



Never Stand Still

Securing Wireless Networks, COMP4337/9337 Authenticaton, Key Distributon (Asymmetric), Certification Authority


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Today's Agenda

- Authentication Recap
- Key distribution using asymmetric encryption
 - Public-key certificates
 - Public-key distribution of secret keys
 - Certification Authority and X.509
- Symmetric key distribution using symmetric encryption
- Kerberos
 - Version 4
 - Version 5

Recap



Recap Authentication Basics

- Quick recap, possibly already done in 3331/9331 (Kurose-Ross Ch8)
- These are basic building blocks
 - Make sure you understand this well as they help material covered in this subject.

Authentication

Goal: Bob wants Alice to “prove” her identity to him

Protocol ap1.0: Alice says “I am Alice”




Failure scenario??



Authentication

Goal: Bob wants Alice to “prove” her identity to him


Protocol ap1.0: Alice says “I am Alice”



In a network,
Bob can not “see” Alice, so
Eve simply declares
herself to be Alice


Authentication: another try

Protocol ap2.0: Alice says “I am Alice” in an IP packet containing her source IP address



Authentication: another try


Protocol ap2.0: Alice says “I am Alice” in an IP packet containing her source IP address



Eve can create
a packet “spoofing”
Alice’s address


Authentication: another try

Protocol ap3.0: Alice says “I am Alice” and sends her secret password to “prove” it.



Authentication: another try


Protocol ap3.0: Alice says “I am Alice” and sends her secret password to “prove” it.



回放攻击
playback attack: Eve records Alice's packet and later plays it back to Bob


Authentication: yet another try

Protocol ap3.1: Alice says “I am Alice” and sends her *encrypted* secret password to “prove” it.



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


Authentication: yet another try

Goal: avoid playback attack


nonce: number (R) used only *once-in-a-lifetime*

ap4.0: to prove Alice “live”, Bob sends Alice **nonce**, R. Alice must return R, encrypted with shared secret key



Failures, drawbacks?

Kurose/Ross Authentication: ap5.0




Bob computes
 $K_A^+(K_A^-(R)) = R$
and knows only Alice
could have the private key,
that encrypted R such
that
 $K_A^+(K_A^-(R)) = R$

Authentication: ap5.0

ap4.0 requires shared symmetric key

- can we authenticate using public key techniques?


ap5.0: use nonce, public key cryptography



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
ap5.0: security hole

man (or woman) in the middle attack: Eve poses as Alice (to Bob) and as Bob (to Alice)



ap5.0: security hole

man (or woman) in the middle attack: Eve poses as Alice (to Bob) and as Bob (to Alice)



difficult to detect:

- ❖ Bob receives everything that Alice sends, and vice versa. (e.g., so Bob, Alice can meet one week later and recall conversation!)
- ❖ problem is that Eve receives all messages as well!

Public key encryption algorithms

Requirements:

- ① need $K_B^+(\cdot)$ and $K_B^-(\cdot)$ such that

$$K_B^-(K_B^+(m)) = m$$

- ② given public key K_B^+ , it should be impossible to compute private key
 K_B^-

RSA: Rivest, Shamir, Adelson algorithm

Public Key Cryptography

symmetric key crypto

- requires sender, receiver know shared secret key
- Q: how to agree on key in first place (particularly if never “met”)?

public key crypto

- ❖ radically different approach [Diffie-Hellman76, RSA78]
- ❖ sender, receiver do *not* share secret key
- ❖ *public* encryption key known to *all*
- ❖ *private* decryption key known only to receiver



RSA: getting ready

- A message is a bit pattern.
- A bit pattern can be uniquely represented by an integer number.
- Thus encrypting a message is equivalent to encrypting a number.

Example

- $m = 10010001$. This message is uniquely represented by the decimal number 145.
2 to the power of 7 = 128
2 to the power of 4 = 16
2 to the power of 0 = 1
- To encrypt m , we encrypt the corresponding number, which gives a new number (the ciphertext).

RSA: Creating public/private key pair

1. Choose two large prime numbers p, q .
(e.g., 1024 bits each)
2. Compute $n = pq, z = (p-1)(q-1)$
3. Choose e (with $e < n$) that has no common factors with z . (e, z are “relatively prime”). E.g.: 4 and 9 are relatively prime. 6 and 9 are not.
4. Choose d such that $ed - 1$ is exactly divisible by z .
(in other words: $ed \bmod z = 1$).
5. *Public key is (n, e) . Private key is (n, d) .*

$$\underbrace{K_B^+}_{\text{Public Key}} \quad \underbrace{K_B^-}_{\text{Private Key}}$$

RSA: Encryption, decryption

0. Given (n, e) and (n, d) as computed above

1. To encrypt bit pattern, m ($m < n$), compute

$$c = m^e \text{ mod } n \quad (\text{i.e., remainder when } m^e \text{ is divided by } n)$$

2. To decrypt received bit pattern, c , compute

$$m = c^d \text{ mod } n \quad (\text{i.e., remainder when } c^d \text{ is divided by } n)$$

Magic
happens!

$$m = \underbrace{(m^e \text{ mod } n)^d}_{c} \text{ mod } n$$

RSA example

Bob chooses $p=5$, $q=7$. Then $n=35$, $z=24$.

$e=5$ (so e, z relatively prime).

