

Family Politics and Democracy in Indonesia
Some Preliminary Findings

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July 2018

Introduction

Family politics is the power a person acquires through family or familial relationships. In a democracy, family politics operates through open contestation in an election, by relying on family support and networks. Specifically, by using familial ties to leverage resources and social networks for the mobilization of mass electoral support. Family politics typically starts with an incumbent politician and then spreads to the broader family network, who also gain shares in power.

One of the main virtues of democracy is that it is an open system for the selection of political elites through competition for votes. In this sense, democracy places no restrictions on the background of those that are able to compete for a seat in power. Incumbents, husbands, wives, brothers, and sisters should all be able to compete in elections for legislative and executive positions—at the national or local level.

Family politics is not a rare phenomenon across the world and is particularly pronounced in young democracies. Yet many activists and observers are concerned with the potentially negative impact of family politics on democracy and democratic performance. Theoretically, there are at least two possible connections between the extent of family politics and both the public's evaluation of democratic performance and public support for democracy itself.

First, it might be the case that an individuals' perception of family politics has no effect on their level of support for democracy as a form of government. In other words, at the individual level, the strength of democracy can be seen as one's commitment to the belief that democracy is the best system of government, or at least the system that is better than all others. This attitudinal commitment is considered important for the consolidation of democracy. (Linz and Stepan 1996). If the majority of people do not support democracy, then the democratic order is vulnerable to the disruption of anti-democratic groups. For example, if in a society there are anti-democratic groups—perhaps democracy is not in accordance with their values or traditions or history—then this group might gain broader support if the level of mass support for democracy is also low. Hence commitment to democracy at the mass level is an essential building block for a consolidated democracy.

Generally, in a consolidated democracy attitudinal support for democracy as a form of government is independent of individuals' socioeconomic conditions or perceptions of government performance. Even when democratic performance is perceived to be weak, people typically still understand that this is not a reflection of the failure of the system of government, but rather its implementation. In short, at a mass level, there can be strong support for democracy even if its performance is weak. With this understanding, it might be the case that in a consolidated democracy, family politics is likely to have no effect on democratic support even if family politics is understood to weaken democratic performance.

Second, alternatively, it might be the case that family politics negatively affects peoples' support for democracy. Some studies have shown that the survival of a given system of government, including democracy, is not determined by broad attitudinal commitment to the system itself, but instead depends on how well the system work. (Clark, Dutt, and Kornberg

1993; Misler and Rose 1997). If the performance of a democracy is good, then support for democracy will also be strong. Democratic performance is related to the broader socio-economic conditions of society. When the public believes that the economic situation, the political situation, and the state of law and order are all doing well, then they will also tend to evaluate the performance of democracy in better terms and, in turn, they will also report greater support for democracy as a system of government.

The presence of family politics can weaken democratic performance for a number of reasons. First, family politics typically involves a single family's monopolistic control over politics in a given area, to the exclusion of other potential entrants. This can be a source of public discontent in the performance of democracy. Second, family politics can allow those families to consolidate power in ways that allows them to extract resources and enrich themselves. In turn, this confers a greater material advantage to those from within the family, to the exclusion of those without, when it comes to elections and campaigns. Third, family politics limits the diversity of politicians. Those that benefit from family politics are typically a small group, representing the diversity of a constituency becomes difficult to achieve if politics is controlled by a much smaller family. Family politics therefore inhibits democratic performance by undercutting the contestation among the various interest groups in society. Fourth, in terms of mass mobilization in less politically informed societies, family politics will weaken debate on substantive issues, as individual voters will rely on the family name as a short-cut for forming preferences. Family politics will therefore weaken democratic performance by weakening debate.

Indonesian Context

Particularly in young democracies, family politics is a common phenomenon. Indonesia is no exception. Relatedly, since Indonesia's democratic transition nearly twenty years ago, its performance has remained shaky. In the last five years, Freedom House has charted a decline in freedom in the country, even after 10 years of continuously increasing levels of freedom (Mujani and Liddle 2015).

