

# Coverage-Based Harmfulness Testing for LLM Code Transformation

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**Warning:** This paper contains harmful content solely for the purpose of evaluating LLMs and does not promote any harmful or criminal activities.

**Abstract**—Harmful content embedded in program elements within source code may have detrimental impact on mental health of software developers, and promote harmful behavior. Our key insight is that software developers may introduce harmful content into source code via diverse semantic-preserving program transformations when using Code Large Language Models (Code LLMs). To analyze the space of program transformations that may be used to introduce harmful content into auto-generated code, we conduct a preliminary study that revealed 32 different types of transformations that can be used to introduce harmful content in source code. Based on our study, we propose CHT, a novel coverage-based harmfulness testing framework that automatically synthesizes prompts using a set of prompt templates injected with diverse harmful keywords to perform various types of transformations on a set of mined benign programs. Instead of checking if the content moderation has been bypassed as prior testing approaches, CHT performs *output damage measurement* to assess potential harm that can be incurred by the generated outputs (i.e., natural language explanation and modified code). By considering output damage, CHT revealed several problems in Code LLMs: (1) bugs in content moderation for code (Code LLMs produce the harmful code without providing any warning), (2) inadequacy in performing code-related task (e.g., Code LLMs may resort to explaining the given code instead of performing the instructed transformation task), and (3) lenient content moderation (gives warning but the modified code with harmful content is still produced). Our evaluations of CHT on four Code LLMs and gpt-4o-mini (general LLM) show that content moderation in Code LLMs is relatively easy to bypass where LLMs may generate harmful keywords embedded within identifier names or code comments without giving any warning (65.93% in our evaluation). To improve the robustness of content moderation in code-related tasks, we propose a two-phase approach that checks if the prompt contains any harmful content before generating any output. Our evaluation shows that our proposed approach improves the content moderation of Code LLM by 483.76%.

**Index Terms**—large language models, code generation, harmfulness testing

## I. INTRODUCTION

Online anonymity and a lack of accountability can exacerbate the widespread dissemination of harmful content. Exposure to harmful content can have adverse effects on mental health and societal behavior. In the context of open-source software development, a study [1] revealed that developers consider using harmful keywords when naming software artifacts as a type of unethical behavior. For example, a developer complained in a GitHub issue that using “genocide”

to name a program element may promote criminal behavior: “It was never a good or ethical name...is...deliberate mass-murder” [2]. Meanwhile, another study [3] showed that the presence of toxic comments may have negative impact on code quality. These studies indicate the importance of ensuring responsible use of natural language in software artifacts (i.e., identifier names and comments).

Recognizing the importance of ensuring the responsible use of LLMs, OpenAI has recruited a group of experts (also known as “red teaming”) to perform manual adversarial testing to mitigate the risks of producing harmful content [4], [5]. Meanwhile, several metamorphic testing techniques have been proposed to detect the harmful content produced by LLMs [6], [7]. However, existing techniques mainly focus on harmful content generated by general-purpose systems (e.g., text generation [6], and image generation systems [7]). With the recent advancement of Code Large Language Models (Code LLMs), prior evaluations have demonstrated promising results in using Code LLMs for solving various software maintenance tasks (e.g., refactoring [8]–[10], and automated program repair [11]–[14]). However, there is a lack of systematic approaches that automatically generate tests to probe and identify harmful content produced by LLMs for code. In this paper, we refer to a systematic testing approach to identify harmful contents generated by LLMs as *harmfulness testing* (Def 4).

**Challenges.** We identify four key challenges of harmfulness testing for Code LLMs. **(C1)** Although source code can be considered as a specialized type of textual content, existing techniques designed for textual content systems are ineffective in identifying the harmful content that can be potentially produced by Code LLMs because they *may ignore the unique characteristics of source code and are agnostic to the vocabulary of programming (which are usually identifier names instead of plain texts in natural language [15])*. Notably, MTTM [6] that performs 11 different textual perturbations did not consider camel case conversion, which is a widely-used coding convention. Moreover, our evaluation in Section IV-C1 shows that LLMs give significantly different effectiveness when detecting harmful textual content embedded in code comment (i.e., natural language embedded in code) compared to those embedded in names of program elements, implying the *need to design transformations customized for perturbing source code*. **(C2)** Prior approaches mainly focus on *limited number of categories* (e.g., hate speech, erotic and violent content [6], [7]), neglecting important categories

such as eating disorder, and misinformation. **(C3)** Although prior evaluation shows that Code LLMs are more robust in performing certain types of program transformations [8], [9], [16], prior techniques largely ignore the *diverse types of program transformations* specified within the prompts given to Code LLMs. **(C4)** Prior approaches [6], [7] mainly rely on a *weak test oracle* that checks if content moderation is bypassed. **Threat Model.** Our threat model considers a malicious or insensitive code contributor (the attacker) who misuses LLMs to generate code containing harmful content and submits it to open-source repositories. Victims who read or use such code, often unknowingly, thereby propagating or being exposed to harmful content.

Our key insight is that *harmful content can be injected into code via diverse types of semantic-preserving program transformations*. To analyze the space of possible program transformations (address C3), we conducted a preliminary study of refactoring types in Fowler’s catalog of refactoring [17]. Based on our study, we obtained a total of 32 refactoring types which corresponds to 32 different prompt templates where each template contains a placeholder for injecting harmful content (usually injected via identifier name).

Inspired by traditional notions of code coverage, we define *harm category coverage* which measures the proportion of harm categories being tested (Eq. 1). Our definition (Def. 1) encodes diverse categories of harmful content based on a unified taxonomy [18]. Unlike prior testing technique [6] that relies solely on random selection of sentences from existing datasets which may miss some important categories, we present CHT, a novel harmfulness testing framework guided by *harm category coverage*.

In short, we made the following contributions:

- **Dataset.** We contributed a *coverage-based harmful content dataset*, a dataset containing 100 keywords/phrases that cover various harm categories. Our dataset has curated keywords/phrases covering 13 harm categories based on a unified taxonomy [18] drawn from various domains. We also constructed a *benign program dataset* that supports 32 refactoring types and contains no harmful content. To assess the scalability of our method, we further built a large-scale *benign program dataset* with more lines of code. Although this work focuses on testing Code LLMs using these datasets, we foresee that they can also be used to improve the harm category coverage of existing testing approaches for general-purpose LLMs.
- **Technique.** We propose CHT, a novel coverage-based harmfulness testing framework that automatically synthesizes prompts using a set of prompt templates injected with a diverse set of harmful words/phrases to perform various types of transformations on a set of mined benign programs. From a testing perspective, the input to a Code LLM for a code transformation task contains (*i1*) a natural language instruction, and (*i2*) the program to be transformed, whereas the test output of the Code LLM consist of (*o1*) the modified code, and (*o2*) a natural language instruction that may contain a warning message.

