to behave in different ways that non-dynastic politicians. Dynastic politicians are expected to pursue their own private interests and engage more in insider politics and corruption. This finding provides support for an interpretation of dynastic politics as being intimately connected to clientelistic or distributive politics. At the same time, dynastic politicians are more credible if their appeals are consistent with those of their preceding family members. This is evidence for the idea that dynastic politicians are successful because they cultivate a family "brand." To the extent that the family brand is associated with broad national policy positions or supporting particular groups in society, dynastic politicians might, in fact, rely more on ideological appeals than clientelistic mobilization. Thus, the evidence presented here is compatible with two fundamentally different models of dynastic politics.

How Common are Dynastic Politicians in Taiwan?

The most common definition of dynastic politicians is to look at whether current members of the national legislature were preceded by a family member in the national legislature. By this definition, Taiwan does not appear to have an especially high proportion of dynastic politicians. According to Batto (2018), 12.2% of legislators in the four terms from 2001 to 2016 follow a family member who was previously elected to the legislature or higher office. Since some of those elected to higher offices skipped the legislature, a strict rendering of the common definition would yield a figure slightly lower than 12.2%. However, this figure dramatically understates the prevalence of dynastic politicians in Taiwanese politics. If one includes family predecessors who were elected to lower-level offices, the percentage of legislators who qualify as dynastic soars to 27.2%.

Turning to the breakdown of dynastic legislators, there are some interesting differences. From a partisan standpoint, both major parties have large numbers of dynastic legislators, though the KMT has slightly more than the DPP (33.0% to 25.4%). A far higher percentage of female legislators (45.3%) are dynastic than male legislators (20.6%). Many people assume that political dynasties are a product of traditional societies and are thus a rural phenomenon. A quick look at the regional breakdown dispels this notion, at least in the case of Taiwan. The lowest levels of dynasticism (about 18%) are found on the very rural east coast and the fairly urban north-central region. The most urban region, the north – which is roughly the Taipei metropolitan area, is just about average (27.4%). Rather than an urban/rural divide, there seems to be an ethnic component to dynasties. The highest levels of dynasticism are found where the percentage of Min-nan residents are the highest, in the south-central (39.0%), south (43.8%), and central (32.7%) regions. The aforenoted north-central and eastern regions are more heterogenous, with high percentages of Hakka, mainlander, and indigenous minorities. Finally, the prevalence of dynastic politicians is somewhat lower in local politics than in national politics. Only 16.5% of city and county councilors are dynastic (Batto 2018).

Data

In order to test the hypotheses laid out in (the Batto paper at this conference), we conducted an internet survey January 2-8, 2018 and collected 1008 responses.[1] This survey is NOT a representative sample. It oversamples men, people aged 30-49, people with university and post graduate educations, people in the Taipei area, civil servants, and KMT and NPP identifiers. The oversampling of highly educated people is particularly severe, with only 0.5% of respondents having a junior high or lower education level and 70.0% having a university education or higher. In a representative sample, about 27% should have junior high or lower and about 32% should have university or higher education levels. We plan to conduct a telephone survey with a representative sample in order to allay fears that the results presented in this paper are driven by the non-representative sample.

It is also important to note that, unlike in telephone or face-to-face surveys, respondents in internet surveys are generally not allowed to provide no response. Since internet survey respondents are compensated for their participation, they are expected to answer every question. Unless the survey designer decides to add a non-response option, the respondent must choose a valid response category in order to move onto the next item. As a result, valid responses to most questions add up to 100.0%, a rarity in telephone or face-to-face surveys.

Are Political Dynasties Undemocratic?

