

WHO GOVERNS PAKISTAN?

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Abstract: This article intends to unveil the concept of governing elite with special reference to Pakistan. The people who occupy the command positions with a capacity to take binding decisions for the society are interchangeably termed as Governing Elite, Power Elite or Decision makers. The concept of ruling class or governing elite varies from country to country under their historical experiences and societal fabric, as in the case of Pakistan, its political system is inherently elitist one. The nature and functioning of Pakistan's political system, the constitutional legacy, the historical experiences have yielded power in real manner to Military and civil bureaucratic elite. This study intends to find the answer of the question that what is role and position of Military, Civil Bureaucratic and Religious Elite in Pakistan's political system.

Governing Elite

There is a general agreement among the sociologists and political scientists that organization of a society entails wide arrays of activities pertaining to political economic cultural, social and religious spheres of life. There is another dimension of this agreement, which elaborates that elite are present in all societies. Elite are the people who have greater social significance in a society. The Elites are the top strata of society having capacity to control or influence, in all spheres of life; the actions of others sometimes even without their consent.

According to Bottomore (T.B. Bottomore, 1970, p. 8) the term elite applies to functional, mainly occupational groups, which have a high status (for whatever reasons) in a society. The core doctrine of theorists of Elite Paradigm- Vilferdo Praeto (1963) and Gateno Mosca(1939) unfolded the concept of elite by reinforcing that there is always a minority of the population in any society which takes major decisions. These major decisions with wider canvass and outcomes become the political decisions. All societies have two classes -a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first, few in numbers, performs political functions. (Mosca, Gateno,1939, p.40 In Bottomore, T.B). The sources of elite recruitment vary from society to society. "The Managerial Revolution" of Burnham delineating the significance of economic forces gives importance to the means of production, which gives a group a dominant position. The fruit of this control would be preferential treatment when the product – in money or goods – is distributed. (Parry,1977, p. 8)

C. Wright Mills, (1956) an American sociologist partly agreed with Burnham that the status and composition of elite must be studied in the context of the economic and social structure of the particular society. Mills presented power elite model or Institutional Approach to study the power structure of the United States, who takes major decisions for society. "Within

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American society major national power now resides in the economic, the political and the military domains” (p.6) He elaborated this phenomenon by stating that high ups of economic, the political, and the military spheres have dominated in the US Political system. He identified that at the top of the economy are the corporate rich, like the chief executives when he talked about political sphere, at the top are the members of the political directorate; and at the top of the military establishment are people in and around the Joint Chief of Staffs and the upper echelons. These domains work in close collaboration, so decisions taken by all of them tend to become total in their consequence having greater social significance. “The leading men in each of the three domains of power - the warlords, the corporation chieftains, the political directorate - tend to come together, to form the power elite of America”.(C Wright . Mills, 1956, pp. 8,9)

His Power Elite model keeps at the top the corporate rich, leaders of the executive branch of the government, and military leaders, directly below of them are the local opinion leaders, members of legislative branch, and at the lowest position are the unorganized exploited masses. His study unfolds a basic reality about the American Society that the elite occupy the top command posts of society. These positions give their holders enormous authority over not just governmental, but financial, educational, social, civic, and cultural institutions as well. A small group being the pivot of society is able to take fundamental decisions for ordinary people. There is an observation that the power of the elite increases because of the close collaboration between political, industrial, and military setup of the American society. This phenomenon is just not peculiar to only the USA. As we see now that governments usually are dependent upon the business world to run the governmental affairs. Similarly, industrial sector now cautiously look forward for the governmental support in the form of subsidies, protectionism, and loans “To be sure, business people and politicians constantly carp at each other. Nevertheless, the fact remains that they have grown so close that they prosper together far more than they do separately. (Retrieved from: www.udel.edu/htr/psc105/texts/power/html) dated: 26.01.2011

Therefore, seemingly, Power or Governing Elite occupy the command posts in the major institutions exercising power and exerting influence through many sub- links. The destiny of lower strata of power elite basically, is to follow the wishes of the dominant power elite. John Macions (2004) comments that “This model is an analysis of politics that views power as concentrated among the rich” (p: 406)

Governing Elite in a Polity

Now we turn to the issue that how to identify the Ruling Elite in a given polity. The ruling elite are always equipped with Political Power, which is a social capacity to make binding decisions that have far-reaching consequences for a society. The element binding decision enumerates an individual’s capacity as a member of social organizations-political, religious, whatsoever, to transmit the consequences and influences to members of the community at large. This element of binding decisions makes some activities in society socially significant than others. This has also appeared as to be a propellant for researchers to locate the actual wielders of political power. It also entails to look for those who are subject of exercise of this power or in

other words those who are to finally receive the far-reaching consequences of binding decisions made by powerful groups and institutions in a body politic. (Orum, Anthony, 1978, p.127)

People, groups or institutions with a right to rule accompanied with a capacity and ability to exert influence on other people and decision-making process, envisaged to run smoothly the activities in political sphere of life, who finally becomes the wielders of political power .i.e. Governing Elite, or In Power Elite. It is not always a constant situation or scenario, in which only legal authority based upon legitimacy rules. Some groups, institutions or even individuals acquire that position which enables them to exert influence or control the behavior of people and decision-making process by other means. They usually play role in decision making through nongovernmental means. They may be termed as Out Power Elite. Deutsch Karl. W. et.al (1967), has taken it as of “the both formal and informal decision makers at a society’s national level.” He has drawn a distinction between General and Functional elites. The former...comprise those who represent their own individual sphere of public life: decision makers in Politics, government, business, the military, communications, religion and so forth. General elites are those who dominate the life of society as a whole. (pp.4, 5)

Lipset, Seymour. Martin (1965) identifies Elites as “which are at the summits of key social structure i.e. the higher positions in the economy, government, military, politics, religion, mass organization education and the professions” (p.411). It has been opined by Spear Percival (1970), that “an elite is a body which controls a particular sphere of life though it may be influenced by other elites at other levels or in different departments. (p.1). No doubt, the term Elite has been differently explained by scholars but there is an agreement in all studies that the phenomenon of Power is central to the notion of a Political Elite. The Political Elite can be used synonymously with the “influential”, the Powerful, the governors, or the decision makers” (Beck Carl, 1965 & Karbo, Harlod R, & Fave, Richard DellaL, 1979, pp. 5,6)

Since the late nineteenth century, social and political theorists inclined to believe that directive power in modern society to be concentrated in fewer and fewer hands. Geraint Parry (1977) states that

“For some, elite are decision makers of the society whose power is not subject to control by any other body in the society. For others elite are the sole source of values in the society or constitute the integrating force in the community without which it may fall apart. (p.64)”

This concept exposes one thing that neither one man nor masses can rule with all efficacies until and unless supported by the groups of advisers, administrators, propagandists, and police. Similarly, the Masses, the class numerous in numbers, have need of acting politically, (to take major decisions) under the direction of a small group or leader. The organizational coherence of this small group unleashes the efficacious factor in the activity of major decisions in society. Small group is not usually disparate and more inclined towards organizational disciplined behavior. The simplification of internal communication channels of a small group

enhances the feasibility of concrete organizational existence. The contact sources are always readily available. So it can be said that a small minority can formulate policies rapidly, has consensual ideas and the ability of showing solidarity in its public appearances.

This class is attributed with a sub division of those who directly or indirectly play an important role in government (governing elite) and those whose activities are not significant (for politics as they do not take major decisions, are termed as non-governing elite. (Andrew Heywood: 2000). Specifically in political sphere, an individual necessarily confront with the capacity of others, who can influence his behavior and control his actions with all intensity and scope. The elite in political sphere are diversely termed as Governing Elite, Power Elite or Ruling Elite. S.F Nadel identified three types of elites, i.e. Specialized Elites, Social Elites, and Governing Elites. The first two categories get shape because of status in the society. The social elite cannot meaningfully or, directly influence the lives of ordinary people, because they are not in command of coercive power or any monopoly of decision-making. Their influence creeps into the lives of common person, they command respect and are “imitated”. Its imitable qualities may range from table manners and accent to cultural or sporting interests”. The third category governing elite is composed of the society’s political rulers, who are at the command posts with legislative and coercive authority in a political system which gives them a pre-eminence in decision making. (Parry, p.72)

The analysis of elite role in a political system in its entirety requires the identification of those groups, institutions and individuals who actively exercise control over different policy areas or decision-making process in a particular political system. Researching for identification of Elites at national level is quite paradoxical due to one of the most pertinent fact that there is always a cluster of groups or people, who are at the command posts in a political system. However, Elites theorists, despite all complexities have delineated some commonly observable types of elites who are more influential than others in political decision making are in a political system. Political Elites are not constant in composition and nature. They vary from system to system and the environment in which they operate.

