



COMP6452 Lecture 3: Blockchain in Software Architecture 1

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
Outline

- What is Taxonomy?
- Varieties of Blockchain – A Taxonomy
 - (De)centralization
 - Deployment
 - Ledger Structure
 - Consensus Protocol
 - Block Configuration and Data Structure
 - Auxiliary Blockchain
 - Anonymity
 - Incentive
- Summary


What is Taxonomy?

What is Taxonomy?

- *Taxonomy is the practice and science of classification of things or concepts, including the principles that underlie such classification*



What is Taxonomy



Why Taxonomy? 分类学法

- Diverse range of blockchain has emerged since the advent of Bitcoin in 2008
 - Complex internal structure and many configurations and variants
- Comparison of different blockchain is difficult
 - Lack of product data and technology evaluation resources
- Blockchain Taxonomy 维度和类别来区分不同的blockchain
 - Dimensions and categories for classifying blockchains
 - Understanding blockchain technology
- Benefits
 - Systematically consider the features and configurations of blockchain
 - Explore the conceptual design space
 - Compare and evaluate design options
 - Assess their impact on **quality attributes**



Properties of Blockchain

- Blockchain cannot meet requirements for all usage scenarios
 - E.g. those that require real-time processing
- Fundamental Properties
 - Immutability *from committed transaction*
 - Integrity *from cryptographic tool*
 - Transparency *from public access*
 - Equal rights *from consensus*
 - Weighted by the compute power or stake owned by the miner
- Limitation
 - Data privacy
 - No privileged users
 - Scalability
 - Size of the data on blockchain
 - Transaction processing rate
 - Latency of data transmission

基本特性

- 1.一旦交易即不可改变
- 2.机密性确保其完整性
- 3.公开性,谁都能看
- 4.少数服从多数,能够达成一致共识

限制

- 1.没有特权用户
 - 2.扩展性差
- 链上数据的大小
交易运行的速度
数据传送的延迟

Taxonomy: A Glimpse 1/2

Classification

| | Permission-less | Permissioned |
|---------|---|--|
| Public | <p>Consensus: Proof-of-X</p> <p>Permission management</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Blockchain layer• Application layer (optional) <p>Incentive: Blockchain layer</p> | <p>Consensus</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Proof-of-X• PBFT, Federated consensus, Round Robin etc. <p>Permission management</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Blockchain layer• Application layer (optional) <p>Incentive:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Blockchain layer• Governance around permissions |
| Private | <p>Consensus</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Proof-of-X• PBFT, Federated consensus, Round Robin etc. <p>Permission management:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Blockchain layer• Network layer• Application layer (optional) <p>Incentive: Governance around access</p> | <p>Consensus</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Proof-of-X• PBFT , Federated consensus, Round Robin etc. <p>Permission management:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Blockchain layer• Network layer• Application layer (optional) <p>Incentive: Governance around access permission</p> |

