‘A’ LEVEL

TROPICAL AFRICAN HISTORY

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PRELIMINARY ISSUES

Acknowledgements

I am indebted to all staff at Turn-Up College for their illustrious efforts to make this publication a success. I express the same thanks to all outside individuals who contributed to this module by way of researching on topics that make up this module. I am particularly thankful to my two lady secretaries, Chiedza Muchena and Crystabell Mudzingwa for the great work they have done. Last but not least, I thank Mr C.K Mhuri who has done the general editing of this publication.

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S. Madzingira

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PREFACE

The vision of the Study Pack project is to create a self-sufficient information base for the student. With this aim in mind, this Study Pack provides all the necessary topical material in a simplified manner. Thereafter, the Study Pack provides a wide range of examination-type questions at the end of each topic area.

A careful study of the text in this module, it will give you a good foundation and information base for the paper on Tropical African history. The language has been tuned to a manageable level for second-language users of English. The end of chapter questions are typical exam-oriented. They tally well with the motif of the study pack project i.e to prepare the student for the examination.

Success is our goal

GLOSSARY OF TERMS IN THE TEXT

1. Critique:- An objective analysis and a discussion of a particular issue.

2. State:- A geographically defined territory governed by a body-politic or defined hierachy of authority e.g President and cabinet of ministers or a king and his senior officers (chiefs).

3. Bureaucracy:- A hierarchy of offices or authoritites that are lined up to perform state functions. The line up must be followed when dealing with issues of governance.

4. Amajaha:- A Zulu/ Ndebele term for all young men, particularly unmarried, that were used by Mzilikazi for military purposes. They were used as body guards.

5. Mercenaries:- Soldiers who are hired by a foreign nation to fight for it for money.

6. Amahole:- A Zulu Ndebele term for all the Shonas who were incorporated into the Ndebele State.

7. Empire:- An amalgamation of states into one large territory headed by an Emperor.

8. Lingua Franca:- A French expression referring to the official language or language of expression especially in trade in French colonies or territories e.g Swahili. Lungua Franca is a blending of two or more languages to create a common language of expression in trade.

9. Slave Trade/Slavery:- A form of human trafficking, selling of human beings as sources of labour to European plantation owners. A rampant West and Central Africa practice during the nineteenth century.

10. Imperialism: - This refers to the extension of political and economic influence or control to an undeveloped country by a developed country that has the power of capital. The powerful country uses its economic power to force the weaker state into subjection.Imperialism is a higher stage of capitalism.

SYLLABUS INTERPRETATION

INTRODUCTION

Tropical Africa (1855-1914) Brief background

The mid 19th century in Africa was characterized by many changes in the social, economic and political spheres. It was during this period that most African states underwent revolutionary changes in the political administration. The majority of them emerged more centralized than their predecessors. In the economic sector, most African States were drawn into the orbit of the world capitalist system.

Religion was yet another sector that was affected by the rapid changes. Local traditional religion was supplanted by both Islam and Christianity. As a result, Africa became the chessboard of international religions in that Islam and Christianity competed against each other in acquiring new converts.

In West Africa, palm oil became one of the most important products which played a vital role in the economic growth of the region. In East Africa, it was copper, ivory, salt and cloves.

It was during this period that a marked degree of international trade took place, for example, traders from as far as Mandinka travelled as far as Freetown and further penetrated into the Sahara. The Atlantic sea board and the Indian Ocean became important areas since they were now constantly visited by the Nyamwezi traders.

All in all, therefore, the immediate background to the Scramble for Africa was characterized by the regeneration of pre-colonial states.

According to Cambridge International Examinations, Advanced level History syllabuses give students not only the opportunity of studying aspects of the past, but also of developing an understanding of the complexity of human societies. The study also helps students acquire a range of thinking skills which are helpful in daily life. It is therefore essential to study Advanced Level History if one needs to have a thorough understanding of all the political, cultural, social and economic developments because they have their roots in the past, and cannot be explained without reference to these roots.

PAPER COMBINATIONS FOR 'A' LEVEL HISTORY (9155)-ZIMSEC)

This European History syllabus is studied in conjunction with other different areas to constitute a complete subject at Advanced Level. For instance, European History can be studied together with another separate Advanced Level History component such as Tropical African History (9155/2) or Zimbabwean History (9155/3).

However, the Zimbabwe Schools Examinations Council (ZIMSEC) allows paper combinations to follow any pattern i.e. Tropical African History can be studied in conjunction with Zimbabwean History and or Zimbabwean History can be studied in conjunction with European History. No single component is therefore complete in itself.

The European History Paper is code-numbered 9155/01 in the Zimbabwe School Examinations Council (ZIMSEC) examination. Technically speaking, it is not a compulsory paper although the majority of candidates register for it. The other papers on offer are 9155/02 (World Affairs since 1960), 9155/03 (History of southern Africa 1854-1914), 9155/04 (Tropical Africa-1855-1914) and 9155/05 (History of Zimbabwe). The European History Paper (9155/01) can be combined with any of the papers stated above. Below are the Advanced level History paper combinations offered by ZIMSEC.

OPTION	**PAPER COMBINATIONS**
A	1 and 2
B	1 and 3
C	1 and 4
D	1 and 5
E	2 and 3
F	2 and 4
G	2 and 5

Option D has clearly become the most popular in schools as evidenced by the increased candidature. Option C is now trailing in second position. The other options have registered a very low candidature to date.

Similar to ZIMSEC, Cambridge International Examinations syllabuses for European History and Tropical African History are clearly the same and therefore the study packs formulated by Turn-up College are highly relevant for both ZIMSEC and Cambridge International Examinations.

In fact, the Tropical African History syllabus offered by ZIMSEC and the History of Tropical Africa offered by Cambridge are identical in content and objectives. The Turn-up study pack, for such a paper (Tropical Africa) is therefore perfectly tailor-made to address the material needs at Advanced Level for both ZIMSEC and Cambridge International Examinations.

The European History study pack is equally relevant for both ZIMSEC and Cambridge alike. The difference comes in the styles of examinations employed by ZIMSEC and Cambridge. ZIMSEC Advanced Level History requires them to choose four essays from at least two sections of the syllabus materials prepared by candidate. Happily, all the sections are covered by this study pack.

Assessing scripts at Advanced Level.

Assessment Aims:
The aims of the syllabus are the same for all Advanced Level History syllabuses and they describe the educational purposes of a course in Advanced Level History.

The aims are to:

1. Develop an interest in the past and an appreciation of human endeavour.
2. To acquire an understanding and a sound knowledge of selected periods or themes
3. To gain an awareness of historical concepts such as change and continuity, cause and effect.
4. To appreciate the nature and diversity of historical sources and methods used by historians.
5. To group a variety of approaches to aspects and periods of History and differing interpretations of particular historical issues.
6. To think independently and make informed judgements on given issues and situations.
7. To cultivate empathy with people living in diverse places and at different historical time frames.

Assessment objectives

1. To demonstrate an understanding of the complexity of issues and themes within a historical period.
2. To distinguish and assess different approaches to, interpretations of and opinions about the past;
3. To express awareness of historical concepts such as change and continuity, cause and effect in the past;
4. To present a clear, concise, logical and relevant argument.

These objectives are tested in essay questions. However, it needs to be noted that at Advanced Level historiography is not necessarily an assessment objective. As in objective number 2, students may have a thorough knowledge of the different schools of thought pertaining to a topic. It is however not necessary to summarize the arguments raised by different authors on a particular argument. Whilst that may earn credit for those who do it accurately and relevantly, it does not in any way disadvantage the other candidate who simply raises pertinent facts, analyses them and relates them to the question.

Generic mark bands for essay questions.

A generic mark band is a standard and agreed mark allocation procedure. These are usually ranging from mark band 21-25 marks where the strongest answers are placed, right down to band 7 where the weakest answers are also placed.

ZIMSEC adopted the Cambridge International Examining Board standards and, therefore, also adopted their generic mark band in the marking and assessment of scripts for candidates at A' level. It is extremely vital to highlight and explain in this chapter how marks are allocated to scripts and what each respective mark band stands for so that candidates and teachers alike may know what to aim for, how thoroughly they should prepare for the exams, and the possible outputs they should forecast.

Band I: 21-25 mark. The approach of the answer is consistently analytical and explanatory. (The terms analysis and explanation' will equally not be taken for granted. They are fully explained elsewhere in this chapter.) The quality of the answer indicates that the student has addressed all parts of the question. For example, How far…? The answer should discuss both the extent of agreement and disagreement with the assertion. Relevant factual information is adequately given and linked to the question. The quality of English expression also applies at this top band because the argument must be structured coherently and accurately. Essays will be clearly question-focused as opposed to topic focused. Hence students should be able to select what material is relevant to the specific question set and leave out what might just apply to a broader topic in general. A perfect answer is impossible to get but the best answers will achieve 25 marks.

Band 2: The requirements for this band are similar to the above band. However, the marks are a little lower (18-20) because whilst answers are analytical or explanatory in style, they tend to be one sided.

Band 3:16-17marks Answers in this band will reflect a clear understanding of the question. The approach will be in many ways heavily narrative and descriptive though fully relevant. Analysis and explanation may be at the very end of the essays. Usually such answers manage to make or pass a few analytical comments within the body of the essay but on the overall the style of writing may be descriptive.

Most candidates do not realize that analysis and explanation with links to the question must be consistently done in every paragraph for their answers to be placed in the top two bands. The 16-17 band, may also have some parts of the answers which lack coherence.

Band 4:14-15 marks

These are usually heavily descriptive and narrative answers which make very little or no attempt to analyse the arguments in the topic. Such marks are given because the descriptive material is very full and relevant although it is not effectively explained and lined to the topic. There may be some limited areas of irrelevance or vagueness but overall, the answer builds enough credit to deserve 14-15 marks.

Band 5: 11-13. These are thin descriptions of the topic, if not question. They constitute a basic pass (48-52%). There is no analysis and explanation and factual knowledge is not as full as the above band. Frequent errors usually occur to answers in this band. These are borderline cases usually determined by the amount of relevant description that they offer
Band 6:8-10 marks; Essays will lack focus on the demands of the question. There may be relevant but inadequate descriptive material to merit any higher marks. The writing will show vagueness and confusion about the implications of the question.

Band 7: 0-7 marks: Essays in this band will be irrelevant and shoddy description. Incomplete answers are also places in this band, if they reveal gross weaknesses in their approach. Marks at the bottom of this band (zero) are rarely given since even the weakest answers manage to raise one or two relevant points.

Examiners will assess which marking band reflects the quality of the answer given by the candidate.

The choice of mark within the band will depend on the quality of the analysis and the amount of relevant supporting information given by the candidate. For example the essays in Bands 1-3 will be clearly question- focused whereas answers in the lower bands will show a primary concern with the general topic rather than the specific question set in the exam. It is important to note that while question focused answers are likely to fetch the most marks, they still have to be analytical, explanatory as well as accompanied by sufficient relevant, accurate factual material.

In summarizing generic mark bands we can use the following diagram to illustrate all the points that have been mentioned above.



If the three pillars are all well represented in an essay, then it should be awarded marks in the two top bands. But if the answer goes on to be balanced in its focus, then marks in the top band, 22-25 must be given.

Guide lines on Essay writing at 'A' Level

a) **Introduction**

The introduction should be short and to the point. Aim for a maximum length of about ten sentences. Anything longer than this could possibly have taken too much of your time. You want to cover the following three areas

i) Explain the question- this involves defining the key terms in the question and explaining what you see the question as being about.

ii) State your argument: state your stand-point- whether you agree with the assertion and to what extent. Do not say "I agree to a certain extent" This sounds vague and adds nothing to your answer.

iii) Outline the themes you wish to consider and link them to the main argument.

An introduction is certainly vital because it shows the reader your line of argument.

AEB History Examiners Report A' Level 1995

Stated the following," The most effective introductions outlined the historical content briefly and identified a line of argument."

The above quote perfectly summarizes the essence of an introduction at A- Level. A good introduction should whet the examiner's appetite to learn more from your answer.

The Main body of the essay

Each paragraph should tackle a key point related to your core point. Rank your points in order of worth, starting with the strongest point and ending with the less important. The first sentence should clearly outline what point you are making in the paragraph. In the middle and at the end of the paragraph link the point to the mainstream of the argument, assessing its relative importance in the process.

- Do not be tempted to go into lengthy factual descriptions of the topic. This, as we have seen, will be deemed descriptive in style, resulting in you only achieving a ceiling of 15 marks.
- Avoid repetition, it is a sign of desperation, not emphasis.
- Be sure you stick to analytical writing. Analytical writing makes judgements but uses the facts in a supportive role.

Narrative writing on the other hand, relates the facts as a story and leaves the story hanging requiring the reader to come to their own analytical conclusions about why and how events came to happen. You want to aim for analytical rather than narrative writing. This will ensure that you explicitly tackle the question you have been asked and do not

waste time reeling out paragraphs of accurate, fascinating but in reality worth very little. (14-15 mark band)

- Still in the body of your answer. You may inset quotations to give weight to your arguments and to show evidence of your deeper appreciation for the topic. Quotations can come from primary sources or from more modern historians. However do not quote just for the sake of it. Many successful essays which earn marks in Band 1 (22-25) have no quote at all. A poor quote is worse than no quote.
- Choose a quote from a historian because it says something that you can then go on to discuss. Quotations should not be left on their own. Instead explain the importance of the content and how it links to the argument
- Quotations need not be long short phrases that express an idea or clever metaphors are ideal candidates for quoting.
- You can paraphrase a historian's argument if you cannot remember it word for word.
- Never try to invent quotations.

The Conclusion

The conclusion rounds the essay off. Your core argument should be obvious by now, but use the conclusion to state it very firmly and to relate it back to the essay title. Please note that:

- The conclusion should not introduce new concepts or arguments
- Avoid phrases such as "in summary." Or "thus it can be seen" they may sound vague
- Keep your conclusion short and to he point. Throughout the essay, examiners expect you to be able to write grammatically correct English and the spelling to be accurate. Avoid the following:
- Slang- this reveals carelessness and lack of respect for the examiner.
- Avoid misspelt proper names- particularly of key historical figures e.g Bismarck instead of Bismarck
- Avoid the use of long sentences that ramble on and on without a break. These create gloom and boredom in your answer.
- Always write in the third person, not in the first person.

Interpretation of key words frequently used by examiners

1. Why… / Explain… } Such questions require the candidate to give reasons. The best answers for such questions often rank the reasons in order of their importance.
   The most important reasons are given down in the order.

2. Account for / Discuss the role of / Examine the role of } They are somewhat related

In the sense that you will need to offer the most valid explanation, and go further to show why other reasons are less preferred. This latter part is often ignored by even the strong candidates. Focus on explaining why the factors chosen are important candidates often get

tempted just to write out a detailed factual account, but description no matter how accurate and relevant will not be enough to score the higher marks.

3. How far… and why…
   There are three parts to this type of question: the extent for and against as well as the reasons why… this is a very common 'A' level History question and as such must be fully and thoroughly known.
4. Compare and contrast. This can be rephrased to- similarities and differences. Compare- is a broader term than what meets the eye. This is because we never have identical situations or personalities in history. We only have similar situations and events. Hence compare… on its own means that a candidate has to explain the differences even where they do not seem to exist. Contrast on the other hand shows direct opposites in the given situations.

5. Analyze. This implies that we give strength and weaknesses, positives and negatives. As a rule, there is no part essay question which requires candidates to offer only one side of the answer.

<u>Developing your argument</u>

At A- Level you are expected to create an argument to answer the given question directly. Start by imagining that you have to answer it in one basic sentence.

- Next, consider the key points you need to make to support your argument.
- The other side of the debate- must never be left out of the arguments you could have made. You need to look at the alternative responses, and proceed to show why you consider them less important.
- Always remember the key words, e.g- "Most successful." What criteria would you use to judge the importance or degree of success?

CHAPTER 1

Abolition of slave trade

Learning objecitves

After studying the chapter, the student should be able to:

(i) Show how West African states replaced slave trade with legitimate exports.

(ii) Discuss the measures taken by Dahomey and other states transformed from slave trading to palm oil trading.

(iii) Discuss the successes of West African Kings in political and economic activities.

Introduction

Long distance trade usually involved the export of labour and import of European manufactured goods. Long distance trade does not create states. Only states that were strong enough and could take this trade benefited from it and expanded their power.

How does a ruler control trade?

Rulers who could control major ports could control the traders who passed through states such as Asante and Dahomey. Furthermore rulers who could control major trade routes were in a position to control trade in general, for example in Buganda. All trade was controlled through appointed officials who made sure that all imported goods remained under the ruler's control. This ensured that no individual could get rich through trade and trade routes.

How does control of trade increase the power of the state?

It gave the King the power to reward loyalty with rare luxury goods. It also enabled the King to control the supply of guns and the army could suppress any revolting chief. Trade also meant that the King was in a position to conquer other states hence conquered those which were poorly armed.

The introduction of new crops brought and enabled the state to feed large numbers of people more easily.

Trade and Independence:

Even in states where trading had contributed to its rise and expansion long distance trade, where it was conducted with European traders, undermined the state's economic position. For example, Europeans controlled the sea and African States wanted European goods. They were forced to trade with European traders. They could not take their goods directly to European traders who if they grew more powerful at the coast, could easily dictate the terms of trade to the Africans.

The African exports were labour and raw materials. These contributed to capitalist development in Europe and further partly contributed to the rise of the Industrial Revolution. The kind of goods Africans imported did nothing to boost local industry. If anything local industry declined. No African States in particular in West African could refuse the supply of guns in return of whatever Europeans demanded. By the late 19th century therefore European traders were in a position to dictate the terms of trade that is what Africans could supply. European technology was far better advanced than African technology. African states had become dependent on European manufacturers. This dependence did not affect African states equally but gradually all of them were weakened.

The Niger Delta States:

The Ibo:

The Niger Delta is a complex system of rivers and creeks through which the Niger River flows to the sea. The interior of the Delta was inhabited by 160 stateless societies.

For over 2 000 years, the Ibo had supplied slaves and other goods in small quantities to European traders who entered their ships off the coast. The area became the European controlled world trading system. At the coast a number of small but fairly powerful commercial city states mushroomed. These city states created trading houses where peasant producers from the interior brought their goods and the slave traders brought their captives. The most important of these were Bonny, Calabar, Itsekireland and Opobo.

The city states grew up out of small lineage groups similar to the Ibo villages. A dominant village ruled a number of other lineages. In the Delta States they formed a strong complex and close unit of communities which didn't extend over a very large area.

The Coastal States:

They did not try and administer these areas. All what they did was to ensure that producers in the interior did not trade directly with European traders. Consequently, each delta state had a complex monopoly of trade within its spheres of influence. Most important of these

were the middle men, thus they were not really producers themselves. Their control of trade on the river was maintained by fleets of well-armed war canoes.

The majority of these rulers were not only progressive but equally modernized. They introduced European education, building and even technological innovation. Another outstanding feature was that even slaves could rise to high positions if they displayed initiative with skill, and ability, for example, Jaja of Opobo was formerly a slave from the state of Bonny and was able to set up his own state in the 1860s.

The geography of the Niger Delta with its small hidden rivers made it an ideal place to continue slave trading long after the British had invaded other states of West Africa. Delta states made profit from illegal slave trade. The area and its hinterland were in the main palm producing area of West Africa. Peasant producers in the interior and Delta middle men were equally to respond to the demand of palm oil.

After the 1840s the Delta led in the production of palm oil in West Africa. As such the region attracted the interest of European countries. The whole political structure of the states was characterized by the House System which facilitated social mobility, adaptability and these houses were organized as co-operatives.

How did their relations with European traders change?

In the period exceeding the 1860s rulers of these states had each a monopoly over the peasant producers and their interior spheres. European traders never went beyond the coast. There were many different European traders trading in the area. As a result a competitive situation existed and this was in the favour of the Delta States who had far more control of the price and setting over the goods they supplied.

Development in the middle of the 19th Century changed relations with regard to the relatively equal balance in terms of trade:

(i) Extension of the official British government interest in the region especially after the creation of the British colony of Lagos in approximately 1863 and the efforts of Britain to abolish the slave trade.

(ii) The amalgamation of all European trading companies into one great company, the United Niger Company and Royal Niger Company.

These two surfaced in the 1860s up to about the 1890s as British monopoly trading interests sought aid from the British navy which culminated in the granting of a royal charter to the company in 1886 to rule over the recently proclaimed Oil Rivers Protectorate.

The British Official Interest:

In the 1860s the British established a consul at Lagos on the Yoruba coast. It is generally argued that they did this because they required a base for anti- slave activities a fleet which

protected the Niger region in their attempt to stop the continuation of the slave trade. Thus British interests in the region continued to 1890s and this was marked by the establishment of Crown Colony in Lagos. The British made treaties with many African rulers on the coast to stop the slave trade and to acquire palm oil.

In 1884 the British attacked and deposed King William Deppa Pepple who refused to co-operate fully with British traders. From about 1855 British commercial interests in the Niger Delta expanded markedly. This was made visible by two developments; technological advancement in scientific development and the development of steamships enabling traders to sail up stream.

As a result, the British became involved in the interior seeking to trade directly with the peasant producers and eliminated middlemen. This threatened interests of the Delta rulers who attempted to prevent them and occasionally even attacked and destroyed their trading ports. The British Navy was called upon to escort and protect the British traders.

Monopoly Trading Companies:

In 1884, a British Company set up trading stations on the Niger River to the north of the Niger Delta. British trading activities in the area were aimed at advancing direct trading contacts with the peasants in the interior and eliminating the middle men. However, this met with stiff resistance from the Delta States especially Brass. War Canoes attacked British ships and trading stations. British traders relied on protection from the British Navy. It should be noted that right up to the 1870s the British were not very successful in their trading activities with the interior. However things changed dramatically after the middle of the 1870s when a British trader George Goldie managed to bring about a major amalgamation of the British trading companies into a single monopoly.

This monopoly trading company had the following advantages over African traders:

(i) It was able to set up prices to its advantage.
(ii) Enabled them in the event of competition which might arise, for example, in the late 1870s two French companies began to trade in the Niger Delta.

The United African Company or (UNC) was able to offer much high prices than the French companies for palm oil. For a while, this meant that UAC made little profit, but it destroyed the competitors. As soon as competition had subsided, including competition from other British traders the UNC brought their prices further down again.

By the late 1870s the UAC controlled over 100 trading stations in the interior each by heavily armed gun boats. Between 1880 and 1886 Goldie's agents signed about 237 treaties on behalf of the UAC with the African communities, forcing them to trade with UAC. It is unlikely that most of the chiefs who signed the treaties understood the full implications of what the treaties encompassed.

The problem of illiteracy enabled the Europeans to word the treaties so that they allowed them maximum advantage. These were orally explained to the chiefs and more often than not neglecting to explain the full implications that were involved. These treaties were recognized by the British government primarily to forestall the French treaties.

They formed the foundation of the creation of the Royal charter in 1886 of the Oil River Protectorate. In 1886 the UAC got a charter from the British government to rule over the Oil River Protectorate. The British government was reluctant to undertake the cost of the paper protectorate into effective occupation.

The diversity of the nature of the Chartered Company was a way of securing British control at a minimum cost. To the British, it served the purpose of eliminating foreign competition and equally developed. Trade to the benefit of the British, thus the government was not committed to any great financial or military involvement.

Moreover, it enabled the British to claim that the established administration or effective occupation as demanded by the Berlin colonial conference (maintained a paper protectorate.) Their interest in trade and successful trade inevitably meant confrontation with Niger Delta States.

Already, before the protectorate's establishment the UAC had with assistance of the British navy attacked and destroyed a number of trading ports belonging to the Delta City States. The UNC embarked on aggressive policy against the Delta middlemen from trading in the area under jurisdiction.

This provoked determined clashes and desperate resistance from the Delta States. With the aid of the British Navy the Niger Delta States were destroyed by the 1890s. African rulers were generally acurately aware of the conflicts of interest of the capitalists.

The Niger Delta states were fairly aware that submitting to European control would not only mean a loss to both political and economic independence but equally a transfer of the economic resources for the benefit of the Europeans rather than the traditional ruling class. It is not surprising therefore that with a few notable exceptions African societies resisted.

NB: African states and societies resisted with a degree of determination and ferocity. Even those few who had given in did so because it was their short- term interest to do so. Resistance to British expansion did not only mean resistance to military conquest, for example, most states refused to tolerate the presence of missionaries and traders which they saw as nothing but forerunners of imperialism.

Bonny:

The years between 1853 and 1854 marked the higher level of Bonny's strength both in terms of political stability and economic prosperity. During this period Bonny was regarded as the wealthiest state within the Niger Delta.

In terms of trade, the state benefited from the slave trade. It was within Bonny that British interventionists encountered stiff resistance. The British used this as a pretext to their intervention in Bonny meant that they wanted to stabilize political activity within the state.

Due to political instability which indirectly affected British merchants, the British intervened not only to depose William but also to have complete control of trade.

Jaja of Opobo:

The rise of Jaja of Opobo was a result of political conflict within Bonny. He advocated modernisation and technical innovation without any European intervention or interference, thus he banned both missionaries and traders from his state.

However, Johnson was hell. He aimed at breaking the political independence of Jaja of Opobo. Consequently, he invited Jaja on a boat and deported him to Ghana where he was charged of blocking the highways of traders. With his absence, the British took over the administration of the state.

Brass:
There was nothing that most African communities could do to resist encroachment in their territories. Things were different within Brass. She resisted British trade regulations which were imposed on her.

Consequently, she landed a pronounced attack on the company's coastal stations. The British Naval expedition was used to destroy some of Brass' settlements using the company's forces. The Company had the most powerful and effective fighting contingent. It was this force which was used to enforce punitive expeditions against societies north of the Delta States, especially those who physically resisted from obeying the company's regulations. All in all, the overall effect of the Company's attitude towards the Delta States was totally negative.

The Atlantic slave trade

The Atlantic slave trade was largely a response to the demand for slave labour in the sugar plantations across the Atlantic Ocean.
Slave Trade also depended on Africans' willingness to sell slaves. They did so because underpopulation, with the consequent difficult of commanding labour by purely economic means, had already stimulated slavery and slave-trading among many but not all African peoples. It was not until about 1 700 that slaves replaced gold as the West African coast's most valuable export. As European and African diseases destroyed the Amerindian peoples, African slaves replaced them. The major reasons for this were that Africans alone were available in the required numbers. They were cheaper than white labourers, and they had the unique degree of immunity to both European and African diseases which came from living on the tropical periphery of the old world. By the late sixteenth century nearly 80% of all exported West African slaves went to the Americas, especially to Brazil where sugar plantations took root during the 1540s.

Slave exports from Africa to the Atlantic by centuries

1450 – 1600	367 000
1601 – 1700	1 868 000
1701 – 1800	6 133 000
1801 – 1900	3 330 000

According to Curtin, 42% of exported slaves went to the Caribbean 38% to Brazil and fewer than 5% to North America, largely because it was far from Africa.

Average slave prices on the West African coast approximate figures at constant 1780 values.

Period	**Price (£)**
1500	10
1600	14
1670s	< 5
1730s	25
1780s	25
1860s	>10

The first slaves came from mainly Senegambia, the upper Guinea Coast, Congo and Angola (An important supplier throughout the trade.) The growth points of the mid- seventeenth century were the Gold Coast and the Bight of Benin (including the Dahomey and the Yoruba Kingdoms.)
Eighteenth-century: expansion areas were the Bight of Biafra (especially the Niger Delta) and Mozambique.
By 1807, the Bight of Biafra, Angola and Mozambique supplied over 80% of British and French slave exports and virtually all the Portuguese trade.

How slaves were obtained

Slaves were captured, kidnapped or raided during wars. Some slaves were obtained through judicial processes, chiefly on charges of adultery. The weak were generally more vulnerable orphans, widows, poor relations, the idle, the feckless and the feeble- minded were all likely to end in slavery. Even those who defied the powerful ended also in slavery. Most final sales of slaves to European merchants were by coastal **middlemen** who strive to prevent either

white men penetrating the interior or inland reaching the sea. In Senegambia and upper Guinea these middlemen were often Afro- Portuguese.
In other areas they were usually the Africans the best known group being the IJAW traders of the Niger Delta.

Consequences
The moment of sailing was traumatic. The anguish was in the mind because many West Africans believed that Europeans were sea creatures, cannibals from the land of the dead whose black shoe-leather was from African skin, whose red wine was African blood, and whose gunpowder was from burnt and ground African bones.
Similar fears existed in Mozambique and among those exposed to the Saharan slave trade.
The atmosphere in the slave quarters between decks was disgusting, sometimes there was no light the ship crew were at times very brutal. Water to drink was a scarce resource- limited to about one litre per day.

Demographic consequences
The real number of slaves exported is not known. This is so mainly because there is no reliable way of estimating loss of life before disembarkment. It's also not known how large West Africa's population was when the trade begun. Angola suffered severely during slave trade. There is evidence of depopulation. There is no consensus on whether Western Africa's population declined absolutely, nor by how much although most experts might think any decline to have been relatively small.
Although slave trade was a demographic disaster for Africa it was not catastrophe because the people survived.

Political consequences
Igbo supplied many slaves but it experienced little political change. Instead it remained predominantly stateless. The chief political result was to shape the character of some states in a merchantilist direction, meaning that political and commercial power were fused, either by rulers controlling trade or by traders acquiring political power. In West Africa it was the import and use of firearms rather than the capture and export of slaves that enabled small, well- armed minorities to dominate larger populations. Slave trade was only one of many forces shaping Western Africa's political history at this time but not always the most important. One of the major states to disintegrate during the slave trade, although not necessarily because of it, was Oyo, the dominant Yoruba Kingdom in the South-West of modern Nigeria.

In Oyo the interaction between indigenous processes and foreign commerce was complex. Conflict tore the political system of Oyo apart. The subject peoples broke away and in 1817 a dissident Kakunfo incited a revolt by Oyo's numerous Muslims which ended with the overrunning of the capital. By around 1835, Oyo was deserted. Internal structural tensions, imperial expansion, and militant Islamism had together destroyed the state. While old land empires collapsed, new merchantilist states arose either by merchants gaining political power or by rulers controlling commerce. Some of the states which grew partly as a result of slave trade were the Niger Delta State, Asante, and Dahomey. A merchantilist state also came into being in Angola.

Economic and social consequences

The slave trade's economic impact was as complex as other effects. Slave trade was growing much faster than international trade as a whole and it was of course, most unevenly distributed within West Africa.

Western Africa traded with the Atlantic World for over 300 years without experiencing any significant economic development. Only on the coast itself in Angola and along the River Senegal, where the slave trade cut deepest did imported cloth damage indigenous textile industries during the eighteenth century. In other areas the expanding market absorbed both local and imported products. Igbo textile production is thought to have increased in the eighteenth century. Yoruba cloth found a market in Brazil and Asante and established a new weaving industry with imported northern skills. Yoruba and Asante developed the whole range of garment industries. New specialists grew up among boatsmen and professional partners. Another effect, with more ambiguous consequences, was to foster slavery within Western Africa, especially female slavery. Women were valued as viable for both their reproductive capacity and their labour. Visitors to Asante and Dahomey noted that male slaves had difficulty in obtaining wives where polygamous masters accumulated women while research on the 19th century suggests that slave wives bore few children perhaps deliberately. Mass slavery also tended to reduce the status of free peasants as in Congo, and this probably affected especially free women, since so many slaves were women.

Slave Trade

Reasons for the rise of the slave trade in east Africa

1. The movement of Seyyid Said to Zanzibar where he settled and established his capital in 1840 was one of the most important reasons why the slave trade grew and affected the interior of East Africa. He embarked on strong plants to open up slave trade routes to the interior of East Africa. Hence, the number of slaves being sold at the slave market in Zanzibar annually during that period reached between 40 000 and 45 000.
2. Greater demand for slaves overseas and in North East Africa stimulated the growth of the slave trade in East Africa. The invention of the Spanish mines in the West Indies increased slave demands to work in the mines. Slaves were also in demand in Arabia, the Far East and Persia.

Moreover, during the second half of the 18th century, France opened up larger sugar plantations on the islands of Reunion, Mauritious and in the Indian Ocean. African slaves were thus in demand, to go and work in those plantations.

Added to the above fact is that the increased demand for sugar and cotton in Europe led to their increase in price, and therefore, more labour (slaves) was needed in the British colonies of West Indies and America. As a matter of fact, the legalisation of the trade by Napoleon I of France in 1802 increased the demand for slaves in all French colonies.

3. Moreover the strong desire for European goods, African chiefs such as Mirambo and Nyungu ya Mawe induced them to acquire slaves in exchange for manufactured goods such as brass, metalware, cotton cloth, beads, spirits (such as whisky), guns and gunpowder. In addition to this, the fact that the middlemen trade reaped huge

profits encouraged these traders to get deeply involved in the trade. The middlemen were either Arab-Swahili traders or African chiefs.

4. The development of plantation agriculture, especially clove plantations, attracted huge labour force. On the other hand, the development of long distance trade, linking the coast and the interior of East Africa provided a basis for the development of the slave trade. Initially, few slaves were needed to transport goods to and from the interior of East Africa, but with the demand for slaves overseas, the same routes were used to transport slaves.

Effects of the Slave trade upon East Africa: Positive effects

1. The interior of East Africa was opened up to the coming of European missionaries who in turn brought western civilisation and modernisation to the region. Eventually missionaries were instrumental in the abolition of the slave trade and the extension of European imperialism in the region.
2. A new race, the Swahili, emerged through the intermarriages between Arabs and Africans. The language is widely spoken in Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda and Eastern Congo to date.
3. Arab towns grew out of simple stop- overs, such as UJiji and Tabora, inland of the east.
4. There was the emergence of powerful states which were directly or indirectly linked to the developments in the slave trade in East Africa. These warlords included Mirambo Nyunguya Mawe, and TippuTip. Defensive states arose either in fear of the Ngoni or of the Swahili Arab slave raiders. Tippu Tip for instance, at one point was in possession of 50 000 guns with which he trained them. Moreover, these new states were larger, fortified and highly centralised and militarised.

5. **Negative Effects**

1. The slave trade led to the de-population and under-development of the continent. The most productive age group estimated to the tune of between 15 to 30 million people, were exported to the Americas, Europe and Asia.
   It is known that about 11 million people went to America alone. Hence, potential empire-builders and great leaders were killed in the process, or they got permanently detached from their continent from which they were capable of making lasting contribution.
2. The slave trade brought misery, suffering and lowered the living standards of people in East Africa. Africans were reduced to commodities which could be bought and sold for money.
3. Normal economic activities such as farming, were severely disrupted. This is because the young and able craftsmen, traders and farmers were carried away into slavery, causing economic stagnation as the normal workforce was either depleted or

decimated. Equally, there was a decline in the production of traditional goods such as coffee, beans, bark cloth and iron, which greatly hindered the cash economy. African industries either collapsed or declined due to competition from the cheap manufactured goods from Europe.

Why did the slave Trade continue into the second half of the 19th century and 20th century in East Africa?

1. As long as there was external demand for slaves, the slave trade was bound to continue. What needed to be done first was to thwart the sources of demand and then abolitioning efforts would be more realiable and successful.
2. It is important to note that the abolition movement which had begun in Britain and her overseas territories, first took effect in West Africa. This then left the slave trade to continue without much disturbance in East Africa. In fact the decline in the West African slave trade encouraged the expansion of the slave trade in East Africa, especially because the greater demand for slaves was still available in America and the West Indies.
3. More importantly, European slave merchants and African chiefs and middlemen were blinded by the huge profits which they got in the trade. This made their active participation and willing co-operation in ending the slave trade very difficult.
4. Other European countries refused to co-operate with Britain because they had not yet industrialised and, hence, they still benefited from it e.g Portugal and Spain. On the other hand a lone campaign by Britain was both audios and expensive. The East African coastline was too vast and this delayed the anti-slavery groups penetrating into the interior. At the same time, Arabs controlled most areas of the interior of East Africa and a considerable thrust of diplomacy was needed to convince the Arabs to give up the slave trade.