Family politics in Indonesia can be seen from several examples. At the national level, it is readily visible. The most prominent example at the national level is the family of the first President, Sukarno. Almost all of Sukarno's children had successful careers in politics. The most prominent is his daughter Megawati Sukarnoputri. Megawati is the chairwoman of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-Perjuangan), the largest party, which is a continuation of the Indonesian National Party (PNI), which was originally established by his father before independence. Megawati became the first vice-president when Indonesia transitioned to democracy in 1999, and then rose to the presidency when President Abdurrahman Wahid was impeached by the parliament. Since her failed re-election bid in 2004, she has remained the chairwoman of the PDI-P.

Other than Megawati, three of Sukarno's other children have also been active in politics: Guruh Sukarno Putra, Sukmawati Sukarnoputri, and Rachmawati Sukarnoputri. Guruh has been

a member of the House of Representatives, representing the PDI-Perjuangan. Sukma and Rachmawati, meanwhile, have frequently tried to establish another political party.

Puan Maharani is Megawati's daughter, and has long been active as one of the PDI-P's central political managers. She has been a member of the House of Representatives several times and is now the Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare. Puti Guntur Sukarno is another Sukarno's grandchildren, Guntur Sukarno's son, Sukarno's first child, and is also now a member of the House of Representatives, representing the PDI-P.

Another major political family in Indonesia is the family of Indonesia's second president, Suharto, who was Indonesia's president for 32 years (1966-1998). His children are generally still active in Golkar Party. At the time of his regime, Siti Hardiyati Rukmana, Suharto's oldest daughter, was Suharto's most active child in politics through the Golkar party. After Suharto fell in 1998, she tried to establish a new party but failed. Since his fall, only one of Suharto's children remains active in politics: Siti Hediati Hariyadi, known Titiek Suharto, continues as a representative of the Golkar Party in the House of Representatives. Later she left Golkar party and joined other family members to set up a new party, the Working Party (Partai Berkarya), which will take part in the 2019 election next year.

The fifth Indonesian President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, has also built a political family. He founded the Democrat Party in 2001, and, with the support of this party, he became Indonesia's president for two periods (2004-2014). His son, Edhi Baskoro Yudhoyono (Ibas) to this day is a member of the Democratic Party and a member of the House of Representatives. His other son, Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono (Agus) was an army officer, but then went on as a candidate for governor of Jakarta 2016. He failed to win the election. Now he is active in the Democratic party and is trying to become a presidential candidate or vice-presidential candidate in 2019.

Among the five former presidents of Indonesia, only President Habibie (third president) and President Abdurrahman Wahid (fourth president) did not build political empires around their families. Habibie's children were all professional, and started their own businesses. Among the children of Abdurrahman Wahid there was an effort to build family politics through his daughter, Yeni Wahid, but this effort has largely failed. Yeni and her siblings are now more prominently known as social activists.

At the local level, family politics is even more prominent. One of the most famous examples is the family of Hasan Sohib from Banten province. Hasan is a businessman and politician from the Golkar Party at the local level. Through a combination of business, politics, charisma, and thuggery, he has created a strong political family. Almost all of his children went directly to politics as Golkar party officials at the local and central level. Among his most prominent children is Ratu Atut Chosiah (Atut).

Atut was a member of the central board of Golkar party, one of the top parties in Indonesia. She was later elected governor of Banten twice, until she was imprisoned for a corruption scandal, for which she remains in jail to the present day. Her siblings became mayors and regent in Banten. Nurzaman became the mayor of Serang city, and Tatu Khasanah became

regent of Serang Regency. Moreover, the former wife of Hasan Sohib became deputy regent in Pandeglang regency, and Atut's sister in law, Airin Rachmy Diany, became the mayor of South Tangerang City.

Atut's husband became a member of the House of Representatives, and her son, Andhika Hazrumy, became a member of the Regional Representative Council (DPD)—the Indonesian senate—representing Banten province. He was later member of Parliament and is now a vice governor of Banten. Andika's wife is now a DPD member, continuing the political career her husband left behind.

Family politics in Banten province can be seen on an even more local level in Tangerang, Lebak, and Cilegon City. In these three areas the political families are also strong. Although not as powerful as the Hasan Sohib family, family politics can be found easily in other provinces in Indonesia. In sum, family politics is not a phenomenon that is foreign to the Indonesian public, and family politics often gets a huge amount of exposure from the local and national mass media because of many scandals associated with it.