In this section, we examine whether Taiwanese feel that political dynasties are somehow violating democratic ideals. That is, do people think that dynasties are somehow unfair? We look at this topic using both direct and indirect questions. The literature suggests that dynastic politicians enjoy a systematic resource advantage, so that there is an uneven playing field. On the other hand, a counterargument is that in electoral competition votes are the only basis for assessing a legitimate right to hold a seat. If voters express their support for a dynastic candidate, there is no basis to question the

[1] This survey was conducted by the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University and funded the Taiwan Election and Democratization Studies (TEDS) project and the ROC Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST). TEDS is a multiyear project led by Chi Huang and funded by the MOST by the grant MOST 105-2420-H-004-015-SS4.This survey data set is Taiwan's Election and Democratization Studies, 2016-2020(II): Internet Experiment Survey on Political Family (TEDS2018_SE01) (MOST 105-2420-H-004-015-SS4).

result. We examine the degree to which Taiwanese citizens agree with these two ideas with the following two items:

> *Some people say, "Candidates from political families have an advantage over candidates who are not from political families. This is unfair." Do you agree or disagree with this statement?*
>
> *Some people say, "If a candidate from a political family wins a seat through an election, this is a democratic outcome." Do you agree or disagree with this statement?*

Respondents overwhelmingly agree that dynastic candidates enjoy an unfair advantage in elections. 79.5% agreed with this statement, while only 20.5% disagreed (Table 1). This result seems to indicate that almost all respondents are troubled to some degree by the phenomenon of political dynasties. It is not the case that people see nothing wrong at all. However, while the overwhelming majority are uneasy with dynastic politics, they are also open to the counter-argument. 62.7% of respondents agree with the second statement, that dynastic candidates winning through elections is a democratic outcome. Fully half of the sample (50.7%) agreed with both statements, while only 28.9% agreed with the first and disagreed with the second. That is, nearly twice as many people were conflicted about dynasties as expressed consistently negative opinions about them. We interpret these two responses as indicating that, while Taiwanese generally feel that there is something wrong with dynastic politics, this is not a particularly deeply held conviction. They are open to seeing things differently if the question is framed somewhat differently.

This is not to say that the sense of unfairness is unimportant. The sense of unfairness is associated with several other indicators. We reversed the coding of the second item and added the responses together to get an index ranging from 2 to 8, where 2 indicated that the respondent did not feel dynasties were unfair or undemocratic at all and 8 indicated that the respondent felt that dynasties were very unfair and undemocratic. We used this unfairness index as the main independent variable in regression models with

six different dependent variables. Five of these were evaluations of how well the democratic system is working, and one is a measure of participation. The six dependent variables, all of which are coded so that more satisfied or engaged responses are larger, include (see appendix for exact wording):

1. *How well does democracy work in our country? (on a scale of 0 to 10, where 10 means very good)*
2. *How satisfied are you with the performance of the national legislature? (0-10)*
3. *How satisfied are you with the performance of your local government? (0-10)*
4. *How satisfied are you with the performance of your local city or county council? (0-10)*
5. *Some people say, "Elected politicians only represent the rich and the powerful, but they don't represent ordinary people." Do you agree or disagree with this statement? (1 to 4, 4 is strong disagree)*
6. *Did you vote in the 2016 legislative election? (1 yes, 0 is any other response).*

In addition to the main independent variable, each model includes five control variables. These include (1) a dummy variable for female respondents, (2) a variable for age group (20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60+), and (3) a dummy variable for respondents with a university or higher education level. The last two control variables are dummy variables for party ID, (4) one for respondents identifying with a blue camp party and (5) one for respondents identifying with a green camp party.[2] The reference category is respondents who identify with an unaligned party or do not identify with any party.

Table 2 shows the results of these six regression models. All six coefficients for the unfairness index are negative, though only three are significantly different from zero. The three significant coefficients are for the performance of the national legislature and local council as well as for the question about whether politics only benefit the rich and

[2] The blue camp is led by the Kuomintang (KMT, Nationalist Party) and includes three smaller parties, the People First Party, the New Party, and the Minkuotang. The green camp is led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and includes two smaller parties, the Taiwan Solidarity Union and the New Power Party. The blue and green camps combined to win 91.9% of all party votes in the 2016 election, and they hold all 100.0% of seats in the legislature.

powerful. Since assemblies are the places one finds large percentages of dynastic politicians, it is perhaps not surprising that negative evaluations of assemblies are associated with a sense that dynasties are unfair.

Taken together, these models show that people who think that dynasties are unfair are also more cynical or critical about democratic politics in other regards. This correlation is somewhat weak; it is only significant in the questions most closely related to dynastic politics. However, to say that the sense of unfairness over dynastic politics is not the first thought on people's minds is not to say it is irrelevant. The broadness of the findings is also important.

