COMP 3331/9331: Computer Networks and Applications

Week 12

Network Security

Reading Guide: Chapter 8: 8.1 – 8.4

Network Security: Overview

Our goals:

- understand principles of network security:
  - cryptography and its *many* uses beyond "confidentiality"
  - authentication
  - message integrity

Network Security: roadmap

8.1 What is network security?

8.2 Principles of cryptography

8.3 Message integrity

8.4 Authentication

8.5 - 8.9 Securing email, SSL, IPSec, Firewall/IDS not covered.

There are several security electives offered

What is network security?

confidentiality: only sender, intended receiver should "understand" message contents

- sender encrypts message
- receiver decrypts message

authentication: sender, receiver want to confirm identity of each other

message integrity: sender, receiver want to ensure message not altered (in transit, or afterwards) without detection

access and availability: services must be accessible and available to users

Friends and enemies: Alice, Bob, Trudy

- well-known in network security world
- Bob, Alice (lovers!) want to communicate "securely"
- Trudy (intruder) may intercept, delete, add messages



Who might Bob, Alice be?

- … well, *real-life* Bobs and Alices!
- Web browser/server for electronic transactions (e.g., on-line purchases)
- on-line banking client/server
- DNS servers
- routers exchanging routing table updates
- etc.

There are bad guys (and girls) out there!

Q: What can a "bad guy" do?

A: A lot!

- *eavesdrop:* intercept messages
- actively *insert* messages into connection
- *impersonation:* can fake (spoof) source address in packet (or any field in packet)
- *hijacking:* "take over" ongoing connection by removing sender or receiver, inserting himself in place
- *denial of service:* prevent service from being used by others (e.g., by overloading resources)

Steganography

- Covered writing
- It conceals the existence of the message
  - *Character marking:* Selected letters of printed text are over- written in pencil
  - *Invisible ink:* A number of substances can be used for writing that leave no visible trace until heat or some chemical is applied to the paper.
  - *Pin punctures:* Small pin punctures on selected letters are ordinarily not visible unless the paper is held up in front of a light
  - *Typewriter correction ribbon:* Used between lines typed with a black ribbon, the results are visible only under a strong light.

Steganography

- Subset

Dear George;
Greetings to all at Oxford. Many thanks for your
letter and for the summer examination package.
All Entry Forms and Fees Forms should be ready
for final despatch to the Syndicate by Friday
20th or at the very latest, I'm told by the 21st.
Admin has improved here, thought there's room
for improvement still, just give us all two or three
more years and we'll really show you! Please
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Steganography

- Null Cipher

PRESIDENT'S EMBARGO RULING SHOULD HAVE IMMEDIATE NOTICE. GRAVE SITUATION AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL LAW. STATEMENT FORESHADOWS RUIN OF MANY NEUTRALS. YELLOW JOURNALS UNIFYING NATIONAL EXCITEMENT IMMENSELY.

PERSHING SAILS FROM NY JUNE I

Steganography

- Photo as a cover?



- LSB Manipulation: Least significant bit of a byte representing a 8-bit grey scale image can change with little change to the overall appearance of the image file
  – There are 256 different variations of grey.

Steganography

- Photo as a cover?
- Can be used with color images using RGB or RGBA
  - Image size and the text to be hidden
- Advantages
  - Does not change the size of the file
- Disadvantages
  - If the picture with the hidden information is converted to another format, then the hidden data may be lost

Steganography

- TCP/IP datagrams as cover?
- Can embed text directly in headers:
  - IP Identification or QoS
  - TCP Sequence Number fields

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Network Security: roadmap

The language of cryptography



m plaintext message

$K_A(m)$ ciphertext, encrypted with key K_A

$m = K_B(K_A(m))$

Symmetric key cryptography



symmetric key crypto: Bob and Alice share same (symmetric) key: K_S

Q: how do Bob and Alice agree on key value?

Simple encryption scheme

substitution cipher: substituting one thing for another

- monoalphabetic cipher: substitute one letter for another
- Ceaser Cipher: replace each letter of the alphabet with the letter standing three places further down the alphabet.