The final abolition of the slave Trade in East Africa.

Like in West Africa, Britain followed a policy of coastal influence in East Africa. As already stated, the East African coast was too vast, and as a result of this, the whole process of abolition would take long-drawn years.

Britain regarded the Sultan of Zanzibar as an ally who would help to guard the East African flank of the route to India around the Cape of Good Hope. It must be highlighted that British interests on the East African coast was insignificant and almost none at the coast. However, the British had time and again had shown benevolence and support to the shaky Omani regime in East Africa. Another powerful motive why Britain persistently gave support to the Sultan was because Britain wanted him to fully side with the idea of abolishing the slave trade. Britain had no real economic motives in East Africa and there were very few British traders on the east coast, either before or after the abolition, of the slave trade in 1873. This differed greatly form West Africa where the anti-slavery movement gained a tremendous amount of support from British businessmen who had vested interests in legitimate commerce in West Africa.

Another delaying aspect in the abolition of the slave trade was the fact that the British consul at Zanzibar from 1841 to 1883 was under the Viceroy of India in Bombay, and not to the Foreign Office in London. This shows clearly that British east African policy was geared to Indian Ocean strategy. The Indians would, thus, act as a wall, on Britain's behalf against the possibility of French imperialism. The French held Reunion and the Comoro islands, had established footholds in Madascar and felt bitter at the loss of Mauritius and the Seycheles to Britain in the Napoleon's war at the beginning of the century. The British thus posted a consul to guide him in (1841), and help him win his authority along the coast. In return, Seyyid Said encouraged the British merchants to settle in Zanzibar and cooperated to act against the slave trade.

Although Britain and Zanzibar signed the Moresby Treaty in 1822, it simply promised to stop the sale of slaves outside Omani territory, in particular, to British India and French Reunion, but the way to final abolition was still far off. The treaty carried the weight of a goodwill settlement, not an enforced settlement. No real mechanisms of blockades and searches were put in place. Hence, the slave trade continued unabated in East Africa.
The 1845 Hamerton Treaty was somewhat stronger. Slaves could no longer be sold outside East Africa. However, Said feared a revolt by the slave traders and complained to the British agent saying; "You have put on me a heavier load than I can bear." However, he had not foreseen the ineffectiveness of the treaty. The British naval squadron employed to hunt slave dhows in the Indian Ocean was too small, the ocean was too vast and the coastline was too long. Hence, as late as 1872, the East coast slave trade through Zanzibar was thus at its peak.

Worse still, in 1870 when Sultan Majid (1856-70) died, Britain made Barghash Sultan on condition that he intensified the effort against the slave trade, but Barghash broke his promise and asserted his independence from the Britisa consul, Sir John Kirk. The British were able to force Barghash to abolish the slave trade in 1873 only because of a lucky event in which they made good use of A hurrican in 1872 ruined Zanzibar's economy, and Barghash was forced to appeal to his powerful ally, Britain for assistance.

Barghash's appeal came at the right time, and Sir John Kirk was able to promise aid on condition that the Sultan abolishes the slave trade. In this move, Kirk was backed up by Sir Bartle Frere who was sent from London to put more pressure on the Sultan. Frere threatened a British naval blockade of Zanzibar and Barghash signed the 1873 treaty which stipulated that no more slaves could be put on board amy ship in Zanzibar waters, and that the Zanzibar slave market should be closed. This decisive action led to slave-trader rebellions in 1875 and 1876 at Mombasa and Kilwa. Barghash, who was still recovering, had to rely on British military and its Navy to suppress the revolts.

However, smuggling of slaves in the years after abolition was on so large a scale that in 1876 the sultan, at Kirle's insistence, proclaimed that slaves could not be moved by land, and slave caravans could not approach the coast. These proclamations were enforced by a new Swahili military force set up and led by a British officer, Lieutenant Lloyd Mathews. Gradually, Mathews took on other responsibilities until he was the Prime Minister of

Zanzibar, though he took his orders, not from the sultan but from the British Consul, the real source of authority. By the time of the German incursion in 1884 and the Partition of East Africa, Zanzibar had been reduced to the role of a puppet state of Britain. Hence, the British policy of coastal paramountcy was developing into a barely disguised political imperialism.
It must be noted still, that in contrast to West Africa, British commercial interests were of little significance in the formulation of British policy on the East Coast. The most active British trader on the east coast was William Mackinnon. In the 1870s he tried to set up a British trading company to pacify and develop the interior. He got the backing of John Kirk, but failed to convince the London government.
So, Mackinnon was left with his British India Steam Navigation Company, carrying the mail from Zanzibar to Aden, more as a public service, than for a desire for profits. Mackinno's road to Lake Malawi was abandoned just a few miles outside Dar es Salaam. Only the Germany threat to the traditional British dominance in Zanzibar in the 1880s gave MacKinnon a chance to found the company with which he intended to carry "civilisation" into the interior.

The abolition of the Slave trade: Effects on African states in the 19th Century.

There is a great deal of controversy over the circumstances which led to the abolition of the slave trade in Britain, say from 1807 onwards when the legal process began to be unraveled. Some historians argue that it was, purely due to humanitarian or moral and religious factors that the inhuman trade was abolished. Others however, argue that the slave trade and slavery were abolished mainly for economic reasons.

One such writer is Conton, a Sierra leonian who stated that,

> "The slave trade was abolished
> largely because it had now
> become more profitable to seek,
> in West Africa, raw materials
> and markets rather than slaves."

Some historians, however, tend to take a general view which acknowledge that the slave trade was abolished because of a combination of factors.

A Boahen in his book Topics in West African History has made a thorough and informative friendly examination of the various factors which led to the abolition of the slave trade. He concludes that the slave trade was abolished due mainly to a combination of both the humanitarian and economic factors. In the first place it should not be forgotten that the attacks on the slave trade did not really begin in Europe and England until the eighteenth century- the very century when, through literature, philosophy and religion, the ideals of equality, brotherhood and liberty of man were broadly proclaimed. The slave trade was condemned alike by philosophy and religion, the ideals of equality, brotherhood and liberty of man were broadly proclaimed. The slave trade was condemned alike by philosophers and economists such as Jean Jacques Rousseau and Adam Smith; literary figures such as Samuel Johnson and Daniel Defoe; and by evangelists such as John Wesley.

Moreover, it is also important to note that all the people who actually organized and launched the attack on the slave trade and remained persistently in the forefront of the attack were men who were personally committed to the evangelical and humanitarian ideals of the day. They included such well-known abolitionists as Granville Sharp and William Wilberforce and later Forwell Buxton and James Stephen. It was these people who formed the society for the Abolition of the Slave Trade in May 1787 and the British Anti- slavery society in 1823. It was in fact these two societies which conducted the campaign against the slave trade. They organized branches throughout the country with a view to arouse public opinion against the slave trade and from 1788 persistently tabled motions in Parliament until their ends were achieved by the abolition of the slave trade in 1807 and slavery in 1833.

Having said that, it is crucial to emphasize that moral and humanitarian pressure alone was not sufficient to transform the story from the hearts of the slave masters, who relied upon the institution of slavery for a living. If humanitarian considerations alone had been sufficient then the slave trade would have been abolished by 1792 when the House of Commons did in fact pass a motion agreeing to the gradual abolition of the slave trade. By that time the majority of the members had clearly become convinced that the sale of Africans was evil and inhuman. Yet no decisive measure was adopted to stop the evil practice.

Economic factors influenced the abolition in this way; first by the end of the eighteenth century, the British West Indian islands had all the slaves they needed and in fact about fifty percent were being re-exported to the islands of other European powers. It meant therefore that the abolition of the slave trade per se would not be totally ruinous to them since they possessed the optimum numbers which they needed.

Secondly, even some of the British West Indian planters began to support the campaign for the abolition of the slave trade from the beginning of the nineteenth century, because they were alarmed by the competitive development of the new fertile French and Dutch islands which the British had conquered during the wars fought between 1792 and 1802. Undoubtedly, one of the reasons leading to the passing of the Abolition Bill in 1807 was this division that occurred in the ranks of the West Indian planters's interest in parliament. This naturally influenced the pattern of voting for new acts of parliament which became law, such as the Bill of 1807.

Furthermore, since Brazil and Cuba were producing sugar in greater quantities and more cheaply during the second half of the nineteenth century, British West Indian sugar could not be sold on the continental markets. There was therefore a surplus of sugar in England and one writer has argued that it was the accumulation of unsold sugar in Britain and the subsequent need to stop further over-production that led to the passing of the Abolition Bills in 1807 and 1833.

A.A. Boahen equally argues that economic conditions in the West Indies alone were not sufficient to bring about abolition. This is evident from the fact that between 1772 and 1774, the British government refused to give royal assent to bills passed by the assemblies of Massachusetts, Virginia and Jamaica aimed at abolishing or reducing the volume of the

slave trade. The colonies were told that they would not be allowed "to check or discourage in any degree, a traffic so beneficial to the British nation."

That the slave trade was a pup of the British economy at the time cannot be doubted. The textile, sugar-refining, sipping and iron industries in Britain all depended directly or indirectly on the slave trade to the West Indian Islands.

Between 1800 and 1830 this situation changed radically mainly as a result of the industrial revolution. The textile industrialists, for instance, needed far more raw cotton than the British West Indian islands could produce and they were obtaining their supplies from the southern parts of the United States. The sugar refiners also needed far more crude sugar than they could get from the West Indies and they began to look to Brazil to cover the gap. Ship-owners were also now deriving far more profit from conveying raw cotton and unrefined sugar from Brazil and the United States to Europe and Britain than conveying slaves to the West Indies. Indeed by 1805 only 2% of British export tonnage was employed in the slave trade. Moreover, as more and more manufacturing machines came into use the demand for more raw materials increased and many industrialists as well as humanitarianists now began to argue that Africans, instead of being exported to the West Indies, could be more profitably employed in Africa to produce such commodities as palm oil needed for lubricating new machines groundnuts and cotton. Manufactured goods could be sold in African markets.

By the early nineteenth century therefore, it had become clear that the slave trade had ceased to be a prop to the British economy and that Africans could serve Britain more effectively by producing cash crops rather than supplying labour to the West Indian colonies. This realization was the main force behind the abolition of the entire slave system between 1807 and 1833. Thus, the strong economic forces at work in the West Indies and in Britain contributed at least as much to abolition as humanitarian and moral considerations.

Effects of the Abolition

Having taken place for centuries, and being abolished at the end of the nineteenth century, the abolition of the slave trade in general, had far reaching social, economic and political effects in West Africa.

The first social effect of the abolition of the slave trade was the suppression of the slave trade in West Africa. After, achieving the legal abolition of the slave trade, the humanitarianists and abolitionists put pressure on European governments to achieve world-wide abolition of the evil trade. As a result of this pressure and the favourable response it received, almost all the European countries had passed acts abolishing sing the slave trade by the 1830s. In spite of these acts, however, the volume of the new illegal trade had in fact increased mainly because of increased demand for slaves in Cuba and Brazil.

The demand for slaves in Cuba and Brazil had in fact enabled the slave trade to the continued into the second half of the nineteenth century, despite the fact that most countries had outlawed the practice. As long as there was demand elsewhere the slave trade would continue to thrive.

The abolitionists therefore urged the British government to send naval vessels to the west coast of Africa to capture any vessel slaves to the Americas and to occupy any areas where the slave trade was still dominant. The British government agreed and introduced a number of measures calculated to suppress the slave trade. They instituted a naval patrol, concluded treaties with some European powers granting them right of search, set up the Courts of Mixed Commission in Freedom to try offenders, and concluded anti-slavery treaties with African rulers. The naval patrol of the west coast which began as early as 1808 continued until the 1860s when the Atlantic slave trade finally ceased.

The USA eventually agreed to sign the abolitionist Bill into law following the American Civil War. This was one of the greatest watershed on the history of the slave trade because, following the defeat of the south by the north in the Civil War, it directly meant that North America could now compel all the southern states to desist from the slave trade. This equally impacted on Brazil and Cuba. They did not live in a Vacuum and could therefore continue to practice the slave trade. The US' presence was a great inhibiting factor upon both Brazil and Cuba. US military patrols ensured that no slave imports were made to the Americas or its immediate hinterland.

Economically the abolition of the slave trade created an economic vacuum on the coast and all kinds of attempts were made to fill it by developing what came to be called "legitimate" trade, that is, trade in natural products such as palm oil, groundnuts, cotton, minerals, coffee, rubber and timber. Both European and African traders first turned that attention to palm oil, which was urgently needed in Europe for lubricating the newly- invented machines and for making soap with which the factory workers could wash themselves. Africans were now encouraged to obtain oil as well as kernel from the nuts for export.

This revived activity was very successful, first in the regions of the Niger delta from where the quantity of palm oil produced increased rapidly throughout the century- from 1000 tons in 1810 to 5000 tons in 1820; to 10 000 tons in 1830 and to 30 000 tons by 1850. Palm oil was also exported from Ghana from about 1820 onwards and by 1840 it formed the third leading export, the first two being gold and ivory.

The various attempts to develop "legitimate" trade in West Africa were not confined to coastal areas only. The European traders tried to exploit the Niger as a commercial highway after the discovery of its mouth by John and Richard Lander in 1830. Indeed as soon as the Lander brothers retread to England with the news of their discovery, two companies were formed to try to establish a permanent trading centre at the confluence of the Benue and the Niger. More Frequent efforts, after three expeditions led to the development of the Niger as a commercial highway.

Moreover, the abolition of the slave trade had some political consequences as well. The British took over Sierra Leone to use it as a base for the suppression of the slave trade on the West African coast and the Atlantic slave trade. However, Liberia and Sierra Leone were soon used as springboards in the colonization of other areas of West Africa.

Thus the abolition of the slave trade involved Europe more deeply into the affairs of West Africa. By 1880 Europeans were not only preaching the gospel and building schools in West Africa but they were also actively trading in a wide range of natural products and as a result of these activities they had in some instances even assumed direct political control. Hence the abolition of the slave trade had all- encompassing results and West Africa, stretching from political, economic, social and religious aspects.

Eastern Africa.

The Eastern interior was one of the most isolated parts of Africa until the eighteenth century, when it was drawn into the world economy through long- distance trade. The South of the Eastern African region had exported ivory and gold for nearly a thousand years, but during the eighteenth century, Mozambique became also an important source of slaves first for French plantation Islands in the Indian Ocean, then for the Americans and finally (from the 1820s) for the Imerina Kingdom in Madagascar. Many slaves came from the Prazos of the Zambezi valley or their raids on neighbouring African societies disrupting especially the Maravi Chiefdoms.

Said (name of a person) was both an able Commander and an economic genius. It did not take him long to see that his East African force was more worthy of his attention than the rocks and deserts in his little state of Oman on the Western side of the Persian Gulf.
He possessed efficient armed forces. He got his ships from the British – under the terms of a treaty made with him.

A major advancement was made in the development of clove plantations. Zanzibar under **Said** became the world's leading producer of cloves. The Sultans also encouraged Arab settlement and the development of food crop plantations in the country north of Mombasa particularly in the areas around Malindi and Lamu.

The development of clove and grain plantations led to the creation of a semi- colonial plantation economy in which the Swahili Arabs of Zanzibar were the masters and the Africans were the slaves. The clove plantations were worked by slaves who were imported from the interior. Arabs established settlements at certain key points, such as Tabora in the Nyamwezi country and Ujiji on Lake Tanganyika. These were mainly commercial depots, but in time they grew to exercise a certain military and political control over the surrounding countryside. Generally the Arabs obtained their ivory and slaves from the local rulers who armed with the imported guns sent their warriors to hunt elephants and to raid the forests of neighbouring peoples, often capturing slaves in the process. In most of East Africa, however, slavery was merely a by-product of the ivory rush than the primary object of the trade.

Sayyid Said encouraged Indians to settle in East Africa. In 1840 there were approximately 1,000 Indians at the East African coast but in 1860 there were about 4,000. Indians managed

Zanzibar's important trade with India, exchanging Indian cloth, metal-ware and beads for ivory and slaves. The distribution of overseas goods in Zanzibar and along the coast was conducted by Indian firms. The Indians were both retailers and wholesales. They acted as bankers, investing their capital largely in loans and mortgages. They extended credit loans to the Sultan and to Swahili, Arab, Indian and European traders. The Indian rupee and copper pice currency gradually replaced the Austrian Maria Theresa dollar as the principal currency in circulation at the coast. The Indians therefore, performed many vital economic services in Zanzibar and were ultimately to extend their influence far inland. Swahili culture experienced considerable Arabinisatian and Indianisation.

The Chief import was cloth, whose falling prices, owing to industrialisation fuelled the whole trading system. Firearms supplemented it from the mid- century, imports reaching nearly 100, 000 a year during the 1880s, Zanzibar became a capital trading centre as well as a plantation colony.

Sultan Barghash, under British pressure, abolished the slave trade in Zanzibar territory in 1873 and in 1876 he issued a proclamation which prohibited the trafficking of slaves from the interior to the coast. This resulted in a sharp decline of the slave trade at the coast but a corresponding increase in the slave trade in the interior. Slaves were used in large numbers to cultivate the estates of the Swahili-Arabs in Eastern Zaire, and the estates of the Nyamwezi, Gogo and Yao peoples in East Africa.

Negative Effects of the Slave Trade

Their role in the political, economic and social fortunes of African communities:

Mention has been made on the importance of the slave trade in the economies of the West African pre-colonial states. Now is the point where a complete and exclusive coverage of the central topic can be made.

The Slave trade marked the beginning of African diaspora. It is believed that it was mankind's greatest disaster According to Davidson. European stupidity merged with African demoralisation. Finally, moral bands were weakened by some parents selling their children for the sake of making profit. Peace that had prevailed, as observed by the Portuguese had now been replaced by warfare i.e slave wars.

Both Hallet and Fage hold in agreement that, although the slave trade brought wealth in the form of some commodities, ultimate effects to Africans development were harmful. Africans themselves indeed were bad bargainers in exchanging men and women whose labour could have been used progressively at home to produce luxury and European goods.

For instance, in powerful states like Dahomey, politically, the slave trade had disastrous effects on African communities especially on small ethnic groups. There were completely wiped out. Military skill became more important than anything else. The pre- slave trade African balance was drastically changed to warfare for quick profits yet it is generally believed that Dahomey profited at the expense of their neighbours.

Guns were now used to create strong governments. Conflicts between coastal and inland states which needed to access the sea became a common feature as in the case of Asante and Fante. It was the conflict between these two that gave the British a chance to penetrate Asante under the pretext that they were defending a less powerful state. The prosperity of Brass, Bonny and Calabar was also attributed to the slave trade.

The slave trade led to the downfall of several states for example, Oyo. Sub chiefs became wealthy both economically and politically. Guns were now used against overall rulers. Dahomey became one of the most powerful states and her army the most feared in West Africa. For instance she began to invade Yoruba her overall ruler.

Some critics believe that the slave trade led to the rise of stronger states. However, modern scholars believe that this did not occur at all-their argument being that there existed very powerful states before, that is, Mali, Ghana and Songhayi being typical examples.

Centralisation is infact the aid to political and economic stability. For instance such features were common in Yoruba before it became insignificant. Development of states for example Asante and Dahomey was a result of internal forces. This had nothing to do with the slave trade. However, the slave trade might have contributed to the stimulating of the development of African States.

Social Aspects:
Africans were now living under the fear of raids. Less powerful neighbours watched their sons, daughters and relatives being taken away and as a result they suffered humiliation without redress. If anything, the slave trade stunted or derailed African development.

Furthermore it brutalized human relationships and in some instances it increased the oppressive powers of the chiefs and according to Robin Hallet, it had a demoralizing effect on those involved. Effects from society to society varied. Some historians maintain that human sacrifices in states such as Asante and Dahomey were also a result of the slave trade.

Loss of Life:

There was loss of life in raids, for example, of those in the eyes of the slave traders who were regarded as too weak to make any profits and were left on their own to die. A considerate proportion perished on the way to the coast. Those who were rejected by European buyers became human sacrifices.

The long journey (middle passage) across the Atlantic was a terrible experience. Life in the new world was equally unbearable. To make matters worse, plantation slavery was even worse. Guiley estimates that annually there were losses of about 2-3 million men who and further between 30-40 million Africans were lost either in the new world or died during the slave trade.

Fage estimates the total population of West Africa by then at 20 million and rate of loss at 7% and consequently believes such a rate of loss need not necessarily have been crippling

one for a healthy society. The slave trade had a tendency of taking away only the fitest leaving behind the unfit thus making it impossible for Africa to balance a loss by birth.

Economically the uprooting of the most productive pupil meant that Africans could remain backward or underdeveloped. (refer to, How Europe underdeveloped Africa by Walter Rodney).

Some Positive Effects of the Slave Trade:

The slave trade retarded ardently the progressive development in Africa. The trade dominated economic activities. As a result, Africans found it relatively cheaper to buy food and clothes from European traders than to manufacture them.

African skills were replaced by European ones since the Africans discovered that they could obtain useful goods without much toil. Skills out of this environment were inferior to those that had been done previously. Such skills were found in arts, iron-making, pottery, cloth weaving, brass and copperware. These remarkably deteriorated.

Abolition and reasons:

As the slave trade developed, and flourished it gave rise to social, political and above all economic problems which ultimately ushered in its downfall. Thus the rise and fall of mercantilism became the cause and fall of the slave trade. A number of reputable historians are of the opinion that the economic factor played a decisive role in the bringing of the abolition of the slave trade.

Eric Williams is one of the authorities who advocate that, if anything, the economic factor influenced to a large extent the abolition. As a matter of fact he is of the view that the very fact that the French Island of St Domingo was relatively larger than any British colony and its soils comparatively more fertile and less exhausted. Its explanation on production was therefore lower. The age of the British Island sugar was over.

He goes on to state that the West Indian system and the slave trade on which it was pivoted, instead of being advantageous to Great Britain, it became the most destructive vis-à-vis her economic interests. Hence the British turned their backs against the West Indies, Brazil, Cuba and the USA for much more profitable raw materials.

Viewed from this angle, Pitt's master plan was ambivalent, for instance he wanted to recapture the European market through the help of sugar from India and consolidate the abolition of the slave trade for purely economic reasons.

However, Williams is of the view that his plan embodied both philanthropic and economic reasons, for he goes on to mention that Gaston Martin, a French historian, accused the

British Prime Minister for aiming through economic campaign to set the slaves free. "… in the name of humanity but also equally ruin French commerce."

He further asserts that the economic reason is manifested by the liberality with which Britain put funds at the disposal of the French abolitionists and the manner in which translation of the anti- slavery work of the British abolitionists was done. The years between 1799-1807 marked a very uneconomical period in the British West Indies, for example, the Island became debt- ridden and bankruptcies became nothing short of the order of the day. Plantations abandonment became the prevailing rule.

It is not surprising therefore that Williams noted that in this period about 65 plantations in Jamaica were abandoned, 32 sold for debts, and 1807 legal suits were pending against the abolition of slavery. Furthermore, this period is also characterized by sugar surpluses which arose to about 6 000 tons in Britain alone.

British and French attitudes towards abolition

The above analysed patterns meant one thing that is, exerting some firm control on production. Therefore, to restrict production, the slave trade had to be abolished. Little wonder therefore that the outcome of West Indian economic disaster gave rise to the abolitionist sentiments.

A.G. Hopkins is of the view that in France there were some people who were equally against the slave trade as they were in Britain but he attributed such feelings to economic leanings. He goes on to state that as early as 1748 Montesqueu a well-known French philosopher, was totally against slavery due to its apparent inefficiency. He therefore observed that:

"The decline of the French slave trade was the result of changes which were largely independent of domestic agitation"

One of the factors which caused this decline was the lack of co-operation between the French plantation owners abroad and the metropolis due to the French tariff system and the prevention of the development of colonial manufacturers. Another reason of paramount importance is that there was a relative decline in the importance of the slave trade. In the late 18th century with the overall result that towns such as Nantes, were less committed to defend the trade than they had been 50 years ago.

Another contributory factor was the slave revolt in St Domingo which according to Hopkins, disrupted production in what by that time was the most important sugar Island in the Caribbean. Inevitably, this incident led to a marked decrease of the French slave trade. Hopkins points out that in 1815 the restored Monarchy in France agreed under pressure from Britain to stop French subjects from trading in slaves.

With regard to England, Hopkins believed that Liverpool, the principal slave port, had become less dependent on slaves by the end of the century. Despite the fact that capitalism had also begun to move into other fields, the end of the slave trade is mostly attributed to

economic reasons. A case in point can be the industry and the branches of trade which had become more important than slavery.

A.A. Boahen also holds in total agreement with the above cited authorities that the economic factor played a major role in the abolition of slave trade. He quotes with caution a, Sierra Leonean who stated that the slave trade was largely abolished because:

"---it had now become more profitable to seek African raw materials and markets rather than slaves." Thus the changing tide in the economic sector of the capitalist world no longer had any room to accommodate the slave trade.

It had to be eliminated once and for all since it had been surplanted by the demand of raw materials and markets. According to Hopkins, the assemblies of Massachusetts, (America) Virginia and Jamaican were denied royal assent when they proposed to pass bills with the aim of abolishing the slave trade.

Thus the British government refused on the grounds that;

"to check or discourage, in any degree, a traffic so beneficial to the British nation," was probably out of question.

Prior to the abolition of the Slave Trade, its existence was the mainstay of the British economy hence Hopkins pointed out that the textile, the sugar refining, the shipping and above all the French and British industries all depended indirectly on the slave trade in the West Indies.

It was the advent or emergence of the Industrial Revolution which changed all the economic parameters in Britain. Machines were now put into operations thus making the production by hand, a by-gone. This increased the demand for raw materials – palm oil, cotton etc. The West Indies would not supply these adequately, hence the British turned to the U.S.A.

Hopkins again states that ship owners were also now getting far more profit from carrying raw cotton and unrefined sugar from Brazil and the USA to Europe than from carrying slaves to the West Indies.

Undoubtedly this prevailing state of affairs further fermented the need to abolish the slave trade. It had become less profitable. Michael Crowder noted that British economic interests could only be implemented by first abolishing the slave trade which had become nothing but an obstacle to her commercial expansion.

In this region they wanted palm oil which was of importance to her industries. Palm oil also became a significant lubricant for industrial machinery, candles, and for soap making.

Walter Rodney believes that the abolition of the Slave Trade had a lot to do with both capitalism and imperialism, thus he says.

"The desire to colonise was largely based on their good intentions in wanting to put a stop to the slave trade. The British in the 19th Century were as opposed to the slave trade as they were once in favour of it."

Rodney further observed that slavery was rejected because it had become an obstacle to further capitalist development. The destruction of African states and their rulers was viewed by Britain as justified because these states and rulers were functionaries of the slave trade. However, this was not the point. The point rather was that these states and rulers were seen as hindrences to Europe's emperial needs.

It was the only factor that mattered with anti- slavery sentiments being at best superflous and at the worst copulated hypocracy.

Humanitarian Reasons

On the issue of humanitarian motives as a cause for the abolition of the slave trade, most of the abolitionists condemned the slave trade on both moral and philanthropic grounds. Such sentiments, as Boahen puts it, "made the 18th century atmosphere particularly favourable for an attack on the slave trade.

However, in some cases, such humanitarian considerations were coupled with economic reasons. Boahen believes that the people who were responsible for staging and implementing the attack on the trade remained persistently in the fore front of the campaign. Thus Boahen believes that these were certainly filled with evangelical and humanitarian principles of the day.

The leading figures of such people included personalities such as Granville Sharpe, William Wilberforce, Thomas Clarkeson and Forewell Buten. This group formed both the Abolition of the Slave Trade and British Anti- Slavery Society.

These two institutions or organizations/ aroused the missionaries view against the slave trade through organized societies. Boahen is of the opinion that from about 1788, they consistently tabled motions in parliament until their aims were achieved by the abolition of the Slave Trade in 1807.

However Eric Williams and Boahen agree that moral and philanthropic factors alone were not adequate. The House of Commons could have done away with the slave trade in 1792 when a motion was passed advocating the gradual abolition of the slave trade.

Most of the members of the House of Commons were fully convinced that the slave trade was inhuman and undignified, therefore we can safely conclude that these people were of the opinion that the Slave Trade be improved rather than be abolished since its termination could have been economical ruinous.

William strongly believes that it was not until 1823 that the emancipation became the aim of the abolitionists.

Again, it is viewed that some abolitionists refused to consume sugar from the West Indies on the ground that it was grown by slaves but surprisingly used furniture from Brazil whose timber was cut by slaves.

Thus Williams goes on to question – "Was Brazilian sugar unnecessary? It was necessary to help facilitate British capitalism. Thus by confronting this demand, those who favoured the abolition of the slave trade chose to give maximum backing or support to the capitalists.

The animosity exercised by the abolitionists towards the slave trade prior to the years proceeding 1853 was now regarded as a by – gone due to the desire for relatively cheap sugar. Gone was the horror which once existed at the idea of a British slave driver armed with a whip.

The Cuban slave driver armed not only with a whip but a cutlass, dagger, pistols and followed by black hounds aroused not even a comment from the abolitionists.

Response of African societies to the Slave Trade:

Britain forcibly prevented European traders from trading in slaves if ever she was going to be able to bring about the economic transition she required. Inevitably this caused a great deal of resentment both from Africa and European traders. Asante became crippled economically.

Examinations Questions

1. In what ways and with what ways did West Africans replace the trade in slaves with legitimate exports?
2. Explain how Dahomey, the Niger Delta states and Senegambia were able to make a successful transition from slave trade to palm oil trade.
3. Account for, and illustrate the emergence of new states in the Niger Delta in the second half of the nineteenth century. Explain why these states were short-lived.
4. Assess the achievements of King Glele of Dahomey and Jaja of Opobo and analyse their significance in African History.
5. Why was the slave trade abolished in West Africa? How successfully was it replaced?
6. How and why was the slave trade ended in West Africa during this period, and with what results for Africans and Europeans?
7. How were the problems experienced in the change form the slave trade to legitimate trade solved in West Africa?
8. Why and to what extent was the Trans-Atlantic slave trade from West Africa still being carried on in this period. How successfully was it finally suppressed?
9. Explain the emergence of the House System and analyse its importance in the states of the Niger delta.
10. Explain the survival of the overseas slave trade and of domestic slavery in East Africa into the second half of the nineteenth century.

11. What difficulties, both within and external to east Africa, delayed the ending of the slave trade in that region? How were these difficulties overcome?
12. Assess the relative importance of the factors that contributed to the decline of the slave trade in East Africa.

CHAPTER 2

PRE- COLONIAL STATES IN CENTRAL AFRICA.

Learning objectives

After studying this chapter the student should be able to:

(i) Assess the state of relationships between the Ndebele and their neighbours.
(ii) Analyse the political composition of the Ndebele state.
(iii) Explain how Lobengula dealt with forthcoming pressures in the Ndebele state.
(iv) Show why missionary activities were more successful in Malawi than in the Ndebele state.
(v) Account for the Ndebele- Shona rebellions against the British settlers.

The Ndebele State.

Origins.

The Ndebele were originally part of the Ndwandwe-Nguni of Natal. The original population was led by the Khumalo lineage led at that time by Mzilikazi. They broke away from Natal during the Zulu-Ndwandwe wars of 1818 -1820. During the 1820's they moved across the Vaal river valley. In approximately 1828, they settled on what is now modern Pretoria. After a number of confrontations with the Boers, during the 1830's they moved further north and west towards the Transvaal. In about 1837, they left the Transvaal altogether in as a group which separated and later came together in the Matopos.

The first 20 years of Ndebele development were marked by the following features:

(i) The State was never able to settle in one place for long, hence migratory.
(ii) The State became very heterogeneous, absorbing mainly Sotho, Tswana and Shona through marriage and capture. Because it was so heterogeneous and mobile, the state developed a highly centralized political and military system. Many of the basic institutions remained typically Nguni -the system of age regiments, the Nguni battle tactics and the whole fabric of social organization centred on chiefdoms under izinduna. However, these were often modified following situations that were faced by the Ndebele.

(iii) A particular aspect of this period was the importance of military action. The army raided neighbouring states for food and people (young women taken as wives and young men for military service). Because of this mobile character, the Ndebele State depended fairly heavily on raiding. When they finally settled down, they developed a state structure still largely assigned along Nguni lines but serving a different royalty. Perhaps, the new and greater problem, was how to bring together the different ethnic groups into one nation. The state now included not only the Nguni, Sotho, Tswana but also Kalanga, Venda, Rozvi and other Shona societies.

State Structure.

The structure of the Ndebele state was extremely complex. First and foremost, were geographical divisions along the following lines.

(i) The Ndebele heartland.
(ii) The areas surrounding the Ndebele, which were occupied by tributary states.
(iii) There was an area which was subject to occasional raids, but was not otherwise influenced by the Ndebele.

The Ndebele Heartland.

People here were directly ruled by the Ndebele King. However, the people lived in individual homesteads which were grouped into larger units under chiefs (izinduna). In the heartland itself, the people were ranked according to their ethnic origins.

At the top of the hierarchy, were the **abeZansi (Zansi)** who were made up of the original Nguni members. Below them, were the abenhla these constituted the Sotho and Tswana people embodied within the state during the first 20 years before the Ndebele finally settled. Then came the **hole (Amahole)**-the indigenous people; the inhabitants of the area which was finally occupied by the Ndebele. Most **izinduna** and senior lineage groups were drawn from the **abenhla**. However, these were never as significant as the **Zansi**. Homesteads of the hole groups were generally the smallest and the least important in the groups.

Political Administration

Tributary States.

(a) Surrounding the Ndebele heartland there existed an area largely occupied by Shona speaking chiefdoms. Chiefdoms were integrated into the Ndebele social and political organization, but they retained their own system of cultural organization and authority, despite the fact that they were required to recognize the Ndebele rule through payment of tribute in form of cattle, grain and young men. Further- more, these chiefs were required to attend the **inxwala** ceremony as well. Initially, these chiefdoms were subject to constant Ndebele raids. However, as the state gradually consolidated its rule and as long as tribute was paid, these societies were not harassed at all.

(b) <u>The Periphery raiding areas</u>.

Societies living beyond the tributary area were subject to occasional raids by the Ndebele **amabutho**. It must be noted that these decreased markedly as the state gained stability. It is incorrect to argue like many Euro-centric and colonial historians have say that:

(i) The Ndebele controlled the whole of Mashonaland. In fact almost all the Shona living beyond what is now Gweru were hardly affected by the Ndebele rule.

(ii) The Ndebele State was a predatory state entirely depending on raids from the surrounding societies. D.N. Beach is of the opinion that the Ndebele raided the Shona far less widely as often thought or as has been supposed. Moreover, he maintains that the Ndebele State was not a crude system of savagery because for most Shona, it was perfectly acceptable as they showed in 1896 when most of the Shona South-West of the country joined the Ndebele in the first Chimurenga war. The raids on the Shona were not out of shear blood –lust, since most raids were not in any way important to the economic system of the Ndebele as has been suggested.

