

# Commitment Schemes

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**Abstract**—This Paper summarizes and introduces to the topic of Commitment-Schemes, a two party cryptographic primitive.

The aim of commitment schemes is to provide a mechanism for Party A to commit to a hidden value and reveal it if necessary. Party B can confirm that the revealed value and the hidden value match.

This Paper first introduces to the topic itself, a hash-based implementation, the *pedersen-commitments* which are based on the discrete logarithm and commitments based on quadratic residues. In Conclusion a Case-study of commitments for one-time authorization in a distributed web-application is provided.

## I. INTRODUCTION

The Internet is a land of mistrust for good reasons, yet it's often required to trust each other.

A common example for the use of commitment-schemes is the *coin-toss by telephone*: Alice declares her call, and Bob tosses the coin. However, Alice is unable to *see* the real coin-toss and relies on Bobs righteousness - which is a pretty bad idea.

Evil Bobs can simply declare the wrong toss for Alice' call, making her loose every single time. Overall Bob can manipulate the outcome easily by choice with his knowledge of Alice' call.

Therefore Alice needs to hide her prediction. A naive way of *saving* Alice from manipulation is that Alice declares her call *after* Bob announces the coin-toss-outcome. Needless to say, now Alice is in the position to make her calls in her favor every time, which is not acceptable for Bob.

Commitment-schemes enable both parties to *fair-play* and tools to detect manipulation creating relative trust. In a successful commitment, Alice hides her guess with cryptographic measures and sends it to Bob. Bob then declares the coin-toss to Alice, without knowledge of her call. At this point Alice knows, if she has won or lost, and enables Bob to read her guess by sending the required keys for decryption.

At this point both parties know the *real* outcome and the real winner of the coin toss. The measures if any manipulation is detected are beyond this primitive.

There are several cases where commitment-schemes are commonly used, for example in *challenge and response*-authentication, whereof a simple example is provided at the end of this paper in section III.

Also, other higher protocols require commitments, such as *secret-sharing*. Unfortunately these protocols are out of scope for this paper.




Fig. 1. Commitments

### A. Protocol

The following steps are considered the basic protocol of commitment-schemes and vary only in their implementation. Often the protocol is shortened to only two steps, the commitment and the reveal (step 1 and 3), as these are the only steps requiring communication. This shortened version is also depicted in figure 1.

- 1) A **commits** to B
- 2) B keeps commitment, unable to read or process it
- 3) A **reveals** to B
- 4) B verifies the commitment

To elaborate this protocol, we use another common picture as shown in figure 1: putting a message in an unbreakable, non-transparent and locked box (shown in the *setup-step* of the figure).

For *step 1* of the protocol, Alice **commits** the box to Bob. Bob cannot see or alter the message inside the box. Picking up the example of the *coin-toss via telephone*, after *step 2* Bob would announce the outcome to Alice.

For *step 3* of the protocol, Alice **reveals** the commitment to Bob, sending him the key for the box (and commonly sending the message as well, proving that she is not only in possession of the key but also the secret itself).

If the key *fits*, Bob is able to unlock the box in *step 4* and compare the message provided by Alice with the message found in the box.

## B. Attributes

The following attributes are required for commitment-schemes (see [DeHa15] *protocoll 4.10* paragraph 4f) to be secure and successfully fulfill their purpose:

- 1) **Binding:** The values Alice put in the commitment cannot be changed after Bob received it
- 2) **Hiding:** Bob cannot gain any information about the message from the commitment itself
- 3) **Viability:** If both parties follow the protocol correct, Bob is always able to recover the committed value

Except for viability, the fulfillment of each attribute will be shortly discussed in the regarding implementations.

These attributes can also be shown applied to the box:

Once locked inside the box, the message cannot be altered by Alice (or any other party). After she commits it, Alice is **bound** to the value, as there can never be a different value inside the box after this point.

Through the virtual properties *non-transparent* and *unbreakable* of the box, the **hiding**-attribute of the protocol is fulfilled: Bob cannot look into the box and does not know anything about the message if he does not have the key. The only way to properly gain knowledge about the message is the key provided by Alice.

