### Class #7 – Part 1

Introduction no Noncooperative Game Theory: Games in Normal Form

#### Motivation

Systems that include multiple autonomous entities with either diverging information or diverging interests, or both










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#### Games

Which cell phone Cartman should pick?










#### Games

And now?











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#### Billions



Decisions Matter: Game Theory in Billions - Part I - Fan Fun with Damian Lewis The Problem With Game Theory - The Philosophy of Billions - YouTube

#### Motivation

- Indeed, the Internet can be viewed as the self-interested, distributed computational ultimate platform for interaction among entities
- Trading agents
- "Interface agents" that facilitate the interaction between the user and various computational resources
- Game-playing agents that assist (or replace) human players in a multiplayer game
- Autonomous robots

### Game Theory

- Outcome of a person's decision depends not just on her preferences, but also on the choices made by others
- Main question:
- Which behaviors tend to sustain themselves when carried out in a larger population?

- What does it mean?
- They want to cause harm to each other?
- Not necessarily!
- They care only about themselves?
- Not necessarily!





- What does it mean?
- Each agent has his own description of which states of the world he likes
- which can include good things happening to other agents
- and that he acts in an attempt to bring about these states of the world

- A utility function is a mapping from states of the world to real numbers
- measures of an agent's level of happiness in the given states
- If uncertain about which state of the world he faces
- expected value of his utility function with respect to the appropriate probability distribution over states

The states can be thought of as the prizes in the context of lotteries

- Alice has three options: club (c), movie (m), watching a video at home (h)
- On her own, her utility for these three outcomes is 100 for c, 50 for **m** and **50** for **h**
- Alice also cares about Bob (who she hates) and Carol (who she likes)
- Bob is at the club 60% of the time, and at the movies otherwise
- Carol is at the movies 75% of the time, and at the club otherwise
- If Alice runs into Bob at the movies, she suffers disutility of **40**; if she sees him at the club she suffers disutility of 90
- If Alice sees Carol, she enjoys whatever activity she's doing 1.5 times as much as she would have enjoyed it otherwise

What should Alice do? Reminder: u(home) = 50

B = m

B = c

$$B = c$$

$$B = m$$

$$C = c$$

25%

150

C = c

$$C = m$$

**12%** 

100

C = m

$$A = m$$

Alice chooses club


Alice chooses movie

What should Alice do? Reminder: u(home) = 50

 $Eu(c) = 0.25(0.6 \times 15 + 0.4 \times 150) + 0.75(0.6 \times 10 + 0.4 \times 100) = 51.75$ Alice chooses club:

 $Eu(m) = 0.25(0.6 \times 50 + 0.4 \times 10) + 0.75(0.6 \times 75 + 0.4 \times 15) = 46.75$ Alice chooses movies

- What should Alice do? Reminder: u(home) = 50
- Alice prefers to go to the club (though Bob is often there and movies (though Bob is usually not at the movies and Carol Carol rarely is), and prefers staying home to going to the almost always is)



Alice chooses club:

 $Eu(c) = 0.25(0.6 \times 15 + 0.4 \times 150) + 0.75(0.6 \times 10 + 0.4 \times 100) = 51.75$ 

 $Eu(m) = 0.25(0.6 \times 50 + 0.4 \times 10) + 0.75(0.6 \times 75 + 0.4 \times 15) = 46.75$ Alice chooses movies

#### Problem

- You have an exam and a presentation tomorrow
- You have time to prepare yourself for just one
- The exam is individual and the presentation is together with a colleague
- . Which one should you pick?

- Possible outcomes
- Exam
- If you study: 92
- If you don't study: 80
- Presentation
- If both work: 100
- If only one works: 92
- If no one works: 84
- The same outcomes are valid for your colleague

- Possible outcomes (summary)
- If you study and your colleague works on the presentation

$$- (92 + 92) / 2 = 92$$

If you both study

$$-(92 + 84)/2 = 88$$

If you work on the presentation and your colleague studies

$$-(80 + 92) / 2 = 86$$

If you both work on the presentation

$$-(80 + 100)/2 = 90$$

### What is a game?

- A set of **players**
- you and your partner
- A set of possible **strategies** for each player
- to prepare for the presentation, or to study for the exam
- joint choice of strategies (the more, the better) A set of payoffs for each player and for each
- the average grade

## Games in Normal Form


- A (finite, n-person) normal-form game is a tuple **(N,A,u)**, where:
- N is a finite set of n players, indexed by i
- $A = A_1 \times \cdots \times A_n$ , where  $A_i$  is a finite set of <u>actions</u> available to player *i*
- Each vector  $\mathbf{a} = (\mathbf{a}_1, \dots, \mathbf{a}_n) \in \mathbf{A}$  is called an action profile
- $u=(u_1,\ldots,u_n)$  where  $u_i:A\to\mathbb{R}$  is a real-valued utility (or payoff) function for player i
- $u:A^n o \mathbb{R}^n$


Your Partner

		Presentation	Exam
	Presentation	90,90	86,92
no	Exam	92,86	88,88


Figure 6.1: Exam or Presentation?








"Player 1" or "Row player"



Strategies A, of Player 1



Payoffs of Player 1





Figure 6.1: Exam or Presentation?



#### Behavior in a Game Reasoning about

- Everything that a player cares about is summarized in the player's payoffs
- If a player is altruistic, the payoffs should reflect it