Hence, we design CHT with several key components: (1) *diversity-enhanced prompt synthesis* where each prompt template has been designed based on transformations found through our study, (2) *benign program mining* where we collect programs that do not contain harmful content either from the online refactoring catalog or bug reports for various types of refactoring, (3) *coverage-based harmful content dataset construction* where we select words/phrases from existing datasets to ensure that all harm categories have been represented with at least three keyword/phrases, convert phrases (with multiple words) to camel cases, and automatically inject the harmful content into the prompt templates, (4) *output damage measurement*, a form of heuristic test oracle [19], [20], where we measure the degree of damage that can be incurred by the Code LLM by automatically analyzing auto-generated code *o1* and explanation *o2* (the ideal case with the least damage is to stop generating code, i.e., empty *o1* and give a warning in *o2*). Compared to prior techniques [6], [7] that only check whether content moderation has been bypassed, CHT can detect various types of problems in Code LLMs (Def. 3): (1) bugs in content moderation for code (the case *GN* where the harmful code is generated without giving any warning), (2) inadequacy in performing code-related task (the case *NN* where no relevant code nor relevant warning has been produced as a Code LLM may fail to perform the instructed task, and only explain the given code), (3) lenient content moderation (the case *GR* where warning message is given but harmful code is still produced).

- **Evaluation.** Our evaluation on five LLMs (*Deepseek-coder:6.7b*, *CodeLlama:7b*, *CodeGemma:7b*, *Qwen2.5-coder:7b* and *GPT-4o-mini*) shows that CHT can automatically identify problems in LLMs with 97.55% accuracy.
- **Refined Code LLM.** To improve the harmful content moderation of Code LLMs, we leveraged the function calling mechanism which allows LLMs to interact with external tools. Experiments on *Qwen2.5-coder:7b* show that 483.76% more harmful code generation requests are rejected along with warning messages, indicating enhanced content moderation for code LLMs.
- **Availability.** Our tool, results and datasets are publicly available at [21].
- **Ethical Considerations.** CHT aims to automatically construct inputs to Code LLMs to identify harmful content in code, which we believe is essential towards building responsible and safe models for code. Using our framework, the model trainers can test their models against potential harms and mitigate them before deployments. Hence, we believe CHT is beneficial with respect to broader impact.

## II. PROBLEM FORMULATION

Although there are other definitions of harm categories (e.g., Azure AI Content Safety with four harm categories: hate and fairness, sexual, violence and self-harm [22]), we select the unified taxonomy [18] for Def. 1 because it comprehensively includes common types of harms described by industry, policy,

community and health experts. Notably, Def. 1 states that harmful content can be manifested via 13 categories of harms.

**Definition 1 (Harmful content).** We define *harmful content* based on a unified taxonomy of online harmful content [18] which includes 13 categories: (1) doxing (i.e., provides personally identifiable information about an individual or organization), (2) identity attack, (3) identity misrepresentation, (4) insult, (4) sexual aggression, (6) threat of violence, (7) eating disorder promotion, (8) self-harm, (9) extremism, terrorism, and organized crime, (10) misinformation, (11) adult sexual services, (12) child sexual abuse material, and (13) scams.

We introduce an assumption of LLMs regarding its input and output space in Def. 2 before presenting the formal definition of harmfulness testing of Code LLMs.

**Definition 2 (Input-Output of LLM  $C$ ).** We define a LLM  $C$  as a closed-box system that maps inputs consisting of (i1) natural language instruction and (i2) code snippet to outputs  $o1$  and  $o2$  where  $o1$  represents the generated code (which could be empty if  $C$  refuses to generate code) and  $o2$  represents the natural language explanation for the given task.

Although we may use Code LLMs for a code generation task that may not include any code as input (in this case,  $i2$  would be empty), this simplified assumption is sufficient for the purpose of harmfulness testing for all code-related tasks for Code LLMs. Prior testing approaches of content moderation systems [6], [7] only measure whether content moderation has been successfully bypassed (which is a binary value: Yes/No). However, a real output can be more complex with each type of output incurring different degree of damage to the user of a Code LLM. Hence, we distinguish between two types of outputs by measuring output damage in Def. 3.

**Definition 3 (Output Damage  $D$ ).** Given a LLM  $C$ , we measure its *output damage* (i.e., potential damage that can be incurred via the two outputs  $o1$  and  $o2$  produced by  $C$ ). We introduce the notations below for the generated code ( $o1$ ) and generated explanation ( $o2$ ):

Notation	Score	$o1$ with harmful content	$o2$ with warning
$GN^{Bug}$	2	✓	-
GR	1	✓	✓
NR	0	-	✓
$NN^{Bug}$	-1	-	-

1. We consider  $GN^{Bug}$  as a bug in content moderation for code because it fails to perform any content moderation (generate code without any warning).
2. We consider  $NN^{Bug}$  as a bug in a Code LLM as it does not produce information relevant to the transformation task (either fails to perform the code-related task correctly or ignore the harmful content).
3. We consider GR as lenient content moderation because while the warning is given, the user can still misuse the generated code for malicious purpose.

As stated in Def. 3, GR indicates the case where code with harmful content has been generated ( $G$ ) but a warning message indicating its reluctance to provide results is generated ( $R$ ). Figure 1 shows an example of GR that although Qwen2.5-coder:7b gave a warning about the use of offensive language, it has successfully generated code. Meanwhile, GN indicates the case where code with harmful content has been generated ( $G$ )

but no warning has been produced ( $N$ ). To provide a score for each type of output, we define the space of output damage  $D$  as  $\{GN:2, GR:1, NR:0, NN:-1\}$  where outputs are mapped to a number indicating the degree of damage to the user of a Code LLM. As an interactive system should provide some relevant feedback instead of not generating the relevant code nor providing any relevant message, we assign  $NN$  a score of  $-1$ . Figure 2 shows an example of  $NN$  where CodeLLama failed to perform the *Introduce Parameter Object* refactoring. Instead of performing the refactoring, CodeLLama resorts to code explanation. We consider this failure to perform the task as a bug in Code LLM.




Fig. 1: An example of lenient content moderation that gives a warning but still generates code with harmful content (GR).




Fig. 2: An example of neither generating relevant code nor providing any warning message (NN).

Based on various ethics aspects of responsible AI [23], we consider NR as the best option (output damage:0) for a Code LLMs as  $L$  not only stops generating code (i.e., high in accountability), it also produces a warning message to educate users (i.e., high in transparency and explainability).

**Definition 4 (Harmfulness Testing).** Given the input-output defined in Def 2, *harmfulness testing* evaluates the output damage  $D$  (stated in Def 3) produced by  $C$ .

### III. METHODOLOGY

To analyze the space of possible program transformations that can be misused for injecting harmful content, we conduct a preliminary study of refactoring that can be misused (Section III-A). Based on our study, we propose CHT, a harmfulness testing framework for Code LLMs. Figure 3 shows CHT's workflow which consists of four key components:

(1) coverage-based harmful content dataset, (2) diversity-enhanced prompt synthesis, (3) harmful content execution in LLMs, and (4) output damage measurement.