Measures and data

Our study of family politics and democracy relies on public opinion survey data, i.e. mass attitudes toward democracy, democratic performance, and towards family politics. We analyze to the extent to which family politics correlates positively or negatively with democratic preference and democratic performance. Measures and wordings of the three concepts are in appendix 2.

Public opinion survey data for this study was conducted on May 15-29, 2018 with a nationwide, nationally representative sample selected through a multistage random sampling design. The original targeted sample size was 2400, and the final sample was 2206 (response rate was about 92%). Compared to the proportion of basic demographics of the nation, i.e. rural-urban, sex, region, ethnicity, and religion, the sample was representative of the national population of voting age (17 or older). See appendix 3 for a more detail information of the survey methodology.

Findings

Descriptive statistics indicates a number of interesting findings: Most people prefer democracy to other types of regimes (Table 1). A majority of the population also assessed positively democratic performance in general in the country. Most people are satisfied with how democracy works in Indonesia. Most of the masses also positively assessed the performance of the national parliament, the local (city or municipality) parliament, and the local governments (mayor or regent).

The people's attitudes towards family politics in general are negative, or neutral at most. (Table 1). However, mixed attitudes or neutral and non-responses are quite high. A majority of the people are neutral regarding a new candidate running for a public office from a political family. It is worth highlighting that most of the people are neutral, not positive nor negative on the issue, though. In addition, there are more people who agree or strongly agree that it is

democratic if a candidate from family politics wins in an election. These measures indicate that the people are neutral or more positive towards family politics. In short, these results confirm that expectation that democracy may accommodate any citizen to participate in an open and competitive election regardless of his or her family background is verified.

Table 1 is about here

However, other measures of family politics indicate that more people in the country are negative towards family politics. There are more people who state that a candidate or politician from a family politics has more advantages, is more corrupt, can't help people, can't preserve local resources (Table 1).

One major problem with these measures is that people in general are not competent enough to assess family politics more specifically. They are mostly not aware with the family background of candidates running in legislative or executive elections. (Table 1). Regardless of this competence, the people are in general not positive towards family politics.

Correlates of Family Politics

Bivariate statistics indicates that democratic preference has a significant correlation with democratic performance (Table 2).¹ A person who is more satisfied with the way democracy works in the country tends to prefer democracy.² If the performance is bad the people are likely to be hostile to democracy. Democratic support in the country is not independent from its performance. This association indicates that the country's democracy is not consolidated, as peoples' commitment to democracy is still affected by its performance. Linz and Stepan argue that preference to democracy is supposed to be independent from its performance if a democracy is consolidated. (Linz and Stepan 1996).

Family politics, on the contrary, does not have a significant relationship with democratic preference³. This insignificant relationship indicates that family politics is not likely to affect directly democratic preference. If democratic preference is an indicator of democratic consolidation at the attitudinal level, family politics, therefore, is not likely to threaten directly democratic consolidation in Indonesia.

Meanwhile, family politics does have a significant correlation with democratic performance. The more positive attitudes toward family politics the more likely to increase

¹ Democratic preference is a 3-point scale: 1 = prefer non-democracy, 2 = regime type does not matter, 3 = prefer democracy. Don't know responses were coded 2.

² Democratic performance is an index constructed from the four items. Interitem-correlations are very strong. Cranvabch's Alpha: 0.846. Don't know responses were coded: 5

³ The seven items of family politics are not very consistent. The items do not constitute a single dimension in a factor analysis. Family politics in this analysis therefore only includes the most positive and significant interitem correlations, i.e. four items: Q64, Q69, Q70, Q71. The index is a 1-3 point scale: 1 = anti-family politics, 2 = neutral, 3 = pro-family politics. Don't know and don't understand the questions were coded 2.

positive assessment of democratic performance. On the contrary, the more negative towards family politics the more negative assessment of democratic performance. A person who thinks that family politics is positive assesses positively democratic performance in the country. On the contrary, a person who think that family politics is negative, then he or she is more likely to think that democratic performance in the country is bad. This pattern of relationship verifies the view previously discussed that anti-family politics tends to be critical of democratic performance. On the contrary, a person who views family politics positively tends to be uncritical and to feel satisfied with how democracy works in the country.

