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Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan 2008-2013

Abstract

The dynamics and nature of civil- military relations in Pakistan is determinantal for the stability of the political system. Direct and indirect military involvement in state policies has developed a sort of distrust and suspiciousness between civil institutions and military. Despite experiencing different constitutional political systems, the trust and predictability could not evolve for the sustained democratic process in Pakistan. The political infrastructure, issues and problems relating to national security also have an impact on the nature of civil military relations. In this context, the policies of elected government during 2008-2013 to control military involvement and influence for the effective functioning of civilian government have not been complied by the armed forces, rather has been taken as a challenge to its institutional strength. Military remained more confident and autonomous to deal with civilian government in this power-tussle. This article focusing the political, administrative and security situation of Pakistan, comprehends the nature of civil military relations during 2008-2013.

Key Words: Civilian, Military, Relations, Democracy, Pakistan.

INTRODUCTION

Civil-Military relations outline a vital position of national security, constancy of a nation state in war and peace. Though, the obligation of civilian control is essential to the notion of civil-military relations. Scholars researching in the area of civil-military relationships, examine the military's part in politics and how it has aroused as the dominating political player very conflictingly.¹ Stephen P. Cohen has assessed the political dimensions in the background of latent challenges to the safety of country within the choice of policy preferences². Hassan Askari Rizvi cited political decay, fragile institutions and insufficient legitimacy of civilian regimes along with the use of soldiers into management as opportunities in favor of military to expand its role in politics.³ Conversely, Ayesha Jalal disposed of the common thought that the shortcomings of political parties are primary variable clarifying the military intercessions in Pakistan.⁴ Ayub Khan's primary argument was that the politicians are incapable of working together, therefore, military needs to intervene to control the political chaos.⁵ Aqil Shah has drawn a striking depiction that extends a recognizable association of the military in Pakistan's politics since its beginning. Shah plainly unfurls the porous complicity between the country's civilian and military spheres.⁶

Conventional attitudes lay emphasis on the proper, legalistic aspects in which the armed forces play a secondary role in nationwide safety measures. On the other hand this approach has come under widespread criticism, especially considering the experiences of developing societies. The customary boundaries between civil and military have become blurred due to professional and non-professional response or behavior.⁷ In this setting this review assists to comprehend political and military attitude which impacts their relationship, either helpful or clashing.

The theoretical framework of this paper is based on the concept of civil- military relations. The essential arrangement in civil- military dealings is the guarantee of civil control, or even more appropriately "political control" of the military. Samuel Huntington, trusted on demonstrable skill as the best methodology/procedure of accomplishing civilian matchless quality through "objective civilian control"⁸. Though professionalism "may lead the military to consider themselves to be the workers of the state instead of political or executive class".⁹ Huntington contended that by "making the military professional the state makes them politically sterile and unbiased."¹⁰ Finer maintains that the very nature of professionalism actually often directs to army disagreement with civilian authorities. As per Janowitz, military is generally regular and would oppose any progress and don't act in a flash as settled upon by the open and unstructured non military civilian society. Subsequently, the military would soon against outside intercession according to the thinking given by Huntington. Consequently, Janowitz declared the hypothesis of union, contradicting that the military, notwithstanding of being delayed to the unrest, was modifying with no outer pressure. This hypothesis expected civilianization of military or a militarization of the general public.¹¹ Rebecca L. Schiff saw another presumption of Concordance underscored the necessity to foster a shared

methodology among military, government, and civil society to obtain harmony and stability in civil-military relations.¹² These researchers contended that the feeble political foundation in Pakistan that is set apart by tyranny, non-adherence to vote based norms, defilement and absence of law and order set the condition of civil-military connections.¹³

This article focusing the political environment and security imperatives during the elected government period 2008-2013 discusses and analyzes the civil-military relations in Pakistan. This understanding shall help us to determine persistence and change to the dynamics which influenced the relationship of civil-military institution. The following section presents the historical context of civil-military relations by taking into account the fundamental issues that determined their course in various civilian and military regimes since country's inception.

After Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah's death in 1948, the political, administrative and economic situation became more challenging to handle for Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. Security threats from neighboring countries particularly after the war with India over Kashmir in 1948 further intensified the situation. The dissident group of military officers, (involved in Kashmir war) with the support of some progressive intelligentsia, and politicians, planned a coup in 1951 against civilian government but could not succeed as the plan was leaked out before time.¹⁴ In this scenario, civil-military relationships developed in an orthodox manner as the political system was weak to resolve the challenges of nation building and state building. After the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951, the leadership vacuum paved the way for British trained civil and military bureaucracy to govern the state thus Pakistan started its journey towards an administrative state.¹⁵

During 1953 and 1954, jurisdictional question between Governor General Ghulam Muhammad and the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan over Qadiani issue, dissolution of first Constituent Assembly and establishment of One Unit, set out a freedom for the military to intercede officially into governmental issues apparently for the benefit of its civilian preeminent commandant. General Ayub Khan, the then Commander in Chief of Pakistan Army was selected as Defence Minister in the cabinet of talent in 1954, where he assumed a critical part to join the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in September 1954 and the Baghdad agreement in February 1955 to safeguard Pakistan from Indian aggression.¹⁶ Subsequently, military emerged as main actor in decision making process especially in defence and security matters and developed complex relation with civilian government.¹⁷

On the other hand the discord and confrontation between the government and bureaucracy over power sharing in state structure led the military to takeover in 1958 by using 'doctrine of necessity'.¹⁸ Gen Ayub Khan was against political parties and participatory politics.¹⁹ However, martial law was lifted in 1962 after implementation of the presidential constitution. Centralized state structure and functioning of indirectly elected parliament affected the growth of democracy and strengthen the political power of military. East Pakistan's movement of provincial autonomy turned into Bengali Nationalism during Ayub regime. Tashkent declaration in 1966 disappointed the public in West Pakistan.²⁰ Demonstrations and rioting against Ayub Khan had been started in 1968. As a result, first military ruler of Pakistan had to resign on March 25, 1969.²¹ A second military rule aroused in 1969 under Gen. Yahya Khan.²² On March 30, 1970, Yahya Khan broke up the One Unit in West Pakistan and restored its separate four provinces (the North West Frontier Province, Sindh, Balochistan, and the Punjab) through Legal Framework Order.²³ The supremacy of the parliament over nonelected institution was compromised to set the power equation between civil and military institution.²⁴ First parliamentary general elections were conducted in December 1970 and Mujib's Awami League swept the polls in East Pakistan whereas Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party won a majority of seats in West Pakistan. Negotiations among military elites and leadership of Awami League and Pakistan People's Party for political settlement could not succeed, resulting in the separation of East Pakistan in 1971.²⁵

In the turmoil, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as elected leader availed the opportunity to assert civilian supremacy in state structure. He removed more than forty senior military personnel from the armed forces on the charges of corruption. Significant changes were incorporated in control and command structure of the armed forces to decentralize the powers of military elites and to enhance the check of political executive on their appointments, promotions and transfers.²⁶ The 1973 Constitution mirrored the desire of the political elite to push the military back to its conventional field. The abrogation of the constitution is an act of high treason in terms of article 6 to assure the "put an end" to the military intervention. These constitutional and administrative measures for civilian institution building were considered as threat to autonomous character of military institution. However, to balance the equation

of civil military relations, Hamood -ur-Rehman Commission report was not published to save military image from facing the consequences for its actions in East Pakistan.²⁷

The impacts and outcomes of Bhutto's authoritarian governance and threatening security environment in Balochistan brought military once again on political scene to regain the control of state. The post-election crises in 1977 proved to be decisive point that activated the military for third military coup in July 1977. Chief Martial Law Administrator General Zia ul Haq was also against the representative institutions and held them responsible for ideological division in Pakistan. The democratic spirit and essence of the constitution of 1973 was compromised first through provisional constitution order in 1981 and later through 8th amendment in 1985 to consolidate the position of President in state functioning. Zia became President of Pakistan through state managed referendum in 1984 for the next five years to stay in power before conducting the non party based general elections, held in 1985.²⁸ Subsequently, this new power sharing arrangement between President and Prime Minister through 8th amendment affected the civil-military relations in ensuing years. General Zia appointed Muhammad Khan Junejo as Prime Minister of Pakistan.²⁹ Zia's relations with civilian government began to sour over the promotions and appointments of officials of high ranks in various institutions of the state that Prime Minister considered irregular and arbitrary on the part of President. Junejo removed Major General Agha Nek Muhammad as head of the Intelligence Bureau in 1986 to assert the civilian control. Similarly he did not appoint any Foreign Minister after the exit of General (rtd.) Muhammad Yaqub Khan. There was also civil- military disagreement on the settlement of Afghan war.³⁰