$d=29$ (so $ed-1$ exactly divisible by z).

encrypt:

<u>letter</u>	<u>m</u>	<u>m^e</u>	<u>$c = m^e \text{ mod } n$</u>
	12	1524832	17

decrypt:

<u>c</u>	<u>c^d</u>	<u>$m = c^d \text{ mod } n$</u>	<u>letter</u>
17	481968572106750915091411825223071697	12	

RSA: another important property

The following property will be *very* useful later:


$$\underbrace{K_B^-(K_B^+(m))}_{\text{use public key first, followed by private key}} = m = \underbrace{K_B^+(K_B^-(m))}_{\text{use private key first, followed by public key}}$$

use public key
first, followed by
private key

use private key
first, followed by
public key

Result is the same!

Diffie-Hellman key exchange



$$K = A^b \text{ mod } p = (g^a \text{ mod } p)^b \text{ mod } p = g^{ab} \text{ mod } p = (g^b \text{ mod } p)^a \text{ mod } p = B^a \text{ mod } p$$


Alice's private key = 5, Bob's private key = 4, $g=3$, $p=7$

Alice's public key = $3^5 \text{ mod } 7 = 5$, Bob's public key = $3^4 \text{ mod } 7 = 4$

Alice's shared key = $4^5 \text{ mod } 7 = 2$, Bob's shared key = $5^4 \text{ mod } 7 = 2$

Diffie-Hellman key exchange

If Eve can tamper with the channel, she can discover Alice, and Bob's secret: MiTM



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Public-key certification


- motivation: Trudy plays pizza prank on Bob
 - Trudy creates e-mail order:

Dear Pizza Store, Please deliver to me four pepperoni pizzas. Thank you, Bob
 - Trudy signs order with her private key
 - Trudy sends order to Pizza Store
 - Trudy sends to Pizza Store her public key, but says it's Bob's public key
 - Pizza Store verifies signature; then delivers four pepperoni pizzas to Bob
 - Bob doesn't even like pepperoni

Certification authorities


certification authority (CA): binds public key to particular entity, E.

- E (person, router) registers its public key with CA.
 - E provides “proof of identity” to CA.
 - CA creates certificate binding E to its public key.
 - certificate containing E’s public key digitally signed by CA – CA says “this is E’s public key”



Certification authorities

- when Alice wants Bob's public key:
 - gets Bob's certificate (Bob or elsewhere).
 - apply CA's public key to Bob's certificate, get Bob's public key



Public Key Distribution of Secret Key

- Prepare a message
- Encrypt that message using conventional encryption using one time session key Session keys are sometimes called symmetric keys,
- Encrypt the session key using public-key encryption with Alice's **public key**
- Attach the encrypted session key to the message and send it to Alice
- Only Alice can decrypt the session key
- Bob has obtained Alice's public key by means of Alice's **public-key certificate**, must be a valid key

Note: Important technique used in several protocols


X.509 Authentication Service

- Distributed set of servers that maintains a database about users.
- Each certificate contains the public key of a user and is signed with the private key of a CA.
- Is used in S/MIME, IP Security, SSL/TLS and SET.
- RSA is recommended to use but not mandatory.
- Digital Signature is assumed to use Hash algorithm
- Digital Certificate: user's id, public-key and CA information as input to hash function. Hash is then encrypted with CA's private key to produce **Digital Certificate**

No need to memorise

Read: Stallings ch4 for a quick overview

X.509 Formats



Obtaining a User's Certificate

- Characteristics of certificates generated by CA:
 - Any user with access to the public key of the CA can recover the user public key that was certified.
 - User can independently calculate hash, decrypt digital certificate using CA's public key, extract hash and compare if hashes match.
 - No part other than the CA can modify the certificate without this being detected.
- Certificates stored in a Directory server – not part of standard.


Distributed Directory

- Users can be registered with a CA and would know its public Key
- Now if A got its certificate from CA X1 and B got it from CA X2.
- If A doesn't know CA X2's public key, it can't trust B's certificate issued by CA X2.
- However, if the two CA's have securely exchanged their public keys, then it can work.
 - A obtains the certificate of X2 signed by X1
 - A knows securely X1's public key
 - A obtains X2's public key from certificate and can verify using X1's signature on certificate
 - A can now get B's certificate from CA X2.
 - Since it has trusted public key for CA X2, things work as usual.

Distributed Directory: Certificate Chain

- Notation $Y << X >>$ Certificate of user X issued by authority Y
- A obtains B's public key using the following X.509 notation
 $X_1 << X_2 >> X_2 << B >>$
- B obtains A's public key using the following X.509 notation
 $X_2 << X_1 >> X_1 << A >>$
 - *Arbitrary chain is possible as long as consecutive pair (X_n, X_{n+1}) of CAs have exchanged certificates securely*

X.509 CA Hierarchy



Hypothetical Example
- Implementations may vary
- E.g cache entries

Hierarchy of CAs

- Previous figure: Connected Circles hierarchical relationship, boxes shows certificates maintained in each CA's directory
 - Forward Certs: Certs of X generated by other CAs (e.g at circle X, $W<<X>>$) – PARENT
 - Reverse Certs: Certs generated by X for others. (e.g. at circle X, $X<<C>> X<<A>>$) - CHILD
- A can acquire the following Certs from the directory to establish as certification to B
$$X <<W>> W <<V>> V <<Y>> Y <<Z>> Z <>$$

(Try to get A's certificate)

Revocation of Certificates

- Reasons for revocation:
 - The user's secret key is assumed to be compromised.
 - The user is no longer certified by this CA.
 - The CA's certificate is assumed to be compromised.
- X.509 has a new version 3 with some recommendations for improvement
 - read in your own time if interested

Acknowledgements

- Network Security Essentials: Stallings, Chapter 4 provided by Henric Johnson, Blekinge Institute of Technology, Sweden (Please refer to Section 4.3 and 4.4 from Stallings)
- Computer Networking A top-Down Approach: Jim Kurose and Keith Ross, chapter 8 (several lecture foils provided by authors)