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Political Trust in Latin America

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Although most empirical research on political trust has focused on the so called developed world, previous scholarly work regarding this topic within Latin American countries has provided some interesting insights. Most notably, Latin American societies show lower levels of political trust when compared to other regions of the world (Catterberg and Moreno, 2006; Mainwaring, 2006; Segovia, 2008). For instance, using data from the World Values Survey (waves 1995-1997 and 1999-2001), Segovia (2008) compared three regions based on a trust index that averages the scores of confidence in the parliament and in the civil service, since both indicators where present in most of the countries (50). The index goes from 1 (no confidence at all) to 4 (a lot of confidence). As observed in Table 1, Latin American countries present lower levels of trust when compared to industrialized and Central/Eastern European countries. Within Latin America, the lower places in the ranking correspond to Mexico (1.85), Peru (1.84), the Dominican Republic (1.79) and Argentina (1.63). On the other extreme, countries with the highest level of trust are Uruguay (2.27), Brazil (2.23) and Chile (2.23) (Segovia, 2008).

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

A second interesting issue uncovered by Mainwaring (2006), refers to the historical causes of the comparatively low levels of political trust. According to this author, the key explanatory variables are not the commonly adduced factors in research within developed nations such as generational value changes or declines in social capital. Instead, low political trust, particularly for Andean countries, responds to the systematic under provision of public goods by the states, or what the author calls state deficiencies. Mainwaring also argues that the dynamics of political competition between political elites in the era of mass media exacerbates the visibility of the state deficiencies, and thereby reinforces low political trust.

In this current article we seek to review the patterns of political trust among Latin American countries. Now, contrary to previous studies that explain cross-sectional variation between countries, we study how political trust has evolved across time in the region, a point entirely unexplored by previous research. In order to do so, we examine how both individual and contextual characteristics have possibly triggered (or not) changes in political trust among the population. We base our analysis in the Latinobarometer dataset, which contains relevant measures of political trust since 1996 onwards. Among the contextual factors we include not only commonly used variables such as corruption and

economic development, but also consider specific aspects of Latin American politics, namely, the ideological orientation of governments. Given that the region has undergone a so called "left turn" during the last decade, we are interested in analyzing whether this turn is associated with changes in political trust at the aggregate as well as the individual level. With this in mind, the questions that guide our analysis are:To what extent are individual political orientations related to political trust? Are left governments characterized by an increase or a decrease of political trust? How is political trust affected by interactions between individual and contextual political orientations?

The chapter begins with a historical overview of the Latin American region. We develop two broad claims. First, since their independence Latin American nations faced chronic challenges for building efficient and stable - and therefore trustworthy - political institutions. Second, there are reasons to believe that this situation may be changing in the last two decades as democracies consolidate, economies grow, and authorities become more responsive to people's needs. Followed by our historical assessment we describe the major trends in political trust occurred in the region since 1996 and after. In the data analysis we employ ordinal probit multi-level models to assess the main correlates of overall levels and changes in political trust among Latin American countries between 2002 and 2011.

Historical challenges to political trust in Latin America

Democratic developments: unequal, contradictory, and discontinuous

For understanding the reasons behind low political trust in Latin America we first look at the process of political institutional building. This process has been contradictory and discontinuous, and took place amidst great socioeconomic inequalities.

In the first place, inequality is a hallmark of Latin America. By 2008 the region as a whole had a Gini index of 48.3, far above high-income countries (30.9) and all other regions of the world, including Sub-Saharan Africa (44.2) (Ortiz and Cummins 2011:26). These staggering inequalities are not new. They can be traced to the concentration of huge land extensions in the hands of a few families since colonial times. This had political implications. While some lower-class individuals occasionally reached the presidency (like Benito Juárez in nineteenth-century México or Evo Morales in current Bolivia), top-level officers and congressmen typically came from the upper classes and the wither sectors of these racially mixed societies. Thus, differences in political power became intertwined with class and racial inequalities. These inequalities could not be justified by resorting to a feudal past (like in Europe) or a religious doctrine (like Hinduism). Large and (perceived as) illegitimate inequalities provided a constant source of distrust toward the political and economic elites and the institutions they represented (Zmerli and Castillo 2012).

In the second place, the building of Latin American political institutions was shaped by contradictions - which, we claim, had implications for political trust. Most present-day Latin American republics were born in the 1820s, after four centuries of Spanish domination. Independence leaders rejected the monarchical model. They were propelled by the novel ideals of democratic constitutionalism heralded by Great Britain, France, and the

United States. Accordingly, they wanted to create free nations were the people would rule through elected representatives. They wrote constitutions and electoral laws (often emulating foreign ones), gathered friends and followers around electoral pacts, celebrated elections for national and regional authorities, and created public spheres where newspapers, street-level discourses, and salon discussions abounded (Posada Carbó 1996, 1998; Valenzuela 2006). Elections became the by-default way of accessing power. Often they were competitive and allowed pacific rotation among contenders. Furthermore, long periods without elections or with completely farcical ones were relatively rare, and they belong to the most well-known experiences of nineteenth-century authoritarianism (such as that of Juan Manuel de Rosas in Argentina).

The contradiction comes from the fact that these democratic developments were shaped by agents who often resorted to anti-democratic practices - at least by Dahlian (1971) standards. Specifically, contenders and especially incumbents soon developed a repertoire of techniques for manipulating electoral outcomes. These ranged from adulterating electoral registries and jailing members of electoral colleges during the election day to stuffing the ballot boxes (Posada Carbó 2000). Aware of fraud, disgruntled challengers often resorted to armed insurgencies for reaching power – and countries such as México, Colombia, and Uruguay excel in their record of insurgencies during the nineteenth century (Valenzuela 2006). Important for our purposes, this combination of profuse and usually respected electoral calendars with recurrent electoral fraud created the widespread feeling among Latin Americans that their governments, and the institutions they represented, merited little trust.

Third, the development of democratic institutions was not only contradictory and unequal but also discontinuous. After the first, turbulent century of independent life, the twentieth century seemed more auspicious for cultivating democracy and political trust in the region. During the 1920s and 1930s lower-class Latin American males were enfranchised, and women followed suit by mid-century. Under populist regimes electoral turnout increased notably and raised hopes for the strengthening of a sui-generis type of paternalistic mass democracy - although populist leaders rarely were genuine democrats. Yet after the Great Depression many countries faced authoritarian reversals. And although democracy blossomed in the 1950s, a new wave of military coups spread during the 1960s and deepened in the 1970s – to the point that by 1978 only Colombia, Venezuela and Costa Rica had democratic regimes (Mainwaring and Pérez Liñán 2005).

By the early 1990s most Latin American countries had recovered democratic institutions, but the frequent alternations between authoritarianism, democracy, and semi-democracies in previous decades created uncertain prospects for the building of solid political trust. In particular, after experiencing harsh military dictatorships, many people acquired an instinctive distrust towards the military and intelligence police units. And in countries such as Chile and Argentina the judiciary was blamed for doing nothing to redress human rights violations (Brinks 2012:577). Overall, the discontinuities of Latin American regimes stand in sharp contrast with Western developed nations, who enjoyed uninterrupted democracies for decades (Germany, France) or centuries (Britain, the United States).