<u>The powers of the King.</u>

1. The Ndebele title for King was Inkosi and he had almost absolute power over the most crucial aspects of social organization. First and foremost, he raised the army. The Nkosi formed a new army whenever there was a need and could appoint an Induna to command the new army. He could also call any of the existing amabutho to do any task which he deemed necessary.
2. He was the highest military authority in the state.
3. The King distributed all the cattle and captives and this gave him the power to reward loyal services of the izinduna or other leading figures, was also in a position to allocate land for settlement, agriculture and for grazing.
4. Land was not a private property of the rulers, though they had powers over its distribution and use.
5. The judiciary system was also under the King's control and the King could use this to liquidate opponents in the state.
6. The King held important religious powers. The royal ancestors were the most superior national spirits guarding the welfare of the nation as a whole.

These spirits were particularly honoured during the inxwala ceremony. To offend the Inkosi was tantamount to offending the national royal guardian. When the Ndebele settled around the Matopo Hills; they incorporated some aspects of the Kalanga or Rozvi religious system especially the cult of priest/ (Mwari cult) – the God Mwari. These religious leaders gave sanction to the Ndebele ruling class and were used as a device to reconcile conquered people.

The taking over of the Mwari cult was a very clever diplomatic maneuver which enabled the defeated people to be loyal to the Ndebele State. The King presided over the **inxwala**

ceremony. This had an important religious and political function. Any Induna or tributary chief who deliberately absented himself from the ceremony, was regarded as a rebel and could expect nothing short of retribution. Participation was an affirmation of the nation on the part of the Induna and demonstrated great loyalty to the **Inkosi.**

Local government.

The State was divided into chieftaincies called **Izigaba**. During Lobengula's rule, there were approximately 60 of these. Within the chieftaincies, were many **izinduna**, one senior Induna – **(Indunenkulu)** had wide powers over the distribution of land and settlement on these lands. Chieftainships were hereditary. An **Induna** was succeeded by the eldest son of the great wife. Senior **Izinduna** were aided by a council of elders in both administration and justice. The **Induna** controlled the distribution of captured cattle given to homesteads. These cattle were not the property of the homestead. They were important as a means of binding individual homesteads to the state and reducing extreme differences in wealth. This protected people against absolute poverty. The izindun'ezinkulu occasionally travelled to the capital where they formed the King' advisory board – **Umphakathi**: This board determined the national policy.

Both Mzilikazi and Lobengula were powerful enough to impose their wills over the two advisory councils – **Izikhulu** and **Umphakathi**, but they were almost always willing to be persuaded by this board. The system of **Umphakath**i and **Izikhulu** emphasized both regional and local leaders in all important decision – making. It did not restrict the power of the King but made sure he remained responsible to the will of his people. The Ndebele political system had checks and balances and almost was democratic in nature.

Most senior Izinduna were related to the King through intermarriage ties. This further entrenched their duties to the state. Royal relatives were considered too superior to rule – fulfilled important ceremonial functions. Thus they were not allowed to create regional power bases or develop local loyalties.

The Ndebele Economy.

The basic productive unit in the Ndebele State was *Umuzi*. The chief was responsible for allocating land to individual families. The agricultural aspect of the economy was based on the cultivation of millet and sorghum. This constituted the primary activity of the society. Both men and women were involved in agricultural activities. In each *Isigaba*, there was a special field set aside as the King's field, which was always the first to be harvested and agricultural products were given to the King in the form of tribute.

Cattle herding was the most important economic activity in society. The whole state was organized into fields for cattle grazing. Raiding was meant to partly conquer and extend royal authority so as to increase the national herd. The economy was also characterized by the movement of cattle to different grazing areas. In winter, the soldiers and herders took

the cattle to better grazing areas in the middle veld. These regions were far from the main settlements. The **amabutho** were therefore necessary to protect the livestock.

There were two concepts of cattle ownership: First there was the collective national herd, *izinkomo zenkosi* including those captured during raids. The king was the only person responsible for the distribution of cattle into different *izigaba*. However, these were only given to the legal and needy.
Secondly, privately owned cattle could be used by owners as they liked and they could be used to pay **amalobolo**. The more cattle a given homestead had meant the more wives it could get.

Trade:

There was little long distance trade in the Ndebele society. However a system of inter-regional exchange existed between regions. Different resources, for example iron, salt, guns and other important foreign goods acquired by sending young men to work in mines south of the Limpopo river. Whatever these youth brought was controlled by the King.

NB: Please note that the following aspects of the economy should be discussed under this heading: - Raids
-Hunting
-Mining
-Smelting

Military organization: the Amabutho System
As already stated, the state developed a highly centralized political and military system. Like most Mfecane states, the state was organized on military lines with the basic military features remaining typically Nguni. This included the system of age regiments, the Nguni battle tactics or war formation and the establishment of regimental barracks surrounding the capital.

However, the Ndebele had to adapt to the new environment which was generally peaceful. Tshaka's restrictions on social aspects like marriage were relaxed. Instead of the soldiers marrying at the age of 40 years, the Ndebele could even marry at 30 years of age or even below. Besides the peaceful environment, marriage was necessitated by the need to increase Ndebele population which was too small-all a result of the migratory nature of its early life. Young men were therefore allowed to marry early and sometimes were even given permission to participate in the agricultural activities.

There was a royal bodyguard *amajaha* who were permanently based at the capital. These included the captives brought from the raids and were then assimilated into the **amabutho.** Apart from their military duties, the **amajaha** also worked in the King's fields.

They also defended the land and cattle. They enforced law and order but above all they were regarded as rebels. Old people were only recruited in times of emergency. More often than not, these immediately returned home after serving their duties. **However**, recruited young

men were made to stay in military camps for a number of years and they were drilled in military skills.

The young men were fed through a system of levies. Those who proved military prowess were allowed to marry and also allocated land for cultivation, thus forming the basis of chiefdoms and villages.

Ndebele relations with neighbouring states.

The Ndebele relations with the Shona

Background

The Ndebele relations with the Shona have been a subject of controversy among different historians. Traditional historians such as T.O. Ranger have tended to view the Ndebele relations with their Shona neighbours in terms of categories based on the proximity of Shona societies to the Ndebele.

In short, Ranger's thesis supposes that the further a Shona society was from the Ndebele, the less likely it was to be raided. He also discussed that those Shona people within the Ndebele state enjoyed peaceful co-existence with the Ndebele, and therefore got absorbed into the social system of the Ndebele.
T.O. Ranger's thesis therefore brings affront two historical truths: that the Ndebele raided the Shona as part of relating with them, and that the Ndebele had peaceful relations with some of the Shona groups, whether within the Ndebele state or without. Whilst these truths have formed the basis of our original understanding and interpretation of the Ndebele-Shona relations, more recent scholasticism has in actual fact heavily criticized T.O. Ranger's thesis to a point of virtual insignificance. One of the major areas of departure is that T.O. Ranger tended to lay heavy emphasis on the fact that it was the Ndebele who predominantly raided the Shona, whereas more recent research convincingly argue that both groups raided each other. Moreover, it has also been shown through the recent researches by D.N. Beach, J.R.D Cobbing and T.I. Matthews that the balance of power between the independent Shona and the Ndebele was beginning to change in favour of the Shona in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The gradual possession of guns by the Shona made them almost invincible, not only against the Ndebele, but also initially against the whites during the 1896- 1897 risings.

Early myths about the Ndebele-Shona relations

In his paper entitled "The Shona and Ndebele power." September, 1973, presented at a workshop held in Gaborone, D.N. Beach has made some up- to-now solid conclusions about the relations between these two groups in question. The paper was later published as a chapter in his subsequent book, War and Politics in Zimbabwe, 1840-1900. Beach highlights some to the original misconceptions about the Ndebele- Shona relations.
In fact, mythology began when the missionary Robert Moffat visited the Ndebele in 1854. Naturally, Moffat had pre-conceived notions about the Ndebele, based on his initial contrasts he had had with them in the 1820s and the 1830s in South Africa. Due to the Mfecane wars and the violence which characterized it, Moffat concluded that the Ndebele

were a war mongering, blood-thirsty and violent ethnic group. Continually seeking to find evidence of Ndebele brutality, Moffat ironically ignored the implications of the Shona raids upon the Ndebele.
Moreover, the myths about the Ndebele- Shona relations were spread by missionary hunters and traders who passed them on to new- comers who entered the country. In that way the chain of myths continued to grow as new arrivals to the country picked up the stories and rubbed them on to others. For example, Robert Moffat's son, John Smith Moffat falsely wrote that.

> "Umpanda is the King of the
> Zulus near Natal and of
> his government Moselekatse's
> is an exact copy."

This was despite the fact that he had not even entered the Ndebele country as yet. The two Kingdoms were significantly different.

Moreover, D-N.Beach notes that not even a single European witnessed a Ndebele raid before the 1890s and described it in writing. Yet writers such as Montagu Kerr produced detailed accounts of Ndebele surprise attacks taking place way before 1890. Kerr had actually travelled through a peaceful Shona country untroubled by the Ndebele. Kerr, like Baines before him and Knight-Bruce after him, had been "briefed" by European residents in the Ndebele country and thoroughly believed the myths.

Another myth was that the people surrounding the Ndebele carried out an annual raid on the orders of their rulers. This myth was widely spread among the settlers in Matabeleland in spite of the fact that there was no evidence for it and a good deal against it.

One reason suggested for the growth of such myths was that missionaries wanted to gain support for missions to save souls of the 'savage' Ndebele. Maybe the travellers too, wanted to stress the wildness of the country through which they travelled, for the purposes of creating adventurous accounts. However, later on some more sinister motives appeared. These included the fact that the missionaries wanted a justification for the destruction of the Ndebele state which they viewed as a hindrance to the spread of the gospel work in both Matabeleland and Mashonaland. One testimony to this line of thought is that the missionaries both wrote to the British Government and the British South Africa Company urging the destruction of the Ndebele state. Moreover, missionaries such as J.S. Moffat and Charles Helm took an increasingly active role in the negotiations for the Rudd Concession which directly paved the way for the demise of the Ndebele state.

Furthermore, the Rudd Concession of 1888 gave both the British government and the British South Africa Company a motive for making the most sweeping interpretations on the extent of Ndebele influence over the Shona, and they went to some lengths to conceal and falsify evidence in order to justify their position. A company secretary for example, itching to extend company rule to Matabeleland wrote prior to 1893.

> "I hope they do raid the Barotses. All
> these raids and deaths and
> murders ought to be entered

> intro a book, so that we may always be able to prove the justification and their being a cruel dammnable race."

This clearly proves that the myths were not a result of a mistaken judgement of events, but clean well calculated moves intended to amass support for colonization.

Interestingly, the Ndebele themselves also took part in the myth-making process, just as well as the Shona. Many seem to have exaggerated the numbers of people they killed and concealed their own losses as a way of building up their image of military greatness and invincibility. For instance, the Ndebele, on occasions, claimed that their power extended to the Save River which was only true for the uppermost fifty kilometers. On the other hand, many Shona groups seem to have accepted the mythology of the Europeans as fact, and exaggerated the numbers and impact of Ndebele raids.

Nevertheless, behind all the myths that were spread about Ndebele raids on the Shona, there was the reality. In actual fact the Ndebele did raid the Shona as well as other peoples in certain places and at certain times. This was not done out of sheer bloodthirsty behavior, or even because it was essential to their economic system, as has been suggested incorrectly. Sometimes the Ndebele conducted raids due to factors within their own state, such as the losses caused to their herds by the lung sickness epidemic of the early 1860s.

Another internal reason why raiding was practiced was because the Ndebele, as a small community, needed to raid others for women and livestock for their own immediate profit. It will be demonstrated that the Shona also raided the Ndebele as well as each other for livestock and any other valuable booty. But from the Ndebele point of view, the unofficial raiding, that is one which was not sanctioned by the King, was to be discouraged because it attracted reprisals. In 1860, Mzilikazi told his Machaha they are "making spears for him by doing so," and indeed it was this cross-raiding between Shona and Ndebele that precipitated the fall of the Ndebele state. As a matter of fact Europeans noted an increase in this kind of unofficial raiding during the 1868-1872 succession crises, when the royal authority was weaker. Such raiding was a serious annoyance to the victims although the fortunes of individual groups varied considerably.

It is important however, that we fully understand the Ndebele historical background in order to fully understand its subsequent expansion.

The background to the Ndebele state

The Ndebele originated from Zululand in South Africa. They were then known as the Khumalo dynasty and their Zanzi followers. It is a fact that the Ndebele state north of the Limpopo, in the early years, consisted of a Shona majority ruled by an Nguni minority; that the Ndebele state inherited a lot of the geographical, economic and political structure of its Shona predecessors; that the politics of the Changamire Rozvi affected the initial conquest of the region by the Ndebele; that the Ndebele state's early expansion and conquests, as well as raids up to the 1860s were affected by the underlying Shona economic structure,

and that the position of the Ndebele on the frontiers of their tributary state was often maintained by alliances with the local Shona.

The Ndebele state planted itself in the midst of a Shona political system. And did not exist in a vacuum.

There had been a long succession of Shona- speaking cultures and political units in the south west before the Ndebele. These included the Torwa who set up their capital at Kame before moving on to Danangombe. The Changamire Rozvi remained in control until the 1830s when they were linguistically absorbed by the Kalanga.

This was the population that was to comprise up to sixty percent of that of the Ndebele state, together with a certain number of captives from other areas, for it is clear that there was no extermination of the Kalanga and Rozvi during the Mfecane. As far as the Rozvi were concerned, the Mfecane took the form of several successive blows, as small groups of Ngoni and Sotho crossed their land. Mpanga, Ngwana Maseko and Zwangendaba all invaded the Changamire state before 1835 and were repelled with some difficulty, while a fourth force under Nyamazana even succeeded in killing Chirisamhuru the mambo. The Ngoni did a lot of damage, taking grain and cattle, yet it is a measure of strength of the Changamire state that, weakened as it was, it did not break up.

Early Ndebele conquests and Raids

The Ndebele invasion of the Changamire Rozvi differed from those of the Ngoni in several ways:

Firstly, Mzilikazi's people made no attempt to attack the central part of the Changamire state, but settled in the western province of Ndumba, west of Mbembesi. Secondly, they consolidated their power by exploiting the splits between the Rozvi, and by entering into an economic relationship with them.

The main body of the Ndebele under Gundwane arrived from the Mzingwani valley in 1838-9. Ndumba's dynasty vanished from the scene relatively early and the main resistance in the immediate areas was led by Mutinhima from the Mulungwane hills. Mutinhima, nicknamed Mafuta, was at first successful in his defence, and may not have been pushed out of the hills until after Mzilikazi arrived.

In short, what happened west of the Mbembesi was that the place of the Ndumba dynasty had been taken by Mzilikazi and his followers, who had settled down among the Kalanga as the Rozvi had done before them. It was thus logical that the Ndebele should not remain on hostile terms with the local Shona because they needed supplies of grain, which would not be forthcoming if raiding was continued for a long time. In 1854 Moffat noted the Ndebele prosperity in grain, and in 1858 he confirmed that the Shona were continuing to live inside the Ndebele –settled area in their own villages.

The Ndebele had thus become rivals of the Rozvi as rulers of the Kalanga and other Shona peoples, and in the period when the Changamire dynasty was weakened by the death of Chirisamhuru Mzilikazi actually took his place as overlord of certain Rozvi families of the

main dynasty. These, including Swabasvi, Lukuluba and Rozani may have been motivated by internal political jealousies among the Rozvi, such as their exclusion from the centre of power and the succession, but they also had an economic motive.

The Ngoni invasions had resulted in the loss of a great number of the Rozvi cattle. The Ndebele, on the other hand, had plenty of cattle but they desperately needed more people. The result was that an exchange took place in which Mzilikazi distributed cattle to the Rozvi mentioned above in return for young people who were incorporated into the Ndebele state and society. This state of affairs extended over the eastern half of the Changamire state and even as far as Tsunga, the land between the upper Munyati and the Mwenezi range. There the Nyandoro dynasty had acted as intermediary rulers between the main Rozvi dynasty and the people north-east of them. At the same time before the great campaigns in that direction in the 1850s and the 1860s Ndebele cattle were distributed there as well.

Professor D. N. Beach noted in his article cited above that such a Ndebele- Shona way of coexistence was not likely to endure for a long time without serious trouble. Firstly, he points out the fact that the main Rozvi dynasty which had withdrawn into the hills was not likely to accept the loss of their position without making some attempt to regain it. Secondly, the economic exchange created by the Ndebele was in the long run extremely disadvantageous to the Rozvi and other Shonas who took part in it.

The Ndebele appear to have retained ultimate ownership of the cattle they distributed although the milk and limited slaughter rights would presumably have been accorded to the herders- but the young people who were levied by the Ndebele were not allowed to return to their own societies. Moffat noted that, "there is nothing they deplore so much as their children being taken from them just at a time when they become useful to their parents." Indeed this practice, taken to excess could ruin any society. Later, the Ndebele did not need to recruit so many young men from their tributaries and so caused less damage and created less resentment. But the combination of a series of grievances and the existing organization of the Rozvi state led to the first serious Shona resistance to the Ndebele.

It must be emphasized that the Ndebele did not believe in total war with the Shona. During the warfare between the Chirimuhanzu dynasty and the Ndebele in the 1850s, Moffat was able to note that between the fighting in 1854-5 and the surrender of Chirimuhanzu in 1857 there had been no further fighting. In 1866 the Ndebele, having attacked Mashayamombe's people earlier in the year actually attempted to trade with them in august. This clearly shows that the Ndebele relations with the Shona were not motivated by any such ideas as just blood, but for a specific reason, within a specific period, raids took place.

Another point to note is that even when the major Ndebele raids were major ones directed against specific targets on the orders of the King, there was a tendency for other people in the area to suffer as well. This was because the Ndebele, whose famed military discipline existed far more in the minds of European writers than it ever did in reality, were prone to scattering across a wide area in search for cattle and women.

This emerges clearly from all detailed accounts from the few Europeans living across a series of communities among the Shona. For instance, Mauch in 1872 lives a picture of a series of raids over a wide front from the western Duma on their Mutirikwi- Popoteke confluence to the upper Popoteke, some seventy kilometers, over a period of about three weeks. The Shona who had at least three days warning suffered various losses but were rarely taken by complete surprise as Montagu Kerr's fictitious account has portrayed.

The same picture emerged from accounts of the 1892 raids on the country from Chivi to Gutu and from those of the 1893 raid on Zimuto. Ndebele raiders also tended to follow-up their intended targets if they fled as and when they pursued the northern Shawasha country in 1883. Even Ndebeles on a peaceful mission such as the delivery of a message would sometimes cover their expenses by raiding.

Moreover, if the main stimulus behind the great Ndebele campaigns of the 1850s and 1860s was the political threat of the Rozvi dynasty, the economic stimulus of the Shona trade system was extremely important. Indeed, it appears to have provoked the first important expansion of the Ndebele power. In inheriting the Changamire state, the Ndebele had inherited its basic economic framework, which in spite of a regional emphasis on cattle, was still aligned to the traditional exchange of gold and ivory for cloth and beads. As mentioned above, warfare between the Ndebele and Shona was not total and it is clear that even during the fighting of 1854-5 the trade system linking the Ndebele with the Zambezi and the coast through the Shona country to the east was still functioning. Nevertheless by the 1850s it had become clear to Mzilikazi that the Shona were difficult to dislodge from their mountain strongholds.

At this point neither side had guns in quantities, although the Shona had been importing a certain number of guns for a very long time. The Ndebele had learned from their experiences south of the Limpopo that guns were useful and in the 1850s and 1860s they did their best to acquire them. The basic Kalanga population of the Changamire state had been accustomed to importing cloth and their needs also had to be supplied. Although supplies of both guns and cloth were available through the variously friendly neutral or hostile Shona dominions to the east, it would obviously be desirable for the Ndebele to control the trade routes to a greater extent.

According to D.N. beach the Ndebele first expanded to the northwest of the country mainly because it was least inhabited and would therefore offer the least resistance since the Ndebele were still weak in the 1840s. The badly watered sand country included Hwange, Pashu and Saba on the Deka and Gwayi as well as Zambezi rivers. These Shona people were not only vulnerable, but the area also offered access to one of the trade routes to the sea. This route was along the Zambezi through the Tonga country to Zumbo, Tete, Sena and the sea, and was economically viable in spite of the distances involved, because nearly all the distance could be covered by some sort of water transport. By the early 1850s, the Ndebele appeared to have established their authority over these Zambezian polities, especially after the death of Hwange in 1853, although intermittent raids on the area occurred for various reasons as long as the Ndebele state survived.

What is important to note from Professor Beach's research is the fact that Ndebele relations with the Shona during this early period were not merely determined by the need to assert their authority as observed by T.O. Ranger's thesis, but to control the vital trade routes as well, which in this case were highly significant indeed.

Beach also brings up an interesting view in studying Ndebele relations with the Shona during Mzilikazi's reign. He cites a Rozvi tradition from the Insiza area which suggested that Mzilikazi extended his policy of cooperation with the Rozvi to the point of requesting Chirisamhuru's son Tohwechipi to return from his exile in the direction of the Eastern Highlands and settle down in his own country, and that it actually worked for a few years before Tohwechipi broke away.

It seems certain that the Ndebele tried to get the Mutinhima house to join them, but they refused. This clearly shows that it was not always to the Ndebele's advantage to be at war with certain strong Shona clans; rather they tried diplomacy too as a way of relating with the Shona.

Another pattern of Ndebele- Shona relations was equally noticed during the 1850s and 1860s. The Shona also raided the Ndebele during these years. The most prominent of these raiders were the Mambo, Tohwechipi; his relative Mutinhima and Chizema the son of Govera ruler of Chirimuhanzu on the Shashe. Part of the reason was because of the revival of Rozvi power, especially the recognition of Tohwechipi as paramount chief by clans that had been subjected to Ndebele rule. These included the Swabasvi house which broke away from the Ndebele and joined Tohwechipi. Mutinhima's house also recognized Tohwechipi. Such a boost made these Shona raiders to penetrate deep into the country of the Ndebele, stealing cattle and, according to the Ndebele, committing atrocities on women. However, these raids provoked a Ndebele response that proved too powerful for the Shona. Battles were fought in the mountains to the east of the Ndebele state: at the Mpopoti range against the Rozvi ruler Dlembeu Kupengobuta, at Umlugulu (Guruguru) mountain, and against the Mhari, ruler Zingwe, who was killed for refusing to supply young people as tribute.

Tohwechipi was forced to retreat through Chivi, past Nyaningwe hill in the direction of Great Zimbabwe. According to a tradition, Tohwechipi employed the "Zvitunya" or strong men who came from the Zambezi to trade who possessed guns. In that way, he managed to defeat the Ndebele some time before 1852. But by 1857 the situation tilted in Mzilikazi's favour partly because of divisions and inter-fights among the Shona.

It is important to note that while the Chirimuhanzu dynasty surrendered early in 1857, they actually became allies of the Ndebele from then until 1889. Indeed Chizema who had been so prominent in raids on the Ndebele was aided by the same Ndebele in his bid to win new land for himself in southern Buhera in the year that followed.

It is clear that such versatile characteristics in the way they related with the Shona cannot be simply classified into groups which would differ in the manner in which they related with the Ndebele. Groups such as Chirimuhanzu lived far off from the Ndebele yet they were allied to them.

How did the Ndebele relate with the Shona when the Ndebele were most powerful?

One notable factor is that the death of Mzilikazi seemed to somewhat lesson the frequency of Ndebele raids upon some Shona communities. For instance, the Hwange, as mentioned above came under the military domination of the Ndebele in the 1850s. After the death of Hwange Lusumbani in 1853 most of the Nambia fled to the Zambezi, but shortly after Lobengula assumed the throne he persuaded them to return as his tributaries. This obviously opened a new era of peaceful coexistence between the two groups.

Moreover, the Shangwe of the Mafungabusi plateau under Chireya were raided twice by Mzilikazi. However, when Lobengula took over the throne the Shangwe came under his domination just at the price of a tribute of tobacco.

Then there was the Hurungwe area between the Munyati and the Angwa rivers where a few raids were carried out along the Zambezi. In this area some groups collaborated with the Ndebele and others resisted with considerable success. Yet no permanent tributary relationships seem to have existed.

Apart from the areas above, the Ndebele had a surprisingly good relationship with the Shona spirit mediums of the Mupfure and Mhanyame valleys. These spirit mediums paid tribute to the great mediums of the Nyamuswa- Wanewawa cluster of spirits, as well as to the Chikomo medium of the Nyuso group at the Mupfure-Munyati confluence. It is claimed that this good relationship with the Ndebele developed as early as 1868. In actual fact, Nemakonde, the local overlord of the area, came to pay tribute to Lobengula and it is possible that by 1886 he too was receiving a counter tribute from the Ndebele.

The Ndebele could have paid tribute to Nemakonde in order to appease the spirit mediums within Nemakonde's territory. Moreover, the Ndebele equally showed great respect to other spirit mediums living on the Mupfure like the Chaminuka medium.

In some cases the Ndebele were part to local power set-ups as a way of maintaining their influence in the tributary areas. In Mutekedza's land for instance, the Ndebele supported the Musanza house against the older Marirambi house because Musonza lined up with them. The same situation was witnessed in the Chirimuhanzu dynasty where the house of Simba managed to maintain an almost continuous succession from father to son from 1857 to 1954, cutting out uncles, brothers and cousins with the help of various powers, including of course, the Ndebele. The point is that all these political interest groups relied upon Ndebele help to maintain themselves, it is also true that the presence of these interest groups made it much easier for the Ndebele to interfere in Shona political structures thereby maintaining their own influence on the frontiers of their tributary areas. This clearly shows that there was no single pattern in which the Ndebele related to the Shona. Indeed, T.O. Ranger was right to observe that the Ndebele relations with the Shona was complex. Raiding was only one of its several components. Be that as it may, he failed to appreciate the real depth of the complexity of Ndebele relations with the Shona.

In a similar way, the Ndebele interacted with the Shona to deal with external threats. In this case they made an agreement with Adam Render, the son- in- law of Mabika, a powerful sub ruler of Charumbira, that he would help to keep the Duma from advancing further west.

Moreover in the great Matibi polity of the lowveld, the ruler called in the Ndebele to drive back the advancing Tsonga, Hlengwe under Vurumela in return for becoming a tributary. The Ndebele agreed to do that and this was most likely done during the reign of Lobengula. He was an expert at these negotiated diplomatic agreements Lobengula considered war against the Shona as the last resort and in fact as long as they accepted Ndebele overlordship and paid tribute, then peaceful relations continued.

Why did the balance of power between the Ndebele and Shona begin to shift between 1879- 1893

One key reason was that the sale of gold and ivory and the labour opportunities of Kimberley and the Rand made it possible for the Shona, who in the 1860s had been fatally short of guns in the face of the Ndebele who possessed them, to re-arm. Guns, which entered the Shona country in the hands of Portuguese traders, venda mercenaries and even Ndebele gun- runners from the Ndebele Kingdom, as well as through Shona long distance traders and migrant labourers made the hill strongholds of the Shona almost sealed to would- be Ndebele raiders and even European intruders during the 1896-97 uprising. In fact, the missionary Cockin wrote in 1897 that,

"Latterly some of the kraals Attacked have shewn fight and being many days away and the towns denser, the AmaNdebele are becoming afraid to go there so much. Cattle and sheep and slaves are not coming in so freely now from these distant raids."

It is probable that Cockin was referring in particular to the war with Chivi. During the 1860s Chivi was evidently tributary to the Ndebele, but in the reign of Mazorodze who ruled from 1870, the Mhari began to acquire guns from the Venda and to build up a considerable herd of cattle guarded by a group of men.

The fact that one of their Shona vassal states now owned guns, constituted a threat to the Ndebele power and in 1879, a major force under Lotshe and Manyeu attacked the Mhari of Chivi at their Nyaningwe capital. Although the Ndebele force was bigger in numbers and made up of the Mbizo ibutho, they were successfully beaten off by the Mhari. The only success was that they captured and later executed Chivi himself on an outlying hill. The Ndebele lost 20 men as well as the war on the ground bringing to light the fact that the Ndebele could confidently take their opponents over the open ground, but they could not win over the well defended hill strongholds. The Mhari thus became independent of Ndebele overlordship from 1879 onwards.

A similar raid took place in 1887-88 on Mashayamombe's and Rwizi people of the Mupfure valley. Although the raid followed a civil war in Mashayamombe's area, in that one group actually invited the Ndebele to come to their aid, there can be no doubt that part of the

reason for the raid was that the Ndebele wanted to neutralize the growing military strength of the Shona in this region.
Isolated Ndebele were liable to be killed, and in 1887 a whole raiding part of the Ndebele was killed and indeed the 1888 raid, according to D.N. Beach's research,

> "Suffered also severely that
> Lobengula was very angry
> and another one was sent out in another direction."

Another key element which accounted for the rise of Shona strength was the increasing interaction with the Portuguese, especially the fact that they actually intended to take over the whole northern eastern and central parts of the Shona country. The effect of the Andrada and Cordon expedition of 1889 was' to have an overall benefit on the Shona. This is because these expeditions gave nearly every Shona polity north of the Munyati River a considerable increase in the size of its armoury. In fact the Portuguese Zungu expedition to the whole Charumbira- Mapanzure- Bere group of peoples in 1872 had only 48 guns for sale but the 1889 expeditions would give this much to a single ruler. Even the small polities got ten guns, as well as gunpowder and rounds of ammunition. This was a huge boost to Shona fighting strength and this had a major impact on anti- Ndebele developments.

The effect of Portuguese maneuvers in the balance of power between the Ndebele and the Shona was immense. For instance, Beach cites the case of Hwata, which was divided into factions after Gwindi's death. Nemakonde and Mutekedza all abandoned their allegiance to Lobengula and accepted the Portuguese guns and flags. This was to be the source where such guns were to be found as far south as the Njanja country and beyond. As a result of these inflows of guns, no major raiding forces of the Ndebele ever again entered the Central Shona country.

Of course the Portuguese were not helping the helpless Shona! They benefited from preferential trade agreements and practices. But they realized that without first checking the Ndebele overlordship over these rich Shona trading entities they could never have a safer headway.

Equally important, but perhaps what brought the demise of the Ndebele state altogether was the presence of the whites under the auspices of the British South Africa Company. After 1888, the Rudd concession had been signed and from 1890 onwards the Pioneer Column swelled into Mashonaland. The Ndebele raid around Chivi and Zimuto in 1891 proved to be quite decisive. Chivi and Zimuto appealed to Rhodes' deputy, Jameson. This in turn led to a demand that Ndebele raiders stay away from the town of Victoria and the main road. This demand was fully complied with, as far as the Ndebele ruler was concerned, until the crucial raid of July 1893 which ushered in disaster upon the Ndebele state.

However, it must be emphasized that the 1893 raid came partly as a result of the Shona actions. In early June 1893 a joint party of raiders from Bere and Makamure house of Zimuto stole cattle from Mpakame, a Shona tributary for the Ndebele at Guruguru hill. He complained to his overlord, the Ndebele sub- chief at the Ghoko range. Lukuluba raided

Bere in retaliation, but on being turned back by Rhodes' police, in turn reported to his superior, Mgandane of Nxa. This led directly to the famous July raid on Bere and Zimuto near Victoria (Victoria incident and the resulting fight of 18 July which eventually led to the defeat and overthrow of the Ndebele state.

Conclusion

It is important to note that what comes out of Professor D.N. Beach's thesis is the fact that the Ndebele relations with the Shona neither followed a certain stereotype pattern nor tradition. The relations were in fact dynamic. Raids were systematically reduced after the death of Mzilikazi. During Mzilikazi's era, raids tended to attempt in many ways, to assert Ndebele rule upon the Shona and as much as possible, crush the revolt of the Rozvi Changamire state so that it would not exercise political competition with the Ndebele state. Even during this time, we noted that friendly relations were obtained between the Shona and the Ndebele.

However, during the reign of Lobengula, the Ndebele state reached its peak in political power and tributary boundaries were more definite. Hence, more and more peaceful co-existences between the Ndebele and the Shona were witnessed. However, breakdowns in relations were as badly blamed on the Shona as they were on the Ndebele, and punitive raids occurred.

Foreign influence to the Ndebele Shona relations had lasting if not crushing consequences. Whilst the Portuguese presence in central Shona country helped to systematically reduce the Ndebele sphere of influence and tributary hinterland, the coming of the British South Africa Company following the signing of the Rudd Concession, deliberately sought to find occasion to pick up a quarrel with the Ndebele. Hence the Victoria Incident of July 1893 provided a brilliant opportunity which the British used to overthrow the Ndebele.

The Ndebele relations with their Shona neighbours were therefore complex, multi-faceted and dynamic. Professor T.O. Ranger's thesis, whilst traditionally convincing, may have been overtaken by more recent research and scholarship on the subject. Indeed the Ndebele had allies as far as Buhera and Chirimuhanzu which may be difficult to prescribe that those who lived far from the Ndebele never accepted Ndebele authority. However, this essay does not in any way make Professor T.O. Ranger's thesis defunct. In Fact it simply re-echoes the researches of Beach and Cobbing which have tended to shed forth more detailed information on the nature of Ndebele relations with the Shona.

Relations with the Kololo/ Lozi

Conflict between the two dated back to the 1840's when Mzilikazi attempted dislodging the Kololo and establish a Ndebele settlement north of the Zambezi - but this was frustrated at the battle of Thaba yaBasadi (women's mountain). Here Kololo males supported by their females, drove back the Ndebele in 1845 and so the Ndebele attempted invading Bulozi but were trapped in the marshy areas around Zambezi and were defeated. This of course included the tsetse menace. Although the Kololo managed to defend itself, the Ndebele threat remained so bad such that when missionaries arrived in Bulozi, they were warmly

received, in the hope that they could be used to stop the Ndebele from raiding Bulozi. When this did not prove fruitful, Lewaneka went so far as to write the English-Queen for her protection and in the 1893 Anglo-Ndebele war, Lewanika sent some of his men to help crush the Ndebele once and for all.

Relations with the Ngwato.

Conflict between the two again began in the 1840's because the Ndebele wanted to extend their tribute payment area and control the Ngwato pastures but the Ngwato armed with guns and using horses, were able to offer fierce resistance such that the Ndebele raids were beaten off.

By 1844 the Ngwato were so confident of defending themselves that Sekema killed Ndebele messengers sent to collect tribute. A brief war in 1867 ended in a Ndebele defeat forcing them to establish peace. Drought in the 1880's forced the Ndebele to resume the raids but the ones in 1882 and 1884 had disastrous results. In the 1884 raid 1 500 of the original 4 000 raiders only survived and one white observer commented.

"After witnessing the return of the impi from Lake Ngami and hearing of reports concerning the campaign, I am of the opinion that a force of 1 500 mounted and well armed could sweep the Matebele power out of the country."

Although the Ngwato were successful, fear of the Ndebele was so great that Khama (Tswana) asked for British protection in 1885, partly to deal with this problem while he was also to assist the members of the Pioneer Column in 1890.

Ndebele Relations with foreigners: (missionaries)

Relations between Mzilikazi and Robert Moffat of the London Missionary Society (LMS) dated back from 1829 when the two met at Umhlahlandlela in South Africa and became friends. In 1859, Robert Moffat visited the Matebele. He was allowed to open a mission school at Inyathi while his son J.S. Moffat was later allowed to open another at Hope Fountain. However, both Ndebele Kings did not welcome conversion to Christianity because it would offer an alternative religion, thus threatening the Kingship, for the King was in charge of traditional religion) therefore it would alter the religion.

Mzilikazi accepted the "Abafundisi" as a trading agency with South Africa and as a source of technical skills (repairing guns).

Ordinary Ndebele saw no need to accept the new religion and abandon their old ones especially as this was said to anger a**madlozi**. Few who showed interest were put to death by the killing Maqeba-(Mzilikazi's trusted Induna and a member of the Umphakathi) in May 1862. Christianity would also interfere with Ndebele system of raiding their neighbours.