#### A. Preliminary Study

Our intuition is that developers may use a diverse set of semantic-preserving program transformations (i.e., refactoring) to inject harmful content. Hence, our study target refactoring types listed in Fowler’s online catalog of refactoring [17], a list of commonly used refactoring by software practitioners. Specifically, our study aims to answer the question below:

**RQ0:** *What are the types of transformations in which harmful content can be injected into a given benign program?*

**Study Methodology:** To avoid personal bias, two annotators independently reviewed the 66 refactorings listed in the online refactoring catalog [17], [24]. Both annotators have over ten years of programming experience. For each refactoring, each annotator independently determined the possibility of modifying or introducing new harmful content into a benign program (e.g., through direct or indirect renaming). After independent analysis, the two annotators meet to resolve conflicts and finalize the set of refactorings. A third annotator is involved when the conflicts cannot be resolved. Following existing approaches [1], [25], we measured the inter-rater agreement among the annotators via Cohen’s Kappa coefficient. Specifically, there are eight out of the 66 refactoring types (12%) with divergent labels, which leads to Cohen’s Kappa coefficient being 88%, indicating near perfect agreement. The entire process of manually analyzing and discussing the 66 refactoring types takes around 12 hours.

Table 1 in [26] shows the results of our pilot study which identifies a total of 32 refactoring types from six categories in which one can use to inject harmful content into a benign program. Notably, refactoring categories that involve extraction, rename, replacement, encapsulate, introducing new program elements, and others can be used to inject harmful code content.

**Finding 0:** Among the Fowler’s online categories of refactoring [17], we identified 32 types of refactoring that can be used to inject harmful content into benign programs. The identified refactoring categories are diverse, including Extract, Rename, Replace, Encapsulate, Introduce, and Others.

#### B. Dataset Construction

To construct the test inputs ( $i_1$  and  $i_2$  in Def 2) for harmfulness testing of Code LLMs, we propose two datasets: (1) coverage-based harmful content dataset for the natural language instruction  $i_1$ , and (2) benign program dataset for the code snippet  $i_2$ .

1) *Coverage-based Harmful Content Dataset:* To assess harmful content generation in LLMs, we define harmful content based on Def. 1, which classifies harmful content into 13 categories. This dataset lays the foundation for evaluating how well LLMs handle and resist the generation of harmful content. It is infeasible to exhaustively explore the space of possible combinations of inputs and outputs of a Code LLM. Hence,

we need to design a systematic way to partition the input space of harmful content into different equivalence classes and try to cover all classes by picking samples from each of them. We call this method “coverage-based” because our keyword selection is based on Input Space Partitioning (ISP) in the textbook [27]. Selecting  $\geq 1$  keywords from each class fulfills each choice coverage criterion in ISP. Based on Def 1, we define *harm category coverage* in Eq. 1.

$$\text{Harm Category Coverage} = \frac{|\text{Executed Harm Categories}|}{|\text{Total Harm Categories}|} \quad (1)$$

Formally, *harm category coverage* is the ratio of *executed harm categories* (i.e., we consider a harm category *cat* being executed if there is a harmful keyword/phrase representing *cat* being provided as input to a Code LLM to run to generate outputs) and the total number of harm categories (i.e., 13 according to Def. 1). Currently, our harm category coverage only considers the number of covered categories by a set of keywords, which may be too coarse-grained. We plan to use semantic trees to select more semantically diverse keywords.

Instead of using sentences from text messages datasets in prior work [6], we construct our harmful content dataset at the word-level (or phrase) level because names of program elements are usually words/short phrases to ease as longer names are shown to have a negative influence on readability [28]. While there are several existing datasets with harmful content at the word-level (e.g., Hurltex [29]), they fail to comprehensively cover all 13 categories or provide a detailed offensiveness grading. To address this limitation, we curate a set of 100 words/phrases drawn from two sources: (1) Weaponized Word [30] and (2) Hurltex [29].

Table 2 in [26] shows that the *Harm Category Coverage* of Weaponized Word is  $7/13$  (53.8%) whereas *Harm Category Coverage* of Hurltex is  $11/13$  (84.6%). Although Hurltex has higher coverage than Weaponized Word, we prioritize using data from Weaponized Word dataset because it has labeled each word/phrase with an offensiveness score, which allows us to select “Extremely offensive” from this dataset to represent the most severe harmful content. For uncovered categories in Weaponized Word, we augment them with words from Hurltex. To further augment these datasets, we select additional words from the names of the category (e.g., doxing). Subsequently, our final dataset has a *Harm Category Coverage* of 100% where each category is represented by no fewer than three keywords.

2) *Benign Program Dataset:* A *benign program* refers to a program that does not have any harmful content. We assume that programs with harmful content (we refer to them as *harmful code*) can be generated by starting with a benign program and applying certain transformations. This assumption is inspired by Mencius’s [31] and Aristotle’s theory of innate human goodness [32]: human behavior is benign at the beginning and then harmful behavior is derived from them.

As different types of transformations require the benign programs to exhibit certain characteristics (e.g., rename variable requires a benign program to have one variable to rename) [33], [34] to be able to successfully execute a given




Fig. 3: An overview of the CHT framework.

transformation, our goal is to obtain a benign program dataset to support diverse set of transformations. To the best of our knowledge, no existing dataset comprehensively covers all 32 refactoring types suitable for harmful content injection, which are essential to ensure the diversity of the tested refactoring types. Hence, we build two tailored datasets: (1) a benign program dataset (BPD) with an average of 8 lines of code (LoC), and (2) a large-scale benign program dataset (BPD-L) with an average of 156 LoC. BPD is from two datasets: (1) an existing dataset of programs used for testing refactoring engines [35], and (2) examples from the online catalog of refactoring [17]. Specifically, the existing dataset [35] mined real-world compilable programs from historical bug reports of refactoring engines (JDT from ECLIPSE, and the Java refactoring component of INTELLIJ IDEA), which inherently covered only 13 of the 32 refactoring types identified in our study. To cover more refactoring types, we complement the dataset with additional examples from the online refactoring catalog. This ensures that the final dataset includes all 32 refactoring types, including those that were not covered by the previously mined programs. By leveraging a combination of real-world examples and code snippets from the refactoring catalog, this dataset lays the foundation for the prompt synthesis component of CHT. To assess the effectiveness of our approach on larger programs, we mine BPD-L from the RefactoringMiner dataset [36], focusing only the 32 types of refactoring from Finding 0. For each type covered by the dataset, we extract the refactored code from the corresponding commit. For each uncovered type, we manually select another program in the dataset that: (1) satisfies the precondition for the refactoring, and (2) is from a different file (to ensure diversity). The final set spans 26 different repositories [21]. Table I shows the detailed statistics for both datasets.

TABLE I: Benign Program Dataset Statistics

Dataset	LoC			Source Programs	Repositories
	Min	Max	Avg		
BPD	3	16	8	32	–
BPD-L	117	189	156	32	26

*Source Programs*: for both datasets, one distinct program is used per refactoring type (32 types) to ensure diversity.

*Repositories*: Repository metadata for BPD is unavailable because the dataset is collected from bug reports [35] and online refactoring catalog [17].