Weak states and political personalism

Political distrust in Latin America can also be traced to the chronic difficulties for building strong, far-reaching, and efficient states. According to Centeno (2003), the paucity of international wars after independence created little incentives to Latin American state-makers for improving the methods of taxation and administration that were the crucibles of solid state-building in Europe. This had consequences to our days. Compared to the developed West, Latin American states have been traditionally unable to provide decent education, health services, or retirement pensions to large segments of their populations (Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay are partial exceptions). Ill-designed or underfunded state programs do little for protecting the labor force - a large portion which has informal jobs - from economic shocks. And during the 1990s the spread of policies that deregulated labor markets did not help. State institutions unable to protect people elicit little trust. According to Mainwaring (2006), bad state performance is the main explanation of low political trust in the Andes.

Additionally, in a region containing some of the most violent countries of the world like Honduras, El Salvador or Venezuela (UNODC 2011), states have been unable to protect their peoples from organized crime and gangs. Even worse, poor civilian populations - from the Guatemalan jungles to the Brazilian favelas - have often been victims of brutal state repression carried out under the banner of fighting guerrillas or crime (Goodwin 2003). Law systems often work biasedly, with the poor, women, peasants, and those of darker skin color receiving unfair treatment. According to O'Donnell (2001:607), sometimes "laws (…) are not more than a piece of paper". And in some regions, enriched networks of organized crime bribe underfunded police agents to impose their law (Altman and Luna 2012). Occasionally this is linked to insufficient state territorial penetration - drug cartels sometimes control considerable regions, as happens today in Colombia or Mexico. Private security firms have proliferated recently to protect those who can pay (Eaton 2012), thus undermining even more the concentration of coercive capacity in the state apparatus[1].

Latin American societies crafted two complementary responses to chronic state deficiencies. The first one was the creation of functional equivalents of the state by civilian populations. Thus, in parts of Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Guatemala, populations residing in areas located outside of the state's reach have resorted to indigenous law and other informal practices for solving disputes and providing security. These include, for instance, Peruvian community patrols (rondas campesinas) and Bolivian neighborhood meetings (juntas vecinales) (Helmke and Levitsky 2006). In the Mexican state of Guerrero, communities organize patrols for limiting the actions of abusive state police forces (Eaton 2012).

A second response can be labeled "political personalism". It consists of leaders that take care of people's unmet needs in particularistic ways, often in exchange for political favors.

[1] However, it would be too much to speak about state collapse or failure for Latin America – even in Colombia (Rotberg 2002) states do work. Instead, Mainwaring (2006) suggests the term "state deficiencies" for Latin America.

Sometimes arising to the status of messiahs (as noted in O'Donnell's 1994 notion of delegative democracies), these political leaders can be traced to the turbulent days of independence wars, when destitute populations needed protection from wandering armies and bandits. These leaders may range from local brokers that help people to obtain health assistance or a phone line (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984), to mythical nation-level figures such as Domingo Perón in Argentina or Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. Formally they represent political institutions. But due to their charisma and supposedly exceptional abilities, they go beyond institutions – when they disappear, institutions may crumble, or so many believe.

The relationship between personalism and political trust is ambiguous. It may be negative: as people get used to solve their problems thanks to the willingness of a leader, trust goes to the leader, not to the institutions he or she is supposed to represent. Criminal variations of personalism also erode institutional trust. Consider the Colombian drug czar Pablo Escobar, who provided food, popular housing and soccer fields to poor communities. In some regions he became way more trusted and loved than the Colombian state. But the relationship may be positive: trust in an exceptional leader may be transferred to his or her institutions or followers.

Intimately related to state weakness is the problem of corruption. Perceived corruption, especially among political elites, decreases public trust in political institutions because authorities are supposed to protect public interests rather than their own. Also, corruption diverts public resources away from public goods, which harms the quality of public policies and decreases trust. Recent Latin American history is peppered with corruption accusations towards top political figures, from Carlos Menem in Argentina and Lula's congressmen in Brazil, to Alberto Fujimori in Peru and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. And consistent with the international literature, cross-national studies in Latin America by Segovia (2008) and Morris (2004) indicate that more corrupt countries elicit lower political trust among their citizens. Still, many Latin Americans do not consider corruption to be the worst of sins, and messianic or charismatic leaders may be highly popular despite solid corruption charges against them. Therefore it may not be surprising if the relationship between corruption and trust is not as strong as expected.

A more auspicious scenario for political trust in Latin America?

We argued above that Latin American history does not provide a fertile ground for high political trust. However, a series of interrelated trends taking place during the last one or two decades suggest a different, more favorable scenario.

First, Latin American economies are growing fast since 2003. The average growth of per capita gross domestic product between 2003 and 2012 was 3.3%, way more than the 1.4% of the 1991-2002 period and of course than the "lost decade" of 1980-1990 (-.4%). During the 2003-2012 period all country averages were positive, and four countries (Argentina,

Panama, Peru, and Uruguay) had averages above 5%. Only three countries – El Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico – had an average growth lower than 2%.[2]

Economic growth helped to fight poverty, which decreased in the region as a whole from 43.9% of the population in 2002 to 28.8% in 2012 (indigence almost halved, going from 19.3% to 11.4% in the same period; ECLAC 2012). Other socioeconomic indicators improved too. While there is no automatic link between socioeconomic progress and political trust, better living conditions may promote among broad sectors of the population the belief that politicians and political institutions are using public resources effectively for addressing popular demands in areas such as education, health, and housing. And more effective institutions promote trust.

A second trend, presumably positive for political trust, is that Latin American states have also strengthened in other dimensions beyond their capacity of delivering socioeconomic goods. For instance, during the last two decades some of them have regained control over territories that were hitherto in the hands of non-state actors. In the early 1990s the Peruvian government defeated the Shining Path and the government of El Salvador deactivated guerrilla movements. The same happened in Guatemala in 1996. Nowadays (early 2014) the Colombian government seems closer than ever to reach a peace agreement with the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), which seriously undermined Colombian stateness since the 1960s.

The other side of the coin, though, is that more territorial control often required the brutal elimination of many civilians, and this may damage trust toward state institutions. And Latin American states are far from having gained complete control of their territories. Organized criminal gangs and drug cartels still control important chunks of Mexican and Central American territories.

Latin American states are also reforming and improving their judicial systems. According to Brinks' (2012) quantitative study, between 1975 and 2009 Latin American courts have gained autonomy from the Executive and increased the scope of their authority. They also elicit more compliance than before. Extra-judicial repression decreased and courts are more reluctant to validate excessive state repression. These developments are not even - they seem to occur in Chile, Colombia and Argentina to a greater extent than in Bolivia, Venezuela and Ecuador (Brinks 2012). Yet they suggest a greater potential for addressing the traditional social disparities in access to an impartial judicial treatment. This should contribute to higher trust - to judicial institutions at least, and perhaps also to the governments that promote these changes.