Plain : a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z
cipher: d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z a b c

e.g.:

```
 Plaintext: meet me after the party

ciphertext: phhw ph diwhu wkh sduwb
```

Encryption key: $c = (p+3) \bmod 26$

Each plaintext letter p substituted by the ciphertext letter c

In general, we have $c = (p+k)$ mode 26

where k is in range 1 to 25

Simple encryption scheme

- With only 25 possible keys, the Caeser cipher is vulnerable to brute force cryptanalysis
- Cipher can be any permutation of the 26 alphabet characters

```
 plaintext:  abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz
ciphertext:  mnbvcxzasdfghjklpoiuytrewq
```

e.g.:

```
 Plaintext: bob. i love you. alice
ciphertext: nkn. s gktc wky. mgsbc
```

Encryption key: mapping from set of 26 letters to set of 26 letters

We have 26! ($> 4 \times 10^{26}$) possible keys

Breaking an encryption scheme

- cipher-text only attack: Trudy has ciphertext she can analyze
- two approaches:
  - brute force: search through all keys
  - statistical analysis
- known-plaintext attack: Trudy has (part of) plaintext corresponding to ciphertext
  - e.g., in monoalphabetic cipher, Trudy determines pairings for a,l,i,c,e,b,o,b
- chosen-plaintext attack: Trudy can get ciphertext for chosen plaintext

Breaking an encryption scheme



Frequency Histogram Analysis for letters in English language

Monoalphabetic ciphers are easy to break because they reflect the frequency data of the original alphabet

Encrypting digrams

PlayFair Cipher: treats digrams in the plaintext as single units and translates these units into ciphertext digrams



M	O	N	A	R
C	H	Y	B	D
E	F	G	I/J	K
L	P	Q	S	T
U	V	W	X	Z

- 5x5 matrix of letters constructed using a key word
  - Example using MONARCHY as the keyword
- Plaintext encrypted two letters at a time

Playfair Cipher



M	O	N	A	R
C	H	Y	B	D
E	F	G	I/J	K
L	P	Q	S	T
U	V	W	X	Z

- Repeating plaintext letters that are in the same pair are separated with a filler letter, such as x, so that balloon would be treated as ba lx lo on.
- Two plaintext letters in the same row of the matrix are each replaced by the letter to the right, with the first element of the row circularly following the last. For example, ar is encrypted as RM.
- Two plaintext letters in the same column are each replaced by the letter beneath, with the top element of the column circularly following the last. E.g., mu becomes CM.
- Otherwise, each plaintext letter in a pair is replaced by the letter that lies in its own row and the column occupied by the other plaintext letter. Thus, hs becomes BP

Breaking an encryption scheme



❖ Playfair cipher has got 26x26 =676 digrams as compared to 26 letters in monoalphabetic ciphers.

❖ The relative frequencies of individual letters exhibit a much greater range than that of digrams,

A more sophisticated encryption approach

- Polyalphabet ciphers
- n substitution ciphers, $M_1, M_2, \ldots, M_n$
- cycling pattern:
  - e.g., n=4: and key is M_1, M_3, M_4, M_3, M_2; M_1, M_3, M_4, M_3, M_2; ..
- for each new plaintext symbol, use subsequent subsitution pattern in cyclic pattern
  - dog: d from M_1, o from M_3, g from M_4

Encryption key: n substitution ciphers, and cyclic pattern

A more sophisticated encryption approach

- Vigen`ere Cipher
- 26 substitution ciphers with shifts of 0 through 25
- cycling pattern:
  - Assume Key consist of m sequence of letters
  - $(p_0 + k_0)$ mode 26, $(p_1 + k_1)$mode 26, …, $(p_{m-1} + k_{m-1})$ mode 26, $(p_m + k_0)$mode 26, $(p_{m+1} + k_1)$mode 26, …, $(p_{2m-1} + k_{m-1})$ mode 26, …
  - $(p_i + k_{i \bmod m})$ mod 26
- There are multiple ciphertext letters for each plaintext letter, one for each unique letter of the keyword

A Transposition Approach

- Perform permutation on the plain text
- Rail Fence Cipher:
  - Write plain text as a sequence of diagonals and then read off as a sequence of rows
  - m e m a t r h p r y

    e t e f e t e a t

Using rail fence depth of 2, Cipher produced is

mematrhpryetefeteat

A Transposition Approach

- Write plain text in a rectangle, row by row, and read the message off, column by column but permute the order of column
- The order of the column becomes the key to the algorithm
- Key:

Key:	4	3	1	2	5	6	7
PlainText:	a	t	t	a	c	k	p
	o	s	t	p	o	n	e
	d	u	n	t	i	l	t
	w	o	a	m	x	y	z

Cipher: ttnaaptmtsuoaodwcoixknlypetz

A Transposition Approach

- A pure transposition cipher has the same letter frequencies as the original plaintext.
- Could be made more secure by performing more than one stage of transposition

Two types of symmetric ciphers

- **Stream ciphers**
  - encrypt one bit at time
- **Block ciphers**
  - Break plaintext message in equal-size blocks
  - Encrypt each block as a unit

Stream Ciphers



- Combine each bit of keystream with bit of plaintext to get bit of ciphertext
- m(i) = ith bit of message
- ks(i) = ith bit of keystream
- c(i) = ith bit of ciphertext
- $c(i) = ks(i) \oplus m(i)$ ($\oplus$ = exclusive or)
- $m(i) = ks(i) \oplus c(i)$

RC4 Stream Cipher

- RC4 is a popular stream cipher
  - Extensively analyzed and considered good
  - Key can be from 1 to 256 bytes
  - Used in WEP for 802.11
  - Can be used in SSL

Block Cipher

- Ciphertext processed as *k* bit blocks
- 1-to-1 mapping is used to map k-bit block of plaintext to k-bit block of ciphertext
- E.g: k=3 (see table)
  - 010110001111 => 101000111001
- Possible permutations = 8! (40,320)
- To prevent brute force attacks
  - Choose large K (64, 128, etc)
- Full-table block ciphers not scalable
  - E.g., for k = 64, a table with 2^{64} entries required
  - instead use function that simulates a randomly permuted table

Input	Output
000	110
111	001
001	111
010	101
011	100
100	011
101	010
110	000

From Kaufman et al

Block Cipher (contd.)



- If only a single round, then one bit of input affects at most 8 bits of output
- In 2nd round, the 8 affected bits get scattered and inputted into multiple substitution boxes
- How many rounds?
  - How many times do you need to shuffle cards
  - Becomes less efficient as n increases

Examples: DES, 3DES, AES

Symmetric key crypto: DES

DES: Data Encryption Standard

- US encryption standard [NIST 1993]
- 56-bit symmetric key, 64-bit plaintext input
- block cipher with cipher block chaining
- how secure is DES?
  - DES Challenge: 56-bit-key-encrypted phrase decrypted (brute force) in less than a day
  - no known good analytic attack
- making DES more secure:
  - 3DES: encrypt 3 times with 3 different keys

Symmetric key crypto: DES

DES operation

- initial permutation
- 16 identical "rounds" of function application, each using different 48 bits of key
- final permutation



AES: Advanced Encryption Standard

- symmetric-key NIST standard, replaced DES (Nov 2001)
- processes data in 128 bit blocks
- 128, 192, or 256 bit keys
- brute force decryption (try each key) taking 1 sec on DES, takes 149 trillion years for AES

Cipher Block Chaining

- cipher block: if input block repeated, will produce same cipher text:



- *Use random numbers:* XOR ith input block, m(i) and random number r(i) and apply block-cipher encryption algorithm
  - C(i) = Ks(m(i) ⊕ r(i))
  - Send across c(i) and r(i)
  - Need to transmit twice as many bits as before

Cipher Block Chaining

- *cipher block chaining:* send only one random value alongwith the very first message block, and then have the sender and receiver use the computed cipher block in place of the subsequent random number
- XOR ith input block, m(i), with previous block of cipher text, c(i-1)
  - c(0) is an initialisation vector (random) transmitted to receiver in clear



Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)

- CBC generates its own random numbers
  - Have encryption of current block depend on result of previous block
  - $c(i) = K_S(m(i) \oplus c(i-1))$
  - $m(i) = K_S(c(i)) \oplus c(i-1)$
- How do we encrypt first block?
  - Initialization vector (IV): random block = c(0)
  - IV does not have to be secret
- Change IV for each message (or session)
  - Guarantees that even if the same message is sent repeatedly, the ciphertext will be completely different each time

Quiz

- In DES cipher block chaining, each plaintext block is bitwise EXCLUSIVE Ored (XOR) with the previous ciphertext block before being encrypted. Why do you think an XOR operation is used instead of an AND or an OR operation?