The elite role, patterns and types in non -western developing political systems are in sharp contrast to the western liberal democracies. The developing countries have distinctive features of poverty, high birth rate, economic dependence on developed world combined with traditional rural structures, and past political experiences under colonial powers, which ultimately led to the formation of political systems, which are inherently different from constitutional democratic political systems of western world. Shills (Wirada, 2005) classified non-western political systems into five categories i.e. (1) Political Democracies (2) Tutelary democracies (3) Modernizing Oligarchies (4) Totalitarian Oligarchies (5) Traditional Oligarchies. The common thread which runs through these categories, exception is for the first category, is that generally boundaries between various governmental structures are absent, and simultaneously a gross deviation in the performance of governmental functions from the constitutional and legal norms of democracy becomes routine. The boundary maintenance, if there is any, is less effective. As Almond comments that “Legislative bodies are far less effective in regulating the performance of the rule making function by the bureaucracy. The rule making

function tends to be performed by the executive” (Almond, Gabriel. In Wirada, vol.1 (edt), p, 201)

In this situation, the elite identification becomes a paradox in transitional political system of developing countries. At one point of time, when democracy is well in place, the governmental structures maintain their boundaries in functions and remains confined to their constitutional role, and then the power elite or Governing Elite comes from Parliament, which is usually comprised of Social and Specialized Elites. Though Mosca (1939,p.257) was in the belief even about the industrial societies parliaments that the “place of the parliamentary elite in the governing constellation is a limited oneassemblies do not govern...they merely check and balance the men who govern.”(cited in : Czudnowski, Moshe, M, 1983, p.220)

The governing elite in Pakistan

To transpose any notions or models of western or American scholars on developing countries posits difficulties because of the peculiarity of these societies’ social, political, historical realities, which are inherently different from western developed nations. To understand the phenomena of Governing Elite in Pakistan, we need to trace out the contours of institutional landscaping of political structure of Pakistan.

The departure of British crown on 14 August 1947 left Pakistan under the partition plan of 3 June 1947 with a political structure featuring parliamentary democracy. The protagonists of Pakistan Movement envisioned this country to be governed and guided by the norms and processes of parliamentary democracy in all spheres of governance. However, the political structure evolved later on, was diametrically opposite to his vision. Many factors can be accounted for this turned around face, as Lawrence Ziring (2004) observed:

The transfer of power established Pakistan as parliamentary democracy but no consideration was given to its colonial history or its traditional background. The British never tutored their subjects in the art of responsible government (p. 68).

Besides these, some other reasons like constraints in the merger of heterogeneity of ethno-religious identities of Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus, Christians and Bengali, Punjabi, Pushtoon, and Urdu speaking into one solidified nation also contributed a lot to deform the political structure of Pakistan. The ensuing years also saw the folly march of other competing forces, which put the analysts in a dilemma exactly to trace out the political stratification and locus of real power holder not only in domestic affairs but also within the parameters of foreign policy.

In 1947, the Governing Elite in Pakistan were civil- political leaders who had exclusive control over governmental policymaking. They by virtue of their membership in Constituent and Provincial Assemblies influenced the foreign and domestic policy as well. Keith Callard pointed out towards only twenty men who were at the command posts during the (1945-1958) initial years. (Callard Keith, 1957, pp.25-26) These Elite meaningfully exerted influence on foreign

policy making until the death of Liaquat Ali Khan, the first prime minister of Pakistan, but after that, Military's role became more dominant than others. Later on, the Civil Political Elites appeared neutralized in matters of defense and foreign policy making. Ayub Khan immediately banned all political parties resulting in suspension of all political activities. Under the charges of corruption and inefficiency, majority of the politicians were banned by EBDO from taking part in any future election.

The phenomenon of ruling or governing elite in Pakistan have been delineated by multifarious dimensions, but broadly there is a consensus among analysts that colonial institutional - structural legacy provided the foundation stone for evolving Governing Elite in Pakistan after first Martial Law. The steel frame of British reign were of two institutions; The Civil Service and Military, continued and nurtured in Pakistan's post partition favorable circumstances with the same characteristic features. Ayesha Siddiqi focusing upon the core question, 'who is Pakistan's Elite' acknowledged the lack of quality social science research in identifying the evolution of elite in Pakistan. she besides indicating towards other groups mainly pointed towards the primacy of Civil and Military bureaucracy as being the fountain of political power in the history of Pakistan. (Siddiqi, Ayesha, Who is this Elite, The Express Tribune, Retrieved: tribune.com.pk/story/.../Who is This Elite)

So politics in Pakistan was overwhelmed by two non-political elites - the military-bureaucratic elite, however intercepted with the short interregnum of democratic rule of politically elected civilians with lesser degree of influence. An astute scholar Ian Talbot comment, "The Army and bureaucracy have been the self-appointed guardians of the Pakistani state since independence. Political parties and constitutions have come and gone or been transformed but these twin unelected institutions have remained the pillars of state (2000, p. 215)

The early years' government dismissals, the fragmentation of political parties, the Assembly dissolutions, the clash between regional identity and the Muslim nationalism conspicuously strengthened these steel frames of power structure. Ayesha Jalal (1990, p. 295) reinforced by saying that domestic, regional, and international factors strengthened the dominance of the Military-Civil Bureaucracy over the political parties and politicians.

A classical study by Asaf Hussein (1979:34) on power elite in Pakistan while unfolding the layers of the power structure in Pakistan explained the spatial context and societal context. According to him in the societal context the elites came from the ethnic social structures of the society, while in the spatial context the real modes of production for elites were either feudal or capitalist sectors. He has also mentioned the ideal one mode of production i.e Islamic, "which visibly or invisibly existed in the external reality. According to him, the formal political orders in Pakistan constitute the Westminster type of representational democracy and democratic structures, but they are showing teeth of an elephant. Therefore, what he feels that real power of the system resides somewhere else. He traced six categories, such as Military Elite, Bureaucratic elite, Religious elite, Land owning Elite, Industrial elite and Professional elite.

He through a model of power structure in Pakistan identified and differentiated between governing elite and non-governing elite (out- power Elite) in Pakistan. Out power elite are not the real power holder in a body politic, not occupying leading positions but exert their influence through other means: media, interest groups, Political parties, public opinions etc. he compiled a list to show the presence of different types of elites at the pinnacle of decision-making apparatus as; LE: Land owning Elite, BE Bureaucratic Elite, RE: Religious Elite, IP: Industrial Elite PE: Professional Elite, ME: Military Elite

The regime type and general political situation made one or the other elite group dominant, not only in domestic affairs, but also in foreign policy making. This enigma of political situation ruined the standardized democratic procedures. Asaf Hussain (225) talked about the circulation of elite power and role in the political system of Pakistan. “It was structure primarily concerned with the circulation of power within its boundaries. The most central area of the field was the power junction occupied by the governing elite; the remainder area engaged by the non-governing elite. Political activity was almost completely the reserve of the elite and if the middle sector and masses became involved, it was as one or another group politically mobilized them in an attempt to wrest control from the elite already occupying the position. The Civil-Military elite tended to submerge the other four groups of elites as their share had always been major in occupying the leading positions because of frequency of breakdown of Political system. The corollary had been that two groups either exclusively or as a joint venture exerted power and influence over the decision making structure.(Hussain, A. (1976), Elites and Political Development in Pakistan. The Developing Economies, 14: 224–238. doi: 10.1111/j.1746-1049.1976.tb00980