Such developments created distrust and bitterness in civil-military relations. In these changed political environment, Junejo criticized Zia wearing dual hats as President of Pakistan and Chief of Army Staff. Army budget and privileges were also criticized on the floor of National Assembly and civilian government showed serious concern to reducing the size of defence budget and privileges to military elites. In this context, the decision of Junejo for an impartial and exhaustive inquiry into an explosion at a military ammunition depot at Ojhri near Rawalpindi in April 1988 and his demand to public the report of this inquiry intensified the civil-military relations. These policies by handpicked Prime Minister were taken as interference in security and foreign affairs and threat to professional interests of the armed forces. Resultantly President Zia dismissed PM Junejo and dissolved the National Assembly on May 29, 1988.³¹

Military remained dominant in all internal and external policy making process during democratic interlude 1988-99. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto replaced the head of ISI, Lt. General Hamid Gul with Major General Shamsul Rehman Kallu to minimize the influence of this institution. However, conflicts and political rivalries between Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif provided the army with additional leverage for influencing in politics and governance of Pakistan. Resultantly, military played the role of an arbiter in resolving the differences between the President and Prime Minister on the appointment of COAS, Corps Commander and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Staff of Committee. Similarly deteriorating law and order situation in Sindh, sectarianism, ethnic violence and gloomy economic condition were main irritants between civil and military leadership throughout this period. On the external level, military was unhappy with the policies of elected governments about Afghanistan issue and Kashmir problem.³² Military perceived their policies as a threat to the National security of Pakistan.³³

The intelligence agencies have gained strength through their enhanced role in regional and global geo politics perspective during this period.³⁴ Chief of Army Staff, General Jahangir Karamat delivered a statement in October 1998 to highlight the need of having National Security Council (NSC) for better dialogues between civil and military leadership on security matters. He was forced to resign by the PM Nawaz Sharif and General Pervez Musharraf was appointed as new Chief of Army Staff. Difference in handling of Kargil conflict between the PM and COAS eroded civil-military relations. To fortify his hold over the military, Nawaz Sharif decided to eliminate General Pervez Musharraf as COAS, but the arrangement fizzled bringing about Nawaz Sharif's ouster from power in October 1999.³⁵

Once again the military rule has been legitimized by the judiciary on the basis of law of necessity and COAS was authorized to amend the constitution for perpetuate himself in power structure. Under General Pervez Musharraf, military played intensified role in both Pakistan's administration and security affairs due to 9/11 incident. American war on terrorism provided Musharraf with opportunity to expand his stay in power as Zia availed the chance due to Afghanistan war in 1980s. His policy towards India remained conciliatory for the political solution of all dispute including Kashmir.³⁶ He secured the position of President of Pakistan through military managed referendum, held in 2002. Later, through seventeenth amendment, President became as powerful as was under the eighth amendment. General Musharraf militarized the state and economy which showed his distrust on civilians and

civil institutions. Musharraf succeeded to institutionalizing the role of military in political structure of Pakistan by constituent the NSC in 2004. However, Musharraf's own popularity drooped while he kept on holding the dual office of President and Chief of Army Staff at the same time.³⁷ The continued and increasing military action against terrorists in tribal areas boarding with Afghanistan, military action against Lal masjid and Jamia Hafsa and the issue of reinstatement of chief justice, Iftikhar Muhammad Choudhary compelled Musharraf to reconsider his strategy towards political leaders of Pakistan's People Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim league Nawaz PML (N). Prior to conduct the general elections in 2008, he appointed Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani the new COAS, on 29 November 2007.³⁸

