

Lesson 10 - Security

Recent Attacks

Rug Pulls

There has been a spate of rug pulls lately

From Rekt.news

[Bald](#)

See article

Shortly after midday UTC on Monday, a total of ~\$23M of liquidity was pulled a profit of 3,163 ETH (\$5.9M).



They denied than admitted what they had done.



Bald
@BaldBaseBald

...

I didn't sell a single token at any point since deployment. Just added/removed 2 sided liquidity and bought

1:59 PM · Jul 31, 2023 · 438.9K Views

50 Retweets 115 Quotes 605 Likes 35 Bookmarks



Post your reply!

Reply



StealthElectronVIP @StealthElectron · Jul 31

...

Cool story bro but as you know, when you add 2 sided liquidity and price goes up, the AMM is selling tokens in exchange for ETH in the pool.

So yes, you did in fact sell a lot of tokens and now have a lot more ETH.

Not judging you, just making it crystal clear.

6

5

156

33.2K

1

Tip



Bald @BaldBaseBald · Jul 31

...

correct

38

7

63

25.1K

1

Tip

Kannagi Finance

See [article](#)

Before the incident the project had \$2.1M TVL according to [DeFiLlama](#) (now just \$0.17), but the scammer only got away with around \$1.1M.

The project's [website](#) and [socials](#) have since been deleted.

Kannagi had been audited twice, and [endorsed](#) (via a deleted giveaway tweet) by ecosystem-leader SyncSwap, as was EraLend which [got rekt for \\$3.4M](#) on Tuesday.

DeFi Labs

See [article](#)

[DeFiLabs rugged \\$1.6M from its users on BSC via a backdoor function in their staking contract.](#)

The project describes itself as “*A decentralized finance platform managed by AI*” with a “*Secure Stable High-Yield Return Staking Pool*”.

The latest [vPoolv6 contract](#) contained the backdoor function *withdrawFunds* which allowed the [funder address](#) to drain the contract of user deposits.

```
152     function withdrawFunds(address _token, uint256 _amount) public payable nonReentrant {
153         require(funder == msg.sender, "vPool: invalid recipient");
154
155         if(address(_token) != address(0)) {
156             IERC20(_token).safeTransfer(msg.sender, _amount);
157         } else {
158             safeTransferETH(msg.sender, _amount);
159         }
160     }
```

The stolen funds include BSC-USD (the vast majority), Cake, wrapped BTC and ETH, and BUSD.


Exploiter

address: [0xee08d6c3a983eb22d7137022f0e9f5e7d4cf0be2](#)

Rug

contract: [0xdEDbd1804569F369e33e453Ee311F0F97dCd0Bde](#)

Example tx: [0xcd255e0d...](#)



rekt

References :

[Rekt.news](#)

 Platypus ▲ (🍣 + 🐾 + 🐟)
@Platypusdefi

Dear Community,
We regret to inform you that our protocol was hacked recently, and the attacker took advantage of a flaw in our USP solvency check mechanism. They used a flashloan to exploit a logic error in the USP solvency check mechanism in the contract holding the collateral.

1:42 AM · Feb 17, 2023 · 172.5K Views

This was quite a simple exploit

It started with the taking a flash loan of 44M USDC which was deposited into Platypus. The resulting LP tokens were then used as collateral to borrow 41.7M USP.

The *emergencyWithdraw()* function only checks whether the user's position is *currently* solvent, but neglects to first check

against any the effect of any borrowed funds. This allows the attacker to withdraw the supplied collateral while keeping the borrowed USP.

```
// ...  
function emergencyWithdraw(uint256 _pid) public nonReentrant {  
    PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[_pid];  
    UserInfo storage user = userInfo[_pid][msg.sender];  
  
    if (address(platypusTreasure) != address(0x00)) {  
        (bool isSolvent, ) = platypusTreasure.isSolvent(msg.sender, address(poolInfo[_pid].lpToken), true);  
        require(isSolvent, 'remaining amount exceeds collateral factor');  
    }  
  
    // reset rewarder before we update lpSupply and sumOfFactors  
    IBoostedMultiRewarder rewarder = pool.rewarder;  
    if (address(rewarder) != address(0)) {  
        rewarder.onPtpReward(msg.sender, user.amount, 0, user.factor, 0);  
    }  
  
    // SafeERC20 is not needed as Asset will revert if transfer fails  
    pool.lpToken.transfer(address(msg.sender), user.amount);  
  
    // update non-dialuting factor  
    pool.sumOfFactors -= user.factor;  
  
    user.amount = 0;  
    user.factor = 0;  
    user.rewardDebt = 0;  
}
```

The collateral withdrawn was then used to replay the flash loan, and the USP was swapped for other stablecoins.