Lobengula accepted the opening of Hope Fountain with the hope that the missionary would persuade Transvaal not to invade his state and to prevent the missionaries from supporting the Zwangendaba group. The result was that as late as 1880 no Ndebele had been converted although a few hundreds regularly attended mass in order to get some payment, that is, six pence for attendance.

It was only when Morgan Thomas opened the independent station at Shiloeh Fountain in 1876, that 6 Ndebele were converted by 1893. This was because he offered them material rewards. The failure of the missionaries made them frustrated and angered such that men like J.S. Moffat and C.D. Helm concluded that the Ndebele political system had to be overthrown for Christianity to progress. This explains why both assisted the BSA Company in its colonisation of the country.

The 1868-70 Succession dispute and the emergence of the Zwangendaba opposition group/ party

This was a period of uncertainity for the Ndebele. King Mzilikazi died and Lobengula took over. Mzilikazi died on September 1868 and this was followed by a period of uncertainty as the Umphakathi failed to agree on a succession candidate.

The Regent Ngimbaba argued that the eligible candidates were Nkulumane and Ubuhlezo who were executed by Mzilikazi in 1840 and that Lobengula the son of a junior Swazi wife should succeed. Younger indunas led by Mbiko Masuku (commander of the Zwangendaba regiment) claimed that Nkulumane was still alive in South Africa and that he was supposed to be invited and succeed his father. Mbiko's argument was given weight by the Natal secretary of colonial affairs Shapestone, who stated that he had a servant claiming to be Nkulumane.

On March 1870 Lobengula ascended the throne when the search for Nkulumane proved futile. Mbiko's regiments challenged the order and refused to accept the new King. Lobengula declared war on them, killed them and seized their property. However, the possibility of Nkulumane's return was to lead Lobengula to death in 1894 and partly explains his weakness to sign agreements with foreigners to be used as allies on the event of Nkulumane's return.

Ndebele internal relations: a critique:

Despite their military prowess, the Ndebele were aware that external relations needed not to be based on the Assegai from the moment Mzilikazi and his followers detached themselves from Tshaka. They were in a position of a particular dependence on the external environment.

However, it should be noted that they were in an unusual position to influence and change it. In D.N. Beach's words:

"It was logical that the Ndebele should not remain on hostile terms with local Shonas because they needed the supplies of grain which could not be forthcoming if raiding was continued for a long time." War and Politics in Zimbabwe (1840-1900) by D.N Beach.

The Ndebele did not believe in total war any more and the Shona did believe in total peace. The Ndebele established regularized forms of diplomatic interactions with other states, for example, with the Gaza Kingdom) since the Gaza was also a powerful raiding state whose sphere of influence met with that of the Ndebele along the Save river.

Peaceful co-existence between the two was essential. Apart from tension arising from cattle raiding, cordial relations were maintained with the Gaza State. When Lobengula ascended the throne, he sent an ox to Mzila King of Gaza. In 1874, relations were further cemented when Lobengula married Mzila's daughter and Mzila's successor returned the complement by marrying Lobengula's daughter.

The Rozvi exchanged young men for cattle. In 1886 the Ndebele having attacked Mashayamombe people's area, attempted to trade with them in August. It has been assumed that the Shona were always victims of Ndebele raids. There were moments when the Shona themselves raided the Ndebele, for example, Tohwechipi, Matiluma and Chozema. However, their raids met with stiff resistance from the Ndebele who proved too strong for them.

By 1857, the situation resolved itself in favour of Mzilikazi's party, partly because of the division among the Shona.

The Ndebele established and maintained good relations with the Shona spirit mediums of Mupfure and Mhenyame valley. They paid tribute to the great mediums of Nyamuswa, Wanewane and at times even allied with the Shona to starve foreign threats. For example, they made an agreement with Adam Render who was Mapike's son-in-law a powerful sub-ruler of Charumbira.

In the great Matibi Chiefdom of the Low- veld, the ruler called the Ndebele to drive off the advancing Tonga- Hlengwe people of Chief Vurumela in return for tribute. Thus they did not always use force in the relations with the people because they lacked sufficient manpower. As a migrant state, the Ndebele were numerically lower to make raids on neighbours. Pursuit by the Boers forced Mzilikazi to avoid hostile relations with the locals. This fear was reinforced in 1847 when one Boer Commander P. Andries Henrrick Potgietter, made an airborne raid on Ndebele cattle posts.

Examination Questions

1. How far do you agree with the view that "the Ndebele relations with its neighbours were complex, and raiding was only one of its several components"?

2. Analyze the political composition of the Ndebele kingdom.

3. How did Lobengula react to the various foreign pressures on the Ndebele state?

4. Why were missionary activities more successful in Malawi than in the Ndebele state?

5. Why did the Ndebele and the Shona people, rebel against the rule of the British South Africa Company?

CHAPTER 3

PRE-COLONIAL STATES IN WEST AFRICA

Learning objectives

After studying the chapter, the student should be able to:

(i) Examine the slave trade activities in the West African states.
(ii) Show how West African states changed from slave trading to palm oil trading.
(iii) Account for the rise of new states in the Niger Delta.
(iv) Discuss the achievements of King Glele of Dahomey and Jaja of Opobo.

Origins

The most important reason for the rise and continued dominance of the Asante rulers was their capability to control and benefit from trading opportunities that presented themselves. A number of historians have come to the conclusion that the Asante state was created in the 17th Century in an area that was well- known for producing kola nuts and gold.

However, we must note that, Asante developed as a defensive union of small states. In fact, its formation was a result of fighting in order to control the gold producing areas. During the slave trade, the Asante State increasingly expanded in order to control some of the areas which could provide slaves. Thus the main reason which characterized the rising and growth of Asante was to control the slave trade.

Another factor was that Asante rulers wanted to trade directly with Europeans at the coast. Slave trading was very vital since it was the only way the state could obtain guns, tobacco, alcohol and other European goods. By the beginning of the 19th century, Asante was already controlling more than 20 tributary states.

Location: Present day Ghana

The Structure of the Asante State:

The Asante was typically African in nature. It constituted of a comparatively small Metropolitan area under the direct control of the ruler (Asantehene). In addition to the Metropolitan area, the ruler also controlled the surrounding tributary states (provincial Asante) which retained their political, cultural and religious beliefs. They were, however, required to pay substantial tribute in gold, slaves, cattle, agricultural products and military service.

How does a ruler maintain the system of tributary states? How does he keep them loyal and preventing breaking and asserting their independence?

It is wrong to assume that because of its decentralised structure, Asante was in a perpetual state of disintegration and held together purely by force. During the 19th century, Asante was one of the most powerful states on the West African coast and put up one of the strongest resistance to the British intruders. Nevertheless, its structure did imply that in certain circumstances tributary chiefs might decide that their interests were not being served and then go on re-asserting their independence.

Religion.
Most historians have come to the conclusion that the most powerful religious symbol was the Golden Stool. They further assert that it was a symbol of the divinely approved authority of the ruler. Within the Metropolitan area itself, the stool was regarded with a high degree of respect, however, within provincial Asante (the tributary states), the stool was not necessarily regarded as of vital importance. But some did acknowledge its importance. This helped to create an element of identity within the Metropolitan State or area. Another important religious activity was what was popularly known as the Odwira Festival. All tributary states were required to present themselves at the Metropolitan area or capital, Kumasi. Taking part in this ceremony or festival, was regarded as a gesture of allegiance or loyalty to the state.

Army.
The army was one of the most well trained and well disciplined organs in West Africa. Whenever necessary, an addition was obtained from the tributary states. This was done through an efficient recruitment system.

Duties
(a) The first duty was to make sure that tributary states maintained their loyalty and paid their regular tribute.
(b) The army was also to ensure the slave trade and slave routes fell under the control of the state.
(c) At times the army could also be used to capture slaves.

Economic Sector.
The ruler was in a position to amass resources that were imperative for the running of the state and the army through the following devices:

(a) He got tribute from tributary chiefs.
(b) He got taxes from traders since he controlled all the trade routes.
(c) He also obtained profits from the state gold mines.
(d) His ability to control the trading ports on the Atlantic Coast.

The ruler appointed certain government officials through whom all trading activities between the British and the Dutch had to be conducted. Thus Europeans were not allowed to trade with anybody other than those trading officials. The control of the slave trade routes

gave the ruler the control of the supply of guns. This ability to control the supply of guns gave the ruler the opportunity to control all European traders. He was in a position to control and direct European manufactured products such as cotton, cereals, liquor, porcelain and beads. These European manufactured products were used in rewarding loyal civil servants in order to enhance national unity.

Bureaucracy.

From about 1850, the rulers of Asante tried to increase their state control over political administration. They formed a system of state officials who were appointed and paid by the Asantehene. As a result, all civil servants came under the control of the ruler. The administration was divided into three separate categories.

(a) There were civil servants who were accountable for finance and tax collection.
(b) Others were merely responsible for running the judiciary sector.
(c) There were also officials responsible for the whole general administration of the state. This was designed to make sure that chiefs ruled according to the wishes of the Asantehene.

Many of these officials were Muslims or they had an Islamic education and were literate in Arabic. This ensured efficiency through keeping written records on important matters relating to justice, taxation and trade. They did not have much power themselves but supervised the activities of tributary chiefs who attended meetings on a yearly basis during the Odwira Festival. In the Metropolitan area, the ruler tightened his control over the district chiefs and replaced the hereditary with an inner council dominated by officials who were more directly under his control.

The Asante state was maintained through a variety of means other than pure military oppression-nevertheless in a decentralized tributary state, the army was more important in controlling the activities of the tributary rulers. This was meant to prevent them from reasserting their political independence. However, with the abolition of the slave trade, it became difficult for rulers to control the strength of his army.

As a result, this led to a gradual weakening of the state. It was this weakness which the British were able to exploit to their advantage in the last years of the 19th century.

NB: Some facts to bear in mind when looking at African history.

(i) Effects of trade including long distance trade.
(ii) Effects of fire arms.
(iii) Traditional structure.
(iv) Relations between Africans and foreigners.
(v) Relations with Europeans.

It is believed that there was a substantial coastal trade between the Asante and Europeans states and this trade was conducted in the following: - slaves, gold and ivory.

Whenever this trade was conducted, it was through European traders and officials of Asante and there was a system of free competition present. This competitive situation was to the benefit of Asante since it meant that Asante could sell to the highest bidder. In return for the export, Asante, got guns and other European manufactured goods. The slave trade had created a dependence on European imports especially guns essential for Asante security and the continual obtaining of slaves. As a result, this gave European traders great advantages over Asante. They were only able to control Asante over the supply of slaves and gold.

Abolition of the Slave Trade: Effects on African states-with specific reference to Asante-during the 19th Century:

A number of historians have noted that, by this time Europeans demanded palm oil, and groundnuts, all meant to the full growth of the Industrial revolution.

Britain forcibly prevented other European countries from trading in slaves since she wanted to bring about the economic transition. She realized that the trade in slaves was no longer necessary. This caused a great deal of resentment in both African rulers and foreign traders.

France and Germany had industries also and this led to a vigorous competition between European trading companies for their home markets.

(a) The competition led to wealthy trading companies taking over smaller ones, a tendency which created a larger monopoly of companies.
(b) This also led to the involvement of European governments to protect their traders.
(c) Asante coast came to be viewed by Britain as her specific sphere of influence. Britain began to buy many of the coastal ports from the previous owners-the Dutch. In this a British monopoly of the coastal trade began to develop. This was strongly resented by Asante. It is therefore not surprising that Asante resented British attempts to prevent slave-trading. This is because the slave trade contributed significantly to her growth and was the source of much needed imported manufactured goods, especially guns.

The abolition of the slave trade and its replacement by legitimate trade created serious problems of political and economic control of Asante. The state found it difficult to make a transition to legitimate trade.

The need to control the coastal trading ports became more important than ever. During the slave trade, European traders had welcomed the existence of a powerful state which could guarantee them a stable source of slaves. However with sudden change on demand for cash crops and new materials, a powerful African state was no longer to the interest of Europeans. In fact, state control meant that European traders were unable to trade directly with producers. It also meant that this state could maintain higher prices for its products than could otherwise be the case.

British trading interests were thus best saved by weakening the centralized power of Asante. During this period, Britain and other European countries encouraged tributary states to revolt against the Metropolitan state. Occasionally the British extended British protection over some areas and directly assisted them to resist Asante control.

Asante's attempts to reassert her control over the coastal areas were a threat to the British interests. British newspapers portrayed Asante as a blood- thirsty empire which tried to subjugate the coastal areas and which threatened the mainstay of the British trading interests to no meaning.

The years 1824 and 1826 were characterized by clashes between the British and Asante. Another war took place between 1863 and 1864 and the British forces were defeated by the Asante army. Asante proved capable of resisting British invasion. However, it must be noted that it was during this period that the state power was badly undermined.

Another factor which caused hostilities between the Asante and British was the taking over of Elimina Castle. The Asante thought that if the British took over this port, they would have total control of trade within the vicinity of Asante. Negotiations were conducted between the two states but all in vain. It was not long before Asante invaded the Gold Coast in an attempt to re-establish the control of Elimina.

However, the army had out-dated muzzle – loading rifles. The British also called troops from the Fante states. Incidentally, Fante was one of the worst enemies of Asante and quickly responded. The Asante army was defeated in 1873 and the British forces with their African counterparts, attacked and destroyed Kumasi.

Although Britain destroyed Asante, the British were not yet willing to take over the state; As a result, they withdrew from Kumasi. Asante was forced to sign a peace treaty giving Britain control of Elimina and recognizing the Fante states' independence. In 1874, in spite of their assistance in the First Anglo- Asante war, Fante coastal states were annexed by Britain. Asante itself fell into a period of civil war from 1888 to 1895.

Asante underwent a period of revival. The new King, Prempe consolidated his state and attempted to establish and create relations with France and Samori Toure. Britain regarded this with anxiety and in 1896 decided to conquer Asante permanently so that she could create full colonial rule over the Kingdom (Details on the development will be considered under Theme 3).

DAHOMEY STATE

Origins.

This was a highly centralized state as compared to Asante and it developed around the 18th and 19th centuries. Available historical evidence points out that Dahomey did not have an abundance of natural resources. Its rise is largely attributed to its participation in the slave trade. Rulers of Dahomey had well organized and highly disciplined army used for capturing slaves. Such slaves were sold at the ports of Dahomey; Porto Novo, Whydah and

Corteney. Some slaves were sold in return for European manufacturers. Another role of the slaves was to help expand the domestic economy. By 1800 much of the food for the army and part of the population was cultivated by slaves in some of the state plantations.

It was not until the early years of the 19th century that the Oyo Empire broke up and consequently Dahomey re-asserted her independence. The years as subject state of Oyo had fermented a strong national identity of Dahomey against Oyo. In the later years of the 19th Century, Dahomey took over part of Porto Novo.

Consequently, her control over the coastal areas comparatively increased. She also attempted to extend outwards so as to gain control of the major palm-oil producing areas. However, this was stopped by the British who were already in control of the areas.

Political Administration.

Dahomey was divided into a metropolitan area like Asante, around the capital and its six provinces. Of all these provinces, the most important was Whydah. Each province was divided into districts and villages. All were governed by highly centralized authority. All village level, positions were hereditary. The headmen were in charge of village affairs but their authority was subject to confirmation by the king.

Villagers could appeal over the headman to government if they felt unjustly treated. This helped to prevent tyrannical power. At national level, the King had absolute power. Some historians maintain that his word was law, but he ruled subject to time, honour, customs and traditions which were developed over generations of Kings and was still protected by the ancestors. Just as the Islamic sultan was bound by the law of Islam, so was the King of Dahomey by customs. Therefore he could not easily break the traditional custom and laws.

Consequently, national custom and law became uniform throughout the state. This gave the King the needed authority, a position reinforced within the whole fabric of customary law, religious authority and others. It also ensured that the ruler never became despotic or arbitrary and take unpopular decisions. Shared customs and traditional practices were believed to give people a sense of unity. The King headed a complicated bureaucracy which extended his personal powers over every significant sector of administration. All senior officials and provincial administrators were appointed and were subject to the King's approval.

The Dahomean Cabinet

(a) **The Migan.**
He was probably the most powerful in the administrative set up. He controlled the army and at times could act as a regent in the absence of King.

(b) Meu: Official responsible for tax collection and was regarded as the most important agent. It is believed he was in charge of the police force and international security.

(c) Torpke was in charge of agriculture and the land.

(d) Yevogan he was the provincial governor of Whydah and constantly controlled European trade. The office was not hereditary, so they could not attract a personal following or local loyalty. However, they were given large estates and residences in the city and they were regularly rewarded for their allegiance.

(e) The Naye – These were women beyond child-bearing age who acted as intelligence officials for the King. They were assigned to all the government ministries and they made a regular check on their activities.

Senior officials acted as councilors vis- a-vis their influence to the State policy as well. All officials were subject to regular inspection by elderly female officials. There was also a highly developed system of courts of judges. These institutions gave judgement according to the established and nationally understood customary law. The efficient and central bureaucracy meant that the strong control of the state was uniform in every sector of life needless to mention that, that is why Dahomey was able to adapt to the changing economic demands.

Religion and National identity

Surrounding the political authority, were both rituals and ceremonies. Furthermore ascension of the King had to be affirmed by religious heads. Royal ancestors had the status of national spirits. People from all walks of life had to attend annual ceremonies in honour of royal spirits. This gathering had important political connotation. Representatives from all areas attended council meetings. However, it was the King who controlled the election of religions leaders. No secret societies or religious organizations were allowed. It was this state religion therefore, which entrenched the authority of the King.

Citizenship.

In Dahomey it was regarded as a special status and it had its own rituals and ceremonies. At national level, this was symbolized by a perforated calabash. This item was used by J.B Webster and E Isichie. This was filled with water designed to symbolize the national spirit. On becoming a citizen of the state, people were required to place a finger into one of the holes of the vase. The ceremony was meant to illustrate that if any citizen withdraw his finger, the national spirit would be unhappy. This means that the whole nation would suffer because the national spirit would drain away.

The Army.

By the middle of the 19th century, Dahomey had a small but well trained army which constituted of approximately 12 000 regular soldiers and it is believed that approximately 5 000 of these were women. Furthermore, there was a militia of about 24 000.

The militia could be called up at any time whenever there was a need to do so. As such, this was organized through a competent process of census and recruitment of officials. The army was under the King's control through the Migan. It was believed that the army was an important device in enforcing both the authority of the King and the strict monopoly of trade with European traders. Control of this trade, meant that people either north or south of Dahomey, were not in a position to acquire guns.

Economy.
It is believed that the majority of agricultural activities on plantations employed slave labour. This type of labour was closely controlled and monitored. Craftsmen within all cities were controlled by the king. It therefore followed that Dahomey was in a position to tax and supervise the marketing of local products. Moreover the state was in a position to impose taxes in the export of labour. As such, it monopolised the distribution of European manufactured goods from the slave trade. All in all, these factors ensured enough revenue for the state to maintain its army and bureaucracy, as well as venturing in development projects.

By 1840, Britain was committed to ending the slave trade. The French and the British trading companies consolidated themselves at the port of Whydah where they encouraged the trade in palm oil, but Brazilian and Portuguese traders continued secretly with trade in slaves. Around 1881, Britain established a blockage at the coastal ports of Dahomey. Slave ships were captured and slaves were freed.

The ending of the slave trade had far- reaching effects on Dahomey (since it constituted the basis of the economy). However, the high degree of centralization and economic planning enabled Dahomey to fully adopt herself to the prevailing economic demands. This adaptation was with regard to the economy now based on the export of oil.

Slaves were still captured but instead of being sold, they were employed locally on the palm oil plantations and on the agricultural estates of the King and officials. Furthermore, slave raiding was no longer the main activity of the army, which was now employed in extending the control of the state into areas that produced palm oil in Yorubaland.

However, in this venture, the army was not fully successful. In fact, it was defeated by Yoruba land on a number of occasions. Significant to note is that, the army also attempted to expand towards Abeokuta and Ketu. By the 1870's the state was exporting about 3 times the value of palm oil compared to the value of slaves she had exported in the 1840's. The same inflexible state controls applied on palm oil trade as had been on the slave trade. Producers and traders were tightly monitored.

Some historians believe that records were kept pertaining to the number of palm oil trees so that trade and taxation could be constantly reviewed. This kind of economic practice was further expanded to cattle and food in either times of shortages or surpluses.

The French Intervention.

During the period up to the 1860's, the French interests were fully entrenched in the Sene – Gambia region (Senegal). But as European competition almost reached a climax over the palm oil trade, the French traders increased their activities on the ports of Dahomey. This activity led to the gradual interference of the French government. The British had already full established themselves around the Niger Delta and also around coastal areas. Consequently, from this activity, the French thought that they may be excluded.

By the 1860's the European powers, Britain, France, Portugal and Germany, were active on the coast of Dahomey, which had been a hive of economic activity. All these powers had been active in the slave trade, but now were flourishing on palm oil and other products for example, distribution of pepper and ivory etc. The state exercised firm control over production at her 3 main ports. This protection was however abandoned in 1868.

During the 1860's and 1870's, France and Dahomey signed 3 trade treaties. These also encompassed friendship treaties. However, the interpretation of these treaties led to conflict. The French regarded them as ceding the coastal ports to them since they hoped to exclude other European powers. Dahomey, on the other hand, felt that she had merely given France the right to trade at these ports but not to occupy them.

Initial Conflict between Dahomey and France.

Conflict initially erupted over the control of the trading ports. In 1879, the French resident at Catonou did not see this as particularly menacing. In approximately 1883, France re-annexed Porto Novo at the request of the ruler of Porto Novo who wanted to re-assert her independence of Dahomey. During the 1880s, France was getting anxious at Germany and British interests in the region and as a result, France became more aggressive than before.

As a precautional measure, the King of Dahomey signed a treaty with Portugal. Behanzin hoped that Portugal claimed that Dahomey was now her protectorate. In 1889, the French forced the King of Dahomey to regard the treaty she had signed with Portugal null and void. The French also demanded that Dahomey should surrender Porto Novo. It was therefore now only a question of time before the ultimate conquest took place in 1894.

France's main motive of occupying Dahomey was a capitalist desire to control the palm oil trade. For instance, in 1883 the French occupied the coastal Popo Kingdom of Porto Novo so as to take the Yoruba palm oil. As a result, French traders moved from Whydah to Porto Novo. This French move meant that Dahomey lost revenue from custom duties due to this shift of trade. In 1887, it is believed that Dahomey exports fell to less than 100 000, whereas they had totaled over 500 000 in the late 1870's. This loss of wealth meant that the state found it difficult to buy sufficient arms to defend herself against French expansion. However, the King was unwilling to fight the French. He permitted France to stabilize her position at the coast unchallenged. In 1889 he even conceded his Kingdom's claims to the port of Catonou after the French had sent a threatening mission but the King's son, Behanzin refused to acknowledge French rule at Catonou.

He brutally crushed a revolt of Dahomean chiefs who wanted to follow the King's policy of the surrender. Consequently, he sent an army to attack Catonou in 1890. However, France defended Catonou successfully. As a result, France concluded that she could be safe if only the state of Dahomey was defeated.

The War.

The French were taken by surprise at the number of Dahomean soldiers. However Dahomean soldiers were armed with old weapons which were slow to load and fire. They

did not know fully how to use their modern German weapons. French soldiers were highly trained and armed. As a result, they never divided their contingent. They used their superior power, thus they avoided in ambush.

On the other hand, Dahomean soldiers were only trained in dawn tactics on towns and did not know how to stop a French advance. African division also contributed to the downfall of Dahomey, for example, Porto Novo and Whydah. The invasion encouraged Yoruba slaves on the Dahomean plantations to revolt.

The capital was moved to Abomey from Porto Novo. The French middlemen could now sell palm oil in France at a price ten times higher than what they paid the producers.

The Role of Religion.

There was a belief in the medium and ancestral spirits. Ancestors were believed to be involved in the day to day life of their descendents. They were the peoples guardians and protectors. People were required to respect their ancestors and live according to the customs. If they failed to do this, it was believed that the ancestors would be annoyed. This belief in the role of ancestors, is a very strong device in society. People always lived according to customs due to fear of offending ancestors. The royal ancestors were believed to have a status of natural spirits which tended to reinforce the allegiance to the ruler.

Symbols, rituals and cultural influence.

Religious symbols and rituals tended to reinforce cult beliefs, for example the Ndebele assimilated the religious beliefs of conquered people which helped to unite them. Important religious ceremonies often had overt political functions.

The Mandinka empire.

Learning objectives

After studying the topic, the student should be able to:

(i) Discuss the strengths of the Mandinka Empire during the colonial period.
(ii) Discuss the effects of the use of firearms in the second half of the nineteenth century on African states.
(iii) Assess Samori Toure's rule of Mandinka Empire.

Background.

Like most of the Jihadist states of West Africa, the Mandinka Empire was composed of a number of independent states which included Sikasso, Kankan, Odienne and others. These states were ruled by traditionalists. During the 18th century a class of Muslims known as Diula Mandinka had established themselves within the empire.

However, the class was noted for its historical confrontations with the traditionalist rulers. They therefore decided to revolt against these traditional rulers but the revolts were always unsuccessful. Common people within the Mandinka Empire had a number of grievances against the ruling class. It is not surprising therefore that Mandinka society became a fertile ground for the new reforming Islam.

Samori Toure.

The Jihadist leader was from a very ordinary family. His parents were ordinary peasants. From his early adulthood, he was converted to the Tijaniyya brotherhood. He joined a small Jihadist army and had gone off fighting in Jihad-holy war. However he broke away from army and formed his own army. He attacked followers from the Mandinka who joined this Jihad army and began to conquer the Mandinka states one by one.

His motives behind these were both political and religious, but the underlying motive was to destroy the traditional ruling elite so as to set up a stable and united political order where both Islamic and trade could flourish.

Conquests
Samori was encouraged many smaller Mandinka states and supported by common people in alliance with the Diula traders. Between 1867-1881 he set up a highly centralized form of bureaucracy. Samori Toure proclaimed himself. Almaami (comander of the faithful) but it must be noted it was the basic popularity of Samori Toure which did most to break down power of traditional rulers and made people acknowledge his leadership.

Samori built schools for his soldiers and provided them with Islamic education. Mass conversions created a new national identity under different people. People from all walks of life and the prosperous, Diula trading class began to regard Samori as a spiritual and national leader.

Economic Organisation

Samori was able to collect taxes which gave him the resources to provide his army. Trade began to play an important role to the political and economic stability of the state. He expanded trade by eliminating small national boundaries.

Samori Toure exercised an element of mercantilism-free enterprise. He also initiated the new system of law. Taxes were imposed on gold trade and villagers were supposed to pay tribute in gold and agricultural products. Moreover, control of the slave trade also largely contributed to the rise and expansion of his empire.

Political Administration

Unlike his predecessors, he organized a highly centralized state divided into various provinces under the jurisdiction of district chiefs. However it must be noted that district chiefs were responsible to Samori Toure. Unlike the provincial level traditional authority at village level was intact but they were subjected to a system of officials which were also directly responsible to the Almaami. Functions of Samori were purely religious and he held all religious authority. The empire was divided into 162 districts of twenty or more villages each. The districts were grouped together to form ten large provinces.

Quidi.
His main function was to work as a judge and law enforcer. All forms of justice were controlled through him.

Sofa.
This official was responsible for military recruitment. Furthermore, he ensured each region was in a position to supply the forces. The Sofa was appointed by Samori himself. The official raised supplies for the army, harvested and sold the produce from Almaami's field which was farmed communically in each village.

District Chiefs.
Samori's district chiefs were assisted by a war chief who had 200 to 300 sofas under his command and a scholar.

The Almami.
The Almami was the supreme political, judicial and religious head of the empire as well as its military commander. He was assisted by a special state council which meant his powers were always curtailed. (They were checks and balances). The Almami (Samori's) state council was composed of provincial heads of three lines of authority: political, religious and military.

Functions of the state council were to assist the supreme leader in state affairs administration and to further ensure he did not to rule arbitrarily. There was a deliberate policy which was to discourage enthusiasm within the state. The basic aim of Samori was to encourage integration of all defeated people.

The Army.
Samori maintained a standing army of about 20 000 to 30 000 men. Due to that, the state was always at war in most of its existence. Soldiers were always well armed. The state also relied on both cavalry and infantry.

<u>Functions of the Army.</u>
At times the army was used for slave capturing and looting which helped to provide the money for maintaining it such as to buy modern weaponary. The army had also an education function, thus soldiers were trained not just to fight but equally to spread Islam. There was an effective centrally controlled system of recruitments. The army provided opportunities for social mobility. Soldiers were given education centred on the basis of alligeance and marriage. However, senior officers in the army were sometimes not derived from the ruling class.

Comments.
The Mandinka Empire was probably the most efficiently run African State in the nineteenth century. It was much more united and centralized than the Tokolor. Two groups were given power at different levels-chiefs at the village level and Samori's friends and relatives at the higher level. Both groups were checked and reduced in power by religious leaders and Sofa

administrators. They were appointed directly by the Almaami. They had no traditional claim to office.

A military state.
Samori's empire has been called a military state because the sofas were so important. The empire was at war for most of its existence so the army had to be strong. Samori was able to appoint the best men, regardless of their origins to high positions in the army. Since education, discipline and national rather than local loyalty were taught in the army, it was a good training ground for political officers.

Promotion of National Identity and Loyalty.

Samori aimed at destroying ethnicism. In its place, he put national loyalty among the Mandinka. At each level of government he saw to it that men of different families and ethnic groups worked together. Less emphasis was placed on village groups which and more on larger political units like the canton which united villages. He also tried to abolish distinctions between groups which worked together. He also tried to abolish distinctions between privileged and non-privileged classes by giving every chance to rise through the army to highest positions in the state.

Mandinka unity was based on law, way of life and thinking of Islam. Religious leaders were as important as the political and military. Images, ancestors' houses and sacred graves were replaced with mosques and schools. Taxation and law were reformed according to Islamic practice. Judiciary matters were usually settled in the alkali's courts at the village, district and provincial levels but very serious matters could be brought before Samori and his state council.

NB: Samori introduced great changes and did not just preserve old customs and institutions. He created a complex administration with political officers appointed by the central government and an efficient loyal army to carry out the government's will-both essential for a modern state. He also aroused a feeling of national pride, without which a state is not likely to last long.Samori was a diplomatic and military genius who was helped by the Mandinka's pride in their history (i.e. is the Mali empire). Samori therefore appeared as a modern Mansa Musa.

With the conquest of Kankan in 1880, he became the most important force in the region. By the early eighties, his control stretched from the forest edge northward to include the Boure goldfields and the upper Niger as far as downsteam as Bamako. But Samori's empire was clearly less Islamic than those created by the early Jihads. He was Muslim, but he had joined some of the earlier fighting in the non-Muslim side of things. For a time he adopted a strongly pro-Islamic policy, taking the title of Almam (Almaami) in 1886 and using state power to force conversion. However, he later dropped the religious emphasis and it appears in retrospect that Samori was moved in the first place by hope that Islam could help to unify the diverse people he happened to control.

Samori and the Europeans.
Until the 1880s Samori built his empire without concern for any European threat. The British in Sierra Leone were non-expensive and served as a convenient outlet for gold and other exports. The French on the Senegal were far away until they began their military advance to the east in 1879. That move was done simultaneously with Samori's own drive down the Niger Valley that both arrived before Bamako in 1883. After some initial brushes with French forces, Samori was able to arrange a truce in 1886-87. That left him free to pursue territorial expansion eastward into the present day Ivory Coast.The French meanwhile were tied up with their wars against the Tokolor Empire to the north.

It seems likely that, about the mid 1880s, Samori had reached something like the limits of territory he could conquer with his original resource and support. His empire was ethnically heterogenous, but it had no earlier experience of political unification over such a large territory, and without even the self-interest its citizens to justify the material cost of still more territorial expansion. In 1888 and 89 a major revolt broke out throughout the western part of the empire, which the almaami suppressed only with the great difficulty.
What then developed in the 1890s will be dealt with later.

Samori Toure's Career: An Assessment.

Samori Toure's political career has been interpreted differently by historians with some according him a hero status at his death while others condemned him as a callous hearted slave master interested in spoils of plunder. What ever has been said or shall be said about him, there is one glaring achievement which cannot be taken away from him, namely his state building genius which gave birth to a vast empire. Emerging from a disadvantaged peasant background which had virtually, no ties with any diagnostic or monarchiacal roots, Samori Toure provided the brick and mortar for the building as a sophisticated vast empire known in history as the Mandinka empire.

His personal empire founded on West African soil stood a determined resistance against the turbulence of French colonization for 16 years from 1882 to 1898 until it finally buckled on its knees under the weight of French imperialism. The Mandinka Empire managed to resist French conquest for 16 years chiefly because its author Samori had created a well-organized social, military, economic and political structure. It was because of his exceptional ability as a nation-builder and his determined efforts to resist French colonization which merited Samori titles such as, "The Napoleon of the Sudan." His own political orientation as a soldier saw Samori adopting a strategy of military confrontation against the French rulers. He fell victim to the formidable forces of colonialism which were animated omnipresent in post-1880 Africa.

Samori chose military confrontation because he clearly saw the French purely as a threat to his growing empire. Credit should actually be given to Samori for trying to protect his creation of the Mandinka Empire by any means necessary. Indeed, it is J.B. Webster's contention that he tried to do for West Africa what Ethiopia did for North-East Africa-namely resisting colonial conquest by military means. Credit should be given to Samori for understanding better more than his contemporary African leaders the importance of beating the enemy at his own game namely by the use of modern weaponry.

Samori was born in 1830 in a disadvantaged peasant family. In his prime youth, he joined the Diula (Dyula) trading concern which led to a leading role in long-distance trade. As a Dyula (Diula) trader, Samori familiarised himself with market towns over a wide area in search of fire arms, horses and cattle. May be it was during that time when Samori became aware of the importance of fire arms.

In about 1850 Samori abandoned the traditional beliefs which his family professed and was converted to Islam having been influenced by the teachings of the great Islamic leader, Al-Hajj Umar. Indeed, he joined the Umar Tijaniyya brotherhood.

Samori's political initiation clearly started in 1853 when he joined the Sise army in an attempt to rescue his own mother who had been captured by (Diula) Dyula clan. While in that army, he distinguished himself as part of the Cavalry. In 1857, he broke away from the Sise army and became an independent warlord.

From 1857-1867 because of his leadership qualities, Samori managed to build his own large army which became a formidable force to reckon in West Africa. He equipped his army with efficient and modern weapons imported from Sierra Leone. Samori started conquering neighbouring Mandinka state into his mother state. Young men from different ethnic groups captured as prisoners of war were conscripted into Samori's army. He established the capital of his empire at Bisandugu and his fame spread. Samori managed to destroy a sense of tribalism or ethnicism among his soldiers by grouping soldiers from different ethnic groups into units which had no relation to their place of origin.

By so doing, he created a sense of national unity among the soldiers. Marriage across tribal or ethnic boundaries were also encouraged and this also broke the barriers of tribalism and gave way to a sense of national unity. By 1888, Samori's army was up between 30 000-35 000 with about 3 000 to 4 000 men employed in the arms workshop. Indeed, it is J.B. Webster et al's contention that by 1888, Samomi's empire was the third largest political unit of the Western Sudan after the Sokoto caliphate.

Elizabeth Isichei, A History of West Africa, has noted that.

"Different scholars assess the importance of Islam in (Samori) his life, some have suggested that he adopted Islam as tactical device to use as a unifying ideology for his vast empire".

