

HISTORY OF ZIMBABWE
From the Stone Age to Colonialism

Based on ZIMSEC Syllabus 9155/5

J GWEZHIRA

Topic 1

RECONSTRUCTION OF THE PAST *JMDGwezhira*

The study of history is a constantly changing business. R Cunningham's view of history is that it is not the study of a special class of facts but rather the study of all views from a certain point. The task of a historian is to cover every aspect of history, i.e. social, economic and political rather than studying non-individuals. The historians are concerned with how people of the past made their living. History shares ground with archaeology, geography, psychology, economics, sociology and anthropology.

Elton says that historians study history in order to inquire on the past to see whether these studies have anything to offer to the future. The first homework of a historian therefore is to select his facts. J Tosh argues that facts are not given but they are selected and given meaning by interpretation. A historian must therefore make sure that what he is writing makes sense. A good historian is able to select facts, explain and interpret them.

Sources of History

Historians agree that there are three main sources, that is, oral tradition, written records and archaeology. There are also auxiliary sources like linguistics and anthropology.

Oral Tradition

These are verbal messages which are passed by word of mouth beyond a historian's period. They might be stories which local people tell about the past. The first official oral tradition was collected in 1966 under the supervision of DN Beach. Other historians such as JP Abrahams also used oral traditions to reconstruct the history of pre-colonial Zimbabwe. According to Jan Vansina, oral tradition is transmitted from generation to generation by word of mouth, songs and poems. J Kizerbo defined oral tradition as the stories of the past passed from other generations. He identifies them as legendary stories and accounts of heroic ancestors.

Africans developed a complex methodology and preservation and this has been widely used by historians to reconstruct the past. It has been argued that oral traditions are the most preserved and carefully taken and retold among a people who have strongly centralised societies. This type of history was helped by professionals who were required to ensure that tradition was passed verbatim. These are called fixed texts.

In contrast, in weak societies events tended to be free but the oral traditions are not entrusted to specific people but could be told by any member of the society, usually the old ones. According to David Henige, oral tradition remains the single most useful tool for historians and this source was used to guide and justify their work. Tosh says that oral tradition gives historians a human face. It created the past rather than explain it. He further asserts that oral tradition enters in the past as fully as is possible. It is the voice of the illiterate societies. Oral traditions are used alongside other sources such as written records and archaeology.

Oral tradition refers to the study of the recent past by means of life history where the informant speaks of his experience. Oral traditions are recollections of the past which are common or universally understood within a given culture because for anything to be regarded as tradition, it has to be widely understood and handed down within a generation.

Advantages of Oral Tradition

- Jan Vansina says OT works alongside other sources like written records and archaeology.
- It gives flesh and colour to the story.
- A historian can ask a question when there is need for clarification.
- It gives information from illiterate societies and where people cannot write OT plays a big role. It becomes reliable when accurate information is given by the informants.
- OT is the living museum of social and cultural values of people who have no written records.
- It is very rich in the convergence of ideas.
- It is a vital source beyond the reach of written records. It prepares the ground for historical reconstruction.
- Historians can make use of the multi-disciplinary approach, collaborating this and cross-checking with other sources.
- It gives a fascinating position of the growth and fragmentation of various powerful states.
- Fixed texts, songs, poems cannot easily be changed for personal interests and are therefore reliable.
- Oral tradition is not affected by the function it serves to the extent of losing value because it can be investigated and used alongside archaeological evidence which can render support or go against it.
- One can compare many versions of the same story and come up with a consensus.

Weaknesses/ Disadvantages of OT

- A common weakness is the failure of record chronology, e.g., the use of average reigns/generations for measuring time. This has a lot of errors, for instance, by referring to years of drought, locusts, etc.
- The illiterate early people had not developed any clear and standard measure of time. Relating events to natural disasters is problematic, especially if these natural disasters occurred within a small space of time, which means events could be mixed up.
- OT may be known to a certain society only and conditioned by society in which it flourished. It therefore does not go beyond the boundaries of people's social setting in which they exist.
- According to Henige, OT has failed to maintain an accurate assessment of events.
- The length of time a tradition lasts, the aims pursued by the propagators and their attitudes to the events they relating may give rise to different accounts which eventually lead to unreliability.
- Telescoping of events has the effect of shortening time and events of the past thereby making them lose relevance. Only past events which influence the present are remembered.
- It is subject to loss of memory yet its importance depends of such memory. T Spear argues that it does not go back more than 500 years in terms of memory.
- OT can never be completely relied upon because nothing is known about the first eyewitnesses who are said to have transmitted the information, thus more recent events are more trustworthy.
- Usually these stories are narrated with the aim to give propaganda; as a result some sections of the story which do not fulfil this obligation are simply ignored or conveniently forgotten. Specialised OT assumed a political function to glorify a claim, especially in highly organised sections.
- There is also the language problem and when a third party is involved facts might be distorted.

Archaeology

This is the scientific study of materials of the past cultures. They are important in reconstructing the pre-colonial history of Zimbabwe before 1450. Archaeologists dig through living sites to uncover material

remains. From this data archaeologists can tell how people lived, their economy, patterns of life, food consumed, etc. archaeology deals with imperishable items, i.e., parts of weapons, utensils such as clay pots, etc. Over three-quarters of the Zimbabwean history for the past century was reconstructed by archaeology.

Mankind remains include bones, iron products, pottery, settlements (e.g., stone buildings like those at Great Zimbabwe), rock paintings and stone carvings like the Zimbabwe bird. These were worked on by archaeologists such as Peter Garlake, TN Huffman,and Innocent Pikirayi.

Modern machines are used and results compared, thus enabling archaeologists to trace the events from the coming of mankind to iron discovery up to the present day. Findings from living sites such as rock shelter, pyramids, Khami Ruins and Great Zimbabwe are studied. Ceramics such as locally made clay pots, imported glass which was a foreign commodity, metal implements such as spearheads, ornaments which were found at graves showing one's stature, are studied.

According to Spear, archaeologists can uncover living sites, people's economy, religious beliefs, settlement pattern and how they lived. Archaeologists are able to estimate the number of people who were occupying a certain site. As a result, if more materials are found this may show that many people were occupying a particular site and the reverse is true. It has been established that the Great Zimbabwe might have been inhabited by between 11 and 18 thousand people and these estimates are based on material remains.

The earliest materials of the past are used to reconstruct history. Stone tools, pounding stones are common tools used by hunters and gatherers in the forest while knives, spears and arrow points and cleavers are tools of the savannah hunters. Similarly, grinding stones, bows and arrows and digging equipment indicate forms of wild grain gathering.

If bones of wild animals are found it means people were hunters but if they are bones of domesticated animals that means the people were herders. Archaeologists might be able to estimate the number of people occupying the place by looking at the number of pole huts and how they were spaced. The quantity of the material found at a place gives an idea on whether people stayed for a long time or were nomadic.

The bones of a single animal together with only the tools required to kill it indicate a temporary camp after killing it. One can find a site where the dead are buried in a prescribed way in ritual subjects, with valuables in the graves and this means that people believed in life after death. The bones of a hand show how good people were at manipulating objects with their hands and the size of jaws and the type of teeth can tell people's diet.

Organic remains of the once living things can be dated by radio-carbon dating methods. All living plants absorb carbon and lose it at a constant rate which can be used to calculate the date. Archaeology shows the presence of deposits of things left by past societies. The style of buildings and the type of pottery from different sites can also be compared. Similarities and differences can be established as was the case between Zihwa and Gokomere where the pottery was similar.

The presence of foreign goods such as beads, porcelain, silk cloths and sea shells from the Far East shows that there was international trade. Spear says that fossilised grains show people's culture and crops grown and bones show the types of animals kept or hunted. Pots and tools give an idea of the daily life while glass beads and shells are imported goods. Precious materials found in graves show the status of the people and the religious aspects of life after death.

Archaeologists also study rock art. However, Spear points out that archaeology does not give a clear picture on politics, religion, language and gender, etc. accumulated durable goods show sedentary life. In the south-western end of the plateau the state systems succeeded each other. The historical sequence shows the replacement of the Torwa dynasty in 1680 by the Rozvi dynasty. This sequence shows an unbroken continuity in the Khami culture between the 15th and 19th centuries. This might mean continuity of the Khami traditions but under the Changamire dynasty.

Excavations carried out at Khami shows that the site had abundant gold which was used to decorate people. Glass objects of the new culture found at Khami, the stone buildings in a new style, construction of huts on platforms, on hilltop sites, plus the old technique of stone-buildings were discovered by archaeologists.

The Chinese porcelain recovered from the upper level of Khami could have arrived during the last decade of the 16th century. It is clear through archaeology that the Khami culture represents the Torwa and that the state was powerful and rich and this has been supported by Birmingham and Martin who refer to it as rich in cattle equal to those at Great Zimbabwe and more highly valued just like the Great Zimbabwe.

Not much is known about the Torwa through written records because the Portuguese were not interested in the state but archaeology has established that their potter was outstanding. Rulers also used imported articles from as far as Portugal and China.

Advantages of Archaeology

- it complements oral sources, for instance, where oral sources cannot give dates, archaeologists can establish these through the use of carbon-dating.
- Archaeology can go far back to the history of the people thereby correcting inaccuracies of oral sources. Archaeology speaks for documents that cannot speak for themselves, e.g., tools, dagga, pottery and glass objects.
- It can retrieve history of up to 20 million years. J KiZerbo says that archaeology historians discover a long past history.
- It tells a lot about materials, culture of the past ad past forms of economic settlement especially on the Zimbabwe plateau culture as is represented by the Great Zimbabwe and the Inyanga archaeological complex.
- Archaeology as a source of history therefore is based on positive statements rather than negative statements which cannot be proved.
- It gives more reliable information because remains studied are tangible, for example, skeletons.

Disadvantages

- Archaeology is expensive, e.g., tools used to excavate past sites and to process to come up with credible results are expensive and poor societies cannot afford them.
- It cannot account for population according to gender, ethnicity, age and language.
- It can lead to false conclusion of a people's culture and social activities, e.g., studied materials can be carried to another area inhabited by other people and they can be credited for those materials.
- Implements such as iron cannot be dated on their own but in relation to those materials containing carbon.

- The scientific investigation in Zimbabwe started around 1890 and archaeology did not give much account of small states like Mapungubwe but to bigger sites like the Great Zimbabwe, Dhlodhlo/Danangombe, etc.

Written records

These can be primary or secondary sources. Primary sources consist of information in raw state and this information is close to the event which it describes. These include eyewitness accounts, diaries, newspapers and archival records. Secondary sources are based on someone's interpretation of a document or opinion contained in a book.

Various forms of sources are found from Arab, Swahili, Portuguese and missionary reports. Written records have also been described as documents from literate visitors and in the case of Zimbabwe, they include Portuguese missionaries, settlers, British hunters and explorers, etc.

Advantages

- They provide dates and according to Torsh, primary sources provide a ready and coherent source.
- They have a long life span and can be stored in libraries and archives.
- They have useful information on events following the colonisation of the country and pre-colonial times.
- They provide historians with reliable dates as opposed to oral traditions
- Events have chronology and give details, e.g., the Portuguese who visited the Mutapa state and other early societies in Zimbabwe.
- They fill the gap left by archaeologists and thus they complement archaeological findings, thus a historian can come up with a better picture of early history of used properly.

Disadvantages

- They are deeply flawed by racism and ignorance by authors who often show a very low understanding of the people among ~~whom~~ they lived and operated, e.g., reference to African societies as primitive. Some pre-colonial and colonial authors considered African as a dark continent with pagan beliefs. African leaders are referred to in writings by whites as blood-thirsty dictators, for instance, Tshaka, while European leaders of the same calibre are seen as heroes, e.g., Napoleon Bonaparte, Alexander the Great.
- There is also misconception of African traditional leaders, e.g., healers who were seen by whites as wizards or witches while those in Europe, doing the same business of healing people, were seen as doctors.
- Some written documents were written out of context. Those who wrote about African societies chose to find a certain situation. Anthropologists wrote huge volumes which were based on crude assumptions about Africa. They collected information and interpreted it according to the politics of the time which had to justify European supremacy over Africans. They used Europe as a standard measure of development and anything not European in style was regarded as backward to them. To them African history meant nothing and there was nothing unusual in seeing it that way. Malinowski, one of the leading anthropologists had this to say about Africans, "I see the lives of the natives as utterly devoid of interest or importance, something as remote to me as the life of a dog."

- These written records by European visitors were concerned with showing European technology, failing to appreciate that the underdeveloped societies were developing at their own pace.
- Censorship deprives the reader of important information. Torsh asserts that in such instances there may be controlling purposes which may limit or distort the information.
- Written records also face the problem of bias and favour for or against an event or personality. This bias can be on the basis of the author's religion, race, ideology, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status, political affiliation and these militate against objectivity.
- Diaries are by nature brief and lack detail. It is difficult to get more than what is recorded. If one tries to inquire for more information, one has to look at things in a general context of the concerned people's history.
- Written records as a source of history seem to imply that only that which is written is history and it discredits oral tradition, archaeology, etc., basically on the grounds that they are not written.
- Although written records have been praised for their long lifespan, there is a chance that they might be destroyed on their way from the primary sources to the archives.

Topic 2

THE STONE AGE CULTURE IN ZIMBABWE

JMDGwezhira

According to DN Beach, the Stone Age was a way of life rather than a fixed time and it did not come to an end at once. Hunting and gathering were dominating the way of life. There is little evidence found on the existence of people in Zimbabwe at this time. The present oldest human remains were found in a cave in Chinhoyi where tools in form of axes were found. During the course of this period tools were greatly improved and better flakes were found.

Some stone tools had shape and were now refined. It sees wild animals were few and so were fruits for gathering and such people were unable to stay at a given campsite all year round. The early Stone Age economy was a mobile one in which people would be using living sites in their surrounding territories for hunting and gathering.

Evidence is not available to justify that sites were either very large or continuously occupied for long periods and this is an indirect suggestion that early Stone Age people were few in number. Tools used included scrappers, choppers, hand axes, knives and stone hammers, etc.

<u>The Late Stone Age</u>

Tools in the Late Stone Age were more refined. Man learnt to strike one against another to make sharp tools which were called microliths. These were used for skinning animals, cutting meat, sharpening sticks and to make arrow heads.

The period covered by the late Stone Age depended on the society. People who lived during this period were speakers of the Khoisan language. They were characterised by small groups whose tendency was to move within a given territory from time to time but their mobility was lazier compared to the early Stone Age. The population density was in accordance with the available.

Stone Age knife and scrapper


Stone Age tools and weapons


Stone hammer and spear

They were few in number and lived relatively peacefully well in a rather balanced relationship with the environment around them. According to some scholars, in view of the great changes that accompanied the early Stone Age, it is worth noting that the Stone Age people do not appear to have adopted either agriculture or herding before the coming of the Iron Age.

Beach says that elsewhere in Africa, Stone Age people began to plant vegetables, crops and developed special stone tools. Trade seems to have taken place but on a small scale. Notable changes in technology reflect innovation or a shift in behaviour. For the first time, there is evidence of systematic rituals as is indicated by signs dealing with death and thus the late Stone Age represents a change in behaviour and technology.

There was the use of rock paintings for the first time and other communities had pottery. There was burial of the dead in graves. Bows and arrows were made and stone tools fixed into handles. Beads decorated and ostrich egg shells also had various uses. There was the use of bone tools and introduction of fishing equipment.

The San's Mode of Production

It was the early primitive communalism in which tools were owned communally. During this period people didn't have much property because they continually moved from place to place looking for game meat and wild animals. There was the division of labour. Small animals were hunted by the use of snares and traps.

Economy

Hunting was done by men using bows and poisoned arrows. They were shot at an animal and it slowly took effect, until the animals could no longer move and was finally slaughtered. The San were fast in terms of speed and they knew animal behaviour, e.g., sounds and footprints, and grazing areas. They smeared themselves with plant scent to destroy the human smell. They imitated animal movement.

Grass covered pits were used to trap big animals. They knew about conservation and one animal was killed at a time. Gathering was the most reliable source of food and was done by women and they gathered a lot of food, fruits, nuts, caterpillars, termites, locusts, honey, tortoises, etc. They had the knowledge on how to preserve the environment and they did not destroy the whole plant but took a small part to allow it to regrow.

Social Organisation

Population was very small (20-30 in a group) because there was no food security and they had to rely on the environment. Each group was made up of about six adults, men and women. The san were nomadic; they moved from place to place to maintain small groups in accordance with the carrying capacity of the environment.

They lived in temporary homes. They monopolised hunting and gathering territories. One group could not move to another group's territory without permission. When food was plentiful, gathering was done once and the food was expected to last for long. Their community, technological changes and marriage partner was chosen for a boy.

Girls were married at the age of 7-8 and boys at 14-15 years. There were initiation ceremonies for boys including learning animals' behaviour and medicines and hunting skills. After marriage the boy joined the woman's family and hunted for them.

Rock Art/Paintings

Pre-historic art has been appreciated for the potential it has on giving out some aspects of the cultural behaviour of the ancestors. Rock art is regarded as a special class of archaeological data. Some scholars argue that rock art is the earliest book in the sense that the painting can be read in the same way books are read.

Rock art was associated with places in which people lived, e.g., caves. Rock art is largely conceptual, symbolic and religious. It has been argued that the rock art in Zimbabwe is a simple, homogenous, cultural entity, the work of the indigenous Stone Age people. Zimbabwean art is a reflection of the society that created it and it shows its perception, values and beliefs of a society.

Rock art depicted composite tools, e.g., bows and arrows, digging sticks. Division of labour among the pre-historic societies, e. g., men as hunters and women as gatherers vividly shown with animals they hunted, tools, fruits gathered, and also showed some aspects of their culture, e.g., dancing. Crops were also shown and estimates on number s of people in a group can be made.

<u>How useful is rock art?</u>

Rock art is useful in the reconstruction of history. Whereas archaeology can recover food remains, rock art comes in to supplement these remains by giving clear illustrations of animals hunted and plants gathered. It

gives great information on identity and appearance of animals and human population, e.g., at Bombal and Matopos were sheep and goats are shown.

There is reconstruction of group size, e.g., where we have art on groups engaged in a kind of activity. It further confirms estimations based on composites. It reconstructs history of the environment, e.g., animals which were found in a given area were painted on rocks. If these animals no longer existed, they were not painted and this shows that the environment had undergone some changes. Pre-historic domestication of animals and plants and the development of food production is shown.

However, there can be many interpretations by different archaeologists who study rock art. It can be interpreted 100% certainly on those who did rock art can never be known and there's a tendency of imposing our opinions.

The Early Iron Age

Through archaeology, linguistics and anthropology, it is possible to have some idea on how people of central and southern Africa had adapted to their natural environment and the use of technology. Like their contemporaries in other parts of Africa the people of this region changed their mode of production from the hunter-gatherer to the Iron Age community. The hallmark of the early Iron Age is the substitution of wooden, stone and bone tools by iron technology. The period is known as the Early Iron Age because it was distinct from the Late Iron Age which followed from about 1000AD.

It represented a new way of life on the plateau and a part of much wider movements out of the most of South East Africa. It was a unique period in history which involved a rapid spread of the economy from the 1^{st} century in East Africa to about the 4^{th} century on the mouth of the Limpopo.

The discovery of iron, smelting and forging increased man's capacity to domesticate and manage the environment. The changes were so profound and emphatic in propagating a new culture just like what happened with Mfecane groups. Stone tools were replaced and were only effective for an economy that was basic, especially cultivation of certain grass crops. People needed food security and this called for other means of production. Means of production refers in this case to various ways used by people to get the necessities of life and these changed the social, economic and political relations.

The Iron Age period was a revolutionary change from the Late Stone Age. To fully appreciate the value of iron technology one has to look at life before iron technology. The population was very small and unsettled due to lack of food, temporary shelter, a mobile economy, no centralised government and the elders were the highest form of authority.

According to R July, the change of the economy from hunting and gathering was a major breakthrough in human history. It brought with it much improved production and the population was settled in an orderly manner. There was a reliable supply of food. People started acquiring wealth because they no longer moved from place to place. As agriculture was introduced, the early farmers made long-term plans rather than short ones.

People could accumulate and specialise in certain trades and there was improvement and expertise. The accumulation of wealth brought about the exchange of goods and services. As a result the haves got services from the have-nots and in turn paid them with the acquired wealth.