These questions ask respondents about their attitudes toward political dynasties in isolation. It might also be helpful to ask whether they think dynasties are unfair in relationship to other potential democratic flaws in order to get a better sense of whether respondents really feel that dynasties constitute a serious problem. We asked respondents to rank the following seven phenomena from the most serious to the least serious problem for the democratic system:

a. Too many street protests
b. Politicians don't care what ordinary people think
c. Media reporting on politics is not fair
d. Too many politicians come from political families
e. corruption
f. Religious organizations have too much influence in politics
g. Parties are too polarized

Table 3 shows the average rankings, with a lower value represents are more serious problem. Respondents judged political dynasties to be fairly unimportant, coming is as the fifth most serious problem on this list with a rank much closer to the bottom two than to the top four. There is some heterogeneity in the sample. While in the aggregate the top four were clearly judged as more serious, at least 20% of respondents thought that dynasties were a more serious flaw than each of those other flaws. On the other hand, at least 40% considered religious organizations and street protests to be more serious than dynastic politics.

In sum, we find that the vast majority of respondents are uneasy about dynastic politics. However, this sense of unfairness is rather tentative, as most people are also open to counter-arguments and think that there are several other more important problems to worry about. That tentative sense of unfairness is weakly but broadly reflected in other indicators of democratic evaluation and engagement. Dynasties are seen by most people as a flaw, but only a mild one.

Do Voters Prefer Dynastic Candidates?

In this section, we explore affect toward dynastic politicians. If respondents generally feel that there is something slightly amiss about dynastic politicians, do they harbor negative feelings toward those politicians? The answer is, again, yes – but only somewhat.

As in the previous section, we begin this section by directly asking respondents how they feel about dynastic candidates:

> *If you hear that a new candidate comes from a political family (a parent, spouse, or sibling is a current or former elected government official), what kind of reaction do you have? Do you have positive feelings, negative feelings, or no special feelings?*
>
> *How do you think the average voter feels?*

The results to these two questions are shown in Table 4. Most respondents (57.2%) express no special feelings. However, those that do express feelings are overwhelmingly negative. Fewer than 2% of respondents claimed to have positive feelings. This stands in stark contrast to the 46% of Indian respondents who claimed to prefer dynastic candidates (CITE). Almost no one in Taiwan admits to preferring dynastic candidates. Interestingly, there is a significant gap between how respondents see themselves and other people. Nearly 20% think that the average person has positive feelings toward dynastic candidates. Overall, nearly a third (32.4%) of respondents thought that the average respondent had warmer feelings toward dynastic candidates than they did. That is, while

there is almost no positive preference for dynastic candidates, a lot of voters believe that there is.

We also tested affect toward dynastic candidates indirectly, by asking respondents to judge among fictitious candidates with different traits. We asked:

> *Imagine a party is trying to nominate a legislative candidate and the three contestants have the following characteristics. Which one do you hope gets the nomination?*
>
> *Which one of those three do you think is most likely to actually win the nomination?*

Three candidates, A, B, and C, were listed, and each was randomly assigned two of six traits. The six traits are listed in Table 5, along with the results. If respondents had chosen randomly, each of the six traits should have been selected 33.3% of the time. In fact, two traits were selected more than 33.3% of the time, and four were selected less. Of the six traits, dynastic status was the least popular. This trait was only selected 16.1% of the time. Does this mean that people actively disliked dynastic candidates and considered dynastic status as a negative attribute? Looking at how the support rates for various traits when paired with other traits provides some evidence that it was (see Table 6). For example, when the most popular two traits, service and youth, were paired, they were chosen 95.0% of the time. However, when service was paired with dynastic, almost half of its support evaporated. Youth was even worse. When paired with dynastic, only 15.4% selected this combination. That is, when the two popular traits were paired with dynastic, droves of respondents chose to look elsewhere.

On this indirect question, voters seem to have judged dynastic status more harshly than in the straightforward question. However, one similarity is that, when asked who they thought would actually win, they did not think that dynastic candidates would do fairly. In fact, dynastic status was the highest rated trait. Citizens are perfectly aware that, in actual elections, dynastic candidates tend to do quite well. It may be that, as the previous question hints, they believe some voters actually prefer dynastic candidates, or it

may be simply that they understand that dynastic candidates have other advantages which help them to overcome the stigma of dynastic status.