Table 2 is about here

What can explain democratic performance and family politics? Who has positive or negative attitudes towards democratic performance and towards family politics?

Political Knowledge

Attitudes towards democratic performance and towards family politics are likely affected by political knowledge⁴. In this study political knowledge is defined as the extent to which the people are aware of, or know correctly the politicians from political families. The people who know the politicians from political families are likely to be more critical of family politics as they are probably more educated and education makes them more exposed to democratic values such as inclusiveness or pluralism. They are more likely to be more socialized to those values.

Indonesians, in general, are in fact not aware with politicians from family politics (Table 1). Only two in ten, on average, know the politicians from political families, or those from non political families. The correlation between this political knowledge with democratic preference is positive and statistically significant (Table 2). On the contrary, the knowledge has negative and significant association with family politics. The more aware of politicians from political family the more resistant they are towards family politics. Family politics is viewed negatively for those who are aware of it. This association indicates that improvement of knowledge of family politics is likely to decrease support for family politics, on the one hand. On the other hand, it is likely to increase democratic support. In other words, political knowledge can make democracy strong without or with minimum family politics.

Demographics

Education potentially has positive relationship with political knowledge. Education provides opportunities to be more informed about politics. The more educated the more likely to know about family politics. The data verifies this relationship. (Table 2).

In addition, education also potentially helps people exposed to democratic values such as liberty and equality. The more educated a person, the more likely he or she is to prefer

⁴ Political knowledge in this study is a 0-10 point scale constructed from awareness (correct answer) of ten politicians, from family politics or from no family politics. Aware = 1, unaware = 0.

democracy to other types of regime. This hypothesis is also verified in the context of Indonesian democracy. (Table 2)

Similar to political knowledge, education also has a negative relationship with family politics. It is also negatively correlated with democratic performance. In other words, education makes citizens more critical of family politics as a form of democratic practice, and also makes them more critical of democratic performance in general. More educated citizens who prefer democracy tend to be negative with how democracy works in a country.

The level of education in Indonesia is low. Most people are only elementary or middle school graduates. This population mostly lives in rural areas. Mostly, the non-educated are among non-Javanese, older, female, and Muslims. Therefore, these demographics have a negative relationship with political knowledge and democratic preference, on the one hand. On the other hand, they have positive relationship with democratic performance and with family politics.

A multivariate analysis indicates that democratic performance remains significant to affect democratic preference controlling for family politics, political knowledge, education, and some other demographics (Table 3). Democratic performance strengthens democratic preference. In addition, the effect of democratic performance, political knowledge, education, rural-urban cleavage, ethnicity, religion, and age all have direct and significant impacts on democratic preference. Political knowledge, education, being urban, being Javanese strengthen democratic preference. On the contrary, being a Muslim, relative to non-Muslim, is likely to weaken democratic commitment.

Table 3 is about here

The pattern of relationship between political knowledge, education, and urbanism, on the one hand, and democratic preference, on the other hand, verify many studies on democracy. Political knowledge and education help citizens exposed to democratic values. Urbanism, in particular, exposes citizens to more cosmopolitan, pluralistic, open, and competitive nature of society—things that are required by democracy.

The impact of Islam on democratic preference is negative and significant. Being a Muslim, relative to being non-Muslim, is likely to weaken democratic preference in the country. This finding supports the claim that Islam is not compatible with democracy (Huntington 1990, 1994). However, many other studies demonstrate that there is not solid evidence to support the argument. They state that Islam does not matter to democracy. (Norris and Inglehart 2010; Fish 1912; Pepinsky, Liddle, Mujani 2018).

An interesting finding is the impact of ethnicity on democratic preference. Being a Javanese in the country is likely to strengthen democratic preference. Need a more extensive exploration why a Javanese, relative to a non-Javanese, prefers democracy. Scholarship on Indonesian politics often claim that Javanese culture is close to feudalism, authoritarian culture, to kingship and hierarchical nature of politics. (Anderson 1970). The findings presented here appear to weaken this claim.