Food production, which had made life easier had its beginnings in the Middle East, spread to Egypt and Ethiopia where crops like wheat and barley were grown and protected by weeding to get higher yields. The knowledge was brought to Southern Africa together with the idea of domestication, pottery and metal working by the Bantu speakers. Agriculture formed the basis of the economy and shifting cultivation was practised. There was division of labour with men using axes to clear land and then burning the twigs and grass. Women tilled the soil. Seed was sown and monitored during the growing season.

G Mahktar asserts that the major achievements brought by iron technology was agriculture and animal husbandry. Domestication in this context means withdrawing animals from natural selection, directing their production and making them serve man. Plant cultivation refers to the deliberate planting of tubers or seeds and the protection of fruit trees with the view to benefit man. He further contends that a transition from food gathering to food growing modified man's attitude towards his natural environment and his group in a number of ways.

Man became a producer and storer and exchanged resources with neighbours and gained goods which he had lacked. This encouraged the development of handicraft and resourcefulness in general. Spears says that iron technology by its nature represents a dramatic breakthrough from stone technology which preceded it. While iron technology involved the transformation of smelting the ore, breaking the rocks or sand at very high temperatures to extract the basic metal and forging the metal into the desired shape.

Iron smelting led to the development of permanent settlements and growth in population. In agriculture people used their experience in gathering. The seed products of wild grains commonly shatter and scatter, the seed matures at different times and once scattered they lie dormant on the ground for long periods for germination. Seeds were then selected according to size, colour and texture. As already noted, iron technology brought better means of production. In turn, iron resulted in social, economic and political changes.

The tools of the Iron Age people were made of iron. It was forged into various products like axes, hoes, knives, spears, arrows and swords. Axes made the clearance of land easier for agriculture with leaves and branches decomposing to make manure. Livestock had the advantage that it could be used in barter trade and also as a source of food and had a longer lifespan as compared to grain. They were also a store of wealth.

It should be stressed that the advantages of iron tools and livestock enabled people to settle down in one place as long as the soil was fertile and pastures available. Population was growing due to availability of food and a balanced diet due to a variety of foods, reduction of diseases which in turn led to higher life expectancy and population growth.

Village communities emerged whose base was mixed farming –growing millet, sorghum, beans, peas, pumpkins and melons in one field. During the Stone Age period, rivers and huge forests were barriers of communication. They were prone to killer diseases such as malaria and sleeping sickness which attacked both humans and animals. With the coming of iron tools, thick jungles were destroyed for agricultural purposes. Disease-carrying organisms disappeared as forests were exterminated.

Later Iron Age people moved to higher areas and some historians have asserted that they wanted granite in the construction of their huts. Economic evidence if seen in the exploitation of gold and ivory which were very popular on international markets. There was a also a change in the economic organisation, largely seen in the growing importance of cattle raising around 1000AD. The Late Iron Age period brought differentiation and marked individualism. The acquisition of wealth became priority number one.

What made change to the Iron Age possible?

During the Early Iron Age there were economic, political and social changes –improved internal and external trade which came about due to the need for iron technology. Change was made possible because of a number of factors.

The migration theory was propounded by DW Philipson who says change was brought about because of migration of people with their technology and new ideas from other areas. TN Huffman argues that for this change to occur there were people who migrated across the Limpopo into Zimbabwe. The visitors increased the animal and human population. They migrated upwards because of overpopulation and they moved in search of free and flat lands.

Iron smelting started in different times and places. In many places of the world stage the Stone Age was followed by the Bronze Age but in Southern Africa the Late Stone Age was followed by the Early iron Age, suggesting that iron technology was brought from outside. Iron smelting may have been brought to Southern Africa through Bantu migration.

Some scholars argue that the Bantu migration originated in the Katanga region in Central Africa while J Greenberg believes that the Bantu homeland was the Cameroon area. Theories have been proposed for the spreading of iron to Southern Africa –the theories of diffusion and migration.

The migration theory suggests that people moved into Central and Southern Africa. These people displaced the Late Stone Age people and absorbed them because of superiority in weapons. In an attempt to establish who the Early Iron Age people were, DN Beach states that they were simply Late Stone Age people in another form. He argues that the appearance of all these economic features at once indicate that they were being brought in from somewhere where they had been developed.

Some scholars argue that if these were merely a Stone Age people learning new techniques from their neighbours and passing them on, one would expect to find a much more uneven spread of these new inventions. It is known that the Early Iron Age people continued to rely on hunting and gathering just as the Late Stone Age people had done and it is known that the Iron Age people in general did not always have as much iron as they needed. The result is that they were forced to resort to Late Stone Age tools.

Under these circumstances, if the Late Stone Age people had been simply gaining new ideas, one would have expected to find a new continuation of stone tools in the first Iron Age village. No strong evidence for this type of survival has been found, making it fairly certain that new people entered Southern Africa bringing in iron tools.

The identity of the new people of the Early Iron Age fits the earlier Bantu-speaking people. Beach finally argues that all the cultural features that can be observed in the Early Iron Age sites correspond more or less closely to cultural features of the Bantu of the day. It seems logical therefore to conclude that the Zimbabwe Plateau was invaded by foreigners who in the process carried with them iron technology.

Reasons for Bantu Expansion

Robinson argues that agriculture meant an increase in people and livestock which necessitated mobility. Therefore, if the number of people in certain sites increased beyond sustenance migration was prompted to a new site and grazing lands.

Pressure might have been felt in different ways –competition for fields, firewood, water, pastures and hunting grounds. There was the emergence of permanent settlements leading to formation of lineages. Lineage heads allocated resources and had political authority. With time the ruling class/ elite controlled weaker clans, resources and commercial activities such as mining, hunting, and trade, etc.

Topic 3

JMDGwezhira

THE MUTAPA STATE

it came into existence around the middle of the 15th century when the Great Zimbabwe collapsed. Around 1420-50 Nyatsimba Mutota led an expedition north from the Great Zimbabwe to the headwaters of the Mazowe tributaries. According to AJ Wills, Mutota welded together a confederation of Shona tribes into an empire extending from the Zambezi to the Limpopo. His son and successor, Nyanhewe Matope (1450-8-) consolidated and extended the empire from his new capital at Fura Mountain.

By the early 16th century the state was in full trade swing with the Portuguese along the Zambezi River and at the Mozambican coast trade posts. However, by the 1830s the state had effectively ceased to exist after declining steadily over two centuries because of a complex set of reasons.

<u>Origins</u>

Most historians believe it rose from the ashes of the Great Zimbabwe. To get a deeper understanding of the Mutapa it is therefore important to look at the reasons for the decline and fall of the Great Zimbabwe. Wills says that according to oral tradition, the objective of Mutota's move to the Dande was the search for salt but a more imperial ambition can be assumed for that move.

a) It is generally thought that there was a violent succession dispute at Great Zimbabwe and that some princes moved to form their own states. One scholar who has broken with tradition on that point is A Chigwedere who argues that the Mutapa was not an offshoot of the Great Zimbabwe but that they had existed side by side for some time before the Great Zimbabwe collapsed. He even surmises that the Great Zimbabwe was actually at one time the capital of the Mutapa state. He however, says that in about 1415 a civil war broke out over succession for the position of Mutapa. The civil war was between Nyatsimba Mutota supported by Chinguwo and Torwa supported by Changamire Dombo. According to Chigwedere's account Mutota was defeated and moved to the Zambezi valley where he established himself, while Torwa went to Khami in the west, leaving the Great Zimbabwe to collapse.
   Whatever the circumstances of the rise of the Mutapa state, what is not in dispute is that the state's rulers were related to those at Great Zimbabwe.

b) Some scholars also contend that the Mutapa rulers may have gone to Dande in search of salt. DN Beach (The Mutapa Dynasty: a comparison of Documentary and Traditional evidence, History in Africa, Vol. 3, 1976), says that in P Abraham's writings and those of others, the story of shortage of salt in Guruuswa is taken seriously as an explanation of the rise of the state. Beach says that in fact, this is a common tradition found on the Mafungabutsi and Urungwe plateau as well as in the Mutapa state, "and probably reflects the modern people's awareness of the local salt trade as a reason for travel in the past rather than a real economic condition of the 15th century."
c) While the Mutapa state may not have replaced the Great Zimbabwe, the decline of the latter coincided with the rise of the Mutapa state. Like the Torwa, the Mutapa state copied much of the ruling class culture from the Great Zimbabwe, like the pottery, arrangement of settlements, the stone houses, etc.

d) Ian Phimister refutes the assertion that the Great Zimbabwe was a continuation of the Great Zimbabwe. He accuses nationalist historians of being chiefly concerned with inventing a historic link between the modern nation state of Zimbabwe and a glorious African past. According to Phimister, the Mutapa state started as an independent entity. He says that because the northern Zimbabwe was an area rich in ivory, salt and gold and copper, the people in the area began to trade with those in Great Zimbabwe.

As a result there was a profound Great Zimbabwe influence and a ruling class emerged which imitated many features of the ruling state culture at Great Zimbabwe. In the Dande area where the Mutapa state was domiciled there are stone buildings almost similar to those of Great Zimbabwe, and oral traditions say these were the first homes of the Mutapa. The pottery found in Great Zimbabwe used the same pattern found later in the Mutapa area, a distinct chevron pattern.

e) The Power of External trade

The Zambezi valley was an important trade route to the east coast, especially after a new trading post was established at Angoche north of the Zambezi. The Angoche were rivals to the Sofala traders who had traded with the Great Zimbabwe. After 1400 therefore, the Zambezi valler trade route became more important than the overland trade route and one of the Kalanga lineages invaded and conquered the Tavara people in Dande, thereby establishing the Muatapa state.
Wills argues that the title of Mwenemutapa/Munhumutapa or Great Plunderer/Lord of the Conquered is said to have been conferred upon Mutota by the Tavara of the Zambezi valley whom the Shona had subjugated.

Political Organisation of the Mutapa

The king, who held the title of Munhumutapa, had absolute powers. According to D Chanaiwa ("Politics and Long-distance trade in the Mwenemutapa Empire during the 16th century" –IJAHS, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1972), the Mutapa Empire was governed through a system if vassalage, divided among vassal lords *(fumos*) and chiefs. Most likely these *fumos* are what Wills refers to as provincial governors. These were appointed from among the Mutapa's relatives, advisors, generals and favourites. In theory they remained in office at the pleasure of the ruling Mutapa, but in practice the offices of several of these *fumos* became hereditary and eventually survived the collapse of the empire.
The *fumos* were primarily territorial administrators responsible for collecting tribute, supplying labourers and warriors, maintaining law and order, and administering justice. They were customarily present at the Mutapa's court (dzimbabwe) during state ceremonies and festivals, and many of them sent their sons to the dzimbabwe to work as pages and messengers. The Mutapa political administration was one with no stipulated salaries; the personnel were rewarded in land grants, free salaries and royal favours. The Mutapas also allowed some of the *fumos*to take charge of long-distance trade in their area and, as a result, wealth and power.
According to Mannuel de Faria e Souza, as quoted in Chanaiwa, there were about 25 vassal lords in the Mwenemutapa empire. A few of the listed lordships included Mungazi, Barwe, Uteve, Manyika, Sedanda, Bocha, Chidima and Mushawatu (whom Gatsi Rusere used to replace Chidima).
While the Mutapa's authority was declining steadily throughout the 16-18th centuries, most of the *fumos* became increasingly powerful or autonomous. Several government officials also attended the Dzimbabwe; some of them were identified by the Portuguese as the treasurer, the military-general, the governor of paramounts, the chaplain and the great musician.

A few of the territorial administrators were descendants of the traditional chiefly lineages of the indigenous Tonga and Tavara peoples who had been conquered by the Mutapa dynasty, although most of them had been replaced by *fumos.*
Their duties were similar to the *fumos,* and the Mutapas demanded allegiance, obedience and tribute from them. Succession to the chieftainship was hereditary, although the ruling Mutapa had to confirm each candidate. Whenever a new Mutapa was installed, the chiefs had to reaffirm their loyalty through the fire ritual. Old fires in the chieftaincies were extinguished, and new ones were received from the new Mutapa; in return the Mutapa protected the chiefs against both internal and external attacks.
The whole administrative fabric of the Mutapa Empire was loosely connected. According to an eye-witness report by father Monclaro, "the greater part of this empire is governed by *fumos* and petty rulers, and though it has powerful kings whom it obeys, it has nevertheless these *fumos* and headmen by whom the people are governed."
The unity and viability of the empire depended heavily on the charisma, well-being and political wisdom of the ruling Mutapa.

Religious Organisation

According to AJ Wills, "it is evident that the Mwenemutapa derived much of his political authority from his religious, indeed, priestly, functions as sole communicator with the Mhondoro or ancestral spirits of the tribe." The ancestral spirits of the tribe were required to intercede with Mwari if the rains or crops should fail or other disaster befell them. From this function the king acquired a semi-divine significance.
The Mutapa people worshipped the Supreme God, Mwari, just like the other Great Zimbabwe preceding them. There were spirit mediums who interceded to God on behalf of everyone. The king consulted spirit mediums in any major decisions like going to war or not and also to find solutions when there was drought.
There were two kinds of spirits;
(i) Family spirit (mudzimu)
(ii) Clan spirit (mhondoro)

Military Organisation

The king was the commander-in-chief of the army which he led to defend the kingdom. In times of war all men were conscripted in the army and soldiers were grouped into battalions. The king could gather 3000-5000 soldiers in 24 hours if the need arose to summon the army. Those who were in distant areas, of course, would take longer.

The instruments of war were spears, bows, arrows, hand axes and shields. Fighting could be sanctioned or allowed when a vassal chief refused to pay tribute or when there was a rebellion.

Economic Activities

1) Crop Cultivation

Crop cultivation appears to have been one of the major economic activities of the Mutapa State. Joao Dos Santos, as quoted in **Chanaiwa,** says the Mutapa had reached a level of self-sufficiency in crops, livestock and fruits when the first Portuguese arrived in south central Africa. Dos Santos recorded the various grains

they grew and animals they kept. They grew crops like rice, wheat, sugar cane, coconuts, taro, oranges, lemons, figs, vines and cotton. They also kept livestock like and also hunted lots of wild animals.

In this predominantly agrarian society, the number of wives, dependants and followers that one could attract were the real measures of wealth. It was a non-cash economy in which surplus was often shared with others as a means of cultivating social relations and enhancing social status. Crops were used to pay lobola, for food, brewing beer, trade.

The importance of agriculture is shown by the fact that any other activities like mining were suspended during the normal agricultural seasons. Every family had its piece of land for farming allocated by chiefs or headmen on behalf of the king. The king had the largest fields in every district and these were worked on by everybody. In times of drought produce from these fields was used to feed the king's subjects.

2) Pastoralism

Pastoralism was a very important economic activity of the Mutapa. Dos Santos says that the Mutapa kept fowls, pigs, goats, cattle, donkeys, among others. There was the royal herd of cattle and also privately owned cattle. The royal herd was found in every province. The king usually had the largest herd of cattle. As a result his cattle could sometimes be lent out to those who had none, in a system called kuronzera.

Apart from *lobola,* cattle were also used to feed visitors of the king or his army stationed in each province or away on fighting errands.

3) Mining

The Mutapa state also participated in mining activities and traded in minerals and mineral products. According to Wills, there were two types of mining in the state;

a) Open-cast mining of gold down to usually not more than 50m. This was because mining was limited by seasoned flooding. In Manicaland there was gold-mining all year round, but further west in more level country the workings were often flooded by rains.
b) There was also alluvial gold mining in which gold was recovered from streams. Before the Arabs reached Sofala, gold was processed to a small extent and then only to provide a steady market in the state.

Gold was therefore originally used to manufacture objects such as bowls, amulets and ankle rings. Chanaiwa argues that the Mutapa himself also owned a number of royal mines which were worked by indigenous labourers recruited by the *fumos* and chiefs. He rewarded these with gifts of animals, cloth, beads and food stuffs.

There is evidence that the Portuguese were attracted to the Mutapa state by mineral resources. Chanaiwa contends that fabulous stories about the abundant gold, silver, copper and ivory in the Mutapa Empire were popularly advertised in Portugal. In Portugal it was erroneously believed that the empire was the biblical Land of Ophir from which the Queen of Sheba produced the gold she traded with King Solomon of Israel. Chanaiwa says "the Portuguese expected to obtain more gold than was produced in Elmina in West Africa, and more than was found in the Spanish Eldorado in South America."

4) Trade

While the Mutapa had no particular interest in the simple political domination of territories or in strict regulation of the daily lives of their subjects, they took care to establish and maintain dominant authority over the economic activities of the empire, especially in the area of international trade.

D Chanaiwa argues that their power and prestige depended mostly on the rate and amount of tribute as well as the export and import duties they could obtain from their subjects. Since the Mutapa dynasty and its administrative aristocracy did not themselves engage in the actual production and processing of natural resources, they had to rely on the willingness of their subjects to do this for them.

Consequently the Mwenemutapas played a very dominant role in the long-distance trade with the Portuguese. The Portuguese wanted to destroy Swahili commercial dominance in south central Africa and establish a Portuguese economic monopoly. The region's trade was also tied to the Portuguese trade in India. The Portuguese brought cloth, beads and other items from India and traded them for gold, copper, iron and ivory. In 1505, the Portuguese established a port at Sofala, and quickly took over the Swahili economic monopoly by force of arms, thus compelling the ruling Mwenemutapa to trade instead with them.

Chanaiwa says that "trade and commerce, not territorial possessions or political domination, were dominant modes in the relations between the Portuguese and the Mwenemutapa dynasty during most of the 16th century." The Portuguese primarily sought friendship and alliances with the Mutapas in order to mine for minerals and to trade in peace and safety. In return they generally paid the required import and export duties.

Long-distance trade did not make a considerable impact on this economy. It seems that only a small oligarchy/elite around the ruling dynasty actually acquired the incoming foreign goods, and thus only they had much interest in the trade. Their new wealth got them more livestock, wives dependants and followers. There was a group of people called *vashambadzi* who carried out the trade on behalf of these elite people in most cases. They were the equivalent of today's salesmen or middlemen.

There was some system of internal trade among the Mutapa people themselves as well as with their neighbours, i.e. the Tonga, Tavara and Maravi on the other side of the Zambezi River. Some of the major items of local trade were the indigenous cotton cloth, fibre mats, sesame oil (mafuta) and coconut oil for lighting.

Apparently the Mutapa did not exert direct control over internal trade unless it interfered with royal prerogatives on long-distance trade with the Portuguese. The Mutapa's most important role in both internal and long-distance trade was the promotion and maintenance of order and justice. He was responsible for providing protection and safety for traders and market centres.

He set up the laws and regulations for the extraction of mineral sources, employment, transportation and trading activities.

Decline and collapse of the State

Various factors have been cited for the decline and collapse of the state, with the combination of Portuguese and civil wars taking most of the blame. Chanaiwa says that "throughout the 17th century, the power and authority of the Mutapas declined steadily due to dynastic civil wars, which were worsened by Portuguese interference." This factor is also supported by D Birmingham and P Johnson (in D N Beach –The Zimbabwe

Plateau) who argue that it was not military weakness but political weakness which led to the demise of the state.

1. Some scholars believe that the state declined because it was too big to be ruled by one man living in a corner of the state. As we have seen, at its height the state covered most of modern day Zimbabwe, from the Zambezi in the north, the Limpopo in the south, Kalahari in the west to large swathes of Mozambique in the east. Under the circumstances, it was very easy for some chiefs far from the capital in Dande to refuse to pay tribute if a weak Mutapa came to power.
   Such cases are corroborated by Chanaiwa when he talks about the decline of the authority of Mutapas throughout the 17th century, with the result that the administration of the empire disintegrated, and most vassal lords became either increasingly powerful or plain autonomous.
   Vassal lords in distant areas were difficult to punish if they rebelled because it took time for punitive expeditions to reach them. They could also consolidate their positions while the Mutapa was busy putting up an army to punish them.