The **viability** is given, as **only** the (correct) key will open the box. The correct key will always open the regarding box, and no other key will *ever* be able to unlock the message.

There are two additional attributes based on the fact that we are working with computers:

- 1) Bobs are able compare commitments.
- 2) Commitments are *tradeable* and replicable - both for Alice and Bob, still keeping their primary attributes and are fully functional. This attribute is vital for the case study presented in section III.

The trading can be displayed with the box: If  $Bob_1$  decides to give the box to  $Bob_2$ ,  $Bob_2$  is also unable to read or open it. Alice can now also contact  $Bob_2$  with the key and the message, to which  $Bob_2$  can open the box and compare the message, just like  $Bob_1$  would do.

Also Alice is able to trade her key and message to any  $Alice_2$ , which enables  $Alice_2$  to reveal her like the *real* Alice would.

The ability to copy and compare commitments is not applicable to the example of the locked box. However, as most commitments rely on numbers, the *real* commitment consists of bits and therefore are easily duplicated.

For the comparison it's to add, that it's possible to have the same commitment for a different combination of messages and keys. However, as the key's should be chosen randomly, these collisions are highly unlikely (in case of the hash-based implementations as likely as hash-collisions themselves).

## C. Additional Security-Measures

There are several *best-practices* which are not functional for the protocol itself, but are necessary to secure any party involved in the protocol and any application using the protocols. They will be shortly summarized and explained:

*a) commitments should be one- (positive-) use only:* This originates from the *reveal*-step, in which everything required to reveal the commitment successfully is transmitted. An eavesdropper would after the initial reveal be able to copy the required *credentials* and also reveal the commitment correct. To fix this issue, simply mark used commitments as deprecated (if they are further required), or delete them completely.

*b) commitments should have a lifetime:* (in time and/or tries) This behavior helps against brute-force attacks from exterior, given that the attacking party does not hold the commitment itself. If an aggressor has the commitment, he can start brute-force attacks locally (this holds true for eve and bob) which still requires **safe** cryptographic implementations. Additionally the lifetime (in e.g. days) is useful for Bob, as he has limited resources and should only keep *required* information.

*c) traded commitments to a third party should be deprecated directly with first reveal:* This is an extended version of the problem shown in paragraph *a)* of this subsection. Given there are multiple copies of the same commitment, and an eavesdropper knows the parties which hold a copy, Eve can successfully reveal the commitment to any party. For addressing this issue, the commitments need to be recursively deprecated throughout any party which the commitment was shared to. A common way to do this for Bob is to reveal the commitment by himself - this method does not require additional structures and also verifies that Bob knows the correct values.

However, if there is a larger number of parties involved, Eve can be *faster* reaching to the last Bob and reveal the commitment. Additionally there are many attacks that disturb the communication between Bob's, thus leaving more chances for Eve to reveal herself as Alice. Sharing commitments should be therefore only used when required.

*d) messages must contain random parts:* This rather trivial point is important for any implementation to fulfill any attribute connected to the *computational safeness* of hashfunctions and the discrete logarithm.

For every implementation based on commitment-schemes all of the above should be taken to account. There are several problems if only a single point is left out, including identity theft and server-malfunctions.

There are common libraries which support you in the goal of a secure implementation, e.g. an implementation in Haskell [Has] . The use of an open-source and **maintained** library is highly recommended.

## II. IMPLEMENTATION

### A. Hash-Based Commitments

For an easy introduction into the implementations, let's first introduce the hash-based commitments. These implementations rely solely on the cryptographic attributes of their regarding hash-function, making them relatively easy to understand, as every cryptographic process is *veiled* by a single function - leaving out complex mathematics.

It's therefore important, to choose a **cryptographic hash function** ( see [DeHa15] section 2.2.1 ). A *normal* hash-function does not fulfill the attributes as shown further below, and therefore cannot be used for commitments.

