

BORING BUFFER OVERFLOWS

CYBER SECURITY!

OUTLINE

- What is an Overflow
- Unsafe Instructions
- A Program in Memory
- Basic Exploitation
- Defenses
- Return Oriented Programming (ROP)
- BROP
- Riscy ROP

BASICS





Diagram illustrating the addition of two 8-bit numbers:

$$\begin{array}{r} 00000001 + \\ 11111111 = \\ \hline 00000000 \end{array}$$

The result is 00000000, with a carry of 1 indicated by a red arrow pointing to the left.

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UNSAFE INSTRUCTIONS



- There are more unsafe instructions then I would know
- We can also use common conventions in an unsafe manner
 - That is accessing memory out of bounds manually



✗ C4996	'scanf': This function or variable may be unsafe. Consider using scanf_s instead. To disable deprecation, use _CRT_SECURE_NO_WARNINGS. See online help for details.	CyberSecurity	Scanf.cpp	7
✗ C4996	'strcpy': This function or variable may be unsafe. Consider using strcpy_s instead. To disable deprecation, use _CRT_SECURE_NO_WARNINGS. See online help for details.	CyberSecurity	Scanf.cpp	

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


A PROGRAM IN MEMORY

HARDWARE



A PROGRAM IN MEMORY

LOADED IN MEMORY




OUTLINE


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BASIC EXPLOITATION

- Sadly I will just talk about this ☹
- How can the Layout of memory help us?
- Where are local variables stored?
- What is the orientation of a Buffer?
- What do you put in the buffer?
 - Msfvenom
 - ROP



ANOTHER IMAGE



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DEFENSES


- ASLR
 - Address space layout randomization
 - Mainly affects the use of library functions
 - Stack based attacks can use NOP slides to negate some of the challenge
 - Libraries need exact addresses to call
- Canaries
 - Terminator
 - Random
 - Random XOR
- NX Memory Pages
 - If you can't Execute Shell Code, What can you do?

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ROP

- This is what we can do when NX Memory is used
 - That is we find *gadgets* in the existing code
- We use those gadgets to force a program to preform the actions we want!
 - Usually this is a system or library call to make the program do some action.
- This often requires access to the source binary/code for analysis
 - There are some methods to bypass this.



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BROP

- Blind!
 - No info about target system
- Requires special circumstances




Figure 5. Stack reading. A single byte on the stack is overwritten with guess X. If the service crashes, the wrong value was guessed. Otherwise, the stack is overwritten with the same value and no crash occurs. After at most 256 attempts, the correct value will be guessed. The process is then repeated for subsequent bytes on the stack.




Figure 10. Scanning for pop gadgets. By changing the stack layout, one can fingerprint gadgets that pop words from the stack. For example, if a “trap gadget” is executed rather than popped, the program will crash.

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RISCY ROP

- Interesting paper, we are out of time...
 - Uses symbolic execution on a known binary to determine ROP chains in a RISC-V architecture

CONCLUSION

DONE, THERE IS NONE