Introducing the RefCFRI: A Continuous Indicator Comparing Referendum Campaign Finance Regulation in 143 Countries

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Data Availability Statement

The dataset on referendum political finance regimes generated and analyzed during the current study is available in the OpenICPSR repository at the following DOI:

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Abstract

As referendums become an increasingly defining feature of global democratic practice, a normative debate has centred around the importance of campaign finance regulations in ensuring fair and democratic procedures that avoid biasing the outcome of a vote. Several studies have attempted to understand how different countries approach this issue as it sheds light on the origins and impact of varied regulatory approaches, as well as whether they reach their intended policy goals. However, existing efforts lack scope, depth and methodological rigor. This study attempts to address these limitations and provide a global, inclusive and methodologically robust comparative measure of referendum political finance regimes. As such, it focuses on the design and compilation of the Referendum Campaign Finance Regulation Index (RefCFRI). We depart from a novel dataset detailing the presence/absence of 39 referendum campaign finance regulations in 143 countries. Using multiple correspondence analysis (MCA), we deliver empirical evidence for the existence of a singular dimension along which countries can be compared, namely the "level of regulation". This dimension effectively forms the RefCFRI, a continuous indicator with potential to contribute to political finance and referendum studies as it can be leveraged as both a predictor and an outcome variable in statistical analysis.

Keywords; political finance, direct democracy, comparative politics, referendum, regulation

Word Count: 4973

1. Introduction

Referendums have become a defining, but often polarizing feature of contemporary democratic practice (Qvortrup 2018: 264-266). As such, scholars have emphasised the importance of regulating referendum processes, arguing that it advances the ideal of political participation by addressing inherent inequalities in the democratic process, thus delivering so-called ‘regulated equality’ (Reidy and Suiter 2015: 161). Campaign finance rules, specifically, are argued to increase voter competence (Binder 2015; Garrett and Smith 2005), create a level playing field between the two sides of the referendum (Binder 2015; Kildea 2016) and battle corruption (Norris and Van Es 2016: 3-4). In other words, they create the conditions for fair and democratic procedures that avoid biasing the result of the vote. Several studies have attempted to understand how different countries approach this issue, but they are often ‘descriptive and dominated by national details’ (Reidy and Suiter 2015: 160). Instead, a more comparative perspective can lead to ‘greater understanding of the origins and impact of varied regulatory approaches’ (Horncastle 2022: 1), while it can also expose whether they deliver on their envisioned policy goals (Norris and van Es 2016: 6). However, current comparative studies (Qvortrup 2021; Reidy and Suiter 2015; Van Klingeren et al. 2015; Zellweger, Serdült and Renfer 2010) lack depth, scope, and methodological rigor.

This research note sets out to bridge these limitations, firstly by building a novel dataset detailing the present-day financing rules in 143 countries that allow for national referendums. Showing the absence or presence of 39 types of regulations from all facets of political finance, including those governing political parties and other actors, this dataset is the first readily available and detailed overview of global variation in referendum campaign finance regulations. The dataset then forms the basis of a continuous indicator for the level of regulation in a country, the Referendum Campaign Finance Regulation Index (RefCFRI). We argue that the dataset and the resulting measure can help foster an understanding of the origins of varying regulatory frameworks, whilst also paving the way towards recognizing their political impact (Reidy and Suiter 2015: 160) and their effects on voters. In what follows, we first discuss the limitations of previous attempts at comparing referendum political finance regimes. The second section details the construction of our dataset, as well as how we use multiple correspondence analysis to reduce dimensions and extract the RefCFRI.

Our concluding section provides reflections on the uses of the index for future research, as well as its own limitations.

2. Previous Work and Limitations

Zellweger, Serdült and Renfer (2010) is the earliest attempt to compile cross-national data (Europe and South America) on campaign finance regulations, or the ‘political finance regimes’ (Norris and van Es 2016) for referendums. They classify countries into four types: those without campaign finance rules, those prohibiting the use of public funds for campaigning, those providing non-financial support for campaigners, and those granting direct financial aid. Van Klingeren et al. (2015) provide a similar analysis on EU Member States, identifying three clusters: countries with specific regulations for public funding (where the general party funding rules apply), those distributing public funding on an *ad hoc* basis and those prohibiting public funding. More recently, Qvortrup (2021: 175) developed an Index of Referendum Regulation (IRR) based on an expert survey and primary sources, which takes into account campaign spending limits and public funding provisions for 30 countries. Countries receive a score out of five based on whether or not these and other types of regulations are present for referendums. Finally, Reidy and Suiter (2015) designed an additive, unweighted index (0-20) based on several sub-indicators focusing on different aspects of referendum campaign regulations in OECD member states. These are rules dealing with campaign participation, communication, finance (i.e. specific measures concerning spending, transparency, public and private funding for both parties and civil society groups), and the overseeing body.