The Religious Elite despite being in an ideological state failed to take an influential part in ruling elite or as direct power holder in body politic of Pakistan. However largely it wielded extensive influence over decision-making process specifically during the military regime. The Balance of Power between the Civil and Military bureaucracy kept changing but it was they who shaped the foreign policy agenda as well provided a leadership in its implementation. (The Making of our Foreign policy, Daily Times, September, 24, 2003)

Dr Saeed Shafqat (2002) affirms contours of Pakistan’s elite structure but with different perspective, while studying the Civil Military relations in Pakistan. He coined two models: Military- Hegemonic Political System (1958-1969). Party Dominant Political System (1977-1985). He has also found the primacy of Military – Bureaucratic Elite in the political structure of Pakistan. He writes “Bureaucratic elite constitute the epitome of power structure in Pakistan; they enjoy power, privilege prestige and status. These elite also monopolize control over governmental resources, both of coercion and patronage. The military and bureaucracy are the principal institutions. These elites are relatively small, cohesive share similar political attitudes and enjoy the institutional base of power” (pp, 4-10)

The Military Elite

Pre- Independence Scenario

The British colonial power erected a formidable institution, the military, to consolidate its rule over the land of aliens, on the pattern of British norms and professionalism. In 1895, it was first time that formal institution of Army was established. The three Armies of presidencies of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras were, finally sub-merged under the command of the C-in-C of India as one organization. The C-in-C of India had been under the charge of executive authority of Viceroy. There was supremacy of civilian authority over the defense affairs. The British Army earlier recruited only the British nationals. Nevertheless, after 1857 war of Independence, realized the importance of inclusion of indigenous elements so the process of Indianization started in 1859 on the principle that “the native Army should be composed of different nationalities and casts and as a general rule, mixed promiscuously through each regiment. Further reinforced in 1862 “Indian regiments may be raised locally and yet contain different classes and sects. This was a direct corollary of British colonial policy of “Divide and Rule and also continued into deployments policy of native portion of Army at different places of sub-continent. “Keep your Sikh regiments in the Punjab and they will be ready to act against Hindus, keep your Hindus out of Punjab and they will be ready to act against the Sikhs”

The inclusion of Muslims was an impossible occurrence as there were no all Muslims units (there were pure Hindu and Sikhs units). The legacy of British distrust of Muslim loyalty dated back to the mutiny of 1857. (Cohen, Stephen: 1984,p. 6). Eventually this policy widened the religious, ethnic rifts and animosity in the sub-continent. The shock waves of this policy could not be curtailed even after the independence in both India and Pakistan. Some races like Ghurkas, Pathans, Sikhs, Rajput, Dogras and Muslim Punjabi of West Punjab were labeled as martial races. which even after independence were treated same way as viewed by Asaf Hussain (1979).Majorly the recruitment of the Pakistan Army had taken place from Punjab district of Jhelum, Gujrat, Attock and Campbelpul (Faisalabad), In the North West Frontier Province Pathans were recruited from Peshawar and Kohat and from the Yousaf Zai, Khatak Afridi and Bangash Tribes. He through a personal source collected the data about ethnic composition of Military officer corps, as no official record is available in this regard until yet.

Table:3.2: Group Strength of the Pakistan Military Officer Corp

Ethnic Group	Percentage
Punjabi	70
Pathans	15
Mohjirs/Baluchi	10
Sindihi	5
	100

Asaf Hussain, (1979), p. 129

The Bengalis were non-existent until 1964, so, since first day, the Punjabis and Pathans with major share formed the military elite in Pakistan. Mehtab Ali Shah (1997) supports this reality by stating that Punjabis represent 56 percent of the population and have 60 percent share in Military Elite. The Pashtoon represents 12.5 percent of the population and 35 percent of the elite. (p. 208)

Post -Independence Situation

The mechanism of division of Armed Forces at the time of partition undoubtedly had the seeds of insufficient resources to build a formidable institution, casting deep scars on coming years of Pakistan's foreign policy priorities. Pakistan, being small in size, was appropriated fewer stores, supplies and facilities, on the basis of proportion of share 64% to India, 36% to Pakistan was fixed. Pakistan received six armored regiments, eight Artillery, twenty-one infantry, while India fourteen armored, forty eight infantry regiments, As regards the fixed installations, Pakistan received Staff College Quetta, the Royal Indian Army Service Corps School Kakul and some important naval facilities at Karachi and Chittagong. (Cohen, p. 7) The division of ordinance also took place when India agreed to pay a sum of 60 million Rs to Pakistan. It enabled Pakistan to establish its first security printing press and ordinance factory. (Askari, 2000, b) The men in uniform were divided based on religious affiliation, which virtually reduced Pakistan's share to 30 percent, as there was no all-Muslim unit in British Army Brain Cloughly comments. (pp. 3, 4)

Many units were mixed in religion, ethnicity and casts. In a battalion for example, companies of 140 men might be Muslim, Hindus or Sikhs. A battalion ordered to join the Army of Pakistan would retain only its Muslim company or companies and those head quarter's officers and men of the same religion. Naturally Indian regiments such as ethnically defined as Jats, Sikhs, Dogras regiments went to India and Balouch and frontier regiments were allocated to Pakistan.

The regiment wearing Punjab badge was divided between the countries. (as Punjab was itself) with its 8th, 4th, 15th Punjabis, about twenty six going to Pakistan. These ethnic and religious dimensions made Pakistan deficient, especially in officer corps. Out of 634 Lt. Colonel 4 were Muslims, 42 majors, 114, were Muslims out of 833 and 1003 respectively. While among upper ranks there was no Muslim officers. (Rizvi,(2000) pp. 45-47. This deficiency was not confined to the service men exclusively, whatever, Pakistan received from military stores was useless and broken. As put into Brain Cloughly study (p. 3) 170,000 tons of equipment and stores were to be intended to be dispatched in 300 Truckloads from India. So, Pakistan's early defence posture was very weak, incapacitated by unjust decisions in term of boundary demarcation of Punjab and Bengal, weak economic condition and poor infrastructure combined with security challenges at Eastern and western borders. Pakistan failed to secure Junagarh (1948) from Indian aggression (a tiny maritime state some 300 miles away from the coast of Karachi. Owing to weak defence, Quaid-e-Azam had to withdraw his decision of sending troops

to rectify the situation aroused due to India's maneuvered aggression for accession of Kashmir (Ayesha Jalal, 1999)

In the given circumstance of the initial years, the decision makers realized the urgency to develop and build up Pakistan Army, at least at par to India, not if exceeding from its defense capacity. Therefore, the foreign policy decision making hovered around the defense needs and security challenges. As put by Askari (b, p. 56) in his book that there had been frequent changes of governments, seven prime ministers and eight cabinets during 1947-58. Daggers drawn political leaders targeted each other with severe criticisms, but in complete agreement of the importance of maintaining strong armed forces. Liaquat Ali Khan was of the view. "The defense of the state is our foremost consideration. Later, Prime Minister Ali Bogra said, he would much rather starve the country than allow any weakening of its defense. President Iskandar Mirza said in 1957 that "it was the foremost duty of every Pakistani to strengthen our armed forces so that country lies in peace. (p. 50)". Even the civilian political leadership in spite of all bitterness and strained civil-military relations continued to give priority to strengthen armed forces at any cost.