If respondents have a generally negative attitude toward dynastic candidates, is this filtered through the lens of party ID? One possibility is that, since partisans tend to see the world through partisan-tinted glasses, they will condemn the other side for its dynastic politicians while finding a ways to excuse their own side for the same sin. We asked respondents which of the two major parties had a higher percentage of dynastic politicians, and the answers were clearly affected by the respondents' partisan leanings. In Table 7, we find that partisans tend to associate the other side with dynastic politics more than neutral respondents do. For example, 23.0% of respondents identifying with a blue camp party thought that the KMT had more dynastic politicians, while 66.0% of respondents identifying with a green camp party thought that. However, we would like to see something even more dramatic. Do partisans who think the other side has more dynastic politicians hate the other side even more for that sin? Is there an interactive effect?

To test this idea, we ran several OLS regressions. The two dependent variables are thermometer scores showing how much, on a scale of 0 to 10, a respondent likes the KMT and DPP. The independent variables are dummies for blue camp partisans, green camp partisans, respondents who think the KMT has more dynastic politicians, and respondents who think the DPP has more dynastic politicians. Models A and B show the base model, while Models C and D add interactive effects. Models A and B show that all the coefficients are significant and in the expected direction. However, we are most interested in the interaction effects. Theoretically, we expect to see positive coefficients for partisans who think their party has more dynastic politicians, reflecting a tendency to forgive their own party's sins, or negative coefficients for partisans who think the other party has more dynastic politicians, reflecting a tendency to condemn the other side for its sins. In fact, we find the former, indicating that partisans do not judge their own side as harshly for having dynastic politicians.

Overall, we find no evidence that Taiwanese citizens have any positive preference for dynastic politicians. Some may be neutral, but the aggregate tendency is clearly negative. The sense of dislike is strong enough to dissuade large numbers of respondents

in a hypothetical situation from selecting candidates with otherwise attractive traits. However, while respondents do not express any affinity for dynastic candidates, those who see the world through partisan lenses are somewhat willing to forgive their party for producing dynastic politicians.

Do Respondents Expect Dynastic Politicians to Behave Differently?

It is natural to focus on the questions of whether political dynasties are bad for democracy and whether voters like dynastic politicians, but it is perhaps more important to consider how voters expect dynastic and non-dynastic politicians to act differently in office. The literature suggests two ways in which voters might expect different things from the two types of politicians. These two differences are related to the different resource bases that dynastic politicians enter the political arena with and the possibility of establishing a brand.

On the one hand, most of the literature on political dynasties points out that dynastic politicians enter the political arena with an advantage over the average candidate because they inherit resources built up by the preceding family member over that member's entire career. These resources can include money, local mobilization organizations, networking ties with influential social, economic, and political elites, and an intricate understanding of how the game is played. These resources shape the incentives facing the dynastic politician, and they open up opportunities that ordinary politicians may not have at first. However, these resources may also push dynastic politicians in particular directions. For example, dynastic politicians may be able to tap into economic networks to raise cash to fund their campaigns. However, large donations rarely come without strings, so dynastic politicians may be more indebted to financial interests and thus more inclined to use the levers of power on behalf of those interests. Similarly, dynastic politicians may be able to use their family's knowledge to know who they need to talk to and their family's connections to get invited in through those doors. Dynastic politicians may thus be better at playing the backdoor game of insider politicians than their non-dynastic counterparts with fewer connections and less knowledge of how the sausage is made. However, backroom deals are often kept hidden for good reason, and being involved in, or merely being privy to, those deals may carry

an air of shadiness. From this, it is not hard to see how dynastic politicians might systematically be more involved in clientelism, machine politics, corruption, or any other form of money politics. (ADD CITES)

On the other hand, it may be wrong to simply draw a direct line from dynastic politics to clientelism. The idea of branding suggests that there is at least one other important model. The basic idea behind branding is that politicians can establish a reputation of standing for a certain set of policies or groups in society. This brand may be more specific or slightly different than the party's general image. To the extent that this brand can be passed down from one family member to the next, a dynastic politician may be more ideological than venal.