In the third place, the consolidation of Latin American democracies after the transitions from authoritarianism during the 1980s and 1990s is another important trend with potential implications for political trust. While democracy was far from granted a few decades ago, in the last two decades most Latin American countries established democratic or semi-democratic regimes that proved resistant to economic shocks and other national crises. By

[2] Analyses based on data from the World Development Indicators, World Bank, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx (retrieved on December 11, 2013).

early 2014 only Cuba is clearly non-democratic. According to the Polity score, the mean level of democracy in the region (variable polity2, which ranges from -10=strong autocracy to 10= strong democracy) increased dramatically and stabilized in the 2000s as follows: -2.29 (1975), -.82 (1980), 3.59 (1985), 6.88 (1990), 7.12 (1995), 7.82 (2000), 8.0 (2005), and 7.53 (2010)[3]. Likewise, the chances that popularly elected governments be overthrown by force are much lower nowadays than it was the case, say, in the 1960s. Amidst strong international pressures favoring democracy, many of the coups or coup attempts that took place in recent years failed, and they did so in a matter of hours (e. g. Ecuador in 2000 and 2010, and Venezuela in 2002). Those which succeeded (Ecuador in 2005 and Honduras in 2009) were condemned by the international community and large domestic sectors.

But the links between democracy and political trust are complex. In the long run democracy is important to political trust because democratic governments are supposed to better address people's demands, and because democracy fosters transparency and accountability. In the short run, however, new democracies may have to deal with disproportionate expectations from civil societies damaged after harsh authoritarianisms. Democratic disenchantment may promote "critical citizens" (Norris 1999) that trust little in institutions and embark in violent protests, which in turn may destabilize democracy - as almost happened in Argentina in late 2001.

In the fourth place, we consider the implications of the so-called "left turn" for political trust. The "left turn" refers to a regional trend of repeated electoral success of leftist governments. It began with the election of Socialist Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 1999 (although Chile might be classified as a pioneer given the 1990 triumph of the center-left Concertación). Venezuela was followed by leftist ascensions in Brazil (2002), Argentina (2003), Uruguay (2004), Bolivia (2006), Ecuador and Nicaragua (2007) and Paraguay (2008). With the exception of Paraguay and Chile, all these countries have since then (and up to early 2014) been ruled by left or center-left governments.

We claim that left turns in Latin America may be propitious for political trust, in the short term at least, for several reasons. First, these governments typically favor (in discourse and often in practice) more inclusive social programs and greater social spending. By doing so, leftist governments try to move away from the neoliberal policies and conservative governments that are associated with the "lost decade" of the 1980s and the feeble progress of the 1990s. In a highly unequal continent, this appearance of heightened awareness to social inequalities and demands may improve political trust. Second, leftist governments have often attempted to mobilize communities in self-government practices. This ranged from participative budgets (following Brazil's pioneer experience in 1989, which soon spread to other countries) to Chávez's social programs Misiones Bolivarianas, which created strong emotional links between the government and the beneficiaries (Handlin 2012). Grassroots mobilization nurtures the belief that political institutions are open to people's competences and skills. And governments trusting the people may be reciprocated.

[3] Analyses based on Polity IV dataset, available at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm; retrieved on January 8th, 2014.

Finally, some leftist governments (such as those in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela) promoted new constitutions through their corresponding constitutional assemblies (Cameron, 2009). These new legal frameworks included and recognized typically underprivileged ethnic groups as well as women (Ellner, 2012). This may have also created the impression of more open and responsive governments, which in turn should foster trust. Of course, these presumed influences may not operate evenly across the population: they may occur only among those supporting such leftist governments. In the empirical section we show how this is sometimes the case.

We close this section with a brief note about the relations between religion and political trust. During four centuries Latin America was a definitely Catholic region. Most people considered themselves as Catholic, and states were officially Catholic until beginnings of the twentieth century. In the last decades increasing pluralism has broken this monopoly thanks to the advance of Evangelical (mainly Pentecostal) denominations and, in Brazil and to a lesser extent Uruguay and Argentina, African diaspora religions (Chestnut 2003). This has also reactivated the traditionally nominal religiosity of Catholics (Stark and Smith 2012). As De Tocqueville (1900) noted long ago, religious faiths, beyond their doctrinal specificities, often connect people with public concerns, eventually improving their trust towards political institutions compared to those without religion. Religion may have implications for political trust in an additional way. Liberalizing reforms on issues with religious overtones like abortion or homosexual rights have been comparative slow in Latin America (except in Argentina and Uruguay and some regions of Mexico). For this reason, irreligious Latin Americans – which are more liberal on these issues – may feel more dissatisfied and trust less in the capacity of political institutions for delivering their preferred outcomes than those adhering to a Christian religious faith. The latter may believe that political institutions protect their values and interests to a greater extent than the former.

Trends in Political Trust

In this section we provide a brief descriptive glance at the evolution of political trust in Latin American countries, **¡Error! No se encuentra el origen de la referencia.** offers a broad view of political trust trends between 1995 and 2011. Besides political institutions, in this graph are also included the police and armed forces since they offer an interesting benchmark for comparison. A first aspect to notice is that the institution with the largest average corresponds to the armed forces, whereas the political parties present the lowest score over all years. Besides, it is possible to appreciate a general downward tendency between 1995 and 2003, which seems to recover from that year onwards. During this second period the government raises as the institution with highest trust after the armed forces. This timing may not be accidental: above we saw that, during the last decade, several important socioeconomic and political changes took place in the region, and that they might be pushing trust upwards.

** Graph 1 ABOUT HERE **

Focusing now in country differences, **¡Error! No se encuentra el origen de la referencia.** shows the means for the four political institutions considering country aggregated data from 2002 to 2011. Countries are sorted in the graph from the lowest (Perú) to the highest (Uruguay) average. Interestingly, for all countries the institutions with lowest trust are political parties whereas the institution with higher trust is the government, with the exception of Brazil and Costa Rica where the Judiciary depicts the highest trust. Furthermore, this rank order also corresponds to the variability of each measure, being the government the institution with the largest variability (sd=.98) and political parties the institution with the lowest variability (sd=0.85). Besides, the three measures also seem to covary in the different time points: the higher score in one of them appears accompanied by a higher score in the others. Actually, the Cronbach's alpha, as an interreliability measure, indicates a relative high association (0.74). A final element to mention from **¡Error! No se encuentra el origen de la referencia.** is the difference between institutions within countries. Countries with lower trust (as Peru, Ecuador, Guatemala & Panama) seem to display smaller differences between institutions when compared to countries with higher trust. This last effect is particularly remarkable in the cases of Brazil, Costa Rica and Chile.

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Graph 2 ABOUT HERE **

A last descriptive picture corresponds to the evolution of political trust by country in the four selected institutions, as depicted in **¡Error! No se encuentra el origen de la referencia.**. In most of the countries it is possible to observe a small increase in trust levels when comparing the initial with the last measurement points, although changes in between are far from being lineal. Ups and downs seem related between institutions. All in all the institution that displays the largest changes is the government.