The pouring of scarce economic resources into defense sector resulted into making military more prominent and powerful in decision making apparatus, even in the situations when it was not in direct control of governmental machinery. In the earlier years, the civilian political leadership was in control of decision making apparatus. The "Cabinet of Talents run the country during this period. This comprised the nation's most powerful public officials. Iskandar Mirza left his autocratic office of Governorship in East Pakistan to take up the leadership of the body. Ch. Muhammad Ali; the Secretary General of the civil service; General Muhammad Ayub Khan, the head of the Army, and H.S. Suharwardy the leader of the dominant opposition party in East Pakistan and the only Bangali with a claim to national recognition were the powerful member of this cabinet. (Zirring, 2004,p.71).But unfortunately failed to sustain power in the hands due to internal rifts and intrigues which eventually facilitated Army in 1958 to takeover, creating a perception among the people that Army could only clean the Augean stables or offer new direction for their concerns (Zirring, p. 8).Besides domestic issues, the strategic and geo-political environment of Pakistan manifested into India's hostility exacerbated the role of military in foreign policy making, Ayub Khan had the perception that "The cause of major problem is India's inability to reconcile her to our existence as a sovereign independent state." (Burk, S. M)

Besides India, Afghanistan's hostile posture also boosted up the role of military establishment in foreign policy making, leading it to search for patron and allies to meet the security challenges on its eastern and western border simultaneously. Pakistan's need for military and security assistance drifted it into orbit of western alliance system. Actually, from Ayub Khan's decade, expressively, military envisioned itself under peculiar geo-political region, to be custodian of frontiers of Pakistan. The strategic considerations determined military attitude towards international politics and led to an alliance with the United States in the 50's, and 1980's.Direct Military rule of Ayub Khan and then Yahya Khan instrumented in institutionalizing the military's role in foreign policy decision making. The legacy continued with General Zia, when decision-making was confined to a very few top military officers.

However, during the initial years the role of foreign office was significant because of some experts present in the foreign office like Agha Shahi and Shahnawaz.

However, General Zia-ul-Haq soon assumed the role of ultimate fountain of all power, for all domestic and foreign policy issues, as he was personally very much interested in foreign policy, that he kept the foreign and defense portfolio with himself. He was virtually the architect of Pakistan's Afghanistan policy of late 70's, and till his demise in 1988. The democracy restored in 1988 after the death of General Zia-ul-Haq, but the shadow of his policies could not be cast off. He pushed the society into social communalism, as Pakistan of 1980s was more conservative as compared to 1960 and 1970s. The religious parties were encouraged to open madrassas (informal religious schools) and recruit common people to fight in Afghanistan against infidel Soviet forces. A relationship was also developed with the urban based merchant class which was socially conservative. This merchant class shared with Zia the Bhutto's hate because of his unpopular nationalization policy (Siddiq Ayesha, 2007, pp. 86, 87).

Zia-ul-Haq also created a "new breed of politicians who were loyal to military establishment (Siddiq, p. 86). Zia secured more and safe place in Decision making process for the military establishment when it instituted Eighth Amendment to the 1973 constitution. This empowered the president to sack a government, appoint the supreme commander of the Armed forces and appoint the heads of three services and the chair of the JCSC. The Article 58(2) B of this amendment was later invoked by presidents frequently in coming years.

The restoration of democracy and return of PPP into power later proved a mock, as power was shared by the political troika, Prime Minister COAS and the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan, an old civil servant, chairman of Pakistan Senate sworn in as president of Pakistan, who later on appointed Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg as COAS. Benazir, despite being labeled, as "symbol of the new democratic Pakistan", was seemingly powerless, but wholeheartedly struggled to consolidate her control. She, in continuation of this move, dismissed General Hamid Gul the chief of ISI, the most important and powerful player of Pak-Afghan policy. Benazir also demanded the COAS Mirza Aslam Beg, to keep her informed about the ISI secret operations. However, ironically, at that time, the ISI was functioning independently beyond the command and control authority of Army. The chasm between the troikas increased so much on certain international and domestic issues as well. Specifically at domestic level, Karachi rioting in Feb 1990, her refusal to suppress terrorists activities across the board, refusal to approve General Beg's proposal of "only no-hold-barred approaches to root out miscreants in the PPP, the MQM and the orders could reverse the wave of terror and bring peace to the troubled country. (Zirring, 2004, p. 215)

This infuriated the high army echelons, combined with difference of opinion over international issues, like Benazir's contrary position over the "Operation Desert Shield, and International coalition moves against Saddam Hussein to defend the region from further Iraqi aggression. The president Ishaq Khan invoking Article 58-2B of the Constitution of Pakistan with the backing of Pakistan's military dismissed Benazir's government on the charges of corruption just after seventeen months on 6 August. 1990. From the very outset, Benazir had to

adjust with Military's terms and gave an important say into every matters to it. (Rais, Rasool Baksh, 1990, P. 206). The Benazir Government had no freedom of action in its foreign Policy operational environment due to the overarching influence by the Army and the President, who inherited General Zia's substantial constitutional power and commanded the sympathy of the bureaucracy, the army and the civil opposition. There were the serious differences between the president and the prime minister on numerous matters of foreign relations.

The role of Army during the 1989-90 was quite significant. Benazir Bhutto could not even assume the Prime Minister ship without the approval of COAS. The acceptance of Ghulam Ishaq Khan as president and the retaining of Shahibzada Yaqoob Ali Khan as the foreign minister were obvious examples of the influence of the army. However, the story of Army influence over foreign policy decision did not end at this point of time. It continued and spanned over the coming years.

On 24 Oct. 1990, Nawaz Sharif victory with 155 National Assembly seats, returned him into corridors of power with his manifesto of expanding education improving national health, generate employment opportunities for all and cautious pursuit of nuclear program of the country. The new government also showed intention to end dependence on United States not only in financial but in political area as well. Soon he was into a dual fight with President Ghulam Ishaq for supremacy. He was dismissed by the same sword of Article 58-2b, which had thrown out Benazir's Govt. He immediately knocked the door of Supreme Court, after six weeks deliberations "what the jurists had to say astonished everyone. In all previous legal contests, involving a head of state and a head of govt. the head of the state had had upper hand. In an unprecedented order, it called for the reinstatement of the Nawaz Sharif government. (Zirring, 2004, p. 227) However, this dual of Supremacy ended in the victory of Army, when General Waheed Kakar intervened and impressed both Prime Minister and President to tender their resignations, in order to restore stability in the system. On July 18, 1993, the civilian government left the corridors of power, paving a way back for Moeen Quershi from his home in the United State to clean the mess of crisis, generated by the power elite of Pakistan. "Moeen Qureshi was the voice of civil-military bureaucracy, not the politicians" Zirring comments, 2004, p. 231).

However, the Short interregnum of caretaker government with all boasting of sacrifices and tightening of the belt for the revival of economy, failed to grab the support of general masses. Fearing his connections to the US, a general perception emerged that this would instrument the freezing of Pakistan's nuclear program. Politicians and general masses severely criticized the caretaker Prime Minister. once again the battlefield of election was open for Nawaz's Muslim League and Benazir Bhutto's PPP on Oct. 6, 7-1993, The PPP won more seats than Muslim League in National Assembly and Benazir second time sworn in as Prime Minister. However, the situation did not improve in its second term. The new PPP government once again was in same political chaos. The military ISI, Judiciary, MQM, and other opposition parties seemed distressed as in 1995, as in Karachi alone more than 2000 were murdered. Altaf Hussain faced trial in absentia.

This deteriorated awesomely the already fragile law and order situation in Karachi, with more bombing, assassinations and mass murders. PPP accused ISI to be involved into a conspiracy of ousting Benazir Government under the patronage of Lt. General Javed Nasir DG ISI. However, this time Benazir was quite cautious in dealing with Military as compared to her previous government. General Jahangir Karamat, the senior most general, first time became the chief of Army staff upon the completion of the term of General Abdul Waheed Kakar on 12th January 1996. Although, Prime Minister wanted a junior officer to be the chief whose candidature was vetoed by President Leghari in favor of Army choice. "This was one of the first public disagreement between the President and the PM and underscored that all was not well within the leadership of PPP" (Robert La, 1997, p. 118)

"Benazir government was careful not to antagonize the military. She extraordinarily cared in formulating a clear and coherent for, but vigorous and consistent in formulating policy goals that the military considered important (Shafqat Saeed, 1997, p. 245) But, this is the irony of fate, that despite her smooth relationship with one of the most potent factor i.e. the Army; she could not survive for her full term in office. President Leghari dismissed her on November 5, 1996 on charges of corruption, extra Judicial killings in Karachi, gross mismanagement of economy, erosion of institution and maladministration. Once again, the fresh election took place on 3 February 1997 under the administration of a caretaker government of Malik Miraj Khalid. Nawaz Sharif's Muslim League appeared successful with a heavy mandate. The political development since 1988 was viewed by "Syed I. H. Gillani in these words: the 'Cycle Election-Constitutional Coup-Elections-Constitutional Coup had now reached a soothing frequency of three years. (Nelson, John. P. R. Malik Dipak, 2007, p. 101).