The attacker was however tracked down


ZachXBT ✅ @zachxbt · Feb 17

...

Replying to @zachxbt

I've reviewed your transaction history across multiple chains which lead me to your ENS address `retlwq.eth`

Your OpenSea account links directly to your Twitter and you liked a Tweet about the Platypus exploit.



20



37



611



80.1K



Tip

In a further twist funds were then taken from the attacker details from Daniel Von Fange

"The attacker forgot to code any way collect the funds after stealing them, so the funds were locked in the attack contract. They also neglected Flash Loan 101 and allowed anyone to call the flash loan callback code. No check that they had started the flash loan. "

"This allowed @BlockSecTeam and the project to retrigger the hack, but with one major twist - the project contracts had been upgraded to steal back from the attacker during the hack"

"The attack sequence involved taking flash loaned USDC, approving it, and depositing into the project. But during the retrigger, the attack code used its own stolen USDC to approve and deposit instead. The new project code simply took the attacker's USDC and ran with it."

Invocation Flow



Wintermute Hack

Rekt [article](#)

Mudit Gupta [blog](#)

Evgeny Gaevoy CEO of Wintermute [tweets](#)

[Attack vector](#)

An admin address was compromised using the profanity vulnerability, Wintermute had removed funds from this address, but hadn't removed its admin role, which allowed the attacker to remove tokens from the vault.

The address was compromised because it had been created using the profanity tool, which was recently found to have a vulnerability.

Admin Address :

0x0000000fe6a514a32abdcdfcc076c85243de899b

It was created in this way to have large number of leading zeros which can save gas.

Evgeny Gaevoy explained :

"Last time we generated addresses this way was in June. We have since moved to a more secure key generation script. As we learned about the Profanity exploit last week, we accelerated the "old key" retirement

And then, due to an internal (human) error, a wrong function has been called and we blacklisted the router instead of the operator (contract that signs)

And such is a challenge of running a (truly) automated Market Maker in the Dark Forest. You must automate processes as much as possible as multisig solutions are not applicable to our way of high speed trading "

The attack started with :

<https://etherscan.io/tx/0xeeecba26d5eb7939257e5b3e646e4bc597b73e256a89cb84a6dfc58de250d8a38> where

Wintermute's hot wallet

(<https://etherscan.io/address/0x0000000fe6a514a32abdcdfcc076c85243de899b>) started calling their vault contract (<https://etherscan.io/address/0x0000000ae347930bd1e7b0f35588b92280f9e75>) to transfer tokens out to the hacker's contract

(<https://etherscan.io/address/0x0248f752802b2cfb4373cc0c3bc3964429385c26>)

Profanity vulnerability

see 1inch [write up](#)

The author of the tool says :

"I've decided to also archive this repository to further reduce risk that someone uses this tool. The code will not receive any updates and I've left it in an uncompliable state. Use something else! "

Evgeny Gaevoy finishes his tweets with

"And this is what we are planning to do. No lay-offs. No strategy changes. No emergency fundraise. Not giving up on defi. Keep moving forward through this bear market with the rest of you"

Nomad bridge Hack

Thanks to [Rekt](#) and [@samczsun](#) for their insights.

On 1st August 2022 the Nomad bridge was hacked and within 3 hours about \$190 M of funds were taken. The attack affected related projects such as EVMOS, Milkomena and Moonbeam.

August 1st 2022

The exploits unfolds...