A hypothetical answer to the phenomenon is that among Javanese, pluralism is strong, and they are more accustomed to living in a more pluralist society. They are likely more tolerant too. Pluralism and tolerance are crucial determinants of support for democracy. (Dahl 1954).

Table 4 is about here

The nature of Javanese culture which is friendly to pluralism and tolerance is probably consistent with “Javanese religion.” They are mostly Muslims, but their Islam is probably different from Islam in general. In a famous anthropological description, Javanese Muslims are “abangan,” a syncretic version of Islam and local religions, which incorporates Hindu traditions. This mixture of traditions creates a unique character of Islam among the Javanese, i.e. more pluralist, tolerant, and open (Geertz 1972).

The impact of family politics on democratic performance is positive and significant. A person who has a positive view of family politics tends to be satisfied with how a democracy works in the country regardless of other factors such as political knowledge and education. This relationship is contrary to the pattern of relationship between education and democratic performance. (Table 4).

A citizen who has a positive view of family politics is likely to be uncritical of democratic performance. On the contrary, a more educated citizen tends to be critical of democratic performance in the country. They tend to be dissatisfied with the way democracy works there. The more educated they are, the more negative the view they typically hold towards democratic performance.

Table 5 depicts the relationship between political knowledge and education, on the one hand, and family politics, on the other. Support for family politics has negative relationship with political knowledge and with education. The more sophisticated an individual is in terms of political knowledge, and the more educated a person is, then the more likely they are to have a negative view of family politics. This pattern indicates that political knowledge and education will weaken family politics, which in turn will strengthen a more critical view of democratic performance.

Table 5 is about here

Conclusion

Indonesian democracy is nowadays unconsolidated. However, most people prefer democracy, and majority of them are satisfied with how democracy works in the country. Democratic performance affects support for democracy. This indicates that commitment to democracy is not independent from its performance. A consolidated democracy is characterized

by preference to democracy by a vast majority of the people regardless of democratic performance and socio-economic problems faced by a country. This pattern does not emerge in the context of Indonesian democracy as Indonesia is not yet a consolidated democracy.

Democratic performance in the country is associated with support for family politics. Support for family politics strengthens satisfaction with individuals' views of how democracy works. On the contrary, negative assessment of family politics weakens people's satisfaction with democratic performance. The negative attitude of people towards family politics is also critical of democratic performance. The more negative towards family politics, the more dissatisfied with democratic performance.

The critical citizens can be identified from their knowledge of family politics and from their level of education. The better informed with family politics the more negative with it, and the more educated the more negative towards family politics.

Support for family politics, relative to anti-family politics in the country is actually small. Because their demographics indicate that this group of people is, by nature, lesser educated and lesser informed, they should be expected to decrease a share of the population in the future, as education improves. Consequently, the share of critical citizens will increase, and support for family politics will decrease. Further, the critical assessment of democratic performance will increase while support for democracy become larger and become more independent from its performance. If this pattern holds, Indonesian democracy is likely to be consolidated.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics

Regime preference (%)				
N = 2206				
Democracy	No difference	Non-democracy	Don't know	
69.4	9.8	6.5	14.5	
Democratic performance in general (0-10 scales) (%)				
N = 2206				
Very bad (0-3)	Bad (4-5)	Good (6-8)	Very good (9-10)	Don't know
2.9	21.8	62.8	10.8	1.6
Performance of The People's representatives at national parliament (0-10 scales) (%)				
N = 2206				
Very bad (0-3)	Bad (4-5)	Good (6-8)	Very good (9-10)	Don't know
7.6	30.1	53.0	6.9	1.9
Performance of city or regency government (0-10 scales) (%)				
N = 2206				
Very bad (0-3)	Bad (4-5)	Good (6-8)	Very good (9-10)	Don't know
4.0	21.8	62.8	10.8	1.6
Performance of the people's representative at regency or city level (0-10 scales) (%)				
N = 2206				
Very bad (0-3)	Bad (4-5)	Good (6-8)	Very good (9-10)	Don't know
5.7	26.7	58.2	7.2	2.0
Democratic performance index				
(Cronbach's Alpha: 0.846)				
N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	SD
2142	0.0	40.0	25.63	5.87