Public Key Cryptography



symmetric key crypto

- requires sender, receiver know shared secret key
- Q: how to agree on key in first place (particularly if never "met")?

public key crypto

- radically different approach [Diffie-Hellman76, RSA78]
- sender, receiver do *not* share secret key
- *public* encryption key known to *all*
- *private* decryption key known only to receiver

Public key cryptography



Public key encryption algorithms

requirements:

1. need $K_B^+(\cdot)$ and $K_B^-(\cdot)$ such that
$$K_B^-(K_B^+(m)) = m$$

2. given public key K_B^+, it should be impossible to compute private key K_B^-

RSA: Rivest, Shamir, Adelson algorithm

Prerequisite: modular arithmetic

- x mod n = remainder of x when divide by n
- facts:

  [(a mod n) + (b mod n)] mod n = (a+b) mod n

  [(a mod n) - (b mod n)] mod n = (a-b) mod n

  [(a mod n) * (b mod n)] mod n = (a*b) mod n
- thus

  $(a \bmod n)^d \bmod n = a^d \bmod n$
- example: x=14, n=10, d=2:

  $(x \bmod n)^d \bmod n = 4^2 \bmod 10 = 6$

  $x^d = 14^2 = 196 \quad x^d \bmod 10 = 6$

RSA: getting ready

- message: just a bit pattern
- bit pattern can be uniquely represented by an integer number
- thus, encrypting a message is equivalent to encrypting a number.

example:

- m= 10010001 . This message is uniquely represented by the decimal number 145.
- to encrypt m, we encrypt the corresponding number, which gives a new number (the ciphertext).

RSA: Creating public/private key pair

1. choose two large prime numbers p, q. (e.g., 1024 bits each)

2. compute $n = pq$, $z = (p-1)(q-1)$

3. choose e (with $e<n$) that has no common factors with z (e, z are "relatively prime").

4. choose d such that $ed-1$ is exactly divisible by z. (in other words: $ed \bmod z = 1$).

5. *public* key is $\underbrace{(n,e)}_{K_B^+}$. *private* key is $\underbrace{(n,d)}_{K_B^-}$.

RSA: encryption, decryption

0. given (n,e) and (n,d) as computed above

1. to encrypt message m ($<n$), compute

   $c = m^e \bmod n$

2. to decrypt received bit pattern, c, compute

   $m = c^d \bmod n$

magic happens! $m = (\underbrace{m^e \bmod n}_{c})^d \bmod n$

RSA example:

Bob chooses *p=5, q=7*. Then *n=35, z=24*.

e=5 (so *e, z* relatively prime).

d=29 (so *ed-1* exactly divisible by z).

encrypting 8-bit messages.

encrypt: $\underbrace{\text{bit pattern}}_{00001100} \quad \underbrace{m}_{12} \quad \underbrace{m^e}_{248832} \quad \underbrace{c = m^e \bmod n}_{17}$

decrypt: $\underbrace{c}_{17} \quad \underbrace{c^d}_{481968572106750915091411825223071697} \quad \underbrace{m = c^d \bmod n}_{12}$

Why does RSA work?

- must show that $c^d \bmod n = m$
  where $c = m^e \bmod n$
- fact: for any x and y: $x^y \bmod n = x^{(y \bmod z)} \bmod n$
  - where $n = pq$ and $z = (p-1)(q-1)$
- thus,
  $c^d \bmod n = (m^e \bmod n)^d \bmod n$

  $= m^{ed} \bmod n$

  $= m^{(ed \bmod z)} \bmod n$

  $= m^1 \bmod n$

  $= m$

RSA: another important property

The following property will be *very* useful later:

$$\underbrace{K_B^-(K_B^+(m))}_{\text{use public key first, followed by private key}} = m = \underbrace{K_B^+(K_B^-(m))}_{\text{use private key first, followed by public key}}$$

result is the same!

Why $K_B^-(K_B^+(m)) = m = K_B^+(K_B^-(m))$?

follows directly from modular arithmetic:

$$\begin{aligned}(m^e \bmod n)^d \bmod n &= m^{ed} \bmod n \\ &= m^{de} \bmod n \\ &= (m^d \bmod n)^e \bmod n\end{aligned}$$

Why is RSA secure?

