



# A new novel method in Signature Matching area

**Presenter** 

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1 March 2017

#### Introduction





ACM/IEEE Symposium on Architectures for Networking and Communications Systems

#### Overview

Call for Papers (PDF) Call for Posters (PDF) Paper Submission Committees

**ANCS Email List** Past Events

#### **ANCS 2017 Conference**



The 13th ACM/IEEE Symposium on Architectures for Networking and Communications Systems (ANCS '17) will be held May 18-19 in Beijing, China.

ACM/IEEE ANCS is the premier forum for presenting and discussing original research that explores the relationship between the algorithms and architectures of data communication networks and the hardware and software elements from which these networks are built, including both experimental and theoretical analysis. To recognize and foster the increasing importance of research into the co-design of computer and network systems, the conference also places an emphasis on systems issues arising from the interaction of computer and network architectures

#### News

February 17, 2017 Call For Posters is online. Dec 17, 2016 Paper submission site is online. Oct 11, 2016 Call For Papers is online. Sep 30, 2016 ANCS 2017 website is online.

#### **Important Dates**

Papers - Abstract submission deadline January 7, 2017 (optional) Papers - Full paper submission deadline January 21, 2017 March 8, 2017 Papers - Notification of acceptance Papers - Camera-ready submission deadline April 1, 2017 March 20, 2017 Posters - Abstract submission deadline Posters - Notification of acceptance April 3, 2017 April 10, 2017 Posters - Camera-ready submission deadline

#### **Sponsors**













#### Contacts

Web Chair: Zhi Liu













O<sup>3</sup>FA: A Scalable Finite Automata-based Pattern-Matching Engine for Out-of-Order Deep Packet Inspection

### **Outline**




- Introduction to Signature Matching
- ☐ O³FA Design
  - Overview
  - Example
  - Optimization
  - Components
- Evaluation



# **Introduction to SM**

# **Signature Matching**





### **DFA vs NFA**



#### DFA Based

- Running Fast


#### NFA Based

- Running Awful
















- Pattern
  - *b*.\* *cde*
- Input packets
  - $\blacksquare$   $P_3$ : dead
  - $\blacksquare$   $P_1$ : caba
  - $\blacksquare$   $P_2$ : dcac






#### Pattern

- **■** *b*.\* *cde*
- Input packets
  - $\blacksquare$   $P_3$ : dead
  - $\blacksquare$   $P_1$ : caba
  - $\blacksquare$   $P_2$ : dcac




cabadcacdead





#### Pattern

- **■** *b*.\* *cde*
- Input packets
  - $\blacksquare$   $P_3$ : dead
  - $\blacksquare$   $P_1$ : caba
  - $\blacksquare$   $P_2$ : dcac







# O<sup>3</sup>FA Design

# O<sup>3</sup>FA overview



- Pattern
  - **■** *b*.\* *cde*
- Input packets
  - $\blacksquare$   $P_3$ : dead
  - $\blacksquare$   $P_1$ : caba
  - $\blacksquare$   $P_2$ : dcac



- Pattern
  - *b*.\* *cde*
- Input packets
  - $\blacksquare$   $P_3$ : dead
  - $\blacksquare$   $P_1$ : caba
  - $\blacksquare$   $P_2$ : dcac

- Observation 1
  - If a regular expression R is matched across a set of packets  $P_1,...,P_N$ , then
    - The suffix of P<sub>1</sub> must match a prefix of R
    - The prefix of  $P_N$  must match a suffix of R.



- Pattern
  - *b*.\* *cde*
- Input packets
  - $\blacksquare$   $P_3$ : dead
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  - $\blacksquare$   $P_2$ : dcac

#### Observation 1

- If a regular expression R is matched across a set of packets  $P_1, ..., P_N$ , then
  - The suffix of P<sub>1</sub> must match a prefix of R
  - The prefix of  $P_N$  must match a suffix of R.
- ✓ Detect suffix de in  $P_3$ .
- $\checkmark$  Detect prefix **ba** in P<sub>1</sub>.
- $\checkmark$  Concatenate detected segments with P<sub>2</sub>.

badcacde



#### Observation 2

- Given a regular expression R in the form sp1.\*sp2 and an input stream of the form M1M\*M2, where M1 matches sp1 and M2 matches sp2,
  - any modifications to I that substitutes M\* with a shorter segment will not affect the match outcome.