One such scholar is J.B. Webster, for one, has indicated that,

"Samori's motives were a blend of religion and economics. He believed God had specially chosen him to spread the faith".

While Samori might have been converted to Islam for the purpose of attracting a following which was also affiliated to that religion. P. Thatcher, thinks otherwise and indicates that;

"Althrough his career, Samori did everything possible to spread Tijaniyya Islam". Indeed his genuine acceptance of the Islam religion is further shown when he renounced the traditional or, "pagan" title, "Faama", and insisted on calling himself the "Almami" a title used by powerful Muslim rulers.

It is indespensible, however that Samori adopted marriage alliances as a unifying factor, and indeed, he made sustained inroads into parts of Futa Jalon and Tokolor empire by means of marriage and diplomatic alliances with his fellow Tijaniyya brothers. In other words, marriages cutting across tribal boundaries were encouraged within the empire to destroy tribalism and to encourage national cohesion. It is J.B. Webster's contention that:

"He also tried to abolish distinctions between privileged and non-privileged classes by giving everyone a chance to rise through the army to the highest places in the state: All this unity which Samori had converted in the pre-colonial days gave his state that unity which was necessary to withstand French aggression".

The policy of divide and rule which the French successfully used in the other parts of West Africa like in the Tokolor empire was misplaced among the Mandinka people. It was because of this national pride which Samori had built which resulted in his people giving a determined fight against the French in the name of presenting the great achievement built by Samori.

Samori also created a stable and reliable economic base to finance the administration of his empire, his army and arms purchases from four sources. The mining of gold which was taking place at Boure gold fields provided the metal which was used for acquiring firearms from Sierra Leone. Secondly the exports of ivory also brought income needed to foot the expenses of the army and administration.

The sale of slaves to the north also brought in substantial state revenue. Samori is alleged to have sold prisoners of war to the north in numbers ranging from about 2 200-7 000 a year. Tribute from vassals and tax from his own subjects all brought a steady state revenue.

When Samori started the war of resistance against the French, the empire was therefore not only militarily mobilized but economically as well hence 16 years of formidable resistance. The war which Samori fought against the French was therefore a total war and modern in nature, since both natural and human resources were totally mobilized.

Politically, Samori was the leader the Empire as well as its commander in chief. Samori differed from the majority of African rulers in that he was himself a soldier who went to the battlefield and drew up the army's military strategies. It should be noted however that Samori was not an absolute ruler as he was assisted to run the state by an inner council of provincial heads political, religious and military leaders. This system of government was highly sophisticated and officials were answerable to him. He promoted them to higher offices for loyalty and on merit and dismissed them for inept performance or disloyalty.

The system was highly centralized because in every village, Samori was economically represented by a "sofa" appointed on merit directly by Samori himself. As such therefore the "sofa" had no traditional or hereditary claim to office. The "Sofa" played important roles like raising troops and supplies for supervising cultivation in the "Almami" or Samori's fields scattered in every village. They were responsible for harvesting and selling the produce from the Almami's fields.

This then was the well-organised and well-knit fabric of the Mandinka Empire which however, did not easily escape the net of French colonialism randomly cast over West Africa after 1882.

The first clash came in 1882 when the French inflicted an attack on Kenyera deep in Samori's empire. With determined resistance, the attack was successfully repulsed by Samori's military state. In 1885 the French took yet another offensive in trying to dislodge Mandinka from the Boure (Bure) gold fields but they were not successful. Samori however lost quite a large number of soldiers to French aggression.

In that same year, the French and Samori worked out a temporary peace truce whose contents and relevance are not necessary to detail here. In 1856, Samori made a great error when he passed an edict which compelled every one to convert to Islam. This edict was bitterly resented by most of Samori's subject who still stuck to traditional religion.The French took advantage of this out cry and began to encourage a series of revolts within Samori's territories. But Samori withdrew the edict and was able to re-establish his authority in 1889.

In 1887-1888, Samori in an expansionist campaign made a great tactical error. He launched an attack on Tieba Traore of the Silcasso state, a war which resulted in Samori losing 10 000 men and all his horses. The French took advantage of this military disability which afflicted Samori's forces or army and invaded his empire in 1891. Despite stunning resistance by Samori's forces, the French forces won the day and captured Bissandugu. Samori did not retreat or throw in the towel. He adopted the "scortched earth policy", burning villages, crops and everything of value to starve off the invaders. It is J.B. Webster's observation that;

"Samori left the French not a grain of maize, not a single man, woman, or child, over a dead and deserted country". This marked the end of the first Mandinka Empire".

Samori engaged his people on a forced march east of the first Mandinka Empire and rebuilt a second empire in the new area with a capital called Dabakala. However the location of the second Mandinka Empire was afflicted by disabilities. Firstly Samori was cut off from Freetown his sure source of fire arms and he lost the Boure (Bure) goldfields. In 1898, the French pursued Samori art towards the second Mandinka Empire. He was attacked and captured in that same year.

It is E. Isichei's summary of the 1889 Franco-Mandinka war that:

"In the end, he was defeated, not by the French but by forces of nature. In forested mountainous country, in the rainy season, his troops were hit by famine. Indeed some of the soldiers defected to the French side for food since they were on the verge of starvation. captured in 1898, Samori was deported to Seychelles at the age of seventy (70).'

It is clear that Samori deserves a page in African history, a page in which one cannot deny him the hero status. He tried by all means necessary to preserve the independence of his state in the fashion of Haile Salassie I of Ethiopia but fell an unfortunate victim to forces of French colonialism.

The Islamic or Jihadist states of western Sudan.

Learning objectives

After studying the topic, the student should be able to:

(i) Explain how the Sokoto Caliphate emerged.
(ii) Discuss the weaknesses of pre-colonial states in West Africa.
(iii) Assess the methods used by West African states in resisting foreign expansion.
(iv) Discuss the internal organisation of the Sokoto Caliphate.

Introduction

According to Oliver and Atmore the Jihads (Holy wars) had nothing to do with direct European intervention in the region and yet they affected the whole of Western Sudan. They had their origin in the revival of Islam in Western Sudan, which was brought by the Arabic speaking Moors who came into Mauretiania from across the Sahara in the 15th and 16th centuries.

The leaders of this revival had retired from the hustle and bustle of politics and trade, and went to live in remote places. They trained small band of devoted disciplines in the study of the Islamic scriptures and legal traditions and in their own methods of prayer and devotion. The disciplines were formed into brother- hoods (tariqa) called after the founding teacher (for examples, the Tija- niyya brotherhood named after Ahmed Tijani). In the 18th century, the Jihad was waged in Futa Toro and Futa Jalon were organized by Fulani (Fula) teachers most of whom belonged to the ancient brotherhood called the Quadriyya.

The Brotherhoods: Why revived?

This was out of the realisation that the Muslim world which had once been formed around the Mediterranean for its military skill, learning, and government was in decline. The Muslim countries and the Middle East were threatened by the growing power of Christian Europe.

In Western Sudan the Muslim empires of Songhai and Borno had collapsed and by 1800 were only small minority groups of Muslims in non- Muslim States. The revival emanated from the fact that scholars of Western Sudan believed this was because most Muslims had abandoned the simple living habits and purity of faith of the earliest Muslims.

As a result, during the nineteenth century they formed a number of reforming movements to restore the Muslim world to its former greatness by newer devolution to the ideals of Islam. This resulted in the formation of the following:

(i) Walihabiya of Arabia – 18th century.
(ii) The Samusiyya of Cyrenica
(iii) The Mahdiyya of the Eastern Sudan.
(iv) The three jihads of the Western Sudan were led by Usman dan Fodio, Ahamad Lobbo and al – Hajj Umar.

Focus is going to be on 2 of the three jihads that is Uthman dan Fodio and al- Hajj Umar.

The Jihad of Usman dan Fodio and the Sokoto Caliphate: (USMAN)

Background.
Uthman dan Fodio, the leader of the great 19th century jihad in northern Nigeria and Niger had been a member of the Qudiriyya brotherhood. The brotherhood was many centuries old. It stressed study and intellectual activity as the way to salvation and so was favoured by educated ruling aristocracies. It was also ascetic, favouring vigorous prayer and penitence.

Uthman (Usman) dan Fodio was born into the Torodbe clan in 1784 in Gobir the Northern Nigeria. He studied under a famous teacher at Agudes, the capital of the Tuareg State of Air in the Sahara, north of his home. This is where he came in touch with the reforming ideas then stirring throughout the Muslim War a part of the great reaction of Islam as a whole to the advance of the Christian West.

Although there was no European menace on the spot to react to in West Africa, it does seem that, along with desire to reform the practice of Islam in the Sudan, the religious leaders did have the sense of a threat to the Islamic world in general from expanding European Christiandom.

This was Dan Fodio's background when he returned from Agades to become tutor to the son and heir of the Huasa Sarki (ruler) of Gobir. It was because of this position that dan Fodio gained considerable influence in the councils of the State, which he used to spread his zeal for religious reform.

1802 was a very important year for Dan Fodio because his pupil Yunfa became sarki on the death of his father. However, this did not help Uthman (Usman)'s cause because the pupil turned against the tutor. Dan Fodio was so disappointed that he retreated from the court to his native village. Here he was joined by members of the reform party. These followers became so numerous that Yunfa threatened him with military action.

Usman (Usman)'s hijra.
The flight (hijra) was prompted by Yunfa's persecution of Muslims and his attempt to assassinate Dan Fodio in Alkalawa, the capital of Gobir. As tension rose Abd al- Salam, a leading Hausa scholar and disciple of Dan Fodio forcibly struck the chains from a group

Muslim slaves belonging to Yunfa. Gobir was seriously divided and a civil war could not be avoided.

It was not merely Muslim Fulani against traditionalist Hausa, some Muslims, Fulani and Hausa were loyal to Yunfa while some Fulani and Hausa traditionalists sympathized with dan Fodio. The revolutionary years-West African since 1800- 1967 page 5).

Dan Fodio and his companions at Degel, including his father, his brother Abdallah, his son Muhammed Bell, Abd al-Salam and a number of scholars and disciples withdrew from Degel to Gudu on the Western frontier of Gobir. Dan Fodio, pointing to the historical parallel of the prophet Muhammad's flight (hijra) from Mecca, then retired to the remote districts of Gudu (21 February 1804)-he had imitated the prophet's hijra from Mecca to Medina.

Supporters began to arrive in the following month both from Gobir and all over the Western Sudan. The numbers were so large that Dan Fodio found himself at the head of a really formidable of army (Arabic maja hidum, from the word Jihad) all burning with religious favour and intent on jihad.

Most of the Skehu Uthman (Usman)'s companions were Fulani, followed by Tuareg and Hausa. At Gudu Dan Fodio reluctantly accepted the title of Amir al- Muminin (commander of the Faithful) and proclaimed a jihad against the unbelievers as the prophet had done at Medina-(This was the traditional title of the Caliphs or successors of the prophet- rulers of the Arab empire in Muslim's glorious era).

The Holy War (Jihad)

Since Dan Fodio was middle – aged and not a soldier but a scholar, his Lieutenants Abdullah and Bello took charge of the military operations.

The following were the words of Dan Fodio after being proclaimed commander of the Faithful. He swore thus

"If I fight this battle that I may become greater than my fellow, or that my son may become greater than his son, or that my slave may lord it over his slave, may the Kaffir (infidel) wipe us from the land "(Rolland Oliver and Antinomy Atmore – Africa since 1800, 1972, page 31).

After the declaration of jihad, dissatisfied men came from all the Hausa States to swear allegiance to the Amir al- Muminin and to receive in exchange of the green barrier of the time believers.

The first defeat of Yunfa's army at Gudu increased Dan Fodio's supporters. The jihad attempt to capture Alkalawa, but when it turned south into Zamfara and Kebbi, it was welcomed as bringing freedom from oppression of Gobir.

Reasons why the Jihad got support.

Dan Fodio won much support by issuing two manifests:

1. Wathiquat Ahl al- Sudan
2. Kitab al Farq

In these he pointed out the duty of Muslims to resist traditionalist religion and evils of government led by non- Muslims.

Finally in 1808 Sarki Yunfa was killed at the fall of Alkalawa and serious resistance collapsed.

3. Muslim grievances in Hausaland: (both Hausa and Fulani).

There were religious, political and economic.

(i) They hated the selling Muslims into slavery.
(ii) They despised the Sultans/ Sarkins for their sacrifices and belief in spirits.
(iii) They despised them for the luxury and sinfulness of court life as well as for the way they treated the commoners.
(iv) They complained about judgments in the courts, and
(v) Bribery and corruption in appointments to office.
(vi) Most important of all the merchants, who were mostly Fulani disliked the heavy marked taxes.

The nomads (mainly Fulani) hated the tax on cattle.
NB: Muslim scholars pointed out that all these things were illegal by Karamic Law. They preached reform and had attracted not only Muslims but also traditionalists ready to support reform even if they did not like the Muslim religion.

Political Organisation of the Sokoto Caliphate.

The end of the jihad was a time of decision for Uthman dan Fodio. Always more of scholar than ruler he returned to his books. His empire was divided into two, his son Muhammad Bello-ruling the eastern part from the newly founded city of Sokoto and his brother Abadallah the western part from Gwandu

The Amir al – Muminin (The Khalifa of Muhammad on earth
At the top of the hierachy was the commander of the faithful. He was in charge of the whole theocracy.
The new political order that emerged in the late 1810s and early 1820s was mainly the creation of Uthman (Usuman)'s brother Abadallah and his son Bello.

Emirs.
Each individual flag-bearer (green) was recognized as Emir over the territory he had conquered. In practice, this meant that central government could not easily remove the Emirs from office, much less control in detail the workings of their subordinate

governments. Thus, although Usman dan Fodio had begun with a detailed clue of the kind of society he wanted to create and had some ideas about the means he planned to use, his successors lacked power to follow through.

Whatever its intentions, the central government could use advice and diplomacy, but only occasional force to correct on especially difficult situations. Even within the area under closer control from Sokoto, old social structures were revived under new names. The aggrieved herdsmen drifted back into seasonal trans - humance, while Muslim aristocracy replaced the old Hausa governments in the towns and the tight social stratification of the old regime reappeared with new men at the top.

How the Emirates developed.

The spread of the jihad.

Even before the fall of Alkalawa made victory certain in Gobir, Muslims had gained control in a number of Hausa States. Immediately after the hijra, Muslims from far away had travelled to Dan Fodio to receive his blessing on their plans to start the jihad in their home states. The Shehu gave flags to his representatives in the various states to show that they had his blessing and authority. Successful jihads were executed in the following states:

1) Zaria, Katsina, Kano
2) Macina
3) Nupe
4) Ilorin

1. The Shehu's flag bearers had gained control by 1809 resulting in the flight of Hausa rulers in Zaria, Katsina and Kano into exile where they set up new states at Abuja and Maradi.
2. For the Macina jihad, Alimado Lobbo, a disciple of Dan Fodio and power wandering Bambara – made his hijra to Humdullah where he built a new capital after defeating the traditionalists. Initially it was regarded as part of the Sokoto Caliphate only to be declared Amir – al- Muminin hence head of an independent Muslim State.
3. In Nupe, a Fulani, Mallam Dendo chief court adviser to Etsu (King of Nupe) had earlier neceived a flag from Dan Fodio. Dendo, leader of the local Fulani held balance of power and supported first one candidate and the other. In the end, his son Uthman Zaki seized the throne of Nupe and founded an emirate and his two rivals fled.
4. The emirate of Adamana was founded by a Fulani educated in Borno, Mallam Adam who visited Sokoto in 1806 and received a flag. He united the Fulani on the Benue and conquered a large area which before had been ruled by many small chiefs. He founded Yola as the capital of the emirate in 1841
5. Further to the south across the Niger the once – powerful Oyo empire of the Yoruba was Afonja the Kakanfo or commander of Oyo army, revolted against his overlord, the Alafin, and set himself as ruler of llorin. In order to keep his independence from Oyo he asked for help from the Fulani and took Mallam Alimi into his service as adviser. Alimi's son secretly obtained the jihad flag and when Afonja tried to free

himself from Fulani domination he was assassinated and Alimi's son took the throne thus bringing IIorin into the_Caliphate. The Fulani – IIorin army sucked the Oyo capital, killing the Alafin and spreading the jihad south among the Yoruba until it as halted by Ibadan's firearms at the battle of Oshongo in 1839. The Yoruba then fought a series of civil wars, when various Yoruba states tried in vain to re-establish the unity lost by the collapse of Oyo.

Dan Fodio died in 1817 and by then the frontiers of the Caliphate were established. Borno was the only place where jihadists had failed to overthrow the traditional rulers

Problems facing the Sokoto Caliphate.

The first decade of the Caliphate was characterized by political instability. It had to fight for its presence in the political scene. The successor to the theocracy-Shehu Bello -Amir al – Muminin faced a leadership struggle, a strong Hausa rebellion and attacks first from Gobir and the Tuareg and later from the powerful army of Borno. The fate of the Caliphate was decided by Bello's leadership in this period.

Bello and Abadallah disagreed over policy-a problem which turned out to be permanent. Abdullah disliked the way the military took over political power and authority at the expense of scholars who were no longer supporting the movement.

As if this was not enough, one rebellion broke out led by the Hausa scholar, Ada al – Salam. This was to be followed by traditionalist uprisings in Kebbi and Zamfara. The Hausa leader complained that the Hausa were not getting a fair share if including those not interested in Islam who were gaining all the benefits of the movement.

Bello was of the opinion that before any serious reforms were carried out, internal revolts and external attacks were to be overpowered. He wanted to negotiate with the Hausa rebels but circumstances forced him to declare Abad al- Salam, the Hausa Scholar an apostate – i.e. that he had given up the faith.

Rebellion had come at a wrong time for the Caliphate because it erupted at the same time the Gobir army from the north and its allies among the Tuareg were trying very hard to crush Sokoto. Bello demonstrated excellent leadership and military tactics by successfully defending the northern frontier and then he crushed the Hausa rebellion.

The Caliphate was also constantly in conflict with Muslim peoples outside the empire. As a result it can be said that throughout much of the country the Caliphate displayed the attributed of a State in formation.

It is not possible to give detail of all the border skirmishes, wars and rebellions involving the Caliphate and the Emirs of the various religions of the Sokoto Caliphate, but a few examples will give some idea of the problems facing the Fulani. Immediately to the north of Sokoto was Maradi. Initially, Maradawa attacks were directed against Sokoto and Katsina but from

the 1840s they were made on Daura, Kano and Zaria. From 1844 to until 1877 Maradawa raids as far as Kano became common place.

In Kebbi the Caliph faced a different problem when this area of the empire went into rebellion. Yaqub Nabane, a prince of the ruling house, was released from 18 years captivity in Sokoto. He immediately began a revolt which lasted for twenty years until it became clear that the independence of Kebbi, Zaberm and Arewa was an irreversible fact.

To the south of Kano the emirates, carved out by the jihad, had been created from non-Muslim and non- Hausa peoples. The integration of these peoples into an Islamic empire was a problem which continued until the period of British conquest. The Gwari waged war against the Kontagora emirate and encouraged unrest amongst Gwari within the emirate.

The Bauchi plateau peoples were a constant source of trouble. Although these groups were small and divided amongst themselves, they were able to mount annoying raids on the surrounding emirates. The Ningi were a much more serious threat and throughout the century raided into Kano and Zaria.

Where the emirates faced problems from non- Muslims they were expected to deal with them without military assistance from the Caliph. A good example is Sambo who was Emir of Zaria from 1878-88. He was deposed by the Caliph partly because he failed to protect his territory from Ningi raids.

On the whole the emirates had to maintain persistent vigilance in the face of pagan and enemy threats. It was extremely difficult for emirates to deal with efficiency and effectively with these threats because there was virtual parity of military equipment and techniques between emirates and their enemies. On the other hand, the pagan peoples and other enemies were unable to pose a serious threat to the survival of the Caliphate because they was virtual parity of military equipment and techniques were unable to pose a serious threat to the survival of the Caliphate because they failed to co-operate and lacked a common purpose. By the last quarter of the century the threat to the Caliphate was less serious than at any period earlier in the century.

State structure revisited.

The Caliphate was one of the largest states ever created in West Africa and yet it remained in loose federation of emirates throughout the century (Michael Tidy, A history of Africa, 1979, p66). This is partly explained by the way in which the state was formed. Outside the heartland of Sokoto the expansion of the Caliphate was the result of successful jihad revolts by independent Muslin leaders and communities. The leaders of these revolts submitted themselves voluntarily to Usman dan Fodio and his successors. This submission remained one of the strongest bond of the Caliphate.

System of Government.

It was, as already indicated earlier, influenced by the manner in which the Caliphate was formed – i.e a federation of separate emirates.

Army.
No standing army was ever created by the Caliph. The emirates had been founded independently and came together voluntarily. It was their duty to defend their independence without direct help from Sokoto. The leaders and rulers of the emirates were local leaders and not agents of Sokoto. However, standing armies were created and an administration increasingly based on the military and became more centralized later.

NB: This did not, of course, mean that the caliph had no power over Emirs. As already noted the Emir of Zaria was deposed in 1888 and there are other instances of emirs being deposed for failing to rule their emirate properly. The Caliph had, however, to be careful to act justly and within the terms of the Islamic Sharia (Law). For examples in 1993 Tukur was appointed as Emir of Kano but this appointment was regarded as unjust. The Caliph was unable to sustain his candidate and after a two- year revolt Yusuf was appointed as Emir.

Tribute Payment.
Subservience of the Emirs to the caliph was shown in various ways. Tribute had to be paid, each Emir was obliged to pay a visit to Sokoto as soon as possible after appointment. Troops had to be provided when required.

Sharia (Law)
The caliph ensured that the Sharia was followed by the Emirs. He attempted to solve disputes between emirates and often co-ordianted action against enemies. The impartiality and integrity of the Caliph helped them maintain the position of esteem earned by Usman dan Fodio.

The economy.
In economic growth, the caliphate appears to have shared in the general progress in the eighteenth century West Africa. The city of Kano became the "Manchester of West Africa," its cotton cloth products being sold in North Africa at Tripoli, on the West African coast as far as the Island of Arguins and as far south as the Congo Basin. Barth, the famous German traveller, estimated that Kano's cloth sales amounted to at list 300 000 000 cowries a year in 1850, a figure equivalent to about £40 000.

The Kano cloth industry was aided by the existence of three favourable conditions:

(i) Two locally grown raw materials, cotton and indigo.
(ii) A large consumer market.
(iii) Highly efficient distributive network organised by Hausa traders over a large region.

The bid produced glass and a variety of brass and silver goods. Sokoto was noted for its superior iron and its superior quality leather, for which there was a world-wide demand. Barth also found throughout the caliphate a thriving agriculture and good variety of produce. Guinea-corn, millet, rice, onions, beans, yams, cassava, groundnuts and sweets, potatoes were plenty. Meat and milk were readily obtainable.

The Caliphate was fortunate to be at the centre of a number of trade routes. From the south the Caliphate was fortunate to be at the centre of a number of trade routes. From the south along the Asante-Kano route came slaves and Kola nuts; to the north the caravan routes led to Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia. From Tripolitania and Cyrenaica came many European products; to the West a route ran to Gao and Timbuktu, and to the east was a route running through Darfur to the Nile and then Egypt. Along all these routes the Hausa pursued an active import export trade. Comparatively this was a busy and prosperous place.

It was this state with its relative prosperity and its political stability that was ultimately to become part of Britain's African empire. The emirates which had remained largely independent of each other found themselves unable to co-operate against less powerful adversaries.

In a nut- shell, parcelisation of political power and authority was enemy number one of most Africa States-a problem which was manipulated by the colonizers.

Repercussions of Uthman dan Fodio's jihad: Reference R.A. Adeleye: Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria- 1804-1906.

Over the ruins of the numerous politics of the vast area of old Northern Nigeria and present day Niger Republic, the jihad established a new political organization the Sokoto Caliphate - based primarily on Islamic Law and values-hence a theocracy. Hausaland was the main theatre of this revolution which had repercussions on the peoples of the Western and central Sudan from the Senegal to the borders of the tropical rainforest in the south.

Although the jihad failed to integrate Borno on the Sokoto Caliphate, it initiated a political revolution in the Kingdom, which ultimately swept away the Seifawa dynasty and profoundly affected the history of the old Borno Empire for the rest of the century. On the northern frontiers of the Caliphate the jihad failed to win all Hausa- speaking peoples, some of whom subsequently remained its inveterate enemies.

To the west of Hausaland does a region comprise Zarber, Dendi, Fogha, Yagha and Gurma peoples who are non- Hausa? This region, against which the jihad was only partially successful, was fragmented into numerous splinter polities.

The jihad administered the death blow to the already tottering Oyo Empire. Only the northern fringes of the Oyo Empire ultimately formed part of the Sokoto Caliphate. The Sokoto Caliphate owed its foundation to the growth of Islam.
Without denying the vital importance of success in war for the initial establishment of the Caliphate, its consolidation and survival depended for more on the common bond provided by Islam than on any military superiority of the jihadists over their adversaries. The jihad itself was upshot of a long process of evolutionary development of Islamic acculturation in the Western Sudan States.

Islam had been introduced into Borno during the eleventh century and into Hausaland from the fifteenth. The earliest protagonists of Islamization were foreign servants and merchants,

while the patrons were kings and their courtiers. The supposed mystical powers of the faith, the dazzle and obvious advantages of writing, the use of Arabic as the Lingua- franca of diplomatic relations outside the ethnic group, the probable attractiveness of the Laws as an instrument of political integration as well as the badge of identification with an internationally accepted religion, all seem to have commanded Islam readily to the Kings and their courts.

Embracing Islam did not involve, and was not seen as involving, a radical overthrow of important aspects of traditional systems and values. Many rulers were noted for their pieties were zealous for the spread of the faith in their domains. However, Islam appears to have remained a religion of the minority top echelons of society until perhaps well into the seventeenth century.

Official Islam apparently emerged as a synergetic blending of the faith with traditional culture types. The growth of education in the Folamic sciences among Western Sudanese peoples was perhaps the most far- reaching factor in the transformation of the religion from a thing accepted on the time awareness of the stipulations of the Quran/ Koran and other sources that govern its practice.

Leadership of this intellectual development was not provided by the Kings but by a rising class of educated elite known as the "Ulama" or Mallam-scholars or learned men. Consequent on this growth in intellectual and missionary fervour, a powerful search light was turned on society.

In these circumstances, innovations in contemporary Islamic practice were no doubt, viewed as resulting from the syncrotic and totally un- Islamic laws and values which governed societies in which, Muslims lived.

Preaching reform involved criticism of the status quo. Conflict between religion and politics, a logically inherent development in such a situation which gave birth to the Sokoto Caliphate.

Against the age-old attribute, Islam was fostering a community that was united by a common ideology even though this unity had as yet no chance of overt political expression.

Another aspect of the jihad which demands attention is the phenomenon that it was Fulani inspired, that it was in the main Fulani led and that he government it established was dominated by the Fulani. The obvious question is whether or not it was fought to achieve Fulani domination.

As foreigners in Hausaland and other states, the Fulani had been discriminated against and as they were more Islamized than other ethnic groups, this was, in additional, interpreted as hatred of their religion. This religious reform movement found its staunchest votaries among the Fulani who were outside the pole of government. The prompt acceptance of the jihad by the Borno Fulani and other Fulani communities in the Hausa States tend to make the jihad appear as a struggle for Fulani political freedom.

To what extent the Fulani reaction was ethnocentric rather than religions cannot be definitely decided since the distinction between loyalty to kin and to religion cannot be demarcated beyond doubt. The fortunes of the reformist movement seem to have been identified with those of a people.

That many Fulani joined the jihad from a sense of racial solidarity cannot be ruled out. It suffices to note that the reformers made their appeal basically on religions grounds. Since the Fulani were not superior in arms or political organization to their opponents, their numerical inferiority alone would have ensured the failure of the jihad if they had not enjoyed the active support of non- Fulani allies and associates.

That the Caliphate was largely Fulani ruled was a direct result of the fact that the jihad leaders were mainly Fulani-but non- Fulani members like Ab- al-Salama were not denied positions in the new scheme of things.

Even though the original aim was the reform of Islam, "the most lasting consequences of the movement were a profound political, social, cultural, religions, economic demographic and intellectual revolution totally unprecedented in its scope and intensity in the history of the West- Central Sudan."

It was on the basis of the integrating force of the Islamic ideology of the "Mallam" that the Caliphate was established and sustained. Yet large scale political integration was an incidental result of the jihad, unforeseen and therefore not specifically prepared for by the leaders of the reform movement.

The central idea of Usman (Usman) dan Fodio's reform movement was the establishment of Islamic law and Islamic ideas as the basis of government in the place of systems midden by non-Islamic laws, observance and practice, which the Shehu saw around him among the "Sudanese" peoples.

His main charge against the Sudanese states was polytheism particularly among their rulers.

Al-hajj Umar and the Tokolor Empire

Origins

The founder of Tokolor/ Tukolar empire was Al-Hajj Umar the son of Said Tall. Umar was born in Futa Toro, on of the Muslim Tokolor states in the Upper Senegal Valley in about 1797.

The Hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca
He went on a Hajj in 1820 and returned in 1839, Umar took about 19 years traveling and studying which resulted in his new mission – the Islamic reform movement. He was drawn to the reform movement by the following developments: -

1. The Wahhabi struggle against the Turks in Arabia
2. The efforts of Muhammad Ali's attempt to modernize Egypt.
3. The efforts of reform of Al-Kanami in Borno
4. Muhammad Bello in Sokoto
5. Ahmed Lobbo in Macina

Marriage Alliances

Umar took wives from the families of Al-Kanami and Bello. In Macina, he was not given support.

The Tijaniyya Brotherhood
Umar preached a new religious doctrine, different from the Qadiriyya that had served other reformers. His message was that of the Tijaniyya, a comparatively new religious brotherhood founded in Fez in the 1780s by Alimad al-Tijani.

The Tijani doctrine was more exclusive and rigid than was common. Compared to the Qudiriyya, it was also more mystical and concerned with the correct ritual practices to bring a sense of direct contact with God. At the same time, it had a weaker tradition of asceticism than did other orders.

Umar's claim that he was the "seal" of the saints was also exceptional. His claim asserted that he was the final Muslim saint in the sense that the prophet Muhammad was the seal of the prophets. This implied that the Tijaniyya was different from the other religious orders in offering not merely a way to God (Allah); but supposedly the only correct way.

It therefore follows that Tijaniyya Brotherhood opposed the ancient Quadiriyya Brotherhood. Instead of emphasizing on study and intellectual activity as a way to salvation, Tijaniyya stressed salvation through action not intellect and focused on strict moral behaviour rather than formalistic prayers. By 1830s, the Tijaniyya was widely followed in the Mighm's (North Africa) and out in the desert, but the main line of transmission to the Western Sudan was to come by way of Lemar's pilgrimage to Mecca in about 1830- where he was appointed head of the order of Western Sudan.

With that authority, Umar made a slow return toward Senegambia with prolonged stops in Borno, Sokoto, Timbuktu and other places before settling down to preach and build up his own following. The base he chose was not his home country but Dinguiray (Dingirai) on the Upper Niger. A huge fortress was built and supporters flocked to him there.

Umar's early appeal was peaceful and widespread. In 1846-47, for example, he travelled with a group of followers from Futa Jalon down the Gambia Valley to the Atlantic, then north, up to the Senegal Valley through Futa Toro on south to his base. With the gifts his followers brought, Umar bought guns from the British in Sierra Leone.

During the next two years, he began military operations that slowly turned his capital into the centre of a small state incorporating several smaller kingdoms in the Upper Niger valley. Toward the end of 1852, he declared a Holy War (jihad) and began still more extensive conquests from Dinguiray North toward the upper Senegal through a region mainly Mandinka-speaking and non-Muslim areas.

A different Jihad

Umar's Jihad was different from those of earlier reformers in that he tried mainly to conquer new territory for Islam rather than purifying the practices of Muslim governments. He called for no Jihad against Futa Toro, Futa Jalon or Bundu and he was less doctrinaire than most earlier reformers. His main interest in the Muslim territories of Senegambia was their support against "pagans" further east.

A standing Army

Umar built up a standing army of 30 000, soldiers composed of infantry with guns and cavalry with horses. From 1852 to 1854 Umar's Tokolor army conquered the Bambara states of Mambule and Kaarta which were ruled by traditionalists.

Forced Conversions

Forced conversions were carried out on the Bambara.If a community refused to be converted to Islam, its homes and farms were burnt, many people killed and survivors were driven into exile or forced to die of starvation. In 1862 the Bambara state of Segu was added to the new Tokolor empire, and the last Bambara king was executed.

Umar called for a great fergo, or voluntary withdrawal with wives and cattle from Futa Toro etc. to follow him eastward to Bundu. He played dynastic politics so as to establish an Almami favourable to his interests, but neither there nor in Futa Toro did he try to establish direct rule.

During the rest of the 1850s, his main concern was to continue the fergo from Futa Toro in order to build up the new base at Nioro. This inevitably involved confrontation with the French who were simultaneously trying to establish the absolute control over Senegal River trade and their informal empire over riverside kingdoms.

Finally in 1862, Umar's army conquered the reformed Islamic state of Macina ruled by Fulani of Qaudiriyya. The cities of Hamdullahj Jenne and Timbuktu were captured and sacked and Ahmadu III, the king of Macina was executed.

The Tokolor empire was now at its height, and stretched eight hundred miles from the east to west. It would no doubt have been much larger had expansion in the west not been prevented by the French in Senegal who repulsed Umar's attacks.

Umar was not however given the chance to organize his newly – established empire. In 1864 he was killed in a Macina rebellion led by Ba Lobbo, Alimadu III's uncle. Al-Tijani, Umar's nephew reconquered Macina for the Tokolor empire, but Umar had become, in the words of Olatunji Oloruutimehia, a historian of the Tokolor;

> "A victim of the violence which his
> Revolution had engendered"

Political Organisation
The empire was organized or comprised of emirates. The empire was too big for continuous central authority or control.

To solve this problem large provinces were allotted to one or another of Umar's family or followers.

These provinces were larger and fewer than the emirates under Sokoto, Umar's son, Ahmadu Seke (Ahmad) took over central power under the title Lamido Junibe (commander of the faithful) which was preferred to the older title of Almaami.

Trusted followers were given regional command at Dinguiray (Dingirai) for the southwest, Nioro for the Sahel, Hamdallahi and Segu for the Niger valley and Kumiakami just east of the upper Senegal.

Problems
Umar's death ended the expansive phase of the Tokolor empire. During the next three decades, it settled down to the usual life of a large Sudanese state. Some historians have suggested that if Umar had lived, he might have gone on to conquer Sokoto as well, and thus unify the whole of Western Sudan; but it seems more likely that the empire had already reached its practical limits.

Upon his succession as Tokolor ruler, Ahmad immediately faced a number of problems, inherited from his father as submitted by J.B. Webster and A.A. Boahen with M. Tidy page 23.

(1) Rebellions.
Umar had placed this sons, brothers and favourite slaves over the conquered emirates and they had little respect for Ahmadu Seku (Ahmad). Macina revolted and two emirs (Ahmad's half-brothers) declared their independence. Large areas of Bambara right inside his empire had still not been conquered and there was real danger that a revolt of the Bambara under Ahmadu's control would be joined by attacks from Bambara areas outside the Empire.

(2) The Tokolor Army
The Tokolor army did not support Ahmadu alone, but divided its loyalty among members of the Umar's family. The army was foreign, recruited not from the conquered areas as in

Sokoto but from outside the empires. It was disliked by the people for its cruelty and immorality which discredited Islam. The soldiers did not pay taxes, and as they owned horses and guns; were almost impossible to discipline.