Taxonomy: A Glimpse 2/2

Quality Tradeoffs

| | Permission-less | Permissioned | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------|--|--------------|-----------------------------------|----|-----------|-----------------------------------|----|--------------|---------------------|----|--------------|------------------------|----|-------------|------------------------|-----|-----------------|-----|-----|--|--------------|----|-----------|----|--------------|----|--------------|----|-------------|-----|-----------------|-----|
| Public | <table><tr><td>Immutability</td><td>+++ (#Nodes, Consensus, Topology)</td><td>++</td></tr><tr><td>Integrity</td><td>+++ (#Nodes, Consensus, Topology)</td><td>++</td></tr><tr><td>Transparency</td><td>++ (Access control)</td><td>++</td></tr><tr><td>Availability</td><td>+++ (#Nodes, Topology)</td><td>++</td></tr><tr><td>Performance</td><td>+ (Consensus, latency)</td><td>++</td></tr><tr><td>Cost Efficiency</td><td>+</td><td>++</td></tr></table> | Immutability | +++ (#Nodes, Consensus, Topology) | ++ | Integrity | +++ (#Nodes, Consensus, Topology) | ++ | Transparency | ++ (Access control) | ++ | Availability | +++ (#Nodes, Topology) | ++ | Performance | + (Consensus, latency) | ++ | Cost Efficiency | + | ++ | <table><tr><td>Immutability</td><td>++</td></tr><tr><td>Integrity</td><td>++</td></tr><tr><td>Transparency</td><td>++</td></tr><tr><td>Availability</td><td>++</td></tr><tr><td>Performance</td><td>++</td></tr><tr><td>Cost Efficiency</td><td>++</td></tr></table> | Immutability | ++ | Integrity | ++ | Transparency | ++ | Availability | ++ | Performance | ++ | Cost Efficiency | ++ |
| Immutability | +++ (#Nodes, Consensus, Topology) | ++ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Integrity | +++ (#Nodes, Consensus, Topology) | ++ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Transparency | ++ (Access control) | ++ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Availability | +++ (#Nodes, Topology) | ++ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Performance | + (Consensus, latency) | ++ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Cost Efficiency | + | ++ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Immutability | ++ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Integrity | ++ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Transparency | ++ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Availability | ++ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Performance | ++ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Cost Efficiency | ++ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Private | <table><tr><td>Immutability</td><td>+</td><td>+</td></tr><tr><td>Integrity</td><td>+</td><td>+</td></tr><tr><td>Transparency</td><td>+</td><td>+</td></tr><tr><td>Availability</td><td>+</td><td>+</td></tr><tr><td>Performance</td><td>+++</td><td>+++</td></tr><tr><td>Cost Efficiency</td><td>+++</td><td>+++</td></tr></table> | Immutability | + | + | Integrity | + | + | Transparency | + | + | Availability | + | + | Performance | +++ | +++ | Cost Efficiency | +++ | +++ | <table><tr><td>Immutability</td><td>+</td></tr><tr><td>Integrity</td><td>+</td></tr><tr><td>Transparency</td><td>+</td></tr><tr><td>Availability</td><td>+</td></tr><tr><td>Performance</td><td>+++</td></tr><tr><td>Cost Efficiency</td><td>+++</td></tr></table> | Immutability | + | Integrity | + | Transparency | + | Availability | + | Performance | +++ | Cost Efficiency | +++ |
| Immutability | + | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Integrity | + | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Transparency | + | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Availability | + | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Performance | +++ | +++ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Cost Efficiency | +++ | +++ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Immutability | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Integrity | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Transparency | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Availability | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Performance | +++ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Cost Efficiency | +++ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Taxonomy Dimensions

(De)centralization

Deployment

Ledger Structure

Consensus Protocol

Block Configuration and Data Structure

Auxiliary Blockchain

Anonymity

Incentive



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Centralization – Decentralization


| Design Decision | Option | Impact | | | | #Failure points |
|--|--|------------------------|-----------------|-------------|--------------------------------|-----------------|
| | | Fundamental properties | Cost efficiency | Performance | | |
| 完全中心化 Fully Centralised | 只有一个提供者 Services with a single provider (e.g., governments, courts) | ⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ | | 1 |
| 部分中心化 Partially Centralised & Partially Decentralised | 有可选择的提供者 Services with alternative providers (e.g., banking, online payments, cloud services) | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ | | * |
| | 有permissioned的blockchain在细粒度的操作下 Permissioned blockchain with permissions for fine-grained operations on the transaction level (e.g., permission to create posts) | | | | | |
| | 有permissioned的blockchain在细粒度的操作下 Permissioned blockchain with permissioned miners (write), but permission-less normal nodes (read) | | | | | |
| Fully Decentralised | Permission-less blockchain | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕ | ⊕ | Majority (nodes, power, stake) | |



Full Centralization

- Services with a single provider
 - E.g., governments, courts, business monopolies
 - Single point of failure
- Services with alternative providers
 - E.g., banks, online payments, cloud services
 - Failure of a single service provider affects its users

举例有哪些完全中心化case




Full Decentralization



有哪些完全去中心化的case

- Permission-less public blockchains
- Completely open
 - New users can join, validate transaction or mine block at any time
- Protect against Sybil attack
 - Pseudonym: blockchain account represents a user
 - PoW: total amount of computational power rather than the number of nodes is important for integrity



Partial (De)centralization 1/2 部分去中心化

- Permissioned blockchain requires authorities act as a gate for participation
 - Permission to join the network (read) 授权方授权给users join
 - Permission to send transaction
 - Permission to mine (write)
- Permissioned blockchain with permissioned miners (write), and permission-less normal nodes (read)
- Permissioned blockchain with permissions for fine-grained operations
 - Permission to create assets