2. Portuguese Interference and Succession Disputes

   Continuous civil wars among the royal houses of the Mutapa dynasty, especially during succession times, caused some rivals to appeal to the Portuguese for military support, first in order to gain support, and then to maintain authority gained. Portuguese officials, traders and missionaries often acted as catalysts to the disintegration of the Mutapa Empire.
   Although their intervention was usually on behalf of a friendly Mutapa, their real objective was to weaken rather than strengthen him, since an independent and powerful ruler would have placed heavy restrictions on their trading activities within the empire. The puppet Mutapa rulers of the 17th century were unpopular in the state and were thus incapable of maintaining the peace and order necessary for the success of long-distance trade.
   As a result the economy was disrupted and the major instrument of the Mutapa's power, as well as the unity and integration of the empire, was gone. Wills says that "the divisions within the state might have been resolved had they not been exploited by the Portuguese and Arabs."
   In the first days the Portuguese interference brought prosperity in the state, until the two sidescstarted to quarrel. In 1494, Chikuyo Chisamarengu became king and was the first to receive the first Portuguese trader, Fernandez, who brought him a bag of rice, a gun and gunpowder as a gift.
   Chikuyo used the guns to spread his territory into the Manyika in the east. However, the actual intervention of the Portuguese seems to have been the takeover of all Swahili Arab trade routes as well as the Mutapa territory itself.
   According to M Newitt (**Portuguese Settlement on the Zambezi)**, Portuguese trade with East Africa in the second half of the 16th century was organised on a monopoly basis for a period between 1535-95.
   During internal strife or civil wars the Portuguese adventurers were also able to rise swiftly to positions of various chiefs and also protecting the Portuguese in the interior. The Portuguese acquired independence and finally manipulated Shona dynastic divisions effectively so as to gain control not only of the Mutapa, but of the Manyika as well.
   The Portuguese were attracted largely by minerals, especially gold. Wills argues that in attracting foreigners, gold was to become one of the factors that would undermine and destroy states.

3. Silveira's death and Portuguese Intervention

In 1561, a Portuguese missionary, Goncalo da Silveira, was killed by Negomo Mapunzagutu on the pretext that he was a Portuguese spy. The king was also influenced by his spirit mediums who thought Silveira was taking over their power. He had converted the king and his mother to Christianity, renaming them Sebastian and Maria. Negomo had also started to dislike Silveira's Christian idea that polygamy was wrong. The Portuguese used the murder as an excuse to invade the state and expel all Swahili Arabs from the Mutapa.

They sent a number of punitive expeditions against the Mutapa, one under Francisco Baretto in 1569 and another under Fernandez vasco Homem three years later. The expeditions were affected by tropical diseases, lack of food and they were also beaten back by the Manyika who were at the same time fighting the Mutapa,

According to Wills, the flare up between the Manyika and Mutapa had happened in 1565 when Chikanga, the Manyika chief, challenged the Mwenemutapa, Mukambo. Both were killed in this war which was still smouldering when Barreto first entered Manyika in 1569. Homem, who led the second expedition, actually resorted to mining silver at Chikawa but the Manyika killed over half of his 400 men. The third expedition sent in 1608 by the Portuguese king Phillip III, under Nuno Alvares, ended in failure after he encountered opposition not only from the Mutapa but also from Portuguese merchants at Sena and Tete. Alvares' group also faced hunger and diseases, and after ten days returned to the coast as a failure.

The major effects of these expeditions was that they not only increased insecurity in the state, but also weakened it by attrition as continuous warfare caused deaths of soldiers and civilians. Some chiefs took advantage of the chaos to stake their independence.

4. Civil wars and succession disputes

Although the Portuguese had failed to invade the Mutapa, civil wars and succession disputes within the state presented them with opportunities which they took to their advantage. In the 1590s the Maravi from north of the Zambezi had invaded the Mutapa in an attempt to take over the goldfields. Gatsi Rusere's army, led by Nengomasha, managed to repel the Maravi. For some reason, Gatsi turned on Nengomasha, his uncle, and had him killed. Some scholars believe Nengomasha may have become too powerful and was becoming a threat to the king's authority. Nengomasha's relatives, Chiraramuro and Matuzianye rebelled and broke away from Gatsi Rusere. Makombe and his Barwe chiefdom also followed suit. The Munhumutapa appealed for Portuguese assistance to regain control of the rebel chiefdoms.

Portuguese traders and soldiers at Masapa, led by Captain Diego Simoes Madeira, fought and defeated Matuzianye. Eventually Gatsi regained control over the Highveld chiefdoms but was never again able to demand tribute from Barwe, Uteve and Manyika. In return the Portuguese promised silver mines and land but when he regained control, Gatsi refused to honour his promises.

In 1607 however, the Portuguese forced Gatsi to sign a treaty under which he surrendered all the mines in the state to the king of Portugal. He was also forced to give up some of his children, including the heir, to the Portuguese who planned to bring him up as a Christian with loyalty to the Portuguese. He was sent to Goa in India where he became a Catholic priest. He never returned to Africa. From 1609, the Portuguese asserted their independence by refusing to pay tribute to the king, and the Captain of the Gates was withdrawn from the king's court.

In 1624 Gatsi died and was succeeded by his son, Nyambo kapararidze, although his uncle, Mavhura Mhande was also claiming the throne with the support of the Portuguese. Kapararidze declared a trade

embargo against the Portuguese after they refused to pay tribute. The Portuguese replied by declaring war on Kapararidze, and a civil war ensued between Kapararidze and Mavhura Mhande.
With Portuguese support Mavhura won and in 1635 he was appointed Mutapa, baptised Philip and also given rules and regulations to follow;

(i) Missionaries were given freedom of action and could now build churches whenever they wished.
(ii) Portuguese representatives within the Mutapa were to enter the state capital with hats and shoes on. He was to sit in a chair and not clap hands to the Mutapa.
(iii) Portuguese traders could now trade in any part of the Mutapa state.
(iv) The Mutapa lost the right to give any gold-bearing territory to any white man or his representative.
(v) The Mutapa was to pay tribute of 3 gold pastas to the Portuguese. He in fact became a vassal of the Portuguese.

In 1659 Mavhura died and the Portuguese appointed another puppet whom they christened Dominguez. However, Dominguez was assassinated by his friends, only to be replaced by another puppet, Nyanyadzi, christened Pedro. Nyanyadzi was succeeded by Nyakunembire, baptised Alfonso.

Nyakunembire tried in 1683 to assert his authority by closing down all mines in protest against harassment by the Portuguese. The Portuguese declared war on Nyakunembire who appealed to Changamire Dombo in Guruuswa to come to his aid. The Changamire assisted the Mutapa to destroy the Portuguese at Dambarare in 1693.

In the early 17th century the Mutapa state had grown weaker, as we have seen. The Blackwoodsmen were recruiting African slave armies along the Zambezi Valley in a bid for power. These are the same people who had in the 1630s assisted Mavhura in his fight with kapararidze. When mavhura was appointed Mutapa an anti-European feeling swept across the Mutapa but another Portuguese military expedition returned him to the throne.

From then on, he and his successors depended on Portuguese support. If they tried to act independently they were over-ruled. P Curtin argues that “the price of their alliance with foreigners was a dramatic reduction in the size of their territory and in the numbers of their followers.”

Portuguese Trade System in the State

There were captains of markets at Mozambique, Sena, Tete and of inland markets such as Masapa, Luanze and Bokoto. Each of these junior captains had to be confirmed by the Mutapa and they also had to pay the Mutapa a fee called the *curva.* If the captain of Mozambique or his appointee assumed office without paying the *curva,* the Mutapa customarily declared an *empata,* meaning they could no longer trade and were embargoed.

When Portuguese merchants came to trade, trading in the feiras was done under the regulation and supervision of both the Portuguese captain and the Mutapa agents, and merchants and their employees had to obtain permission from the Captain of Masapa or from the Mutapa himself in order to leave for the capital or for African villages. They were required to enter the capital without arms and to approach the Mutapa barefooted. When they reached him they knelt and prostrated themselves on the ground.

Masapa was the most important market. Because no Portuguese citizen could enter the territory between Masapa and the Mutapa capital without permission, Masapa was known as "gates" to dzimbabwe, and the captain at Masapa was known as the Captain of the Gates. This man was customarily recommended by the Portuguese traders and then appointed by the captain of Mozambique. He was also responsible for collecting one-twentieth of every load (mutoro) of trade goods from all incoming caravans on behalf of the Mutapa. He had jurisdiction over all the Portuguese in and beyond Masapa and had the right to settle disputes between the Portuguese and Africans in Masapa.

Throughout the 15th century the Mutapa apparently exercised effective sovereignty, since all Portuguese attempts to take full possession of mineral resources, inland markets and trade routes ended in failure. The Portuguese neither affected the political and administrative machinery of the Mutapa dynasty nor changed the cultural patterns of the people. However, the situation changed dramatically in the 17th century, as we have seen.

Decline of Portuguese Influence

In the 1690s the Mutapa regained their powers with the assistance of a strong Rozvi state under Changamire Dombo. The Portuguese were now competing with the Swahili who sold Indian cloth and beads. In many ways Portuguese products were expensive and thus could not be sold in large quantities. In spite of the incessant civil wars and succession disputes the Mutapa state continued to exist well into the 19th century, and even, according to S Mudenge, until 1902.

Unlike the 17th century when Portuguese prazo holders were plundering the Mutapa Empire, the 18th century saw independent Mutapa rulers now persuading and sometimes intimidating the Portuguese traders, sometimes stealing from them. However, it is important to note that in spite of their actual or perceived weaknesses the Portuguese remained the puppet masters of the Zimbabwe Plateau.

Newitt says that the Portuguese funded Tonga raids into the Mutapa state although this was made to appear as if it was a counter-attack by the Tonga against their long-standing Karanga rivals that had taken over Tonga trade routes to the coast.

An overview of the Prazo System

Largely because of their failure to establish viable trade on the Zimbabwean Plateau, the Portuguese tried to establish farming or agricultural communities in the Zambezi valley. These agricultural plantations were known as prazos (Portuguese for farm or estate). Large tracts of land were acquired by force from Africans, usually for nothing.

In a style that was to be repeated centuries later by European colonialists, the Portuguese either took land not under occupation or simply fenced in even those areas that were occupied by the Shona. Those who were fenced in became their workers, who were unpaid. In cases where the Portuguese could find no volunteers/workers, they forced the village chiefs to provide the labour force. More often than not this demand was backed up by an army comprising of Portuguese and African men. The army was known as the Chikunda army.

Men were often given work targets. In cases where they failed to finish, their families were detained without food until the work was finished. During the work itself supervisors lashed at the workers using rhino hides (chicote) to make them work harder.

Topic 4

THE ROZVI STATE

JMOGwezhira

The origins of the state are a subject of much debate among historians who probably agree only on the fact that the state was founded by Changamire Dombo around 1690.

a) The State seems to have been raised from the ashes of the Torwa state. Some historians argue that Dombo managed to cobble together a state made up of several Shona dynasties. This was mainly because the Torwa state in the South west and the Mutapa in the north east had been weakened by internal strife and external influence of the Portuguese.
b) Some oral traditions seem to suggest that Changamire Dombo first rebelled against the Mutapa, then conquered Torwa in the south west, then the Manyika and Uteve kingdoms. The latter two were by the time of Dombo's rise semi-independent of Mutapa influence. However, Changamire Dombo seems to have remained on good terms with the Mutapa, which is shown by the fact that in 1693 he assisted the Mutapa people to drive out the Portuguese from Dambarare tradition post.

Social Organisation

Rozvi rulers were of the Moyo totem. The homestead was the smallest unit in the state. The Rozvi society was patrilineal, which meant that inheritance was passed through male members. There was sexual division of labour in which women participated in farming for grain and vegetables while men herded cattle and hunted. Polygamous men were generally successful and powerful. Families with more daughters began to gain more wealth through marriages, getting cattle which were also a form of wealth.

Military Organisation

The Mambo, king of the Rozvi, drafted young men into collective labour, including the building up of a formidable army which extended the Rozvi frontiers and consolidated Dombo's power base. On three occasions the Rozvi army relieved Zumbo from a Mutapa attack -1746, 1772 and 1780. Portuguese records also show that the Changamire bodyguard was permanently under arms. The bodyguard was called Gwanangwana, which means wide awake.

The army's weapons included bows and arrows, daggers, spears, battle axes, shields and guns (muskets) acquired from trade with the Portuguese and Swahili traders. The army was grouped into battalions. The invincibility of the Rozvi army is demonstrated by the fact that the Ndau and Zezuru people migrated from the north and south east into the Rozvi state, running away from the Portuguese.

Portuguese records show that the Rozvi army slaughtered all the Portuguese traders at Dambarare in 1693.

Political System

The Mambo was the head of state and on his death all the king's sons were to wait for their turn to rule until they managed to rise to the throne. Over generations however, the system became extremely complex and caused countless leadership crises that many historians regard it as a weakness in the Rozvi political system.

In provincial administration the method of succession was hereditary. The provincial leaders were appointed and approved by the Changamire himself because they were his eyes and ears. The Changamire also held the religious and political authority to install new provincial chiefs. The Mambo could even appoint his relatives and was represented at every level. According to KR Robinson, the ruling Rozvi kept themselves apart from the common people in terms of settlement.

Some of the Rozvi changamires known to have ruled the state from its inception to its demise in the late 19th century include Changamire Dombo, Chagadzike, Rupandamanhanga, Gumboremvura, Chirisamhuru, Mutinhima, Dyembeu, Sororezhou, Tohwechipi, Chikore Gumunyu and Jiri.

Religious Organisation

The Rozvi prayed to and appeased the ancestral spirits on many occasions. They did this through spirit mediums who could communicate directly with God. They also worshiped Mwari Musikavanhu, the high God, whom they believed created all things. It was believed that the Mambo was connected directly to Mwari and therefore his opinion could not be questioned.

He was feared and also highly respected. If there was a dispute over succession the most important medium of the area had the final word on the matter. In addition, the religious authority had the support of the Tumbare (army leader). Together their word carried enough force to enable them to be respected.

Economic Organisation

Like all the other Late Iron Age States, the main basis of the Rozvi economy was pastoralism and crop production.

1. Crop Production/Agriculture

The Rozvi cultivated cereals like finger millet and sorghum, among other crops. Shifting cultivation, for long held by scholars as the preserve of the Early Iron Age, was commonly practised in the Rozvi state. Because of their proximity to the Portuguese, the Rozvi acquired exotic crops like yams, sugar cane, maize and rice, which, however, did not become staple foods.

Some crops were also acquired from Indian traders, e.g, potatoes, melons, cucumbers and fruit trees like guavas, pine apples and paw paws. It is important to note that nobody really owned land in the traditional system. It was communally owned, with the Changamire or Mambo as the guardian of that land. Every adult was entitled to a piece of land.

2. Pastoralism

Apart from cultivation, the Rozvi were cattle herders. They kept livestock, e.g., cattle, goats and sheep. In the state livestock was viewed as wealth but cattle was not the most common animal. It was the goat. Most rituals like marriage transactions used goats, not cattle because everyone had them. Cattle could be used for many purposes like;

a) Bringing in more wives
b) Making the Rozvi more secure from droughts and famines and they could be traded for grain.

c) Apart from providing leather and other useful by-products they added milk to the diet of the Karanga.

The Rozvi also kept donkeys and fowls.

3. Mining

Like the Mutapa peoples, the Rozvi were also a mining community. They mined gold, iron and copper. The Rozvi traditionally smelted iron although archaeology does not provide conclusive evidence that iron smelting took place within the area. It is believed that all gold and other special metals were surrendered to the Changamire and any vassal chief found in possession of these metals faced the risk of being killed for that.

Robinson asserts that "it would appear probable that the Rozvi Mambos demanded gold as tribute from those groups who mined it." For those who mined and wilfully surrendered the gold to the king, the Changamire would thank them with cattle or give the miner small quantities of the precious metal for his efforts.

The Changamire could not use all the gold that was brought to him. He either used it in the long distance trade with the Portuguese or dished it to members of his ruling council or some of his subordinate chiefs.

4. Tribute

The Rozvi undoubtedly accepted tribute in the form of work (labour), agricultural products, cattle and at times wives from their subjects. The stones used to build the ruins of Khami are said to have been brought as tribute to the Rozvi mambo. Pottery is said to have been made as tribute to the royal women. The purpose of tribute was that it was essentially a declaration of loyalty to the Mambo.

Whenever there was need for a national ritual, all districts made their contributions in form of grain or cake tobacco (chamba) or any other item. Most of these were used for the ritual and the remainder became royal property. Although tribute was accepted as tradition there is no doubt that the tradition was well-calculated to benefit the royal lineage at the expense of the tributary chiefs or his subjects.

5. Hunting

Was a major preoccupation at Khami where there are bones of animals spread over many acres. Numerous iron arrow heads have been recovered at the same place. The common tools used were spears, arrows, axes and also nets. Hunting parties were organised which could stay in the bushes for several weeks without coming back, drying up meat in the bush.

Hunters surrendered to the chief what h was entitled to as the chief guardian of all the animals in the state;

a) Elephant tusks
b) Elephant hooves to be used as stools
c) All pangolins because they were royal animals.
d) Lion and leopard skins.

The headquarters of Changamire Dombo were called Manyanga meaning large horns. This was reference to elephant tusks that were hunted for and taken to the Portuguese trading posts in exchange for various items like cloth and guns.

The Rozvi were also skilled in the art of ivory and bone carving. Bracelets made from ivory were in common use by important people.

6. Trade

The Rozvi state engaged in both long-distance and localised trade. Because they could obtain guns from foreign trade, it contributed to the expansion and consolidation of the Mambo's power. The Rozvi had trade links with the Portuguese. While trade with these and other foreigners does not appear to have been very large, the most sought after trade items were glass beads and cloth.

Imports excavated at Khami consist of cloths and beads, Chinese porcelain, Arab and Portuguese earthenware, European silver, canons and other firearms of Portuguese origin. The early forms of external goods traded were glass beads and black and white calico cloth, the latter of which was used as part of traditional ceremonial clothing and at installations of chiefs. It is important to note that the Shona also made their own cloth from wide cotton. Robinson argues that spinning of wild cotton has been proved at most sites of Rozvi tradition.

Relations with other people

People who adopted the Rozvi traditional customs became part of the state and enjoyed Rozvi protection from enemies. They were also spared from raids. Some of the dynasties that took advantage of that generosity are chiefs Chitema, Chikanga Mutesa, Makoni, Marange and Mubheru Nyashanu. Some dynasties resisted Rozvi domination and by the start of the 19th century had successfully asserted their independence from the Rozvi, e.g., Seke, Chihota, Mangwende and Chinhamora.

Decline of the Rozvi State

a) It was mainly a result of the Mfecane wars. Scores of offshoot armies from South Africa came through the Zimbabwe plateau while running away from Tshaka, and in the process they accelerated Rozvi decline. In the 1830s, for instance, Zwangendaba was defeated by Soshangane of the Gaza State. Consequently, Zwangendaba migrated into the Zimbabwe plateau with his Ngoni army, fighting and scattering most of the surviving Rozvi people. He proceeded to areas north of the Zambezi and the Rozvi state was left on the brink of collapse.
   in 1837, another group of Nguni warriors fleeing the wars in the Nguniland area, and led by a woman warrior called Nyamazana, crossed the Limpopo and fought the remnants of the Rozvi army. They captured and killed the Rozvi ruler, Chirisamhuru. After that Nyamazana moved west of the plateau and hooked up with the Ndebele, another group that had run away from Tshaka and was under Mzilikazi. Nyamazana became Mzilikazi's wife.
b) In the early 1840s, the Ndebele arrived on the plateau, led by Mzilikazi and invaded the capital of the Rozvi at Khami on the western edge of the pleateau. Unlike their other Nguni cousins, the Ndebele decided to stay permanently on the platea.
c) The Shangani that had tossed out Zwangendaba also started to raid Rozvi territory from the direction of Chipinge in the south east. Faced with pressure from all corners, the Rozvi state crumbled. In fact, the Mfecane wars were probably the major cause of the collapse of the state. In a short period of less than 15 years, the Rozvi state was attacked by at least six strong groups, i.e., the Ngwane, Maseko Ngoni, Zwangendaba, Nxaba, Nyamazana and the Ndebele.
d) After 1860, the Rozvi state existed only in name. in 1890, CJ Rhodes and the BSAC occupied the area inhabited by the Rozvi, the remaining place where the Rozvi still claimed to have a hold on. The group disappeared from the map with their last nominal ruler, Tohwechipi.
e) In the 1860s, the Hiya, a group of migrants from the Save Valley set off on a career of raiding from the Save to Gwelo. They were not crushed by the Rozvi until the 1790s, and they were ferocious that Birmingham and

Martin say that “their thirty years of raiding gave the central plateau a foretaste of the Mfecane raids of the next century.”

Meanwhile the steady decline of the state continued such that by the beginning of the 19th century tribute to the rulers became rare. Rulers only received token tribute except in areas where elephants could be hunted. Little gold was available to finance a regular military force and even the title of Mambo was dropped by the local rulers.