Table 1. Tobe continued

Family Politics				
Feeling towards family poitics (%)				
N = 2206				
Positive	Negative	Neutral	Don't know	
15.3	12.5	57.9	14.3	
A politician from family politics has more advantages (%)				
N = 2206				
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	Don't Know
1.1	26.5	44.2	1.2	27.0
Democratic if a candidate from family politics wins an election (%)				
N = 2206				
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	Don't Know
1.3	27.0	41.9	.4	29.4
More probably corrupt (%)				
N =2206				
From family politics	From non-family politics	Don't know		
44.6	13.4	41.9		
More likely performed (%)				
N = 2206				
From family politics	From non-family politics	Don't know		
25.1	31.8	43.1		
More likely preserve local resourses (%)				
N = 2206				
From family politics	From non-family politics	Don't know		
19.8	34.1	46.1		
Family politics index (1-3)				
N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
2206	1	3	1.93	.46
Knowledge of family politics sclae (0-10)				
N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
2206	0.00	10	2.03	2.18

Table 2. Pearson's Correlations of Relevant Variables

Democratic preference	1									
Democratic performance	.057**	1								
Pro-family politics	-.018	.071**	1							
Political knowledge	.143**	-.013	-.117**	1						
Education	.130**	-.070**	-.065**	.298**	1					
Rural citizen	-.093**	.021	.026	-.250**	-.271**	1				
Religion: Islam	-.080**	.005	-.032	.033	-.054*	-.068**	1			
Ethnicity: Javanese	.042*	.073**	.026	.133**	-.035	-.049*	.257**	1		
Age	-.063*	.014	-.031	.011	-.329**	-.060**	-.001	.066**	1	
Gender: Male	.045*	-.125**	.009	.157**	.062**	-.002	.010	.005	.117**	1

**Correlation is significant at .01, *correlation is significant at .05

Table 3. Multivariate Analysis of Democratic Preference (Regression Coefficients)

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Beta Standardized	T	Sig.
	B	Std. Error			
(Constant)	2.581	.111		23.166	.000
Democratic performance	.007	.002	.067	3.149	.002
Support for family politics	-.001	.007	-.004	-.188	.851
Knowledge of family politics	.028	.006	.101	4.405	.000
Education	.015	.006	.061	2.507	.012
Rural citizens	-.070	.027	-.058	-2.592	.010
Religion: Islam	-.180	.041	-.096	-4.426	.000
Ethnicity: Javanese	.059	.027	.049	2.207	.027
Age	-.002	.001	-.055	-2.401	.016
Gender: Male	.048	.026	.040	1.854	.064

Table 4. Multivariate Analysis of Democratic Performance (Regression Coefficients)

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	25.424	.944		26.944	.000
Pro political dynasty (four items)	.216	.067	.069	3.222	.001
Knowledge of political families	.043	.062	.016	.693	.488
Education	-.161	.058	-.068	-2.764	.006
Rural-Urban (Rural)	-.410	.265	-.035	-1.546	.122
Religion (Islam)	-.355	.398	-.020	-.893	.372
Ethnicity (Javanese)	.893	.262	.075	3.403	.001
Age	.001	.010	.002	.067	.947
Gender (male)	-1.438	.253	-.123	-5.690	.000

Table 5. Multivariate Analysis of Support for Family Politics (Regression Coefficients)

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	8.632	.238		36.244	.000
Knowledge of political families	-.092	.020	-.108	-4.660	.000
Education	-.043	.019	-.057	-2.331	.020
Rural-Urban (Rural)	-.070	.085	-.019	-.822	.411
Religion (Islam)	-.192	.127	-.033	-1.514	.130
Ethnicity (Javanese)	-.014	.084	-.004	-.165	.869
Age	-.007	.003	-.055	-2.380	.017
Gender (male)	.074	.081	.020	.916	.360

Appendix 1

Reliability Test “Democratic Performance” Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.844	.844	4

Inter-Item Correlation Matrix

	kinerjadem ok_Q59	kinerjadem ok_Q60	kinerjadem ok_Q61	kinerjadem ok_Q62
Democatic peformance_Q59	1.000	.532	.487	.510
National representative performance_Q60	.532	1.000	.559	.675
Local representative performance_Q61	.487	.559	1.000	.689
Local government performance_Q62	.510	.675	.689	1.000

Recording of Family politics

All variables are recoded into a 1-3 point scale: 1=anti-family politics, 2 = neutral and non-respond, and 3 = pro-family politics.

