


Supporting Information / Online Appendix for “Do Politicians Racially Discriminate against Constituents? A Field Experiment on State Legislators”

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Appendix A. Differences Between Parties in Time Until Registration Deadline

Figure SI1. Differences Between Parties in Time Available to Respond



As noted in the paper, because we sent all of the emails at the same time, the time between when legislators received the email and the voter registration deadline differed across states. Since the partisan composition of legislatures also varies across states, one potential

concern is that any differences we observed between the parties might simply be the result of differences in how long each group had to respond before the voter registration deadline came, perhaps altering the political environment or considerations of the legislators heterogeneously across parties. To see if this was a concern, we graphed, by party, the cumulative density by how many days before the voter registration deadline the legislators were sent the email request. These results are displayed in Figure SI1 and indicate that there are almost no differences between the parties. Republicans had an average of 13 days to respond to the emails before the voter registration deadlines in their states while Democrats had 13.4 days. These results increase our confidence in the results since 0.4 days is not enough to drive any of the differences we observe between the two parties.

Appendix B. The Partisan Preferences of Individuals with the Experimentally Manipulated Aliases

In this experiment, we use the aliases Jake Mueller and DeShawn Jackson to signal the putative race of the email sender. One feature of whites and blacks in the United States is that whites split their support fairly evenly between the two parties, while blacks have supported the Democratic party at rates of about 90 percent in recent decades. To verify that the larger patterns of partisan support among whites and blacks in the United States were also reflected in the individuals with the names used for the aliases in our study, we examined the distribution of party registration among the individuals with these names in an available voter file (Kentucky's). Shown in Table SI1, the data indicate that the last name Jackson and the first name DeShawn are indeed both strong signals of a Democratic partisan preference. The ratio of people registered as Democrats compared to the number registered as Republicans is 2:1 among people with the last name Jackson and 8:1 among people with the first name DeShawn. In contrast, people with the first name Jake or Jacob and the last name Mueller are split evenly across the two parties. Again, this is strong evidence that legislators are likely to infer that DeShawn Jackson has a Democratic preference, but not have strong prior beliefs about the preferences of someone named Jake Mueller.

Table SI1. Party Registration of Actual Individuals with the Experimentally Manipulated Names

	First Name DeShawn	Last Name Jackson	First Name Jake/Jacob	Last Name Mueller
Republican	9.7%	30.9%	44.2%	43.5%
Democrat	80.6%	63.0%	46.7%	45.7%
Other/Independent	9.7%	6.1%	9.1%	10.8%
N	72	8,249	2,382	538

Notes: Data comes from the 2008 Kentucky voter file and shows the party registration of actual individuals with the names of the aliases used in the study. The data indicate that the last name Jackson and the first name DeShawn are both strong signals of a Democratic partisan preference.

Appendix C. The Full Experimental Results by Race and Party of Legislator

Table S12. Full Experimental Results, By Race and Party of Legislator

(a) White Republicans					
	No partisanship	Republican	Democrat	Party Differential	
DeShawn	59.3%	57.9%	53.5%	4.4	Combined 3.7 (<i>p</i> =0.16)
Jackson	N=351	N=354	N=353	(<i>p</i> =0.24)	
Jake	66.9%	62.5%	59.5%	3.0	
Mueller	N=356	N=352	N=348	(<i>p</i> =0.41)	
Race	-7.6*	-4.6	-5.9		
Differential	(<i>p</i> =0.04)	(<i>p</i> =0.21)	(<i>p</i> =0.11)		
		-5.3* (<i>p</i>=0.05)			
		Combined Effect			

(b) Black and Non-Black Minority Republicans					
	No partisanship	Republican	Democrat	Party Differential	
DeShawn	44.4%	62.5%	75.0%	-12.5	Combined 25.7 (<i>p</i> =0.11)
Jackson	N=9	N=8	N=8	(<i>p</i> =0.62)	
Jake	75.0%	78.6%	22.2%	56.4***	
Mueller	N=8	N=14	N=9	(<i>p</i> <0.01)	
Race	-30.6	-16.1	52.8*		
Differential	(<i>p</i> =0.23)	(<i>p</i> =0.46)	(<i>p</i> =0.03)		
		12.2 (<i>p</i>=0.45)			
		Combined Effect			