** Graph 3 ABOUT HERE **

Another important feature highlighted by Graph 3 is the relatively high level of variation in aggregate levels of trust within each country. While trust in government is certainly the most visible case, trust in Congress and political parties also show relatively sizable changes in trust across time. In some cases the trends are positive such as in Bolivia and Venezuela, while in others the evolution of trust seems more trendless (such as in El Salvador and Honduras). Results from table 2 corroborate this intuition more formally. It shows the estimates from three-level hierarchical Anova models that estimate the proportion of all variation in survey responses to questions about trust in political institutions (which we detail in the following section) attributable to variation within each

country (within-country variance) and to variation in trust across countries (between-country variation).[4]

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

Results indicate that trust in Congress, Political parties and Government is more variable within countries than between countries. Or more simply, political trust for these three institutions tends to vary, on average, more within a single country than across all countries. This implies, of course, that aggregate levels of political trust tend to be quite changeable. This is particularly the case for trust in Political parties and Government where the within-country variance is more than double than the between-variance estimate. On the other hand, the within-country variance of the Judiciary is only slightly smaller than the between-country estimate, thereby indicating a substantial level of variation at both levels.

Research Design and Measurement

In order to understand how trust in political institutions among Latin Americans has evolved during the last decade we employ Latinobarometer survey data[5]. This survey project has been interviewing every year national samples of adult population of Latin-American countries since 1996, but given that some key individual level questions were not asked in all years we restrict our analysis from the year 2002 onwards. In total, our analysis includes 153 surveys from 17 countries during a time span of nine years, all of which totals more than 150.000 respondents.[6]

Our empirical analysis considers trust in four political institutions, namely, the Judiciary, national Congress, Political parties and the Government. The questions employed in the Latinobabrometer survey to measure trust in each of these institutions, as well as their four-point response categories, have been exactly the same for all countries during all applications.[7] Needless to say, this high degree of methodological consistency assures us that changes in the level of political trust reflect actual changes in the evaluations of Latin American citizens, and not changes in the survey instrument.

[4] Results shown on table 2 were estimated using MCMC simulation methods. All details about this procedure are explained in the following section.

[5] The Latinobarometro organization surveyed annually each of the countries included in our study (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, México, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela). The samples are about 1,200 cases per country every year. Each year the study realizes about 19,000 face-to-face interviews of adult population, representing more than 400 million Latin American inhabitants (www.latinobarometro.org).

[6] We also drop the Argentinean surveys from 2005 onwards since the World Bank does not report income per capita data during this period, which as well detail later, is one of the independent variables included in the statistical models.

[7] The employed question is: "Please look at this card and tell me, how much trust you have in each of the following groups, institutions or persons: A lot, some, a *little, or no trust?"*

Our analysis considers both individual and aggregate level variables. Among the former, we include a series of socio demographic variables, which includes gender (dummy variable), birth cohorts (5 ten-year age groups), education (dummy variables representing primary, secondary, and tertiary levels), and religious affiliation (dummies for Catholics, and Evangelicals and other religion, with non-affiliated individuals as reference category). Following the literature we also incorporate indicators related to respondents' perception of the performance of government (presidential approval) and the economy (evaluations of the economy of the country and of the family). We expect that favorable assessments of both are associated with more confidence in political institutions (Mainwaring, 2006; Segovia 2008; Mishler and Rose, 2001, 2012; van de Meer and Dekker, 2012). Lastly, we incorporate a left-right 11-point self-location scale.[8] Although the specific meaning of this last variable might change from country to country (see Kitschelt et al. [2010]), there is increasing evidence about its widespread usage as a heuristic devise across Latin American societies (Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita, 2013). We do not have any specific expectations about the marginal relationship of this variable and political trust, but we do expect that this variable will interact significantly with some country-level variables. We detail this expectation below.[9]

At the country level we incorporate three variables: a) level of control of corruption as measured by the World Bank Governance Indicators project; b) per capita income, using GDP per capita adjusted by purchase power parity (measured from the World Bank Development Indicators); and c) the ideological platform of governments (or governmental ideology).[10] While the first two variables are commonly employed in empirical analysis predicting trust in political institutions (Segovia, 2008; Misher and Rose, 2001, van de Meer and Dekker, 2012), the latter requires further elaboration. This variable classifies in terms of left-right ideological inclinations the economic policies implemented by each government during its tenure in office. This variable was originally measured by Murillo,

8 To capture individuals' ideological inclinations we actually introduce two variables. Following work from Jackson et al. (2010), we introduce the left-right position of all survey respondents who explicitly mentioned a position, while those who didn't (which represent roughly 23% of the sample) are assigned the country-year survey mean. We distinguish these respondents from the rest with an additional dummy variable in which they receive a value of "1".

9 Political trust is also commonly associated to interpersonal trust and institutional fairness. Several authors (Misher and Rose, 2001; Mainwaring, 2006) claim that the relationship with interpersonal trust is endogenous, reason because of which we do not incorporate this variable in the analysis. So far we haven't found a variable capturing institutional fairness that has been applied across all (or at least most) years in the Latinobarometer surveys. A pending task of this paper is to find a reasonable proxy that can capture this evaluation and incorporate it in the statistical models.

10 We omit an indicator that qualifies the level of democracy of each country (i.e. Freedom Score) given that for the period covered in our analysis there is very little variation. For example, using the Freedom Score there are 5 countries that do not change their score any year and six which change only one point during one year. Therefore, any results from this variable would be driven primarily by the few countries that indeed experience more change on this variable. An alternative which we will explore in the future is the age of the democratic regime of each country. This variable can be considered as an indicator of democratic consolidation, and indeed varies significantly across our sample.

Oliveiros and Vaishnav (2010), which rely on previous data sets and the expert judgments of more than thirty scholars. An important feature of this measure is that it was coded considering the economic policies that presidents effectively implemented during their tenure in office, as opposed to the platform he or she might have campaigned on. The original data set covers the period 1976-2007- We thus had to code some more recent governments following the guidelines contained in the codebook of Murillo, Oliveiros and Vaishnav (2010)[11]. This variables scores government's ideological platform on a 5-point scale, where 1 is Left, 2 is Center-Left, 3 is Center, 4 is Center-Right and 5 is Right. According to the authors a left wing position applies "to political actors who seek, as a central programmatic objective, to reduce social and economic inequalities" (Murillo, Oliveiros and Vaishnav, 2010). Through this variable we attempt to capture whether the "left-wing turn" that several Latin-American countries have experienced has had any consequences over Latin-Americans' level of trust in political institutions.