Item	Recode 1-3
Q64: If a candidate comes from a political family (a parent, spouse, sibling, or child is a current or former elected government official), are you more likely to support him/her, less likely, or does it make no difference? a. More likely to support b. Less likely to support c. No difference	1=Less likely to support 2= no difference, don't know 3= More likely to support
Q66: Some people say, “Second-generation politicians represent a problem for democracy because they demonstrate that the children of powerful people have unfair advantages over the children of ordinary people.” Do you agree or disagree with this statement?	1= Agree/strongly agree 2= Don't know 3= Disagree/strongly disagree
Q67: Some people say, “As long as they are able to win their offices by getting enough votes in a	1= Disagree/strongly disagree

popular election, second-generation politicians are not a problem for democracy.” Do you agree or disagree with this statement?	2= Don't know 3= agree/ strongly agree
Q68: Do you think a politician from a political family or one not from a political family is more likely to be corrupt?	1= From family politics 2= don't know 3= From a non-family politics
Q69: Do you think a politician from a political family or one not from a political family is more likely to be able to get things done?	1= from non-family politics 2= don't know 3= from a family politics
Q70: Do you think a politician from political family or from one not from a political family is likely to preserve natural resources of this region?	1= from non-family politics 2= don't know 3= from a family politics
Q71: “If you have a problem, do you think a politician from a family politics or from one not from political family is more likely to help you?	1= from a non-family politics 2= don't know 3= from a family politics

Reliability Test and Factor Analysis for Political Dynasty Items

ITEM-ITEM DENGAN RECODE 1-3

Reliability Test “Pro Political Dynasty Items—7 Items”

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.385	.412	7

Inter-Item Correlation Matrix

	prodinasti_Q64_3	prodinasti_Q66_3	prodinasti_Q67_3	prodinasti_Q68_3	prodinasti_Q69_3	prodinasti_Q70_3	prodinasti_Q71_3
prodinasti_Q64_3	1.000	.007	.203	.100	.158	.120	.139
prodinasti_Q66_3	.007	1.000	-.166	.086	.002	-.017	.011
prodinasti_Q67_3	.203	-.166	1.000	.004	.130	.072	.080
prodinasti_Q68_3	.100	.086	.004	1.000	-.088	-.050	-.025
prodinasti_Q69_3	.158	.002	.130	-.088	1.000	.346	.360
prodinasti_Q70_3	.120	-.017	.072	-.050	.346	1.000	.441

prodinasti_Q71_3	.139	.011	.080	-.025	.360	.441	1.000
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Reliability Test “Pro Political Dynasty – 4 Items”

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.602	.585	4

Inter-Item Correlation Matrix

	prodinasti_Q64_3	prodinasti_Q69_3	prodinasti_Q70_3	prodinasti_Q71_3
prodinasti_Q64_3	1.000	.158	.120	.139
prodinasti_Q69_3	.158	1.000	.346	.360
prodinasti_Q70_3	.120	.346	1.000	.441
prodinasti_Q71_3	.139	.360	.441	1.000

Knowledge of politicians from political family or non-political family

Correct Answers

No	Politician	From political Family or from non-political family
1	Puan Maharani	Political family
2	Dave Akbarsah Fikarno	"
3	Maruar Sirait	"
4	Agus Gumiwang Kartasasmita	"
5	M. Guruh Irianti Sukarnoputra	"
6	Siti Hediati Suharto	"
7	Pramono Anung Wibowo	Non-political family
8	Nusron Wahid	"
9	Utut Adianto	"
10	Bambang Soesatyo	"

We make a score by adding the number of answers a respondent was able to correctly identify

The distribution of scores (correct answers)