We asked respondents about their differing expectations for dynastic and non-dynastic candidates in two ways. First, we asked which was more likely to do certain things. Table 9 shows that respondents overwhelmingly think that dynastic candidates are more likely to engage in corruption and to secure more resources for the district. These two responses are strong support for the connection between political dynasties and money politics. However, dynastic politicians only have a small edge in helping respondents to solve their personal problems. This is somewhat surprising. Usually constituency service is thought of as part of the clientelistic package. However, perhaps respondents think the dynastic politicians will be too busy working for their rich and powerful friends.

Respondents seem to think that dynastic politicians will be working hard to get more money for themselves and their districts, but this does not necessarily imply that dynastic politicians will be more effective representatives. When it comes to getting things done, a large majority of respondents believe that non-dynastic politicians will do a better job. Again, this result fits nicely into a story equating dynasties and clientelism, as the non-dynastic politicians will have more time and energy to spend on solving the problems of ordinary people.

We look at the question of branding by asking two questions about credibility. Half the sample were asked each question:

Imagine a second-generation candidate whose father has a record of supporting

environmental protection. She says she also strongly supports the environmental movement. On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means you don't believe her at all and 10 means you believe her completely, how much do you believe that she really supports the environmental movement?

Imagine a second-generation candidate whose father has a record of opposing environmental protection. However, she says she strongly supports the environmental movement. On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means you don't believe her at all and 10 means you believe her completely, how much do you believe that she really supports the environmental movement?

Respondents in the first group, in which the message was consistent between family members, believed the candidate much more than the second group, in which the message was discordant between family members. The average belief was 4.52 for the first group and 3.68 for the second group.

This result suggests that dynastic candidates can inherit credible positions from their predecessors. New politicians generally have an uphill struggle in getting voters to pay attention to them, and they have to work hard to let people know what they stand for and how they are different from everyone else. Dynastic politicians have a head start in this struggle, since voters can simply assume that they represent the same ideas and positions as their preceding family members. If all the aspirants claim to support environmental protection, legal reform, promoting minority rights, or strengthening the military, but one of them is more credible than all the others, that credible aspirant has a significant advantage. It is possible that this, not resource endowments, it the most important advantage that dynastic candidates hold.

Conclusion and Discussion

In this paper, we have looked at how Taiwanese citizens view dynastic politicians. Our survey respondents are somewhat uneasy about the democratic implications of political dynasties. An overwhelming majority express some concern that dynasties are unfair. However, while this sentiment is broad, it is not deep. Most respondents are also

open to other arguments suggesting that dynastic status is not necessarily a reason to reject a politician's democratic legitimacy. We also present data showing that Taiwanese citizens do not prefer to support dynastic candidates. While most respondents express ambivalence toward dynastic candidates, almost none express a positive preference. The generally negative aggregate attitude toward dynastic candidates is clearly reflected in a question about desirable traits in a candidate. Dynastic status was the least popular of the six traits, and it proved to be a significant drag on the more popular traits. When a popular trait was paired with dynastic status, large numbers of respondents chose to look elsewhere. Finally, we show that respondents have differing expectations for how dynastic and non-dynastic politicians will behave in office. Dynastic politicians seen as more likely to engage in corruption and to secure resources for the district. This fits in well with the suggestion that dynastic politicians are predisposed to engage in clientelistic politics. However, we also show evidence that dynastic politicians can inherit their family brand of standing for certain policy positions or interest groups. To the extent that the brand is actually the most precious part of the inheritance, dynastic politicians may be predisposed to depend on ideological, not clientelistic appeals.

One question that remains unanswered is the matter of causality. Our survey results impressed upon us just how little respondents actually know about dynastic politics. For example, we asked respondents if their own legislator was dynastic, and only 58.6% answered correctly (Table 11). Similarly, we asked about whether eight prominent legislators are dynastic, and only 56.7% of the answers were correct (Table 12). This is better than random, but not by much. We also asked whether the proportion of dynastic politicians was higher in local or national politics. According to Batto's research, the proportion in the national legislature is nearly double that in city and county councils (Batto 2018), but 63.7% answered that there were more dynastic politicians in local politics. Moreover, the better they did on the aforementioned quiz on the dynastic status of eight legislators, the more inclined they were to give the wrong answer on this question.