The exploit was spotted as unusual activity by @spreekaway, see this [thread](#)

Nomad bridge getting rugged??? Looks very very sus

📄 Nomad: ERC20 Bridge	OUT	0xe4a4df7e1689589efb0...	100
📄 Nomad: ERC20 Bridge	OUT	📄 0xa8ecaf8745c56d5935c...	100
📄 Nomad: ERC20 Bridge	OUT	📄 0xd1a7feb0317bbe40ac...	100
📄 Nomad: ERC20 Bridge	OUT	⌚ bitliq.eth	100
📄 Nomad: ERC20 Bridge	OUT	0xb5c55f76f90cc528b26...	100
📄 Nomad: ERC20 Bridge	OUT	📄 0x00000000000000660def...	100
📄 Nomad: ERC20 Bridge	OUT	📄 0xf57113d8f6ff35747737...	100

10:37 PM · Aug 1, 2022 · Twitter Web App

It seemed that transactions were draining funds from the bridge, by sending 0.01 WBTC you could get 100 WBTC back

⌚ bitliq.eth	IN	📄 Nomad: ERC20 Bridge	0.01
📄 Nomad: ERC20 Bridge	OUT	0xe4a4df7e1689589efb0...	100
📄 Nomad: ERC20 Bridge	OUT	📄 0xa8ecaf8745c56d5935c...	100

In theory the bridge was controlled by a transfer first being proved and then a transaction could go through to process the movement of the funds.

So what *should* have been happening is that the messages submitted should have been proven, then included in a merkle tree whose root is stored and flagged as confirmed at a certain time.

What seemed to be happening is that messages were being processed that hadn't previously been confirmed. Once the

initial exploiting transaction went through, anyone could simply submit a similar transaction to drain funds for themselves.

Subsequently there were many such transactions from exploiters, white hats , along with the use of MEV techniques to take advantage of the situation.

	! 0x13ea2c98982d1fde14...	Process	15259332	4 days 11 hrs ago	0xe4a4df7e1689589efb0...
	! 0x8183fe98f81deb8aa37...	Process	15259332	4 days 11 hrs ago	Nomad Bridge Exploiter 3
	0xa304a513cc1b62da3d...	Process	15259312	4 days 11 hrs ago	Resident Arbitrageur
	0xe7fd692fcfae783149b...	Process	15259312	4 days 11 hrs ago	Nomad Bridge Exploiter 1
	0xa9ddf5f8c22c33f814a...	Process	15259312	4 days 11 hrs ago	0xa5eff6157b44d7eba6b...
	0xe0112511747dd3b0c3...	Process	15259303	4 days 11 hrs ago	⌚ bitliq.eth
	0x39b107d43d88f1120e...	Process	15259303	4 days 11 hrs ago	Nomad Bridge Exploiter 3
	0xcd54193008330871d8...	Process	15259282	4 days 11 hrs ago	Resident Arbitrageur
	! 0x6ae090b41da74ed958...	Process	15259249	4 days 11 hrs ago	Nomad Bridge Exploiter 2
	! 0x370e7192707fa7d4da...	Process	15259240	4 days 11 hrs ago	Nomad Bridge Exploiter 2
	0xef73e48c1be5f025412...	Process	15259240	4 days 11 hrs ago	Nomad Bridge Exploiter 2
	! 0x8732887090364bd5f8...	Process	15259217	4 days 11 hrs ago	Nomad Bridge Exploiter 2
	! 0x282525e58e17d5f442...	Process	15259217	4 days 11 hrs ago	Nomad Bridge Exploiter 2
	! 0xa9108b394beeb02efc...	Process	15259217	4 days 11 hrs ago	Nomad Bridge Exploiter 2
	! 0x51f0ed5db858a85218...	Process	15259202	4 days 11 hrs ago	0xe4a4df7e1689589efb0...
	! 0xbbb009a4b5cb19d8ae...	Process	15259201	4 days 11 hrs ago	⌚ bitliq.eth
	! 0x11f468aa89bc97d748...	Process	15259200	4 days 11 hrs ago	Nomad Bridge Exploiter 1
	0x56b4ade16ad35792f0...	Process	15259159	4 days 11 hrs ago	0xe4a4df7e1689589efb0...
	0x73ae1f3a7f81d140e21...	Process	15259156	4 days 11 hrs ago	0xa5eff6157b44d7eba6b...
	0xb0447743d0d29c5756...	Process	15259155	4 days 11 hrs ago	⌚ bitliq.eth
	0x5c5f3325d212b8e086...	Process	15259155	4 days 11 hrs ago	Nomad Bridge Exploiter 3
	0x498a0778cc8448a100...	Process	15259104	4 days 12 hrs ago	0xe4a4df7e1689589efb0...
	0xa5fe9d044e4f3e5aa5b...	Process	15259101	4 days 12 hrs ago	⌚ bitliq.eth
	0xb1fe26cc8892f58eb46...	Process	15259101	4 days 12 hrs ago	Nomad Bridge Exploiter 3