By 1873 Ahmadu had defeated his half-brothers; his cousin reconquered Macina. Ahmadu began to disband the army and rely more upon the subject people for support. However, he really needed a strong army to check the French advance.

The Tokolor Empire and the French

As already shown, the French menace started at the death of Al-Hajj Umar. Such a large empire tempted French strategists to make a new set of plans for informal penetration under the Lamido Junibe's shields but the local French military commanders preferred to try for outright conquest, which they carried through in a series of campaigns beginning in the late 1880s and ending in 1895.

The French wanted to open trade routes for the St. Louis merchants, yet twice they failed to respond when Umar offered interior routes and markets in exchange of guns. The French did not want a powerful neighbour like Umar, nor, as Catholics, did not want to aid the spread of radical Islam. They knew too, that, abuses practiced by the rulers Umar had overthrown were also found under French ruler. In the French, French settlements Christians ruled and Muslims served. When people began to leave the French settlements to join Umar, the French and the former ruling groups formed an alliance, based on their common fear of Umar.

In 1854, as Umar's popularity reached its peak, the Frenchman Faidherbe arrived as governor of the French settlements along the coast. He was not anti-Muslim and he liked the idea of co-operation with a powerful African state in the interest of commerce. However, he was determined that the Tokolor empire should not extend to the coast and threaten the tiny French settlements. Faidherbe now had an ideal opportunity to extend French rule by posing as the protector of the previous rulers against radical Islamic.

In 1855 Faidherbe built Fort Medina on the edge of the Tokolar Empire to show how far he aimed to extend French power. He said that Umar could/ create his empire east of Medina and if Umar accepted this, he was ready to welcome Umar's proposal for France- Tokolor co-operation.

Umar and his advisers were divided as to whether to accept this division of the country. Some favoured destroying Medina, conquering the Futa and forcing the French to accept their terms. Others, including Umar himself wanted to accept the Medina boundary. Umar thought that the French were only interested in trade, not in building an empire (and that was a mistake) and so there was no conflict between Tokolor and French aims.

To compromise with his anti-French opponents, Umar made a half hearted attack on Medina in 1857. The French repulsed the attack and Umar concentrated on enlarging his empire to the east.

Umar and Tijaniyya elsewhere made great efforts to meet French demands. In Algeria and Tunisia, for example the Tijaniyya helped French expansion and colonialism.

Like this father, Ahmadu Seku (Ahmadu) did not make a strong attack on the French despite the interest in Senegal. This was because he was a religious not a military leader. Secondly he had reduced the army and taken away the privileges of the Tokolor who fought against him and thirdly, he could not rely upon the subject peoples.

In the early eighties, Ahmadu was the obvious leader of an Anti-French Coalition of African states; yet he rejected alliances and also estrangled Samori (even though he was also Tijani) and actually assisted French troops to suppress the Medina revolt. This failure to form an alliance with Samori meant the end of the Tokolor Empire as will be shown later.

Examination Type Questions

1. Account for the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate in Western Sudan.

2. "Pre-Colonial West African states lacked the means to the deal with internal revolts".Do you agree?

3. Why and how did African states in Senegambia and Western Sudan resist foreign expansion?

4. Analyse the internal organization of the Sokoto Caliphate.

5. In what ways and with what ways did West Africans replace the trade in slaves with legitimate exports?

6. Explain how Dahomey, the Niger Delta states and Senegambia were able to make a successful transition from slave trade to palm oil trade.

7. Account for and illustrate the emergence of new states in the Niger Delta in the second half of the nineteenth century.
   Explain why these states were short-lived.

8. Assess the achievements of King Glele of Dahomey and Jaja of Opobo and analyse their significance in African History.

9. Why was the Mandinka empire one of Africa's most efficient states in the pre-colonial period?
10. Show how Samori Toure created the Mandinka Empire between 1857 and 1887 and analyse its main political and religious features.
11. What was the effect on African states of the use of firearms in the second half of the nineteenth century?
    Answer in relation to West Africa.

12. Write an appraisal of the career of Samori Toure of the Mandinka empire and show his importance the history of Africa.

CHAPTER 4

THE CREOLES

Learning objecitves

After studying the chapter, the student should be able to:

1. Assess the achievements of the Creoles in West Africa and explain why Britain changed its attitude and policy towards them late in the nineteenth century.
2. Show how, and explain why, Christianity expanded rapidly in West Africa during this period.
3. Compare the impact of the Creoles on West Africa with that of the British and French missionaries in Uganda during this period.

Sieara Leone in the 19th and Twentieth Centuries
The early years of Siera Leone: 1807-50

Siera Leone was originally inhabited by the Mende and Teme, before it was taken over by the British as a Crown Colony in 1807. The British decided to make Freetown in the headquarters of its anti- slave trade squadron which patrolled the West African coast. The captured slave ships were brought to Siera Leone and all their cargos of slaves, when freed, became known as "recaptives." Altogether 40 000 free slaves were settled in Siera Leone. The population had grown rapidly from just 2 000 in 1807 to 11 000 in 1825 and to 40 000 in 1850.

Siera Leone became one of the great cultural "melting pots" of the world since its population was a blend of peoples from different cultures, languages, religions as well as different geographical locations, as in West Africa from Senegal right down to Angola.

Governor Charles McCarthy (1814-1824) settled the "recaptives" in villages of which had a school and a church. He and his successors followed a policy of spreading western education and Christianity among the "recaptives" who embraced these aspects of British culture with zeal. The original Siera Leone black settlers and the "recaptives" were grateful to the British who had liberated them from slavery. They identified themselves with their British rulers, but not in the manner a slave identifies himself with his master. Black Siera Leoneans felt themselves to be free citizens of the British Empire, not a conquered people.
Most of the villages were given English names, like Kent, York and Wellington and two villages' founded by ex- West Indian soldiers, waterloo and Hastings, recalled British military history, Africa was, however, remembered by Kissy, (named after the Kissy people) Kru and Congo Town. Not all the recaptives were settled in the farming villages some were either recruited into the army, the (Royal African Corps), or apprenticed (adopted) into the homes which educated them and gave them their own surnames.

Who were the Creoles?

The recaptives intermarried with the original black settlers who had come from England and Canada in the late eighteenth century. By 1850 the Creoles had emerged as a distinct group. The creoles were essentially blacks with a slight mixture of white blood, but they developed a culture and way of life that was as much European as it was African. They were Christian and monogamists, but they kept the extended family system as in African societies. Their language, Krio, was the English language africanised. The Creoles maintained ethnic clubs and societies such as those of the descendants of Igbo and Yoruba. Their Christian religion, was like lengthy funerals, and the so called communication with the family dead.

The Creole culture which followed after 1850 was Christian, but with an emphasis upon the events of the life -cycle - (birth, baptism, circumcision, marriage and death) reflecting the influence of Africa religions as well. The Creole social system was built on monogamy like European societies. Creole food was a blend of West Indian French and African cooking. The numerous cultural strands which make up the Creoles are best seen in Krio, language which is English and Yoruba enriched by Portuguese, Spanish and French vocabulary and containing elements of Temme, Mandinka, Igbo, Susu and Arabic.

Early Creole achievements

At first when the recaptives moved from the villages into Freetown, they had built mud huts or houses alongside the elegant houses of the settlers. They were lowly pedlars (small – scale traders), hawkers , tailors, barbers , carpenters or masons , but soon they began trading in the interior , operating respectable shops and buying or building storey houses like the settlers,. By 1839, two "recaptives" were rich enough to purchase auctioned slave ships for their coastal trading operations. The "recaptives" worked hard, lived cheaply, co – operated in wholesale purchases and were soon out selling both European and settler merchants.
Many of the creoles became wealthy and educated their children in secondary schools in Freetown and even in universities in England. As the children of both groups intermarried the distinction between receptive and settlers slowly disappeared. The recaptives were not assimilated by the settlers, instead the Creoles, who emerged as a distinct group by 1850, were a blending of settlers and "recaptives", the proud inheritors of European, American and numerous African cultures. It must be noted that the Creole achievement was strongly evident in education. In 1868, for instance, 22% of the people in the colony had been educated in schools. The figures of Prussia were 16% and only 13% for England during the same period. The British missionary societies deserved credit for their share in this magnificent effort, but they were never able to supply enough schools and maintain enough teachers to meet the demand. There were secondary schools for both boys and girls and a teacher training college, Fourah Bay, was formed in 1827, cater becoming a university in 1876.

The height of Creole Civilisation: 1850- 1890

The educational system poured forth a stream of teachers, clergymen, doctors, lawyers and writers, producing many of the distinctions of West Africa. John Thorpe was the first African lawyer in 1850, while J.B. Horton became the first medical doctor in 1859. He graduated at the same time with William Davie, and the two were renowned for their pioneering work for a long time.

Samuel Ajayi Crowther became the first African Protestant Bishop in 1864, and he is most remembered for the Niger Mission which was wholly manned by African clergymen. His all- Creole staff in the Niger Mission also partly Christianised the delta city states and created a self - supporting, self - governing Delta church. Other Creole Missionaries were also active among the Igbo and the Yoruba and in the Gambia.

The educated Creoles excelled in spreading the religion of the book. In 1861 the Church of England withdrew its missionaries from Siera Leone and turned the entire work over to the Creoles under the native Pastorate Church.

Sir Samuel Lewis was probably the most outstanding Creole during the 19th century. He became the first newspaper editor its, the first Mayor of Freetown, the first African to be granted Cambridge and Oxford degrees and the first African Knight.

Creoles had always sat in the Governors; Council, but in the 1850's the growing maturity of the society brought forth agitators for increased representation. In 1863 a new constitution. In 1863 a new constitution introduced executive and legislative councils in which Creoles were represented in both councils. In 1872 when Creoles held almost half of the senior civil service posts, Governor Pope – Hennesy maintained that there were enough qualified Creoles to replace the entire European staff. In 1893 therefore; Freetown was made a municipality with its own mayor. By the end of the century Creoles formed an educated society, proud of their achievements, who voiced their views in a vigorous and flourishing press, and took a prominent part in religious and secular government. Moreover agriculture was an exception to the story of success. The original settlers worked hard growing pepper, cotton and cinnamon on a large scale. The two commodities Europe wanted, sugar and cotton, did not grow well, nor could the settlers really compete in the world market without the use of slave labour. The "recaptives" first turned to farming, but although they understood African agriculture, they could not achieve a respectable standard of living like the settlers; the "recaptives" were ambitious and hence turned from farming to trade. The villages declined as the young people left for Freetown to become shopkeepers or traders. Necessity made the Creoles an adventurous and exploring race. Their traders first spread out into the northern rivers, the interior and the Sherbvo. They purchased condemned slave ships and traded further down the coast. In about 1839 "recaptives" began to return to Egba land in search of both their relatives and work, so that by 1851 there were 3 000 Egba "recaptives" living in Abeoleuta. By the 1880's creoles were operating businesses in Bathurst , Monrovia, Cape Coast , Accra, Lome , Porto Novo, Lagos , Abeokuta , on the Niger and in the Cameroons.

The Creoles pioneered trade in areas untouched or only slightly touched by European traders. They opened up the Siera Leone hinterland land and developed a flourishing trade in groundnuts in the north and palm oil in the south. Many Yoruba "recaptives" returned to Yoruba land and Lagos. A blend bourgeoisie arose, living in expensively built mansions in Freetown, Lagos and Bathurst. Each mansion generally contained a marble burst of Queen Victoria – a symbol of Creole wealth and power, and identification with Britain.

Perhaps the most successful Creole traders were Richard Blaize (1854-1904), who left Freetown in 1862 and made his fortune in Lagos. Of Yoruba origin, Blaize started as a retailer mainly in imported cloth, but he expanded his trade to become a wholesaler who imported directly from England, and as an exporter of palm oil, palm kernels and cotton. He started a credit bank and also a newspaper, The Lagos Times. In 1896, Blaize's various enterprises were worth £150 000- well over £ 1 million by today's values.

Communities sent appeals to Siera Leone for missionaries and teachers to be sent to them. In many instances some Europeans were sent, but it was the Creole teachers and missionaries far more than the Europeans, who, in responding to these appeals, were the pioneers of education and Christianity along the coast as well as in some parts of the interior of West Africa. As already noted, Bishop Crowther led an all Creole staff which christianised the city states and created a self supporting and self -governing Delta Church before the end of the century. In this way, Creoles were pioneers among the Igbo and Yoruba. More notable is the fact that in 1875 the Lagos Anglican churches were organized into a pastorate on The Siera Leone model, almost totally operated by Creole clergy men. Even as late as 1900. Creoles clergy favoured the majority of the missionaries among the Yoruba. Everywhere Creole held the prominent church positioning an Anglican Bishop (Crowther), Superintendants in Anglican and Methodist churches, a Colonial Chaplain in the Gambia, and archdeacons on the Niger. They filled most of the civil service posts even at higher levels, in Siera Leone. Many posts in the Gambia, the Gold Coast and Lagos were filled by the Creoles, at least until the deliberate de- Africanisation policy of the late19thcentury was implemented by post – partition Governors.

Initially, as the British expanded their empire into West Africa, they were dependent upon the Creoles to fill the junior and many other senior posts of the civil service. In this way the Creoles were regarded as equal partners in the development and administration of the West African a region. Creoles sat in the executive and legislative council of Ghana, Gambia and Nigeria.

In Ghana, Creoles were: judges of the Supreme Court, colonial treasurer, Solicitor – General, Postmaster general, chief Medical officer, district officers and one acting governor. In Nigeria Creoles occupied posts of the registrar of the Supreme Court, Colonial Treasurer and Postmaster General. In the Gambia two successive Chief Justices, and in Abeokuta, both the president and secretary – General of the Egba United Board of Management were Creoles. In Liberia one Creole was elected mayor of Monrovia and another, President of the Republic. Under the Royal Niger Company and in Lagos as well as in Dalear, Creoles held responsible positions as marine engineers. Moreover, in Fernando Po, a Creole prospered as a cocoa plantation owner. Everywhere along the coast creoles were either the first or among the first as clergymen, lawyers, doctors and newspaper owners. In fact, as late as 1925, 44 out of 56 barristers were of Creole descent. The foregoing facts and figures demonstrate

beyond any doubt that created and the wheels of civilization and modernization in West Africa, in all spheres of economic, political, social and colonial government administration. Due to the vast advancement achieved by the Creoles in West Africa Sierra Leone thus became the hub of the region the nerve centre in all aspects of development. Freetown newspapers were read all along the coast, more copies being sold outside than inside Sierra Leone. The wealthy charities built schools, churches and public buildings which gave Freetown the appearance of comfort and wealth. Freetown was the centre, and the Creoles the agents of a unique fusion of European and African culture which inspired other Africans to imitate them. Thus Siera Leone became the motherland of Christianity Western education, and culture and the spread of English language in British West Africa.

Although the major Creole group was Christian, there were Muslims as well. Muhammed Shitta Bey, born in Waterloo, of Yoruba "recaptives" was typical, except in his religious conviction, of hundreds of other Creole sons abroad. As a child he emigrated to Badagri with his parents. As a man he traded on the Niger from his business headquarters in Lagos, when he made his money. He did not forget Freetown, but gave generously towards the rebuilding of the Fourah Bay mosque in 1892. In Lagos he spent £4 000 on building a mosque which still bears his name. He was one of the earliest advocates of Western education for Muslims. In recognition of his good works, the Sultan of Turkey awarded him a dectorate and the title "Bey".

Freetown was also an intellectual centre in the 19th century. Sierra Leone's "sons abroad" sent their children back to Freetown for their secondary education. Creole children, along with the children of the rising African educated class, along the coast, still returned to Freetown for teacher – training, divinity and university degrees. As a result the largest proportion of the student body of Florah bay College was drawn from outside Siera Leone. This shows how vitally central Siera Leone had become, to the civilization of West Africa. Furthermore, Creole culture was creative. In linguistics J.C Taylors's work on the Igbo, C. Paules on Niger and P.J. Williams on Igbirra are less well known than Bishop Crowthers Grammar and vocabulary of the Yoruba Language in 1843. In Medical research, Dr J.B Horton wrote a number of books on tropical medical medicine, the most important of which was The Medical Topography of the West Coast of Africa, which was published in 1860. Dr J.F Easmon, head of the Ghana Medical Service, researched on blackwater fever and Dr Oguntola Sapara studied the Sopono smallpox society of Lagos. In history and Geography of Siera Leone J.B.Horton wrote his West African countries and peoples, Samuel Johnson, " Holly John-son" son of a pioneer Creole missionary , completed his classic History of the Yoruba in 1897.Between 1850 and 1898 the Creoles were called Siera Leoneans by Africans who lived along the coast , although a very small community excelled in every field of endeavors' open to them , (trade, religion, the professions, administration and the creative arts), Freetown, in the last fifty years of the 19th Century, shone with a brilliance

and held an importance that was well out of proportion to its small size. These were the golden years, the age of Creole civilization.

Examintion Tpye Questions

1. Assess the achievements of the Creoles in West Africa and explain why Britain changed its attitude and policy towards them late in the nineteenth century.
2. What did the Creoles contribute towards the civilisation of West Africa during this period? Why did the British change from a policy of assimilation to indirect rule between 1890 and 1914?
3. With reference to West Africa show how, and explain why, Christian missions and missionaries were a force for modernisation and change.
4. Assess the achievements of the Creoles in West Africa and explain why Britain changed its attitude and policy towards them late in the nineteenth century.
5. Show how, and explain why, Christianity expanded rapidly in West Africa during this period.
6. Compare the impact of the Creoles on West Africa with that of the British and French missionaries in Uganda during this period.

CHAPTER 5

NGONI INCURSIONS AND THEIR EFFECTS

Learning objecitves

After studying the chapter, the student should be able to:

i) Identify the Ngoni, and assess the socio-politico-economic impact of their invasion on central and East Africa.

ii) Explain why and with what results east and central Africa were overtaken by the Ngoni.

iii) Assess the importance of the key figures in the history of Ngoni invasions.

The Ngoni Migration and settlement in Central and East Africa

Who were the Ngoni?

The Ngoni were originally Ndwandwe people under Zwide's leadership who inhabited northen Zululand. But when Shaka defeated Zwide, one part of his group, the Ngoni moved northwards under the leadership of Zwangendaba. In origin, therefore, the Ngoni were close relatives of the Zulu. They were full-time warriors and cattle plunderers, hence, they were disliked by other tribes. They were pushed further north of Limpopo and eventually reached southern Tanzania. They were forced out of South Africa by the "Mfecane" wars led by Shaka the Zulu. They came to be known as Ngoni mainly because of their Nguni language but had absorbed the Tonga, Shona and Cewa on their way to East Africa.

It must be emphasized that the Ngoni were a very important Mfecane group whose movement, like that of the Ndebele and the Kololo, heavily influenced historical developments in Central and Eastern Africa.

The movement and settlement of the Ngoni into Central and Eastern Africa

Zwangendaba's Ngoni travelled to their new destinations in several groups, but three main groups have been identified. The Jere Ngoni were the biggest group under Zwangendaba himself. Then there was the Maseko Ngoni, first led by Ngwane who was later succeeded by his son. The thirs group was Nxaba's Msene-Ngoni. It must be emphasized that the Ngoni groups kept on splitting up due to mutual rivalries and quarreling amongst themselves.

Zwangendaba succeeded in regrouping his Jere people and other small groups that had been dispersed by the war, and were willing to accept his authority, and led them north eastwards into southern Mozambique. Although the people of southern Mozambique, mainly the Tonga- speaking, were larger in numbers than Zwangendaba's migrants, they offered-very little resistance to the intruders. Morover, Zwangendaba's people had learnt effective methods of war from Shaka's Zulu and they put them to good use during their northward trek.As they proceeded they were joined by many southern Mozambicans, especially the Thonga, and in this way Zwangendaba's nation grew and his forces became numerous and stronger.

However, in 1831 Zwangendaba met the Ndwandwe leader (Shangani) and Nxaba leader of the Msene-Ngoni. The three leaders quarreled and in the war that followed, both Zwangendaba and Nxaba were defeated but not destroyed. They, hence, led their respective groups northwards. Zwangendaba's peope travelled north-west towards the lower Zambezi valley area. Here they struck terror among the Portuguese settlers at Sena and Tete before turning southwards through the area formally ruled by Mwene Mutapa.

In the meantime Nxaba's group, also running away from Soshangane, were entering the same area and the two groups clashed there in the lower Zambezi area. Zwangendaba was defeated and forced to continue his march south-westwards onto the Zimbabwean high veld. Here, the tottering Rozvi empire of the Changamire mambos was nearing its end. This was in about 1832. However the Rozvi army under its able general, Tumbare, bravely met the invaders at Tumbare's mountain stronghold, Nhava yaTumbare (later called Ntaba yeZinduna). Zwangendaba was successfully repelled and forced to march northeast into what is now Mashonaland, where his Ngoni caused a great deal of damage and destruction.

The Ngoni did not, however, remain long on the Zimbabwe plateau. The march continued until they crossed the Limpopo on 19 November 1935. They crossed the great river somewhere near Zimbo. However, one section of Zwangendaba's Jere Ngoni decided to stay on in Zimbabwe under one of Zwangendaba's remarkable female chiefs called Nyamazana. Nyamazana's Ngoni continued with raids on the Rozvi and their people, killing the last Changamire ruler, Mambo Chirisamhuru II at his fotress at Manyanga in about 1836.

There are many stories among the Shona relating to the way Mambo Chirisamhuru was killed by Nyamazana's people. One account says that the Rozvi king threw himself down a steep cliff to avoid being captured by the enemy. Another one says that he was captured and skinned alive. Yet another oral tradition says that the Ngoni had been told about the fame of this great ruler and that his achievement and bravery were due to the fact that he had two hearts. Thus when Nyamazana captured Mambo Chirisamhuru she removed his heart from the body in order to prove that he had only one heart and not two as had been believed.Manyanga Hill where Chirisamhuru was killed, was later named by the Ngoni and the Ndebele, Ntaba zikamambo, in memory of the last, Changamire king. Nyamazana's Ngoni were later incorporated into the Ndebele of Mzilikazi and Nyamazana herself became one of the Ndebele king's queens.

The main Jere Ngoni group, now including the Shona and Tonga elements, continued its migration northwards, settling for about four years in the Nsenga area and for another four years among the Cewa peope. They probably continued their northward migration in pursuit of richer grazing lands and adventure. They moved northwards to the area at the source of the Liangwa on the Fipa plateau of western Tanzania. Here, Zwangendaba established his headquarters and died there in about 1848.

A Note on the Maseko and Msene Ngoni

After their defeat by Soshangane in about 1831, the Maseko Ngoni of Ngwane and the MSene Ngoni of Nxaba split. Neither of the two travelled with Zwangendaba. The Maseko

Ngoni crossed the Zambezi at its mouth and settled somewhere in the country between Lake Malawi and the western coast of the Indian ocean in the southern-eastern part of Tanzania. Some time in about 1860 they were defeated by Zulu-Gama's Gwangara Ngoni living in the Songea district. The leadership of the group was now passed on to Mputa, Ngwane's son.

They, therefore, fled the Songea area and went to the Ncheu district of southern Malawi where, it would appear, the group plunged into a civil war as a result of a succession dispute in which both Chikusi and Chifisi claimed the throne. Chikusi was successful in the fighting and he got the throne. Chifisi was not destroyed however, and he remained in the kingdom as a potential threat to Chikusi.

Maseko Ngoni's greatest success and achievement was during the years 1879 to 1885. At this time the Ngoni carried out raids into areas east of Domwe, Ntumba, Chipeta, Nyanja and Mbo village which were brought under their control. The Maseko Ngoni even raided the Yao communities, forcing them to seek shelter on hilltops. The Yao were, however assisted by the Kololo of the Shire Highlands area, who possessed guns. They were also helped by he white missionaries who were based at the Livingstone Mission station.

As time went by, however, the Maseko Ngoni fell more and more under the influence of the Yao. After the deaths of Chikusi and Chifisi, another succession war broke out between their sons. Chikusi's son, Gomani, was successful, largely because of assistance from Mpanda's Yao. The Maseko Ngoni had also absorbed a lot of Chewa people into their ranks and as a result, they were losing their original cohesion, when white people came to settle in the area. Many more went to work for Mponda, a Yao chief. A lot of them came under missionary influence since raiding now became less profitable, and it was now more difficult for Ngoni chiefs to recruit people for their military age regiments.

On the other hand, the Msene - Ngoni of Nxaba went towards the Masene of Mutapa kingdom after being beaten by Soshangane in 1831. Nxaba's people remained in Zimbabwe during most of the 1830's raiding the Shona for cattle and grain. They crossed the Zambezi into Zambia in the early 1840's, ensuring that they made no contacts with the Jere Ngoni. Zwangendaba's Ngoni, for fear of hostilities, however, the Msene Ngoni clashed with the Kololo of Sebetwane and Nxaba and most of his men were killed. What is important to note is the fact that as the Ngoni entered Central and East Africa, they split into many groups, in some cases, became completely absorbed by the local peoples. Moreover, due to mutual jealousies, suspicious rival ambitions and greed for both power and wealth, the Ngoni quickly disregarded their original loyalty to Zwangendaba and ventured into central and eastern Africa, sometimes as independent warlords.

What was the impact of the death of Zwangendaba?
Zwangendaba's death was followed by a succession dispute involving his sons and members of the royal family. It would appear that Mbelwa, the youngest of the princes, had been chosen to succeed his father, but the elder brothers, Mpezini and Mthwalo who equally had ambitions of their own, opposed this. While the dispute and disagreement continued, one of the kings' senior men, Ntabeni, became acting leader of the Jese Ngoni. He made the situation worse by naming Mpezini as Zwangendaba's new successor with Mthwalo as the

next in line. Mbelwa was banished to a new village. That only made the situation more complicated, and split the Jere Ngoni into five different groups which settled in different areas of central and east Africa, as separate nations, the followers of Ntabeni settled in sourthen Tanzania as the Tuta Ngoni.

Another group emerged under one of Zwangendaba's relatives, called Zulu Hama, who led his group to the Songea district of Tanzania where they became known as the Gwangwara Ngoni. This is the group that defeated the Maseko Ngoni in Songea and pushed them out of the area in the 1860's.

However, the main group continued for some time under the joint leadership of two of Zwangendaba's chiefs, Mgayi and Gwaza. Gwaza showed wisdom by installing Mpezini as leader of one group. This group later settled in the area of the Zambia- Malawi- Mozambique border. Gwaza led one of the groups to the Henga valley area in Malawi and here he offered the leadership to Mthwalo. Mthwalo declined the offer and instead, recognized his young brother Mbelwa as leader, saying, "I chose you as chief. Tomorrow you may if you wish make an end of me" Mbelwa, however, did not kill Mthwalo as the latter had feared. Instead what resulted was a spirit of Ngoni reconciliation which was to play an important part in future Ngoni Politics.

Mbelwa proved to be an able military leader, conquering a number of peoples including the Tumbuka Kamanga and killing Chikulamayembe, the well- known and powerful chief of the Tumbuka- Kamanga people. Hence, the Tumbuka, Henga and Thonga were taken captives. The raids were carried out as far as the Lake Malawi region (Kazembes country) and Lubemba Mbelwa was, however, defeated by Mwase Kasungu, who had possession of guns. But Mwase Kasungu later became a friend and ally of Mbelwa. One of Mbelwa's raiding expeditions was led by Chiwere Ndlovu who was a Nsenga captive. Chiwere later broke away from Mbelwa to find his own Chiwere Ngoni state in the Dowa district of central Malawi.

Meanwhile, Mpezini had led his people towards Lake Bangweulo where they came into conflict with the Bamba in about 1850. After a very destructive battle, Mpezini moved into the Nsenga territory taking with him many Nsenga captives – so many that his people became predominantly Nsenga speaking. Around 1870, the Mpezini Ngoni settled in the Petauke district of eastern Zambia. From there they moved to the Chipata district where they defeated the Chewa of chief Mkanda in the late 1870's. Mpezini's young brother, who had also been defeated by the Bemba, led his small group back to Malawi where he joined Mbelwa's Kingdom.

It must be highlighted that the Tuta Ngoni, the smallest group, left Ufipa plateau and clashed with the Holoholo near Lake Tanganyika. They disrupted the trade route between Tabora and Ujiji. In the 1850's they invaded the Nyamwezi, capturing many and incorporating them in their ranks. They finally settled at Kahawa south of Lake Victoria.

Why were the Ngoni successful in wars against the peoples of Central and Eastern Africa?

The Ngoni had large, disciplined, and well trained armies. They were grouped in age regiments which were maintained for long periods. Moreover, they had more superior fighting methods and weapons, such as the assegai, and a big cow- hide shield which could provide ample defence for the fighters, whereas the local armies resorted to the traditional method of using long throwing spears. The Ngoni invariably made use of the assegai and swift methods of combat, copied from Shaka the Zulu.

Moreover, the Ngoni did not cultivate crops, but rather lived by plundering from others. This enabled them to have a standing army always ready for battle. The Ngoni were in many ways a professional fighting force, due to the frequent raiding expeditions which they had to carry out, as well as being occasionally at war against each other. This made them a vastly different and better fighting force than the ordinary inhabitants of central and eastern Africa.
The fact that the Ngoni absorbed young men for warriors and young women for wives, rapidly increased their size and military strength. These young men were immediately drafted into the military age regiments where they became known as Ruga- ruga or Maviti (madzviti). Due to the fact that they had no real family around them, they became more ferocious raiders and were often hired as effective mercenary soldiers by Mirambo, Nyungu Ya Mwe and even Mkwaway of the Hehe. This made the Ngoni more seasoned fighters with a crashing fighting zeal against any opponent.

The use of the cow horn formation, combined with the assegai and high military discipline, proved very effective. They also chose clear open spaces for fighting, and liked attacking their enemies by night which produced a sense of unparalled shock. This versus the small, fragmented society, weakened by the ravages of the slave trade in most of East Africa, made the Ngoni highly victorious.`
Moreover, there was disunity among the East African people living in isolated societies which made it easy for the Ngoni to defeat them. On the other hand, the Ngoni were fully united under their commanders. Moreover, the strong Ngoni military leaders such as Zwangendaba, Induna and Maputo acted as unitary factors which inspired the Ngoni to victory. The fact that the Ngoni moved in large numbers, often took their opponents by surprise.
Moreover, the Ngoni used the assimilationist policy. They absorbed the people whom they defeated, for instance, when Mpezini conquered a group such as the Nsenga he sent them to different parts of the Kingdom to keep them separate, and so prevented rebellion. Later he modified this policy, leaving some groups in their villages to carry out hunting and agriculture work, and allowing others, such as the Chewa and Kunda, who had resisted Ngoni rule, to pay tribute for not being raided.
Mbelwa's policy had, from the start, been to charge tribute instead of full absorption. The Tonga, Henga and Tumbuka living in Mbelwa's country had been allowed to live as separate communities paying tribute to the Ngoni king. This meant that they kept their identity, chiefs and language and, hence, often became co operative. However, sometimes the policy backfired when these communities rebelled and caused disharmony among the Ngoni.

Effects of Ngoni invasions in centrol and East Africa

Positive effects

The Ngoni created new and large states in areas where previously the peoples had been weak and politically fragmented. The Ngoni invasions themselves led to the rise of outstanding leaders to prominence. These included Mirambo, Nyungu ya Mawe and Mkwawa who adopted Ngoni military tactics to rebuild and defend their empires. They eventually managed to successfully resist Ngoni invasions, for instance, the thirty small Hehe clan – settlers were united under their leader Munyigumba and then managed to conquer the weaker Bena and Sagata peoples. More striking is the fact that when the Hehe adopted Ngoni fighting methods they successfully defended themselves against the Gwangwara Ngoni to the South of them, and ultimately defeated the Gwangwara.

Mirambo of Urambo and Nyungu ya – Mawe of Ukimbu created new states by using Ngoni methods of war, even hiring Ngoni mercenaries. Even Swahili traders who were armed with guns were forced into state building by the Ngoni invasions eg, Jumbe Kisutu, the east coast wory trader at Kota Kota on the western shores of Lake Malawi, created a little state by receiving Chewa refugees and arming them to resist the Ngoni. He used the refugees to help him defeat the local Chewa rulers, whom he made subordinate to himself, and employed the Chewa people as ivory hunters and traders or as food – producers. Thus a purely African – oriented event, (the military revolution) completed by Shaka spread well beyond the Zulu homeland, and it was of fundamental importance in the creation of these larger units. It was not only the purchase of European made guns from the east coast that led to the growth of larger political units in East and Central Africa.

Furthermore there was the spread of Ngoni customs and culture such as the initiation ceremonies where teenagers were taught sex education and underwent circumcision. Intermarriages between the Ngoni and the peoples of East and Central Africa subsequently led to improved relationships between invaders and the indigenous peoples, and an increase in population.

Negative Effects

The Ngoni invasions undoubtedly caused widespread loss of life leading to depopulation in some parts of central and East Africa. They destroyed the Rozvi empire on their northward migrations, they were "litee a swaru of locusts forced to continue advancing as it destroys its own livelihood" writes historian J.D. Omer – Cooper.

They slowed down the economic growth of the people of southern Tanzania when they grabbed their crops and cattle, because the Ngoni were cattle plunders, continuous looting therefore led to poverty. In the same vein trade (long distance) between Tabora and Ujiji was equally disrupted. Scorched – earth policy of fighting by the Ngoni led to widespread famine in some areas

As new weapons and military tactics were introduced, increased warfare and aggression led to insecurity in East Africa.

There was also loss of people's languages, customs and culture raids caused many people to become homeless and tribe less, with people losing their identity. Such groups became terrorists who lived by war and plunder, and hunting for ivory. They included the "Ruga – ruga" who began hiring their services as mercenaries to any chief wiling to pay them.

Although today due to intermarriage, ties it may be difficult to immediately identify the Ngoni in Central Africa and East Africa, their tradition and cultural practices live on.

Examination Type Questions

1. Who were the Ngoni? Assess the social, economic and political impact of their invasion on central and east Africa.
2. Why and with what results were central and East African societies defeated by the Ngoni?
3. Trace the movements of the Ngoni from the time they entered central Africa up to Tanganyika how did they affect the region and its peoples?
4. Assess the importance of <u>any two</u> or of the following in the history of Africa in this period;

a) Zvangendaba of the Ngoni.
b) Abushiri of the Pangani.
c) Mutesa I of Buganda
d) Jaja of Opobo.

CHAPTER 6

PRE COLONIAL STATES IN EAST AFRICA

BUGANDA STATE

Learning objectives

After studying the top, the student should be able to:

(i) Discuss Menelik II's political resistance to European Colonialism.
(ii) Compare and contrast Johannes IV and Theodore II.
(iii) Examine the failures of Tewodros.

Background:

Prior to 1650, Buganda was one of the small independent lineages in the interlacustrine region. The class had a generally wide influence over its members. The period from approximately 1600-1800 was characterized the following:

- Firstly, by territorial expansion
- Secondly, it was marked by administration consolidation
- Thirdly, the increasing importance in military system
- Fourthly, the beginning of centralized political structures.

Buganda was located on the north-western area of Lake Victoria in a region that was very fertile. The introduction of bananas gave the people of Buganda a source of food well-suited to their geographical environment. Since bananas provide a high yield for comparatively less input in terms of work, general food production was left for women. Men were freed from production activities so that they could be readily available for military services. However in other states like Bunyoro, Bunganda's rival, men played an important role in the agricultural sector and responsible for herding cattle, clearing the land for fields and even till the land.

Political organisation of the State:

Administration

The Kabaka (state king) was the head of the state. He had influence in the 3 sectors of the state organization. Also he was regarded as the supreme human being which deserved respect/ loyalty and allegiance. He appointed the chiefs who administered the villages, districts and provinces on his behalf. It is very important to note that the power of the state was centralized - (centralized state.)