- Pattern
  - *b.\* cde*
- Input packets
  - $\blacksquare$   $P_{10}$ : dead
  - $\blacksquare$   $P_1$ : caba
  - $\blacksquare$   $P_3, P_4, P_5, P_6, P_7, P_8, P_9$
  - $\blacksquare$   $P_2$ : dcac



#### Pattern

■ *b.\* cde* 

#### Input packets

- $\blacksquare$   $P_{10}$ : dead
- $\blacksquare$   $P_1$ : caba
- $\blacksquare$   $P_3, P_4, P_5, P_6, P_7, P_8, P_9$
- $\blacksquare$   $P_2$ : dcac

Suffix( $P_1$ ) |  $P_2$  | prefix( $P_{10}$ )

badcacde

### O<sup>3</sup>FA overview



- One or more DFAs
- Supporting FAs
  - Prefix FAs
  - Suffix FAs

# O<sup>3</sup>FA example



#### abc.\*def, ghk

- 1. Creating sub-patterns
  - .\*abc.\*
  - .\*def.\*
  - .\*ghk

# O<sup>3</sup>FA example – contd.



#### 2. Creating prefix and suffix sets

- .\*abc.\*
  - prefix: {.\*abc.\*, .\*abc, .\*ab, .\*a}
  - Suffix: {.\*abc.\*, abc.\*, bc.\*, c.\*}
- .\*def.\*
  - prefix: {.\*def.\*,.\*def, .\*de, .\*d}
  - Suffix: {.\*def.\*, def.\*, ef.\*, f.\*}
- .\*ghk
  - prefix: {.\*ghk, .\*gh, .\*g}
  - Suffix: {.\*ghk, ghk, hk, k}

**NSLab** 






- Prefix Set: {.\*abc.\*, .\*abc, .\*ab, .\*a, .\*def.\*, .\*def, .\*de, .\*d, .\*ghk, .\*gh, .\*g}
- Suffix Set: {.\*abc.\*, abc.\*, bc.\*, c.\*, .\*def.\*, def.\*, ef.\*, f.\*, .\*ghk, ghk, hk, k}

# O<sup>3</sup>FA example – contd.



- Prefix Set: {.\*abc.\*, .\*abc, .\*ab, .\*a, .\*def.\*, .\*def, .\*de, .\*d, .\*ghk, .\*gh, .\*g}
- Suffix Set: {.\*abc.\*, abc.\*, bc.\*, c.\*, .\*def.\*, def.\*, ef.\*, f.\*, .\*ghk, ghk, hk, k}



- Prefix Set: {.\*abc.\*, .\*abc, .\*ab, .\*a, .\*def.\*, .\*def, .\*de, .\*d, .\*ghk, .\*gh, .\*g}
- Suffix Set: {.\*abc, abc, bc, c, .\*def, def, ef, f, .\*ghk, ghk, hk, k}





- Prefix Set: {.\*abc.\*, .\*abc, .\*ab, .\*a, .\*def.\*, .\*def, .\*de, .\*d, .\*ghk, .\*gh, .\*g}
- Suffix Set: {.\*abc, abc, bc, c, .\*def, def, ef, f, .\*ghk, ghk, hk, k}

# O<sup>3</sup>FA example – contd.



#### 3. Simplifications in the prefix and suffix sets

- Prefix Set: {.\*abc.\*, .\*abc, .\*ab, .\*a, .\*def.\*, .\*def, .\*de, .\*d, .\*ghk, .\*gh, .\*g}
- Suffix Set: {.\*abc, abc, bc, c, .\*def, def, ef, f, .\*ghk, ghk, hk, k}

Removing similar elements



- Prefix Set: {.\*abc.\*, .\*ab, .\*a, .\*def.\*, .\*de, .\*d, .\*gh, .\*g}
- Suffix Set: {.\*abc, abc, bc, c, .\*def, def, ef, f, .\*ghk, ghk, hk, k}