Statistical Modeling

Given that the Latinobarometer surveys are applied annually, when the data is pooled we obtain a repeated (or time-series) cross-sectional design, with respondents nested in yearly surveys, and these nested within countries. With this type of data it is not only possible to estimate the association between individual and contextual factors, and political trust, as in a common multilevel research design. Much more interestingly, we can also analyze how changes in contextual factors within a single country are associated, possibly, with alterations in the level of political trust. In other words, we can model simultaneously between-country and within-country variance. Now, given that our main objective is to assess how political trust has evolved among Latin American public, we concentrate our modeling efforts into capturing the latter type of variance. In fact, we incorporate in our statistical model country level fixed effects in order to "absorb" all between-country variability, so that all stable features of the countries in our sample --such as electoral systems, levels of ethnic and religious diversity, among many others-- are held constant in the empirical analysis (see Duch and Stevenson [2008] and Fairbrother [2013] for similar research designs). This implies that the coefficients of the aggregate level variables can be interpreted in our models as the (non-linear) average change of the dependent variable within a country associated with a unit change of the contextual variable.[12]

[11] Specifically we coded Piñera's (Chile) government initiated in 2010 as centrist (code 3), Morales's government after the 2009 election as left-wing (code 1), Funes's government in El Salvador since 2009 as center-left (code 2), Lobos government in Honduras since 2009 as center-right (code 4), and Mujica's government in Uruguay since 2009 as center-left (code 2).

[12] Additionally, if we had included a country-level random effect we would add to our model the potentially unwarranted parametric assumption of a normally distributed country-level random effect. This assumption will hardly occur given that the sample includes only 17 countries. Stegmueller (2013) finds that hierarchical models with few countries can have several problems.

We estimate two series of statistical models. The first set corresponds to ordinal probit models with a random intercept at the survey level, and the set of covariates detailed in the previous section. Following van de Meer and Dekker (2011) we incorporate the left-right self-location scale to assure that if the presidential ideology has a significant effect it is not due to possible compositional effects of the public that live in countries that experience ideological turns in their political system. Similarly, we incorporate economic evaluations not only because some authors claim that political trust is conditioned by performance evaluations (Mainwaring, 2006; Misher and Rose, 2005), but also to assure that if we find significant effects associated with GDP per capita it is not attributable to some specific configuration of economic evaluations within the populations included in our sample.

The second batch of statistical models include the same set of covariates but adds interactions between government approval and government ideology, as well as between the left-right scale and government ideology. We incorporate these interactions in order to find whether the influence of government ideology over political trust is conditioned by the partisan and ideological allegiances of respondents. While it is entirely expectable to find significant interactions between these variables when we predict confidence in government, things are not as clear when considering trust in the other three political institutions (judiciary, congress and parties). Indeed, non-significant interactions between these variables could possibly indicate that the influence of presidential ideology over these institutions, which encompass groups and people with heterogeneous political preferences, may be significant even among those who do not approve the president and identify with the opposite ideological pole than their current government

Parameter estimation of all models was conducted through a MCMC framework.[13] The sampling chains for each model ran for 50,000 iterations with the first 10,000 dropped as a burn-in period, and were thinned to save every 40th iteration. This procedure left a total of 1000 samples from the posterior distribution for each parameter of the models from which we base statistical inference. Convergence diagnostics indicated the chain of all models reached a steady state. The autocorrelation of all parameters from all models were all under $\rho < .10$. All models with random intercepts were estimated using an inverse-gamma prior with shape and scale parameters set to 0.001 for the random effect variance. For random coefficient models we employed a conjugate inverse-Wishart distribution with scale set equal to an identity matrix and degrees of freedom set to the same dimensions as the random effects matrix. Both priors are proper and relatively uninformative (Gelman and Hill, 2007). Regression coefficients, on the other hand, were assigned the commonly used and uninformative normally distributed prior with mean zero and very large variance ($\sigma^2 = 10^{10}$).

[13] Particularly using the R library MCMCglmm (Hadfield, 2010).

Empirical Results

Table 1 shows the parameter estimates for the ordinal random intercept models. At the individual level we find several variables with significant estimates. Perhaps most interesting, respondents' religious affiliation show some strong and positive effects. Specifically, self-declared Evangelicals and Catholics, compared to non-religious individuals, report higher levels of in each of the four political institutions included in the analysis. As suggested above, this may result from the role of religion in connecting people with public issues, or from the intuition among believers that political institutions protect their moral values on religiously charged issues such as homosexual rights and abortion. While the posterior means of both groups are significant (their credibility intervals exclude the value of zero) for all the institutions, the largest estimates are for the Judiciary (0.16 y 0.17 for Evangelicals and Catholics, respectively), with Congress slightly behind (0.15 for both groups). In probability scale, being a Catholic "average" respondent, as opposed to non-religious, decreases the chances of mentioning "no trust" in the Judiciary by 0.07 points.[14]

Birth cohorts and educational attainment also affect trust in political institutions, but in a more limited fashion: younger and more educated people often trust less. We find significant and negative estimates for birth cohorts in the equations predicting trust in Congress and Government, which implies that respondents' who were born more recently tend to trust less in these institutions. On the other hand, groups with higher levels of education than the reference group (who are those with primary education only) show lowers levels of trust. The patterns are not linear or large, though they are significant in the equations predicting trust in Congress and Political parties.

We move now to economic evaluations. While better assessments of the national economy are strongly associated with more trust in political institutions, the assessment of ones own economic situation is also significantly related to political trust, but much more modestly. This is consistent with the traditional finding about the greater relevance of sociotropic voting compared to egotropic voting (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981).. Comparing the estimates of each equation one can observe that, with the partial exception of the Judiciary, the posterior means of the evaluations of the national economy at least double in size those about the respondents' personal situation. As one might expect, the largest posterior mean was obtained predicting trust in government. In this case, for an average respondent, a one unit change in the perception of the economy (out of a 5 point ordinal scale) decreases the chances of mentioning 'no trust' in Government in 0.15 points.

[14] By "average" respondent we mean a prototypical respondent that has average values on all continuous and ordinal independent variables, mode responses on categorical independent variables, and from Mexico.

Both individual-level political variables -presidential approval and left-right self identification- show significant estimates as well. A more favorable assessment of the president is associated with more political trust for all four of the political institutions considered, albeit there are some important differences in the size of the estimates. The posterior mean of approval predicting trust in government more than doubles the size of the posterior mean predicting confidence in Congress, Political parties and the Judiciary. However, the estimates still indicate a reasonably large (partial) association for these last institutions. For example, compared to an average respondent that does not approve presidential performance, one that does approve it reduces the probability of a 'no trust' response in 0.16, 0.21, and 0.18 points on a probability scale, respectively.

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

The estimate for the left-right self identification scale shows that higher values, which indicate a more right-wing position, are associated with more confidence in political institutions. However, the size of the posterior means indicates that the associations are relatively modest for all of the institutions. For example, an increase of 5 points in the left-right scale decreases in only about 0.03 points the probability an average respondent mentions "no trust" in political parties or in the Judiciary. On the other hand, those who did not mention a political position on the scale have significantly lower levels of trust in all four political institutions than those who did mention it.