Army commanders were appointed by him on merit. It is also essential to note that promotion to higher positions in the state's hierarchy was through capabilities or talent, that

is after a certain individual had distinguished himself the best among others. For example a capable soldier or a commander could be promoted to high rank due to his abilities and innovations. Therefore promotion did not matter whether a certain individual was a commander or of royal background.

The king had powers to appoint and dismiss the chiefs if they proved disloyal and rewards were taken away from them. It was a humiliation to have rewards taken away because the society would look down upon that individual and regarded him as a rebel.

General organization was based on lineage system. The royal lineage was responsible for executing special public duties. However, the rest of the lineages in Buganda were hereditary. The period from between the 17th and 19th centuries was marked by expansion of Buganda and centralization of the state in general.

Expansion and military conquests created new posts which the king could fill with personal followers. The wars also created military leaders who could be rewarded if they remained loyal to the state. The king created new chieftaincies in all the early conquered areas, appointed military leaders and other followers to these chieftaincies. Therefore by the mid 19th century there were very few hereditary chiefs left. Almost all chiefs owed their status to the royal privileges and they remained loyal. It was these chiefs who formed the central structure of the political administration.

As in the Ndebele state, conquered people were incorporated into the state. Local customs were retained so that conquered people felt that their rulers were a continuation of the old system. Moreover, the king established new chieftaincies in all the newly conquered areas. He also appointed his military leaders and other followers to these chieftaincies. These could often bring their followers to settle in the area, thus achieving an integration between Buganda and the tributary states. Therefore the state was administered through a system of hereditary chiefs.

Individual lineage heads were grouped together into counties ruled over by senior chiefs. In the late 19th century, some senior chiefs became powerful enough to actually challenge the king to regain their independence. Personal ambition combined with the action of missionaries led to a sudden and serious decline of the state power. This was also the time when the British imperial factor was beginning to entrench itself in the state.

The army and its roles in the state:
Like the Ndebele, the king controlled the army in Buganda. It had no influence in the administration of the state (it was itself under the influence of the Kabaka). He was in a position to appoint all military generals and senior officials. Generals who had proved their ability in the military were often rewarded with chieftaincies.

However, unlike the Ndebele, the army of Buganda was not a standing force until at a later stage in the development of the state. It consisted of the body guards stationed at the courts and Ganda state. It safe- guarded the position of the Kabaka and circulation of court laws.

The standing, army a product of centralization, was comprised of all able-bodied and fit young men from all the states of Buganda. It also consisted of tributary soldiers who because of central control system were always readily available for military service at short notice.

The army played a fundamental role in Buganda's expansion. It also played an important role in maintaining peace and trade. It defended the state and ensured the prevailing of peace and order and also protected areas of raw material production and trade routes. However, as the slave trade gained momentum, the army became an important device in the capturing of slaves.

The Ganda economy:

Basically, Buganda relied on her tributary states. It was through these tributary states that chiefs paid tribute in the form of food, cattle, iron and labour. However, later in the 19th century the goods that were paid were in the form of ivory, slaves and gold.

Trade in slaves generated large state income which was used to develop all the sectors of the state. Slaves were raided from other states. They looted grains, cattle through this system. The king was in a position to appropriate the wealth of the nation, so as to effectively run the state and army. For instance in the late 18th century Buganda was drawn into the long distance trade (L.D.T.) The kings became strong enough to control it. This type of trade included among other things such commodities as ivory and slaves.

These items of commerce had to be supplied by Buganda in exchange for cotton, cowrie shells, copper, bracelets and porcelain. From the beginning of the 19th century guns became the most important commodity. Through this control of long distance trade the king ensured exclusive rights over acquisition and distribution of prestigious imported goods.

This meant that the king could be in a position to easily reward his leading subjects with such luxury imported items. It also meant that Buganda's army was the only one in the interlacustruine region which was armed with guns. Revenue from trade and exports were therefore an important source of finance. Buganda largely depended on conquest and tribute for many of the goods not available within the state, for example iron had been previously imported from Bunyoro. The conquest of the states Kyaggeo and Budder were undertaken largely to secure enough supplies of cattle slaves and ivory.

Fertile soils and enough rainfall enabled the rapid growth of bananas which were sold on the eastern coast which were taken to be the staple diet of the people on the coast-Arab's Swahili and the Indians.The banana production constituted quite a large proportion of profits or income of the state economy. It was easy to produce them since they did not demand extra care from men. The male population was left to organize all political and military issues which were important and demanded power and "intelligence".

Stable rainfall also contributed to the Ganda economy. Reliable rainfall enabled the growth of green pastures. There were enough pastures to sustain of large herds of cattle.They

provided grazing land. Cattle were very essential for they provided beef, milk and hides which were processed into different types of clothes and sandals.

Ivory production was very important. Elephant hunting increased due to the increase in demand for ivory-second from slaves. All these commodities enabled the state to generate large revenue through long distance trade. Market revenue constituted much to the state's income. All the transactions were charged 10% of the total value and was taken to the government which knew how to utilize them for the development of the state. Also there were road tolls that were levied on every caravan that passed across and through Baganda territories.

The payment of tribute, though political in nature, was of great economic importance. All the assimilated states paid tribute in the form of cattle, gold, iron and salt. The tribute could be also in the form of slaves which were then sold to the slave traders (buyers).

Land was also important especially fertile land.

Land ownership or tenure: political economy.

Land was scarce and therefore served as the basis of royal domination. In Buganda the king "owned" almost all the land and controlled people through control of the land. When he assigned an administrative territory to one of his chiefs, the appointment implied control over and used by the ordinary cultivators.

The king also created a separate and special class of chiefs (called batoagole) who received independent estates within the domains of administrative chiefs. A great estate was a power base, for a chief could give land to minor chiefs, and then to ordinary cultivators, all in turn for political allegiance and tribute ultimately collected from the peasantry. (Philip Curtin, Steven Feirman, Leonard Thompson and Jan Vansina; African History Longman (USA) 1978, page 170-171) share that:

"Buganda's banana and plantain gardens were the key to economic, and therefore political value of land. The climate of Buganda (as already mentioned) is unusually suited for the cultivation of these plants, which not only one eats as fruit but form the starchy staple of the diet and are even the main ingredient in brewing beer. Banana gardens require a considerable initial labour investment; the soil must be cleared and usually another, preparatory crop planted before young banana plants can be put in and grow. In Buganda, once the plants are producing however, they go on for decades with relatively little attention. Ordinary cultivators in Buganda therefore had substantial investment in their land; moving to new land meant losing a comparatively large investment and gave large yields meant in turn that the population was comparatively dense and stable. It then became worthwhile to make further investment in infrastructure such as communication. Thus each important chief used the labour owned by his subjects to construct foot paths between his own centre and capital".

Land in Buganda took on a symbolic value as well. A person who lived on a chief's land was dependent on him and owned him loyal service as well as tribute. The most ancient and honoured clans of Buganda had some land of their own, which did not come from the king and were to that extent independent of the king's authority. It was clearly more important for those clan members to retain their own land rather than to receive twice as much from the king-and sacrifice independence. Due of the greatest rewards a king could bestow to important chief was an estate exempt from royal taxes which was therefore an independent power base. In the 19th century, if not earlier, ordinary peasant sometimes left their land to move to another place, where a kinsman was chief and political conditions more favourable.

Transactions on land were not only economic but political. The political relationship was sometimes valued more highly than the land payment that was in its justification.

Land and acquired luxury commodities from trade were used by the Kabaka for bribery. All the chiefs and army commanders were supposed to work very hard and quite competitively so as to get rewarded by either a portion of land or luxury goods or items. The land and luxury goods were used for rewarding the capable and loyal chiefs and army commanders.

This way the Kabaka ensured that his position was less or not threatened. The Buganda state had expanded its boundaries in new areas of new material production (e.g. salt, iron, and salt deposits). These minerals deposits added value to the slave economy.

Social aspects of Buganda/ Relations with foreigners

Religion

Kings of Buganda were not themselves religious or mediums. However they had some control over a separate religious system which consolidated their authority.

The Role of Religion

It must be noted that East Africa and Central Africa were unlike West Africa in that there was no direct contact with Europe prior to the 1880s by which time the Scramble for Africa had reached its peak. It goes without saying that the missionaries were an imperialist factor since they acted as forerunners of capitalism.

The Berlin Colonial Conference had clearly marked different spheres of influences of the various countries of Europe. These spheres of influence were marked in East Africa. Britain was given Kenya and Germany Tanganyika. But it must be noted right from the onset that Germany was gradually moving into the interior. Britain on the other hand had her interests directed towards Buganda. However, she was not yet prepared to undertake the responsibilities of colonizing Buganda. She wanted to keep other colonies while she was still brooding over East Africa. Thus she kept asking herself whether the region was worth colonizing therefore to this end Britain actively encouraged missionaries in London to come to Buganda.

The Kabakas of Buganda faced one serious problem of both political and religious nature, that is, the absence of strong altar-crown relationship. They did not have direct control of

religious orders. His religious influence ended with his people. It is doubtful if the conquered were compelled to adopt Ganda religious systems.

Whilst some aspects were forced to be adopted by the conquered groups e.g. language, the conquered were allowed to practice their own traditional customs and religion. Such a situation left the Kabakas with very little influence on social matters, and this influenced how one of them was to respond to external influences which transformed Buganda.

Three external influences which transformed Buganda

During the reign of Mutesa I

During the reign of Mutesa I (1854-1884) Buganda was transformed by three foreign influences:

1. The arrival of Swahil-Arab traders from the east coast, who brought with them Islam, which soon gained many converts.
2. Interference by Khedive Ismail of Egypt who sought to extend Egyptian influence southwards into the interlacustrine area.
3. The arrival of Christian missionaries (Protestants from Britain and Catholics from France)

Influence of the Swahili -Arab Traders and Islam

In 1844, the first Swahili-Arab traders from the east coast entered Buganda. Commercially, these traders contributed to the expansion of Buganda's long-distance to trade, which led to an emphasis on trade in ivory, slaves and guns rather than trading commodities like coffee, beans, bark cloth and iron.

But, as Michael Tidy notes: "The most striking aspect of the coast traders' arrival in Buganda was cultural revolution inspired by Islam, a phenomenon with no parallel in the east African interior. This revolution in turn precipitated a political revolution that was equally unique".

The most prominent of the east coast traders, Ahmed bin Ibrahim was also keen on spreading Islam as he was on trading with the Ganda people. Islam made great strides in Buganda after Mutesa endorsed the new faith in 1866.

Although he never formerly became a Muslim (largely because of his refusal to accept the Islamic practice of circumcision) Mutesa was in general strongly attracted to Islam. He liked the doctrine of an active God unlike the impersonal and disinterested Ganda High god Katonda. Mutesa also liked the Islamic concept of eternal life and forgiveness of sins and the recording of the tenets of the faith in a book.

Between 1866 and 1875 Buganda became a semi-Islamic state. Partly Mutesa used Islam for tactical purposes. He was engaged in a power struggle with the traditionalist priests of the Lubaale priests who were a barrier to his centralised absolutism. He welcomed Islam

into Buganda as a counter-weight to Lubaale (which clearly shows that the Kabaka did not have religious power).

But it seems Mutesa was also quite sincere in his admiration of Islam. He observed the Ramadaan continuously for the next ten years, practiced Islamic religion zealously, learned Arabic, adopted Arab dress and manners, Islamised his court (many court chiefs and pages became Muslims) and building mosques. Mutesa also ordered the execution of many traditionalists who opposed the spread of the religion.

1. The threat from Egypt

During the 1880s both Buganda and Bunyoro faced constant threat from Khedive Ismail of Egypt who was determined to expand Egyptian influence into the interlacustrine area. Ismail attempted to do this by linking two agents, first the new British explorers, Samuel Baker, and later the British army officer, Charles Gordon.

From the Egyptian base at Gondokono on the White Nile. Baker and Gordon interfered greatly in the affairs of interlacutrine kingdoms. Gordon was appointed Governor of Equatorial, the name Egypt gave to the province which it established in this area.

Gordon suggested to Ismail that a supply route should be suggested from the east coast to interacustrine kingdoms, so in 1875 Ismail sent Egyptian troops to occupy the mouth of Juba River and find a route inland to Buganda. But this was claimed by the Sultan of Zanzibar, who appealed to the British for help against the Egyptians.

The British, who regarded the Sultan as more reliable opponent of the slave trade than Ismail, backed the Sultan and the Egyptians were forced to leave the East African Coast in 1876. Thus the Egyptian threat receded and disappeared completely when there was a coup in Egypt and Ismail was deposed.

Influence of the Christian Missionaries

It was largely because of this threat from Egypt that Mutesa had welcomed Christian missionaries into Buganda. In 1875 the explorer Henry Morton Stanley visited Mutesa was greatly impressed with the Kabaka's intelligence and organizing ability.

As Michael Tidy notes,: "Stanley described Mutesa in letters to Britain as the light which would lighten the darkness of the interior of East Africa".

Mutesa I accepted Stanley's suggestion that Christian missionaries come from Europe to Buganda. He accepted it largely because he as worried at the time (1875) about the threat posed by the advancing Egyptian forces under Gordon.

Michael Tidy explains: "Mutesa clearly wanted European missionaries because he associated religion with government and believed missionaries would be representatives of European governments in his diplomatic struggle with Egypt. Mutesa appears to have looked forward with expectation to the military, political and economic power that missionaries would bring him".

The first missionaries arrived in 1877. They were British Protestants (the Church Missionary Society) led by Alexander Mackay. In 1878 a group of French Catholics (the White Fathers) arrived led by Father Simon Lourdel. The christian missionaries quickly gained converts, especially among many of the idealistic young men working at the Kabaka's court.

Michael Tidy explains why Christianity appealed to many of these court pages: "The christian teaching of equality and dignity of men, the message of a personal saviour and the compelling personality of Christ himself were all of a marked contrast to the cynicism and uncertainity of life of the royal court".

Mutesa himself almost became a Christian at one point, but the Katikiro (Prime Minister) Mukasa strongly advised him to remain independent of the three rival foreign religious groups (Muslims, Protestants, and Catholics) Mukasa said, "If you join any of these foreign religions, there will be no peace in this country".

By 1881, after the Egyptian threat had disappeared, Mutesa largely lost interest in both Christianity and Christian missionaries. He became increasingly angry and confused about the bitter disagreement that were taking place between the Protestants Missionaries and Catholics missionaries.

Indeed Mutesa and his people began to regard Protestantism and Catholism as two different religions, the former for the "Ingleza" and the latter far the "Fransa". In his last few years Mutesa, now a sick and dying man, returned to the traditional Ganda gods.

But Islam, Protestantism and Catholism, had become firmly rooted in Buganda by the time of Mutesa's death in 1886, and they had already produced tensions and conflicts which were to cause political as well as religious upheavals under Mutesa's successor, the young and weak Kabaka Mwanga.

How religious and political clashes led to the decline and collapse of Buganda during the reign of Mwanga

By the time Kabaka Mutesa died in 1884 there were already serious rivalries and conflicts among different groups of Muslims, Protestants and Catholics. These were to lead to open warfare under Kabaka Mwanga.

Mwanga was an inexperienced young man and was only 18 years old when he became Kabaka in 1884. As Michael Tidy notes:

"His character showed evidence of many personal weaknesses. He was easily led, revengeful, unpredictable, addicted to bhang-smoking and homosexual".

Mwanga soon begun a ruthless persecution of the christians at the urging of the Katikiro Mukasa, who feared that increasing number of the christian pages at the court might

threaten his own position and Swahili-Arab traders in Buganda, who worried Mwanga that the christians were opening the door to European imperialism.

In 1885 Mwanga arranged to have a Protestant Bishop, James Hunnington murdered by a local Soga chief because he thought Hannington was an agent of European imperialism. One Catholic Chief who protested Hannington's murder was also put to death.

In May, 1886, Mwanga summoned the court pages and demanded to know which of them were christians. According to Michael Tidy;

"Mwanga was furious that they were resisting his homosexual advances". About 30 pages admitted being Christians and they burned to death at Namugongo.

Ironically, Mwanga's persecution of Christians increased their political influence in Buganda. The martyrdom of the pages won widespread sympathy and admiration. Even the Katikiro Mukasa now urged Mwanga to stop the whole sale executions.

Mwanga soon began building up a powerful royal court of young chiefs and began to challenge the authority of the elderly senior chiefs whom Mwanga feared and hated and whom he had antagonized by his policies. Some of the young chiefs were Christians; others were Muslims.

Mwanga's scheme ultimately worked against him as the young chiefs began asserting their independence. The paranoid Mwanga decided in 1888 to kill or expel all Christians and Muslims in the country. However, the young chiefs beat Mwanga to the punch and staged a successful coup in early 1888, forcing Mwanga into exile and setting up a joint Christian-Muslim government.

This christian-Muslim coalition proved uneasy and ultimately unworkable. Later in 1888 there was a Muslim coup and the Christians were expelled. The new Muslim Kabaka, Kalema, carried out even worse persecution of the Christians than Mwanga had earlier.

During the period of Muslim rule, Christian missionaries were expelled, churches and bibles were burnt and many Ganda Christian were killed. Kalema's harsh rule precipitated a civil war from 1889 to 1890. The Christians and Mwanga formed an alliance of convenience and succeeded in overthrowing Muslims.

The Christians needed Mwanga because he had the support of the mass of people. The Christians won mainly because of the work of two generals; the catholic commander Gabriel Kintu and the Protestant Samuel Kungulu.

After the Christian victory, nearly all the Swahili-Arabs in Buganda were killed and their political influenced died with them. Also the Ganda Muslims suffered the same sort of persecution that the Christians had suffered earlier.

Mwanga was back as Kabaka but, as Michael Tidy notes:

"The coups and religious wars in Buganda from 1887 to 1890 led to the transfer of effective power from the Kabaka to an oligarchy of young Christians." Mwanga found his former absolute power now sharply curtailed. The Protestant leader, Apolo Kagwa, became Katikiro (a post he held for 36 years) and other ministries were divided between Protestant and Catholic chiefs.

Soon intense rivalry developed between the Protestant and Catholic leaders within the new ruling group and two rival parties emerged: the "Ingleza party (composed of the Protestants led by the Katikiro, Apolo Kagwa and his supporters) and the "Fransa" party (consisting of the Catholics and the Kabaka Mwanga and his supporters).

Mwanga did not really believe in the old religion or any of the new ones in Buganda. He allied himself with the Fransa party because, like the Catholics, he feared the expanding imperialism of the British in East Africa in the shape of the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEA).

But in July, 1890, Britain and Germany signed the Anglo-German agreement which declared Uganda to be a British sphere of influence. So the IBEA Company sent another expedition to Buganda, this time saw Swahili and Somali soldiers under captain Fredemick Lugard, who arrived at the Kabaka's capital Mengo in December, 1890.

A very reluctant Mwanga was pressurized into signing a protection treaty with the IBEA Company. However, as Michael Tidy notes "Mwanga showed no enthusiasm at the signing ceremony and for two years he refused to fly the company flag."

Although Captain Lugard had promised to be neutral between Protestants and Catholics, he became increasingly identified with the Protestants. Relations between Lugard and Mwanga became more and more strained, and in early 1892 matters finally came to head over the "Mugoloba case".

Mugoloba, a Catholic leader, killed a protestant, allegedly in self-defence. Mwanga tried the case according to Ganda law and acquitted Mugoloba. The Protestants appealed to Lugard, who demanded that Mwanga order, Mugoloba's execution. Mwanga refused and this led to open warfare between Catholics and Protestants.

In the battle of Mengo, fought on January 24, 1892, Lugard used the Maxim guns to defeat the Catholic forces under Gabriel Kintu. Mwanga and the Fransa chiefs fled temporarily to Bulingugwe Island in Lake Victoria. The battle of Mengo revolutionalised the political situation in Buganda. The Protestants were now the ruling class and they gained the largest share in the new land settlement.

Under this settlement, the Catholics, who were far more numerous than the Protestants, were allocated the large but single province of Budda. The Ganda Muslims were given three small counties (which was later reduced to one country after an unsuccessful revolt by a

group of Ganda Muslims in 1893). The Protestants obtained the rest, which was most of Buganda.

Mwanga was allowed to return to the capital Mengo and to keep his position as Kabaka. The victorious Protestants wanted to make the new regime appear legitimate to the Ganda people, who held the Kabakaship in high respect. But a new treaty between Mwanga and the IBEA Company reduced his independence further, and he became nothing more than a constitutional monarch, a position he would not willingly hold indefinitely.

Mwanga became increasingly resentful as time passed. He objected to the stopping of tribute from the Soga to Buganda, which had been one his major sources of income. He objected also to the enactment of a law ending the Kabaka's prerogative as the sole giver of land and allowing anyone to buy land.

But above all, Mwanga objected to the purge of his court pages in 1896. Michael Tidy notes: "In 1896, alarmed at the revival of homosexuality and drunkenness at Mwanga's court and the steady increase in his personal entourage the Christian government leaders had hundreds of young men and boys removed from the Kabaka's service.

Mwanga wanted both the restoration of his old political power and recognition of what he regarded as his personal right to appoint his own servants. By 1897 many of Mwanga's subjects were also disenchanted with protestant-British domination:

(i) Many Catholic leaders had not become reconciled to the regime since their defeat in 1892.
(ii) Many Muslims could not accept Protestant domination.
(iii) Many traditional leaders resented the suppression of customary practices such as bhang-smoking. They also had suffered economically from the banning of slave trading.

In 1897 Mwanga left the capital and raised the standard of revolt in the mainly Catholic province of Buddu. Thousands of Ganda from all religious parties and sections of the population joined him.

But the revolt was strongly opposed by the senior Protestants as Apolo Kagwa and some senior catholics such as Mugwanga, who held senior government posts, and whose positions and power demanded on their diplomatic alliance with the British.

A combined army of British forces and the followers of the senior Ganda leaders defeated Mwanga and his 14 000 supporters at Kabuwoko Hill. Mwanga fled to German East Africa where he was interned by the Germans.

Later Mwanga escaped and returned to Buganda where, ironically linked up with Kabalega of Bunyoro, who had been driven from his kingdom by the British. But in 1898 Mwanga and Kabalega were captured at Lango by an army of Ganda Protestants and British troops. They were exiled together to the Seychelles and Mwanga died there.

Under the Buganda Agreement of 1900, the British government rewarded the senior Christian leaders for their loyalty to the British during Mwanga's rebellion. British colonial rule had now been firmly established in Buganda.

Summary

Excitement surrounding literacy, new technology and alien religions swept Buganda in the second half of the 19th century. Islam was introduced first, followed by protestant and Catholic Christianity. The changes came at a time when Buganda had been expanding, and when its Kabaka had been gaining power at the expense of his neighbours and of local leaders within the kingdom.

Over decades each successive Kabaka had made a greater proportion of the administrative positions approcative, rather than hereditary. Buganda had also gained control of trade route around the western side of Lake Victoria. Mutesa, who was Kabaka from the late 1950s until 1884 was intensely, interested early in his reign in the culture, religion and technology of the Zanzibar traders who came to his court.

He was eager to increase numbers of firearms, especially the advanced weapons that were more effective than the usual trade in guns, and along with the guns came incidentals such as Zanzibari-style soap, clothing and bed frames.

Mutesa was also interested or fascinated by theology. In the late 1860s his court adopted the Islamic calendar, fasting and the reading of the Koran. Those who adopted new religions most easily were the teenage pages who had come from all parts of the kingdom to live at the royal court, in order to seek Mutesa's and later his son Mwanga's favour and mind advancement as chiefs.

Interlacustrine States (Land between Lakes): Bunyoro and Buganda

Kingdom of Bunyoro`

Origins: The people of Bunyoro originated from the areas of the Sudan and they were the Southern Nilots and the Luo and they were driven to the south by the stronger groups for example the Nilo- Hemites. It is here in the lakes region that they were driven so that they conquered the indigenous inhabitants and then set up the Kingdom of Bunyoro-in the interlacustrine region. This Kingdom extended from Lake Mabuto as far south as the Katanga river in parts of Modern Zaire and deeper to the boundary of Modern Rwanda.

The Kingdom of Bunyoro was ruled by the Luo chiefs of the Bito clan. The chiefs did not hide the fact that they were foreigners and they married local women as well as encouraged others to intermarry. Intermarriage was done in order to bring peace in the region. It was also done in order to increase the chief's own numbers. By 1600 the Kingdom was probably the strongest in the region having conquered many neighbours and territories and incorporated them into the Kingdom of Bunyoro.

However like all other African Kingdoms in West, East, South and Central Africa, the Kingdom had declined by the 18th and 19th centuries because of the following reasons:

a) Division within the Kingdom, created internal revolts by the conquered chiefs. The conquered chiefs attempted to regain their lost independence in the late 18th century. This caused confusion.

b) It began to experience attacks by its neighbour Buganda who felt it as a threat. Buganda encouraged internal revolts within Bunyoro in order to weaken her, so that Bunyoro would not be able to attack Buganda Kingdom. Bunyoro gradually declined. However, the economic changes towards the second half of the 19th century allowed for the revival of Bunyoro power. East African trade in the form of ivory and iron necessitated the revival of Bunyoro. Bunyoro King was known as Omukama. So from 1859-69 Bunyoro was ruled by Omukama Kamurasi and from 1869 -97 Omukama Kabalega.

Political organisation:

The king had very definite and even autocratic powers in addition to the ritual and symbolic functions similar to those accorded to Kings in other parts of Africa. All authority in the state was centred on the king even though he entrusted a part of his authority to provincial governors and they in turn entrusted some of their own authority to the chiefs in their areas. These officials at times exercised great authority but this was simply because the king allowed them to share his power.

The governors were appointed by the king and he could dismiss them at will if they were disloyal and inefficient. Authority was hierarchical i.e. from the King down to the headman in the village.

NB: There was no clear provision of succession to the throne and therefore, there was no threat of opponents supporting an heir to the throne and deposing the king. The governors were generally very loyal because they hoped to be nominated as kings. The rulers were not indigenous to the area and therefore not of the same blood as the people they ruled over.

Only matters concerning families were in the hands of the family head chosen by the local community. Most other affairs remained in the hands of the chiefs or sub- chiefs appointed directly or indirectly by the king.

The royal officials and members of the royal family made up a superior social class so as to maintain their identity. They were respected throughout the state and stood above the ordinary people.

Reign of Omukama Kamurasi (1852 – 69)

He gained the throne through alliance with the Lang'I Nilotic neighbours of Bunyoro. He contributed to the revival of Bunyoro power by admitting foreigners in his Kingdom namely, the long distance Arab traders from Khartoum in the north and Swahili from the

east (Tanzania). Kamurasi used the money these traders paid in the form of taxes and toll tax to build his Kingdom Kamurasi also struck good relations with the Nyamwezi and he also used their trade routes.
Bunyoro Kingdom had the advantage of being centrally located in the main trade routes to the coast and therefore it flourished as a base for long distance trade in the interlacustrine region.
The exports included iron goods for example hoes spearheads, iron rods produced from local iron ore deposits. Salt was also a great export from Kibero Mines and areas around Lake Mabuto. Kibero Mines were under state control and were the chief source of wealth. It was the duty of chiefs to look after the Omukama's wealthy.

NB: The profits from the exports of wealth helped in acquiring firearms and ammunition from Muslim traders and therefore facilitated the establishment of an efficient army for both defence and expansion. Ivory, because of the availability of guns, became one of the main exports because as many elephants as possible could be killed. Ivory became a royal monopoly. Tribute in the form of Ivory was expected by the Kamurasi. It was directly exchanged with the traders by the king.

Firearms brought sudden wealth and long distance trade flourished as a result. In the long run elephants became scarce and were threatened with extinction. While Bunyoro Kingdom prospered because of firearms, others were destroyed or simply declined. Slave trade also flourished during that time but more people died during transportation.

Omukama Kamurasi had opened the way for Bunyoro's former military power. But much of his work was left to his successor Omukama Kabalega

Kamurasi's Achievement:
He managed to reunify and revive Bunyoro power. He brought peace and stability within Bunyoro. He managed to bring wealth and build state revenue especially in the salt and ivory trade. He was very successful in his military reforms. In the 1860s he was able to subdue most of his neighbouurs. He had even started wars of expansion which were to be carried out successfully by Omukama Kabalega.

Omukama Kabalega (CWA iii)-1870-97.
He was born in 1850 and assumed power in 1870. He won in a succession dispute with his brother Kabigumire. He won because he had been a soldier; Kabalega was popular with the army which supported him. As a Prince he had mixed freely with the people and had the common touch, so the mass of people, the Bairu or peasant-farmers supported him. He also hired both Arab ivory traders from Khartoum who had guns and Lang'i mercenaries to fight for him. Once in power Kabalega embarked on the policy of consolidating his position by executing disloyal princes together with their supporters and in this way he removed opposition and incited fear among his subjects. He then went on to some political, military and social reforms. His grand aim was however, the consolidation of Bunyoro power. As a result each policy that he carried out was intended to strengthen Bunyoro.

Military reforms.

Kabalega created a standing army of 10 regiments each with a 1 000 to about 2 000 men. His regular army was called Abarusura. The army was under the direct control of Kabalega. This was to prevent soldiers being loyal to anyone else but the king and this therefore eliminated any chances of a coup d'e tat. The army was well equipped with guns.
The old military system in Bunyoro where an army was armed at short notice in times of emergency by local leaders, who rounded up available peasant farmers was abolished.
Local leadership was replaced as military leaders by communes and foreigners, who were appointed and promoted on merit by Kabalega himself.

The army was recruited from adventurers from all parts of Uganda, but most of the new professional soldiers were Bairu especially the army commander *Rwabudongo.* The majority of the army came from Bunyoro while some were conscripted from the Acholi langi and the madi. These were trained by Arabs from Khartoum and they were trained in the use of guns.

NB: Kabalega's motives in creating a standing army war to build up a force independent of the hereditary Gaza (country) chiefs and members of the royal family who had supported Kabigumire (his elder brother and rival to succession) and whose loyalty to him was suspicious.
A loyal army would make it easier to defend the country against invasion from Buganda, and at the same time make it possible to expand Bunyoro. Indeed the army succeeded in reducing the power of the aristocracy.
The soldiers were not paid a regular income and as a result plundered from the aristocracy because the king believed that this would reduce their power and remove any threats to his position. However the king lost some of his wealth through plundering because the soldiers did not bring all the booty. Wherever the soldiers conquered the king or Omukama allowed them to plunder as much as they wanted.

Merits of Military Reforms

i) The Kingdom became strong and well defended.
ii) The aristocracy were no longer a threat to the power of Kabalega.
iii) Army became very loyal to the king and nobody else had influence over any part of it.
iv) In 1876 Toro was reconquered. Successful raids were carried out against Nkore, Rwanda and Karagwe. All these were forced to pay tribute.

In the North, Chepe, between Bunyoro and Lake Kyoga was reconquered. Tribute was exacted from Nilotic-speaking communities beyond the Nile, such as the Acholi and Alua. In the east, Kabalega's new army defeated the Bugandan army at the Battle of Rwengabi. Some districts of Buganda were occupied and 20,000 Buganda were enslaved. In 1890 the army passed through Northern Buganda to raid Busoga and exact tribute from there.

Administration

Kabalega's administrative reforms were closely linked up with his military reforms. Army generals were made territorial chiefs, so there was overlap between political and military authority. Kabalega centralized the government and created provinces run by loyal chiefs who could meet the King on major issues. All chiefs and other government officials were appointed not inherit and therefore hereditary chiefdoms were phased out. This promoted efficiency as commoners would not want to let the king down since they had nothing to do with power.
New chiefdoms were created as rewards for commoners who served the Kingdom well. The traditional chiefs were allowed to keep their traditional titles but all the power and privileges were removed or largely ignored.

Social reforms
Kabalega encouraged intermarriages between all the various cultural and ethnic groups that existed between his Kingdom. He himself married from various ethnic groups and encouraged the chief to do the same in order to unite the whole Kingdom and prevent the rise of rigid class structures.

Initially three social classes used to exist although at a superficial level. At the top were the *Babito* of *Luo* origin, followed by the *Bahima* pastoralists, finally there were the *Bairu*, who were Bantu peasant agriculturalists. Kabalega disliked these structures of division, no wonder why he encouraged intermarriages. He also encouraged free mixing on equal level. He was trying to avoid disunity.

Decline of Bunyoro

East Africa continued

Tippu Tip:
He was one of the best-known of the Swahili. Arab traders. He was born Hamid-bin Muhammed el Murjebi. He was born in 1830 in Zanzibar. He was nicknamed Tippu Tip possibly because he blinked a lot or became of the sound of his guns. His mother was a Muscat Arab of ruling class. Tippu Tip's father and his paternal grandfather were coastal Swahili who had taken part in the earliest trading expeditions to the interior. His paternal grandmother had been the daughter of a Nyamwezi chief and Tippu Tip's own earliest journeys were with Nyamwezi caravans traveling round the south end of Lake Tanganyika to Katanga. He set up his own headquarters at Kasango on the Lualaba where he described himself as Sultan of Utetera. For twenty years, beginning in the early 1870s Tippu Tip was the most powerful man in eastern Zaire. He was loyal to the Sultan of Zanzibar of the Arabs, he maintained excellent relations with the Nyamwezi.

Tippu Tip began his own career in 1867. He set out from Zanzibar at the head of a large and exceptionally well- armed caravan to obtain Ivory in Tabwa country in northern Zambia. He entered, attacked and conquered Nsima, a ruler of known to possess a vast store of Ivory. When he returned his fortune from Nsama included thirty tons of Ivory, ten tons of copper and a thousand slaves. Through the use of diplomacy and force Tippu Tip eventually ruled a

state for more than 30 000 people, in eastern Zaire. From about 1870 to about 1890 he expanded his state northwards until he ruled about a quarter of modern Zaire. He called himself the "Sultan of Utetera". He appointed Swahili-Arab, Nyamwezi and local agents to act for him to maintain order and collect tribute in the form of Ivory and slaves.
Tippu Tip had plenty of guns (50 000 at one stage) and trained his men in the proper use of them. He was also able to establish political power because the local populations were small in numbers and politically fragmented. The navigability of the rivers in his territory greatly facilitated both the extension of his rule and the expansion of his trade.

Besides political dominance in eastern Zaire-Tippu Tip and other Swahili-Arabs developed large plantations of food crops such as rice, sorghum and maize. He also constructed large and well-built houses in the style of Zanzibar. Over and above that Tippu-Tip and other Arabs were also responsible for the adoption of KiSwahili as the Lingua franca of eastern Zaire. Tippu-Tip worked well with both Mirambo and Leopold II. He had friendly relations with Mirambo in contrast to the Tabora traders who quarreled with the King of Urambo to the detriment of their trade. He used his close family ties with the Nyamwezi to cement an alliance with Mirambo. Tippu-Tip agreed to trade for Mirambo at the coast, while in return Mirambo would protect Tippu-Tip's caravans between Ujiji and Tabora from the Tuta Ngoni and other raiders.

After realizing that the European powers were closing in on Tropical Africa, Tippu-Tip from 1883 to 1886, made a great great effort to rally the Arabs of eastern Zaire to acknowledge the political authority of the Sultan of Zanzibar. His hope was that the Sultan's dominion over East Africa would be recognized by the Europeans. In this way Tippu-Tip hoped that his rule in eastern Zaire would become permanent. However the European powers at the Berlin Conference did not uphold the Sultan's claims over the interior of East Africa. Tippu Tip became a colonial agent of Belgium in 1887 when the accepted appointment as Leopold's Governor at Stanley Falls. After his eventual retirement to Zanzibar in 1892 his former lands were conquered by European forces. The Belgians took over many of the institutions of Arab rule in eastern Zaire and employed many Swahili in positions of subordinate authority. However the Swahili language known locally as Kingwana remains the common language of this part of Zaire.