The basic protocol implemented with hash-functions:

- 1) Alice chooses a random value  $s$
- 2) Alice produces  $h = \text{Hash}(m \star s)$  and sends  $h$  and  $\text{Hash}$  to Bob
- 3) Bob keeps  $\langle \text{Alice}, h, \text{Hash} \rangle$
- 4) Alice reveals herself by sending Bob  $m$  and  $s$
- 5) Bob checks if  $\text{Hash}(m \star s) \equiv h$

This implementation is parallel to the example with the box: The *key* to the box is the random salt, and the message is hidden behind it.

To choose a random salt value is necessary, as the domain of the messages is usually limited. Picking up the example of the coin-toss, Alice would be only able to commit to *Tail* or *Head*. Without a random value, Bob (and any Eve) could simply try both values and compare to the commitment.

While the example of coin-tossing is rather trivial, even bigger example such as *dates of birth* can be easily tried for multiple centuries.

Additionally, without the salt, using rainbow-tables and other dictionaries is possible.

It's also to mention that the message  $m$  should never be *really* valuable - as it's send in cleartext in *step 4* of the implementation.

The attributes required for a correct commitment-scheme are inherited directly by the attributes of a cryptographic hash-function (see [Mironov05] section 4.1 paragraph 3f):

**Binding:** After Alice created the hash, due to the **second-pre-image resistance** (see [DeHa15] section 2.2.1 proposition 2.11) of the hash-function, she won't find any second message in feasible time that produces the same hash<sup>1</sup>. Therefore, she is bound to her value, as any other message would produce a different hash.

**Hiding:** After Bob recieved the hash, due to the **pre-image resistance** (see [DeHa15] section 2.2.1 proposition 2.12) of the hash-function, the only way Bob can get to know  $m$  is by

<sup>1</sup>Bob needs to verify the used hashfunction. There are known hash-collisions to some hash-functions, which can be used to intentionally produce failures

trying every possible value. As mentioned above, it's necessary to add a random salt for this attribute to be guaranteed.

To end this implementation, let's summarize the benefits:

- the implementation is easy to understand without further knowledge of mathematics
- *iff* the hash-function is cryptographic, the commitments are *safe*
- it's possible to commit *words* as messages, unlike other hash-functions, enabling *human-readable* examples

### B. Pedersen Commitments

Instead of using hash-functions for their functionality, the pedersen-commitments (See [Pedersen01] section 3) gain their security from the un-feasability to extract roots from a finite body build by two (large) prime numbers (see [DeHa15] Algorithm A.40 paragraph 2). This assumption is also known as the decision diffie-hellman problem and is used for other common cryptographic protocols, such as the ElGamal-encryption (see [Boneh96] section 4.1).

Even tough *finding* these roots is as good as guessing (see [Boneh96] section 3.4 corollary 3.5) if not every required element is known, if the prime numbers are known verifying the result is trivial.

Producing cypher-texts firsthand is also an easy task for Alice.

Unlike the hashfunction, there is a bigger setup Bob needs to do before the main-protocol begins:

- 1) choosing a large prime number  $p$
- 2) choosing a smaller prime number  $q \in \{1..p | q \div (p-1) = 0\}$
- 3) choosing  $g, v \in G_q \neq 1$
- 4) sending Alice  $p, q, g, v$

With these steps, Alice and Bob are sure to operate in the same finite body, which can be checked for *computational safeness*. The produces  $g$  is often called the *generator*, the  $v$  often *validador*.

Choosing the body can also be done by Alice, which would drastically benefit her, as she can purposely choose generators and validators which would enable her to construct non-unique commitments.

As a simplified example, Alice could choose the same  $g$  and  $v$ , making it possible for her to switch message and salt at will, while successfully revealing her commitment.

Even if Bob notices  $g = v$ , and rejects these kind of tricks, Alice is able to produce variables for certain collisions, which Bob can only notice with brute-forcing.

Therefore it's common for Bob to choose the body, as he is not about to commit values. If Alice notices problems with the safety of the given numbers, she can reject the communication.