Topic 5

JMDGwezhira

THE MFECANE

Background to the Upheavals

1. The Sotho-Tswana Groups

The political order among the Sotho-Tswana groups at the beginning of the 18th century was organised along patriarchal lines. Some men inherited high ranks like kingship. However, young men and foreigners were subordinated. There was absence of centralised political power.

Senior men of positions ensured conformity of rules in society. Family unity was crucial to building a consensus. Coercive power was available for the political elite but it was too weak to allow political autocracy.

Households also retained considerable autonomy from chiefly control except for those societies with age regiments. Power among chieftaincies was built through strategic alliances involving exchange of women and cattle. The chief had the duty to allocate land.

2. Northern Nguni

Up until the 18th century territory was occupied by numerous small chiefdoms. Among the numerous Nguni groups who later fought for supremacy in the 19th century were the Ngwane, Khumalo, Zulu, Ndwandwe, Mthethwa, and the Batwane. DW Hedges says that the process of social transformation among the Nguni dated back to the 16th century. In his view this was prompted by regional and ecological factors. He argues that competition in the western coast and the dry uplands led to transformation of societies.

Chiefs with iron deposits had the means to challenge authority hence their emergence and they had their own weapons, while those who didn't have the iron deposits had to engage in regional and international trade to acquire those weapons. Through trade, chiefdoms were able to expand their power. According to Hedges it is therefore possible that it was through trade that some chiefdoms dominated and later on tension emerged for control of that trade.

<u>Hunting</u>

Big hunting parties were needed for the purposes of repelling big game that attacked people. Initially hunting was meant for the purpose of economic survival. Hunting also led to the development of military tactics. The *amabutho* also evolved at this time. The lineage system allowed for expansion of political entities but there were problems with the system in that it required control of population growth. Scholars like Jack Daniel and Jeff Guy argue that in the 19th century there was an increase in population thereby straining resources. Because of the nature of Zululand this fostered competition for available pastures and arable land.
Works published by Guy and Daniel show the royal clans of the Mthethwa, Ndwandwe and Ngwane from 1800-26. There is evidence that preference was for good pastures and alluvial soils. Because of the environmental limits of the region it meant that if the good sites became difficult to get chiefdoms were ready to fight in the event of disagreements. It is against this background that we have what is called the Mfecane, a period of upheavals, wars and carnage in the Nguni area from about 1818.

Mfecane Debates

Much of the debate on the Mfecane is centred on the characteristics of the event. JD Omer-Cooper has described it as the most formative event in African history. On the other hand historians like MacMillian have described it as the most destructive act which shows African barbarism at its worst. Thill says it led to depopulation of the entire Highveld. Some historians have also seen it as an African revolution. J Cobbing says it was a great event because it led to state formation.

Causes of the Mfecane
Several theories have been advanced to explain the phenomenon.

1) The White-influence theory says that Dingiswayo, wandering in exile, found himself in the Cape, and met a white traveller called Cohen who then taught him new tactics of fighting. Dingiswayo then went to Grahamstown where he was impressed by the regimental system which he saw in the British barracks. He then went back to his kingdom of the Mthethwa and implemented what he had seen.
   The theory has been lambasted by historians as racist. Its presupposition also gets some facts wrong. For instance, age regiments and the amabutho started well before Dingiswayo was even born.
2) The individualist approach –this theory attributes change to great men. Omer-Cooper brings in Tshaka as the central figure in the Nguni disturbances. Max Gluckman also argues that Tshaka was a disturbed man with an insatiable desire for terror. Walter also says that Tshaka used violence as a deliberate excuse to create an autocratic state. It is important to note that Omer-Cooper saw the Zulu state as a central focus of the Mfecane and Tshaka as the driving force.
   However, this theory has also been criticised as inadequate to explain the Mfecane. The idea of attributing change to individuals is fundamentally wrong. The whole Nguni societies contributed to the Mfecane. Proponents of this theory also get some facts wrong. Neither Tshaka nor Dingiswayo was responsible for introducing the amabutho system, although it can be argued that they perfected it. J Wrights has found evidence which suggests that the amabhutho were products of the process of social political change which developed in the northern Nguniland before Tshaka and Dingiswayo. British historians like Hugh Marshall-Hole perpetuated the myth of Zulu responsibility for the Mfecane, a myth which emerged in the context of the colonisation which was aimed at reinforcing justification of the British conquest of Zululand and the rest of Africa.
   Omer-Cooper only focuses on the internal dynamics but ignores the external factors which were quite important in influencing the outbreak of the Mfecane directly or indirectly.

3) The Environmentalist theory
   Gluckman was the first to propose the possibility of overpopulation as a source of environmental stress, leading to political chaos and the emergence of the Zulu as the dominant state in Nguniland.
   Gluckman argues that there was continuous growth in population in Nguniland from about the 16th century onwards. In the 18th century the trek Boers started fleeing from British rule in the Cape, expanding eastwards and thereby blocking further expansion by the Nguni.
   Gluckman says that by the beginning of the 19th century the population in Nguniland had reached a critical point. Land was no longer available for settlement and chiefdoms could no longer split because the weaker party had nowhere to go.
   J Guy also supports the same argument. He points out that with time, the deterioration of land combined with the droughts and famines of the late 18th century meant that political conflicts were inevitable.

Marshall-Hole contends that by the beginning of the late 19th century South East Africa was hit by a drought which came to be known as *madhlatule*. This drought caused a crisis so inhabitable lands decreased and food production fell. Phillip Bouwer has also accepted this argument as valid. He says that when the drought occurred, the social transformation of Southern Africa had undergone some notable changes. Whereas in the past families had ruled by consensus, now dominant groups exercised control through the new amabutho.
When drought and famine came these groups began to be threatened by the prospect of drought and loss of supporters and their cattle to drought. These used their control over the amabutho to control others and replenish their herds through raids. In this attempt to pursue their interests Southern Africa was thrown into conflict.

Criticism

a) Elizabeth Eldridge says that the theory does not take into consideration regional variations as it basically focuses on the Ngwane of Sobhuza and may not necessarily be true of other groups.
b) Guy has also been criticised for only looking at pastoralism and ignoring cultivation yet crop production was the central aspect of the Northern Nguni.
c) There is also evidence that the environmental degradation occurred. Guy's conclusion that by the 18th century the physical resources were breaking down under existing forms of exploitation is unfounded.
d) Eldridge argues that Omer-Cooper and Gluckman over-generalised their theories. She says that if there was overpopulation how then dowe explain the fact that the fertile land tracts in Natal were left unutilised by Tshaka?
e) If the population had increased beyond sustenance through pastoralism is it not possible that the population could have been sustained by growing more crops in the fertile land.

4) Collision over trade

The theory was advanced by those not convinced with the environmental explanation. DW Hedges argues that from 1715 onwards trade in ivory at Delagoa bay boomed to new heights, allowing the Hlengwe and then the Mabudu to build up trading empires. Hedges says that around the 1790s when key sections of the northern Nguni were integrated with mercantile capital the ivory demand declined and people started to compete for trade with the Dutch at the Cape.
Monica Wilson has suggested that Dingiswayo and Tshaka extended control over many kingdoms because they wished to monopolise trade with the Portuguese at Delagoa Bay.
However, some historians dismiss the theory as unsustainable. L Thompson, for instance, argues that the issue of trade was insignificant and that trade through the bay was very small and chaotic. He says that there is no evidence of a significant influx of imported goods from the Bay to Nguniland during the time of Tshaka and Dingiswayo.

5) External pressure against Nguniland

J Cobbing and J Wright sought to explain the Mfecane in the context of European influence. Cobbing in particular suggested that the Mfecane was influenced by the European demand for labour. He points out the activities of raiding communities like the Griqua and the Korana in the interior. Cobbinng also points to the upheavals that accompanied the Dutch and British advances in the latter half of the 18th century and the

early 19th century. He says that the Portuguese pushed the Ngwane into a cauldron. He also says the activities of the Griqua and their use of arms put pressure on the surrounding communities.

Pressure from the Dutch in the south demanding labour also pushed the Xhosa. Cobbing argues based on this that African societies were then squashed together in a small pocket of land in Zululand. These developed defensive tactics resulting in conflict.

Eldridge and Caroline Hamilton have however criticised Cobbing's theory. Hamilton essentially says that Cobbing's attempt to remove ultimate responsibility for the Mfecane from Tshaka is wrong.

Southern Africa in the Mfecane Aftermath

The mfecane was succeeded by the Great Trek and then penetration of white settlements into the Highveld and Natal. The events radically distributed power among South African chiefdoms and for a time these events also promoted the aggregation of power into fewer but stronger hands.

A number of states also emerged during and after the mfecane, e.g., the Sotho kingdom under Moshweshwe –these managed to build a very strong state until Moshweshwe's death in the early 1870s. amonh the Tswana, Khama's Ngwato people also remained a force to reckon with until the British invasion. There were also the Pedi under Sekhukhune, which became the strongest state among the Tswana until the coming of the British.

Another state that arose out of the crisis was that of the Swazi. In southern Mozambique there was the Gaza state under Soshangane who eventually succumbed to Portuguese pressure in the 1890s. There was also Mzilikazi and the Ndebele and other minor states of the Xhosa, Tengwe and the Mpondo. The Zulu state itself survived the death of Tshaka in 1828 and remained a very powerful state in spite of the pressure caused by the British. It also survived the overthrow of Dingane in 1838 and under another leader, Mpande, the Zulu managed to survive without military confrontation from the British. It was finally destroyed in 1879 when Cetshwayo was defeated by the British at Rorke's Drift.

Topic 6

JMDGwezhira

THE NDEBELE STATE

Background

It was one of the products of the mfecane. They had fled from Tshaka in 1823 when the leader of the Khumalo, Mzilikazi, who was a chief under Tshaka, refused to surrender cattle he had gone to raid on behalf of Tshaka. After indications that Tshaka would destroy the whole Khumalo chiefdom, Mzilikazi decided to flee with his people, at the time reckoned to number around 300 people. R Brown says that when Mzilikazi fled from Tshaka and settled north of the Drakensburg mountain in the mid-1820, he was accompanied by a tribal following numbering only a few hundred. Subsequently, to increase the security of the state, other fighters from Zululand were incorporated by force, as well as thousands of Sotho and Tswana captives and volunteers.
While they were moving further across the Limpopo it led to the assimilation in varying degrees of large numbers of former inhabitants of the Rozvi Empire.
It is difficult to estimate the size of the Matabeleland society by the 1830s but it is generally believed that the whole population numbered about 100,000 and the army comprised about 15-20% of that. About 60% of the population was believed to comprise of incorporated groups either under voluntary tributary status or reluctant tribute payers whose payment of tribute had to be enforced in some instances.
It is also known that the authority of the Ndebele in the outer areas of the state was fluid, either expanding or regressing.
It is also debatable why the Ndebele moved further from north of the Drakensburg on to Zimbabwe. Cobbing attributes this to pressure from the Cape whites which gave stimulus to the Ndebele movements. The Ndebele undoubtedly faced numerous challenges during their move from the Drakensburg up until the time they settled on the Zimbabwe Plateau. For instance, in 1837 to 1838 they were defeated by the Boers and a punitive Zulu expedition respectively. This resulted in a hurried move to the north.
When they settled on the Zimbabwe Plateau the Ndebele military prowess and discipline were famed throughout Southern Africa. When they arrived on the plateau they were a formidable opponent of the Rozvi. The Shona were generally disunited and easily fell victim to their attackers like the Ndebele. As Samkange argues that Mzilikazi was not immediately challenged because the Shona had not recovered from the Zwangendaba plunder when Mzilikazi arrived on the plateau. N Bhebhe also contends that the Shona's chief weakness, which was exploited by Mzilikazi, was the fact that they were riven by petty jealousies and rivalries which hampered any chance of any united Shona action.

The Ndebele Economy

There have been a lot of arguments about the exact nature of the Ndebele economy. A lot of writers have argued that their economy was based on raiding of neighbours, but any such generalisation is erroneous. While the Ndebele did in fact raid their neighbours they also had other economic activities. They engaged in agriculture, livestock raising and even hunting, just like other states on the plateau.

1. Cultivation

The Ndebele practised farming. Proof of the Ndebele penchant for cultivation is found in the fact that the main part of their diet was grain. About 80% of the crops grown in the Ndebele state were millet varieties or maize, so it is fair to argue that the emphasis given by some historians on cattle raiding is misplaced. Rev

Thomas M Thomas, as quoted in R Palmer (Land and Discrimination in Rhodesia), wrote in the 1870s that during the rainy season the Ndebele fields would be found full of crops except in times of trouble.

The Ndebele also grew water melons, sugar cane, pumpkins, groundnuts, sweet potatoes and many other crops. Cotton was also common but was not very important. This was probably because of the following reasons;

a) Ndebele trade was not developed enough to make cash crops more important than food crops.
b) The Ndebele were still practising barter trade for which they exchanged crops and other items. The Ndebele are also known to have practised a form of shifting cultivation since the fields became exhausted after 4 to 5 years.

Cultivation among the Ndebele was a family rather than a village or community activity. Some historians have wrongly asserted that the people worked for and on behalf of the king. However, there were instances when the people would work for the king in his fields especially for the *isiphala senkosi* (king's granary) or as payment of tribute. Although the king owned all the land, in theory, in practice he also had his allocation of fields to farm in.

2. Pastoralism/Livestock raising

It was also another important branch of the economy. Cattle occupied a very important place in the cultural and economic spheres of the Ndebele. This is shown by the fact that the whole Ndebele kingdom was organised to protect both the grazing areas and fields. Cobbing says that raiding was partly designed to steal cattle from the neighbours.

After the 1893 Anglo-Ndebele war the Europeans progressively destroyed the Ndebele system by destroying its cattle-owning system. In 1894 the British South Africa Company even abolished private ownership of cattle.

During the rule of Mzilikazi and Lobengula individuals had their own cattle which they could use for many purposes like paying tribute, slaughtering for meat, bride price and also as a status symbol. The king had the largest herd of cattle which he acquired through different means and ways. Culturally cattle could also be used as a form of bride price and slaughtered at functions such as wedding ceremonies and at births and deaths.

Politically the cattle were also important in that ownership of cattle would mean ownership of wealth and control of political power. The number of cattle one possessed also determined how close one would be to the royal lineage. It therefore became the objective of every man to own cattle. Cattle were also used in the production of shields, whips and hides for clothing.

A major objective of raiding was to use the enemy cattle to replenish the national herd. It was a form of cattle imperialism. There were two types of cattle ownership;

a) That which involved full ownership
b) That which involved extensive rights but falling short of ownership in a legal sense (*ukulagisa)*

Full ownership would come about in situations where the king would reward his people for certain very pleasing tasks and services, like those who would have brought gold or royal animal skins to the king. In

times of plenty where they would have been full replenishment of the national herd the king would at times assign individuals to hold certain herds in trust for him.

The individuals would not claim a full degree of ownership but the advantage would be that they would use the cattle but not slaughter. The king's cattle or communal cattle would be given to the new *amabutho* by the king on the formation of a new age group. The *amajaha* were normally used by the king for hunting expeditions. The king would also send the *amajaha* in large groups to hunt for royal bucks for the royal family. More hunting was however done by individuals or smaller groups from one family.

3. Manufacturing

This was another important economic activity. Articles manufactured by the Ndebele included those made of iron, clothing and pottery but iron products were the most important because they needed spears and other weapons, agricultural implements and as payment of bride price. Iron working for the Ndebele could never be a laborious activity because they were Bantu. However, iron working among the Ndebele should not be looked at in the same context as the wide-scale iron working engaged in by other Bantu people elsewhere in Africa.

4. Trade

There were basically to types of trade –long-distance/external and local/external trade;

a) Internal trade was conducted between members of the Ndebele state. Products such as iron implements, grain, milk or snuff were traded. This was in all cases barter trade, meaning that no money of any form was exchanged.
b) External trade was that conducted between the Ndebele and other neighbouring states like the Shona, the Tswana and also even the Portuguese, the Dutch and the British at the Mozambican coasts and at the South African coasts like the Cape and Delagoa Bay. The Ndebele traded their livestock for grain when droughts occurred, as they usually did in their part of the plateau.
   Because the Ndebele blacksmiths could not sufficiently meet the needs of the people for iron products, some had to buy these from people like the Karanga who were good at iron smelting. Trade relations involving local products in exchange for western goods were established, especially between 1840 and 1859 when the Mzilikazi desperately wanted to acquire firearms to defend his kingdom against the Boers.
   The need to defend his country against the Boers forced Mzilikazi to be involved in trade for firearms with the Portuguese on the Zambezi. The irony is that while he hated Boer imperialism, his orientation towards the Portuguese seemed to welcome them. The Ndebele also traded for Indian goods like calico cloth. This type of Indian cloth was at times paid as tribute to the Ndebele king by some Shona groups. The Ndebele also exchanged ivory for sloth. Some south-western Shona groups sometimes used the Ndebele as middlemen to sell their gold for goods, British percussions and guns so as to replace the flint-lock guns of the Portuguese. The Ndebele made this switch as well.
   Subsequent Ndebele trade with South African whites was in a big way facilitated by the coming in of missionaries from South Africa. The result of this trade was the proliferation of firearms in the Ndebele kingdom and the development of beads as a currency. Because of the centralised nature of the Ndebele

state the king benefitted most from this trade. He used some of his purchases to reward the indunas so as to ensure loyalty.

Ordinary people were also involved in trade by exchanging their grain produce, handicrafts, vegetables, tobacco, spears and war axes for beads and strips of calico cloth. Firearms and ammunition and beads which were in fact western articles could also be used to pay bride price. Ivory was the most lucrative export of the Ndebele.

Before the introduction of firearms the Ndebele never hunted for elephants as individuals. The king was directly in charge of the activity. He as an individual had the largest pile of ivory which he usually exchanged for guns,. The ordinary Ndebele therefore did not really benefit from this long distance trade of ivory. This situation prevailed until 1868 when Mzilikazi died. The Ndebele also traded for dagga (mbanje) with the San.

The period after Mzilikazi's death, up to 1893 saw greater participation of the Ndebele in elephant hunting as individuals, ivory trade itself, and the reaping of profits from this trade. This can be explained by the proliferation of arms. During this period royal monopoly over chief commodities came to an end with the demise of ivory trade in the Ndebele state.

The Europeans with whom the Ndebele traded now focused their attention on Ndebele cattle. The traders would also bring into the country more goods than could be absorbed by the king alone. The number of wagons bringing merchandise had increased from 2 to 3 annually in the 1860s to about 20 annually in the 1870s.

Blankets and clothing were beginning to dominate the Ndebele imports and according to R Stokes, by 1872 the king was said to be "invariably well-dressed in European clothes." Ordinary people and indunas were participating in large numbers. As early as 1873 most people were reported to be wearing clothes. Some wealthy indunas were purchasing guns, something which could easily be a threat to the power of the king.

5. Raiding

This is still a contentious issue among historians. Most have now discarded the theory that the Ndebele were heavily dependent on raiding for economic sustenance. R Brown says that the Ndebele social and economic organisation depended on continual success on war against their neighbours. He says that the Ndebele raided for cattle and food in order to strengthen their military ranks and the population in general. By the 1880s there was an evident feeling among the Ndebele that the existing raiding grounds were more or less worked out roughly around the same time the increasing supply of guns in the interior had begun to make the Ndebele raiding parties less invincible. By the end of that decade the Ndebele relied heavily on cattle raided from neighbours.

Young men were raided from the surrounding communities in order to boost the population. Because of the above reasons it cannot be said that raiding and plundering were the power of the Ndebele economy once they arrived on the plateau

When they finally settled on the Zimbabwe plateau raiding was minimal because;

a) On their way to Zimbabwe the Ndebele were always mobile and therefore could not engage in farming.
b) Since cattle raiding went hand in hand with raiding for women and young men, when they settled in Zimbabwe this was no longer necessary.

Zimbabwe on the eve of Colonial Rule

There was no Zimbabwe, just a kingdom of Lobengula in the south-western parts of the plateau and some Shona chiefdoms in the east and north-east. Lobengula's influence reached to other parts of what is today known as Zimbabwe, that is, Masvingo, Murehwa and Nemakonde among others. There was coerced and voluntary tribute payment. Some chiefdoms of the Shona willingly paid tribute to Lobengula while others had to pay when raided or simply out of fear that they could be raided. On the eve of colonisation there were various whites at Lobengula's court –traders, hunters, missionaries, prospectors and concession-seekers.

a) Missionaries

Lobengula's father, Mzilikazi had already made friendship with a missionary, Robert Moffat, in the 1830s. The missionaries wanted to be allowed to preach the gospels. In 1859 Mzilikazi allowed them to build a mission at Inyathi but stressed that they would be closely monitored. The London Missionary Society was the most influential in the Ndebele state. In fact Mzilikazi reluctantly gave them permission to establish a mission at Inyathi in the southern area of the state because he believed they wanted to interfere in the politics of the state.