Partial (De)centralization 2/2

- More suitable in regulated industries **这种方法更适合需要管理的industries**
- Banks establish the real-world identity of transacting parties
 - Know-Your-Customer (KYC) regulation
- Transactions on permission-less blockchain
 - Across jurisdictional boundaries
 - Undermine regulatory controls
- Better control access to off-chain information about real-world assets
最好能够通过链下来进入real-world asset

半中心化半去中心化

Tradeoffs between permissioned and permission-less blockchains

Transaction processing rate, cost, flexibility in changing the network rules, reversibility and finality



Taxonomy Dimensions

(De)centralization

Deployment

Ledger Structure 分类结构

Consensus Protocol

Block Configuration and Data Structure

Auxiliary Blockchain

Anonymity

Incentive



Deployment Overview

有三种deploy的选择

- 1.公开blockchain
- 2.财团/公司/社团blockchain
- 3.私有化blockchain

| Deployment Option | Fundamental properties | Cost efficiency | Impact | |
|---------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------|-------------|-------------|
| | | | Performance | Flexibility |
| Public blockchain | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕ | ⊕ | ⊕ |
| Consortium/community blockchain | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ |
| Private blockchain | ⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ |

- Public blockchain: Most cryptocurrencies
 - Anyone on the internet can access
 - Better information transparency and auditability
 - Sacrifice performance
 - Data privacy relies on encryption or cryptographic hashes
 - Different cost model (*Lecture 5*)

公开blockchain

- 1.任何人都可以access
- 2.更好的透明度
- 3.牺牲了性能
- 4.加密依靠hash
- 5.不同的cost model

Deployment Overview

社团blockchian

1. 跨越多个组织

2. 共识process 被之前授权的node所控制

3. 不是所有机构都可以读取数据的(some 商业机密不能对competiter获取)

Impact

| Deployment Option | Fundamental properties | Cost efficiency | Performance | Flexibility |
|---------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------|-------------|-------------|
| Public blockchain | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕ | ⊕ | ⊕ |
| Consortium/community blockchain | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ |
| Private blockchain | ⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ |

- Consortium/Community blockchain

- Across multiple organizations
- Consensus process controlled by pre-authorized nodes
- Read permission can be public or restricted to specific participants

Consortium/private instantiation of public blockchain

- Blockchain platform is open source
- Network layer access control – firewall

- Private blockchain

- Write permission kept within one organization
- Governed and hosted by a single organization - most flexible

私有链

1. 只有创建者才可以写数据

2. 灵活性很高



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List


| Option | Fundamental properties | Cost efficiency | Impact | | Flexibility |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------|-------------|-----|-------------|
| | | | Performance | | |
| Global list of blocks (Bitcoin) | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕ | ⊕ | ⊕ | ⊕ |
| Global DAG of blocks (Hashgraph) | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ |
| Global DAG of transactions (IOTA) | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ |
| Restricted shared ledgers (Corda) | ⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ |

- Global list of blocks
 - Bitcoin/Ethereum
 - Nodes record blockchain as tree of blocks
 - Shorter branches attached to the main chain represent alternative competing histories
 - Used for operating blockchain and determining consensus
 - Blockchain is a list of blocks under the logical view from a user's perspective

Tree



- Orphan/Stale
- Two nodes find a block at same time
- Propagated, verified, but eventually being cast off
- Fast block time suffer from a high number of stale blocks
- Ghost (Greedy Heaviest-Observed Sub-Tree)
- Add stale blocks (uncles) into calculation of cumulative difficulty



Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG)

| Option | Fundamental properties | Cost efficiency | Impact | | Flexibility |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------|-------------|-----|-------------|
| | | | Performance | | |
| Global list of blocks (Bitcoin) | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕ | ⊕ | ⊕ | ⊕ |
| Global DAG of blocks (Hashgraph) | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ |
| Global DAG of transactions (IOTA) | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ |
| Restricted shared ledgers (Corda) | ⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ |


- Global DAG of blocks
 - Hashgraph
 - Logical view of transactions is based on a directed acyclic graph of blocks
 - Rather than a list

Graph

Blockchain



Tangle (DAG/ Directed Acyclic Graph)



| | Blockchain (Bitcoin) | IoTA |
|----------------------|-------------------------|----------|
| Byzantine Toleration | 51% | 34% |
| Confirmation Time | 60 min (6-Confirmation) | Unstable |