The implementation of the pedersen-commitments:

- 1) Alice requests  $p, q, g, v$  from Bob.  
Alice checks that:

- $q, p$  are primes,
  - $q$  divides  $p-1$ ,
  - that  $g, v \in G_q$ .
- 2) Alice chooses her message  $m \in \{1..p\}$  and a random number  $r \in \{1..q-1\}$
  - 3) Alice sends  $c = g^{r \cdot v^m}$  to Bob (**commit**)
  - 4) Bob keeps  $\langle Alice, c, \langle p, q, g, v \rangle \rangle$
  - 5) Alice can reveal herself by sending  $r, m$  to Bob.  
Bob checks  $c = g^{r \cdot v^m}$

The **Hiding** is fulfilled with the discrete-log assumption, as no one who receives the tuple  $\langle p, q, g, v \rangle$  can find the  $r, m$  which produce  $c$ , without guessing or computing every possibility. Given large prime numbers, this is computationally impossible.

The **Binding**-attribute is only partly fulfilled: As shown above, if Alice would have the power to choose  $\langle p, q, g, v \rangle$  she would be able to produce a lot of collisions. It's still possible for her to find collisions on purpose, if Bob has chosen the finite body.

However, if Bob has chosen large prime-numbers and distinct  $g, v$ , he can be relatively safe, as Alice will have troubles finding these collisions in reasonable time. This implementation can still be considered *pro-Alice*, as she is put in a more powerful position.

The primary benefits of the pedersen-commitments are the following:

- the commitments always contain random parts
- the computational security can easily be increased by choosing bigger prime-numbers

### C. Quadratic-Residues

Another implementation of commitment-schemes is based on quadratic residues in a finite body, first introduced by Manuel Blum in 1982 (See [Blum82]) and therefore (by far) the oldest commitment-scheme. In this scheme, Alice commits herself to a single bit (for reference, see [DeHa15] section 4.3.1).

The basic idea is to produce a finite body of size  $n = p \cdot q$  where  $p, q \in Primes$ . A number  $v$  of this body is quadratic if and only if it's quadratic in both  $p$  and  $q$ . To commit to *true*, Alice sends  $n$  and  $v$ , but **not**  $p$  **and**  $q$ , and chooses a quadratic  $v$ . If she wants to commit to *false*, she sends a non-quadratic  $v$ .

While it's easy to compute whether a given number is quadratic in a prime using the *legendre symbol*  $(\frac{v}{p})$  (see [PrGloLeg]), it's not possible to simply compute whether a number is quadratic in the product of two primes, except if both primes are known.

Given any number  $v \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ , one could guess that is not a quadratic residue - this holds true for 75% of all cases.

As this makes *guessing* the commitment better than simply guessing *true* or *false*, we need to implement an additional security measure: The value  $v$  must be chosen from the numbers in  $n$ , which have a positive Jakobi-Symbol (see [PrGloJak]).

Despite additional mathematic attributes, the Jakobi-Symbol can be simplified as the product of legendre-symbols, defining  $(\frac{v}{n}) = (\frac{v}{p}) \cdot (\frac{v}{q})$ .

There are two cases, in which the Jakobi-Symbol is positive: The value  $v$  is quadratic in **both**  $q$  and  $p$ , or the value  $v$  is **not** quadratic in **both**  $q$  and  $p$ .

Thanks to this addition, *guessing* whether a given value  $v$  where  $v \in J_n^{+1}$  is quadratic in  $n$  has a chance of 50% and is therefore not better than guessing *true* or *false*.

The only way to successfully calculate instead of guessing is to find one of the prime numbers by trying, which is not feasible given large prime numbers.

Based on these mathematical procedures, the protocol works as follows:

- 1) Alice chooses primes  $p, q$  and an element  $v \in \{x \in J_n^{+1}\}$
- 2) Alice commits to a bit  $b$  by choosing a random number  $r$  and sending Bob:  $n, v$  and  $c = r^2 \cdot v^b$
- 3) Bob verifies that  $(\frac{v}{n}) = 1$  and keeps  $\langle Alice, n, v, c \rangle$
- 4) Alice reveals herself by sending Bob  $p, q, r, b$
- 5) Bob verifies that  $p, q$  are primes,  $n = pq$  and  $c = r^2 \cdot v^b$

This protocol enhances the above assumptions by hiding the real value and it's quadraticity behind a random value  $r$ . Therefore the verification is a little more complex.

