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Tobias Klein (tk trapkit de)

Please find attached a detailed advisory of the vulnerability.

Alternatively, the advisory can also be found at:

<http://www.trapkit.de/advisories/TKADV2009-004.txt>

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Hash: SHA1

Advisory: FFmpeg Type Conversion Vulnerability

Advisory ID: TKADV2009-004

Revision: 1.0

Release Date: 2009/01/28

Last Modified: 2009/01/28

Date Reported: 2009/01/25

Author: Tobias Klein (tk at trapkit.de)

Affected Software: FFmpeg SVN trunk < revision 16846

Remotely Exploitable: Yes

Locally Exploitable: No

Vendor URL: <http://ffmpeg.mplayerhq.hu/>

Vendor Status: Vendor has released an updated version

Patch development time: 3 days

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Vulnerability Details:

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FFmpeg contains a type conversion vulnerability while parsing malformed 4X movie files. The vulnerability may be exploited by a (remote) attacker to execute arbitrary code in the context of FFmpeg or an application using the FFmpeg library.

FFmpeg is used by a lot of popular software projects like VLC media player [1], Mplayer [2], Perian [3] and Xine [4].

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Technical Details:

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Source code file: libavformat/4xm.c

```
[...]  
93 static int fourxm_read_header(AVFormatContext *s,  
94 AVFormatParameters *ap)  
95 {  
..  
103 [8] int current_track = -1;  
..  
106 [9] fourxm->track_count = 0;  
107 [10] fourxm->tracks = NULL;  
..  
160 } else if (fourcc_tag == strk_TAG) {  
161 /* check that there is enough data */  
162 if (size != strk_SIZE) {  
163 av_free(header);  
164 return AERROR_INVALIDDATA;  
165 }  
166 [1] current_track = AV_RL32(&header[i + 8]);  
167 [2] if (current_track + 1 > fourxm->track_count) {  
168 fourxm->track_count = current_track + 1;  
169 if((unsigned)fourxm->track_count >= UINT_MAX /  
sizeof(AudioTrack))  
170 return -1;
```

```
171 [3] fourxm->tracks = av_realloc(fourxm->tracks,
172 fourxm->track_count * sizeof(AudioTrack));
173 if (!fourxm->tracks) {
174 av_free(header);
175 return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
176 }
177 }
178 [4] fourxm->tracks[current_track].adpcm = AV_RL32(&header[i + 12]);
179 [5] fourxm->tracks[current_track].channels = AV_RL32(&header[i + 36]);
180 [6] fourxm->tracks[current_track].sample_rate = AV_RL32(&header[i+40]);
181 [7] fourxm->tracks[current_track].bits = AV_RL32(&header[i + 44]);
[...]
```

[1] The signed int variable "current_track" (see [8]) is filled with user supplied data from the media file

[2] This statement checks if the user controlled value of "current_track" is greater than "fourxm->track_count". The variable "fourxm->track_count" is initialized with 0 (see [9]). By supplying a value >= 0x80000000 for "current_track" it is possible to cause a change in sign that results in "current_track" being negative. If "current_track" is negative, the if statement will always return false and the buffer allocation in [3] will never be reached.

[4] As "fourxm->tracks" is initialized with NULL (see [10]) and line 171 is never reached this leads to an exploitable NULL pointer dereference. It is possible to write 4 bytes of user controlled data to the memory location "NULL + current_track". As the value of "current_track" is also controlled by the user it is possible to write 4 bytes of arbitrary data at a wide range of memory addresses.

[5] See [4]

[6] See [4]

[7] See [4]

A malicious party may exploit this issue to execute arbitrary code by overwriting a sensitive memory location (such as a GOT/IAT entry, a return address, buffer length or boolean variable).

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Solution:

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Upgrade to FFmpeg SVN trunk >= revision 16846

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History:

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2009/01/25 - FFmpeg maintainers notified

2009/01/27 - Patch developed by FFmpeg maintainers

2009/01/28 - Public disclosure of vulnerability details by FFmpeg maintainers

2009/01/28 - Release date of this security advisory

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Credits:

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Vulnerability found and advisory written by Tobias Klein.

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References:

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[1] <http://www.videolan.org/>

[2] <http://www.mplayerhq.hu/>

[3] <http://www.perian.org/>

[4] <http://www.xinehq.de/>

[5] <http://git.ffmpeg.org/?p=ffmpeg;a=commitdiff;h=72e715fb798f2cb79fd24a6d2eaeafb7c6eeda17>

[6] <http://www.trapkit.de/advisories/TKADV2009-004.txt>

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Changes:

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Revision 0.1 - Initial draft release to the vendor

Revision 1.0 - Public release

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PGP Signature Key:
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<http://www.trapkit.de/advisories/tk-advisories-signature-key.asc>

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