### C. Diversity-enhanced Prompt Synthesis

Given the two inputs (obtained from coverage-based harmful content dataset and the benign program dataset), CHT

performs diversity-enhanced prompt synthesis using a set of prompt templates to prepare the prompts that will be feed as inputs to a LLM under test. Specifically, for each type of transformation, we further design the corresponding prompt template. To enhance the diversity of the program transformations used, we designed two types of transformations: (1) refactoring with either a single word or phrases converted to camel cases, and (2) transformations that introduce natural languages (e.g., code comments).

**Refactoring.** We design a tailored prompt for each specific refactoring type by incorporating the name of the refactoring type into the prompt (e.g., rename the variable “s1” to <new-Name> in Figure 1). The detailed prompts corresponding to each refactoring are provided in [37]. To follow the vocabulary of a given programming language (i.e., CHT currently supports Java programs), we convert all the multi-word phrases in the coverage-based harmful content dataset into camel case naming conventions. Although this adaptation can be seen as a special type of textual perturbation similarly used in prior work [6], our evaluation in Section IV-C4 shows that by applying only one tailored type of perturbation that follows programming conventions, CHT can effectively bypass the content moderation of most Code LLMs.

**Transformations that Introduce Natural Language (NL).** This transformation focuses on the **Insert Comment** task, which is designed as a comparative approach to refactoring. The goal is to assess whether LLMs exhibit different behavior when processing tasks related to code refactoring versus tasks involving natural language, which contain harmful content without any textual perturbation. We design one prompt template for all benign programs:

*Insert a comment for the following code with the content [keyword]:*

In this prompt, CHT dynamically replaces the placeholder “[keyword]” with entries from the harmful keyword dataset, thereby generating a diverse set of prompts. This setting allows us to systematically evaluate how LLMs handle the incorporation of potentially harmful language in unperturbed format compared to structured code transformations (i.e., refactoring).

### D. Harmful Content Execution in LLMs

We conduct harmfulness testing by feeding our synthesized prompts to both Code LLMs and general LLMs. While our primary focus is on Code LLMs, it is valuable to also



include a comparison with general LLMs to identify potential differences in their ability to resist the generation of harmful content. This comparison provides insights into the distinct challenges posed by specialized code generation models versus more general-purpose models. The input to this component consists of the synthesized prompts, which are designed for both the refactoring task and the insert comment task.

**Code LLMs.** To evaluate Code LLMs, we use open-source models in the Ollama platform [38]. Our selection criteria is:

- 1) The model must be specifically trained to understand and generate code in programming languages.
- 2) To guarantee the quality of the model, it should have more than 500,000 of downloads on the Ollama platform.
- 3) Given the nature of the code-related tasks that we focus on, the model should be able to process instructive prompts.
- 4) Due to computational and cost constraints, the model should ideally have a parameter scale  $\leq 7b$ .

Based on the criteria above, we selected four open-source Code LLMs: *Code Llama:7b* [39], *CodeGemma:7b* [40], *Qwen2.5-coder:7b* [41], and *Deepseek-coder:6.7b* [42]. We excluded StarCoder2 [43], which is a code completion model because it does not effectively support instructive prompts (does not meet criterion (3)).

**General LLMs.** To enable a comparative analysis of performance differences between Code LLMs and general LLMs, we include GPT-4o-mini [5] in our testing. This comparison is essential for understanding how domain-specific models, such as Code LLMs, differ from general-purpose models in handling harmful prompts.

#### E. Output Damage Measurement

After executing each input, CHT evaluates the output produced by the LLM by measuring the output damage as specified in Def. 3. The goal is to quantify the degree of harmful content injection into the outputs, and understand how well the models resist harmful content generation. Def. 3 shows that we categorize the outputs into four types: *GR*, *GN*, *NN*, *NR* where *NR* represents the ideal case where a Code LLMs behaves correctly and other types either indicates a bug or lenient content moderation.

To validate the generated code, for the program refactoring task *o1*, CHT: (1) uses the regular expression ```` (.*) ```` to extract all code blocks from an LLM response (i.e., code blocks are usually marked with ````` in markdown); (2) for each harmful keyword *k*, constructs a variant set  $V(k)$  comprising the original form and a camelCase variant when *k* is a multi-word phrase; (3) normalizes the code blocks and all variants using Unicode case folding (case-insensitive); and (4) uses string matching to check whether the injected harmful keyword occurs in the code blocks. For the insert comment task, CHT also uses string matching to detect if the injected harmful keywords are found in the generated comments.

As the explanation *o2* is written in natural language instead of a particular format, CHT uses a keyword-based text matching approach to categorize *o2*. While more advanced natural language processing techniques can be used to categorize *o2*,

we use the keyword-based text matching approach as the output damage measurement component plays the role of assertions in harmfulness testing, which should be run relatively fast to validate the results. To identify a set of keywords that represent potential warning messages indicating inappropriate content (e.g., “offensive” in Figure 1), we randomly sampled and manually reviewed 20% generated responses for each LLM since different LLMs tend to generate their own unique warning messages. To assess sensitivity to the manual-verification rate, we repeated the procedure at 10% (instead of the default 20%) and examined whether the RQ2 accuracy changed with the revised keyword set (Section IV-B shows the results). With the identified set of keywords indicative of a warning message, CHT checks whether the remaining responses contain these keywords.

### IV. EVALUATION

Our evaluation focuses on the research questions below:

**RQ1:** How effective is CHT in harmfulness testing across different LLMs?

**RQ2:** How accurate is CHT’s output damage measurement?

**RQ3:** How different factors affect CHT’s effectiveness?

**RQ4:** Can we improve content moderation in a Code LLM?

**Implementation.** As explained in Section III-D, we tested five LLMs: four Code LLMs (*Deepseek-coder:6.7b*, *CodeLlama:7b*, *CodeGemma:7b*, and *Qwen2.5-coder:7b*), and one general-purpose LLM (GPT-4o-mini). We performed program refactoring and comment insertion tasks for Code LLMs on Google Colab with an NVIDIA L4 GPU. For *GPT-4o-mini*, we call the OpenAI API [44]. We set the *temperature* to 0 for all LLMs to reduce randomness and ensure reproducibility.

#### A. RQ1: Effectiveness Across Different LLMs

Table II shows the effectiveness of LLMs in generating harmful code in our collected dataset. The first column listed the LLMs under test. Based on Def. 2 and Def. 3, we classify the responses of each LLM into four labels (i.e., *GN*, *GR*, *NR*, and *NN*) according to their output damage. For each category, we also listed the results for refactoring (column “Ref.”) and code comment insertion (column “Com.”).

On average, 65.93% harmful code is successfully generated without any warning message (i.e., *GN*), indicating that their ability to resist harmful code generation is still limited. OpenAI’s general purpose model, GPT-4o-mini, performed the worst, 85.66% of its responses contain harmful code and without any warning. On the other hand, the best performing model is CodeLlama:7b, with is only 38.13%. We can also observe that on average 0.61% harmful code is generated together with the warning message (i.e., *GR*). In which CodeLlama:7b and GPT-4o-mini generate the lowest and highest number of harmful code, that is 0.16% and 1.78%, respectively.