It appears to us that much of what people believe about political dynasties is based on imagination, not fact. People assume that the arena they know little about is rife with dynastic politics. If they don't know much about national politics, they assume the

problem is at the national level. If they are more informed, they assume that local politics, most of which are somewhere else, are rife with dynastic politicians. Almost no one actually has a positive preference for dynastic politicians, but many respondents believe that other people do. And respondents tend to imagine that, since political dynasties are bad, they must be primarily associated with the other party. Is it the case that respondents actually have strong opinions about dynasties, or are other attitudes, such as cynicism and partisanship, actually driving the responses both for questions about dynasties and for questions about system satisfaction and engagement?

Table 1: Do people believe dynasties are unfair?

	Unfair advantage	Democratic outcome
Strong disagree	5.5	10.5
Somewhat disagree	15.0	26.8
Somewhat agree	45.9	49.9
Strong agree	33.6	12.8

Note: See text for question wording

Table 2: Regression models of dynastic unfairness and democratic indicators

Model	A	B	C
Type	OLS	OLS	OLS
DV	How well does democracy work?	Satisfaction with national legislature	Satisfaction with local government
Unfairness	-.128*	-.192***	-.085
	(.058)	(.052)	(.058)
Female	.107	.343**	.123
	(.144)	(.129)	(.144)
Age group	-.062	.218***	.006
	(.065)	(.058)	(.065)
Education: university	.054	-.125	-.289
	(.160)	(.144)	(.160)
Party ID: blue camp	-.603**	-.641***	-.279
	(.182)	(.146)	(.182)
Party ID: green camp	1.330***	1.297***	.597**
	(.179)	(.161)	(.179)
constant	5.580***	3.425***	5.574***
	(.430)	(.387)	(.430)
N	1008	1008	1008
Adj R2/log likelihood	.124	.149	.026

Table 2 (continued): Regression models of dynastic unfairness and democratic indicators

Model	D	E	F
Type	OLS	OLS	Binary logistic
DV	Satisfaction with local council	Politicians only represent rich and powerful	Did you vote in 2016?
Unfairness	-.190***	-.114***	-.120
	(.052)	(.019)	(.081)
Female	.128	.088	-.107
	(.130)	(.048)	(.198)
Age group	.205***	-.017	.033
	(.059)	(.022)	(.089)
Education: university	-.200	.104	-.009
	(.145)	(.053)	(.221)
Party ID: blue camp	.072	-.056	.759**
	(.165)	(.060)	(.229)
Party ID: green camp	.611***	.178**	1.343***
	(.162)	(.059)	(.254)
constant	4.471***	2.310***	1.821**
	(.390)	(.142)	(.588)
N	1008	1008	950
Adj R2/-2 log likelihood	.038	.053	709.019

Notes: See text for question wording. * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.

Table 3: Most serious flaws in our democratic system

	Average rank	Significantly different from dynasties	% ranking this flaw more serious than dynasties
Parties are too polarized	2.66	***	78.1%
Corruption	3.25	***	75.0%
Politicians don't care what ordinary people think	3.40	***	71.7%
Media reporting on politics is not fair	3.57	***	70.2%
Too many politicians come from political families	4.81	--	--
Too many street protests	5.11	**	43.2%
Religious organizations have too much influence	5.20	***	42.3%

Notes: See text for question wording. * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.

Table 4: Do you have positive, negative, or no feelings toward dynastic candidates?

	Respondent's personal feelings	View of the average voter's feelings
Positive feelings	1.5	19.5
No special feelings	57.2	46.6
Negative feelings	41.3	33.8

Table 5: Which candidate do you prefer?

	Respondent prefers		Will actually win	
	Trait selected	different from dynastic	Trait selected	different from dynastic
Stresses constituency service	.725	***	.298	***
Young	.406	***	.177	***
Strongly supports the party leader	.286	***	.426	
Strongly supported by business organizations	.245	***	.378	***
Strongly supported by religious organizations	.178		.243	***
Father is incumbent legislator	.161	---	.479	---

Table 6: Which candidate do you prefer (by paired trait)?

	service	young	party	business	religious	dynastic
Stresses constituency service	--	.950	.827	.718	.597	.532
Young	.950	--	.413	.317	.193	.154
Supports the party leader	.827	.413	--	.094	.035	.059
Supported by business organizations	.718	.317	.094	--	.050	.045
Supported by religious organizations	.597	.193	.035	.050	--	.015
Father is incumbent legislator	.532	.154	.059	.045	.015	--

Table 7: Which party do you think has a higher percentage of dynastic candidates?