(c) White Democrats					
	No partisanship	Republican	Democrat	Party Differential	
DeShawn	54.3%	56.1%	62.1%	-6.1^	Combined -2.1 (<i>p</i> =0.42)
Jackson	N=348	N=362	N=375	(<i>p</i> =0.10)	
Jake	61.2%	58.3%	56.3%	2.1	
Mueller	N=363	N=355	N=352	(<i>p</i> =0.58)	
Race	-6.8^	-2.2	5.9		
Differential	(<i>p</i> =0.06)	(<i>p</i> =0.55)	(<i>p</i> =0.11)		
		1.9 (<i>p</i>=0.47)			
		Combined Effect			

(d) Black Democrats					
	No partisanship	Republican	Democrat	Party Differential	
DeShawn	41.9%	22.4%	44.0%	-21.6*	Combined -13.2* (<i>p</i> =0.03)
Jackson	N=62	N=58	N=50	(<i>p</i> =0.02)	
Jake	29.1%	18.8%	24.1%	-5.3	
Mueller	N=55	N=64	N=54	(<i>p</i> =0.49)	
Race	12.8	3.7	19.9*		
Differential	(<i>p</i> =0.15)	(<i>p</i> =0.62)	(<i>p</i> =0.03)		
		11.2^ (<i>p</i>=0.06)			
		Combined Effect			

(e) Non-Black Minority Democrats					
	No partisanship	Republican	Democrat	Party Differential	
DeShawn	52.8%	50.0%	57.7%	-7.7	Combined -16.8^ (<i>p</i> =0.06)
Jackson	N=36	N=28	N=26	(<i>p</i> =0.58)	
Jake	30.0%	37.1%	61.1%	-24.0*	
Mueller	N=30	N=35	N=36	(<i>p</i> =0.04)	
Race	22.8^	12.9	-3.4		
Differential	(<i>p</i> =0.06)	(<i>p</i> =0.32)	(<i>p</i> =0.79)		
		4.4 (<i>p</i>=0.63)			
		Combined Effect			

Notes: ^Sig. at the 0.10 level, *Sig. at the 0.05 level, **Sig. at the 0.01 level. A positive difference in the race differential rows indicates a lower response rate towards the DeShawn alias compared to the Jake alias, while a negative difference indicates a higher response rate towards the DeShawn alias compared to the Jake alias.

Appendix D. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Professionalism Score, District Racial Composition, and Re-election Status

The regressions in Table SI3 show that white legislators' level of differential treatment was not significantly heterogeneous with respect to their state's Squire index of legislative professionalism, their district's racial composition, whether they were running for re-election, or whether they are from the American south.

Table SI3. Differential Treatment (White Legislators only)

Independent Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
DeShawn Treatment	-0.105* (0.044)	-0.078** (0.030)	-0.086^ (0.044)	-0.084** (0.030)
<i>Heterogeneous Treatment Effects</i>				
Squire Index*DeShawn	0.149 (0.188)	-	-	-
District Black %*DeShawn	-	0.012 (0.209)	-	-
Up for Re-election*DeShawn	-	-	0.013 (0.053)	-
South*DeShawn	-	-	-	0.026 (0.055)
<i>Control Variables</i>				
Republican Legislator	0.066* (0.026)	0.067* (0.026)	0.067* (0.026)	0.067* (0.026)
Up for Re-election	0.108** (0.029)	0.107** (0.029)	0.101* (0.039)	0.107** (0.028)
District Population (100,000s)	0.006 (0.019)	0.006 (0.019)	0.006 (0.019)	0.006 (0.019)
Median HH Inc. (\$10,000s)	0.037** (0.010)	0.036** (0.010)	0.036** (0.010)	0.036** (0.010)
Senator	0.051 (0.032)	0.050 (0.032)	0.050 (0.032)	0.050 (0.032)
Squire Index	-0.145 (0.150)	-0.070 (0.117)	-0.070 (0.117)	-0.070 (0.117)
South	-0.198** (0.033)	-0.198** (0.033)	-0.198** (0.033)	-0.211** (0.042)
District White %	-0.245 (0.161)	-0.248 (0.161)	-0.249 (0.161)	-0.247 (0.161)
District Black %	0.065 (0.202)	0.056 (0.228)	0.059 (0.202)	0.060 (0.202)
Constant	0.645** (0.161)	0.636** (0.160)	0.642** (0.162)	0.639** (0.160)
N	1418	1418	1418	1418
R ²	0.075	0.075	0.075	0.075

Notes: ^Sig. at the 0.10 level (two-tailed), *Sig. at the 0.05 level (two-tailed), **Sig. at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).