John Moffat admitted as such when he said that "there is no blinking the fact that the tendency of Christianity is to overturn native governments. The missionaries themselves largely failed in their endeavours to convert the Ndebele. However, some Ndebele were converted to Christianity but they were very insignificant.

Rev Thomas M Thomas reported some successes at Siloh in the 1880s. According to N Bhebhe, by 1900 however, it is estimated that less than ten people had been converted to Christianity in the whole of the Ndebele state. The reason was that the missionaries were not allowed direct access to the people when preaching. In some cases they had to preach while people were located about 100 metres away from them.

As a result of the reluctance of Ndebele leaders to grant missionaries reasonable access to the ordinary people, missionaries became ardent fans of Cecil John Rhodes. It is crucial to note that Rev Charles D Helm assisted as translator in the negotiations between Lobengula and Rhodes' representatives which led to the signing of the Rudd Concession.

b) Traders

Most of them were coming to sell their wares and go back to South Africa and Mozambique. Basically the Ndebele had been willing traders with the whites but almost always looked at them with suspicion. It was only around the 1880s that small numbers of traders settled permanently in Matabeleland. Traders like Fairburn and Dawson actually set up bazaars (stores) in the state.

These had to pay huge bribes in order to stay in the king's capital. The king is reported to have frequently helped himself to their goods without payment. According to R Brown, when Rhodes came he found them on their last legs, so broke that he had to subsidize them although he had other motives apart from helping them to stay afloat.

c) Hunters

These were coming to hunt and go back with trophies. They never stayed in the country. Hunters arrived roughly around the same time as traders. By the 1870-80s Fredrick C Selous and Thomas Baines had roamed most of the plateau looking for hunting trophies.

d) Prospectors

Gold and diamonds had been discovered at Kimberley and Witwatersrand in 1874 and rumours spread that the belt spread out to the Transvaal and north of the Limpopo. The prospectors had been asking Lobengula to go and dig some minerals in areas that were deemed to be under his control. Generally Lobengula had no wish to grant the prospectors anything in Matabeleland or parts of Mashonaland under his control. In 1870 he gave some whites a concession to mine at Tati which was definitely not under his control and was also claimed by Khama, the Tswana king.

While Lobengula feared to give an outright refusal to give whites mining areas he wanted to buy time by putting obstacles in the way of concession-seekers. Frank Johnson's concession seeking group was in 1887 lucky to leave Matabeleland with only a fine after they were found to have collected gold without permission.

e) Concession-seekers

These were coming out of an era of change in Europe. They were looking for colonies. According to the Marxist theory of Lenin, Europe had reached its highest stage of economic development and would change to imperialism in Africa because Latin America and Asia had already been taken and shared among European states.

According to the colonial rules arising out of the Berlin Colonial Conference, in order for a colony to be recognised internationally, European power had to show that they had acquired permission from an African chief or king to take over the area, that is, a concession or treaty. It was in an endeavour to fulfil this condition that in 1888 three European men were sent by the Cape Prime Minister, CJ Rhodes, to Lobengula's court.

The three men, Charles Dunell Rudd, Francis Robert Thompson and Rochford Maguire were assisted in the negotiations by Rev CD Helm, a frustrated London Missionary Society priest who had for over 25 years failed to convert the Ndebele people to Christianity.

Rhodes' dream was to get British rule from Cape to Cairo. Unfortunately for him, most parts of Africa along the way had already been taken by other European powers.

Topic 7

JMDGwezhira

COLONISATION OF ZIMBABWE

Background

The Ndebele state was one of the last independent states in the region. Missionaries were all around Lobengula and had their own attitude towards the indigenous people. By the 1880s, the majority of them began to find the option of Ndebele colonisation actually desirable. This was mainly due to their failure to convert more than a handful of the Ndebele to Christianity. One missionary, John Moffat, wrote at the time that "the Ndebele are a miserable people and have made myriads of their neighbours miserable too. It will be a blessing to the world when they (the Ndebele) are broken up."
In the mid-1880s, the Ndebele king was aware that Europeans were about to descend on his kingdom. He had heard of the Boers in South Africa, the Germans in German South West Africa, and the Portuguese in the east. He was, quite clearly, encircled now. The Portuguese had coloured on the map territory from Mozambique to Angola, claiming that it was all under them, which was basically untrue.
At the same time, the British had a High Commissioner in South Africa who was very influential and was active in pursuit of the colonisation of Matabeleland and Mashonaland. At the time the British were attempting to get a concession from Lobengula the High Commissioner was Sir Hercules Robinson.
After the Tati Concession which Lobengula signed with the British in 1870, Lobengula signed three other treaties that culminated in the colonisation of Mashonaland in 1980, and his state by the beginning of 1894.

The Tati Concession 1870

In 1870, Lobengula had signed the Tati Concession with John Swinbourne. The Concession gave Swinbourne the right to search for gold and other minerals on the tract of land situated at the extreme south west of the country between the Shashi and Ramaquabane Rivers. Very little came out of this concession. The land in question was located in a disputed area between the Tswana and Ndebele peoples.



The Grobler Treaty 1887

In 1887, Piet Grobler, a Boer from the Transvaal state in South Africa, was sent by his president, Paul Kruger, to negotiate a treaty with Lobengula. Lobengula was clearly feeling the heat. In 1885, a British mission had been sent to inform him that his neighbour, Khama, king of the Tswana/Ngwato, had just accepted British protection.

Reverend William Sykes of the Inyathi Mission station told him over and over again that gold had been found in his country and that whites were determined to mine it. He was also told that if he tried to resist them, the gold seekers would not hesitate to destroy his power by force of arms, arms whose potency he knew well enough to fear them.

Lobengula then signed a treaty with Grobler with the following terms;

a) There would be everlasting peace between the Ndebele and the South African Boer Republics, namely the Orange Free State and the Transvaal.
b) Boers recognised Lobengula as a paramount chief and that he would be an ally.
c) Lobengula was to provide military assistance to the Boers whenever he was called upon to do so.
d) Lobengula agreed to catch and send back all criminals who would have escaped from the South African republics.

e) Hunters and traders from the South African Republics would be allowed to operate in Lobengula's kingdom without hindrance.
f) The South African Republics would provide and appoint a Consul who would settle in Lobengula's kingdom. The Consul would administer justice, among other functions to citizens of the Boer republics who might violate Lobengula's laws.

Although Lobengula later renounced the treaty citing that he had not understood its meaning, the Transvaal government proceeded to appoint Piet Grobler as its Consul in Lobengula's state. Grobler did not last in his position; he died while going to collect his family in Transvaal.

The Moffat Treaty –February 1888

One of the main players in colonisation at this time was John Smith Moffat, a missionary whose father, Robert Moffat, had been a friend of Lobengula's father, Mzilikazi. As a result of this friendly background, Lobengula trusted Moffat as a family friend. After realising that the Boers now had an upper hand in Matabeleland, Cecil John Rhodes despatched Moffat to go and sign a treaty with Lobengula. The treaty essentially cancelled the Grobler Treaty. On 11 February 1888, the Moffat Treaty was signed between Lobengula and Moffat. The terms of the treaty were as follows;

a) Lobengula renounced the Grobler treaty.
b) The treaty also professed everlasting peace and friendship between the Ndebele and the British.
c) Lobengula promised not to enter into any agreement, correspondence or treaty with another foreign power in relation to his kingdom without the permission of the British.

The Rudd Concession –October 1888

Rhodes did not necessarily like the Moffat Treaty in its current form. In fact he loathed both the Moffat Treaty and the Grobler Treaty. He, being an adventurer and an avowed colonialist, did not want the area between the Limpopo and the Zambezi Rivers taken by anyone else. It was his primary intention to extend the British Empire. Rhodes' competition was from his countrymen who came to Lobengula's court for concessions.
Rhodes was determined to find the legendary ***King Solomon's Mines*** which he thought were somewhere on the Zimbabwe Plateau. In 1884 the Bechuanaland had already become a British Protectorate. There was in that territory a company operating on behalf of the British government, Gifford-Couston Company. Gifford and Couston had also sent an emissary, EF Maund to Lobengula to negotiate for a concession.
They had found that the Bechuanaland mineral resources were not the *Eldorado* that they believed. While this company and others elsewhere needed money and were financed by banks in England, Rhodes had his own money and could fund his own expeditions. However, he was not well-known in Britain and the British Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury thought he was pro-Boer.
Rhodes' advantage was that he was on the ground in Southern Africa and did not need to depend on reports from explorers. His objective became one of a concession from Lobengula. Lobengula was a shrewd, clever

man but Rhodes wanted a concession by any means necessary. He therefore sent three gentlemen with various skills to Lobengula's court;

a) Charles Dunnell Rudd, a businessman and member of the Cape Parliament
b) Francis Robert Thompson who had grown up next to Africans and was an expert in Africa customs, psychology and languages. He worked for Rhodes in Kimberley and also spoke fluent Tswana, which Lobengula also spoke.
c) James Rochford Maguire who had been a student at Gifford like Rhodes.

When he was looking for a Royal Charter after the signing of the Concession, Rhodes bribed some British government officials and this gave him a huge advantage.

The High Commissioner, Robinson, wrote an introductory letter for the three emissaries of Rhodes, complete with a government seal. They wanted to impress Lobengula. Rhodes also courted the assistance of Moffat. Rudd and his mates spend about six weeks trying to persuade Lobengula, who by now had a clear idea that the whites were trying to get his state. His great misfortune was that Kimberley and Witwatersrand mines in South African were not producing as much as the whites wanted. Word spread that Lobengula's kingdom had the Second Rand (belt of gold).

When Lobengula's indunas got wind of what the three white men wanted they called for an indaba to question them. According to A Davidson, the three claimed that they represented the Great White Queen, thereby arousing the curiosity of the Ndebele. The indunas were worried about the whites staying for long in the state. While Lobengula did not want to sign a concession, he also could not openly refuse.

The indunas were pressing him to get rid of the whites but he knew by experience that killing the three whites would invite retribution for him. When the indunas continued to pester him, R. Brown (The Zambesian Past) says that he told them that the whites were his friends, and that since the indunas were afraid of the whites he could call the whites to assist him against the indunas. Among the indunas, Lobengula had a few notable supporters like Lotshe Hlabangana, Gambu Sithole, Sikombo Mguni, Magwegwe and Faku Dhliso. The motives of these people in supporting the king in search for peaceful relations with the whites are difficult to establish.

Late in October, Thompson called Lotshe and Lobengula into a hut where they conversed in Tswana. It is not clear what they discussed, but when he came out, Lobengula had a change of heart and agreed to sign the Rudd Concession.

Terms of the Rudd Concession

The whites promised Lobengula the following;

1) That he and his successors would receive a monthly allowance of 100 pounds sterling for an unspecified period.
2) Lobengula would receive 1000 rifles and 100,000 rounds of ammunition.
3) An armed steam boat to patrol the Zambezi, or in place of that, 500 pounds sterling.

There were also some verbal terms of the treaty;

4) The whites would dig only one 'hole' in Mashonaland and return to their country.
5) Only 10 white men would enter the Lobengula's country.
6) They would surrender their guns on entry would abide by Lobengula's laws, and in fact be his people.

The verbal terms were just that, and were not written on the Concession document itself. Reverend Charles D Helm, a London Missionary Society priest based in the Ndebele state, was used as the translator during the negotiations. When he was questioned later on by his superiors in the LMS, Helm informed them of the interpretation of the concession which he gave to Lobengula, which he said included the following; "the grantees Rudd and Company) promised Lobengula that they would be bringing not more than 10 men to work in his country, that they would not dig anywhere near towns and that their people were to abide by Lobengula's laws and in fact be his people." According to N. Bhebe, it was this promise which got Rudd the concession. "If this was all that was needed to save his nation from violent destruction, then he was ready to sign the document."

It would seem that Lobengula was naïve to have agreed to the promise that only ten men would enter the country but he was not naïve. He knew this was possible and practical. The mines at Tati had been operating on such basis since 1870. It is therefore fair to conclude that while Lobengula was duped into believing Rudd's word, he was definitely not stupid. Davidson also casts the blame for the signing of the Rudd Concession on Helm. He argues that Helm deliberately recorded and translated lies and was in fact paid to do so by Rhodes. He uses as evidence the fact that Helm, on a visit to South Africa later on, stayed in a house rented for him by Rhodes.

When Lobengula found this information, Helm was tried and banned from being a missionary although he was allowed to stay in the Ndebele state as a trader.

The missionaries took sides because they were angry that they had generally failed to convert the Ndebele, which they blamed on the administrative model and political hierarchy of the State. Brown argues that "it is clear that there is a difference between Lobengula's understanding of the Concession and Rhodes' intended use of it".

Rudd let the Ndebele state as soon as the treaty was signed because he was aware of the chaos that would ensue when Lobengula discovered the actual meaning of the concession. Two weeks after the concession was signed, Maund, and agent of Gifford, who also wanted a treaty, advised the king to seek protection from the Queen or an alliance with her against the Portuguese. He was given two Ndebele envoys to accompany him to London.

Bhebe argues that the main mission of Maund was to put pressure on Rhodes to also give his company a share in the mineral rights, which he succeeded in doing. Meanwhile, Lobengula, having confirmed that he had indeed sold away his country, embarked on numerous courses of action. Firstly, under pressure from his people, he killed Lotshe who had advised him to sign the concession. He also sent two envoys, Babejane and Mshete, to London to get the original concession from Rhodes. Rhodes had them delayed at the Cape while he rushed to London to get a Royal Charter from Queen Victoria, the ruler of the British Empire. The Royal Charter was permission and endorsement by the British to put the Concession into action.

Lobengula's other response was to try and publish a notice in newspapers cancelling the Rudd Concession. Most newspapers, being owned by allies of Rhodes, refused to publish the notice. The only one which agreed was a small-town newspaper in Bechuanaland whose influence was weak. As a result of Lobengula's failure to have the Rudd Concession cancelled, in October 1889, Queen Victoria granted Rhodes the Royal Charter.

Under the Charter, Rhodes was obliged to form a company for the purpose of carrying out the colonisation of the territory on the Zimbabwe plateau. He formed the British South Africa Company (BSAC). The provision for him to form a company was a result of a new policy proposed by the British PM, Lord Salisbury. He

argued that Britain could not continue to bear the expenses of colonialism. He felt that it was necessary to subcontract duties to Concessionaire companies or Chartered companies which could fund their own occupations on behalf of the British government.

However, if the interests of the companies were threatened, the British government would be ready to send British soldiers to defend them. From about 1890 therefore Britain was controlling large chunks of Africa through companies and the BSAC was the largest of them all.

In order to come up with this company Rhodes used a motley collection of influential people including government officials. In spite of that fact, he faced opposition from many sections of the society, especially missionaries in Britain itself. The Aborigines Protection Society was also opposing him. In his application for the Charter, Rhodes promised that his company would do the following;

a) Preserve peace and order in the territory and abolish any form of slavery and domestic servitude or slave trade.
b) Regulate traffic in intoxicating liquor.
c) Not interfere with the religion of any class of people or tribe in the area.
d) Pay regard to the customs and laws of the natives and to preserve/protect elephants and other game in the territories.
e) The company was given the right to organise administrative machinery and it was to have its own police force and establish a shareholding company.
f) The company to have the power to grant land rights for use over definite periods or in perpetuity.
g) The Company would give concessions for mining and timber exploitation.
h) Establish settlements anywhere near the said territories.

Meanwhile, in order to offset the effects of the Rudd Concession, Lobengula granted Edward Lippert a concession. The Lippert Concession, as opposed to the Rudd Concession which gave mineral rights, gave Lippert the right to lay out towns, grant land leases for definite periods or in perpetuity. This land granted by Lippert could be for any purpose, including building towns and cities, and farming. Lobengula's game was sent off target when Rhodes bought the Lippert Concession. The grand effect of this was that Rhodes now had concessions for both the land and the minerals. Both concessions applied to Mashonaland, which Lobengula was arguably not paramount of.

The company, with everything in the bag, proceeded to prepare its own flag and court of arms which had the motto, "Justice, Commerce and Freedom". The Charter had given Rhodes control of an area larger than England itself. The British had also given in the Charter both Matabeleland and Mashonaland, which was more than what the Rudd Concession intended. The Charter had given a state within a company. Soon after getting the Charter Rhodes sent his friend, Leander Starr Jameson to Lobengula to ask him for permission to go through his kingdom on the way to Mashonaland.

According to Bhebe, Lobengula called an indaba of his chiefs to discuss the question. Although they advised the king to accept the guns promised in the Concession, they refused to grant the road. Instead they authorised him to arrange to give Rhodes a place to mine near the Ramakobane. The king also hinted that he would allow the Column to pass on condition that Rhodes himself came up to discuss matters with him. Rhodes refused to do, but proceeded with preparations to occupy Mashonaland. Lobengula distrusted anyone associated with Rhodes but he had no choice but to like Jameson when he treated him for gout.

There were also secret plans to attack and kill Lobengula and then tell the world that he had been planning to kill Khama, who had already signed a protection treaty with the British. Lobengula later relented but asked that the column should come through Bulawayo.

The Pioneer Column

Preparations were made by Rhodes for the recruitment of a pioneer force that would found a settlement in Mashonaland. The selection was carried out with considerable care. Rhodes insisted that every member of the expedition should have had South African experience, and that a good number should be Dutch/Afrikaners/Boers, whom he knew to be very good farmers.

Two hundred whites were then chosen from about 2000 applications. Most of them were still below 30 years of age and included people specialised in trades such as would be needed to start a new community, e.g., bakers, blacksmiths, printers, carpenters, storekeepers, farmers and miners. The Pioneer Column was led by Major Frank Johnson. Four hundred armed men, commanded by Colonel Graham Pennefather, were to accompany the column for further security.

The expedition was well-equipped, its supplies amounting to 117 wagon loads and herds of cattle to be driven alongside. During the march, each trooper in the column was to receive as payment 7shillings and six pence per day. On arrival in Mashonaland, each would get a 3000 acre farm anywhere he desired, and peg up to 15 gold claims. Rhodes had told them, “stay with me and I will send you home a millionaire.”

According to AJ Wills, after raising the Union Jack at Fort Salisbury, Lobengula protested against the activities of the pioneers. Parcels of land were being allocated to settlers thereby revealing the true nature of Rhodes’ enterprise. The column avoided Bulawayo. The reason is not clear but it seems they wanted to avoid clashes with Lobengula as they had broken promises made to him. Instead of only ten men, the number that came numbered well over a thousand including the men provided by Khama.

The invasion force wanted to impress upon the indigenous people that they had power. They had storm lights that were bright at night, something the blacks had never seen before. Fredrick Courtney Selous, assisted by Francis Thompson, guided the column. Selous was an experienced Savanna hunter who had roamed the plateau while Thomson was an expert in the native languages and customs and was expected to be helpful.

The column built forts as security bases along the way –Fort Tuli, Victoria, Charter and on 12 September 1890 they arrived at Harare Kopje where they established Fort Salisbury. They next day they raised the British flag, the Union Jack. The forts were military defence outposts and every night they set up defensive laagers (squares) made up of wagons. Along the way the Column faced a lot of problems. They were hit by blackwater fever, which quinine and ram failed to cure. Lions also menaced the animals drawing the wagons.

<u>Was Lobengula naïve to sign the Rudd Concession?</u>

When he was offered guns by Rudd and company Lobengula thought he had gone a long way towards solving his problems. On one hand he was to receive powerful guns which could be used if Boers, the Portuguese and his internal rivals threatened him. This was to come at the cost of only ten men who were to be under his laws. According to E. Stokes , after the indunas had repeatedly given him hell following the

signing of the Rudd Concession, Lobengula told them, "you say you are afraid of the white men's guns. If you give me problems I will call them. They are my friends." This goes to show how much importance he attached to guns.