If  $A$  wants to commit a quadratic residue, she chooses a quadratic  $v$  and  $b = 1$ , therefore  $r^2 \cdot v^1$  will be quadratic

If  $A$  wants to commit a non-quadratic value, she chooses a non-quadratic  $v$  and  $b = 0$ , therefore  $r^2 \cdot v^0 = r^2$  which is quadratic

If  $v$ 's actual quadraticity and  $b$  do not match,  $c$  won't be quadratic and therefore rejected by Bob.

## III. CASE-STUDY: MIGRATING USER PRIVILEGES IN WEB-APPLICATIONS

To finalize this paper, a use-case for commitments is presented.

This example describes how a one-time authentication for a web-application can be realized with commitments.

There are common examples and closed-source libraries which enable developers to implement these features easily, however to keep this paper neutral, only the concept will be shown without going further into detail of several implementations.

User-Privileges in web-applications are commonly granted by setting regarding attributes in the session-cookie. As the session-cookie is in the hands of a possibly malevolent user, one of the main-security-measures is to certify the cookie

by the server. This behaviour is similar to the H-MAC (See [BeCaKra96] section *the rational* paragraph 3ff ) signing messages in common message exchange applied to cookies.

As the host usually verifies the cookie in every transaction, he is safe for two main attacks: The user can not create his own cookie, and he cannot alter given cookies. The only way to receive a certified session-cookie is through a successful login.

Creating a safe login seems like an easy task - but is in itself one of the most important and maintenance-intensive parts of every web-page. Hardening the page, keeping everything up to date and enforce principles such as *Layered Security* (See [Denman12] for further reading) requires not only knowledge but time. Therefore simplifying login-procedures, especially for distributed web-applications is a primary goal of web-development.

For this cause commitment-schemes can be used to implement a simple *challenge and response* protocol for one time authentication and privilege-migration. For the general setup, see the figure 2:

Alice is the user, Bob-1 is the server which has a functional (and safe) login. Bob-2 is known to Bob-1 and they trust each other. Alice's final goal is to be logged in and use Bob-2's services.

The start of this protocol is shown in figure 2: In the first step, Alice needs to be logged in and trusted by Bob-1. She then announces her wish to migrate to Bob-2 (e.g. by clicking on a hyperlink) and places a commitment. While these commitments vary from implementation to implementation, they usually contain a mixture of random variables, as well as common connection-attributes such as IP-address and system-times. After the commitment is received




Fig. 2. Start: Alice logs in, announces her wish to migrate and deposits a commitment

by Bob-1, he can start the migration as in figure 3. The first thing to migrate is the commitment itself - with a reference to Alice. This transmission does not need to be encrypted.

Additionally a secure encrypted message about Alice's privileges needs to be exchanged between Bobs. This can either be:

- 1) The session-cookie itself
- 2) a database reference

- 3) a reference to Bob-2's internal security (such as a system-role)

Where most common is the first option, which also enables the possibility for a double-certification, if Bob-2 does not need additional attributes: He therefore signs the full, signed cookie from Bob-1 when granting it again, creating an certification-stack.




Fig. 3. Bob-1 migrates the commitment to Bob-2, as well as additional information for the privileges

After Bob-2 successfully received the two messages, he can challenge Alice to reveal the commitment, as shown in figure 4. If she is able to, she is granted to privileges regarding the second message.

She is now able to interact with Bob-2 as if he would have had an usual login.

Most of this protocol can be simply done by user-scripts running in background - it's not required for Alice to enter any random numbers manually. These variables can be migrated with the browsercache. The Challenge can also be requested and resolved fully automatically, creating the user-experience of a connected web-page.




Fig. 4. Bob-2 challenges Alice to reveal herself, Alice reveals, Bob-2 grants a certified cookie

If the communication between parties is secured, and the commitment-scheme has a safe implementation, this one-time authentication is as-safe as the original login.

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