Among the contextual variables we find very interesting patterns. In first place, we find that current levels of political trust within a country are negatively correlated with changes in the level of political corruption for all political institutions, but Government. However, and quite surprisingly, the posterior means of this variable are not significant. This is a very interesting result that contrasts sharply with results from many cross-sectional studies, which find strong negative and highly significant associations. Previously we speculated that more lenient views of corruption among Latin Americans might weaken the expected relationship between corruption and trust in within-country analyses like ours. But there could be two additional reasons for explaining this lack of significance. First, Latin Americans publics might be slow learners such that collective levels of political trust do not react immediately to changes in corruption. In other words, at the aggregate level it might take some time for the public to react to corruption events. We will explore this possibility in future versions of this investigation. Second, yearly changes in political corruption tend to be very small; they may be too small to produce a statistically detectable change in political trust. Clearly, this point merits further research.

Our variable about government's ideological platform (governmental ideology in short) contains statistically significant estimates for all institutions but the Judiciary. The negative signs of the posterior means indicate that when governmental ideology moves to the right

political trust decreases within a country. The magnitudes of the estimates are similar for trust in Congress and Political parties, and a bit larger, as one might expect, for trust in Government. The 0.10 posterior mean of trust in the equation predicting trust in Political parties implies that the probability that an "average" respondent mentions 'no trust' increases about 0.03 for each point a government moves towards the right. This implies that, within a given country, a change from a deliberately left wing government (such as the current government of Morales in Bolivia or Correa in Ecuador), to a right wing government (as the one of Bolaños Geyer in Nicaragua), leads to an increase of 0.15 points in the proportion of respondents that mention not to trust in the political parties of their country.[15] The respective difference for trust in Government amounts to a reduction of 0.21 points. Doubtless these are very substantial results. Among many possible implications, they indicate that political elites can influence directly the level of trust that citizens confer to their political institutions. Also, these results suggest that the "left turn" discussed at the beginning of this chapter may have boosted political trust. We speculated that this might happen because leftist governments usually create more inclusive social programs and legal frameworks, and mobilize communities in self-government practices - all things that should increase trust (but of course the point is far from being settled). Finally, the negative signs of the coefficients of this variable also contrast directly with the positive signs of the left-right ideological scale (which is coded in the same direction). Therefore, while a more right-wing ideological position at the individual level is associated with higher political trust, changes towards the right in the position of governments reduce political trust.

Lastly, we also find positive and significant effects for changes in the average income level of countries. The results are particularly strong for Congress, Political parties and Government. A one unit increase in the logarithm of the per capita gross domestic product, which could be represented as a change from the 20^{th} to the 80^{th} percentile of the income distribution, leads to a reduction of 0.18 points in the proportion of respondents that mention to have 'no trust' in their national Congress. This difference rises up to 0.27 points when it comes to trust in Government. Wealthier states can provide better public services and assure better living conditions to the population, creating a fertile ground for political trust This is consistent with the fact that, as noted above, from 2003 onwards both economic growth and political trust boomed in the region (see graph 1). Still, this presumed effect should not be immediate. Further tests of different time lags in the independent variable are needed.

The results reviewed so far indicate relatively strong within-country contextual influences over trust in political institutions. However, the estimates we have considered correspond to

[15] In addition to the current linear specification of this variable in the regression models, we also treated it as a categorical factor with each level as an independent variable. Results strongly suggested that a linear specification adequately captured the association with the political trust variables. Fit statistics BIC and AIC favored the linear specification in all instances.

"unconditional effects" that assume that there are no cross-level interactions between individual level and contextual variables. This seems an unwarranted assumption. As suggested above, the positive impact of leftist governments on political trust may operate only, or more strongly, within leftist supporters. For addressing this point, table 2 shows results from a series of random coefficient models that relax this assumption and incorporate interactions between governmental ideology and individual-level political variables (presidential approval, left-right position and the dummy variable indicating whether a respondent mentioned any ideological position). Through these interactions we analyze whether left-wing changes in governmental ideology affect political trust only among government supporters and/or left-wing advocates, or instead whether they spill over to non-supporters and right-wing enthusiasts.

TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

Of the four institutions we consider, we find significant interactions only for Congress and Government, specifically between government ideology and presidential approval in the case of the former, and between government ideology, presidential approval, and the left-right scale in the case of the later. Both interactions with presidential approval are negatively signed, thereby indicating that the association between trust and government ideology is stronger among government supporters. Similarly, the positive sign of the interaction with the left-right scale indicates that government ideology becomes less influential as respondents declare increasingly right-wing positions.

In order to asses these patterns more intuitively, Graph 4 and Graph 5 show the predicted probability that an average respondent mentioned 'somewhat' or 'a lot' of trust in Congress and Government, respectively. In the case of Congress, where we only consider the interaction with presidential approval, there is a clear trend of higher levels of trust among those who approve the work of the president as government ideology becomes more left-wing. While the predicted probability for an average voter who supports a right-wing government is 0.23, the equivalent estimate for a supporter of a left-wing government is 0.45. Contrary to this, trust in Congress hardly changes at varying levels of government ideology among government opponents.

Graph 5 shows even more striking patterns. In this case we calculate the predicted probabilities of responding 'somewhat' or 'a lot' of trust in Government considering different levels of presidential approval and positions on the left-right scale. In general terms, the effect of government ideology becomes largest among left-wing government supporters. For an average voter with these attributes, a change from the most right-wing to the most left-wing platform corresponds to a change in the predicted probability from 0.18 to 0.65. The respective difference among a right-wing respondent, from 0.37 to 0.52, is quite smaller, but far from negligible. Now, similarly to the results from trust in Congress, trust responses among those who do not approve the work of the president are much less

sensitive to the ideological inclinations of governments. In the best case, which corresponds to left-wing respondents, the respective differences go from 0.04 to 0.17. In case of right-wing voters we observe slightly less trust in government - from 0.13 to 0.10.

Lastly, it is important to mention that the non-significance of the cross-level interactions for trust in Political parties is actually a very interesting null finding. Contrary to the responses observed for Congress and Government, Latin Americans' trust judgments about parties become increasingly positive as governments move to the left, but this effect does not seem to be concentrated neither among government supporters nor left-wings adherents. They apply to the population at large.

Discussion

In the present chapter we have analyzed political trust in Latin American with an explicit historical perspective that has stressed the political context from which political trust judgments emerge, as well as how these judgments have evolved during the last decade in the continent.

Our empirical analysis of the Latinobarometer survey data has uncovered a series of interesting patterns regarding how Latin American's trust their national political institutions (specifically, the Judiciary, Congress, Political parties and Government). In first place, trust in these political institutions does not only vary across countries, but tends to do so even more within countries as time passes by. Far from an immutable trait, political trust in Latin American countries appears to be sensitive to the ups and downs of political events. Moreover, this aggregate variation does not seem trendless, but quite the contrary. It is possible to observe a modest increase in aggregate level of political trust in most Latin American countries beginning around the 2003-2004 period.

Second, and consistent with previous empirical work, we find that individual level performance evaluations, as well as survey respondents' political inclinations significantly affect trust in political institutions. Those who perceive that the national economy is doing well and those who approve the work of the president not only trust in government at higher rates, but this positive effect tends to spill over onto the other three political institutions considered in our analysis.