General Election 2008 and Resurgence of Civil Institution

General Musharraf had made game plans to win the general elections but the new COAS would not help him and separated the ISI from legislative issues, was surprising for Musharraf. Under political compulsions and international pressure both the political leaders, Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, were permitted to participate in elections. However Benazir was murdered in Rawalpindi on 27 December 2008, political opponents claimed that Musharraf was behind her murder. PPP won the general elections of 2008 which was then headed by Mr. Asif Ali Zardari. The outcome ended up being a gigantic dissent vote against dictatorship. The PPP and the PML (N) arose as the primary champs getting 120 and 90 seats individually in the 342-part National Assembly. The principle supportive of Musharraf's party the PML (Q) endured a significant misfortune winning just 51 seats in the National Assembly. Both Nawaz and Zardari did not trust Musharraf who could use his power as President of Pakistan to sack the elected government. The PML (N) and PPP drafted a charge sheet against Musharraf to get rid of him. In these changing circumstances, Musharraf had lost help from inside the military, which had brought him into power and kept him in power. Resultantly, on 18 August 2008, he resigned as president of Pakistan.³⁹ General Kayani directed a more pragmatic approach in administrative, economic, legal and security context and allowed the political processes to take their natural course. This non-intervention policy in fact, encouraged Zardari to be elected as the next President of Pakistan. Zardari supported broad -base political unions and purposely presented another political culture of settlement with his adversaries particularly with PML (N).⁴⁰ The civilian government of PPP from 2008-2013 is eminent for some striking political, administrative and security events to comprehend the nature of civil-military relations.

Civilian Control and Military Resilience

After taking oath, as President of Pakistan, Zardari committed himself to fight against terrorism and fortifying democratic practices in Pakistan besides working for peace and stability in South Asia. Chief of Army Staff, General Kayani precisely announced intimate support for the new Parliament on 12 September 2008. In this regard he said, "All elements of the national power under the new democratic leadership will safeguard the territorial integrity of Pakistan with full support of the people". Initially, there seems a complete unanimity of views among civilian administration and military.⁴¹ General Kayani, called back about 300 serving military officers from civil institutions⁴² but it did not mean that military had accepted the subordination of civilian government. National Security Council was dissolved in November 2008 by the civilian government to limit the influence of military in public affairs. The civil government made an effort to lay hands on ISI by putting this organization under the direct authority of the Ministry of Interior so that working and functioning of this potent organization could be checked. This step of civilian government resisted by the military elites, consequently this decision was retrieved by the government within a day. Political government made concerted efforts to control all the state institutions. In pursuit of this goal, a Standing Committee on defence was established on March 17th 2008 to inquire military expenditures and budget. However, it was ensured that perks and privileges of the Armed Forces are not reduced.⁴³ Military was reluctant to present and discuss defence budget. Military elites believe that the effects could be negative if defence budget is publicized.⁴⁴ These assertive initiatives by civilian government angered the top brass of military.

Meanwhile, National Logistic Cell (NLC) scandal raised the suspicion on institutional weakness in the system that also affected the civil-military relations. NLC plays a vital role in transportation of logistics across the country and the services are utilized for both military and civil purposes. The issue came into surface when the news went on air about illegal investment of rupees 1.8 billion in stock exchange by the top officials of NLC which was considered a serious breach of law. However, punitive actions were taken instantly to send the message across the country that no institution is above the law.⁴⁵ Inter Services Public Relation (ISPR) issued the statement that the

COAS has shown serious concern about the NLC scandal. Departmental Inquiry continued for quite some time and later two high rank officers were punished during the tenure of General Raheel Sharif. It was a clear cut message that army means business and accountability should remain effective across the board.⁴⁶ Subsequently Gen. Kayani criticized the government for not handling the corruption cases against various Federal and Provincial Ministers of PPP government. General Kayani had conveyed the high command's disapproval of the PPP-led cabinet's performance to President Zardari and demanded the sacking of several corrupt ministers.⁴⁷ General Kayani remained assertive to appoint his trusted associate Lieutenant General Ahmad Shuja Pasha as DG ISI in September 2008.

Security Concerns and Expanded role of Military

The military has additionally extended its controls over civilian, apparently to counter illegal intimidation and aggressiveness. For example, during the emergency 2007, Musharraf amended the military act of 1952 to engage the military to attempt civilian in military courts for offenses considered biased to the security and protection of Pakistan. Strict radicalism and hostility are the most serious dangers to democracy, political stability, cultural concordance and plural society.⁴⁸ In view of the deteriorating law and order situation in Baluchistan and Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), Chief of Army Staff was adamant in planning and coordinating anti-terrorism operations in these areas. General Kayani put in concerted efforts to develop strong feeling of Pakistani nationalism among troops and worked vigorously to establish writ of the state. Because of his serious interest, salaries and living environment of soldiers was enhanced considerably. In December 2008, a former Lieutenant General Naeem Khalid Lodhi was appointed as defence secretary for the ascendancy of military control in decision making process. For gaining trust of the political leadership against war on terror at western borders and to take all stake holders on board about planned operation, he arranged discussions with the President, political leadership and the Federal Secretaries at General Headquarters Rawalpindi. This event was taken other way round to undermine the political supremacy. The criticism was generated by initiating negative propaganda showing military dominance at the face of established civil rule.⁴⁹