The top 3 exploiters were

[0x56D8B635A7C88Fd1104D23d632AF40c1C3Aac4e3](#) (\$47M)

[0xBF293D5138a2a1BA407B43672643434C43827179](#) (\$40M)

[0xB5C55f76f90Cc528B2609109Ca14d8d84593590E](#) (\$8M)

Some exploiters sent their funds through Tornado Cash to obfuscate the trail of funds.

As usual the exploited project appealed for people to return their funds.

Nomad have offered a deal to the exploiters asking for return of 90% of the funds, allowing the other 10% to be regarded as a bug bounty

Update: Nomad Bridge Hack Bounty

Nomad is announcing an **up to 10%** bounty to Nomad Bridge hackers where Nomad will consider any party who returns **at least 90%** of the total funds they hacked to be a white hat. Nomad will not pursue legal action against white hats. Funds must be returned to the official Nomad recovery wallet address:

0x94a84433101a10aeda762968f6995c574d1bf154.

Please be wary of impersonators and other scams.

Nomad is continuing to work with its community, law enforcement and blockchain analysis firms to ensure all funds are returned.

N O M A D


[Return of funds](#)

From @PeckShieldAlert as of August 5th, about 11% of funds have been recovered / returned

Nomad Funds Recovery Address

Token	Amount	Value (\$)
ETH	241	\$399,392
WETH	1,308.86	\$2,163,813.5
WBTC	92.7	\$2,145,448.8
USDC	6,261,842	\$6,268,104
USDT	2,013,335.7	\$2,015,349
CQT	34,366,035	\$2,836,778.8
FRAX	1,614,400	\$1,612,913
DAI	2,879,523.8	\$2,882,403
CARDS	158,082.5	\$41,911
IAG	247,189,221	\$1,308,560
SUSHI	4,557	\$6,835
C3	1,649,120	\$237,192
GERO	23,101,165.5	\$43,500
HBOT	1,200,320	\$4,279
FXS	12,503	\$93,647

● ETH & WETH ● WBTC ● USDC ● USDT
 ● CQT ● FRAX ● DAI ● Other



PeckShield

Some white hats have managed to recover some of the funds

Thank you to

-  .eth (\$4m)
- 0xE3F40743cc18fd45D475fAe149ce3ECC40aF68c3 (\$3.4m)
- darkfi.eth (\$1.9m)
- returner-of-beans.eth (\$1m)
- anime.eth (\$900k)

for returning a total of \$11.2m to our recovery address!

We've recovered a total of \$16.6m so far.

5:19 AM · Aug 4, 2022 · Twitter Web App

Exploit Details

The vulnerable contract is the Replica [contract](#)

This contract was upgraded and had the following initializer

```
function initialize(
    uint32 _remoteDomain,
    address _updater,
    bytes32 _committedRoot,
    uint256 _optimisticSeconds
) public initializer {

    __NomadBase_initialize(_updater);
    // set storage variables
    entered = 1;
    remoteDomain = _remoteDomain;
    committedRoot = _committedRoot;
    // pre-approve the committed root.
    confirmAt[_committedRoot] = 1;
    _setOptimisticTimeout(_optimisticSeconds);

}
```

It was initialized with the zero address

[Transaction](#)

```
Function: initialize(uint32 _remoteDomain, address _updater, bytes32 _committedRoot, uint256 _optimisticSeconds)

MethodID: 0xe7e7a7b7
[0]: 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
[1]: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
[2]: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
[3]: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
```

```
function initialize(
    uint32 _remoteDomain,
```

```
address _updater,  
bytes32 _committedRoot,  
uint256 _optimisticSeconds  
) public initializer {  
    __NomadBase_initialize(_updater);  
    // set storage variables  
    entered = 1;  
    remoteDomain = _remoteDomain;  
    committedRoot = _committedRoot;  
    // pre-approve the committed root.  
    confirmAt[_committedRoot] = 1;  
    _setOptimisticTimeout(_optimisticSeconds);  
}
```