However, these attempts at comparing national referendum campaign finance regimes are deficient from a methodological point of view. All studies are based on a limited sample, and, in the case of Zellweger, Serdült and Renfer (2010) and Van Klingeren et al. (2015), the focus is solely on a single aspect of referendum campaign finance, namely public funding. Qvortrup (2021) only adds campaign spending, and, similar to Reidy and Suiter (2015), measures levels of regulation based on additive indices. This treats all regulations equally with regards to their contribution to the overall system; a potentially problematic assumption. In what follows, we detail how our study attempts to bridge these limitations by applying multiple correspondence analysis to a novel dataset of referendum regulations. This way, we develop a globally representative and methodologically robust comparative measure, inclusive of all aspects of referendum political finance regulation.

3. Compiling the RefCFRI

In order to explore cross-national variation in global referendum political finance regimes, we develop a new dataset similar to International IDEA's Political Finance Database (IDEA-PFD), which collects data on 58 regulations for 180 countries (IDEA, n.d.). We consider "referendums" as all direct democratic instruments that require the electorate to vote on a specific question/legislation/policy decision. This includes votes mandated by the constitution, optional referendums initiated by the executive or the legislature, or citizen initiatives. It excludes recall (i.e. the removal of an official from office) or legislative/agenda initiatives (the placement of a specific topic on the legislative agenda) that do not require a popular vote. Our case selection consist of UN-members where a) the legislative framework (constitution or other piece of legislation) allows for the organisation of national referendums, or b) that have organised an *ad hoc* referendum over the last 50 years. This allows us to take into account countries such as Czechia, where referendums are not formally a part of the political constellation but which did organise a vote on EU membership in 2003.

Several cases had to be omitted from the sample due to difficult internal situations, such as ongoing civil conflict (Somalia) and sovereignty disputes (Cyprus). Afghanistan was also left out of the study, following the transition to Taliban leadership in 2021. Additionally, we excluded North Macedonia due to uncertainty on which regulations and rules actually apply (see ODIHR 2019). Finally, several cases showed evidence of having referendum campaign finance regulations, but the original legislative sources were unavailable, making it difficult to present a complete picture. This was the case for Chad, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, Honduras and Qatar. This resulted in a sample of 143 countries: 44 from Africa, 27 from Asia, 36 from Europe, 15 from North America, 11 from Oceania and 10 from South America.

3.1 Data Collection

To examine cross-national variation on regulatory regimes in our sample, we devised 39 questions concerning the presence/absence of specific regulations (see Table 1). These questions largely follow the questionnaire that forms the foundation of the IDEA-PFD.

As such, they cover all areas of political finance while also taking into account regulations regarding social and other online media advertising. Yet, there are some key deviations. For one, our questions emphasize the difference between parties and other (non-party) actors (instead of between parties and candidates), as these are the central players when it comes to referendum campaigns. When deemed relevant, questions are repeated for both types; for instance, the question on whether spending limits exist in a specific country is asked for parties (LIMSPENDPARTY) as well as *other actors* (LIMSPENDOTHER). In the case of the latter, we purposedly use a broad delineation to capture the wide variety of legal and natural persons that can get involved in referendum campaigns (corporations, associations, (groups of) citizens, NGO's, …). The second deviation takes into account the fact that some countries might have restrictions on the types of actors, or even parties, that are allowed to campaign by including the questions REGPARTY, REGREQPARTY, REGOTHER and REGREQOTHER.

[Table 1]

We answered these questions for each country in our sample with information collected through desk research from primary sources, i.e. the relevant legislation as well as regulations set out by the respective bodies governing referendums. As will be discussed, both provisions applying specifically for referendums as well as broader regulations on campaign finance in general offered relevant information that we used to answer our questions. This distinction informed how we dealt with missing data; for the former, it resulted in omission of the respective case, as discussed above. If primary sources were not available for the wider political finance regulations, we relied on secondary material such as the IDEA-PFD or reports from the Venice Commission. As those regulations have been studied more extensively than the referendum-specific ones, these secondary sources are more reliable. All sources were consulted in their most up-to-date version between January-April 2024, and the collected data was cross-checked amongst the authors to ensure maximum internal validity.