The military has expanded its role in controlling over the religious extremist and terrorist groups in various pockets of Pakistan. It directed fruitful security activities in Swat and South Waziristan in 2009 and removed Pakistani Taliban and other religious extremist groups. The military accomplishment in counter-terrorism and counter-rebellion has expanded its significance in light of the fact that the civil administration, the police and the paramilitary power had before neglected to secure these regions against the religious extremists and terrorists.⁵⁰ Military establishment retained full control over key issues such as nuclear power, Afghanistan and Kashmir considering its domain.

Military's Arbitrary Role in Politics

First crucial challenge to this civilian government was to resolve the issue of deposed judges, along with Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, Chief Justice of Pakistan. Both political parties i.e. PPP and PML (N) had a difference of opinion about strategy to reinstate judges who were ousted by the then President General Musharraf in the light of declaration of state of emergency 2007. The matter of restoration of judges was quite tricky in ongoing circumstances. The PML (N) leader Mr. Nawaz Sharif was insisting upon tabling of resolution to reinstate all sacked judges within the time frame of one month. The government in power was hesitant in this regard. This confrontation between executive and judiciary provided the space to army to play its role to defuse tension among masses and lawyer forum. For political gains PML (N) and to serve party's objective announced Long March to exploit the situation against Present Zardari.⁵¹ Law enforcement agencies were ordered to block the entry of Long March participants into Islamabad by placing hurdles and barriers on expected routes. Army was also called in aid of civil power to effectively control the situation and to prevent untoward occurrences.⁵² Long March started as per plan and different political leaders made speeches calling reinstatement of removed judges. At Gujranwala, the key leaders of the Long March were informed that government is ready to accept their demand. It was perceived that Long March was successful under the leadership of Nawaz Sharif. Under such conditions government felt that there is no other option left except showing flexibility to accept demand of the protestors.⁵³ It is assumed that military was behind this decision of government. President Zardari was quite apprehensive of the developed circumstances as he was worried about military intervention in case judiciary takes some adverse actions which may lead to destabilizing the political government.⁵⁴ The army regained its reputation as most effective state institution during flood emergency 2010.⁵⁵

Furthermore, the division among political leaders of PML (N), MQM and JUI who could not preserve their initial unity and commitment for democracy, provided the opportunity to military to play arbitrary role.

Civil-Military Splits

Mumbai Attacks

The Mumbai attack in May 2008 was cataclysmic in shaping the direction of civil-military relations. India was vociferous in denouncing Pakistan and claimed that Pakistani state sponsored these terrorist attacks. The civilian government agreed to send Pakistan's Intelligence Chief to India to work with New Delhi to investigate the incident but the military asserted and rebuffed the civil government from taking such a step. Recognizing, its fragile nature in prevailing circumstances the political leadership quickly conceded space to the military to take the lead on security and defence matters.⁵⁶ However, Zardari was interested for better relation with India by putting the Kashmir issue on back burner to improve the trade relations with India. In his interview, to *Wall Street Journal* in October 2008, Zardari said that "India has never been a threat to Pakistan". He also said about militant Islamic group operating in Kashmir as "terrorist." These statements angered the military established and effected the civil military relations. President Zardari and Indian PM Manmohan Singh were agreed on a deal over Kashmir but military top brass resented this move and did not endorse it.⁵⁷