Tradeoff Overview

| Option | Fundamental properties | Cost efficiency | Impact | | Flexibility |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------|-------------|-------------|----------------------------|
| | | | Performance | Flexibility | |
| Global list of blocks (Bitcoin) | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕ | ⊕ | ⊕ | ⊕ |
| Global DAG of blocks (Hashgraph) | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ |
| Global DAG of transactions (IOTA) | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ transaction history |
| Restricted shared ledgers (Corda) | ⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ Multiple small ledgers |

- Multiple small ledgers shared between parties of interest
 - Hyperledger Fabric, Corda
 - Parties of interest are authorized to view the transactions recorded in the ledgers

Peer-to-Peer Ledger

- Hyperledger Fabric
- A collection of small ledgers
 - Channel
- More rigid transaction distribution policy
 - Isolating transactions within the channels



- Corda
- Abstract logic view is a global graph of transactions
 - View most parties see is a collection of small ledgers shared with other business contacts
- Notaries are used to further limit transaction distribution
 - Special agents
 - Attest to the integrity of unseen parts of the global transaction graph

c·rda



Taxonomy Dimensions

(De)centralization

Deployment

Ledger Structure

Consensus Protocol

Block Configuration and Data Structure

Auxiliary Blockchain

Anonymity


Incentive



Consensus Protocol

- Miners generate new blocks
- Miners propagate the blocks to the peers in the blockchain network
- Miners encounter different competing new blocks
- Miners resolve this using consensus mechanism

- 1.发现新块
- 2.通知每个在net里的块自己发现了新块
- 3.矿工开始竞争新块
- 4.矿工采用共识机制解决



Consensus Overview

| | Option | Fundamental properties | Cost efficiency | Impact | |
|------------------|--|------------------------|-----------------|-------------|-------------|
| | | | | Performance | Flexibility |
| Security-wise | Proof-of-work | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕ | ⊕ | ⊕ |
| | Proof-of-retrievability | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕ | ⊕ | ⊕ |
| | Proof-of-stake | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ |
| | Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) | ⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕ |
| Scalability-wise | Bitcoin-NG | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕ | ⊕ | ⊕ |
| | RBBC | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕ |

Proof-of-Work 1/2



- Miners compete for right to write block
- Solve a hash puzzle
 - Easy to verify, difficult to solve
 - Takes effectively random time

$H(\text{nonce} \mid\mid H(\text{ }) \text{ of previous block} \mid\mid \text{Tx} \mid\mid \dots \mid\mid \text{Tx})$ is very small

| |
|---------------------------------|
| Nonce |
| $H(\text{ })$ of previous block |
| Transactions |
| ⋮ |

Output space of hash (256 bits)



- *If the Hash function is secure: The only way to succeed is to try enough number of values*
- *Prob (winning next block) = Fraction of global hash power the miner controls*

Proof-of-Work 2/2

- Not energy-efficient
 - Electricity consumption of Bitcoin is close to Turkmenistan
- Proof-of-work for good use
 - Primecoin
 - Generates prime number chains which are of interest to mathematical research



Proof-of-Stake

选取资产最多的来validate下一个块

所现有的财产

- Select the next mining node based on the control of the native digital currency
- Align the incentive of digital currency holders with the good operation
- Does not necessarily select the next miner with the largest stakeholding
- More Cost-efficient, shorter latency

Peercoin

- Prove the ownership of a certain amount of peercoin
- Combines randomization and coin age



peercoin



NXT
Cryptocurrency



Tendermint



casper

Delegated Proof-of-Stake

- Account delegate their stake to other accounts rather than participating in the transaction validation
- Bitshares
 - Representative take turns in a round-robin manner



bitshares™



Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT)

确保达成共识,尽管有坏人存在

- Ensure consensus despite arbitrary behaviors from fraction of participants
- More conventional approach within distributed systems
- Stronger consistency and lower latency
- Smaller number of participants
- Used in permissioned blockchains
- All participants agree on the list of participants in the network



STELLAR



corda



Other Alternatives

- Proof-of-Retrievability (Permacoin)
 - In proportion to distributed storage of archival data
- Proof-of-Elapsed Time
 - Miner waiting a random time to write the next block
 - Using Intel SGX (Software Guard Extension)
 - Run trusted code in trusted environment
 - Ensure the wait times are created fairly