In the initialize function, committedRoot is set to 0x00

```
committedRoot = _committedRoot;  
// pre-approve the committed root.  
confirmAt[_committedRoot] = 1;
```

and so

```
confirmAt[_committedRoot] = 1;
```

The first attempt to [exploit](#) the contract failed, it was an expensive failure costing 215 ETH.


```
    require(_m.destination() == localDomain,
"!destination");

    // ensure message has been proven
    bytes32 _messageHash = _m.keccak();
    require(acceptableRoot(messages[_messageHash]),
"!proven");

    // check re-entrancy guard
    require(entered == 1, "!reentrant");
    entered = 0;
    // update message status as processed
    messages[_messageHash] =
LEGACY_STATUS_PROCESSED;
    // call handle function
    IMESSAGERECIPIENT(_m.recipientAddress()).handle(
        _m.origin(),
        _m.nonce(),
        _m.sender(),
        _m.body().clone()
    );
    // emit process results
    emit Process(_messageHash, true, "");
    // reset re-entrancy guard
    entered = 1;
    // return true
    return true;
}
```

This line

```
require(acceptableRoot(messages[_messageHash]),
"!proven");
```

checks the validity of the merkle root of the messages using this function

```
function acceptableRoot(bytes32 _root) public view
returns (bool) {
    // this is backwards-compatibility for messages
    // proven/processed
    // under previous versions
    if (_root == LEGACY_STATUS_PROVEN) return true;
    if (_root == LEGACY_STATUS_PROCESSED) return false;
    uint256 _time = confirmAt[_root];
    if (_time == 0) {
        return false;
    }
    return block.timestamp >= _time;
}
```

using the following constants declared earlier.

```
bytes32 public constant LEGACY_STATUS_NONE =
bytes32(0);
bytes32 public constant LEGACY_STATUS_PROVEN =
bytes32(uint256(1));
bytes32 public constant LEGACY_STATUS_PROCESSED =
bytes32(uint256(2));
```

The line

```
uint256 _time = confirmAt[_root];
```

now returns 1 (remember in initialize, `confirmAt[0x00]` is set to 1)

You can check the return value of this function yourself on etherscan as I did :

5. acceptableRoot
_root (bytes32)
0x00
Query
└ <i>bool</i>
[acceptableRoot(bytes32) method Response]
» <i>bool</i> : true

Thus any message sent to process would succeed !

Note

The audit report from Quanstamp is [available](#), their finding 'QSP-19 Proving With An Empty Leaf' is particularly relevant to this exploit, but perhaps not understood by the Nomad team.

Arbitrum critical vulnerability

A critical vulnerability that was spotted in time, caused by too much optimisation.

See [writeup](#) from white hat.

A bridge address is used to receive funds deposited in Arbitrum, it is vital that this address is set up correctly and cannot be switched to a malicious contract.

Upgradeable contracts can go very wrong if the initialize function isn't adequately secured.

In this contract there were 2 flags in storage to check if initialize had been run or was running

```
modifier initializer() {
    // If the contract is initializing we ignore whether _initialized is set in order to support multiple
    // inheritance patterns, but we only do this in the context of a constructor, because in other contexts the
    // contract may have been reentered.
    require(_initializing ? _isConstructor() : !_initialized, "Initializable: contract is already initialized");

    bool isTopLevelCall = !_initializing;
    if (isTopLevelCall) {
        _initializing = true;
        _initialized = true;
    }

    ...
    if (isTopLevelCall) {
        _initializing = false;
    }
}
```

The initialize function also had check to see if the bridge address was already set

```
105     function initialize(IBridge _bridge, ISequencerInbox _sequencerInbox)
106         external
107             initializer
108             onlyDelegated
109         {
110             -         if (address(bridge) != address(0)) revert AlreadyInit();
111             bridge = _bridge;
112             sequencerInbox = _sequencerInbox;
113             allowListEnabled = false;
114             __Pausable_init();
115         }
```

Unfortunately that checked had been taken out to reduce gas, but things would still be ok, as long as the flags were still set...