Kerry Lugar Bill

Military and civil government developed distance because of Enhanced Partnership Act known as Kerry Lugar bill 2009. US Senators Richard Lugar and John Kerry were the key person in initiating the bill. The clauses of the bill revealed 1.5 US dollar non military aid which was planned to be disbursed in five years.⁵⁸ The Kerry Lugar bill was considered detrimental to Pakistan's sovereignty by opposition parties and public in general. Over all the provisions of the bill was highly criticized by the opposition benches. However, the bill was defended by Federal Information Minister in the Assembly. The Corps Commander's conference at GHQ also discussed the contents of the bill and expressed its serious concern over its derogatory wordings and clauses. Military elites clearly declared it objectionable and having adverse impact on national security and sovereignty. Some of the critique raised concern over civil dominance in military matters if the clauses of the bill are accepted. Stance of Zardari's government of supporting the bill was his clear intentions to enhance the scope of civilian control in defence matters. In such environment the meeting of Chief of Army Staff with Foreign Affair officials at GHQ in March 2010 was considered as military intervention in political matters. The meeting was held before COAS official visit to United States on matters of strategic issues of the region.⁵⁹ Through administrative nexus military impacted the political government to deal with its institutional force. This nature of Civil-military relations spread different theories. Kayani explained as the most 'impressive General in the World' in 2009. He had the assistance of Obama government to guarantee the intelligence in the war against terrorism. The military confirmed its solidarity interfering in political dynamic and ensuring convenience of civil government. Under these conditions to settle the relations with military, Gilani extended Gen. Kayani's tenure as COAS for next three years and grant DG of ISI two one-year extensions in 2010 and 2011.⁶⁰

The Raymond Davis Case

In January 2011, Raymond Davis, a United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) worker shot two Pakistani men, asserting that he acted justifiably when they threatened him, Zardari again ended up in a tough spot. The USA asserting that Davis had political resistance in light of which he be delivered, however on the different was a military rankled over Davis' quality in the country for a potential one-sided clandestine activity. Under tension from the military, just as from inescapable fights by Pakistanis shocked by the possibility of exemption for Davis, the PPP government discovered little space to connect carefully with the US. However, Zardari would not like to endanger USA help or strain two-sided relations any further. After negotiating Davis's release provided he pay blood money to the groups of casualties, Zardari by and by ended up disengaged from the political mind-set in the country.⁶¹

Abbottabad Incident

On 2nd May 2011, a plan was conceived by America to launch an operation inside Pakistan to arrest Osama Bin Laden. A United State Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was sure that he was taking refuge in Abbottabad in a civil locality, near Pakistan Military Academy. The plan was unfolded on the said date and US helicopters attacked inside Pakistan territory, raided the house where reportedly he was hiding. They captured Osama Bin Laden and his family and moved back swiftly. The operation went unnoticed and American helicopter could not be intercepted by Pakistan Air Force. Intelligence information about his presence at Abbottabad was provided to US authorities by Mr. Shakeel Afridi, (a medical doctor by profession). The whole incident raised serious questions over negligence and slippages at the part of various intelligence agencies of Pakistan.⁶² Intelligence and senior military officers were called upon by the government to provide explanations and formulate a response for this sequence of events. The GHQ provided details about the incident to Parliament of Pakistan on 13 May 2013. Helicopters used in operation took flight above ground level along with the ground contours to remain undetected from Radar coverage. Later the news was aired by United States about the capture and killing of Osama Bin Laden during operation. A High level investigation Commission was appointed by the then PM Gilani to inquire the whole matter.⁶³ However, could not avail the opportunity to channelize the process of accountability to assert civilian control.

Memogate Dilemma

Memogate debate erupted in October 2011 which further stressed the civil-military relationship. It was an addressed memorandum, sent to previous US military Chief Admiral Mike Mullen. It mirrored the worries that Pakistani military outfits may endeavor to overturn the civilian government in the wake of ordering the military to stand down during the Osama Bin Laden attack.⁶⁴ The letter was addressed to Admiral Mike Mullen a top military official of the US, demanding help from Obama administration against expected military takeover in Pakistan. The letter was written and delivered through then Ambassador to US Mr. Hussain Haqqani. Writing of such a letter raised suspicions over loyalty of the civil government toward its own country. It was generally considered that letter was written on severe reservations of the Armed Forces in the back drop of handling matters by the civil government on the issue of Abbottabad Incident. However, the incident widened gap between civil government and military relations. Discussions in the print and electronic media raised questions of Zardari's dependency over United States to save its government thereby undermining sovereign status of Pakistan. A petition was filed in Supreme Court which demanded constitution of Judicial Committee to thoroughly investigate the Memogate Scandal. The contents of the letter were testified by ISI and submitted to the commission through Lt. Gen. (rtd) Naeem Khalid Lodhi, the Defence Secretary. In retaliation, the government removed the General Lodhi from the post.⁶⁵ Opposition in the Parliament vigorously criticized the scandal, thus environment of trust deficit increased between civil-military relations. Supreme Court of Pakistan sought explanation and clarifications on the memogate from the government, the ISI and the COAS. Supporting its stance, PM criticized the Armed Forces and said that army is crossing its limit. Press release issued by ISPR stated that "there can be no allegation more serious than what the honorable prime minister has leveled. This had very serious ramifications with potentially grievous consequences for the country".⁶⁶ The showdown among government and military over this issue influenced the democratic process enormously. Military and Haqqani had been at this junction previously, at the Kerry Lugar scene in 2009. Military had demanded Haqqani's expulsion in 2009, having an instrumental impact in the Kerry Lugar help, yet he dealt with the situation around then, at that point. Military was not ready to trust him any more on the memo case issue and insisted the government to inspect the matter and consider the delegate to be responsible. While, Haqqani had denied having any influence in memo debate. He said 'the target isn't me; the target is President Zardari and Pakistani democracy. "Soon after attending the gathering with President, PM, COAS, DG of ISI on 22 November 2011, Haqqani offered his resignation. Military remained more sure on this issue as it has expanded its controls over civilian government in national security narrative.⁶⁷