Nawaz Sharif, once again in premiership, mesmerized with the heavy mandate, this time availed all opportunities to consolidate his rule with an iron hand. He mindfully deprived president of his exclusive power of 8th amendment by 13th amendment. The other pillar of troika the COAS was also undermined, when he successfully forced General Janghir Karamat for the resignation and appointed General Perviaz Mushraf the new COAS, bypassing, the selected successor General Ali Quli Khan. Nawaz Sharif ignored the well-established norms of civil – military relations. This rule emphasized respect for the Military's autonomy and civil-noninterference in its internal organizational service affairs. Hassan Askari Rizvi (2000) comments that Sharif felt that he could now assert his authority on the post Karamat Army's high command, especially under the erroneous perception that a predominantly Punjabi- Pakhtoon high command would not support Musharaf, an Urdu speaking Mojahir Army chief vi-a-vis a Punjabi prime minster (Rizvi, Hassan Askari, c, p. 217)

Since 1990, Army chose to act covertly, from sideline but its role was not fully dormant as civilian political leaders could not take any political or economic decisions without the consent of Army command. Though, during 1990-1999, their role as the real power holder was in the background, yet, they did not relinquish all matters unattended. The top Military Elite kept on discussion on some very intricate issues; of decline in economy and the growing scarcity of the funds, which eventually had clipped the growth of Army. The aftermaths of nuclear race with India in 1998 enhanced the schism between the Army and political leadership, because the

financial crises became a strategic problem. The forced removal of General Janghir Karamat and the erupts around the Kargil Operation brought the Army and Nawaz Sharif relations to a point of no return, as Nawaz Sharif at international forum tried to blame military leadership just to avoid political consequence at domestic and international level. So the events on 12th Oct. 1999, when Nawaz Sharif staved off General Prevaiz Mushraf's, the then COAS, plane landing on Karachi Air Port led Army to roll back its role from side line and set-up third military regime in Pakistan (Diethelam, Weidemann. (2007) p. 101).

Besides the main institution of Military's formidable structure of approximately 600,000 personnel, the intelligence agencies have also appeared as to be the most important and potent instrument in the hands of military elite to exert their influence over decision making process in both domestic and foreign affairs issues. Intelligence agencies are set up to gather information about the security issues and feed national governments to enable them take appropriate measures to counter the subservient activities of every force beyond the border of a state. Since, a nation incapacitated due to sensitive information specifically about a hostile neighbor cannot guard the frontiers of the state.

The Civil Bureaucratic Elite

Bureaucracy, a body of officials, is always inevitable for the smooth functioning of state or even large organization as well. It is a "professional corps of officials organized in a pyramidal hierarchy and functioning impersonal uniform rules and procedures" (Britannica concise Dictionary: retrieved from <http://www.answers.com/topic/bureaucracy>.dated:31-12-21-2010

With the passage of time the importance of bureaucracy is increasing, as it with specialization in various dimension of state machinery, runs the system of state. Certain characteristics are common in bureaucratic structures all around the world. These are: Hierarchal organization with arrangement of Government officials in pyramidal form, in which line of authority runs from top to bottom and each lower officer is answerable to and supervised by the next higher officer. Functional organization requires that every office is assigned a special task and selection of officer is based upon their qualification. Professional Management entails that professional qualification is prerequisite for the officials to perform the assigned and desired task. Institutionalized procedures are always there as well -defined rules and procedures streamline the working of the every bureaucracy.

Max Weber visualized the ideal type of bureaucracy in Germany, before First World War but since then patterns of administration have changed, specifically in the developing states, which emerged after unyoking the colonial domination but with weak economies, political instability and non-viable political structure, and inherent vulnerability to succumb to non-standardized procedures, patterns and working of state institutions. (Enid Russel, 1988) So bureaucracies' evolved in these less developed or developing states on diametrically different patterns and they in approach being more pervasive ,more powerful, and becoming an active and dominant political actor in decision making process. (Sohail Mehmood, 1990)

Pakistan being the ex-colonial state was no exception. As BU in Pakistan, a lineal descendent of ICS, (Indian Civil Service) was setup by British Colonial power that retained its characteristics features even after independence. In Pakistan ICS was renamed as Civil Service of Pakistan and in India as Indian Administrative Service. The CSPs besides structural patterns, also inherited the traditions, norms, political ethos of ICS. The ICS officers had always been recruited from the elite class by qualifying an entrance exam, a very superior and difficult one, which could only be passed through a very superior quality education. The lower strata people could not even have dreamt of it.

This superior educational background and entry into superior service inculcated western outlook even in Indian native civil servants, which continued as it is after independence combined with other factors of high salaries, decisive role in policy formation and planning divisions and execution apparatuses. So the Deputy Commissioner, the lowest in ranking attained the role of "Government in the field" (Asaf Hussain, 1979, p.60)

The ICS officers' approach has always been authoritarian in tone and content with zero tolerance for outside interference in the absolute use of their authority. And there was no tutoring on the part of the government to train bureaucrats to accept politicians' superiority as the elected representative of masses. The role behavior of ICS transmitted so rigorously in upcoming CSPs that they emerged with even more powerful role than that of their imperial predecessors. (Hussain, 63). At the time of partition, Pakistan's share in the official corps was very minimal, because the Muslim ratio was only 9 percent, who had hardly any experience at higher posts of Bureaucratic hierarchy as only one Muslim officer had served as the joint secretary, while 5 or 7 came with the experience of Deputy Secretaries. Pakistan's first foreign secretary Mr. Ikramullah had been near the rank of the full-fledged secretary. Shirn Tahir Kheli comments that (dissertation, 1972) "several respondents emphasized Ikramullah's pro British orientation as having enormous effects on Pakistan's foreign policy in the 1949-1951 period. They told this writer that it was one of the conditioning factors for Pakistan's closeness to the West." (P, 158)

Under partition scheme, ICS were permitted to choose one of the three courses for their future. First, he might opt for service either India or Pakistan without any reduction in salary or rank or without any loss in pension privileges. The second alternative included the leaving of service with allowances equal to officer's salary from 1947 to normal retirement date. The third option required re-entry into service by personal contract with the government concerned. Out of 101, ICS-IPS Muslim officers, 95 opted for Pakistan. The other remained in India or got retired.

Table: 3.5 Cadre Origins of ICS-IPS in Pakistan at the time of Partition

Cadre	Number	Percentage
Muslim ICS	83	53.0
Christians ICS	1	0.6
British ICS	36	23.0

Muslim IPS	12	7.6
British IPS	14	8.8
War Candidate service	11	7.00
	157	100.00

Source :La. Palombra(1971,p.370)

Out of 157, 15 held judicial and 6 diplomatic assignments. Accordingly, only 136 officers were available to form Pakistan's administrative structure. Majority of the Muslim officers were from provinces, which did not form with Pakistan. There was an uneven representation of the incorporated provinces of Pakistan, as Punjab 27% NWFP 3% and Sindh had only 5 percent share. Asam and Bengal had 20% Portion. (La, Polombora, Joseph (1971), 360,370) This created a chasm between the provinces and center-provinces as well. As viewed by Kennedy (1987,p. 5) In the absence of significant institution of Political representation one dominant method of securing representation or an ethno-regional group is to reserve positions in the bureaucracy for one's relevant nationals. Initially Central Superior Services were the constellation of 13 services. The Civil Services of Pakistan was at the apex, an elitist group, occupied the key post in policymaking institutions. The power elite in the BU system from 1947 to 1962 were 82 ICS officers, with annual increase of about 25 CSP officers. These were entitled to and held practically all the top posts at the federal level and 2/3 of the posts of provincial level. However, there was some sharing of power especially in the provinces between the all Pakistan CSP and the only other all-Pakistan viz the PSP. Until 1973, the structure of BU continued with the cold patterns, as the ranks were divided into four classes.