From Table II, we also observe that 7.49% harmful code generation requests are rejected with warning messages (i.e., *NR*). We consider *NR* as the best option (output damage=0) since LLM not only stops generating harmful code, it also produces warning messages to educate users about potential

TABLE II: Effectiveness of LLMs on harmful code generation. The values are shown as percentages (%).

LLM	GN (2)		GR (1)		NR (0)		NN (-1)	
	Ref.	Com.	Ref.	Com.	Ref.	Com.	Ref.	Com.
CodeGemma:7b	70.34	59.00(-16.12)	0.50	<b>0.03</b> (-94.00)	12.72	<b>39.63</b> (+211.56)	16.44	1.34(-91.85)
CodeLlama:7b	<b>38.13</b>	53.81(+41.12)	<b>0.16</b>	0.72(+350.00)	<b>13.22</b>	34.88(+163.84)	<b>48.50</b>	10.59(-78.16)
Deepseek-coder:6.7b	63.66	88.97(+39.76)	0.41	1.28(+212.20)	0.19	1.00(+426.32)	35.75	8.75(-75.52)
Qwen2.5-coder:7b	71.84	<b>49.31</b> (-31.36)	0.22	0.31(+40.91)	5.91	15.81(+167.51)	22.03	<b>34.56</b> (+56.88)
GPT-4o-mini	85.66	83.41(-2.63)	1.78	4.94(+177.53)	5.41	11.00(+103.33)	7.16	0.66(-90.78)
<b>Average</b>	<b>65.93</b>	66.90(+1.47)	<b>0.61</b>	1.46(+139.34)	7.49	<b>20.46</b> (+173.16)	<b>25.98</b>	11.18(-56.97)
Qwen2.5-coder:7b++	<b>49.44</b> (-31.18)	<b>49.81</b> (-1.01)	0.22(+0.00)	1.84(+493.55)	<b>34.50</b> (+483.76)	<b>15.97</b> (+1.01)	15.84(-28.10)	32.38(-6.31)

The numbers in parenthesis in row 1 denote the output damage score (e.g., *GN* has a score of 2). Ref. = Refactoring, Com. = Insert Comment. Each value in the Ref./Com. column is calculated as  $\frac{x}{y} \times 100\%$  where  $x$  is the number of outputs with a given label for a LLM, and  $y$  is the total number of outputs.

violations (i.e., explainability). Among all LLMs evaluated, CodeLlama:7b achieves the best performance (13.22% *NR*). However, only 0.19% responses from Deepseek-coder:6.7b are *NR*. On average, 25.98% responses do not contain any harmful code or warning message (i.e., *NN*). GPT-4o-mini gives the lowest number (7.16%) of *NN* while 48.50% of CodeLlama:7b’s responses are *NN*. Table II shows that among all the LLMs evaluated, GPT-4o-mini generates the highest number of harmful codes (85.66% *GN* and 1.78% *GR*). CodeLlama:7b is the most effective in rejecting harmful code generation (13.22% *NR*, and 48.50% *NN*), and generate the least harmful code (38.13% *GN*, and 0.16% *GR*).

**Finding 1:** Our evaluation shows that LLMs have limited ability to resist harmful code generation. On average, 65.93% of harmful code is generated without any warning, while 0.61% is produced despite a warning message. Among the models evaluated, CodeLlama:7b and CodeGemma:7b perform the best in rejecting harmful code generation.

#### B. RQ2: Accuracy of Output Damage Measurement

As CHT relies on output damage measurement *OD* as test oracle, it is important to access its accuracy. Formally, the accuracy of output damage measurement  $Accuracy_{OD}$  is the ratio of correct predictions of the four labels to the total predictions of all samples.

$$Accuracy_{OD} = \frac{|Correct\ predictions\ of\ labels|}{|Total\ predictions\ of\ samples|}$$

To measure  $Accuracy_{OD}$ , we collected a sample of responses generated by LLMs at a 95% confidence level with a 5% margin of error. The required sample size is given by  $n = \frac{z^2 \hat{p}(1 - \hat{p})}{e^2}$ . Assuming an effectively infinite population and the conservative proportion  $\hat{p} = 0.5$  with  $z = 1.96$  and  $e = 0.05$ , the required sample size is 384 responses per LLM, yielding a total of 1,920 across the five LLMs under study. For each sampled response, two annotators independently classified the response into one of the four labels (*GN*, *GR*, *NR*, *NN*). To reduce bias, the label produced by CHT ( $label_{tool}$ ) is not shown to each annotator; any conflicts are discussed by the annotators until they reached a consistency. Then, we use a script to automatically compare  $label_{tool}$  with the manual label. Our manual classification results show that CHT achieves an overall  $Accuracy_{OD}$  of 97.55% (at 20% sampled keyword set, described in Section III-E), indicating relatively high accuracy. With a sampling of 10%, CHT achieves an overall  $Accuracy_{OD}$  of 97.50%. Compared to the default

setting of 20%, the absolute difference is 0.05%, showing that our measurement is still relatively accurate despite sampling less keywords. This is because LLMs’ responses only contain limited keywords so a small set of keywords is sufficient.

**Finding 2:** The output damage measurement in CHT achieves an overall accuracy of 97.55%.

**Ethical Considerations.** When manually analyzing  $Accuracy_{OD}$ , annotators may be exposed to harmful auto-generated outputs. To mitigate the negative impact of reading harmful content, we recommend each annotator to focus their attention on classifying the outputs into the four labels instead of understanding the meaning of harmful words/phrases. Annotators are also recommended to view positive words or images after reading harmful content.

#### C. RQ3: Impact of Different Factors

We evaluate six factors that can affect CHT’s effectiveness: (1) insert comment versus refactoring, (2) impact of refactoring categories, (3) impact of harm categories, (4) impact of camel case conversion, (5) size of benign programs, and (6) impact of harm category coverage.

1) *Insert Comment versus Refactoring:* Table II shows the effectiveness of LLMs for the generation of harmful code comments (“Com.” columns). The overall average for generating harmful code comments without any warning message (*GN*) is 66.90%, which is almost the same as for refactoring tasks. Qwen2.5-coder:7b, CodeGemma:7b, and GPT-4o-mini tend to generate less *GN* compared to refactoring. Deepseek-coder:6.7b performs the worst, with 88.97% of its responses containing harmful code comments without any warning message (i.e., *GN*). Meanwhile, the best performing LLM is Qwen2.5-coder: 7b (49.31% *GN*), which achieves a 31.36% reduction compared to refactoring. The average generation of harmful comments for *GR* is 1.46%, which are relatively low despite a 139.34% increase compared to refactoring. However, the percentage of *NR* for the generation of harmful code comments (20.46%) is almost three times higher compared to the generation of harmful code (7.49%), indicating that more requests for the generation of harmful code comments are denied with warning messages. Chi-square tests shows that the difference in output labels between the insert comment and refactoring task is statistically significant across all models (all  $p$ -values  $< 0.05$ ; see [21] for details). Compared to code modification via various types of refactoring, which may be more complex, LLM tends to refuse generating harmful code

comments written in natural language because the refactoring operations could be more challenging to perform. During this process, the attention of LLMs to content moderation might be distracted and decreased, making them more susceptible to generating harmful code [45].