- Prefix Set: {.\*abc.\*, .\*ab, .\*a, .\*def.\*, .\*de, .\*d, .\*gh, .\*g}
- Suffix Set: {.\*abc, abc, bc, c, .\*def, def, ef, f, .\*ghk, ghk, hk, k}

# O<sup>3</sup>FA example – contd.



#### 3. Simplifications in the prefix and suffix sets

- Prefix Set: {.\*abc.\*, .\*ab, .\*a, .\*def.\*, .\*de, .\*d, .\*gh, .\*g}
- Suffix Set: {.\*abc, abc, bc, c, .\*def, def, ef, f, .\*ghk, ghk, hk, k}

Removing elements that are covered by more general elements in the same set




- Prefix Set: {.\*abc.\*, .\*ab, .\*a, .\*def.\*, .\*de, .\*d, .\*gh, .\*g}
- Suffix Set: {.\*abc, bc, c, .\*def, ef, f, .\*ghk, hk, k}






#### abc.\*def, ghk








abc.\*def, ghk




# O<sup>3</sup>FA example – Prefix and Suffix FAs





abc.\*def, ghk




# O<sup>3</sup>FA example – Suffix FAs



$$P_3 = adef$$

 $P_1 = bhab$ 

 $P_2 = cegh$ 




# O<sup>3</sup>FA example – Suffix FAs



 $P_3 = adef$ 

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
# O<sup>3</sup>FA example – Suffix FAs



$$P_3 = adef$$

 $P_1 = bhab$ 

 $P_2 = cegh$ 







$$P_3 = adef$$

$$P_1 = bhab$$

$$P_2 = cegh$$

Suffix(P<sub>1</sub>) | P<sub>2</sub> | prefix(P<sub>3</sub>)

abceghdef

# O<sup>3</sup>FA: Optimizations




Using Index tags to avoid false positive

## O<sup>3</sup>FA: Optimizations



- Using Index tags to avoid false positive
- Compressing Suffix FAs



# O<sup>3</sup>FA: Optimizations



- Using Index tags to avoid false positive
- Compressing Suffix FAs
- Creating DFA instead of NFA from suffix or prefix sets



# **Evaluation**

#### **Experimental Setup**



- □ 176 backdoor rules
- ☐ 304 spyware rules
- □ 500 dot-star rules (5%, 10%, and 20%)
- 500 range-star rules (50% and 100%)
- 500 exact match rules

- 16 input streams
- Break 1MB input streams to 64KB packets
- Re-order packets

#### **Analysis Aspects**



- □ O³FA Memory Footprint
- Buffer Size Savings
- Memory Bandwidth Overhead
- Traversal Overhead


# O<sup>3</sup>FA Memory Footprint



	FA Kernel							
Dataset	Regular	· multi-DFAs	Supporting-FAs					
Datasci	# of DFA	Memory Footprint	# of FA States	Memory Footprint				
Backdoor	8	60	4k	0.62				
Spyware	10	56	12k	1.35				
Dotstar0.05	15	26	26k	3.58				
Dotstar0.1	8	60	25k	3.12				
Dotstar0.2	14	100	23k	2.76				
Range0.5	1	5.6	24k	2.43				
Rangel	1	5.8	24k	2.05				
Exact-match	1	4.7	17k	1.92				


#### **Buffer Size Savings**





#### **Buffer Size Savings - Contd.**





■ opt. reassembly scheme k=2,s=1

O3FA engine k=4, s=1

SO3FA engine k=2, s=1

opt. reassembly scheme k=4,s=2

■opt. reassembly scheme k=4,s=1

Ø O3FA engine k=4, s=2

# **Memory Bandwidth Overhead**



Table 2. Ratio between the number of csNFA states traversed and the number of input characters processed (%)