- suppose you know Bob's public key (n,e). How hard is it to determine d?
- essentially need to find factors of n without knowing the two factors p and q
  - fact: factoring a big number is hard

RSA in practice: session keys

- exponentiation in RSA is computationally intensive
- DES is at least 100 times faster than RSA
- use public key crypto to establish secure connection, then establish second key – symmetric session key – for encrypting data

session key, K_S

- Bob and Alice use RSA to exchange a symmetric key K_S
- once both have K_S, they use symmetric key cryptography

Network Security: roadmap

Authentication

Goal: Bob wants Alice to "prove" her identity to him

Protocol ap1.0: Alice says "I am Alice"



Failure scenario??

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

in a network,
Bob can not "see" Alice,
so Trudy simply declares
herself to be Alice

Authentication: another try

Protocol ap2.0: Alice says “I am Alice” in an IP packet containing her source IP address



Failure scenario??

Authentication: another try

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

Trudy can create a packet "spoofing" Alice's address

Authentication: another try

Protocol ap3.0: Alice says "I am Alice" and sends her secret password to "prove" it.



Failure scenario??

Authentication: another try

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

playback attack: Trudy records Alice's packet and later plays it back to Bob

Authentication: yet another try

Protocol ap3.1: Alice says "I am Alice" and sends her *encrypted* secret password to "prove" it.



Failure scenario??

Authentication: yet another try

Protocol ap3.1: Alice says "I am Alice" and sends her *encrypted* secret password to "prove" it.



record
and
playback
still works!

Authentication: yet another try

Goal: avoid playback attack

nonce: number (R) used only *once-in-a-lifetime*

ap4.0: to prove Alice "live", Bob sends Alice *nonce*, R. Alice must return R, encrypted with shared secret key



Alice is live, and only Alice knows key to encrypt nonce, so it must be Alice!

drawbacks?

Authentication: ap5.0

ap4.0 requires shared symmetric key

- can we authenticate using public key techniques?

ap5.0: use nonce, public key cryptography



Bob computes

$K_A^+(K_A^-(R)) = R$

and knows only Alice could have the private key, that encrypted R such that

$K_A^+(K_A^-(R)) = R$

ap5.0: security hole

man (or woman) in the middle attack: Trudy poses as Alice (to Bob) and as Bob (to Alice)



ap5.0: security hole

man (or woman) in the middle attack: Trudy poses as Alice (to Bob) and as Bob (to Alice)



difficult to detect:

- Bob receives everything that Alice sends, and vice versa. (e.g., so Bob, Alice can meet one week later and recall conversation!)
- problem is that Trudy receives all messages as well!

Network Security: roadmap

8.1 What is network security?

8.2 Principles of cryptography

8.3 Message integrity

8.4 Authentication

Digital signatures

cryptographic technique analogous to hand-written signatures:

- sender (Bob) digitally signs document, establishing he is document owner/creator.
- *verifiable, nonforgeable:* recipient (Alice) can prove to someone that Bob, and no one else (including Alice), must have signed document

Digital signatures

simple digital signature for message m:

- Bob signs m by encrypting with his private key K_B^-, creating "signed" message, $K_B^-(m)$


Bob's message, m
Dear Alice
Oh, how I have missed you. I think of you all the time! …(blah blah blah)
Bob
K_B^-
Bob's private key
Public key encryption algorithm
$m,K_B^-(m)$
Bob's message, m, signed (encrypted) with his private key

Digital signatures

- suppose Alice receives msg m, with signature: m, $K_B^-(m)$
- Alice verifies m signed by Bob by applying Bob's public key K_B^+ to $K_B^-(m)$ then checks $K_B^+(K_B^-(m)) = m$.
- If $K_B^+(K_B^-(m)) = m$, whoever signed m must have used Bob's private key.

Alice thus verifies that:

- Bob signed m
- no one else signed m
- Bob signed m and not m'

non-repudiation:

- ✓ Alice can take m, and signature $K_B^-(m)$ to court and prove that Bob signed m

Message digests



computationally expensive to public-key-encrypt long messages

goal: fixed-length, easy- to-compute digital "fingerprint"

- apply hash function H to *m*, get fixed size message digest, *H(m)*.