A further optimisation cleared out the first 3 storage slots after upgrade

```
function postUpgradeInit(IBridge _bridge) external onlyDelegated onlyProxyOwner {
    uint8 slotsToWipe = 3;
    for (uint8 i = 0; i < slotsToWipe; i++) {
        assembly {
            sstore(i, 0)
        }
    }
    allowListEnabled = false;
    bridge = _bridge;
}
```

So, an attacker could now call the initialize function, setting the address of the bridge contract to a contract that they control, and thus receive any ETH that users deposit.

Poly Network hack

Recap of function selectors

[Encoding the function signatures and parameters](#)

Example

```
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;                                     language=none

contract MyContract {

    Foo otherContract;

    function callOtherContract() public view returns
(bool){
        bool answer = otherContract.baz(69,true);
        return answer;
    }
}

contract Foo {
    function bar(bytes3[2] memory) public pure {}
    function baz(uint32 x, bool y) public pure
returns (bool r) {
        r = x > 32 || y;
    }
    function sam(bytes memory, bool, uint[] memory)
public pure {}
}
```

The way the call is actually made involves encoding the function selector and parameters

If we wanted to call `baz` with the parameters `69` and `true`, we would pass 68 bytes total, which can be broken down into:

1. the Method ID. This is derived as the first 4 bytes of the Keccak hash of the ASCII form of the signature `baz(uint32,bool)`.

0xcdcd77c0:

2. the first parameter, a uint32 value 69 padded to 32 bytes

3. the second parameter - boolean true, padded to 32 bytes

In total

Poly Network – Stolen Funds Breakdown



Ethereum Blockchain

	Quantity stolen
USDC	96,389,444
WBTC (wrapped Bitcoin)	1,032
DAI	673,227
UNI (Uniswap)	43,023
SHIBA	259,737,345,149
renBTC	14.47
USDT	33,431,197
wETH (wrapped Ether)	26,109
FEI USD	616,082



Binance Smart Chain

	Quantity stolen
BNB	6,613.44
USDC	87,603,373
ETH	299
BTCB	26,629
BUSD	1,023



Polygon Blockchain

	Quantity stolen
USDC	85,089,610

Polynetwork react to attack



Poly Network @PolyNetwork2 · Aug 10, 2021

Replies to [@PolyNetwork2](#)

...

We call on miners of affected blockchain and crypto exchanges to blacklist tokens coming from the above addresses.

[@Tether_to](#)
[@circlepay](#)

19

95

420

▲

Tip



Poly Network @PolyNetwork2 · Aug 10, 2021

...

We will take legal actions and we urge the hackers to return the assets.

188

313

527

▲

Tip



Poly Network @PolyNetwork2 · Aug 10, 2021

...

Assets involved include [\\$WBTC](#) [\\$WETH](#) [\\$RenBTC](#).

ETH:0xC8a65Fadf0e0dDAf421F28FEAb69Bf6E2E589963

We call on miners of affected blockchain and crypto exchanges to blacklist tokens coming from the above addresses.

[@BitGo](#) [@renBTCFinance](#)

14

51

262

▲

Tip



Poly Network @PolyNetwork2 · Aug 10, 2021

...

Assets involved include [\\$DAI](#) [\\$UNI](#) [\\$SHIB](#) [\\$FEI](#).

ETH:0xC8a65Fadf0e0dDAf421F28FEAb69Bf6E2E589963

We call on miners of affected blockchain and crypto exchanges to blacklist tokens coming from the above addresses.

[@MakerDAO](#) [@Uniswap](#) [@Shibtoken](#) [@feiprotocol](#)

25

76

274

▲


Tip

Example messages to the attacker

- Can I have some ETH? i been losing a lot of money
Thank you
 - Consider donating to public goods after all the pleasure
you've got from using public infra 🌱
 - ngmi
 - Welcome to the crypto world. Fee Tips: Use
tornado.cash to laundry your money ASAP.
 - Forget your USDT. Forget your USDC.
 - Swap tokens to ETH then deposit to tornado.cash . Good
luck.
 - Hi. Boos. Can. You. Give me eth thanks
 - You can use Tornado for currency mixing
 - DONT USE YOUR USDT TOKEN YOU VE GOT
BLACKLISTED
 - You can buy every pudgy penguin on opensea :)
 - Dad, this is my only asset. Please accept it
 - JOINING FOR EPIC SCREENCAP
 - Please gice me some eth
 - DONT USE YOUR USDT TOKEN
YOU VE GOT BLACKLISTED,god bless you
 - Remove liquidity from curve pool in form of DAI,
and exchange it for Eth and launder with Tornado
-

Mismanagement of access rights between two contracts

EthCrossChainManager is an owner of EthCrossChainData,
= EthCrossChainManager can execute privileged functions!