Two additional aspects related to the data collection must be highlighted. Firstly, few countries have a specific regulatory framework governing referendum campaigns, and even less have referendum campaign finance *fully* governed by a single piece of legislation written specifically for referendums[1]. Instead, most cases have what we termed a *hybrid regime* combinin provisions written for referendums with more general political finance legislation. For instance, in Azerbaijan, the Election Code has provisions specifically aimed at regulating nearly all aspects of referendum campaign finance. However, when it comes to private and public funding of parties, the general Law on Political Parties applies. A third category are countries where legislation explicitly states that referendum campaign finance is *fully governed by (aspects of) general political finance regulation*. In France, the Electoral Code stipulates in Article L558-46 that when it comes to referendums, the regulations governing candidates in traditional elections apply, but that it is necessary to read ‘party’ or ‘group entitled to participate in the campaign’ instead of ‘candidate’ or ‘list of candidates’.

A final category are countries without general provisions mentioning the financing of referendum campaigns, neither specifically nor in terms of them being governed by electoral regulations. For these cases, we checked whether the latest referendum organised in that country had any *ad hoc* campaign finance regulations applying only to that vote and treated those as the general regime for that country. While there is no guarantee that future referendums will be regulated in exactly the same way, it is likely that the campaign finance regime will be relatively similar. Several countries did not have such *ad hoc* regulation, and instead had the aforementioned general provisions that cover some aspects of political finance, but these were in no way tied to referendum campaigns. For instance, parties in Ivory Coast receive general public funding, are required to report their general yearly accounts, and are prohibited to accept donations from foreign interests based on Law 2004/494. Others, like Antigua and Barbuda, Cuba, or Vanuatu, have no provisions on political finance whatsoever.

A second aspect is that as we collected the data, we continuously checked whether a country that allowed for multiple types of direct democratic votes also had

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[1] Countries like Albania, where the Electoral Code states that its provisions also apply to referendums (Art 1.1), are not classified in this category since these provisions apply to elections *and* referendums. This is different from, for instance, the United Kingdom, where referendum-specific regulations are in the same piece of legislation as election provisions but formulated in a separate scheme.

separate regimes for these types. In the end, this was only the case in Brazil. Here, "referendums" (used to ratify or reject a specific legislative or administrative act) are regulated *ad hoc*, while "plebiscites" (performed before an act passes through parliament), according to Art. 7 of Superior Electoral Court Resolution 23,385 of 16/08/2012, are regulated by Law 9,504 of 30/09/1997, which sets out the standards for elections. We initially set out to split these types up into separate cases, which would have created two entries in our dataset: one for Brazilian referendums and one for Brazilian plebiscites. However, in the case of the former, we encountered data availability issues in that the relevant *ad hoc* regulations could not be located. We therefore only included the regime governing Brazilian plebiscites in our sample.

3.2 Coding

In order to make the data more readily comparable, we created 40 nominally coded variables[2], 39 of which correspond to the questions indicating the presence/absence of specific regulations. Coding was an inductive process; after an initial coding effort, we evaluated categories assigned to each variable and made changes so that coding was more nuanced and would better reflect reality. As during the general data collection, coding was cross-checked amongst authors. In what follows, we discuss these changes and go over some additional aspects of the coding.

35 of the variables are binary, taking either *yes* or *no* as values. Four variables have an additional coding category, a first one being PUBFUNDPARTY. This variable receives a *yes* only when extra funds are made available specifically for the referendum campaigns. When there is general public funding for parties, the variable is coded as *general*. The same strategy was used for FINREPPARTY; the variable takes *yes* when parties need to report specifically on said finances, while it takes *general* if parties need to report on their finances more generally (f.i. through annual statements). Similarly, MONITORBODY is coded as *yes* if there is a dedicated body that monitors whether the financial regulations are being followed. If, instead, the monitoring body is a country's Electoral Commission, for instance, we code the variable as *general* as in this case, these bodies have functions that expand beyond the context of referendums.

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[2] For categories and distribution across our sample, see Supplementary Materials subsection B.1, "Variables of Dataset".

