Class #7 – Part 1

Introduction no Noncooperative Game Theory: Games in Normal Form

Motivation

 Systems that include multiple autonomous entities with either diverging information or diverging interests, or both













Games

Which cell phone Cartman should pick?









Games

• And now?












Billions



<u>The Problem With Game Theory – The Philosophy of Billions - YouTube</u>
<u>Decisions Matter: Game Theory in Billions – Part I – Fan Fun with Damian Lewis</u>


Motivation

- Indeed, the Internet can be viewed as the ultimate platform for interaction among self-interested, distributed computational entities
 - Trading agents
 - "Interface agents" that facilitate the interaction between the user and various computational resources
 - Game-playing agents that assist (or replace) human players in a multiplayer game
 - Autonomous robots

Game Theory

- Outcome of a person's decision depends not just on her preferences, but also on the choices made by others
- Main question:
 - Which behaviors tend to sustain themselves when carried out in a larger population?

- What does it mean?
 - They want to cause harm to each other?
 - Not necessarily!
 - They care only about themselves?
 - Not necessarily!





- What does it mean?
 - Each agent has his own description of which states of the world he likes
 - which can include good things happening to other agents
 - and that he acts in an attempt to bring about these states of the world

- A <u>utility function</u> is a <u>mapping</u> from states of the world to real numbers
 - measures of an agent's level of happiness in the given states
- If uncertain about which state of the world he faces
 - expected value of his utility function with respect to the appropriate probability distribution over states

 The states can be thought of as the prizes in the context of lotteries

- Alice has three options: club (c), movie (m), watching a video at home (h)
- On her own, her utility for these three outcomes is 100 for c, 50 for m and 50 for h
- Alice also cares about Bob (<u>who she hates</u>) and Carol (<u>who she likes</u>)
- Bob is at the club 60% of the time, and at the movies otherwise
- Carol is at the movies 75% of the time, and at the club otherwise
- If Alice runs into Bob at the movies, she suffers disutility of 40; if she sees him at the club she suffers disutility of 90
- If Alice sees Carol, she enjoys whatever activity she's doing 1.5
 times as much as she would have enjoyed it otherwise


• What should Alice do? Reminder: u(home) = 50

$$60\%$$
 40% $B = c$ $B = m$ $B = c$ $B = m$ $A = c$ $A = m$ $B = c$ $B = m$ $B = c$ $B = m$ $B = c$ $B = m$

Alice chooses club

Alice chooses movie

What should Alice do? Reminder: u(home) = 50



Alice chooses club:

$$Eu(c) = 0.25(0.6 \times 15 + 0.4 \times 150) + 0.75(0.6 \times 10 + 0.4 \times 100) = 51.75$$

Alice chooses movies

$$Eu(m) = 0.25(0.6 \times 50 + 0.4 \times 10) + 0.75(0.6 \times 75 + 0.4 \times 15) = 46.75$$

- What should Alice do? Reminder: u(home) = 50
 - Alice prefers to go to the *club* (though Bob is often there and Carol rarely is), and prefers staying *home* to going to the *movies* (though Bob is usually not at the *movies* and Carol almost always is)

it makes sense...

Alice chooses club:

$$Eu(c) = 0.25(0.6 \times 15 + 0.4 \times 150) + 0.75(0.6 \times 10 + 0.4 \times 100) = 51.75$$

Alice chooses movies

$$Eu(m) = 0.25(0.6 \times 50 + 0.4 \times 10) + 0.75(0.6 \times 75 + 0.4 \times 15) = 46.75$$

Problem

- You have an exam and a presentation tomorrow
- You have time to prepare yourself for just one
- The exam is individual and the presentation is together with a colleague
- Which one should you pick?

- Possible outcomes
 - Exam
 - If you study: 92
 - If you don't study: 80
 - Presentation
 - If both work: 100
 - If only one works: 92
 - If no one works: 84
 - The same outcomes are valid for your colleague

- Possible outcomes (summary)
 - If you study and your colleague works on the presentation

$$- (92 + 92) / 2 = 92$$

If you both study

$$- (92 + 84) / 2 = 88$$

 If you work on the presentation and your colleague studies

$$-(80 + 92)/2 = 86$$

If you both work on the presentation

$$-(80 + 100)/2 = 90$$

What is a game?

- A set of <u>players</u>
 - you and your partner
- A set of possible <u>strategies</u> for each player
 - to prepare for the presentation, or to study for the exam
- A set of <u>payoffs</u> for each player and for each joint choice of strategies (the more, the better)
 - the average grade

Games in Normal Form

- A (finite, n-person) normal-form game is a tuple (N,A,u), where:
 - N is a finite set of n players, indexed by i
 - $A = A_1 \times \cdots \times A_n$, where A_i is a finite set of <u>actions</u> available to player i
 - Each vector $\mathbf{a} = (\mathbf{a}_1, \dots, \mathbf{a}_n) \in \mathbf{A}$ is called an <u>action</u> profile
 - $u = (u_1, \dots, u_n)$ where $u_i : A \to \mathbb{R}$ is a real-valued utility (or payoff) function for player i
 - $u:A^n\to\mathbb{R}^n$

Your Partner

Presentation	Exam
90,90	86,92
92,86	88,88

You Presentation Exam

Figure 6.1: Exam or Presentation?

What is a game?









Figure 6.1: Exam or Presentation?



"Player 1" or "Row player"



Strategies A₁ of Player 1



Payoffs of Player 1





Figure 6.1: Exam or Presentation?



Reasoning about Behavior in a Game

- Everything that a player cares about is summarized in the player's payoffs
 - If a player is altruistic, the payoffs should reflect it