

Advanced Security for Systems Engineering WS12


Security in der Praxis - Machine Readable Travel Documents

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- Security
- Machine Readable Travel Documents - Ecosystem
- ePass - Technology
- Security features
- Interchange & Future
- Challenges & Myths

- security - what is it?
 - consists of multiple definitions
 - information security, it-security, data security/privacy, physical security, etc...
- security architecture
 - structure and planning of the concept and design
 - incorporate different security domains
 - key facts
 - requirements
 - framework
 - changes & continuous improvement


- core principles
 - confidentiality
 - integrity
 - availability
- enhancements
 - authenticity
 - non-repudiation
- all in one vs. discrete and individual
 - trade-offs **will** occur
 - business requirements



- plenty of possibilities
 - need to know
 - least privilege
 - least functionality
 - separation of duties
 - rights and permissions
 - dac - mac - ndac (rbac, orcon, drm, et al)
 - k.i.s.s.
 - psychology

- considerations
 - holistic security analysis
 - search for weakest link
 - end to end perspective
 - maintenance
 - software vs. hardware
 - usability & transparency
 - different views
 - operations
 - systems
 - technical

- considerations
 - attacks
 - vectors
 - surface
 - motivation
- layered security
 - combination of different and independent elements, modules, domains
 - meshing and covering of controls
 - mixture of software, hardware, people
 - risk acceptance



- ecosystem
 - subject - document holder
 - object - id
 - token - document
 - front-end
 - inspection systems
 - border controls
 - backend
 - public key infrastructure(s)
 - databases
 - international interoperability

Machine Readable Travel Documents

- id
 - name
 - biometric data
 - face
 - fingerprint(s)
- goal
 - verifying identity of document holder
 - providing authenticity of document


- austrian passport since june 2006 with Chip
 - since march 2009 issuance of 2nd generation
- profile:
 - smart card chip (ICC) / NXP 80KB
 - smart card operating system (STARCOS)
 - passport application ICAO specification (Doc 9303)
 - contact less communication via RFID

- radio frequency identification (RFID)
 - original purpose: automatic identification and location by tags/transponder
 - active / passive tags
 - development since WWII
 - transmission of information cleartext
 - machine readable travel documents (MRTDs)
 - ISO 14443
 - range of active communication
 - nominal / within lab environment: 0 – 1m
 - passport chip: ~10cm

- hardware
 - chip-design per se
 - internal bus system
 - no contact/listening/modification from external
 - scrambling of bus informationen
 - shielding against electrical, optical and thermal interference
 - active sensors
 - self destruction on breach
 - internal checksum and signature calculations
 - common criteria eal 5+

- smart card chip operating system
 - closely incorporated with hardware
 - functionality comparable to personal computer
 - kernel, memory management, security manager
 - master file, dedicated files, elementary files
 - common criteria eal 4+ (including special enhancements)
 - communication with OS by using ISO command set
 - „application protocol data unit“ (APDU) the only channel
 - ISO 7816-x
 - protected transmission by encryption (“encAPDU”)


Security features - Chip | encAPDU



„Application Interface for smart cards used as Secure Signature Creation Devices - Part 1: Basic requirements“
cwa14890-01-2004-Mar.pdf

- basic access control (BAC)
 - authentication between MRTD and reader (inspection system)
 - challenge response
 - initiating and establishing secure messaging
 - key derivation based on machine readable zone (MRZ)
 - document number
 - birth date
 - validity date
 - secure messaging algorithmus: 3DES | 112bit (!)

- passive authentication (PA)
 - protection of integrity
 - digital signature of complete content
 - prerequisite: national public key infrastructure
 - Country Signing Certificate Authority (3072/4096Bit)
 - Document Signer (2048/3072Bit)
 - mandatory
 - saved in Document Security Object (EF.SOD)
- problem: chip substitution




*„Specifications for Electronically Enabled Passports with Biometric Identification Capability“
ICAO DOC 9303 Part 1 Volume 2*

- active authentication (AA)
 - protection against chip-substitution
 - challenge response
 - additional asymmetrical keypair on chip
 - private key only known to chip
 - public key accesible (DGI5)
 - rsa 1024 bit
 - only “1st Generation“ of austrian passports (pre-fingerprint/eac)

- extended access control (EAC)
 - protection of sensitive biometric data (fingerprint, iris, et al)
 - fine grained control of access
 - two protocols
 - chip authentication
 - terminal authentication
 - prerequisite: public key infrastructure
 - independent of CSCA
 - multiple tiers
 - country verifying certificate authority (CVCA)
 - document verifier (DV)
 - inspection system (IS)

Security features - Software | EAC



Arrows denote certification.


„Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents – Extended Access Control (EAC)“

Technical Guideline TR-03110

- EAC – chip authentication (CA)
 - establishing a strong cryptographic channel between chip and reader
 - detection of chip substitution
 - elliptic curve diffie-hellman
 - 224/256bit keysize for dh-handshake
 - 3DES | 168 bit session key

- EAC – terminal authentication (TA)
 - authentication providing access for sensitive data
 - inspection system must provide its authenticity
 - reading device using a terminal certificate
 - reading device must provide whole certificate chain towards passport chip
 - MRTD-chip validates certificate chain
 - challenge-response identification of reading device
 - control matrix of which data can be accessed (rbac)

Security features - Software | Workflow




„Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents – Extended Access Control (EAC)“
 Technical Guideline TR-03110

- certificate interchange
 - international
 - ICAO public key directory (PKD)
 - between european states
 - establishment of single point of contact (SPOC)
 - web service for communication between SPOCs
- future security features
 - password based authentication encryption (PACE)
 - supplemental access control (SAC)
 - terminal authentication as first step
 - only authorized readers can communicate with chip

- challenges
 - precise implementation necessary
 - *“The future of digital systems is complexity, and complexity is the worst enemy of security.”*
 - „stick to the standards“ – no room for individuality or errors (see examples)
- examples
 - JPEG2000 buffer overflow
 - <http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/08/epassport>
 - „elvis passport“
 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0u4pg_XwNk8

Challenges & Myths



- random serial number tracking
 - „A Traceability Attack Against e-Passports“
 - <http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~tpc/Papers/PassportTrace.pdf>
- measurement of radiation of RFID systems (MARS)
 - https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/ElekAusweise/RFID/Mars_Teilbericht_ITheorie_pdf.pdf?__blob=publicationFile

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Thank you!

<http://security.inso.tuwien.ac.at/advsecsyseng-ws2012/>