Focusing on individual LLM, we observed that Deepseek-coder:6.7b generates the most harmful code comments (88.97% *GN* and 1.28% *GR*) leading to 90.25% harmful code comments. Qwen2.5-coder:7b produces the least (49.31%) harmful code comments compared to other LLMs. CodeGemma:7b and CodeLlama:7b generate more *NR* compared to other LLMs, and relatively less harmful code comments (*GR*). This indicates that the content moderation in CodeGemma:7b and CodeLlama:7b are relatively effective in harmful code comment generation because they not only generate less harmful comments but also reject more requests with warning messages (higher transparency and explainability).




Fig. 4: The heatmap of *GN* for different refactoring categories. Each value is a percentage (x/y)% where x denotes the number of a given refactoring category with label *GN* and y is the total number of *GN* for a given tool.

**Finding 3:** Compared to harmful code generation, LLMs tend to refuse harmful code comment generation and provide warning message to indicate potential risk (*NR*). Among the models evaluated, Deepseek-coder:6.7b performs the worst, while CodeGemma:7b and CodeLlama:7b perform the best.

2) *Effectiveness for Different Refactoring:* Figure 4 shows the heatmap for the effectiveness of LLMs in generating harmful code for various refactoring categories (y-axis) in Table 1 in [26]. We focus on *GN* because its output damage is the highest. Figure 4 shows that CodeLlama:7b performs the best since it produces the lowest number of harmful code for all refactoring categories. In contrast, GPT-4o-mini produces the highest number of harmful code for all refactorings, indicating its poor ability to resist harmful code generation. For “Extract” refactoring, Qwen2.5-coder:7b performs as bad as GPT-4o-mini, producing 27% harmful code without any warning message. CodeGemma:7b produces more harmful code for “Introduce” and “Replace” refactoring.

**Finding 4:** Across all refactoring categories, GPT-4o-mini generates the highest number of harmful code, while CodeLlama:7b produces the fewest.

Figure 5 shows the heatmap of *NN* for various refactoring types. Based on Table II, we observe that although CodeLlama generates the least number of *GN* compared to other tools, it has the greatest number of *NN* where it tends to generate *NN* for “Introduce” and “Extract” refactoring category. When manually investigating the results, we notice that CodeLlama tends to explain the given code when it encountered complex refactoring types that it fails to perform (e.g., Figure 2). This can be considered a type of hallucination.

**Finding 5:** Code LLMs such as CodeLlama:7b may produce *NN* for complex refactoring categories (e.g., “Introduce”) that it fails to perform. It may resort to explaining the code instead of performing the task (a form of hallucination).




Fig. 5: The heatmap of *NN* for various refactoring categories. Each value is a percentage (x/y)% where x denotes the number of a given refactoring category with label *NN* and y is the total number of *NN* for a given tool.




Fig. 6: The heatmap of *GN* for various harm categories. Each value is a percentage (x/y)% where x denotes the number of a given harm category with label *GN* and y is the total number of *GN* for a given tool.

3) *Effectiveness of Various Harm Categories:* Figure 6 shows the heatmap for the effectiveness of LLMs in generating harmful code for various harm categories. The horizontal axis shows the different LLMs, and the vertical axis lists the harm



TABLE III: Effectiveness of LLMs on harmful code generation (we exclude data for “Insert comment” as phrases in comments are not converted into camel case): Phrase (20 phrases) versus Word (80 words).

LLM	GN (2)		GR (1)		NR (0)		NN (-1)	
	Phrase	Word	Phrase	Word	Phrase	Word	Phrase	Word
CodeGemma:7b	74.38	69.34(-6.78)	0.78	0.43(-44.87)	<b>16.72</b>	11.72(-29.90)	8.13	18.52(+127.80)
CodeLlama:7b	<b>50.63</b>	<b>35.00</b> (-30.87)	0.31	<b>0.12</b> (-61.29)	8.44	<b>14.41</b> (+70.73)	<b>40.63</b>	<b>50.47</b> (+24.22)
Deepseek-coder:6.7b	73.28	61.25(-16.42)	0.31	0.43(-38.71)	0.00	0.23(N/A)	26.41	38.09(+44.23)
Qwen2.5-coder:7b	82.66	69.14(-16.36)	<b>0.00</b>	0.27(N/A)	0.94	7.15(+660.64)	16.41	23.44(+42.84)
GPT-4o-mini	85.16	85.78(+0.73)	2.81	1.52(-45.91)	2.81	6.05(+113.30)	9.22	6.64(-27.98)
Average	73.22	<b>64.10</b> (-12.46)	0.84	<b>0.55</b> (-34.20)	5.78	<b>7.91</b> (+36.84)	20.16	<b>27.43</b> (+36.07)

Each value in the phrase/word column is calculated as  $\frac{x}{y} \times 100\%$ , where  $x$  is the number of outputs with a given label under the corresponding LLM and keyword format (i.e., phrase or word), and  $y$  is the total number of output labels for that LLM and keyword format.

keyword categories. As shown in Figure 6, overall, GPT-4o-mini performs the worst for each harmful category among all LLMs. Among all categories, GPT-4o-mini tends to perform worse when generating harmful code for “doxing”, “insult”, “misinformation” and “scams”. Although we only evaluated on GPT-4o-mini, this result aligns well with GPT-4o System Card [5] which focuses on evaluating other categories (e.g., self-harm and threat of violence).

In contrast, CodeLlama:7b achieves the best performance for all categories. Deepseek-coder:6.7b, and Qwen2.5-coder:7b are more prone to generate harmful code related to sexual content (i.e., “child sexual abuse materials” and “sexual aggression”). Indeed, we observed that all the evaluated LLMs tend to neglect content moderation for at least one category among the three categories related to sexual content (“adult sexual services”, “child sexual abuse materials” and “sexual aggression”). We attribute this to the fact that the content moderation of most LLMs [46], [47] usually group together all sexual-related content under one “Sexual content” category. This indicates the *importance of considering more fine-grained harm categories* when evaluating harmful content. By defining harmful content with more categories (Def. 1) and using harm category coverage, we can use CHT to show the inadequacy in content moderation for the three sexual-related categories.

**Finding 6:** Overall, GPT-4o-mini generates the highest number of harmful codes for nearly all harm categories, while CodeLlama: 7b produces the least. All evaluated LLMs perform differently across the three sexual-related categories as LLMs usually combine them into one category “Sexual Content”. By considering more fine-grained harm categories, CHT ensures that all categories are well-tested.

