Commitment-Schemes

Leonhard Applis

TH Nürnberg

20.12.2018

Table of Contents

Introduction



Figure: Kung Fu Hustle - Lollipop Girl

Plot Summary:

1. Villain destroys village and steals girls lollipop
2. Girls swears vengeance
3. Girl becomes Kung Fu - master
4. Girl finds the villain. Villain recognices her by the lollipop

Commitments

Basic-protocoll

- A **commits** to B
- B keeps commitment, unable to read or process it
- A reveals to B
- B can verify the commitment



Figure: Commitments

Attributes

1. **Binding:** The Values Alice put in the Commitment cannot be changed after B recieved it
2. **Hiding:** Bob cannot gain any information about the message from the commitment itself
3. **Viability:** If both parties follow the Protocoll, Bob is always able to recover the committed value

Additional for *real-life-applications*:

1. Bob's are able compare commitments
2. Commitments are *tradeable*

Applications

Challenge and Response
You can setup your own anonymus challenges, leaving a commitment at Bob's. If someone show's up saying he's Alice, Bob challenges to reveal the commitment.

JSON-Web-Tokens (JWT):
A payload (e.g. some account details) are encrypted to a commitment and passed to a third party.
You can verify yourself at the third-party revealing the commitment
this is done *automatic* via session or systemattributes

Table of Contents

1. Alice produces $h = Hash(m)$ and sends Bob h and $Hash$
2. Bob keeps h and $Hash$
3. Alice reveals herself by sending Bob m
4. Bob checks if $Hash(m) \equiv h$

Important: NEVER use actual important data as message, you send it as cleartext in Step 3.

Fullfillment of Attributes

Hiding: because of the Hash-functions **Pre-Image resistance**, it's nearly impossible to find the message m from the hash. This holds true for any Bob and any Eve.

Binding: because of the Hash-functions **collision-resistance**, it's nearly impossible to find another message m with the same hash.

Usually: Bob (and Eve) are not able to *guess* m from h and $Hash$

But: if the *plausible domain* of m is known, its possible for modern computers to brute force reveal your m

Example: Alice commits to Bob about the result of a soccer game Germany vs. Brazil.
Therefore she chooses a score of 0:7 and sends Bob $h = SHA_3(str(0:7))$ and the Hashfunction SHA_3
Eve catches the commitment and knows the context of the soccer game.
she can know try reasonable combinations of results from 0:0 up to 20:20.
She only needs to try $20 \cdot 20 = 400$ results

Improved Concept:

1. Alice chooses a random value s
2. Alice produces $h = Hash(m, s)$ and sends h and $Hash$ to Bob
3. Bob keeps h and $Hash$
4. Alice reveals herself by sending bob m and s
5. Bob checks if $Hash(m, s) \equiv h$

Addition

Alice is anonymus. She never stated her name, used certificates, etc. Alice can produce as many commitments for as many personas as she wants.

For increased security:

- commitments should be one-use only
- commitments should have a lifetime
- traded commitments to a third Party should revealed directly with first reveal
- messages must be chosen random

Table of Contents

Commitm Schemes
Leonhard Applis
Basics
Hash-Based
Discrete Log
Binary

Prerequisites: Bob needs to setup the environtment for alice, by

1. choosing a large prime number p
2. choosing a smaller prime number $q \in \{1..p | q \div (p-1) = 0\}$
3. choosing $g, v \in G_q \neq 1$
4. sending Alice p, q, g, v

Now Alice can *build* the exact same group and subgroup like Bob.
This is similiar to sending the hash-function.

Implementation

1. Alice requests p, q, g, v from Bob. Alice check that q, p are primes, q divides p-1, that g and v are valid elements.
2. Alice chooses her message $m \in \{1..p\}$ and a random number $r \in \{1..q-1\}$
3. Alice sends $c = g^r v^m$ to Bob **(commit)**
4. Bob keeps $< Alice, c, < p, q, g, v >>$
5. Alice can reveal herself by sending r, m to Bob. Bob checks $c = g^r v^m$

Benefits

Major:

- Commitments always contain random parts
- No collision possible (unlike Hashfunctions)

Minor:

- tupels are smaller to store than hashes
- p, q, g, v are easily changed/renewed (you could not renew hashfunctions)

Table of Contents

Commitment to only 0,1 using quadratic residues.

A number n is **always** quadratic, if it's the product of two quadrats.

$$p^2 * q^2 = p * p * q * q = (p * q)^2$$

choose primes p, q and check for every element $x \in \mathrm{Z}_{\mathrm{n}}^*, n = p * q$

The only way to check if x is quadratic in n, is to check if its quadratic for p and q!

Required: Legendre-Symbol $(\frac{x}{p}) = x^{p-1} mod(p)$

$(\frac{x}{p})$	$(\frac{x}{q})$	$(\frac{x}{n})$	quadratic
1	1	1	yes
1	-1	-1	no
-1	1	-1	no
-1	-1	1	no

given X and guessing we have 75% cases where it's not quadratic.

given X and $(\frac{x}{n}) = 1$ we have 50:50 Quadratic:nonQuadratic

1. Alice chooses primes p, q and an element $v \in \{x \in \mathbf{Z}_n | (\frac{x}{n}) = 1\}$
2. Alice commits to a bit b by choosing a random numer r and sending Bob: n, v and $c = r^2 \cdot v^b$
3. Bob verifies that $(\frac{v}{n}) = 1$ and keeps it
4. Alice reveals herself by sending Bob p, q, r, b
5. Bob verifies that p, q are primes, $n = pq$ and $c = r^2 \cdot v^b$

If A wants to commit a quadratic residue, she chooses a quadratic v and $b = 1$, therefore $r^2 \cdot v^1$ will be quadratic
If a wants to commit a non-quadratic value, she chooses a nonquadratic v and $b = 0$, therefore $r^2 \cdot v^0 = r^2$ which is quadratic