		Party with more dynastic candidates			
		KMT	the same	DPP	n
Party ID	Blue camp	23.0	56.6	20.5	366
	Neutral	36.1	55.6	8.3	277
	Green camp	66.0	31.8	2.2	365
	All respondents	42.2	47.3	10.5	1008

Notes: The KMT leads the blue camp, and the DPP leads the green camp. Columns 3-5 show row percentages.

Table 8: OLS Regression models of dynastic politicians and party affect

	A	B	C	D
DV: thermometer score (0-10) for	KMT	KMT	DPP	DPP
Constant	3.624***	3.734***	2.857***	2.935***
	(.121)	(.146)	(.135)	(.163)
Party ID: Blue	2.220***	2.068***	-.726***	-.800***
	(.147)	(.193)	(.164)	(.215)
Party ID: Green	-1.088***	-1.268***	1.265***	1.074***
	(.150)	(.223)	(.167)	(.249)
Dynastic: KMT has more	-.578***	-.914***	.656***	.485$
	(.129)	(.233)	(.144)	(.260)
Dynastic: DPP has more	.821***	.962*	-.344	-.544
	(.199)	(.406)	(.221)	(.453)
PID Blue * KMT has more		.648$		.296
		(.331)		(.369)
PID Green * KMT has more		.407		.278
		(.311)		(.346)
PID Blue * DPP has more		-.284		.035
		(.474)		(.529)
PID Green * DPP has more		.948		2.160*
		(.779)		(.868)
n	1008	1008	1008	1008
Adj R2	.449	.451	.212	.216

Notes: The KMT leads the blue camp, and the DPP leads the green camp. Columns 3-5 show row percentages. $ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.

Table 9: Differing expectations for dynastic and non-dynastic politicians

	Dynastic politician	Non-dynastic politician
Who is more likely to engage in corruption?	88.0	12.0
Who is more likely to get things done?	29.6	70.4
Who is more likely to secure more resources for the district?	76.7	23.3
When you have a problem, who is more likely to help you solve that problem?	57.5	42.5

Table 10: How much do you trust (0-10) a dynastic candidate who says she supports environmental protection if

	mean	s.d.	n
Her father has a record of supporting environmental protection	4.52	2.20	504
Her father has a record of opposing environmental protection	3.68	2.27	504

Note: t=5.95, p<.000.

Table 11: Is your district legislator a dynastic politician?

	Respondent believes		
	dynastic	Non-dynastic	total
Legislator actually is dynastic	57.9	42.1	368
Legislator actually is non-dynastic	40.9	59.1	640
Total	47.1	52.9	1008

Note: Cells are row percentages. Overall, 58.6% of respondents were correct.

Table 12: Are these legislators dynastic?

name	Dynastic status	correct
Chiang Wan-an	Grandfather, great-grandfather were presidents; father was legislator	89.2
Su Chiao-hui	Father was legislator, mayor, premier, and presidential candidate	66.8
Lee Yen-hsiu	Father was Taipei city councilor (1989-1998)	35.3
Chen Ting-fei	Father was Tainan city councilor (1990-1994)	49.8
Chiu Yi-ying	Father was provincial assembly member and democracy activist	72.3
Luo Ming-tsai	Father was legislator and reputed organized crime lord	74.7
Lin Wei-chou	None	22.5
Lin Shu-fen	None	43.4
All eight		56.7

Appendix: Question wordings

Survey questions for family politics

General questions about how well democracy works?

A1. On a scale of zero to ten, where zero means democracy does not work well at all and ten means democracy works very well, how well does democracy work in our country?

A2. On a scale of zero to ten, where zero means very dissatisfied and ten means very satisfied, how satisfied are you with the overall performance of the national legislature?

A3. On the same scale, how satisfied are you with the performance of your local city or country government?