Similarly, the organizational layout included the three categories. The first was the general administrative category for which the CSPs were recruited. Secondly, there was the functional recruitment for services such as the Pakistan Foreign Service (FSP) the Police Service of Pakistan (PSP), Income Tax Service, Customs, Central Excise, Audit and Accounts Services. The third category included the engineering and health services. But the real power had always rested in the hands of CSPs, But FSP and PSP also enjoyed a prestigious position as compared to other services.

As commented by Kennedy (1987,p, 10)

Beneath these Brahamans were 9 rather broad spectrums of Kashtriyas, whose most favored Jatis included the Foreign Service of Pakistan and the four Finance and Accounts Services. Clearly subordinate to these Services were various favored central superior services. However, membership in the Central Superior Services, regardless of cadre affiliation, conferred twice born, status to its

member. The officers without such affiliation by analogy were the untouchables of the administrative system.

A Pakistani writer Ilhan Niaz (2010) has divided the history of the Pakistani Bureaucracy into four broad categories. The first expands over the years when an elected civilian executive exercised control over the Bureaucracy. These are 1947-1953, 1972-1977, and 1977-1999. The second phase covers the years when bureaucracy more or less was in control of policymaking: 1953-1969, 1985-1990. While the years 1969-72, 1977-85, 1999-2008 marked as the period of military dominance in policy making arena. About the years 1990-1999, he writes that nobody was the in charge of policy making in real sense.

The politicians did not make policy and the administration of the country languished for want of direction. Each change of government was accompanied by shuffles and reshuffles of the bureaucracy. Having lost its *Espirit de corps* sense of competence prestige, and self respect the BU favored and sought to please the boss. (p,128).

The administrative reforms introduced by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto regime on 20th August 1973 completely restructured the previous colonial bureaucratic order. As it was believed by Bhutto that the Bureaucracy was elitist in nature, inefficient, pro-status Quo and needs to be reformed and transformed into a new Pakistani brand administrative structure. The reforms included the basic changes into infrastructure, organizational layout. As all service cadres was abolished and system of occupational groups were introduced. The ranks system was restructured into 22 national pay grades. Grade 1-4 were for working class with unskilled tasks grade 5 to 15 for clerical personnel, grade 16 for superintendent and grade 17 to 22 for officers. The new scheme services renamed these as cadres, assigned official an occupational group and his job type, promotional prospects remains within the purview of initial affiliation.

Before 1973 reforms, the promotional prospects, training facilities and housing were more lucrative for CSPs as compared to others. A combined pre-entry training system was introduced for all occupational groups, which were previously essential only for CSPs and Foreign Service of Pakistan through Civil Services Academy. The decision was also taken to make lateral entry into bureaucracy not through Public Service Commission. (Kennedy, 1987). During Bhutto period, 303 officers were removed from services on different charges under the law. But Zia-ul-Haq reinstated them, by and large retained changes into 1973 reforms but he made unprecedented in -take from Armed forces into Superior Civil Services which actually militarized the civilian bureaucracy.

A ten percent quota was fixed for retired Army officers. Resultantly, Army, meaningfully mustered the control over the decision making process. As Heady Goodnow comments that the prolonged stretched of Army rule had made the higher Army and Civil Services positions virtually undifferentiated. (Mehmood, Sohail, 1990, 67)

The Zia regime took a mid way position, he tried to nurture BU to that extent which could only support to his rule, not to grow as a challenge. Some parallel organizations specifically Intelligence Agencies patronized more and strengthened even at cost of Bureaucratic competency.

Laporte commenting on the administrative reforms concluded that the perpetuity of the old pattern at the district level and a lack of workable system of elected government let the old system continued while short interregna of Basic Democracies during Ayub Regime and strong party workers cadre had some effect on the power and role of BU at district level. However, it could not bring any change at institutional level. The Mushraf regime blew a hit to the power of BU even at district level, when decentralization was essential for the establishment of true democracy. The Devolution Plan announced on 14th August 2000, contained reforms for district to village levels under a new set up of local government. The popular participation at grass-root level increased by reserving seats for some marginalized groups. This gave women priority, as one third of the seats to the Zila Tehsil union and village councils were reserved for women. The 5% of total seats were allocated for workers/peasants and minorities. The supremacy of elected representatives was established over the Bureaucracy. The district level administration alone with police was put under the control of Zila Nazim (District Administrator) and Niab Nazim (Deputy Administrator) of local governments.

This corresponded to Mushraf emphasis, on 17th Oct 1999 speech, for governments to serve not to rule the people. Whatsoever was the motive behind it, the BU was first time made accountable and people's right to, instead of Bureaucracy, development participation (Talbot Ian, 2002, Contemporary South Asia, 11(3) 311-328).

Before it, the Primacy of BU in financial matters remained intact since 1947. Ghulam Muhammad (the ex-finance minister) Ghulam Ishaq attained the most prestigious positions (the governor General, the president respectively) because of their primacy in the civil service, which was due to expertise and role in financial affairs. The post of Deputy Commissioner (DC) abolished, who was the actual repository of power at district level and manifestation of iron hand of British colonial power. The magisterial power held by the DC was transferred to District and Session judges and police functions were handed over to the district Nazims. The DCOs (District Coordinating Officer's) were to function as the chief advisers to the district Nazims and as in charge of eleven District Offices (DOs) and coordinate the work of the executive district officers, (EDO). The DCO and DPO, grade 20 or 19 public servant remained the federal or provincial employed. After October 1999, the military once again on the steering wheel of the administrative system, became the senior partner with a large-scale entry into civil-Bureaucracy. The retired and serving military officers held almost 600 senior level posts in the federal and provincial governments. (Kennedy, Charles, 2001, Mimeographed paper, p.s 1-11)

Religious Elite

Quaid Azam invoked the two-nation theory, a calling for the formation of a state of a Muslim homeland in the sub-continent, believing that 'India is not a nation, nor a country, it is a

sub-continent composed of nationalities, Hindus and Muslim being the major nations (Hussain Asaf, 1979, p. 28)

There seemed no obscurity in his mind about religion as being the sole source of a way of life for the Muslims in sub-continent. He, despite his western orientation, sternly believed in necessity of acquiring a separate piece of land to preserve and for observance of Muslim identity in Hindu majority dominated sub-continent. As per his vision, there was not any possibility of cultural amalgamation or cohesion of Hindu Muslim, or even as political entity, in spite of indoctrination of western democratic norms of Indian nationals by British colonial rulers. Quaid-e-Azam emphasized all the distinctions present between Hindus and Muslim. He clarified that Islam and Hinduism are different and distinct social systems. He also obliterated that the conception of common nationality would ultimately lead towards the destruction of India. Therefore, the dangers as perceived by him in common nationality, led him to indentify Islam with Pakistan as a justifiable rationale under his leadership. However, the corps of traditional Ulema could not reconcile with the idea that a westernized leader was pleading in the name of Islam, so these suspicions did not let them to stand with Muslim League's demand for Pakistan. The self-proclaimed guardianship of Muslim interests in sub-continent by Ulema was seemingly under threat by the hands of secular leadership.

Actually, Muslim clergymen's skepticism was grounded in the history of Anglo-Muslim relations evolved after the War of Independence 1857. The burden of blame on Muslims of this uprising severed the Anglo-Muslim relations deeply, their counterpart in the start of uprising benefited from these strained relation. The cruel punishments, hanging, flogging and confiscation of property of Muslim nobility and a belief that Muslims started a holy war to oust British rulers alienated Muslim from the mainstream of life in sub-continent. The fate of Muslims lost in obscurantism, resultantly learning English, going to schools and entry into administration were declared Haram (Not permitted). At this juncture of history, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, (1867 – 1898) a reformer, a protagonist of Aligarh Educational Movement tried to pull out Muslims from this obscurantism. Maulana Altaf Hussain Hali, Allama Iqbal and Muhammad Ali Jinnah carried with them the legacy of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan. These reformers aptly assessed the socio-political situation of Muslims in India. They admitted the fact, that if not taken the notice, Muslims would be absorbed by the growing Indian nationalism, nurtured by the Gandhi's symbolism of the Gao Mata (Mother Cow) the chakar (spinning wheels) Sataya (Truth) Ahinsa (Non-violence) and Aapysia otconey with the Shudihi Shanghtan movements mindset of Hindu leadership.