Lobengula was not entirely wrong to assume that only ten men could carry out mining activities. The mine at Tati had been running with little disruptions under the same circumstances since 1869. There were also a number of people in Lobengula's kingdom that also favoured acceptance of at least one group of whites in order to forestall others.

a) Lotshe, besides being bribed by whites in order to influence the king, is also credited with an acute awareness of the white men's superior military powers. He advised the king to come to an agreement similar to that between Khama and the British.
b) Gampu Sithole also supported accommodation of whites in the Ndebele state. He had travelled through Botswana and had observed how their chief, Khama, was saving his people from violent defeat by accepting a mild political control and allowing western customs.
c) The king must also have found backers among those longing for the destruction or modification of the Ndebele society. These people desired modification because they wanted peace. They were fed up with the constant warfare and loss of life for which the Ndebele had become known.
d) In addition, people with means of trading with white people supported the king's peaceful policies towards white penetration. Those who opposed his policies within the kingdom were mainly his long-time enemies who had never accepted his leadership after the succession crisis of 1868-70.
    (i) Old survivors of Mzilikazi's rule. They were opposed to anything that threatened to change the Ndebele way of life. They pointed out that gold existed in the country, not for Europeans, but for Africans to sell.
    (ii) Traditional diviners and other doctors whose very existence depended on the traditional way of life. Hlengisani in particular knew fully well that if the Ndebele system were to be destroyed he would lose the handsome he was getting from the king for doctoring the army before and after each raid.
    (iii) A substantial number of young married and unmarried men who had never been to the white towns of Kimberly and Johannesburg and thus had no idea of military power opposed the king's accommodation of whites. They saw the king's peaceful policies as based on cowardice and would have nothing to do with them.

Topic 8

JMDGwezhira

THE ANGLO-NDEBELE WAR (WAR OF DISPOSSESSION) 1893-4

Causes of the War

1. The BSAC justified the war against the Ndebele on the grounds that the Ndebele were a bloodthirsty people who always aspired to kill their neighbours at the slightest provocation. They took as evidence the fact that the Ndebele had continued to raid the Shona chiefs even after the whites' arrival on the scene in 1890. Some chiefs like Nemakonde abd Chivi were killed for refusing to continue paying tribute to the Ndebele because they believed they were now under another authority, the BSAC. The raid on chiefs Bere and Gomara, which we shall deal with in detail later, was taken as evidence that the Ndebele needed to be stopped sooner rather than later.
   Ndebele aggression and cruelty to the Shona, played down and generally ignored between 1890 and 1893, were now played up. Rutherford Harris, the BSAC Secretary and propaganda chief, wrote piously that the problem between the BSAC and Lobengula was not one about gold, land or taxes, but "the unfortunate slave or MaHoli". He was referring in this instance to the Shona, commonly called the Hole by the Ndebele. Details of all previous raids on the Shona were now compiled. Missionaries'' letters calling for intervention on behalf of the Shona, up until now ignored, were now sent to the British press.
   According to Wills, when Moffat wrote from Bulawayo to deny that Lobengula had any aggressive intention, and to denounce Company preparations for war, Moffat's letters of 1890 in which he predicted and welcomed such a war were publicised. Harris set about convincing the world that Lobengula was preparing to invade Mashonaland and that the Company's preparations were defensive.

2. Lobengula realised that the whites had cheated him and thus just wanted them out of the country. He had failed to persuade the world that he had not given his country to Rhodes. The occupation of Mashonaland, theoretically granted by Lobengula, was in fact carried out against his bitter opposition. The occupation also game as the climax of a series of events in which the Ndebele aristocracy felt themselves to have been deceived systematically by Rhodes. Wills says that "the Ndebele aristocracy regarded the war of 1893 as an unjustified and unprovoked attack upon a monarchy who had gone to almost humiliating ends to avoid war with the whites".
3. There was the issue of grazing lands between the Zambezi and the Limpopo. The area occupied by the Ndebele was very suitable for ranching, being general lowveld. The BSAC saw in the herds and the lands of the Ndebele a prize richer than anything to be won in Mashonaland.
4. The absence of gold in Mashonaland led to a sharp fall in the value of the Company's shares. Rumour was carefully spread that Lobengula's kingdom stood on a hill of gold and that the Company's fortunes could be revived if his kingdom was taken. Mining prospects were thought to be at least favourable, and communication with South Africa through Matabeleland was easier.
   Hopes circulating in London helped to reconcile anxious shareholders to the war and to persuade them to double the share capital of the Company. It has been suggested that the Company's interest in the war was that it stood to increase the Company's value. According to Wills, Rhodes was closer to the truth when he told a shareholders meeting in London that, "we either had to have that war or to leave the country."
   LS Jameson, the Administrator of Mashonaland was also to say that "… a strike on Matabeleland will give us a tremendous lift in shares."

5. Some Ndebele indunas and amajaha (the young soldiers) who had no appreciation of the white men's military power, had been itching for a fight with the whites right from the beginning when the whites came

looking for concessions. They believed Lobengula had been wrong to allow them to go through to Mashonaland without a fight. The amajaha, especially, had to be restrained by Lobengula countless times as they even stalked the Pioneer Column on its way to Mashonaland. They were always asking him for permission to' wash' their spears with the blood of the whites.

6. The Victoria Incident

In early 1893, about 500m of telegraph wire was stolen by subjects under a Shona chief in the Fort Victoria area, Gomara. The BSAC demanded that either the culprits be surrendered or a fine be paid in form of cattle. After Gomara paid the fine, it turned out that the cattle in fact belonged to Lobengula. The BSAC returned the cattle and the matter was considered settled.
However, around the same time, another Shona chief, Bere, stole cattle belonging to Mgandani Dlodlo, a Ndebele chief in Shurugwi. Meetings were held in Bulawayo during which militants led by Mgandani demanded permission to go and recover the cattle. Lobengula was pressured to dispatch a regiment under Mgandani and Manyawo Ndiweni to deal with the errant Shona chiefs.
The impi (group of Ndebele soldiers) carried a letter to the BSAC officials in Fort Victoria, saying that they had no desire to molest the whites but, according to Bhebe, the message did not reach the whites until the raid was over. The effect of the raids was that the Shona fled for refuge to the fort and the work in surrounding farms and mines was disrupted. The leaders of the Ndebele impi, Mgandani and Manyawo, led their troops to the fort to demand that the Shona who had sought refuge be surrendered to be dealt with. Jameson was duly dispatched to Fort Victoria to try and deal with the disturbances. While initially he saw the raid as no cause for war and that the whites were not in gander, once in Fort Victoria Jameson changed his mind and now started agitating for war.
Jameson could hardly be blamed for his change of opinion. The difference between this raid and previous one was that it was the first to occur in an area occupied by the white settlers. Previous raids had been ignored largely because they had not actually seriously threatened white lives and property. Although the Victoria raid had not in practice threatened white lives, it did threaten the lives of their Shona labourers some of whom were killed. AJ Wills argues that "one could no longer take the killing of the Shona so calmly when it threatened the drying up of the labour supply." In fact, Jameson's telegram to Rhodes actually summed up the problem obtaining for the whites in Victoria, "…the serious part is that every native has deserted from the mines and farms."
Jameson recommended that the Ndebele be shot at to show the Shona that they were being protected, adding that, "unless some shooting is done, I think it will be difficult to get labour even after they have all gone." Jameson also said in the telegram that there had been so many cases of the Shona being killed even in the presence of their white masters that "the natives will not have confidence in the protection of the whites, unless we actually drive the Matabele out."
Consequently, the Ndebele were ordered to cross their border within two hours or they would be driven by force. Mgandani responded to this order by saying that,"very well, we shall be driven." When Captain Lendy followed them two hours later, to make sure they had crossed the border as ordered, he found the impi pillaging, looting from and killing Bere's people. Lendy and his men then fired into the group, killing a number of Ndebele warriors, including Mgandani. The matter might have ended there had Jameson not realised the chance presented by this incident to deal with the Ndebele once and for all.
He wrote that either compensation was demanded from Lobengula for the Victoria raid, or "we would go to Bulawayo." There was obvious pressure for a war against the Ndebele. As Jameson himself said, "we have an excuse for a row over murdered women and children now, and getting Matabeleland open will give us a tremendous lift in shares and everything else."

7. The Border Dispute

The Anglo-Ndebele war was also caused by the assertion of a border between Mashonaland and Matabeleland by Jameson. Not long after the assumption of this position by the BSAC Administration, Jameson began to lay traps for Lobengula. He asked the king to recognise a boundary between them, running along the Tokwe, Munyati and Mupfure Rivers. This was not only a provocative and dangerous suggestion to make to the king, but Lobengula could also not accept that border without risking a rebellion from his people.

Preparations for War

From the moment Lendy shot at the Ndebele warriors, things moved wuickly. Jameson and Rhodes knew that when it came ti the point of war with the Ndebele, there would be no shortage of volunteers eager to lay their hands on Ndebele cattle and land. On the other hand, despite the killing of members of his Victoria raid impi, Lobengula no more wanted war September 1893 than he had ever done; he knew the outcome of such a war.

But it was not a war he could avoid. Inevitably, the necessary incidents of the Ndebele firing on Company forces in the east and British forces in the south were reported. The High Commissioner gave permission for the advance on Matabeleland.

It has also been argued that the deaths caused by Captain Lendy on the Ndebele in Fort Victoria also made war inevitable. Lobengula complained that the white men seemed eager to drag him into a quarrel. Consequently, his first reaction was to recall an impi of 6,000 that had gone across the Zambezi for a raid on the Lozi. In September, Lobengula returned the current instalment of money paid according to the Rudd Concession, as well as the rifles and ammunition he had received. The move was calculated to display both his wish to avoid war and his disillusionment with Company policy.

In July 1893, after the Victoria incident, according to Bhebe, Jameson had already firly come down on the side of war. Hostilities were started by the Company and the final decision on that was Jameson's responsibility. He had now come to accept that peace and prosperity would never be possibly with a militant warrior nation on the border. He sensed relief and anxiety among the rank and file of the settlers that the crisis with the Ndebele, long foreseen, had arrived. This factor, rather than hopes of finding gold in the Ndebele state, unquestionably explains Jameson's decision to go to war.

Jameson and the BSAC started a spirited campaign to recruit volunteers to depose Lobengula. The volunteers were each promised 12 gold claims, 6,000 acres of land and a share of half the cattle which would be captured from Lobengula. According to Beverly White, a church service was held in Fort Victoria before the force departed for Matabeleland. The congregation sang the song, "Onward Christian soldiers." Reverend Sylvester delivered his sermon from a pupil fashioned out of ammunition cases and told the force that "the sons of Ham must be destroyed." Jameson was to say later that "all men of religion with whom I freely consulted agreed with me on every point."

Two columns of BSAC fighters set out for the Matabele, one from Fort Victoria and another from Salisbury. They hooked up at Iron Mine Hill in Shurugwi. These numbered about 6,000 whites and 2,000 Ngwato soldiers under Khama also marched from Botswana. About 500 British men and officers were also on standby in Botswana.

Course of the War

On 24 October 1893 about 5000 Ndebele soldiers were heavily beaten by the Company soldiers at Shangani River. They were clearly no match for the whites who were armed with modern weapons like machine guns

and the Maxim gun. In the second battle at Mbembesi River the Ndebele were again defeated and on NObember 4 Jameson and the troops entered Lobengula's capital, Bulawayo, triumphantly.
Lobengula had burnt his capital and fled northwards. In order to complete the defeat of the Ndebele it was decided to follow Lobengula and capture or kill him. A force under Major Patrick Forbes and Major Allan Wilson followed. Their pursuit of Lobengula resulted in Wilson and about forty other soldiers being massacred by the Ndebele.

Result of the War

1. The war ended in 1894 with the defeat of the Ndebele. Historians have called it a war of dispossession because after the war the Ndebele lost their leader Lobengula and their independence. The Ndebele monarchy was abolished and replaced by a white administration. Three of Lobengula's sons, who were potential successors to the throne, were taken by Rhodes to the Cape to be educated.
2. The Ndebele lost more than 90% of their cattle to the BSAC and the volunteers, about 80,000 beasts. The BSAC claimed that the cattle belonged to Lobengula and as he had been defeated, they had every right to take them.
3. The Ndebele also lost their land and were pushed to the dry reserves of Gwayi and Shangani.

Who Was to Blame for the Anglo-Ndebele War?

That the war broke out can be attributed to both sides. Each side contributed to the causation and ultimately the outbreak of hostilities in 1893.

<u>Lobengula's Blame</u>

1. He did not accept the whites as the new rulers in Mashonaland and thus continued to raid Shona chiefs. After the Victoria incident the whites decided they could no longer afford to watch Lobengula raid the Shona as they risked losing Shona labour.
2. The impi sent to Fort Victoria, led by Manyawo and Mugandani possibly overrated their military capabilities. It was naïve for them to believe that Shona refugees at Fort Victoria could be surrendered by the whites on demand so that the Ndebele could kill them. They were also unwise to have refused to cross their border within two hours as ordered by Captain Lendy.
3. The most naïve thing was the assumption by Lobengula that the killing of Shona people, who happened to be labourers of the white settlers, was not in itself molestation of the whites. After getting a report on the Victoria shootings, Lobengula wrote to Jameson arguing that the shooting of his men was unfair and provocative since none of the whites in Fort Victoria had been affected.
4. Lobengula also signalled a complete change in relations with the whites when he stopped taking his allowance and returned guns given under the Rudd Concession. Lobengula also ordered the return of his soldiers that had gone to raid the Lozi across the Zambezi River. If that was not a signal for war, then nothing was.

<u>The BSAC's Blame</u>

1. The BSAC wanted to exploit resources on the plateau without being disturbed or threatened. Their main mission in waging this war was to prop up the Company shares with gold that they believed or led shareholders to believe was in abundance in the Ndebele state. As Rhodes said, “we either had to have that war or to leave the country.” The whites also had to liquidate the militant Ndebele nation if they wanted to peacefully exploit Mashonaland.
2. It was wrong and provocative of Jameson to unilaterally set a boundary between Mashonaland and the Ndebele state when the Shona and Ndebele had never known any such frontiers. Lobengula could not observe this boundary and still retain the respect of his people.
3. The Victoria Incident was taken as an excuse to deal with the Ndebele once and for all. Jameson confirmed as such when he wrote in his telegram after the incident that, “we have an excuse for a row over murdered women and children…”

Topic 9

JMDGwezhira

THE FIRST CHIMURENGA/UMVUKELA 1 (1896-7)

There is a lot of controversy over the uprisings. T.O. Ranger, for instance, has been lambasted by other historian for having overstated the role and importance of spirit mediums in his book, **Revolt in Southern Rhodesia**. The main criticism comes from DN Beach and J Cobbing who deny that the spirit mediums had a major part in the war. In his article, "**The Absent Priesthood",** Cobbing denies that Kaguvi, Mkwati and Nehanda organised the risings. Beach ("**Nehanda: a woman unjustly accused")** says that Nehanda was not killed for playing a part in the risings but for ordering some people to kill Pollard, a white man in Mazowe.

Causes of the Uprisings

1. Police Brutality

After 1894 the Ndebele people were disarmed by force. In Matabeleland any African seen with a gun was shot on sight. Ranger says that the BSAC recruited its police force from among the warriors of Lobengula's old regiments. He argues that the Matabele Native Police composed of only the Matabele people. These policemen were used to assist Native Commissioners to collect labour, arrest deserters, procuring evidence in native cases and detective and police work in general.

The police proved to be a mistake as they became the tyrants of the countryside. At the Great Indaba with Rhodes soon after the war, an induna complained of ill-treatment and spoke of the brutality of Zulu police who ravished their daughters and respected no-one but the Native Commissioners. Ranger contends that "there's overwhelming evidence of the hatred with which they were regarded by the Ndebele, generally." In some cases the Company also employed white policemen who in some cases were former convicts in Britain or its dominions like Canada, Australia and New Zealand. These men were hard core criminals who could not be expected to treat Africans with kid gloves when it came to maintenance of law and order.

In a few cases Shona policemen were imposed on Matabeleland. These generally ill-treated the Ndebele in revenge for earlier raids. They were only removed at the instigation of Rhodes when the Ndebele cited it as a grievance of the uprising later on.

2. Natural Disasters

From 1894-6 the Zimbabwe plateau was hit by a series of natural disasters –locusts, drought and rinderpest. Rinderpest was livestock disease that ravaged the cattle and caused the death of a big number of them. The situation was made worse by the fact that the settlers, in order to try and control the disease, shot and killed the infected cattle or suspected of being infected. The Africans, whose economy was locked in their herds of cattle, naturally could not be persuaded of the need to do this, especially since they were then forced to burn or bury the killed cattle.

They were also not allowed to eat the cattle. At the same time the series of droughts meant that there was very little food to eat. The few crops that were grown either wilted or were finished off by the locusts which also deprived cattle of pastures. Spirit mediums like Mkwati, Umlugulu, Nehanda and Kaguvi advised the people that the misfortunes had come because ancestors were angry with the whites. They said that the plagues could only end when the whites were driven out.

3. The Jameson Raid 1895

It was one of the immediate causes of the war. On his last and fatal gamble, Leander S Jameson had led the great majority of the white police of Rhodesia into defeat and capture in the Transvaal. They had gone there to stir up an uprising against the Boer leaders of the state, but the uprising did not happen, and they were captured and imprisoned. As a result, in all of Matabeleland there were only 48 white police officers, and still fewer in Mashonaland. Rumour of this fiasco by Jameson travelled fast and the Shona and the Ndebele knew that this chance was the best they could ever get to fight and defeat the whites. For some weeks after the war started the Ndebele and the Shona were actually overrunning white settlement in outlying districts, killing dozens in the process. The BSAC only reversed this trend when they asked for reinforcements from South Africa and England. Only these reinforcements won the day for the settlers.

4. Taxation

From about 1893 the Company imposed a number of taxes on the black people. In 1894 the hut tax was introduced, pegged at 10 shillings per hut per year and was collected by the police. It was to be paid in form of livestock, i.e., cattle, goats or sheep, but Africans also had the option to obtain money for the hut tax by working for whites. Chiefs like Nemakonde refused to pay this tax. In 1895-6, in Mutoko, resistance to this tax was consistent and caused skirmishes between the Native Commissioners and hostile chiefs. It climaxed in June 1896 with a combined attack by all the main chiefs on the Native Commissioner's camp.

In Marondera chiefs also drove away the police. According to Ranger, the methods of tax collection were undoubtedly the main reason for Shona hostility. The tax collection caused massive de-stocking in African areas such that in some areas of Mashonaland the Executive Council decided in November 1895 that the collection of hut tax should be suspended for three months and thereafter should not be levied in the form of stock "in view of the fact that at this rate there would be no cattle to collect in a year or two."

According to Ranger, the tax collection demand came as the last in a series of grievances and led them to plan open and general armed resistance."

5. Abuse of Women

White settlers were also accused of abusing a number of women. They could take daughters and people's wives at will. Relatives who complained were heavily punished. The situation was most humiliating for women and girls. In the case of girls, most lost the opportunity of marriage forever because of the loss of virginity. Husbands who lost their wives could not be expected to lie idle without responding.

One of the native commissioners, Weale, wrote that when he assumed that post in September 1894, he found that blacks would run every time they saw a white man. He gathered afterwards that some police formerly stationed there had a habit of assaulting and raping any native woman they found in the veldt alone.

6. Forced Labour

When the white settlers arrived in 1890 and pegged their mines and farms, there were no African volunteers to work for them, even in paid employment. Chiefs were asked to provide labour but some actively opposed that order and had to be forced. From March 1892, for instance, the police were always on hand to lend support to settler demand for labour. In March 1893, Amandas, a headman, was arrested, fined 6 head of cattle and given fifty lashes in front of his people and others, all for refusing to send his men to work for whites and threatening to fire on the police if they came for labour.

In December 1894 black resistance to demands for labour was so bad that a Native Commissioner wrote that every time a white man appeared Africans would run away and hide for days. As a result anyone who needed

workers had to press the first they came across. One reason why they ran away was that in Umtali, for instance, it was noted that before the month was up farmers ill-treated the workers until they ran away and consequently got no payment.

Deserters from mines and farms were often lashed. Sometimes cattle were seized from a chief and only released when he supplied labour. In Melsetter, missionaries had to complain in 1897 that the method of labour collection, which also involved seizing wives as hostages in case their husbands escaped, was "unjust and government has no right thus to arrest and impress natives." In Matabeleland, Zansi young men who had previously refused to work were now forced to do two months compulsory work every year. The NC of Gwelo wrote that forced labour existed where supply was not equal to demand.