Consensus Overview

| | Option | Fundamental properties | Cost efficiency | Impact | |
|------------------|--|------------------------|-----------------|--------|-----|
| | Performance | Flexibility | | | |
| Security-wise | Proof-of-work | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕ | ⊕ | ⊕ |
| | Proof-of-retrievability | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕ | ⊕ | ⊕ |
| | Proof-of-stake | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ |
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| | RBBC | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕ |

Scalability-wise

将比特币的操作过程解耦为两个平面

- Bitcoin-NG
 - Decouple Bitcoin's operation into two planes: Leader election and transaction serialisation
 - Selected leader is entitled to serialize transactions until the next leader is selected



- Red Belly Block Chain
 - Democratic Byzantine consensus without leader nodes
 - Transactions being collected by a set of proposers
 - Proposers collectively decide on a proposed set of transaction to send to a verifier
 - Verifier enforces consensus using hashes exchanged for the proposed sets of transactions

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
Block Configuration 1/2

| Option | Impact | | | |
|--|------------------------|-----------------|-------------|-------------|
| | Fundamental properties | Cost efficiency | Performance | Flexibility |
| Original block size and frequency | ⊕⊕ | n/a | ⊕ | n/a |
| Increase block size / Decrease mining time | ⊕ | n/a | ⊕⊕ | n/a |

- Adjust mining difficulty to shorten the block time interval
 - Reducing latency
 - Increasing throughput
 - Increased frequency of forks
 - Ethereum has shorter block time interval (10-20 seconds) than Bitcoin (10 minutes)
 - Ethereum needs more confirmation blocks than Bitcoin

Block Configuration 2/2

- Block size limit
设置gas就是为了让smartcontract 不要太复杂
- Data size in MB (Bitcoin): Proposal for Bitcoin to increase block size from 1MB to 8 MB
- Gas limit (Ethereum): Limit the complexity of the contained transactions
- Decision on block size is subject to tradeoffs
- Speed of replication, block time interval and throughput
- Mining new block can not start before observing the latest block
 - State changes as a result of the new block
- Unlimited block size causes DoS
- Flooding system with transactions such that the block time interval is high
- High block size increase the risk of empty blocks
- It is economical to mine as many empty blocks as possible
 - If block limit and block mining reward is high
- Deteriorates the value of the network
 - Not processing new transaction anymore



Processing transactions

Mining empty blocks without processing transactions

Block Data Structure 1/3





- Block size limit might not be a consensus rule in the first place
 - A hard limit on the block size chokes the growth of Transaction
 - Changing the limit requires a change of the consensus rules
 - Developers decide a new block size limit
 - Merge code and hope the ecosystem follows (can be rejected by miners)
- Bitcoin unlimited
 - Removed block size from the consensus rules
 - The maximum size of a block is freely adjustable by the miners
 - New Bitcoin client that helps the system to scale

Block Data Structure 2/3




- Bitcoin Nodes
 - Keeping a list of unconfirmed transaction in memory (*mempool*)
 - When a new block is minded, its transactions must be relayed between nodes
- Bitcoin unlimited Nodes with Xtreme Thinblock
 - Avoid sending transactions again
 - Using a Bloom filter to reduce transmission sizes
 - Images the *mempool* onto a Bloom filter



Block Data Structure 3/3

- Bloom filter
 - An array of Boolean
 - Designed to indicate whether an element is present in a set
 - Probabilistic data structure
 - Either definitely is not in the set or may be in the set

布隆过滤算法
比特币
它具有很好的空间和时间效率，被用来检测一个元素是不是集合中的一个成员，这种检测只会对在集合内的数据错判，而不会对不是集合内的数据进行错判，这样每个检测请求返回有“在集合内（可能错误）”和“不在集合内（绝对不在集合内）”两种情况，可见 Bloom filter 是牺牲了正确率换取时间和空间。



Taxonomy Dimensions

(De)centralization
Deployment
Ledger Structure
Consensus Protocol
Block Configuration and Data Structure
Auxiliary Blockchain
Anonymity
Incentive



Tradeoff Overview

| | Option | Fundamental properties | Cost efficiency | Impact | |
|------------------|---|------------------------|-----------------|-------------|-------------|
| | | | | Performance | Flexibility |
| Security-wise | Merged mining | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ | ⊕ | ⊕ |
| | Hook into popular blockchain at transaction level | ⊕⊕ | ⊕ | ⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ |
| | Proof-of-burn | ⊕ | ⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕ |
| Scalability-wise | Sidechains | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕ | ⊕ | ⊕ |
| | Multiple private blockchains | ⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ |

Merged Mining 1/5

利用Auxiliary Proof-of-Work (AuxPOW)实现Merge Mining。

以Namecoin的merge mining为例：

bitcoin作为父链 (Parent blockchain), namecoin作为辅链 (Auxiliary blockchain)。父链不需要知道辅链的存在；而辅链需要有协议来支持复用父链的POW结果 (AuxPoW)。

目标：需要实现只计算 $H = \text{Hash256}(\text{bitcoin header})$ 。当H符合Bitcoin的难度要求时，那么就挖出BTC，而符合Namecoin的难度要求时，那么就挖出NMC。

- Mining is ordinarily exclusive
- Each attempt either has a chance to be a parent chain block or has a chance to be a new chain block
- Obstacle to bootstrapping
- Miner splits mining resource to mine a new blockchain
- Miner switch between parent chain and new chain

Hash(prev || merkle_root || nonce) < TARGET

Parent chain (Bitcoin)

Hash(prev || merkle_root || nonce) < TARGET

New chain


Merged Mining 2/5

$\text{Hash}(\text{ prev } \parallel \text{ merkle_root } \parallel \text{ nonce}) < \text{TARGET}$


Parent chain (bitcoin)

$\text{Hash}(\text{ prev } \parallel \text{ merkle_root } \parallel \text{ nonce}) < \text{TARGET}$

New chain



Merged Mining 3/5



Merged Mining 4/5

- Parent chain client
 - Block with encoded new chain block looks like any other Bitcoin block
 - Hash in *scriptSig* is ignored
 - No change
- New chain client
 - Interpret new chain block
 - Ignore parent chain transactions
 - Understand parent chain block
 - Be able to verify the “work”


Merged Mining 5/5



- Namecoin is the first blockchain uses merged mining with Bitcoin
- A small miner (or mining pool) on a large network can demolish a merged mining blockchain
 - Jan 2012: CoiledCoin – Eligius pool (large mining pool)
 - Eligius decided that CoiledCoin is a scam
 - Launch an attack to mine a lot of blocks that reversed days of transaction history of CoiledCoin
 - A long chain with empty blocks containing no transaction to make DoS
 - Cheaper for attackers
 - Jul 2013: TerraCoin – unknown
 - Nov 2013: WorldCoin – unknown
- Many mining pools merge-mine several sidechains
 - Ghash.IO: Bitcoin, Namecoin, IXCoin, Devcoin

Hooking into Public Blockchain at Transaction Level


- Hash of new chain is embedded in transaction of parent blockchain (*OP_RETURN*)




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Sidechain 1/5

- Unilateral peg



- Bilateral peg




Sidechain 2/5

- Proof-of-Burn



- Signed by the same private key
- Same signature scheme


- Snapshot




Sidechain 3/5

- *Bilateral pegged sidechain is a voting system*
- A group of custodians cast vote on
 - When to unlock tokens
 - Where to send the unlocked tokens to
- Single Custodian
- Multi-sig Federation

Sidechain 4/5



Sidechain 5/5



Problems of Sidechain

- Public blockchains do not have settlement finality
 - Main chain can never be 100% sure if a sidechain transaction has been accepted by the network
 - Neither does sidechain
- Bitcoin-backed sidechains require a soft-fork or hard-fork for Bitcoin to add new complex *opcode*

Entangled Blockchains

- Entangle both chains to overcome the lack of transaction finality
- Reversal of the lock transaction in main chain → Reversal of the unlock transaction in side chain
- Sidechain transaction is embedded in transaction of parent blockchain (*OP_RETURN*)
- Sidechain block has extra parent in the parent blockchain
 - Sidechain nodes verify that parents
- Sidechain block is anchored by cryptographic commitments in parent blockchain transaction
- Sidechain client maintains a copy of parent blockchain

Tradeoff Overview



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| | Multiple private blockchains | ⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ | ⊕⊕⊕ |

Sharding 1/5

- Full nodes require sizeable storage space
 - Bitcoin > 200GB
 - Ethereum > 600GB
 - Keep growing
- Sharding
 - Divide the blockchain state into pieces
 - Blockchain nodes only hold some shards
 - Transaction sharding vs. State sharding