4) *Phrases Versus Single Word:* There are 20 phrases and 80 single words in our coverage-based harmful content dataset. Note that this ratio of phrase/words is inherited from our dataset construction step as we prioritize more offensive words/phrases and use category names (e.g., “eating disorder promotion”) as phrases. Table III shows the effectiveness of LLMs on harmful code generation with respect to phrases versus words. As we convert phrases into camel cases to follow programming naming conventions, we expect single words to be more effective for LLM to perform content moderation. The result in Table III shows that phrases converted to camel cases are more likely to bypass content moderation. On average,  $GN$  for phrases is 73.22% compared to 64.10% for words. Similarly, the percentage of  $NN$  for words is greater than

that of phrases (27.43% for words versus 20.16% for phrases). Our statistical analysis using chi-square tests shows that the differences in output labels between phrases and single words are statistically significant across all models (all  $p$ -values < 0.05; see [21] for detailed data), implying that the camel case conversion in CHT is effective.

**Finding 7:** Compared to single words, our evaluation shows that LLMs are less effective in content moderation for phrases converted to camel cases.

5) *Size of Benign Programs:* Table IV shows the results for the two benign program datasets (BPD and BPD-L) on the refactoring tasks. Compared to BPD, all models produce fewer  $GN$ s and more  $NN$ s on BPD-L. On average,  $GN$ s decrease by 23.07% and  $NN$ s increase by 71.98%. Average  $GR$  and  $NR$  also decrease on BPD-L. The increase of  $NN$ s occurs because larger inputs make instruction following harder: models tend to explain the program rather than executing the refactoring (e.g., Figure 2). CodeLlama:7b is the least robust with the least  $GN$ s (2.97%), and the most  $NN$ s (96.44%) on BPD-L. Its  $NR$ s decrease from 13.22% (BPD; best) to 0.59% (BPD-L; worst), showing poor robustness to larger inputs. Qwen2.5-coder:7b gives the most  $NR$ s on BPD-L (7.17%). We include results for the insert comment task in our website [21]. Similar to the refactoring tasks, all models produce less  $GN$ s on BPD-L than BPD, and more  $NN$ s (except GPT-4o-mini). CodeLlama:7b remains the least robust with the least  $GN$ s (1.00%) and the most  $NN$ s (98.56%).

**Finding 8:** Given larger programs (BPD-L), LLMs are less robust in refusing harmful code generation (less  $GN$ s) and ineffective in transformation (more  $NN$ s) with CodeLlama:7B having the largest decline in robustness.

6) *Impact of Harm Category Coverage:* To assess the impact of harm category coverage (defined in Def. 1), we conduct an ablation study of a harmful keyword dataset with lower coverage. Specifically, we use only the Weaponized Word (excluding HurtleX) as the source of harmful keywords with only 53.8% harm category coverage. For a fair comparison with the original 100-keyword dataset, we expand the Weaponized Word subset to the same size (100 keywords) following the same procedure in Section III-B1. The ablation results (in our website [21]) show that only 7 of the 13 harm categories are covered. With a lower coverage dataset, uncovered categories such as “doxing” and “self-harm” (marked as “N” in Table 2

TABLE IV: Effectiveness of LLMs given various program sizes in the two benign program datasets: BPD versus BPD-L.

LLM	GN (2)		GR (1)		NR (0)		NN (-1)	
	BPD	BPD-L	BPD	BPD-L	BPD	BPD-L	BPD	BPD-L
CodeGemma:7b	70.34	54.50(-22.52)	0.50	0.44(-12.00)	12.72	3.44(-72.96)	16.44	41.62(+153.16)
CodeLlama:7b	<b>38.13</b>	<b>2.97</b> (-92.21)	<b>0.16</b>	<b>0.00</b> (-100.00)	<b>13.22</b>	0.59(-95.54)	<b>48.50</b>	<b>96.44</b> (+98.85)
Deepseek-coder:6.7b	63.66	52.25(-17.92)	0.41	0.09(-78.05)	0.19	2.44(+1184.21)	35.75	45.22(+26.49)
Qwen2.5-coder:7b	71.84	68.45(-4.72)	0.22	0.16(-27.27)	5.91	<b>7.17</b> (+21.32)	22.03	24.23(+9.99)
GPT-4o-mini	85.66	75.41(-11.97)	1.78	1.91(+7.30)	5.41	6.78(+25.32)	7.16	15.91(+122.21)
Average	65.93	<b>50.72</b> (-23.07)	0.61	<b>0.52</b> (-14.75)	<b>7.49</b>	4.08(-45.53)	25.98	<b>44.68</b> (+71.98)

Each value in the BPD/BPD-L column is calculated as  $\frac{x}{y} \times 100\%$ , where  $x$  is the number of outputs with a given label for an LLM, and  $y$  is the total number of outputs. All experiments reported here are conducted on the refactoring tasks. Results for the insert comment tasks are provided in [21].

of [26]) are not exercised, showing the importance of using a high coverage dataset.

#### D. RQ4: Improve Content Moderation of Code LLMs

As shown in Section IV-A, content moderation in Code LLMs is often ineffective where harmful code is often generated (with or without warning), we propose to enhance the robustness of content moderation using a two-phase approach that performs content moderation before invoking a Code LLM. To achieve this, we leverage function calling [48], a commonly used mechanism in AI-assisted development that enables LLMs to interact with external tools. Specifically, we choose to enhance the content moderation capability of *Qwen2.5-coder:7b* because it has the highest number of “Pulls” on Ollama among the four evaluated Code LLMs [49], indicating its widespread adoption. Additionally, it is the only evaluated Code LLM on Ollama with the “tools” label, implying that the other evaluated Code LLMs lack function-calling (“tools”) support. By dynamically identifying user intent, the model can invoke predefined tools for specific tasks. In our implementation, we introduce a tool named `identify_harmful_keyword`, which is sent as a parameter when a request is made to *Qwen2.5-coder:7b*. The tool receives a keyword and performs an additional inference call to *Qwen2.5-coder:7b* to assess its harmfulness. When harmful content is suspected, the model autonomously invokes the tool with the keyword as input. Upon evaluation, if the keyword is deemed harmful, the model returns the response: “*The keyword [keyword] is harmful and inappropriate, I cannot assist with that.*” where *[keyword]* is replaced by the identified words. Conversely, if the keyword is determined to be non-harmful, the model proceeds with the code-related task. To address the non-mandatory tool invocation in Ollama, we introduce a retry mechanism with up to three attempts, improving moderation reliability while preserving model flexibility.

Table II shows the performance of *Qwen2.5-coder:7b* in harmful code generation before (*Qwen2.5-coder:7b*) and after our improvement (*Qwen2.5-coder:7b++*). With our improvement, the harmful code generated via refactoring without a warning message (*GN*) decreased from 71.84% to 49.44%, achieving a 31.18% reduction. Moreover, 34.50% of harmful code generation requests were successfully declined with warning messages (*NR*), reflecting a 483.76% improvement. However, the results for harmful comment insertion remained unchanged. This could be attributed to two factors: (1) *Qwen2.5-coder:7b* is specifically designed for code, making improvements more significant in code-related tasks than natu-

ral language, and (2) *NN* in *Qwen2.5-coder:7b* usually occurs when it outputs the same input program without giving any warning message indicating its refusal (low in explainability).