_method is user defined
= can be set at will.

```
bytes4(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(_method, "(bytes,bytes,uint64)"))),
```

mira

5

Vulnerable Contract 2: EthCrossChainData

Very High Privileged contract ! ➔ Can only be called by its owners.

Set + manage list of “Keepers”

= list of public keys that manage the wallets in the underlying liquidity chain


➔ Keepers have the right to execute large transactions, transfer large amounts to other wallets.

Vulnerable function: putCurEpochConPubKeyBytes

= become a “Keeper”

Set the public key (passed as parameter) as a Keeper

10



Aiming to find X such that

$\text{Hash}(X, \text{bytes}, \text{bytes}, \text{uint64})$

=

$\text{Hash}(\text{putCurEpochConPubKeyBytes}, \text{bytes}) = 0x41973cd9$

The Brute Force solution was

$X = f1121318093$

The attacker received a rather cryptic message

" Dont instant tornado funds, dont instant move blacklistable tokens to DAI/ETH? Insider confirmed!"

The attacker was looking at Tornado Cash and sent themselves a message

"Wonder why Tornado? Will miners stop me? Teach me please"

Then someone found a link between an address used by the attacker and some exchanges and tweeted

"Did the PolyNetwork Exploiter accidentally use the wrong sender address for this tx 0xb12681d9e? The sender address is tied to FTX, Binance, Okex accounts."

The hacker's attitude started to change, he suggested he could return "some tokens" or even abandon them, saying that they were "not so interested in the money".

Followed by a suggestion : "What if I make a new token and let the DAO decide where the tokens go"

Finally the attacker messaged "Ready to return the fund !"

See this [spreadsheet](#) for all communications

The attacker starts to return the funds

Polynetwork starts to refer to the attacker as 'Mr White Hat' and offer him a job and bounty

#PolyNetwork has no intention of holding #mrwhitehat legally responsible and cordially invites him to be our Chief Security Advisor. \$500,000 bounty is on the way. Whatever #mrwhitehat chooses to do with the bounty in the end, we have no objections.

'We appreciate you sharing your experience and believe your action constitutes white hat behavior. But we can't touch user assets and Poly Network doesn't have its own token. Since , we believe your action is white hat behavior, we plan to offer you a \$500,000 bug bounty after you complete the refund fully. Also we assure you that you will not be accountable for this incident.

We hope that you can return all tokens as soon as possible. You can reserve the equivalent value of 500,000 USD in any assets to the current owner address. We will make up this part of the assets to Poly Network users.

Your contribution is very helpful to us. Again, we think this behavior is white hat behavior, therefor this 500,000 USD will be seen as completely legal bounty reward. We will also ensure that you will not be held accountable for this incident, and we will publicly express our gratitude to you.'

Lasttime Refund	Chain	Hacker Address	Hack	Refund
12/8/2021 15:40:04	ETH Chain	0xC8a65Fadf0e0dDAf421F28FEAb69Bf6E2E589	272 mil	Almost
	BSC Chain	0x0D6e286A7cfD25E0c01fEe9756765D8033B32	253mil	ALL
	Polygon Chain	0x5dc3603c9d42ff184153a8a9094a73d46166321	85 mil	ALL
Still waiting more Fund	Chain	Receive Address (Polynetwork Multisig)	Balance	Received
8394,74 Hours	ETH Chain	0x71Fb9dB587F6d47Ac8192Cd76110E05B8fd21	Almost	Almost
	New Multisig	0x34d6b21d7b773225a102b382815e00ad876e2:	ALL	ALL
	BSC Chain	0xEEBb0c4a5017bEd8079B88F35528eF2c722b:	ALL	ALL
	Polygon Chain	0xA4b291Ed1220310d3120f515B5B7AccaecD66	ALL	ALL

A number of rather lengthy messages follow the return of the funds

Q & A, PART TWO:

Q: WHAT REALLY HAPPENED 30 HOURS AGO?