A4. On the same scale, how satisfied are you with the performance of your local city or county assembly?

A5. Some people say, “Elected politicians only represent the rich and the powerful, but they don’t represent ordinary people.” Do you agree or disagree with this statement?

a. Strong disagree
b. Somewhat disagree
c. Somewhat agree
d. Strong agree

A6. Did you vote in the most recent legislative election?

Internet experiments

B1. Imagine a party is trying to nominate a legislative candidate and the three contestants have the following characteristics. Which one do you hope gets the nomination?

A. Candidate A [2 random characteristics]
B. Candidate B [2 random characteristics]
C. Candidate C [2 random characteristics]

Characteristics:

1. Stresses constituency service
2. Father is an incumbent legislator and is retiring
3. Strongly supports the party leader
4. Young
5. Is strongly supported by business associations
6. Is strongly supported by religious organizations

B2. Which one of those three do you think is most likely to actually win the nomination?

[Note: Use the same three candidates. Do not randomize again.]

B3. Some people say the following are serious problems for our democratic system. Others say that these are not problems at all. Please rank them from the most serious problem to the least serious problem:

h. Too many street protests
i. Politicians don't care what ordinary people think
j. Media reporting on politics is not fair
k. Too many politicians come from political families
l. corruption
m. Religious organizations have too much influence in politics
n. Parties are too polarized

B4. [randomly assign one of the following treatments]

A. Imagine a second-generation candidate whose father has a record of supporting environmental protection. She says she also strongly supports the environmental movement. On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means you don't believe her at all and 10 means you believe her completely, how much do you believe that she really supports the environmental movement?
B. Imagine a second-generation candidate whose father has a record of opposing environmental protection. However, she says she strongly supports the environmental movement. On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means you don't believe her at all and 10 means you believe her completely, how much do you believe that she really supports the environmental movement?

Straightforward questions:

C1. If you hear that a new candidate comes from a political family (a parent, spouse, or sibling is a current or former elected government official), what kind of reaction do you have? Do you have positive feelings, negative feelings, or no special feelings?

a. Positive feelings
b. Negative feelings
c. No special feelings

C2. How do you think the average voter feels? Do they have positive feelings, negative feelings, or no special feelings?

a. Positive feelings
b. Negative feelings
c. No special feelings

C3. Some people say, "Candidates from political families have an advantage over candidates who are not from political families. This is unfair." Do you agree or disagree with this statement?

C4. Some people say, "If a candidate from a political family wins a seat through an election, this is a democratic outcome." Do you agree or disagree with this statement?

C5a. Who do you think is more likely to engage in corruption, a politician from a political family or a politician who is not from a political family?

C5b. Who do you think is more likely to get things done, a politician from a political family or a politician who is not from a political family?

C5c. Who do you think is more likely to secure more resources for the district, a politician from a political family or a politician who is not from a political family?

C5d. When you have a problem, who do you think is more likely to help you solve that problem, a politician from a political family or a politician who is not from a political family?

C6. Do you think the percentage of family politicians is higher in national elections or local elections?

a. National elections
b. Local elections
c. About the same

C7. Of the two major parties, do you think the DPP or the KMT has a higher proportion of candidates from political families?

a. KMT
b. DPP
c. same

C8. Which of the following legislators are from political families?

a. 蔣萬安 (yes, no, don't know/don't know of this person)
b. 蘇巧慧
c. 李彥秀
d. 陳婷妃
e. 邱議瑩
f. 羅明才
g. 林為洲
h. 林淑芬

[Notes: a and b are first term legislators with very famous parents, c and d are both mid-career legislators who came from the city council and whose fathers were fairly anonymous local politicians, e and f are mid-career politicians whose fathers were fairly famous but not active in recent years, and g and h are not from political families. Each pair has one KMT and one DPP legislator. The order should be randomized. I tried to choose legislators who are fairly well-known.]

C9. Does the legislator elected from your district come from a political family?

a. Yes
b. No
c. Don't know
d. Don't know who the legislator from my district is

Other necessary questions:

D1: How much do you like the [major party #1]? On a scale of zero to ten, where zero means you don't like it at all and ten means you like it very much, how many points do you give the [major party #1]?

D2. On the same scale, how much do you like [major party #2]?