Conclusion

The forgoing discussion shows that the civil- military relations have now and again been complicated since the formation of Pakistan in 1947. The security challenges from India and Afghanistan particularly after the war with India in 1948 over Kashmir enabled the military to influence the political structure. The inclusion of general Ayub Khan as defence minister in the cabinet in mid 1950s further strengthen the role of military in internal security and external policy matters. This bureaucracy-military nexus led the country to become an administrative state. In these circumstances, elected governments could not assert civilian control in political structure despite the inclusion of various provisions to the constitution of 1973 to restrict the role of military for the effective functioning of

civilian governments. However, the struggle for power attaining between the two institutions and exercises power to control state authority has contrarily tensed the civil-military relations and thus effected the growth of democratic institution. Security and foreign policy affairs have remained major contested issues between the civilian government and armed forces throughout the political history of Pakistan.

In this context, the nature of civil- military relations during 2008-2013 was not much different from its historic patterns of seven decades. Regardless of having diverse established encounters and a few political turns of events, the trust and consistency couldn't be advanced in the two sides. Pakistan is sadly assailed with a large number of issues that keep on spoiling the majority rule measure and furthermore puts a weight on the civil-military relations. Elected government of PPP took various steps to assert civilian control in state system but not succeeded. Establishment of standing committee on defence in March 2008 to inquire military expenditure and budget was considered as challenge to the internal autonomy of the military institution. Serious differences were developed when civilian government decided to limit the involvement of ISI in politics by putting this organization under the ministry of Interior. Military's top brass strongly resisted the decision subsequently government had to take back this decision within a day. Military establishment was unhappy with these initiatives of the government and criticized the cabinet ministers for their poor performance and corruption. Military has also played arbitrary role in settling the confrontation between executive and judiciary over the issue of deposed judges and also extended its control in state structure under security narrative. The COAS kept up the tradition of intruding in civilian domain. Through administrative nexus military impacted the political government to deal with its institutional force. This nature of civil-military relations spread different theories. Kayani explained as the most 'impressive General in the World' in 2009. This action was taken other way round to undermine the political supremacy. During 2008 - 2013, first time in the political history of Pakistan, military chief and DG of ISI briefed the security situation to the parliament thrice. Nonetheless, the Memogate issue and Kerry Luger bill put enormous strain upon civil military relations. Military establishment made uncertainty on the civilian government and remained dominant in shaping the core areas of foreign policy. Abbottabad incident, questioned the commitment of state security and its relationship with terrorists. Clash among civil and military drive expanded when the PM, Gilani, featured the military saying that a state inside a state will not be allowed to exist. However, civilian government could not exploit the situation for the supremacy of elected institution. Military has developed its economic stakes in maintaining its control over the state and its politics for institutional hegemony. The military remained a powerful political actor with its national exchequer, ability to manipulate the civilian regime and the ways to shape public opinion and foreign policy. In this specific circumstance, the analysis shows that civil-military relations in Pakistan have would in general be influenced by verifiable heritages, prompting the development of military strength which sabotaged the civilian incomparability and influenced the nature of democracy. A structural tension, latent or explicit, stems from the competition between these two poles of power. When the army is in office it subjects the state to its domination and when the civilians are in power the army insists on retaining prerogative incompatible with democratic regime. A healthy and balanced relationship between the civilian government and military is a requirement of the time to make Pakistan stable.

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