Third, we find that within-country variation in political trust is strongly influenced by changes per capita income and in the ideological orientation of governments. While the cross-sectional association with the first variable is a common result found in previous research, our repeated cross-sectional design confirms that annual changes in per capita income, which could be interpreted as variation in economic performance, also trigger changes in aggregate level of political trust within a country. While the magnitude of the

association was particularly large with trust in Government, it was also significant and substantially large for trust in Congress, Political parties and the Judiciary.

Our estimates also indicate a positive relationship between left-wing changes in government policy and trust in three of the three of the four political institutions we consider (Congress, Political parties and Government). These results confirm our initial suspicion about how the so called "left turn" may have boosted political trust. We believe the mechanism behind this association refers to recent Latin American leftist governments' tendency to create more inclusive social programs and legal frameworks, and well as their strong mobilization of popular segments of the population. However, this is nothing more than a interpretation that demands more research.

Finally, we also found some interesting cross-level interactions between the ideological orientation of Latin American governments and survey respondent's political preferences. Specifically, we found that the association between trust in Congress and government ideology is stronger among respondents who approve the work of the president, thereby indicating that the boost of trust in Congress associated with left-wing changes is mostly concentrated among supporters of government. In a similar, but a bit more complex fashion, government ideology becomes more predictive of trust in government among respondents that approve the president and identify on the left side of the ideological spectrum. In contrast to these last two cases, we find that the influence of government ideology over trust in Political parties seems to apply to the population at large.

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Table 1: Trust in political institutions by region (Segovia, 2008)

	Mean	Sd	N (individuals)	N (countries)
Industrialized	2.36	0.67	33,769	24
Central and Eastern Europe	2.10	0.71	23,110	17
Latin America	2.00	0.77	12,838	9
Total	**2.21**	**0.72**	**69,716**	**50**

Table 2: Posterior means and 95% Bayesian credible intervals (in parenthesis) for parameters of Anova ordinal probit model for confidence in political institutions.

	Judiciary	Congress	Parties	Government
Intercept	0.73	0.58	0.17	0.83
	(0.55, 0.91)	(0.44, 0.73)	(0.03, 0.3)	(0.68, 0.98)
Threshold 1	1.45	1.43	1.42	1.37
	(1.44, 1.47)	(1.42, 1.45)	(1.41, 1.44)	(1.35, 1.38)
Threshold 2	2.91	2.91	2.86	2.77
	(2.88, 2.93)	(2.89, 2.93)	(2.84, 2.88)	(2.75, 2.79)
Variance Components:				
$Sigma^2$ survey	0.11	0.17	0.16	0.36
(Within-country)	(0.09, 0.13)	(0.14, 0.21)	(0.12, 0.18)	(0.28, 0.43)
$Sigma^2$ country	0.14	0.10	0.07	0.06
(Betwwen-country)	(0.06, 0.29)	(0.04, 0.23)	(0.03, 0.14)	(0.01, 0.17)
N cases	210533	209035	212290	179672
N surveys	200	200	200	166
N countries	17	17	17	17

Table 3: Posterior means and 95% Bayesian credible intervals (in parenthesis) for parameters of ordinal random intercept probit models for confidence in political institutions.

	Judiciary	Congress	Parties	Government
Intercept	-1.35	-5.65	-6.56	-7.14
	(-3.82, 1.11)	(-8.35, -3.08)	(-8.99, -4.11)	(-10.08, -3.81)
Gender (male=1)	-0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.02
	(-0.02, 0.01)	(-0.02, 0.01)	(0.01, 0.04)	(0.01, 0.04)
Cohort 1941-50	-0.01	-0.05	-0.02	-0.10
	(-0.05, 0.03)	(-0.09, -0.01)	(-0.05, 0.02)	(-0.14, -0.07)
Cohort 1951-60	-0.01	-0.06	-0.02	-0.11
	(-0.04, 0.03)	(-0.1, -0.03)	(-0.05, 0.02)	(-0.14, -0.08)
Cohort 1961-70	0.00	-0.07	-0.03	-0.16
	(-0.03, 0.04)	(-0.11, -0.04)	(-0.06, 0.01)	(-0.19, -0.13)
Cohort 1971-80	0.02	-0.08	-0.03	-0.22
	(-0.02, 0.05)	(-0.11, -0.05)	(-0.06, 0.01)	(-0.26, -0.2)
Cohort 1980 or after	0.11	0.02	0.06	-0.27
	(0.08, 0.14)	(-0.01, 0.05)	(0.03, 0.1)	(-0.3, -0.23)
Secondary Education	-0.03	-0.03	-0.06	-0.04
	(-0.04, -0.01)	(-0.05, -0.01)	(-0.08, -0.05)	(-0.06, -0.02)
Technical Education	-0.05	-0.01	-0.07	0.00
	(-0.08, -0.01)	(-0.05, 0.02)	(-0.11, -0.04)	(-0.04, 0.03)
Colledge education	-0.01	-0.03	-0.06	0.00
	(-0.04, 0.01)	(-0.06, -0.01)	(-0.09, -0.04)	(-0.02, 0.03)
Other religion	0.08	0.05	-0.04	0.02
	(0.03, 0.12)	(0.02, 0.1)	(-0.08, 0.01)	(-0.02, 0.07)
Evangelical	0.16	0.15	0.06	0.09
	(0.13, 0.19)	(0.11, 0.18)	(0.03, 0.1)	(0.06, 0.12)
Catholic	0.17	0.15	0.11	0.11
	(0.14, 0.2)	(0.12, 0.18)	(0.08, 0.13)	(0.09, 0.14)
Evaluation national economy	0.24	0.27	0.26	0.37
	(0.23, 0.25)	(0.26, 0.28)	(0.25, 0.27)	(0.36, 0.38)
Evaluation personal economy	0.14	0.13	0.11	0.13
	(0.13, 0.15)	(0.12, 0.14)	(0.1, 0.12)	(0.12, 0.14)
Presential Approval (1=yes)	0.47	0.59	0.46	1.15
	(0.45, 0.48)	(0.57, 0.6)	(0.45, 0.48)	(1.14, 1.17)
Left-right scale (0-10)	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01
	(0.02, 0.02)	(0.01, 0.02)	(0.02, 0.02)	(0.01, 0.01)
Dosen´t mention Left-right position	-0.23	-0.23	-0.28	-0.16
(dummy)	(-0.24, -0.21)	(-0.25, -0.22)	(-0.3, -0.26)	(-0.18, -0.14)
Presidential party economic ideology	-0.04	-0.09	-0.10	-0.13
	(-0.09, 0.01)	(-0.14, -0.04)	(-0.15, -0.05)	(-0.19, -0.07)
Control of Corruption	-0.18	-0.04	-0.14	0.09
	(-0.47, 0.21)	(-0.42, 0.29)	(-0.49, 0.19)	(-0.32, 0.53)
Log GNI per Capita (ppp)	0.02	0.49	0.54	0.69
	(-0.24, 0.29)	(0.22, 0.78)	(0.27, 0.79)	(0.35, 1)
Variance Component:				
$Sigma^2$ Intercept	0.07	0.08	0.07	0.11
	(0.06, 0.09)	(0.06, 0.1)	(0.05, 0.08)	(0.08, 0.14)
N cases	158623	157671	160378	162007
N surveys	149	149	149	149

Note: All regression models control for country-level fixed effect.