So the urge of preserving the Muslim identity had fully beholden the Muslim mindset and moved intelligentsia to secure the separate homeland of Muslims. As Majawar Hussain Shah explains, "The mere arithmetic of numbers would place Muslims permanently under Hindu domination. With such fears the idea of Muslim identity was born and nurtured under the rubric of religion" But he also clarifies one point here that ... the basic documents outlining the demand for Pakistan such as Iqbal's Address at Allahabad and the Lahore Resolution of March 1940 do not identify religion as the main force behind the demand for Pakistan. Iqbal's addresses

essentially devoted to the conceptual framework where culture appears prominent under the name of Islam". (p. 32)

The traditional Ulema deriving their intellectual inspiration from Deoband Madrasstul-Uloom appeared hesitant to reconcile the idea of Muslim nationalism because as per doctrinal interpretation, the Muslims cannot be confined into territorial boundaries as a nation on western standard. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Maulana Hussain Ahmed Madni shared the viewpoint of Muslim nationalism and opposed the creation of Pakistan prominently. So, priestly class, specifically the Deoband Dar-ullom qualified, issued decree (Fatwa) declaring Jinnah "Kafir-e-Azam and advising Muslim not to join Muslim League .But refuting this religious decree the democratic vote of Indian Muslims gave birth to Pakistan.(Akhtar, 2009)

The predicament and paradoxes emerging out of a situation in which Pakistan was created as a nation state, pleaded in the name of religion, born out of a democratic process, bewildered the relationship of religion and politics in the political system. Since the creation, Pakistan was fraught into an intricate debate of "what role Islam should play in the state" Jones, Owen Bennet, (2002: XV) commented, "A strict interpretation of the two nation theory has led many Pakistanis to conclude that country was always intended to be the Islamic state. But, others in my opinion, in majority, have a different view. They believed that Jinnah was trying to create a country in which Muslims could live in safety, free from Hindu domination. So Most of Pakistanis could not reconcile with the idea of theocracy, rather aspired for a modern, tolerant, and stable state and political system for Pakistan. This group, to instantiate its arguments quoted Quaid's speech on 11 August 1947, in Constituent Assembly.

You may belong to any religion or caste or creed, that was nothing to do with the business of the state, you will find that in the course of time Hindus would cease to be the Hindus and Muslims would cease to be the Muslims, not in the religious sense. Because, that is personal faith of each individual, but in the Political sense as citizens of the states. (Quaid's, speeches and statements, Chudhary,Golan. W, 1998, p.47, Toheed, Ahmed. 2010)

He was determined to establish an inter-communal harmony, as observed by Sharif-ul-Majahid. "Statesmanship [sic] now demanded the healing of the wounds, the burying of the bitter memories of the past, the building up first and foremost confidence in the minorities" (Hussain, Mujawar, Shah, 1996, p. 41)

Modernists substantiated their claim by giving examples from Quaid's speeches delivered pre-partition as well. To them, Quaid dismissed the demand of Ulema for the imposition of shariah law " Whose Shariah," Jinnah asked "I do not want to get involved, the moment I enter this field, the Ulema will take over, for they claim to be experts. I certainly do not propose to hand over the field to the Ulema (Bennet Jones, 2004, p. 12)

Similarly, in a broadcast talk to the people of the United States, Quaid - e -Azam repudiated any possibility of Pakistan to be a theocratic state, to be ruled by the priests with a

divine mission”. However, radicals did not give in and continued with their arguments that Quaid had no secular orientation. As Maulana Shabir Ahmed Usmani of JUI, a leading traditionalist spoke in 1949 in Constituent Assembly.

“Islam has never accepted the view that religion is a private matter between man and his creator and as such has no bearing on the social or political relations of human being. The Quaid-e-Azam made the following observations in the letter he wrote to Gandhi in August 1944. The Quran is a complete code of life. It provides guidance for all matters, religious or social, civil or criminal, military or penal economic or commercial (Bennet, 2004, p. 12)

Who are Religious Elites

After the creation of Pakistan, this rivalry permeated in society, finally passing through the events, the adoption of the 1949 objective resolution, 22 points of Ulema, the 1953 anti-Ahmedia agitation and the constitutional debates leading to the formation of new constitution, culminated into declaring Pakistan a Muslim state. Since then, religion, as a consistent policy of state, became in one or the other form and in varying degree as an instrument of strengthening Pakistan’s identity. No doubt, the government and power apparatuses in Pakistan slipped into the hands of top Military Brass and Civil Bureaucracy from the politician in a very short span of time. however, the solidification of religion in the polity gave birth to a third power pole i.e. the priest class, the Ulema or Mullahs, who despite declaring Pakistan an act of unfaithful have claimed to its ownership in the name of Islam, formed the religious elite. The religious elite derived their power from religion and its political role in the polity. As Haqqani (2005, p. 15) relates:

The emphasis on Islam as an element of national policy empowered the new country’s religious leaders; it also created a nexus between the “custodian of Islam” and country’s military establishment, civilian Bureaucracy, and intelligence apparatus, which saw it as the guardians of the new state.

The Religious Elite are composed of three elements; local Maulvis, the learned Maulanas (Ulemas) and the Pirs and Mashakihs (spiritual leaders), sharing conservative outlook, influencing masses through sermons and subscription to maximizing their power in the political system. In coming years, they gradually strengthened and organized in the form of western type of political parties, but surprisingly, despite having all appeal of religious ethos, failed to secure a significant political representation in elected bodies. The doctrinal antecedents of religious elites goes back to either Deoband Darl-Uloom India or to Brailvi school of thought. Deband, a small town in the District of Saharanpur (UP) at a distance of ninety miles way form Delhi appeared the learning seat of traditional Ulema, in which a small Arabi Maktab was raised, in 1867, to the status of Darl-ullom, which soon began to attract the students and learners, of Islamic ideology from almost all the Muslim world. Haji Imdad-Ullah, Maulana Qasim Nauntwi and Maulana Rashid Ahmed Gaunghi, the founders, represented the rebellious spirit of the disgruntled Muslims, who since the days of the Faradiyah Movement had been manifesting their uneasiness

and dissatisfaction of in one way or the other with the state of affairs, created by the establishment and perpetuation of foreign rule in India. They were not going to surrender before the resultant sufferings. (Faruqi, 1962, pp. 23-25).

Ulema of Deoband, negating the concept of Indian Muslim nationalism, ideologically associated themselves with the International Muslim Community. (Muslim Ummah), in 1919, during the khilafat Movement they formed their own political party, namely Jamiat-Ulama-i-Hind. This party stood by Indian National Congress and opposed the creation of Pakistan. However, in 1945, a group of Ulema headed by Maulana Shabir Ahmad Usmani in a convention at Calcutta defected from the Jamiat-Ulama-i-Hind and formed Jamiat-Ulama-i-Islam. This organization whole-heartedly supported Pakistan. Maulana Shabir Ashmad Usmani believed that, exemplifying the migration of Holy Prophet from Macca to Madina, Pakistan would become a bulwark model and source of inspiration for the whole of the Muslim world. Therefore, the services rendered by JUI during the referendum in 1947 by NWFP were commendable, and motivated many notable Mashaikh and saints, like Amin-ul-Hasnat the Pir Manki Sharif to the cause of Pakistan. Besides Maulana Madni, the other great supporter of Pakistan included Maulan Ashraf Ali Thanvi, Maulana Ihtisham-ul-Haq Thanvi, Maulana Zafar Ahmad Ansari and Mufti Muhammad Shafi. They supported Pakistan with a common aim to convert a country created by a westernized secular leadership to an ideological Islamic state. Maulana Madni also proposed 1949 Objective Resolution,

Bralevi School of thought, no doubt a product of traditional Islamic Education, appeared with distinctive features under the known personality of Raza Ahmad Khan Bralevi, at Braili, a town in UP India. The Ulema from Bralevi tended to be the tolerant of Sufism, mysticism and numerous local or regional customs and traditions, commonly referred to as 'folk Islam or popular Islam'. They perceived Islam just not as a set of abstract and utopian ideals, but a combination of comprehensive and living belief system connecting historical and cultural traditions of those who call themselves devout Muslims.