Hash function properties:

- many-to-1
- produces fixed-size msg digest (fingerprint)
- given message digest x, computationally infeasible to find m such that x = H(m)

Internet checksum: poor crypto hash function

Internet checksum has some properties of hash function:

- produces fixed length digest (16-bit sum) of message
- is many-to-one

But given message with given hash value, it is easy to find another message with same hash value:

message	ASCII format
I O U 1	49 4F 55 31
0 0 . 9	30 30 2E 39
9 B O B	39 42 D2 42
	B2 C1 D2 AC

message	ASCII format
I O U 9	49 4F 55 39
0 0 . 1	30 30 2E 31
9 B O B	39 42 D2 42
	B2 C1 D2 AC

different messages but identical checksums!

Hash function algorithms

- MD5 hash function widely used (RFC 1321)
  - computes 128-bit message digest in 4-step process.
  - arbitrary 128-bit string x, appears difficult to construct msg m whose MD5 hash is equal to x
- SHA-1 is also used
  - US standard [NIST, FIPS PUB 180-1]
  - 160-bit message digest
- SHA-2 and SHA-3 (recent standard) are better - security

Digital signature = signed message digest

Bob sends digitally signed message:



Alice verifies signature, integrity of digitally signed message:



Recall: ap5.0 security hole

man (or woman) in the middle attack: Trudy poses as Alice (to Bob) and as Bob (to Alice)



Public-key certification

- motivation: Trudy plays pizza prank on Bob
  - Trudy creates e-mail order:
    Dear Pizza Store, Please deliver to me four pepperoni pizzas. Thank you, Bob
  - Trudy signs order with her private key
  - Trudy sends order to Pizza Store
  - Trudy sends to Pizza Store her public key, but says it' s Bob' s public key
  - Pizza Store verifies signature; then delivers four pepperoni pizzas to Bob
  - Bob doesn' t even like pepperoni

Certification authorities

- *certification authority (CA):* binds public key to particular entity, E.
- E (person, router) registers its public key with CA.
  - E provides "proof of identity" to CA.
  - CA creates certificate binding E to its public key.
  - certificate containing E's public key digitally signed by CA – CA says "this is E's public key"


Bob's public key
K_B^+
Bob's identifying information
digital signature (encrypt)
CA private key
K_{CA}^-
K_B^+
certificate for Bob's public key, signed by CA

Certification authorities

- when Alice wants Bob's public key:
  - gets Bob's certificate (Bob or elsewhere).
  - apply CA's public key to Bob's certificate, get Bob's public key



A certificate contains:

- Serial number (unique to issuer)
- info about certificate owner, including algorithm and key value itself (not shown)



Edit A Certification Authority - Netscape

This Certificate belongs to:
Class 1 Public Primary Certification
Authority
VeriSign, Inc.
US

This Certificate was issued by:
Class 1 Public Primary Certification
Authority
VeriSign, Inc.
US

Serial Number: 00:CD:BA:7F:56:F0:DF:E4:BC:54:FE:22:AC:B3:72:AA:55
This Certificate is valid from Sun Jan 28, 1996 to Tue Aug 01, 2028
Certificate Fingerprint:
97:60:E8:57:5F:D3:50:47:E5:43:0C:94:36:8A:B0:62

This Certificate belongs to a Certifying Authority
- [ ] Accept this Certificate Authority for Certifying network sites
- [x] Accept this Certificate Authority for Certifying e-mail users
- [ ] Accept this Certificate Authority for Certifying software developers

- [ ] Warn before sending data to sites certified by this authority

- info about certificate issuer
- valid dates
- digital signature by issuer

Certificates: summary

- Primary standard X.509 (RFC 2459)
- Certificate contains:
  - Issuer name
  - Entity name, address, domain name, etc.
  - Entity' s public key
  - Digital signature (signed with issuer' s private key)
- Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI)
  - Certificates and certification authorities
  - Often considered "heavy"

Quiz

- Suppose Bob wants to send Alice a digital signature for the message *m*. To create the digital signature
  - A) Bob applies a hash function to *m* and encrypts the result with his private key
  - B) Bob applies a hash function to *m* and encrypts the result with Alice's public key
  - C) Bob encrypts *m* with his private key and then applies a hash function to the result
  - D) Bob applies a hash function to *m* and encrypts the result with his public key

Quiz

- Suppose a CA creates Bob's certificate, which binds Bob's public key to Bob. This certificate is signed with
  - A) Bob's private key
  - B) Bob's public key
  - C) The CA's private key
  - D) The CA's public key