Table 4: Posterior means and 95% Bayesian credible intervals (in parenthesis) for parameters of ordinal random coefficient probit models for confidence in political institutions.

	Judiciary	Congress	Parties	Government
Intercept	-1.15	-4.94	-6.19	-7.77
	(-4.31, 2.06)	(-8.09, -1.81)	(-9.24, -3.08)	(-11.75, -4.43)
Gender (male=1)	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.02
	(-0.02, 0.01)	(-0.02, 0.01)	(0.01, 0.04)	(0, 0.03)
Cohort 1941-50	-0.01	-0.05	-0.02	-0.11
	(-0.05, 0.03)	(-0.09, -0.01)	(-0.06, 0.02)	(-0.14, -0.07)
Cohort 1951-60	-0.01	-0.07	-0.03	-0.12
	(-0.05, 0.02)	(-0.1, -0.03)	(-0.07, 0.01)	(-0.15, -0.08)
Cohort 1961-70	0.01	-0.08	-0.03	-0.16
	(-0.03, 0.04)	(-0.11, -0.04)	(-0.07, 0)	(-0.2, -0.13)
Cohort 1971-80	0.02	-0.08	-0.03	-0.23
	(-0.01, 0.05)	(-0.11, -0.04)	(-0.06, 0.01)	(-0.26, -0.19)
Cohort 1980 or after	0.12	0.02	0.06	-0.26
	(0.08, 0.15)	(-0.01, 0.06)	(0.03, 0.1)	(-0.3, -0.23)
Secondary Education	-0.02	-0.02	-0.06	-0.03
	(-0.04, -0.01)	(-0.04, -0.01)	(-0.08, -0.04)	(-0.05, -0.02)
Technical Education	-0.04	-0.01	-0.07	0.01
	(-0.08, 0)	(-0.04, 0.03)	(-0.11, -0.04)	(-0.03, 0.04)
Colledge education	-0.01	-0.02	-0.06	0.02
	(-0.03, 0.02)	(-0.04, 0.01)	(-0.09, -0.04)	(-0.01, 0.04)
Other religion	0.07	0.06	-0.03	0.03
	(0.04, 0.12)	(0.01, 0.09)	(-0.07, 0.02)	(-0.01, 0.07)
Evangelical	0.16	0.16	0.07	0.10
	(0.13, 0.19)	(0.12, 0.19)	(0.04, 0.11)	(0.08, 0.14)
Catholic	0.17	0.16	0.12	0.14
	(0.15, 0.2)	(0.13, 0.18)	(0.09, 0.15)	(0.11, 0.17)
Evaluation national economy	0.23	0.26	0.25	0.35
	(0.22, 0.24)	(0.25, 0.27)	(0.24, 0.26)	(0.34, 0.36)
Evaluation personal economy	0.13	0.12	0.11	0.13
	(0.12, 0.14)	(0.11, 0.13)	(0.1, 0.12)	(0.12, 0.14)
Presential Approval (1=yes)	0.55	0.42	0.52	0.75
	(0.43, 0.67)	(0.09, 0.75)	(0.19, 0.83)	(0.39, 1.15)
L-R scale (0-10)	0.00	-0.03	-0.01	-0.09
	(-0.08, 0.07)	(-0.1, 0.04)	(-0.08, 0.07)	(-0.16, 0)
Dosen´t mention L-R position	-0.21	-0.20	-0.29	-0.15
(dummy)	(-0.32, -0.09)	(-0.32, -0.08)	(-0.41, -0.18)	(-0.26, -0.03)
Government Ideology	-0.03	-0.07	-0.09	-0.07
	(-0.1, 0.03)	(-0.14, -0.01)	(-0.16, -0.03)	(-0.14, 0.01)
Control of Corruption	-0.19	0.81	0.52	1.56
	(-0.62, 0.22)	(0.67, 0.94)	(0.41, 0.64)	(1.36, 1.72)

Log GNI per Capita (ppp)	0.01	-0.03	-0.15	-0.01
	(-0.3, 0.37)	(-0.46, 0.38)	(-0.59, 0.23)	(-0.45, 0.46)
Presential Approval *	-0.03	-0.08	-0.02	-0.15
Government Ideology	(-0.07, 0.01)	(-0.12, -0.04)	(-0.06, 0.01)	(-0.19, -0.09)
L-R Scale * Government	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.03
Ideology	(-0.01, 0.03)	(-0.01, 0.04)	(-0.01, 0.03)	(0.01, 0.06)
Dosen't mention L-R Scale *	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.01
Presidential party Ideology	(-0.04, 0.03)	(-0.05, 0.03)	(-0.03, 0.04)	(-0.04, 0.03)
Threshold 1	1.52	1.51	1.48	1.55
	(1.51, 1.53)	(1.5, 1.52)	(1.47, 1.5)	(1.54, 1.56)
Threshold 2	3.05	3.11	3.03	3.18
	(3.03, 3.07)	(3.1, 3.13)	(3.01, 3.05)	(3.17, 3.2)
Variance Components:				
Sigma^2 Intercept	0.12	0.12	0.11	0.15
	(0.10, 0.15)	(0.09, 0.15)	(0.08, 0.14)	(0.12, 0.2)
Sigma^2 Approval	0.09	0.11	0.09	0.19
	(0.07, 0.11)	(0.08, 0.13)	(0.07, 0.11)	(0.14, 0.23)
Sigma^2 L-R scale	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
	(0.03, 0.05)	(0.03, 0.05)	(0.03, 0.05)	(0.03, 0.05)
Sigma^2 No L-R scale	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07
	(0.05, 0.09)	(0.06, 0.09)	(0.06, 0.09)	(0.06, 0.09)
N cases	158623	157671	160378	162007
N surveys	149	149	149	149

Note: All regression models control for country-level fixed effect.

Graph 1: Evolution of political trust in different institutions



Source: Latinobarómetro, own elaboration based on Zmerli & Castillo (2012)

Graph 2: Trust in political institutions by country in Latin America (average from 2002 to 2011)



Source: Latinobarometer, own elaboration

Graph 3: Evolution of trust in political institutions in Latin American countries



Source: Latinobarometer, own elaboration

Graph 4: Predicted values of trusting Congress 'Somewhat' and 'A lot' by presidential approval and government ideological platform (with 95% confidence intervals).



Source: Latinobarometer, own elaboration

Graph 5: Predicted values of trusting Government 'Somewhat' and 'A lot' by presidential approval, left-right position and government ideological platform (with 95% confidence intervals).



Source: Latinobarometer, own elaboration