Sharding 2/5


- Transaction Sharding



Sharding 3/5



- Conflicting state
- Using the recipient address instead
- Smart contract address




Sharding 4/5




- After sharding is activated
- State sharding
- Each unique account is in one shard
- Accounts can only transact with other accounts within the same shard
- Two levels of interaction

Random validator who need to verify the transactions in the shard

| | | | |
|---------------|----------|-------------|-------------|
| Shard ID: | 43 | <sig #1284> | <sig #2543> |
| Pre state: | a138b3ff | <sig #7821> | <sig #6118> |
| Post state: | 835680cc | <sig #9053> | <sig #4337> |
| Receipt root: | fa3819d4 | <sig #1662> | <sig #4785> |
| Tx a142 | Tx a558 | Tx eca6 | |
| Tx a35f | Tx e25a | Tx 34ac | |
| Tx 2308 | Tx 6987 | Tx f260 | |
| Tx 9f14 | Tx ec30 | Tx 5fc3 | |



Sharding 5/5



- **Transaction**
 - Change the state of shard
 - Generate a receipt
- **Receipts**
 - Stored in a distributed shared memory
 - Seen by other shards
 - Not modified
- **Receipts enable cross-shard communication**
 - Accessed via multiple Merkle trees from the the transaction group Merkle root

Taxonomy Dimensions

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


Pseudonymity

- Bitcoin is pseudonymous (pseudo-anonymous)
 - Physical world evidence can be connected to compromise the anonymity of Bitcoin users
- Silk Road
 - “eBay for drugs”
 - Cash flow of at least USD213 million
 - Combination Tor and Bitcoin
 - Exposed physical IP address of the Silk Road server
 - Iceland
 - Customer service manager was arrested
 - Linked Ross Ulbricht with “Dread Pirate Roberts”
 - FBI became the second largest owner of Bitcoins
 - 144, 000 Bitcoins



Tor is a intermediary server

- Hidden IP address
- Hidden users surfing on it



Mixing Services


- Mixing service
 - Group transactions together with multiple *input* addresses and *output* addresses
 - Hard to track which output address is paid by which input address
 - A series of mixing services can be linked sequentially
 - Mixed transactions are uniformed in value
- Dash: Pre-anonymize funds through mixing rounds
- Monero: Ring signature



Advanced Cryptographic Technology

- Zcash
 - Encrypted payment information in transaction
 - Cryptographical method to verify the validity of the encrypted transaction
 - Zero-knowledge proof
- Zero-knowledge proof
 - Allow the blockchain network to maintain a secure ledger
 - Enable private payment without disclosing the parties or amounts involved

You have a secret that you don't want others to know, but you want to proof you have the secret



Taxonomy Dimensions

- (De)centralization
- Deployment
- Ledger Structure
- Consensus Protocol
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- Incentive**



DATA
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Incentive

- Financial incentive in the cryptocurrencies
 - Join the network
 - Validate transactions
 - Generate blocks
 - Execute smart contract
- Bitcoin
 - Reward for generating new blocks and fees associated with transactions
- Ethereum
 - Fee to execute smart contract
- Enigma
 - Fixed price for storage, data retrieval and computation within the network
 - Security deposit
 - Deposit of dishonest node will be split among the honest nodes



Summary

- Blockchain Taxonomy
- (De)centralization
- Deployment
- Ledger Structure
- Consensus Protocol
- Block Configuration and Data Structure
- Auxiliary Blockchain
- Anonymity
- Incentive

Course Outline – next two weeks

| Week | Date | Lecturer | Lecture Topic | Relevant Book Chapters | Notes |
|------|--------|--------------|---------------------------------------|---|--|
| 3rd | 4 Mar | Sherry Xu | Blockchain in Software Architecture 1 | 3. Varieties of blockchain 5. Blockchain in Software Architecture (including software architecture basics) 1/2 | |
| 4th | 11 Mar | Mark Staples | Blockchain in Software Architecture 2 | 5. Blockchain in Software Architecture (Non-functional properties and trade-offs) 2/2 | Pitching session Assignment 1 due (Wednesday) |
| 5th | 18 Mar | Sherry Xu | NPFs 1 | 6. Design Process for Applications on Blockchain 9. Cost | |



Consultation Time

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