Besides Ulema, the Pirs being an important constituent part of Religious Elite formed a more powerful source of religious influence than the traditional or fundamentalists Ulema of both Deohandi and Bralevi Schools of thought. Sufism in Sub-continent, and original founder Sufis of these orders were followed by Pirs, called Sajjada Nashins, either appointed or hereditary successors of the original saints. These Pirs have always had a role in propagating Islam and Khanqahas appeared a source of religious guidance for ruler Muslims. Mujawar Hussain quotes (Riaz Hussein, 1996, p.21).

Khanqahas (shrines of the Muslim Sufi saints were instrumental in the spread of Islam as well as in the development of popular Islam in India and Pakistan. Hussein stressing the importance of Pirs in political and sociological perspective states that (P.2)

The Muslim League could not do better in the 1937 election as it heavily relied upon the support of the urban-based Ulema, who promoted the mosque based "orthodox Islam, with which the rural masses could not readily indentify. The Unionist Party (Punjab) enjoying the

support of Pirs won 99 seats while the Muslim League captured 19 seats only. So, Muslim League also appealed to the Pirs for electoral support for 1946 elections. The reason of powerful and influential role of Pir among rural population has been subscribed to a factor that is according to Hussein (P.22).

The Pirs believed that an Islamic state under the leadership of the Muslim League would be quite acceptable since their own belief system would reflect in the politicians' behaviors, who were likely to be their "Murids." These Pirs performed exceptionally an important role in the propagation of Two Nation Theory amongst the rural population, especially during the last phase of the Pakistan movement. (Deadly Embrace, P.157). Muhammad Waseem, while discussing the genesis of Islamic establishment (religious elite) outlined four major settings of the Islamic establishment.

- a) Organizational setting
- b) Sectarian setting
- c) Educational setting
- d) Iconoclastic setting

In organizational setting, he includes Islamic parties such as JI, JUI, Jamiat-Alh-e-Hadith and Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqah-e-Jaffaria (NFJ). These parties generally have been the part of mainstream politics either by contesting elections at the national or provincial levels or by agitating in the street on the specific issue. Though, these Islamic political parties failed to secure any considerable share in elected bodies since 1947, consequently remained out of the preview of decision making apparatuses, however, exerted pressure through indirect means in spite being apart ideologically from each other. These parties maneuvered to take joint stand on various issues, ranging from domestic to foreign policy arenas. such as at domestic front, 22 point of Ulema, 1949 objective resolution, 1979 Hudood ordinance, 1991 Shariat Act, the separate electorate for religious minorities, entry of religion on passport, or Ahmedia issue and also Blasphemy law, on foreign policy front, they jointly presented their views on Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia Chechnya, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq etc.

For the first time, in 2002, an alliance comprising six religious parties; JUI(F) JUI(S), JUP, Jamiat Ahl-Hadith (Sajid Mir) Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Fiqah Jaffaria, and (JI) Jamat-e-Islami performed well in electoral competition at provincial level. They formed their own government in NWFP and managed to make a coalition government in Baluchistan. Similarly, at national level they bagged 68 seats. However these successes were, as understood by analysts, subscribed to the handiwork of ISI and military establishment which thought that the "Mullahs could be of great help in solving the Kashmir issue. The military could also use the mullahs of bullying India, the traditional adversary of Pakistan. The absence of the main stream political parties from the country was another cause of success of the MMA" (Dr. Abdullah Khan, Pakistan's Deeni Madaris in Politics, Central Asia, 60, summer 2007).

The sectarian dimension had ushered religious violence since 1980, which alienated and unsecured the minority community Shia and others such as Christian, Hindus and Ahmedia.

These sectarian outfits managed to kill their rivals and get away without any punishment because of some clandestine patronage of political forces and state establishment. The regional security milieu with rivalry of international forces, within the context of revolution in Iran, war in Afghanistan and Kashmir, combined with Iran Saudi proxy war on the soil of Pakistan gave impetus to domestic sectarian division.

The educational dimension depicts the Madrassah system spread all over the Pakistan and considered main source of power for regions elite. Madrassas have expanded not only quantitatively but also qualitatively in terms of extending their influence in the political system. At the time of independence there were only 137, as stated by Tariq Reham (Baxter, 2001, pp. 180-181). These madrassas represents all the sects of Islam; Deobandis, Bralvi, Al-Hadith and also Shia, but at marginal level. He quotes Khalid Ahmed.

“The largest number of seminaries are of Deobandi, at 64 percent, followed by Brailvi, at 25 percent only 6 percent are Ahl Hadith. But the increase in the number of Ahle Hadith seminaries or maddrasshas has been phenomenal at 131 percent, going up from 134 in 1988 to 310 in 2000. (p.180)

In April 2002 Dr Mahmood Ahmed Ghazi, the minister of Religious Affairs reported of 10,000 Maddarassas with 1.7 million students as quoted by Tariq Rehman.

Table 3.6: The Breakdown of Madrassas sect wise.

Provinces	Deoban di	Bralvi	Ahl-e- Hadith	Shia	Others	Total of provinces	Total of province (2002)
Punjab	590	548	118	21	43	1,320	3,100
NWFP	631	32	5	2	8	678	1200
Sindh	208	61	6	10	6	291	900(+300 in FATA)
Baluchistan	278	34	3	1	31	347	700
Azad Kashmir	51	20	2	--	3	76	Not given
Islamabad	51	20	--	2	3	76	100
Northern Areas	60	2	27	11	3	103	150
Girls Madrasshas	Not given	Not given	Not given	Not given	Not given	Not given	448

Adopted form: Craig Baxter, 2004, P. 183.

The Tanzim-al-Madaris, situated at Lahore, function to control the Brailvi Madarassas throughout Pakistan, Similarly, the Wifaq-ul-Madris at Multan and Faisalabad administer the Deobandi Madaris and Ahl-Hadith respectively. The Wifiaq ul Madaris Shia at Lahore is the custodian of Shia Madaris in the country (Pakistan's Deeni Madaris in Politics, P.95, Central Asia)

Religious Elite, deficient in vote bank, but successfully utilized the street power, available to them due to extensively spread network of Madrassah system as commented by Shafqat Mahmood.

The Mullahs have shown the ability to mobilize. They may not have the largest vote bank, but thanks to the Madrassah street power are always available to them. The madrassa student role became more obvious, when they were frequently used by the civil military establishment to fight with Soviet forces in Afghanistan in 1980s, and continue to be used by the state apparatuses, military, intelligence agencies, in Afghanistan and Kashmir as well.

Tariq Rehman through a survey unveiled the mindset of religious students towards domestic and foreign policy.

Table 3.7: Priorities of Madrassha Students

What should Pakistan be	Agree	Disagree	Undecided
a.Conquest Kashmir	99.24	0.00	0.76
Develop nuclear weapons	96.18	1.53	2.29
Implement Sharia	97.71	0.76	1.53
Give equal rights to religious minorities	6.87	81.68	11.45

Source: (Baxter,2004, P.181)

Q.2: Do you want the language of higher Jobs in the state and private sector to continue to be English

Yes reply: 89.31

No reply: 10.69

Source : Baxter,2004,p.183)

The iconoclastic setting, according to Mohamed Waseem, denotes the Tablighi Jamat, a non-militant organization, devolved to persuade non-practicing Muslims to observe the basic tenants of Islam. Its annual meeting convenes at Raiwind, a village near to Lahore; attract millions of people from all corner of the world. (P. 159)

Dr Saeed Shafqat (4-8) while discussing the ‘religious elite’ come to the conclusion that Religious groups have proliferated in Pakistan in the past two decades and derive their strength not only from their followers but also their institutions back in history(such as pre-independence Nadwa, Deoband) and post -independence Madrasshas and politico- religio parties. He vociferously states that religious groups are potent force in Pakistani politics and enjoy power and influence quite disproportionate to their actual size.

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