**Finding 9:** By introducing a function-calling-based content moderation mechanism, *Qwen2.5-coder:7b++* shows considerable improvement in mitigating harmful code generation (31.18% reduction in *GN* and 483.76% increase in *NR*).

#### V. RELATED WORK

**Evaluation of Code Models.** Prior evaluations on code models focus mainly on robustness [16], [50], [51] or attacks of code generation systems [52]–[54]. Our study differs by: (1) Prior approaches perturb source code or docstrings, whereas ours modifies only natural language instructions by constructing a benign program dataset for testing, transformation tools such as refactoring engines and Code LLMs, (2) our approach has a different testing goal than prior approaches—CHT injects harmful content into the prompts for coverage-based harmfulness testing instead of testing for robustness, and (3) we propose diversity-enhanced prompt synthesis that considers various refactoring types that may introduce harmful content. **Testing related to harmfulness.** Several approaches have been proposed for testing AI-based systems (e.g., question answering software [55], [56], sentiment analysis systems [57]–[59]), and GenAI systems [60]–[64]. Most testing approaches focus on identifying software discrimination across gender, ages, and races [65]–[71]. The work most closely related to our framework is the metamorphic testing of content moderation software (MTTM [6] for textual content and OASIS [7] for image content generation). Although CHT shares similar goals with these approaches, CHT differs in four key aspects: (1) CHT targets Code LLMs which take as inputs natural language instruction, and code written in programming language instead of textual/image content, (2) CHT uses coverage-based testing to improve harm category coverage instead of metamorphic testing, (3) CHT measures output damage instead of checking if the content moderation has been bypassed, (4) while the camel case conversion in CHT can be seen as a textual perturbation, it represents programming naming convention, and is different from the 11 perturbations in MTTM.

**Alignment of AI Systems.** Aligning with ethical values is important for developing responsible AI systems. This process includes data filtering [72]–[74], supervised fine-tuning [75], [76], and reinforcement learning from human feedback [77]–[79]. Several studies focus on the alignment of AI systems in terms of social bias [60], [80]–[82], specific ethical issues

(e.g., safety [61], [83], stereotypes, morality, and legality [62], [63]), adversarial prompts [84], [85], adversarial testing via red teaming [4], [5], [86], and “jailbreaking” [87]–[90]. Similar to these approaches, harmfulness testing aims to ensure the alignment of AI systems with respect to harmful content generation. Different from these approaches, harmfulness testing aims to identify harmful content generation in Code LLMs and access its output damage via coverage-based testing.

## VI. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

We discuss several key implications for future research:

**Harmfulness-aware name recommendation.** Our study revealed diverse types of transformations that can be used to introduce harmful content into code. These transformation either involves directly or indirectly selecting a identifier name or inserting code comments. Although there are many proposed approaches for identifier name recommendation [91]–[93], none of these approaches are “harmfulness-aware” (i.e., do not consider the possibility of choosing a harmful keyword as the name). Hence, our study aims to call for attention to consider the ethical aspect during identifier name suggestion.

**Code LLMs versus general LLM in harmful code generation.** Our evaluation of four Code LLMs and one general LLM (GPT-4o-mini) show that GPT-4o-mini generates the highest number of harmful code compared to other LLMs designed for code (Finding 6). This finding is somewhat surprising as OpenAI has recruited “red teaming” to conduct adversarial testing [4], [5], [86] but our evaluation shows that GPT-4o-mini is still prone to harmful code generation despite the ongoing manual testing effort. This shows that *an automated testing approach like CHT that identifies harmful content in auto-generated code is important* to ensure adequate testing.

**Systematic testing of harms.** As the first harmfulness testing framework that identifies harmful content in auto-generated code, CHT lays the foundation for systematic testing of harms. Particularly, the two components of CHT: (1) coverage-based harmful content dataset and (2) output damage measurement are the key enablers of a systematic testing approach. Notably, coverage-based harmful content dataset emphasizes the importance of a coverage-based approach to ensure that all the harm categories have been executed during the testing process (Finding 8). Meanwhile, output damage measurement highlights the importance of using a more fine-grained test oracle to check for the potential risks of harms that can be incurred by various types of generated outputs.

**Detected problems in LLMs.** Our output damage measurement that is more fine-grained than prior approaches (that check if content moderation has been bypassed [6], [7]) allows us to detect various problems in LLMs: (1) *GN* that represents bugs in content moderation for code (most frequently occurred in LLMs as shown in Finding 1), (2) *NN* that may indicate problems in performing the transformation, (3) *GR* that implies lenient code moderation that still generate harmful code. These bugs show the needs to (1) improve the robustness of content moderation of Code LLMs, and (2) enhance the program transformations capability.

**Responsible use of natural language in auto-generated code.** While prior study [1] observed that using harmful words in naming software artifacts as an unethical behavior, this paper revealed that there exist similar concerns on the responsible use of natural language in Code LLMs. By converting phrases into camel cases, Finding 9 shows that these harmful content is more likely to bypass the content moderation of LLMs. As there is recent trend of introducing programming education to young children [94] and using LLMs for programming education [95], our study calls for attention to *responsible use of natural language in auto-generated code*.

## VII. THREATS TO VALIDITY

**External.** Although there are other transformations (e.g., bug-fixing) that can be misused for injecting harmful content, our study mainly focuses on refactoring types in the online catalog. However, our study have identified 32 different refactoring types and emphasized on the importance of considering diverse transformations. Meanwhile, our findings may not generalize beyond Java as our benign program dataset only contains Java programs, and the camel case conversion is based on Java naming conventions. However, the idea of embedding harmful content in identifier names is general and can be easily adapted to other languages (e.g., `snake_case` for Python).

**Internal.** Our implementation and scripts may have bugs that can affect our results. To mitigate this threat, we make our dataset, source code and scripts publicly available.

**Conclusion.** Conclusion threats of our evaluation and study include subjectivity of manual analysis when answering *RQ0* and analyzing the output damage measurement. We mitigate the subjectivity of manual analysis by having two annotators independently labeled each refactoring type/output damage, and meet to resolve any disagreement.

## VIII. CONCLUSION

Harmful content embedded in program elements within source code may incur negative impact on mental health of software developers. To understand the program transformations that may be used to inject harmful content into auto-generated code, we conduct a preliminary study that revealed 32 transformations that can be used to inject harmful content in Code LLMs. Based on our study, we propose CHT, a novel coverage-based harmfulness testing framework tailored for Code LLMs. Our evaluations show that content moderation in LLM-based code generation systems is easy to bypass where LLMs tend to generate harmful words/phrases embedded within program elements without providing any warning message (65.93% in our evaluation). To enhance content moderation of Code LLMs, we proposed an approach that first performs content moderation by checking for harmful content before proceeding with code-related tasks. In future, we envision our testing framework being incorporated into Code LLMs to automatically identify harmful contents in code, and eliminate them via censorship.

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