Finally, for FINREPDONOR, we observed that some countries only require this when donations are of a specific amount. In this case, we added the category *certain amount* as a third possible value. This leads us to the issue of additional, more detailed information on referendum political finance regimes such as the precise threshold for this or other variables such as spending or donation limits. While these limits are undoubtedly valuable information to take into account when describing a country's referendum campaign finance regulations, we deemed it not appropriate to include these in our final dataset. In the end, the goal of this exercise is to make a readily comparable overview of the regimes governing the political finance of referendums in different countries. Between diverging currencies and questions on how to classify the different levels of the strictness of limits, we concluded that including this information would go against our main research objective (see also Horncastle, 2022). Furthermore, we argue that indicating the presence of certain limits holds a lot of value, as it shows a willingness – or lack thereof – of law-makers in a specific country to intervene in the behaviour of campaigning actors.

Three variables need extra explanation, the first two being REGREQPARTY and REGREQOTHER. These variables are binary, but are dependent on the question if campaigning actors need to register with the monitoring body before they are allowed to participate in a referendum campaign (i.e. REGPARTY and REGOTHER). If the answer to these questions is no, the corresponding question on the requirements is coded as NA since it is no longer applicable. Finally, OTHERACTORS is a variable that does not correspond to a specific question; instead, it classifies the level of regulation of other actors in referendum campaigns. There are a number of variables in the dataset that deal with regulations specific for third-party actors, but in ten countries[3] they are banned from participating in referendum campaigns as a whole. Accurately capturing this in our dataset is difficult, since introducing a third category, *banned*, for those variables and those countries would result in a form of autocorrelation: countries who take this category in one variable, would automatically take this category for all other related variables. This would potentially distort the analysis. Instead, we added the

[3] The countries in question are Albania, Bahrain, Cameroon, the Dominican Republic, France, Guatemala, Mexico, Moldova, the Republic of Congo and Togo.

aforementioned variable, which distinguishes between four categories: *zero, low, high* and *banned*. It looks at the total number of regulations which a country has concerning other actors and classifies them based on their position compared to the average amount of said regulations for the sample amongst cases with at least one regulation on other actors (which is just under 5). If these actors are banned, the variable is coded as *banned*, and all other variables related to other actors are coded as NA. As we will discuss in the next section, this makes it so that these variables do not weigh on the indexing.

The final key consideration that we make emerges from the global nature of our sample, which comprises nations from all regions of the world. Within this, we include cases from the Pacific region, where party systems range from weakly organized to non-existent (Anckar and Anckar, 2000). To ensure comparability, we code all party related variables as 'no' in those nations where parties are not formally recognised. This follows the logic that, if parties *were to emerge* in these contexts, they would operate in an unregulated space, under the current financing regime. Based on these considerations, the pre-processing of data results in a comprehensive and novel dataset that provides a present-day snapshot of the political finance regimes governing referendum campaigns around the world.

3.3 Dimension Reduction: Multiple Correspondence Analysis

To move from a large amount of variables to an easily interpretable indicator, we use multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) as a feature extraction method that analyzes the patterns of relationships within unordered categorical data (Abdi and Valentin 2007). Graphically, it represents the association between the categories of the variables 'as dots in a space with very few dimensions', thus reducing the dimensionality among a large set of variables/cases into a number of 'factors' (Di Franco 2016: 1301). These factors allow for a characterization of the cases using the variables (Husson and Josse 2014: 165), therefore representing reality more accurately than the additive indices from previous studies.

All analyses are done in *RStudio* (version 2023.12.01).[4] As a consequence of OTHERACTORS, REGREQPARTY and REGREQOTHER, 350 missing values were introduced in the data, making up about 6% of total possible values. We use regularized iterative multiple correspondence analysis (RiMCA) as an imputation method for missing values, which ensures that the imputation is done with consideration of the relationships between cases, as well as variables (Josse et al. 2012). For this, we used the R-package *missMDA* (Josse and Husson 2016). The MCA is performed with R-Package *FactoMineR* (Lê, Josse and Husson 2008), where we correct eigenvalues and proportion of explained inertia for the extracted dimensions through the Greenacre method (Greenacre 2006: 67-69).[5] We determine the number of dimensions to retain for interpretation using the scree-test based on the screeplot for the explained variance of each dimension, which identifies 'trivial' factors as those that lie below the 'scree' on the plot, i.e. where the variance tends to taper off more gradually (Cattell 1966). Figure 1 shows a big drop-off from the first dimension to the second dimension, and only a minor inflection from the second to the third dimension. As such, we solely interpret the first dimension, which explains 81.3% of the variance in the MCA.