A: LONG STORY.

BELIEVE IT OR NOT, I WAS _FORCED_ TO PLAY THE GAME.

THE POLY NETWORK IS A SOPHISTICATED SYSTEM, I DIDN'T MANAGE TO BUILD A LOCAL TESTING ENVIRONMENT. I FAILED TO PRODUCE A POC AT THE BEGINNING. HOWEVER, THE AHA MOMEMNT CAME JUST BEFORE I WAS TO GIVE UP. AFTER DEBUGGING ALL NIGHT, I CRAFTED A _SINGLE_ MESSAGE TO THE ONTOLOGY NETWORK.

I WAS PLANNING TO LAUNCH A COOL BLITZKRIEG TO TAKE OVER THE FOUR NETWORK: ETH, BSC, POLYGON & HECO. HOWEVER THE HECO NETWORK GOES WRONG! THE RELAYER DOES NOT BEHAVE LIKE THE OTHERS, A KEEPER JUST RELAYED MY EXPLOIT DIRECTLY, AND THE KEY WAS UPDATED TO SOME WRONG PARAMETERS. IT RUINED MY PLAN.

I SHOULD HAVE STOPPED AT THAT MOMENT, BUT I DECIDED TO LET THE SHOW GO ON! WHAT IF THEY PATCH THE BUG SECRETLY WITHOUT ANY NOTIFICATION?

HOWEVER, I DIDN'T WANT TO CAUSE _REAL_ PANIC OF THE CRYPTO WORLD. SO I CHOSE TO IGNORE SHIT COINS, SO PEOPLE DIDN'T HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT THEM GOING TO ZERO. I TOOK IMPORTANT TOKENS (EXCEPT FOR SHIB) AND DIDN'T SELL ANY OF THEM.

Q: THEN WHY SELLING/SWAPPING THE STABLES?

A: I WAS PISSED BY THE POLY TEAM FOR THEIR INITIAL REPONSE.


THEY URGED OTHERS TO BLAME & HATE ME BEFORE I HAD ANY CHANCE TO REPLY! OF COURSE I KNEW THERE ARE FAKE DEFI COINS, BUT I DIDN'T TAKE IT SERIOUSLY SINCE I HAD NO PLAN LAUNDERING THEM.

IN THE MEANWHILE, DEPOSITING THE STABLES COULD EARN SOME INTEREST TO COVER POTENTIAL COST SO THAT I HAVE MORE TIME TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE POLY TEAM.

Security / Best Practices

Ecosystem

The Web3 Security Stack



Consensys Best Practices

General

- Prepare for Failure
- Stay up to Date
- Keep it Simple
- Rolling out
- Blockchain Properties
- Simplicity vs. Complexity

Precautions

- General
- Upgradeability
- Circuit Breakers
- Speed Bumps
- Rate Limiting
- Deployment

- [Safe Haven](#)

Solidity Specific

- [Assert, Require, Revert](#)
- [Modifiers as Guards](#)
- [Integer Division](#)
- [Abstract vs Interfaces](#)
- [Fallback Functions](#)
- [Payability](#)
- [Visibility](#)
- [Locking Pragmas](#)
- [Event Monitoring](#)
- [Shadowing](#)
- [tx.origin](#)
- [Timestamp Dependence](#)
- [Complex Inheritance](#)
- [Interface Types](#)
- [EXTCODESIZE Checks](#)

Token Specific

- [Standardization](#)
- [Frontrunning](#)
- [Zero Address](#)
- [Contract Address](#)

Documentation

- [General](#)
- [Specification](#)
- [Status](#)
- [Procedures](#)

- [Known Issues](#)

- [History](#)

- [Contact](#)

Attacks

- [Reentrancy](#)

- [Oracle Manipulation](#)

- [Frontrunning](#)

- [Timestamp Dependence](#)

- [Insecure Arithmetic](#)

- [Denial of Service](#)

- [Griefing](#)

- [Force Feeding](#)