7. Loss of Land

The loss of land was one major issue that led to the revolt of Africans in Matabeleland and Mashonaland. When the Pioneer Column came, each member was promised and actually given 3000 acres of fertile land. The result of such arbitrary parcelling out of land formerly belonging to the Africans is that they were dispossessed of a lot of fertile land. The cultural and grazing land of the Ndebele had also been one of the inducements offered to volunteers under the Victoria Agreement, each man being given the right to peg out a farm of 3000 acres. The Ndebele were ordered to move to reserves.

According to Ranger, the whole of the Ndebele home area had been given away in the few months which followed the conquest of their area. The British Deputy Commissioner, Richard Martin said in 1897 that "the areas allocated to the Ndebele were badly watered, sandy and unfit for settlement, therefore unsuitable for native location."

Lord Grey, the Administrator of the colony also admitted about the Gwayi and Shangani reserves allocated to the Ndebele that "it would not be surprising that the reserves are regarded by the natives as cemeteries, not homes." In fact, almost all Ndebele peoples refused to move into the reserves, with the result that they found themselves living on private farms and therefore subject to rental charges, eviction and other misfortunes. The uprising was therefore fought with the intention to recover land lost to the whites.

8. Loss of Cattle

After the defeat of the Ndebele in 1894, the BSAC took most of their cattle by force. They claimed that the cattle belonged to Lobengula, as since they had defeated him they had every right to take the cattle. According to Ranger, of the original 200,000 cattle they owned in 1890, only about 40,000 remained in private Ndebele hands after the Anglo-Ndebele war. This provided a cause for war because, as Philip Mason has pointed out, "the question of cattle was a matter which for any Bantu lay very near that core of self-respect without which a man or a people break into degradation of desperate violence."

A lot of cattle were given to the volunteer fighters as per the Victoria Agreement and some whites like John Meikle even took upon themselves the task of rounding up the cattle from the Ndebele, high number of which was sent across the Limpopo into South Africa. The loss of cattle also extended to Mashonaland where a lot of cattle were lost through the payment of taxes. The losses continued to occur even into the uprising. Ranger argues that while the Ndebele had possessed about 200,000 cattle before the Anglo-Ndebele war, in 1897, after the uprisings, the rinderpest and the forfeitures, there were only 13 893 head of cattle in the whole of Rhodesia.

9. Revival of the Ndebele Monarchy

The Ndebele also hoped to revive the kingship but they realised that this could not be hoped for within the framework of the Company administration and that the Ndebele way of life could only be preserved by flight or resistance. In 1894, a senior induna, Sikombo, was punished for illicitly convening a meeting of chiefs. In 1896, Lobengula's brother Mabele was banished for holding an illegal council of indunas. Early in 19896 another of Lobengula's brother trekked with his followers and wives out of the BSAC's area of control northwards across the Zambezi, hoping to find a place to recreate the Ndebele state. Most of the regimental commanders and members of the royal family were coming to the conclusion that they must fight.

10. Other regiments in the Ndebele state had not had the chance to fight in the 1893 war. They believed that the Ndebele state had not been defeated. These therefore pressurised the indunas for a chance to fight the whites.

11. Role of Spirit Mediums

Spirit mediums influenced the Ndebele and Shona risings. These included Mkwati, Umlugulu, Nehanda and Kaguvi. Spirit mediums also operated in Central Zimbabwe, i.e., Chivi, Nhema, Gutu and Chirumhanzu. Ranger had suggested that the Shona risings had the aim of bringing back the Rozvi Empire but this is probably far-fetched. The people merely wanted their freedom and several other grievances addressed. Religious and political leaders allied to try and expel the whites. While the mediums were important in the risings, the Chimurenga could still have occurred without them because there are other grievances that had nothing to do with religion. However, whites at the time acknowledged that the spirit medium of Nehanda was the most powerful medium in Mashonaland. Nehanda and other mediums were responsible for the coordination of the war in both regions.

It must be noted that both the Shona and the Ndebele were a religious and superstitious people and therefore revered and respected these mediums. Anything that they said therefore was bound to be respected. Besides informing the people that the ancestors were angry with the presence of the whites in the country, spirit mediums also had a score to settle with the missionaries who were trying to convert people away from traditional religion. In the new religion being pandered about by missionaries, spirit mediums had no role to play and if they allowed it to flourish they would have no jobs, eventually.

12. Other General Causes

The 1896 risings came as a shock to the whites as they thought they had pacified the Ndebele by defeating them in the 1893 war. The Ndebele also thought the Shona would never rise against them as they believed the Shona were timid and generally afraid of the whites.

The Shona had a history of good relations with the Portuguese whom they traded with since the 16th century. The British now tried to stop that trade because they feared that the Shona would get guns in the trade. In turn, the Shona were upset that the British had taken away their right to choose trade partners. According to Ranger, there is evidence that even after the coming of the BSAC the Portuguese delivered hundreds of rifles to Shona chiefs like Makoni and Mashayamombe. The British goods were also generally more expensive than those sold by the Portuguese.

The British had also misunderstood the Shona whose only wish was to see the British as allies against the Ndebele and in some cases the Portuguese. The Shona had also believed that the British were temporary settlers as other had done before. Ranger talks of an America, "Curio" Brown who once visited Mashayamombe. Brown was asked when the whites would have enough gold and return to Kimberly. Brown told the chief that the

whites were in the country forever and that thousands more would come and build towns larger than all of Mashayamombe's villages.

Gradually the Shona began to realise that the whites intended to be rulers. Whereas in the past villages could shift at will, now there were rigid boundaries and control by the BSAC administration. The whites had taken the very fertile land. The Shona's fury was clearly justified. They had not entered into any agreement with Rhodes nor had they been consulted by Lobengula when the concession was signed, yet it was their region that was first occupied by the BSAC. The BSAC eroded the powerbase of local chiefs by making themselves the ultimate authority over every natural resource including land.

Why were the Whites taken by Surprise?

The first Native Commissioner admitted that the whites had underrated the Shona. They believed the Shona would not rebel because they would be 'grateful' to the whites for protecting them the Ndebele raids. After the rebellion various whites later labelled the Shona as treacherous.

The whites were also convinced that the Ndebele would not rebel. They believed that the Ndebele society, no matter how centralised and effective it had been in the past, had been so oppressive that most of those involved in it hated it. In short, the whites believed the Shona welcomed Company rule as protection against the Ndebele and that most of the Ndebele welcomed Company rule as protection against their own institutions.

Assessing the Role of Spirit Mediums in the Uprisings

The participation of spirit mediums in the 1st Chimurenga has generated a lot of debate among historians. Sir Earl Grey, a Commissioner and the Salisbury magistrate, Hugh Marshal Hole at that time argued that the risings were spontaneous and were a result of Shona ingratitude to the BSAC. Hole says this was compounded by the superstitious nature of Africans who were coordinated by witchdoctors that gave them medicines, claiming they would make them evade bullets.

From the 1960s, however, some historians changed that view of the revolt. TO Ranger, for instance, argues that Africans were organised by spirit mediums in the risings, the Matopos and Njelele shrines being the centre of the coordination. J Cobbing ("The Absent Priesthood") however argues that it was not the spirit mediums that coordinated the risings as Ranger says, but the Ndebele royal family, especially indunas and Lobengula's widows. Beach also refutes Ranger's theory when he contends that Nehanda and Kaguvi never led the risings. He says that Nehanda was not executed for ccoordinating the risings but instead for ordering the killing of Pollard. Ranger confirms in his own book that Mkwati, another spirit medium, actually went to the Njelele shrine to get medicine from Umlugulu to stop the locust plague.

Overview of Results of the Uprisings

By the end of 1897 the Shona and Ndebele had been brutally put down. This was an unfortunate end to the aspirations of a people who had believed their grievances against whites were justified. They had been ill-treated in a number of ways by white administration

After 1897 the Shona employed three types of responses. One was to claim that they were now respecting the whites as their new rulers. Some believed that the religious leaders had been betrayed by their own followers who were reluctant to fully observe their commands. In 1901, Chief Mapondera entered Rhodesia at the head of a force with the intention to retake some chiefdoms from the whites. He was stopped by w white counter attack

supported by the Native Police. Mapondera was captured in 1904, charged with murder and sentenced to imprisonment. However, the resistance he inspired continued for another ten years, raiding white prospectors and loyalist chiefs,

1. In Matabeleland, the white policy of imposing loyalist chiefs took root. Umlugulu was made chief by the whites because he had brought the diehard rebels hiding in the Shangani forest out of the war. He had also shown bravery in 1896 by apprehending Ndiweni who had caused much terror to the whites.
2. The Ndebele and Shona were defeated because the whites were using superior guns like the Maxim gun. On the other hand the Africans themselves were using spears, arrows and old unreliable guns, most of them procured from the Portuguese.
3. In Mashonaland, explosives were used to blast Africans out of the caves they were hiding in. despite humanitarian outcry in England, this pattern, first used against Makoni was repeated against many Shona strongholds. This was after it had been realised that the Shona caves were heavily fortified and also that they had stored enough food to last some months, and that they could not be starved into submission. In many cases, captured leaders of the rebellion like Makoni were executed.
4. When the Ndebele were convinced to surrender they held meetings with Rhodes at which he made a number of concessions to the Ndebele's grievances;
   a) Rhodes promised that the Ndebele police would be disbanded.
   b) He also promised to reform the administration, and pledged that he himself would stay on in Rhodesia to do it.
   c) He promised that the abuses they complained of would not happen again.
   d) He pledged the personal security of the senior indunas if they surrendered. As a result of that promise none of the leaders in the Matopos was put on trial.
5. The chiefs in both regions lost their power, i.e., judicial and political. The duty of trying people for criminal and civil offences now fell on the company officials or magistrates. Ndebele and Shona chiefs became paid officials of the government. Likewise the political duty of allocating land to people was removed from the chief and vested in the Native Commissioners.
6. At the third indaba between Rhodes and the Ndebele in Sept 1896, the Ndebele were asked to surrender their arms and also to surrender anyone involved in the murder of white women and children. Only those who killed people n fair fight were pardoned.
7. One of the leaders of the rebellion, Siginyamatshe, was sentenced to 12 years in prison, which he served in Cape Town. Makumbi, the commander of Mkwati's bodyguard, Nehanda, Kaguvi and others were hanged for murder.

Topic 10

JMDGwezhira

COMPANY RULE FROM 1898 -1923

Lord Grey, the Administrator of Mashonaland, intimated that they would educate the Shona whom he wanted to be trained in vocation. Rhodes promised the Ndebele life like that of the whites. He wanted to put in a well-trained administration because poor administration was one of the reasons for the uprisings.

The Native Affairs Department was then formed with Grey as its head. Grey was against land being given freely to whites. He wanted Africans to get land first before the whites but at the same time he wanted to reserve some land for whites. People who had participated in the Jameson Raid had also been promised some land. They therefore impressed upon the Company the matter be treated with urgency.

Rhodes and Grey also intended to give enough land in Matabeleland for Ndebele needs, set up a reserve system in Mashonaland and to bring an end to the era of unrestricted white land exploitation. The 1989 Order-in-Council forced the BSAC to provide enough land for Africans in both provinces. As a result, in Mashonaland a reserve system was set up which met Shona requirements in the short run in a more or less satisfactory way. In Matabeleland Rhodes had allowed the Ndebele to return to the land they had occupied in Lobengula's time, but only temporarily.

The issue of African labour became more serious after the risings. The Company promised chiefs a commission for every person they turned to the whites for labour. The Company even suggested an increase in taxes to force Africans to go to work. In response, in 1903 the new Legislative Council passed a law raising the hut tax from 10 shillings to 2 pounds a year. The new Native Affairs Department head, Milton, was not in agreement with this increase. Because memories of the 1896-7 risings were still fresh and fear of another rising if the tax was actually implemented, the Colonial Secretary refused to sanction an increase of more than 10 shillings. He even imposed a year's on the collection of that additional 10 shillings.

It was also argued that Africans would still not go to work even if the taxes were increased. Actually some of them resorted to brewing beer at the mines to raise this tax. Most whites were not happy with this behaviour. Some condemned Africans as "idle loafers who like to live the life of a retired gentleman and do not want to think about tomorrow."

Proclamation of Southern Rhodesia

An Order-in-Council of 1898 established Matabeleland and Mashonaland as one country called Rhodesia. Rhodes began to use his money to build railways across the country. The first line came through Mafikeng and Botswana and reached Bulawayo in 1897. The Beira line reached Mutare in 1989. In 1902, the year Rhodes died the two lines joined in Salisbury. The settlers saw Rhodes' death as a blow because it was his money, efforts and zeal that brought the country under British rule. In a way his death represented the death of an era.

The Legislative Council

The Southern Rhodesia Order-in-Council of 1898 established the first Legislative Council, the equivalent of today's parliament. Sir Alfred Milner, the High Commissioner of South Africa and Rhodesia, created the Legislative Council. It was composed of 10 members, five of whom were nominated by the BSAC and four elected by the settlers. The Chairman of the Council was the Company administrator himself. He was thus expected to vote with the Company's appointees.

The OIC (Order-in-Council) was the first constitution of Southern Rhodesia. The Resident Commissioner, who was a representative of the British government, sat in the Council but had no vote. According to Ranger, potentially the settler element was the most powerful, above the Imperial and Company representatives.

In 1903 the settlers achieved equality of representation and in 1908 actually retained a majority. K Young argues that although the settlers had gained some say in legislative matters, the administration remained the prerogative of the company administrators. The settlers continued to have an uneasy alliance with the company. Although they seemed to be working together they had different interests.

Milner's first OIC was that without the permission of the Foreign Secretary in England, no discrimination against blacks was permitted except in the supply of ammunition, arms and liquor. In practice however, the Company continued to do as it pleased. They ill-treated blacks without any complaint from the High Commissioner. Under the new constitution chiefs lost their powers. After the revolt ten chiefs were appointed to manage ten districts in the whole of Matabeleland, four of whom had never been chiefs or in the line to be chiefs.

The Administrator-in-Council could remove chiefs subject to the permission of the High Commissioner. The chiefs themselves had no recognised powers of jurisdiction. They were simply responsible for the good conduct/behaviour of their tribes, for notifying deaths, crimes and epidemics to the Native Commissioner. They also assisted in collecting taxes and for apprehending criminals.

Capitalist Development in Rhodesia

From the beginning the BSAC had been different from other companies in that it had had the South African business experience. The company also had capital from South Africa where Rhodes made a fortune which he used to further the British Empire. The BSAC was very peculiar, rich and wanted the British colony to be seen as other colonies like Australia. They intended it to be a settler colony like New Zealand, Australia and Canada, i.e., with farmers, traders, miners and artisans, all of whom wanted to get rich.

In other colonies elsewhere in Africa, especially West Africa it was a question of using locals to produce local resources but in Southern Africa it was simply for whites to settle. Rhodesia was to be developed along capitalist lines. Infrastructure was already in place; for instance by 1897 the railway from cape Town had reached Bulawayo. Missionaries were impressed by these developments because it was good for their work in the interior.

The 1896-7 uprisings had disrupted these capitalist developments. These had to be revived if the colony was to survive. For capitalism to develop, it depended on African labour and land. The hopes for a second rand had failed/withered and the new colony could only succeed through agriculture. In 1989 a Labour Board of Southern Rhodesia was formed to supply labour to the mines. At the same time the Native Affairs Department continued to use chiefs to recruit labour. Chiefs were promised money for every man they supplied as labour to the whites.

To maintain profitability forced labour was re-introduced and wages, where available, were pitiful. Soon after the war peasant production suffered and whites started to buy cattle cheaply from Africans. The value of African produce was determined by European merchants who gained immensely from this relationship. When the Anglo-Boer war broke out in 1899 in South Africa, Africans in Rhodesia found themselves producing more for South Africa.

The Chief Native Commissioner reported that Africans were selling their grain at considerable profit and labour shortage continued at mines and farms. Africans had not been willing to work in the dangerous mines where death rates were high. They resorted to growing more crops to avoid the mines and farms. One official noted that Africans "are natural agriculturalists and view mining with little enthusiasm." Those who looked for jobs went to better

paying mines in South Africa. One native commissioner commented that "the labour supply in the whole of Southern Rhodesia has been poor. The natives' attitude has been more like a strike."

Another reason why they didn't want to work in the mines was that the Shona still viewed the discovery of gold at Kimberley as a source of their loss of independence.

Africans after the Uprisings

Africans continued to be ill-treated by the Company even after their revolts had been suppressed. There was a lot of discriminatory legislation passed by the Legislative Council up to 1923 when they relinquished power to the Responsible Government.

1. The 1898 constitution that established the Legislative Council failed to give Africans a representative voice but the same constitution also gave Africans, in theory, a nominal right to acquire land in the same manner as whites, that is, by buying the land. In practice, very few Africans used this right because either they had no money or the native Commissioners discouraged them.
2. The Immorality Suppression Act

   This law made it illegal for a black man and a white woman to engage in extramarital intercourse. The maximum penalty for this indiscretion was 5 years hard labour for the man and 2 years for the woman. It was not an offence, however, for a white man to sleep with a black woman. Although white women generally complained that this was a sexist law it was not changed until well into the 1970s.

3. The Municipal Act of 1907

   It empowered municipalities to discriminate against Africans. They could determine where Africans could live, where and when they could be found and what facilities they could use or have. In terms of this law the Bulawayo Municipality passed the regulation that no African could walk on a street pavement. The law continued to apply until the 1960s when it was amended to allow blacks to enter cinemas and also use swimming pools. However, when Ian Smith came to power as Prime Minister in 1964, he had the law changed three years later to allow municipalities to discriminate again.

4. Labour and Levies

   This has been called back door forced labour by Ian Phimister. The doubling of hut tax to 20 shillings by 1904 followed by a spate of levies and taxes between 1908-12 was aimed at closing down the peasants' options of earning money so that they could go and do wage labour. The Kaffir Beer Ordinance of 1912 for instance banned Africans from brewing beer near mines or farms. In 1909 blacks living on unalienated land had to pay rent to the BSAC. Tenants on private or company land paid even higher rates. Grazing fees were also imposed in 1912. The dog tax was introduced in 1912 and two years later dipping of cattle was made compulsory at a cost of 1 shilling per head. By 1923 three quarters of all cattle were being dipped.

COMPANY ADMINISTRATION TO 1923

From 1890-98 there were two areas of administrative jurisdiction –Mashonaland and Matabeleland. In 1898 the two were brought under one administration, Southern Rhodesia. The Resident Commissioner of Rhodesia reported to the High Commissioner at the Cape. The HC in turn reported to the Colonial Office in London.

After a decade of unprofitable mining investments the company accepted the settlers' demand for more farming land. The state apparatus made sure that the once successful African producers now became impoverished and landless. The objective of all these laws was to push Africans into the labour market. Labour was obtained from Africans through two main ways –creation of reserves and the imposition of a litany of taxes.

Even this creation did not bring about a miraculous change of heart among Africans in relation to labour. Some land was still available and people could still grow what they needed for subsistence. Land became scarce or deteriorated in quality and therefore a growing number of African men were forced to seek labour in the capitalist economy.

There was at this time obviously a correlation between land scarcity, decrease in production, closed opportunities in the market for Africans and the increasing number of job seekers in the urban areas, farms and mines. By 1905 the capitalist sector was able to boast that there were too many job seekers than they could absorb. The reserves were a carefully planned thing and surveyors were sent throughout the country to map them.

End of Company Rule

As the number of settlers increased it became clear that a decision would have to be made about who would control the country when the Royal Charter expired. The royal Charter was due to expire in 1914, after 25 years in operation, unless it was renewed. The possibility of an association between Southern Rhodesia and the Union of South African colonies was also widely canvassed.

In 1914 the British government decided that Southern Rhodesia would get a Responsible Government and later on possibly be incorporated into the Union of South Africa. It was hoped that this would avoid the headache of British financial responsibility and eventual clashes between the settlers and the British government. However, the Company was allowed to continue to administer Southern Rhodesia for another 9 years to 1923.

In a referendum held in 1922 the majority of the whites voted against union with South Africa. This showed that were ready for a responsible government. On 1 October 1923 therefore Rhodesia, with her population of 35,000 settlers became a self-governing colony.