To understand what the dimension measures, we can look at the geometric plot of the MCA outcome, which are represented in a Euclidean space. Categories that are close together have a similar distribution and are more interdependent, while those far apart are highly dissimilar and more independent (Di Franco 2016: 1305). Figure 2 positions the different categories on the first two extracted dimensions, with the second one added for graphical representation purposes.[6] The first dimension clearly divides between all 'yes' categories (right) and 'no' categories (left), with the exception of the REGREQOTHER categories. The reason for this is unclear; potentially, the high amount of cases that take missing values on this variable (118) could be an explanation

[4] The codebook for the analysis is available in the Supplementary Materials, section A. "RStudio Codebook".

[5] Original MCA eigenvalues, the concrete application of the Greenacre correction and resulting values are available in the Supplementary Materials, Subsection B.2. "Greenacre Correction".

[6] The complete coordinates of all the categories are available in the Supplementary Materials, subsection B.3. "Full Coordinates Categories MCA".

in this regard. However, since these categories are both located close to the origin of the axis, they did not significantly contribute to the formation of the dimension (DiFranco 2016: 1305). In contrast, we can state that the absence of sanctions (furthest left category) and the presence of a ban on corporate donations for other actors (furthest right) are the most highly weighted categories in their respective direction. Indeed, no country in our sample is coded as having both categories.

Additionally, we see that the *General/Certain Amount* categories are closer to the origin of the first dimension than most of the other categories, which makes sense as they do not relate to referendums specifically. Accordingly, they make little contribution to the formation of the axis. Equally, the positioning of the categories for OTHERACTORS falls in line with our interpretation of the first dimension: *zero* is located on the left hand side, along with most of the no-categories, and as we move further right, we first encounter *low,* followed by *banned* and *high* respectively. This could be explained by the fact that when third party actors are banned, we can conceptualize this as a *yes* on the spending limit and private income regulations, but when these actors are instead highly regulated, it means that countries also provide regulations for transparency and public funding.

Figure 3 shows the coordinates of the countries in our sample on the first dimension, with cases positioned relative to their coding in the categories in the previous figure. The group of countries that share the lowest score on the dimension are all completely unregulated when it comes to referendum campaign finance. On the other side of the spectrum, Armenia and Liberia have over 30 of the studied regulations in place, the main difference between the two being that Armenia provides general public funding for parties as well as indirect funding. Both are also coded in the *high* category when it comes to OTHERACTORS. Thailand and Uruguay, the two countries in the middle as their score is closest to zero, have 14 and 15 regulations in place respectively. When it comes to comparing referendum political finance regulation in European countries, therefore, MCA has delivered empirical evidence for the existence of a singular dimension, namely "Level of Regulation": the higher the score (i.e. the coordinates) of a country on this dimension, the higher the level of regulation concerning referendum political finance in said country, and vice versa. The coordinates of a country on this dimension form a continuous indicator for the level of regulation, and make up our RefCFRI.[7]

4. Conclusion

As referendums become an increasingly defining feature of global democratic practice, a normative debate has centred around the importance of campaign finance regulations in ensuring fair and democratic procedures and unbiased outcomes. In this sense, cross-national understanding of variation in campaign finance regulations is vital, but existing attempts have lacked adequate scope and methodological rigor. This research note offers a first step towards addressing this gap by comparing the referendum political finance regimes of 143 countries through a novel dataset and the compilation of the RefCFRI, thus offering concrete contributions to political finance and referendum studies. Firstly, the dataset on which the RefCFRI is built is the most comprehensive and global overview of regulatory frameworks governing referendum campaign finance. It looks at the presence/absence of 39 specific regulations for almost all countries that allow for referendums, covering all aspects of political finance for both political parties and other actors. As such, it offers researchers and policy-makers interested in direct democracy a resource comparable to IDEA-PFD. A second contribution is the compilation of the RefCFRI itself, a single continuous indicator that shows how high or low the level of referendum campaign finance regulation is in a country. Past efforts to quantify and compare these regulatory frameworks relied on additive indices, therefore taking on the assumption that all types of regulations affect the stringency of the system to an equal level. Constructed via application of multiple correspondence analysis, the RefCFRI offers a more methodologically sound approach.

