

A Contraction for Sovereign Debt Models

Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador
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- The Uniqueness of Markov equilibria in [Eaton and Gersovitz \(1981\)](#)
- [Auclert and Rognlie \(2016\)](#) proves it by contradiction
- Challenge: Bellman operator is not a contraction mapping
(with constant $\beta < 1$)
- Contribution: 'Inverse of value function' is the fp of a contraction.

Key Idea

- Initial Problem: (not contraction)
Given a debt level, the government maximizes its utility

$$v(b) = \max\{v_d, v_r(b)\}$$

- Dual Problem: (contraction)
Given an at least utility level of government, what is the maximum debt value

$$b(v_r) = \max \dots$$

Whether Default

- Given exogenous state s and a debt level b
- The value function of the government is

$$v(s, b) = \max \{\text{Default}, \text{Not Default}\}$$

- Default: can never borrow from or lend to the market
- Default = $v_d(s)$
(solution to a pure optimal saving model)
- Not Default: repay the debt b , and decide the next period b'

Continuation Value

$$v_r(s, b) = \max_{(c, b') \in \Gamma(s, b)} \left\{ u(c) + \beta \sum_{s'} \max\{v_d(s'), v_r(s', b')\} P(s, s') \right\}$$

- today's action $b' =$ tomorrow's debt level b'
- Q: What is $\Gamma(s, b)$

Feasible Correspondence

$$v_r(s, b) = \max_{(c, b') \in \Gamma(s, b)} \left\{ u(c) + \beta \sum_{s'} \max\{v_d(s'), v_r(s', b')\} P(s, s') \right\}$$

$$\Gamma(s, b) := \{(c, b') \in \mathbb{R}_+ \times \mathbb{R} : y(s) - b - c + q(s, b')b' \geq 0\}$$

- income - repayment - consumption + **'do activity in market'** ≥ 0
- $b' > 0$: borrow money from market; $b' \leq 0$: invest in the market
- $q(s, b')$: price: present value of tomorrow's 1 dollar
- Q: What is $q(s, b')$ of interest

Markov Equilibrium

$$v_r(s, b) = \max_{(c, b') \in \Gamma(s, b)} \left\{ u(c) + \beta \sum_{s'} \max\{v_d(s'), v_r(s', b')\} P(s, s') \right\}$$

$$\Gamma(s, b) := \{(c, b') \in \mathbb{R}_+ \times \mathbb{R} : y(s) - b - c + q(s, b') b' \geq 0\}$$

$$q(s, b') = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{R}, & b' \leq 0 \\ \frac{1}{R} \sum_{s'} \mathbb{1}\{v_r(s', b') \geq v_d(s')\} P(s, s'), & b' > 0 \end{cases}$$

Issues

$$v_r(s, b) = \max_{(c, b') \in \Gamma(s, b)} \left\{ u(c) + \beta \sum_{s'} \max\{v_d(s'), v_r(s', b')\} P(s, s') \right\}$$

$$\Gamma(s, b) := \{(c, b') \in \mathbb{R}_+ \times \mathbb{R} : y(s) - b + q(s, b')b' \geq c\}$$

$$q(s, b') = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{R}, & b' \leq 0 \\ \frac{1}{R} \sum_{s'} \mathbb{1}\{v_r(s', b') \geq v_d(s')\} P(s, s'), & b' > 0 \end{cases}$$

- **Generally, it is not a contraction**
- (Challenge to work with ADP: T_σ depends on v)



Properties

$$v_r(s, \textcolor{red}{b}) = \max_{(c, b') \in \Gamma(s, b)} \left\{ u(c) + \beta \sum_{s'} \max\{v_d(s'), v_r(s', b')\} P(s, s') \right\}$$

$$\Gamma(s, b) := \{(c, b') \in \mathbb{R}_+ \times \mathbb{R} : y(s) - \textcolor{red}{b} + q(s, b')b' \geq c\}$$

- $v_r(s, b)$ is strictly decreasing in b
- The maximizer (c, b') satisfies

$$b = y(s) - c + q(s, b')b'$$



Dual Problem

- The inverse function is

$$B(s, v) = \max_{c, b'} \{y(s) - c + q(s, b')b'\}$$

subject to

$$v \leq u(c) + \beta \sum_{s'} \max \{v_r(s', b'), v_d(s')\} P(s, s')$$

Bellman operator

- Given $b' = B(s', w(s'))$, we have $v_r(s', b') = w(s')$

$$(Tb)(s, v) = \max_{c, b', \{w(s')\}} \{y(s) - c + q(s, b')b'\}$$

subject to

$$v \leq u(c) + \beta \sum_{s'} \max \{w(s'), v_d(s')\} P(s, s')$$

$$b' \leq b(s', w(s')) \text{ for } s' \text{ with } w(s') \geq v_d(s')$$

where

$$q(s, b') = R^{-1} \left[\mathbb{1}\{b' \leq 0\} + \mathbb{1}\{b' > 0\} \sum_{s'} \mathbb{1}\{w(s') \geq v_d(s')\} P(s, s') \right]$$

Contraction

- Let S be finite and $V \subset \mathbb{R}$ be compact
- Let $W := b(S \times V)$
- With some assumptions, they show
 - $TW \subset W$
 - T is order preserving
 - $T[(b + \lambda)](s, v) \leq (Tb)(s, v) + R^{-1}\lambda$ for any $\lambda \geq 0$

AUCLERT, A. AND M. ROGNLIE (2016): “Unique equilibrium in the Eaton–Gersovitz model of sovereign debt,” *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 84, 134–146.

EATON, J. AND M. GERSOVITZ (1981): “Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis,” *The Review of Economic Studies*, 48, 289–309.