Responsible Government

The vote for responsible government changed the history of the country forever. It had been the practice elsewhere in British colonies like Canada, New Zealand and Australia that settlers, not chartered companies, were in charge. Responsible government meant that after a time they would be in total control of the country's internal matters. However, external matters like the declaration of war were left in the hands of a governor appointed by the British government. In the course of its colonial lordship over Southern Rhodesia, the British were to appoint nine governors to help manage the colony on their behalf;

1. John Robert-Chancellor 1923-28
2. Cecil Hunter Rodwell 1928-34
3. Hebert James Stanley 1935-42
4. Evelyn Baring 1942-44
5. William EC Tait 1944-46
6. John N Kennedy 1947-53
7. Peveril Barton RWW Powlett 1954-59
8. Humphrey Gibbs
9. Lord Christopher John Soames 1979-80

Why Settlers Voted for Responsible Government

In 1915 the BSAC had been given only a 10 year supplementary mandate to run the colony but it ended prematurely in 1923. The S Rhodesian settlers began to fear the Afrikaner (Boer/Dutch) nationalism that was prevailing in South Africa during that time. There was a real fear that the Boers wanted to force the colony of S Rhodesia into the Union of South Africa. The Union was made up of the Cape and Natal (British Colonies), the Transvaal and the Orange Free State (Dutch colonies). This fear united Rhodesians into voting against union with South Africa.

During the struggle for responsible government there had been a struggle between the settlers themselves; i.e. , farmers and miners. The Company came to the miners' side because they wanted political reform. The farmers wanted more say in the running of the country. By 1920 the farmers were saying that they wanted to be the majority in the Legislative Council. On the other hand the Company feared that the farmers were not experienced enough to run the country and would raise the taxes in order to punish the company.

On the other hand the settler farmers saw the BSAC as failing to provide them with much labour. They complained that their tobacco production was being hampered by lack of labour. The Native Labour Bureau argued that it was doing its best to assist the farmers but the farmers were complaining that this was in fact not true.

People in support of Responsible Government formed the Responsible Government Association. They chose a leader, Charles Coughlan, a lawyer who had advised the miners during the struggle between the miners and farmers but had changed sides after realising that the farmers were stronger.

In 1921, the British Prime Minster appointed Winston Churchill as the Colonial Secretary. Churchill immediately appointed a commission led by Lord Barton, the former Commissioner at the Cape. The Commission submitted its report recommending responsible government for the colony.

Topic 11

JMDGwezhira

THE RISE OF MASS NATIONALISM

From the very beginning the rebel faction in Matabeleland had a clear target for renewed political action. There was a lot of disillusionment with the settlement of 1897 between the Company and the indunas. One of Lobengula's sons, Nguboyenja, who was preparing in 1908 to train as a lawyer, came back and began to study the conditions of native life in the country. He was also asking for information regarding native reserves, the term under which they stayed there, etc. neither Njube (one of Lobengula's sons who died in 1910), nor Nguboyenja (who suffered a nervous breakdown in the same year) survived to work out fully the implications of this new sort of politics.

Nyamanda, who had also led the 1896 risings, tried to lead the Ndebele peacefully in resisting the new land policy and evictions from their lands by the new farmers. Nyamanda counted among his allies the African National Congress lawyers, the Ethiopian church leaders, Ndebele teachers, ministers and migrants and black South African settlers in Rhodesia. All of these also wanted a chance to buy land and were prepared to attach themselves to the idea of a revived Ndebele state.

The idea of a Matabele home thus enjoyed the support of many non-Ndebele peoples while the Ndebele radical elements gave weight to petitions attacking the move to responsible government and calling for imperial intervention instead. They argued that it was better to be ruled directly from London instead of being ruled by the settlers with whom they had had problems.

In 1919 an abortive attempt was made to form a Rhodesian Native National Congress. Long after the 1920s Ndebele politics revolved around the idea of the kingship and the idea of the national home, and the Matabele Homes Society remained the main vehicle. However, as Ranger says, after 1923 it became more and more irrelevant to national politics. Leadership in the sphere of national politics fell to the new elite associations like the Rhodesian Bantu Voters Association, the Southern Rhodesia Native Welfare Association, the S Rhodesian Bantu National Congress or to the rising trade union movements.

According to N Shamuyarira, "the Matabele Home Society survived as a tribal society long after trade unions had taken over the role of political pressure groups." Some independent African churches like the Church of the White Bird led by Matthew Zvimba also provided a way for Africans to challenge white supremacy.

<u>Movements of Mass Nationalism</u>

a) The Matabele Homes Society

   It was particularly vocal in denouncing plans to reduce the size and quality of reserves but African opinion continued to be ignored. In the 1922 referendum only 60 Africans, out of the 900,000 population, were eligible to vote.

b) In 1923 Abram Twala, a Zulu Anglican teacher formed the Rhodesian Bantu Voters' Association, urging Africans to depend on themselves for their salvation. In 1927, a delegation was sent to London to petition King George for the restoration of the Ndebele monarchy, a move which provoked settlers into banishing Lobengula's relatives to Bechuanaland and South Africa.

c) The Reformed Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union, the first mass movement between the two world wars, led to the emergence of men like Masotsha Ndlovu. RICU had close links with the South African Communist Party and one of the early RICU leaders, Charles Mzingeli, held May Day parades until 1957. After 1945 there was a nationalist resurgence as African soldiers who had fought alongside the whites returned home to find themselves still second-class citizens, according to D Martin and P Johnson. In 1945 the first effective strike by African workers on Rhodesian Railways was organised to win a pay increase and trade union recognition.

d) The African National Congress

The first general strike followed in 1948 but indecisiveness by the ANC left the thrust of militancy firmly in the hands of trade unionists. One of them, Benjamin Burombo, who ran the British African Voice Association, was one of the most outspoken and fearless champions of African rights in that era. Still, according to Martin and Johnson, "throughout the first half of the century nationalist protest tended to be fragmented and sporadic."

e) The City Youth League

It was formed in 1955 by James Chikerema, George Nyandoro, Edson Sithole and Dunduza Chisiza. It was later changed to the African Nationalist Youth League to give the movement a broader national appeal. Chisiza was a Malawian migrant worker who had to be deported in 1956 after the ANCYL organised a successful bus boycott by Africans in Salisbury.

f) The Southern Rhodesian African National Congress

In 1957, growing consciousness of the need for a strong, united African nationalist movement gave birth to the SR ANC with Joshua Nkomo as president, Chikerema as vice and George Nyandoro as Secretary-General. The party was banned and its leaders detained under a state of emergency declared throughout the Central African Federation in 1959.
The banning of SRANC, led to the arrest of its leadership except Nkomo, who was out of the country, the arrest of 500 of its members, and ultimately the birth of another movement, the National Democratic Party on 1 Jan 1960. The NDP was led by Michael Mawema but he was replaced by Nkomo in a reshuffle after just nine months. Still in the belief that change could be achived by constitutional means, its leaders attended the 1961 constitutional conference in London.

g) The National Democratic Party

Their first major act was to reject the 1961 constitution which gave Africans very limited positions in parliament and a limited franchise. The NDP also boycotted the referendum on the 1961 constitution, leading to their ban in December 1961 by David Whitehead for failing to recognise the new constitution. According to D Auret, "the banning of the NDP in that year ended the belief that their rights would be safeguarded through participation in the normal political life of the country."
The government continued to entrench the position of the whites while eroding the rights of the blacks. Martin and Johnson say that the downfall of Garfield Todd as Prime Minister in 1958 had led to a marked shift towards greater oppression of the Africans. The Law and Order (Maintenance) Act (LOMA) was

introduced in 1960 and the Public Order Act replaced by the Emergency Powers Act. The laws allowed the security to arrest and detain anyone suspected of crimes without a warrant.

h) ZAPU

The Zimbabwe African People's Union was formed just ten days after the banning of the NDP, with the same leadership from the NDP. ZAPU was banned ten months later but before it was banned on 26 September 1962, its leadership had reached two important decisions;

1) To start bringing arms and ammunition into the country.
2) To send young men out to train in sabotage.

As a result, arson and other acts of destruction increased from August 1962. The ZAPU leadership also decided that if the party was banned it would go underground. When the ban came, Nkomo was in Zambia, from where he fled to Tanzania ostensibly to consult with Ndabaningi Sithole who was in fact in Athens at the time. Other leaders like Leopold Takawira, Robert Mugabe and Jason Moyo were placed under restriction. Nkomo was criticised by his colleagues for abandoning them and he returned to Southern Rhodesia where he was restricted to his home area of Plumtree.

i) ZANU

The formation of the Zimbabwe African National Union was a result of many reasons.

1) Nkomo's lies to his restricted colleagues that Tanzanian president, Julius Nyerere had advised them to go to Tanzania to form a government-in-exile. It was in fact his idea that the same colleagues had earlier on refused to accept.
2) The other leadership of ZAPU became increasingly discontented with his leadership. They wanted a firmer policy of confrontation and a new, more decisive, party.
3) Others perceived that Nkomo was indecisive and that there was lack of confidence in him in Zambia, Tanzania and some other African countries which supported the liberation struggle.
4) The other leadership thought that Nkomo had been vacillating for over a decade by joining the federation talks in 1952, then running for a federation seat, and more recently by his handling of the 1961 constitution.
5) The last straw was his suspension of Ndabaningi Sithole, Takawira, Mugabe and Morton Malianga after intercepting letter from executive members in Dar-es-Salaam saying they had lost confidence in his leadership.

As a result of the foregoing factors, ZANU was formed on August 1963 with Sithole as President, Mugabe as Secretary-General and Takawira as Vice-President.

Causes of the Rise of Mass Nationalism

1. Disparities in the Distribution of Land

There were various models of land distribution throughout the colonial period, all of them not discriminatory against Africans. The laws which informed these models were the Land Appropriation Act of 1915, the Land Apportionment Act 1931, Land Husbandry Act 1951, and the Land Tenure Act
According to Martin and Johnson, the original idea of the Land Apportionment Act was that the cities and towns and commercial farms would be exclusively white domains with no Africans living in them except to serve whites. African urban areas were prescribed in an amendment to the LAA in 1941 which divided the country into four areas –European, Native, Forest and Unreserved land.
Under the Native Land Husbandry Act there was provision for control of the utilisation and allocation of land occupied by natives to perform labour for conservation of natural resources. Under these provisions African families were entitled to five head of cattle and eight acres of land. Families were forced to sell off cattle in excess of five at artificially low prices. Martin and Johnson say "the LHA generated more bitterness against the settler government than any previous legislation." They also say that the LAA was from 1931 subjected to over 60 amendments although none of these affected the principles applying to African land.

2. Lack of Education

It was to become the second major grievance of Southern Rhodesia's Africans. Schools for Africans in most cases were established and run by missionaries. These mission schools played a crucial role in the education of Africans. By 1920 there were 43,000 pupils in nearly 700 schools, 5,000 of them European. In spite of this, the government spent 18 times more on each white pupil than a black one.
There was also administrative discrimination as the Department of Education was responsible for white education and the Native Affairs Department for African education. In 1930, education was also made compulsory for white children and extended in 1938 to Asians and Coloureds.
Up to 1980 this same basic right never included Africans. The settler government emphasized technical rather than academic education for blacks, thereby limiting employment possibilities to manual labour and minor artisan fields.
The government of Todd from 1953-58 brought the first serious attempt to improve African education. The number of government primary schools rose from 20 in 1953 to 46 in 1956. Under Todd, education was taken away from NAD and mission schools were given grants to help introduce four year courses in secondary schools. A government teacher training school and technical teacher training school were opened. These measures contributed to Todd being condemned by the settlers as a dangerous liberal, and were instrumental in his ejection from power.
The formation of the Rhodesian Front in 1962, its coming to power later in the same year, and the replacement of Winston Field by Ian Smith as Prime Minister in 1964 represented a further setback to all forms of African advancement.
Enrolment in teacher training colleges declined and budget cutbacks decreased school intakes. In 1964 higher school fees were introduced leading to some pupils dropping out. The number of pupils declined by over 10,000, to 703,000 between 1968 and 1970. The number of teachers, many of whom had been detained, also fell.
Smith's government emphasized technical rather than academic education for Africans. In a statement to parliament in 1966, the Minister of Education stated that for the great majority of Africans there is no purpose in education other than literacy.

3. Labour Conditions and lack of job Opportunities

One serious problem facing miners, farmers, railway builders and also threatened the economic prospects of the new territory was the shortage of labour. A clause in the 1897 Native Regulations for Southern Rhodesia made it compulsory for chiefs to provide labour for public works if required to do so but this was cancelled on the intervention of the Secretary for Colonial Affairs in 1898. The District Commissioners were however, still required to aid in supplying labour for the mines.

In 1899 Labour Bureaux were established but this did little to improve the situation. Very few Ndebele were willing to work. On the other hand the Shona were agriculturalists and tended to leave employment with the onset of rains. Moreover, the Shona were distinctly unwilling to do underground work, preferring road and railway work and woodcutting. Whites were also to blame as some employers withheld pay to force some people to stay at work. Some simply ill-treated workers.

Many whites began to favour the return of forced labour, which the British government was not keen on. An attempt by the Chamber of Mines to bring in Chinese labourers in 1900 was opposed by Rhodes as not being feasible. In 1901 there was an attempt to force Africans to work by raising the poll tax to two pounds per head, which was disallowed by the British government again.

Other incentives worked wonders such that by 1903/4 the newly established Southern Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau reported that 7,000 Africans passed from Malawi and Zambia into Southern Rhodesia for work. The incentives included rest houses with supplies of food for men on their way to find work.

The Native Labour Regulations of 1903 also provided for a minimum wage and daily ration, the issue of a blanket in winter, and the payment of the fare home on completion of contract. However, from 1900 there were serious problems of labour supply.

Various pieces of legislation were also used to subjugate Africans. In 1901 the Master and Servants Act excluded Africans in domestic service, agriculture and mining from trade union activity. The full significance of this can be shown by the fact that in 1962 Africans employed in these sectors numbered 323,000 or 52% of all wage-employed Africans. This meant that the majority of black workforce was barred from trade union activity or the right to collective bargaining. No minimum wage was set by the government as it was argued that wages were determined by market forces. They were entitled to only one day off per week and the maximum day was set at 10 hours.

The 1911 African Labour Relations Act covered Africans employed to perform bodily labour in mining, agriculture, animal husbandry, trade or manufacture but excluded domestic and skilled workers. It made it an offence to poach labour by offering higher wages or other inducement because agricultural workers were short at the time. No similar legislation ever existed governing non-Africans.

In 1931 the Public Service Act reinforced government policy by excluding non-whites from the civil service except as teachers and nurses. In 1934 the Industrial Conciliation Act was passed when white trade unionists complained that their jobs were threatened by technologically oriented African education. The ICA excluded Africans from the definition of an employee. In 1959 however the Act was amended to allow some African labour unions to be registered in other fields of employment. Whereas white trade unions were automatically registered under the Act, black unions had to apply and qualify for registration. By June 1962 only five had been granted registration certificates. The ICA covered all workers except those in domestic service, agriculture, civil service and the Rhodesian Railways.

Apart from those categories the Act implied a fundamental change, introducing union-management negotiations for a limited number of workers –mainly skilled and therefore white –while conditions of the rest of the workers were regulated by Industrial Boards. These were appointed by the Minister of Labour to recommend wage policy. It is important to note that the unions were precluded from affiliating with any political party or organisation or from using funds to further the intentions of a political party or organisation.

In 1971 constraints were placed on the right to strike if it was deemed to be against the "public interest." Under Section 31 of LOMA it became a criminal offence to incite strike action in "essential services." These essential services ranged from coal mining, the production, supply and delivery or distribution of food, fuel and coal. Under the provisions of this section, African workers who went on strike could be imprisoned for life or sentenced to death. In 1973, the African Registration and Identity Act and the Vagrancy Amendment Act were enacted to prevent African job seekers and small traders from entering the urban areas.

The wage gap between blacks and white had become a source of deep anger. In 1974, for instance, the average earnings for Africans were £266 a year compared to £3,580 for the European, Asian and Coloured employees who comprised only about 11% of the total workforce.

4. Disparities in Health Care

According to AJ Wills, the only two reasons Europeans provided basic health services for Africans were because of;

a) The danger of epidemics like smallpox spreading to European areas.
b) Because a healthy labour force was needed particularly by the mining industry.

In rural areas, as had occurred with education, most of the burden fell upon the missionaries to establish dispensaries and hospitals. Only in the 1920s did the government begin to take responsibilities for rural health services. There occurred many disease outbreaks associated with low standards of hygiene, e.g., trachoma, malnutrition, infections of the respiratory systems, skin and eyes, measles and whooping cough.

One study in Macheke found that 90% of African children living on European farms were undernourished. Infant mortality prior to 1980 was 120-200 per 1000 live births for Africans compared to 17 per 1000 births for Europeans. In 1976 the government provided only one hospital bed for every 1261 blacks compared to one for every 255 whites. In 1977 when there were 13,781 general hospital beds in the country, the missions were responsible for 4095, some 30% of the total and two-thirds of all rural beds. Wills says that the government provided only £2million in grants to local authorities, missions and voluntary organisations, a mere 9% of the total health budget.

5. The Absence of the right to vote (franchise)

Throughout the colonial period, there were property and income qualifications demanded for every person who wanted to exercise their right to vote. In 1923, a voter needed to have fixed property worthy £500 and annual income worthy £200. There was no colour limit and elections were to be held every five years. As a result of these prohibitive qualifications, not many Africans could exercise their vote in 1923. Many did not manage to vote in the parliamentary elections until the 1960s when many Africans had acquired enough riches to qualify to vote.

In the federal elections of 1953 for example, Wills notes that only about 450 Africans were eligible to vote out of a population of more than 2,5million Africans. In March 1956 Godfrey Huggins (also known as Lord Malvern) presented the public with his conception of two multiracial common voters' rolls, with a higher and lower qualification. The two-tier proposal was framed with the objective of reconciling two principles;

a) That the political domination of Europeans by Africans must never come about.

b) Party divisions along racial lines must be avoided at all costs.

In May that year the government appointed the Tredgold Commission to investigate a new franchise system for the colony "under which the government is placed and remains in the hands of civilised and responsible people." The Tredgold Report, released in March 1957 recommended a system of two voters' rolls.

The Upper Roll

This was confined to people of either race who were either British subjects and satisfied a fairly high standard of combined education and property qualifications.

Lower/Special Roll

It gave the voting rights to those with an income of over £15 a month, provided the total number of special votes should not exceed in value more than a third of the total votes cast. Under this arrangement neither roll was exclusively confined to one race, though to begin with the upper roll would be predominantly European. The Commission adhered to the principles;

a) The qualification of 21 years in a universal suffrage system itself was an arbitrary one.
b) Although every man had a right to a say in his own government, this did not imply an inalienable right to vote.
c) The vote called for an exercise of responsibility and skill.

In response to this principle, African nationalists criticised the relegation of Africans to the position of second class citizens. "One man one vote" became a slogan of the African political platform.
The Constitutional Amendment Bill passed by the Federation Parliament on 31 July 1957 increased the membership of the Assembly to 59, of whom 12 should be Africans and three Europeans representing African interests. The African Affairs Board opposed it on the grounds that it reduced the proportion of effective African representation.
In S Rhodesia the Todd government's proposal was that voters on the Special/Lower Roll would join with ordinary voters in electing members of parliament. However, special voters could only constitute a maximum of one-sixth of the ordinary voters. Thereafter the Special income qualification of £20 was raised to £60. According to Wills, Todd's intention here had been to ensure the registration of Africans with 10 years education.

The 1961 Constitution

Under the new constitution of 1961, people in S Rhodesia could qualify as voters if they were 21 years of age, citizens of the Federation, had lived in the constituency for three months before the election, and had sufficient knowledge of English to complete the registration form. The requirements for the A Roll were once again set high;

a) An income of £720 for the previous two years or property worth £1500.
b) Have completed primary education and had property worth £1000.
c) Secondary education and fixed property worth £500.
d) Be chiefs or headmen.

In the B Roll the requirements were;

a) An income of £240 for the previous six months or property worth £450
b) Completed two years secondary education and an income of £120 in the last six months or fixed property worth £250.
c) Those being 30 years plus, had an income of £180 in the last six months or fixed property worth £350.
d) Kraalheads with a following of 20 families.
e) Ministers of religion

The constitution was not profoundly sexist, but married women could vote on either roll if their husbands qualified.

The 1969 Constitution

Under the 1969 constitution, parliament was made up of 66 members, 50 of whom were whites. Of the 16 Africans, 8 were elected directly and 8 indirectly by electoral colleges of chiefs, headmen and councillors, 4 in Mashonaland and 4 in Matabeleland.

There was a senate of 23 members distributed as follows;

10 whites chosen by European MPs

10 African Chiefs, 5 each from Mashonaland and Matabeleland, chosen by the Council of chiefs in each province.

3 members appointed by the President, one Coloured and 2 Europeans