These strengths notwithstanding, there are two primary limits of our study. First, the dataset that we compiled excludes some variables that made cross-national comparison less viable, such as the exact thresholds for donation or spending limits. Second, our study provides no immediate insights into the *de facto* realities of referendum campaign finance. Despite this, our study has bridged numerous methodological gaps that previously existed in the budding field of referendum political

[7] The specific scores for each country are available in the Supplementary Materials, Subsection B.4. “RefCFRI”.

finance and, accordingly, provides a solid departure point for the development of future research into this underexplored topic. The RefCFRI should offer a crucial resource for the future development of theoretical works in this area, while also allowing for empirical testing of pre-existing theories in a large-N perspective. As the index takes the form of a continuous indicator with a normally distributed sample, it lends itself ideally for large-scale multivariate statistical analysis. Researchers may, for instance, use the RefCFRI as an outcome variable and examine causes of cross-national variation in levels of regulation. The index could also function as a predictor in statistical models, allowing for a better understanding of how variations in the regulatory framework affect the financial behaviour of campaigning actors that operate within them. This would allow policy-makers to examine which forms of regulation are most effective, and could also contribute to the normative debate on whether regulations actually achieve the aspired "regulated equality". Finally, researchers could replicate the same methodology in a time series analysis to capture how the political finance regimes have evolved over time, and to develop causal mechanisms in the study of legislative reform.

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Tables

Table 1. Questionnaire for data collection for referendum political finance regimes dataset.

Code	Question
Spending Limits	
LIMSPENDTYPE	Limits on what actors can spend money on?
LIMSPENDPARTY	Limits on spending political parties?
LIMSPENDOTHER	Limits on spending other actors?
LIMSPENDMEDIA	Limits on media advertising spending?
LIMSPENDONLINE	Limits on online media advertising spending?
RESTRONLINE	Other restrictions concerning online media advertising?
Public Funding	
PUBFUNDPARTY	Direct public funding to parties?
PUBFUNDOTHER	Direct public funding to other actors?
FREEMEDIAPARTY	Free or subsidized access to media for parties?
FREEMEDIAOTHER	Free or subsidized access to media for other actors?
INDIRPUBFUND	Any other form of indirect public funding?
Transparency	
FINREPPARTY	Parties have to report on their referendum campaign finances?
FINREPOTHER	Other actors have to report on their referendum campaign finances?
FINREPPUBLIC	Information made public?
FINREPDONOR	Actors have to reveal identity of donors?
FINREPINCOME	Reports have to include info on itemized income?
FINREPSPEND	Reports have to include info on itemized spending?
TRANSPONLINE	Additional provisions regarding online campaigning?
SANCTIONS	Sanctions provided for infractions?
MONITORBODY	Dedicated body that monitors whether regulations are followed?
REGPARTY	Parties need to register with a monitoring body before campaigning?
REGREQPARTY	If yes: parties need to fulfil specific requirements to be eligible?
REGOTHER	Other actors need to register with a monitoring body before campaigning?
REGREQOTHER	If yes: other actors need to fulfil specific requirements to be eligible?
Private Income	
DONFORPARTY	Ban on donations from foreign interests to pol. parties?
DONFOROTHER	Ban on donations from foreign interests to other actors?
DONCORPPARTY	Ban on corporate donations to pol. parties?
DONCORPOTHER	Ban on corporate donations to other actors?
DONTUPARTY	Ban on donations from trade unions to pol. parties?
DONTUOTHER	Ban on donations from trade unions to other actors?

DONGOVCONPARTY	Ban on donations from corporations with government contracts to political parties?
DONGOVCONOTHER	Ban on donations from corporations with government contracts to other actors?
DONGOVCORPPARTY	Ban on donations from corporations with partial government ownership to parties?
DONGOVCORPOTHER	Ban on donations from corporations with partial government ownership to other actors?
DONLIMPARTY	Limit on the amount a donor can contribute to a political party?
DONLIMOTHER	Limit on the amount a donor can contribute to other actor?
DONIKLIMPARTY	Limit on in-kind donations to political parties?
DONIKLIMOTHER	Limit on in-kind donations to other actors?
DONBANK	Donations go through the banking system?