Dataset	k=2, s=1				k=4, s=1				k=4, s=2			
	$P_{\rm M} = 0.35$	$P_{\rm M} = 0.55$	$P_{\rm M} = 0.75$	$P_{\rm M}$ =.95	$P_{M}=0.35$	$P_{\rm M} = 0.55$	$P_{\rm M} = 0.75$	$P_{\rm M}$ =0.95	$P_{\rm M} = 0.35$	$P_{\rm M} = 0.55$	$P_{\rm M} = 0.75$	$P_{\rm M} = 0.95$
Backdoor	0.0144	0.0202	0.0278	0.0349	0.0347	0.0337	0.0440	0.1010	0.0144	0.0202	0.0278	0.0349
Spyware	0.0590	0.1002	0.1163	0.1286	0.1158	0.1942	0.2188	0.1853	0.0590	0.1002	0.1163	0.1286
Dotstar0.05	0.0804	0.0838	0.1173	0.2595	0.1733	0.1394	0.1517	0.3927	0.0804	0.0838	0.1173	0.2595
Dotstar0.1	0.0526	0.0715	0.1054	0.2610	0.1129	0.1184	0.1701	0.3974	0.0526	0.0715	0.1054	0.2610
Dotstar0.2	0.0363	0.0611	0.1142	0.2977	0.0531	0.1112	0.1806	0.3622	0.0363	0.0611	0.1142	0.2977
Range0.5	0.0973	0.1015	0.2170	0.2238	0.1839	0.1865	0.3488	0.3831	0.0973	0.1015	0.2170	0.2238
Rangel	0.0638	0.1180	0.2181	0.3927	0.1697	0.1910	0.3319	0.6929	0.0638	0.1180	0.2181	0.3927
E-M	0.0391	0.0627	0.1460	0.3140	0.1407	0.1395	0.1959	0.4374	0.0391	0.0627	0.1460	0.3140

#### **Traversal Overhead**



#### Ratio between Number of extra character processed and the size of the input stream

Dataset	k=2, s=1				k=4, s=1				k=4, s=2			
	$P_{\rm M} = 0.35$	$P_{\rm M} = 0.55$	$P_{\rm M} = 0.75$	$P_{\rm M} = 0.95$	$P_{\rm M} = 0.35$	$P_{\rm M} = 0.55$	$P_{\rm M} = 0.75$	$P_{\rm M} = 0.95$	$P_{\rm M} = 0.35$	$P_{\rm M} = 0.55$	$P_{\rm M} = 0.75$	$P_{\rm M} = 0.95$
Backdoor	0.0114	0.0102	0.0346	0.3277	0.0211	0.0139	0.0732	0.5140	0.0119	0.0076	0.0288	0.3376
Spyware	0.0059	0.0058	0.1333	2.4362	0.0101	0.0090	0.2635	3.6701	0.0057	0.0049	0.0753	2.4427
Dotstar0.05	0.0103	0.0076	0.2645	1.0132	0.0220	0.0389	0.4492	1.5218	0.0134	0.0221	0.2679	1.0135
Dotstar0.1	0.0041	0.0129	0.0116	2.2671	0.0120	0.0304	0.0183	3.3866	0.0073	0.0136	0.0111	2.2464
Dotstar0.2	0.0083	0.0092	0.0160	3.4655	0.0164	0.0173	0.0225	5.2268	0.0098	0.0101	0.0112	3.4838
Range0.5	0.0007	0.0011	0.0032	0.0137	0.0017	0.0020	0.0054	0.0214	0.0009	0.0012	0.0033	0.0128
Rangel	0.0006	0.0011	0.0033	0.0123	0.0014	0.0020	0.0051	0.0153	0.0008	0.0012	0.0033	0.0102
E-M	0.0006	0.0011	0.0033	0.0168	0.0014	0.0022	0.0054	0.0214	0.0008	0.0012	0.0033	0.0159

### **Summary & Discussion**



- O³FA memory footprint is less than 100MB
- O<sup>3</sup>FA state buffers can be 20x 4000x smaller
- O<sup>3</sup>FA bandwidth is linear in the number of incoming characters
- □ O³FA traversal efficiency is comparable to that of conventional flow reassembly methods

- Supports only variable length operators
  - .\*, C\*, [C<sub>i</sub>, C<sub>j</sub>]\*, .+, C+, ...





#### Thanks for your attention!