Mirambo of the Nyamwezi
The Nyamwezi people occupied West-Central Tanzania. They pioneered routes westward to Lake Tanganyika and beyond into the upper Zaire region, southwards to Shaba, northwards to Buganda and about 1800 they had reached the east coast. Their strategic position along the central routes from Zanzibar to the interior was a vital factor in Nyamwezi development in the 19th century. It enabled them to build on their existing extensive trade in salt, ironwork, copper, grain livestock, bark goods, pottery and later ivory. This economic enlargement combined with the new military techniques learned from the Nguni who came to East- Central Africa from Tshaka's Mfecane resulted in the formation of three large states i.e. Unyanyembe, Urambo and Ukimbu.

Mirambo-was born Mbuya Mtelya in the late 1830s. He grew up a warrior and also took part in the long- distance trading expeditions. Mirambo used wealth gained from ivory

trading to equip a private army of mercenary soldiers. These soldiers, known as ruga- ruga in Nyamwezi country, and Maviti and Magwangwara elsewhere roamed the countryside usually pillaging on their own account but ready to be employed by ruthless warlords or Arab traders. Sometimes their raids caused their victims to combine against them. The centralized state of the Hehe for instance in South-Central. Tanzania was formed in this way. Mirambo welded the ruga- ruga into a highly disciplined and efficient force using Ngoni weapons and tactics. His personal courage and the booty he distributed to his followers for their service in war, gained a large loyal following Mirambo created by the 1860s a state of his own called Urambo. He expanded westwards as far as Ujiji, northwards almost to Lake Victoria and Southwards to Lake Rukwa.

In this way Mirambo managed to control the major trade routes from Tabora to Ujiji, Tabora to Buganda and Tabora to Shaba. He could exact tolls on all of these routes Mirambo had 20,000 guns at one time but a chronic shortage of ammunition meant they could not be used in war as well as Ivory hunting. He had to rely on spears instead, as weapons for warfare.
Mirambo became powerful enough in the 1870s to rival the Arab merchant princes. It was with Mirambo and not with his fellow Arabs, that Tippu Tip allied himself in his commercial exploitation of eastern Zaire.

Through diplomacy Mirambo welcomed and allied himself with a number of Europeans. He welcomed Philippe Broyan the Swiss trader who was a valuable commercial partner and the British missionary Southon. Southon did not make a single convert in Urambo, but he wrote a letter on behalf of Mirambo. He also kept Mirambo informed on world politics. His attempt to befriend Sir John kick, the British Consul on Zanzibar was a great failure. This was mainly due to the death of two British Traders Frederick Carter and Tom Cadenhead at the hands of some of Mirambo's warriors in 1880.

Although he managed to curve such a great state, Mirambo failed to successfully modernize it. The state he created was insecurely built on his personal charismatic qualities and did not long survive his death in 1884. During Mirambo's life time, the new local rulers were loyal to him but after his death many rebelled to reassert the traditional authority of their family. There was no real community feeling among different people. Each component of the state remained basically committed to its own entity. Over and above that Mirambo successors lacked his ability. The personal loyalty of soldiers was not carried over to the new rulers. His brother Mpandashalo succeeded him and ruled from 1885-90. Mpandashalo was not a gifted leader. The state which Mirambo built over the years crumbled under the leadership of Mpandashalo.

Mkwawa of the Hehe

The Hehe state existed in the northern part of the southern Highlands of Tanzania. It lies between the Great Ruaha and Kilombero rivers. By 1855 the Hehe, people were divided into many small political units based on clans.The Hehe people came together under Munyigumba to oppose the Ngoni incursions. Munyigumba used profits from ivory trading to build up an army along Ngoni lines. The army successfully resisted Ngoni raids into Uhehe.

Munyigumba died in 1879 and was succeeded by his able son Mkwawa. Mkwawa defeated a rival claimant to Mwambambe. In power, Mkwawa quickly emerged as one of the most powerful rulers of new states in eastern Africa. He continued the Hehe Ngoni war which had started in 1878, won several battles against the Ngoni and forced them to make peace in 1881. He organized raids on neighbouring Ubena, Usagara, Ugogo and Usangu, and on Swahili-Arab trading caravans. Raids, trade and tribute from weak neighbours helped to build up his wealth.

Mkwawa controlled his state through the use of fear. He killed all opponents in Uhehe even those who were perceived as opponents. This helped to hold his state together. However it was not only through fear that he controlled the state. Many people were loyal to him out of gratitude. They depended on him for their personal position and wealth. They also wanted protection from the Ngoni people Mkwawa improved the political organization created by his father. Within Uhehe itself Mkwawa made provincial rulers subject to appointment and dismissal by himself as head of state and thus increased the strength of central government and the unity within the state. Those areas which did not resist his expansion often retained their own rulers who had to pay regular tribute. Mkwawa also used diplomacy to unite his people. Marriage alliances for example were concluded with as many groups as possible.

The Hehe state eventually crumbled as a result of German invasion.

THE REIGNS OF THEODROS, JEHANNIS AND MENELIK II

Background

Ethiopia is a Greek word meaning people with burned faces. Before 1755, Ethiopia enjoyed unaccustomed success in its political, social and religious life under the dynasty which took power in 1270 and ruled for 704 years until Haille Selassie I was deposed from power on September 12, 1974. This dynasty called itself Solomonic and claimed to have descended directly from the Solomonic dynasty. The emperor from the Solomonic dynasty took the title; “king of kings” or “Negus Negasta”.

However, by 1755, the Solomonic dynasty was on the verge of collapse. Indeed in the period 1755-1855, central government (or the authority of the Emperor) brokedown almost continuously. The period 1755 to 1855 was a century which witnessed a general decadence in central authority of the Emperor.

The “Rases” or provincial administrators set-up semi-independent rulers and fought each other. The century was likened to the “era of princess” described in the Old Testament book of Judges. The civil wars brought about or permitted by the “Rases” kept Ethiopia weak and fragmented as the Rases commanded more real power than the Emperor at Gondor, the capital of Ethiopia who in reality had become a mere figure who needed real authority to impose on his people.

According to Michael Tidy, the collapse of Central authority produced three results. Firstly, it led to the breakdown of law and order. Secondly, the civil war triggered by the “Rases” in

the struggle for power and followers resulted in the decimation of the population. Hope lay deep in the Ethiopian tradition which predicted the coming of a Messiah king who could re-unite Ethiopia, conquer Jerusalem, Mecca and Medina, put an end to the Islamic religion and usher in universal peace. This Messiah King to come was Tewodros, Kassa, the son of one principal governor of Qwara province who claimed to be the prophesied Messiah king.

Kassa was born in 1818. His father died when he was just a boy. As a result, his father was succeeded by his half brother, Kinfu, as the Ras of Qwara province. His mother, the widow was forced to become seller of Koso, flowers used as medicine for tapeworms. The boy was adopted by his half-brother Kinfu. Kassa was put in a monastery where be became literate in Amhamic, Ge'ez (the ancient language of the Ethiopian church) and Arabic, and learned the scriptures.

Kassa trained as a soldier and distinguished himself as a marksman and a master at calvary. Kinfu his half brother and the Ras of Qwara province was impressed by his talent. As a result, Kassa was made the commander of Kinfu's army. Kass won local civil wars and he was appointed as successor of Kinfu in 1845 by Ras Ali II (the gala regent of Yohanni's III the emperor of Ethiopia eversince 1832). Ras Ali wanted the powerful Kassa on his side. Kassa was given Ras Ali's daughter for marriage. He was however not loyal as a vassal and from 1852, he rebelled against Ali and Yohannis, worked towards acquiring the throne for himself.

Kassa's army was swollen by deserters from other armies who were attracted by a prospect of loot. Kassa acquired guns for his army and disciplined his forces along Egyptian lines.

Innovations

(a) He abandoned the traditional pattern of Ethiopia warfare of pitched battles in day light and opted for surprise attacks at night and ambush.
(b) He advocated for loyalty and devotion of his soldiers.

The Campaigns

In a series of brilliant campaigns from 1852 to 1856 Kassa made himself master of Ethiopia (Abyssinia). In 1852 at the Battle of Gur Amba he defeated the army of Biru Goshu, the ruler of Gojjam province, who had been sent against him by Ras Ali. In 1853 he defeated Ali himself in two battles; Taqusa and Ayashfal. Ayashjal was a decisive battle in Ethiopian history. It was the most vital battle in Kassa's rise to power, and it brought to an end the "Era of the Princes".

The western provinces were now under Kassa's control. In order to bring all Abyssimia under his control, the powerful vassal states of Tigre to the north and Shewa to the South, and the Muslim Wallo Galla between them, had still to be conquered. In 1855 he defeated the governor of Tigre at Deresge.

In 1855, he made an agreement with the chief priests or "abunas" that he would not antagonise the church if he was crowned emperor. He indicated his intention of alliance with the church. As such Kassa was crowned emperor Tewodros (Theodore) II in 1855.

The son the Koso-seller replaced the ancient Solomonian dynasty. In 1855-1856 Tewodros defeated and conquered the Walla Galla, and carried out a terrible slaughter of their Muslims. He then occupied Shewa, captured the new Shewan king, the eleven year old Sahle Momiam (the later Emperor Menelik II) and imprisioned the boy in his fortress capital Maqdala. Abyssinia had been recruited by military conquest.

Tewodros Domestic Policy

Tewodros was a man with a vision. He ascended the throne hoping to transform the country. His major aim was to reunite Ethiopia as a means of transforming and modernizing the country.

Administration Reforms:

1. He increased the authority of the emperor by taking the initiative of appointing all governors who reported and were answerable to the emperor.
2. He created a large national army which was salaried and equipped with modern weapons. Like Samori, he destroyed ethnicity, by uniting people from different ethnic backgrounds in the regiment.
3. Local authority (the provincial governors) was replaced by national loyalty.
4. Law and order was largely restored.
5. Bandit groups were also eliminated.
6. The judiciary was revamped and reformed. In Bandit cases, for example, only the murderer was hanged or killed and not his relatives.

Attempted Church Reforms

Despite the "abunas" assistance, Tewedros forgot the government-altar alliance he promised and sequestrated the church's land property.Each parish was given land sufficient to two priests and three deacons.Excess clergy who had enjoyed exemption from paying taxes were required to work and to pay taxes to the government.

Technological Reforms

On the aspect of Technological reforms, Michael Tidy submitted that Tewodros bought guns from Europe and established diplomatic relations with a number of foreign states. He hired European Engineers and military artisans to repair military artillery.

Like Samori of the Mandinka state, Tewodros perceived the importance of adopting modern technology as part of the response to European penetration. He had learned this lesson when as a war-lord in Qwara in the 1840s, he had suffered a stinging defeat by a well-armed and well-trained Egyptian force in Ethiopian-Sudan border.

Realizing the importance both of artillery and industrilisation, he hired European engineers, and persuaded missionary artisans to provide him with the military equipment needed. Cannon foundries and powder mills were set up, and several huge cannon mortars were built.

Achievement? A Critique: Michael Tidy:

His achievements were more apparent than real and his reforms cosmetic in nature. His career was adversely affected by his volatile (nature) character.Tewodros character

deteriorated after the death of his wife Tewabetch in 1858 and of his close friends the British Consul Walter Plowden and the English engineer John Bell in 1860, and the condition of the nation worsened along with the emperor's personality. Generally, he was cruel, violent and emotionally unstable, given to bouts of bad temper. Rebels were ruthlessly slaughtered and women and children were treated as slaves. When Menelik escaped from prison, for example, all guards were slaughtered.

His administrative reforms were generally superficial and he tried to impose a highly centralized system on the great feudal nobles without regard to the decentralized nature of politics in Ethiopia of his day. He did not even have the means to impose his authority effectively but he tried to impose highly centralized authority without due regard to the feeling of these nobles. Provincial nobles did not lend their support to his vision of a unified and modernized government because they wanted to remain independent of central authority.

He lacked the bureaucracy on which to build a national administration, and so only a feudal system could have worked, with the provincial nobles attached to the Emperor with military and marriage alliance. He had no role model to copy as was the case with Yohanis IV and Menelik II who had.

He turned the ordinary people against himself by constantly marching the army all over the country to suppress the provincial rebels who could not accept the loss of their traditional privileges and powers. Imperial soldiers were garrisoned under a system whereby the farmers in each district became responsible for feeding them. This alienated Tewodros from the mass of the population that is the peasants.

Campaigns against provincial rebels led to the exhaustion of the treasury and consequently to his inability to pay the army. Indeed in the 1860s about 1 000 of his soldiers opted to join rebel leaders Menelik II and Yohannis IV.

The Emperor's attacks on the privileges of the church aroused great resentment coming from the priests. The church became angry with Tewodros reforms or policies and it turned them against him and towards his political enemies, the provincial nobles. Tewodros had forgotten the state-altar alliance which was made up in 1855.

Tewodros's religious policies generally led to direct confrontation with his people as he tried to Christianise Muslims by force. He tried to suppress underground opposition at every level by pursuing one rebel after the other. Violence did not enforce obedience or loyalty but merely increased or solidified disloyalty and bred opposition mis-rule and mis-government.

Two years before his death, his power was oftenly felt in one province, that of Maqdala. To cut the long story short Tewodros did more damage than good to Ethiopian unity as his vision.In fact he further divided Ethiopia.During the last year of his misrule or misgovernment the "era of princess" which had characterised the Ethiopia of 1755-1853 resurfaced.

Tewodros II's Foreign Policy

He wanted Europe's friendship without its imperialism. He sought technical aid and advice of Europe. He also welcomed Protestant German missionaries, Krapf and Stern, who worked for British Societies and distributed Amharic Bibles. He developed close friendships with two Britons: John Bell, an engineer, who married an Ethiopian and acted as a kind of secretary for Tewodros, and Walter Plowden, the British Consul.

In 1862 he wrote a letter to Britain asking for assistance, but the letter was not given a quick response until 1866. Tewodros asked Britain to send skilled workers to Ethiopia.

Britain finally sent the workmen to Ethiopia. The British kept them at Massawa until Tewodrose released Camercon and a messenger was sent. Britain therefore set a military expedition in 1867-68 under General Napier, first to rescue the captives and secondly Britain wanted to test new military technology and methods. In April 1808, Britain stormed Magdala. The Emperor shot himself through the month to avoid capture. His soldiers fought on bravely long after all hope had gone.

The British, withdrew from the country after their victory and the "Era of the Princess" returned. Kassa of Tigre, however was rewarded by his allies with a vast store of guns and ammunition, which he used to make himself king of kings by 1871.

Tewodros' objected failure to reunify and mordernise Ethiopia cannot be disputed. It is very difficult not to sympathise with Tewodros. The vision of United and modern state died still-born and remained after he went to his grave. His vision cannot be taken away.

YOHANNIS IV (JOHN IV)

Overview

The successor to Tewodros II, Emperor Yohannis IV fought his way to the throne with arms obtained from the British, who had encouraged him as a rival of Tewodros (Theodore). In the 1870s the main external enemy of the Empire of Ethiopia, which was still a collection of semi-independent provinces than a united kingdom, was Egypt.

The expansionist policies of the Khedive Ismail, directed towards the Red Sea and Somali coasts, threatened to revive the previous long isolation of the Christian lands in the interior mountains. Egypt took over control of Suakin and Massawa in 1865 from the Ottoman Sultan and occupied much Eritrea. In 1875 Ismail extended an Egyptian protection over the Muslim rulers of Zeila and Harar, and launched and Egyptian attack upon Ethiopia from both north and the east.

The Emperor Yohannis was successful in halting the Egyptian invasion, but the continued Egyptian occupation of the more important Red Sea and Somali parts severely curtailed the supply of arms and other goods to Ethiopia. This weakened Yohanis in his conflicts with Menelik; the powerful ruler of Shoa, with whom he had to contend for the title of Emperor.

Shoa, which lies to the south of Tigre and Amhara, had suffered greatly, from the Galla invasions of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries.

The two rulers of Shoa before Menelik had been engaged during the previous fifty years on a similar course of re-armament and expansion (at the expense of the Galla and other pagan or Muslim people) to that undertaken by Tewodros.

In 1878, Yohannis had to make terms by which Menelik married his daughter and was recognized as his successor. Even so, concealed hostility and competition continued between the two, until Yohannis' death in the battle against the Khalif Abadallah in in 1889 when Menelik at last became emperor.

The Rise Yohannis IV

The fall of Tewodros II (Kasa) resulted in the rise of another Kasa-the leader of Tigre did not immediately become king of kings for the throne was occupied by Tekele Giyorgis (1868-71) before Kassa won a decisive victory against him at Adwa in 1871. Kasa's 12 000 well Kasa armed and well trained riflemen defeated cavalry charges of 60 000 men. Kasa of Tigres was also assisted by Ras Alula, the son of a peasant and one of Ethiopia's greatest generals. In 1872 Kassa was crowned at Aksam as Yohanni's IV.

Political Reforms

Yohannis' brought far more of measure political unity to Ethiopia than Tewodros. He consolidated his authority over the highlands by diplomacy rather than warfare, and by creating a federation rather than a strongly centralized state.

His achievement was within the realm of practical possibility, and proved acceptable to the provincial rulers. In 1878, Yohannis made an agreement with Menelik of Shoa, (see overview) a marriage alliance. Menelik agreed to drop his claim to king of kings, and pay tribute to Yohannis. Yohannis would no doubt have liked to reduce Menelik's power but was unable to do so because of constant foreign threat. On the other hand, Menelik never fully kept the agreement and continued to trade northwards, with the Italians for arms, even when Yahannis was at war with them.

Yohannis could not be said to have fully united the country. He never really established his authority of Takle Haymanot, king of Gojjam, and had little control over Menelik, who refused to fight with Yohannis against Mahdist Sudan invaders. Paradoxically, it was Menelik, the strongest of obstacle to unity from 1865 to 1889, who really united the country in the 1890s.

Religious Policy

It was a continuation of Tewodros' policy of intolerant denunciations of certain sects in the Ethiopian church, Catholics Muslims and Traditionalists. These last two groups were ordered to accept Christianity within three and five years respectively. This policy was, of course; impossible to implement effectively, and even where many conversions were made, they were rarely long.

Military policy (Resistance to Foreign Enchroachment)

This was his major achievement and his real importance in the history of Ethiopia.

1) Resistance to Egyptian Invasion

By 1872 Egypt had taken control of the Red sea coast, occupying the port of Berbera. In that year the Egyptians invaded Ethiopian borderlands which were only semi-dependent on the emperor: under the leadership of the Swiss adventurer, Munziger they advanced from Massawa into the highlands and occupied Bogos province in 1875, when Egypt made a three-pronged attack on Ethiopia.

The first expedition left Zeifa on the north Somali coast and occupied the town of Harar in the south-eastern foothills of the highlands. Harar remained Egyptian for the next years.

The second column under Munziger marched from Tujurah near Jibuti towards Shewa (Shewa) but was defeated by the Afar of the coast and so never reached Yohannis' territory, Munziger, the Swiss was killed.

The third column moved in land from Massawa into Tigre and was annihilated by Ras Alula at Gundat. A new expedition under Ratib Pasha commander- in chief of the Egyptian army, was heavily defeated by Alula at Gundat. Alula won because of his skill at deploying large numbers of men, and his careful use of terrain to overcome superior Egyptian firepower. Thousands of Egyptian breech loading rifles were captured. After British conquest of Egypt the threat from her receded and Egyptian forces to the east of Ethiopia were withdrawn.

2. **Resistance to Mahdist Sudan Jihad:**

This new threat came from the West. The Mahdists launched a jihad against Christian Ehtiopia in the years 1885-9. Alula defeated them in 1885 at Kufit but they managed to occupy and sack Gondar under their general Abu Anai. In the face of repeated Mahdist attacks some of the local Ethiopia chiefs wavered allegiance, at least one went over to the Mahdist's side.

Yohannis almost defeated the Mahdists in 1889 at Metemma on the border, but he was killed by a stray bullet. What had been virtually a victory turned into an Ethiopian rout: the Emperor's troops fled as news of his death spread through the army.

3. **Resistance to Italian threat:**

Before his death, however, Yohannis had defeated the first Italian attempt to penetrate Ethiopia. In 1869 Italian missionaries bought the Red Sea village of Assab which became an official Italian colony in 1882.

In 1885 the Italians took over Massawa, and abolished the free transit of Ethiopian goods. The attempts to obtain a foothold in the high lacks led to the destruction of the small Italian force by Alula at Dogali in 1887. However, this did not end Italian

designs on Ethiopia. A far more serious Italian threat had to be faced by Menelik, the new Emperor.

WHY ETHIOPIA SURVIVED AS AN INDEPENDENT AFRICAN STATE:

Source: Journal of African History Volume 5, 1964.

"The Protectorate Paragraph of the Wichale Treaty" by Suen Rubenson: It has been argued that Ethiopia survived as an African State because, by the Wichale Treaty of 2 May 1889 between Emperor Menelik and Count Autoneko. She had become an Italian protectorate. Article III of the treaty was in a sense the legal birth certificate of the Italian colony of Eritrea, because it defined for the first time in treaty form a boundary line between Ethiopia and a coast area under foreign sovereignty.

The crucial issue in the Ethiopian-Italian war of 1895-6 and 1935-6 was not so nuch the existence or extent of the colony of Eritrea by one of independence versus foreign protection or domination for all of Ethiopia.

Article III had given the Italians a foothold in the Ethiopian highlands and the Italian wanted to use it as launching ground on Ethiopia.

By Article XVII of the treaty Menelik had bound himself to use the Italian government for all negotiations in matters which might arise with other powers or governments.

Although the words, "protectorate" and "protectionism" are conspicuously absent, there can hardly be any arguments about the implications of this clause. In the colonial thinking of the later part of the 19th century, the establishment of a protectorate over an African territory was closely tied up with the exclusive right to conduct or control its foreign affairs. Thus Article XVII limited Ethiopian sovereignty and actually made Ethiopian an Italian protectorate.In Italian policy this article soon overshadowed all other clauses in its importance.

In this way, it is argued that Ethiopia was sealed off from occupation by other European powers. Once the treaty had been ratified and additional convection following the Italian successes signed on 7 October 1889, the Italian government lost no time in making its claim known to other governments.

Article XVIII was accepted by thirteen signatory powers of the Berlin General Act without reservation. But Rudenson has overemphasized the protectorate status of Ethiopia in preventing her becoming a European colony.If the Treaty kept other powers out of Ethiopia, what then prevented Italy herself. Who was left free to do what she liked, from raping Ethiopia during the partition era? Ethiopia's protectorate status was basically of little value to her continued independence. In any case, Menelik did not regard himself as dependent on Italy as shown by the fact that he continued diplomatic correspondence with other European powers without using Italian channels. He wrote to Britain, France, etc requesting guns to fight Mohammedian invasions and protection against the European embargo on arms sale to African States.

This was an outright violation of Article XVII as it was known in Europe and it brought the validity of Italy's claims into question. Menelik may have pledged himself to use Italian diplomatic channels whenever he felt them to be of convenient advantage but did not regard Ethiopia as a protected dependence of Italy. After a prolonged diplomatic contest over the meaning of Article XVII, Menelik finally denounced the whole treaty of Wichale, in February 1893, and informed all other European powers of this step.

The break was complete, and although further attempts were made by Italy to come to terms with Menelik, the problem of the protectorate paragraph finally led to war and to the battle of Adowa, where Menelik's unexpected and overwhelming victory solved the conflict in Ethiopia's favour. In the 26 October 1896 peace, Treaty, the independence of Ethiopia was emphasized and the protectorate paragraph was unrolled.

Ethiopia had won by sheer military superiority. Menelik and a United Ethiopia said no to protectorate status. The Battle of Adowa proved that Ethiopia could not become of Italy because she was too strong in relation to be her would be protector. Italy's defeat solved the problem for Europe and for Menelik over the protectorate issue.

Dr. H.S. Marcus has suggested that, between the defeat of the Italians at Adowa and the collapse of the Mahdist army and state at Omdurmas, the external policy of Menelik was dominated by an aggressive campaign of territorial acquisition all along the Western frontier of Ethiopian ("Ethio- British negotiations concerning the Western Border with Sudan"- "1896-1902" by Harold G. Marcus – Journal of African History 1863.)

He argues that Britain supported Italian colonial ambitions in Ethiopia as a counter pause to Emperor Menelik's stated policy of expansion. The defeat of Italy at Adowa in 1896 brought about a vacuum in Ethiopia which opened the Eastern Way to the Nile for France.

Marcus argues that Menelik turned to expansionism which has been called unscrupulous military ambition in which he used Italian arms. He considers that in the Sabat basin, Menelik seriously relied upon the assistance of the French missions in maiking good the claims put forward in his circular to the powers of Miyazhya 1883 (April 1891).

In Dr, Marcus' view, Menelik's entente with Khalifa Abdullahi "was no more than reinsurance if the French were not successful, he could still tell the Khalifu that he had been time to the Unity between Ethiopia and Sudan."

On the contrary, Sanderson brings forward the thesis that Menelik was a foresighted diplomat in which, the Mahdist alliance was the central venture of his diplomacy. On this view, Menelik deliberately sacrificed the French was little more than a ruse to retain their goodwill and support at a time when massive military and diplomatic intervention by Europeans in northeast Africa, creating, in Menelik's eyes at least, a very critical situation for Ethiopia.

Sanderson sees Menelik as a strategist who did not invade powerful Sudan but consolidated the Western border to protect himself from Egypt. He does not see Menelik's policy as dominated by a drive for territorial aggrandizement. Sanderon concludes that so long as the powerful Mahadist State (Sudan) was in effective control of the frontier areas, Menelik was prepared to sacrifice some of his most cherished territorial ambitions in order to avoid a clash with the Khalifa, even if the purely military outcome of such a conflict would have been in his favour.

When the Khalifa's authority crumbled away on the Ethiopian frontier, Menelik, had of course no alterative but to insure against Anglo- Egyptian action by staking his claims to those regions which the especially coveted. Although Menelik enjoyed military superiority to his neigh bours, he preferred skillful diplomacy as opposed to sheer force.

Thus Sanderson (Foreign Policy of the Negus Menelik", G.N. Sanderson, Journal of African History Vol V 1964) says that Menelik was not only a great warrior but a subtle and far-sighted diplomatist with, at times, an almost Bismarckian capacity for keeping several irons in the fire. By 1896 Menelik, naturally enough after his experience with the Italians, had become extremely, perhaps excessively, sensitive to "European threats." Menelik had knocked out the Italians at Adowa, only to find that another more formidable power had entered the military arena in North - East Africa.

Menelik was afraid that British advance up the Nile might ultimately threaten Ethiopia, so he tried to make an alliance with the Khalifa in the face of a common enemy. Menelik's foreign policy was dominated by the need to protect Ethiopia against the converging, British threat -Kitchner in the north, and Macdonald in the South. Menelik had enough respect for British military power to shrink from a head- on collision with so powerful an adversary. Thus Menelik's maintanance of an entente with the Sudan was caused by the looming danger of European Powers, France and Britain.

Sanderson's argument is that, Ethiopia escaped partition because of Menelik's Bismarckian diplomacy. This of course raises the question of how much importance one can attach to the role of individuals. Sanderson concludes thus on Menelik's diplomacy" "The Entente with Omduruman was therefore an integral and indispensable part of Menelik's solution to Ethiopia's "European problem," which the Battle of Adowa seemed for a time not to have solved but rather to have revived in a new and even more dangerous form." Sanderson has undeniably placed too much emphasis on the role of Menelik as an individual in preserving Ethiopian independence.

What saved Ethiopia was undeniably the popular sense of unity-a common language, a common religion-far more than the role of the leader. In fact, the unity threw up a powerful leader to the front. There was a strong cohesive national identity supported by a strong army. The rulers, Tewedros, Johannis and Menelik had constructed a strong nation state. Moreover the State had basic goegraphical identity-enclosed within inaccessible mountains. Here lay the reasons rather than simply European weakness. The force in a popular unity was able to overthrow foreign aggression and save Ethiopia from European colonization.

Examination Questions

1. What factors enabled Menelik II of Ethiopia to become the only African leader to resist successfully a European attempt at conquest?
2. Did Johannes IV have more success than Theodros II in uniting Ethiopia and preserving its independence?
3. Which of Ethiopia's rulers in this period contributed most to the country's unity, modernization and security from invasion?
4. "Tewodros had vision, ambition and energy in all that he did." Why then did he fail?

CHAPTER 7

MISSIONARY ACTIVITIES IN EAST AFRICA:

Learning objectives

After studying the chapter, the student should be able to:

(i) Discuss the impact of missionary activities on African Societies.
(ii) Show how Christian missions helped European colonial activities.
(iii) Analyse the impact of Missionary works in Buganda; Malawi and Yorubaland.

Introduction:

Any attempt to examine the penetration of the interior of Africa by the Europeans in the 19th Century must begin with missionaries. These provided the first concerted thrust at African institutions and way of life. The explorers preceeded (some missionaries were explorers for example Dr David Livingstone) the missionaries. The latter were men in transit, while the former were men with a mission. They wanted to stay and win Africa for Christianity.

The activities of the missionaries had a serious bearing on the direction of African history in the 19th and 20th century. Initially, they usually invited their home government. Countries to come and conquer Africa and the pattern of the Partition were greatly affected by earlier settlement of the missionaries. Missionaries claimed to know the African better than other Europeans. Many policies pursued by the colonizers were inspired by the reports of the missionaries (as well as explorers or adventurers). The Missionary activity in Africa is viewed as the pioneering arm of imperialism.

The late 18th century had witnessed a religious revival in Europe which emphasized the duty of the individual Christian to convert his fellows.This revived interest in conversion brought about a resurgence of European Christian missionary activity in non- Christian lands and especially in Africa.

According to M. Tidy, the "Dark" continent was erroneously considered to be lacking in religion and a land where Christianity could be written on a blank slate. The missionaries genuinely believed they had spiritual duty to convert the Africans.

Their sincerity and courage cannot be doubted for some gave their lives in order to spread their faith. All accepted the equation of the advance of Christianity with the progress of western Capitalism. They believed that the introduction of capitalism to Africa would end African poverty. They viewed European commerce as a weapon against both the slave trade and traditional African society, both of which would need to be destroyed if missionary work if were to have a hope of real success. They felt that if African traditional society were subjected to alien influence, in at least one form, legitimate trade then it would absorb an alien religion like Christianity. The missionaries also hoped to spread European culture throughout much of Africa as they assumed the superiority of European culture to African and believed that the spread of European culture and Christianity would inevitably go hand in glove with "Civilizing mission."

Reactions of Africans to Christian missions:

There were basically five types of responses:

1. Certain rulers allowed and invited missionaries to work and gave them positive encouragement and helped convert many people to Christianity.
2. Certain rulers welcomed missionaries but for non- religious reasons, and placed heavy barriers to the work of evangelization.

3. Certain rulers simply barred missionaries from entering their territory.

A class overview:

(a) Khama of the Ngwato, rulers of Bonny, King George Dappa Pepple and Oko Jumbo, welcomed missionaries for the pure acceptance of the gospel message.

(b) Mutesa and Lewanika welcomed missionaries as a policy of diplomatic alignment with European military and political power. They allowed some of their subject to be converted to the "White man's religion" though they stood aloof from it themselves.

(c) Some African leaders associated with missionaries for economic benefit, especially guns which they hardly got.

d) Rulers such as Mirambo, used the British missionaries as honorary secretaries.

(e) Some African rulers kept the missionaries out of their areas as they feared that the white men would disturb the traditional way of life on which their authority depended. In Dahomey and Jaja's Opobo missionaries were barred for it was felt that they claimed spiritual superiority over the local ruler who was also the traditional religious leader. Converts were seen as disloyal to the ruler (another example is the Ndebele).

Converts in the pre-colonial period were "marginal men" in African society. They were often slaves or freed slaves or refugees. In West Africa most missionaries were Africans from the freed slave population of Sierra Leone and their converts were mostly Yoruba war refugees or Niger Delta Slaves.

In East Africa the converts were mainly freed and run- away slaves who came to live in mission villages at or near the coast.

In Central Africa (Malawi) many converts were of frightened peoples in weak communities who turned to the missionaries as alternative "chiefs" who could protect them against powerful enemies.

In few cases converts were from groups of standing in society, such as court pages of Buganda. It was also normal for people before the colonial era to reject Christianity and polygamy might be the main cause.

Africans could not accept the whiteman's religion because of the divisions between various Christian groups (Catholics, Protestants).

Christianity made less progress than Islam maybe because Christianity demanded too much on great theological understanding and commitment before converts were accepted than did Islam. Converts to Islam initially needed to accept a number of very basic propositions. Their deeper understanding came after their acceptance of Islam. Islam did not demand an end to polygamy.

Despite the difficulties and problems, the ground work for the expansion of Christianity has been laid in many areas before the European Scramble for Africa.

Missionary Impetus to European involvement in East Africa:

Maxon R.M. points out that the same kind of religious feeling which fueled the anti- slavery campaign in Britain and elsewhere lent a major impetus to missionary work by European Christians.

Several missionary societies were established in Britain, notably the London Missionary Society (LMS) and the Church Missionary Society (CMS) which raised money to send missionaries to preach the gospel and bring about conversion in Africa. Very little had been achieved in East Africa.

NB: Christ had told his followers to go and preach. His message of God's love to all men – and to the best of their ability they did, so that it spread with astonishing speed. During the centuries that followed however, the Christian Church varied in missionary efforts. Perhaps the most impressive force it has exerted in modern history come in the late 18th and 19th centuries as a result of the evangelical movement in Britain, which drew its inspiration from the Christian gospel and created a new awareness of Christian obligations. This brought about a tremendous upsurge of protestant missions. The Baptist Missionary Society was started in 1792, LMS in 1799 and Foreign Bible Society in 1813.

The Church Missionary Society and Methodists at

Rabai and Ribe:

In fact the first Europeans to settle on the main land of East Africa were missionaries and the first of them was Dr. Krapf, a German who had originally wanted to be a sea- captain but, instead, joined the Church Missionary Society in England. After some years in Ethiopia he decided-incorrectly, as it happened, that the Galla occupied much of Central Africa, and to convert them would have immense results. It was in order to reach them, that in January of 1844 he arrived in Zanzibar, where Seyyid Said received him most courteously, before he moved to Mombassa on the mainland in May. Within weeks his wife and child died but Krapf kept on and by the end of the years had translated the whole New Testament in Swahili.

In 1846 he was joined by the Rev. J. Rebmann, and a mission was established at the village of Rabai in the hills overlooking Mombassa. Having established this base, both missionaries sought for routes and sites in the interior, and their explorations, and especially their news of snow-capped peaks on the Equator encouraged further explorers. They were joined in 1849 by Erhardt, and in 1853 Krapf returned to Europe. His writings had created widespread interest, and in 1862 he returned, this time bringing with him Thomas Wakefield of the Methodist Missionary Society, and they established themselves at Ribe before Krapf left for home. In 1863 Charles New joined Wakefield and together they started a school, but the children had to be paid with cloth in order to get them to attend. Although the Arabs had conducted Koranic schools at the coast for a long period, the mission school at Ride, and less successfully at Rabai, where Rebmann disapproved, were the first ones to give general education.

The Roman Catholics:

While Rabai and Ribe were in their early stages the Roman Catholic bishop of Reunion sent his vicar- general with a small group to Zanzibar to start a mission, in 1860. In 1863, this was handed over to the Holy Ghost Fathers, led by Father Horner from the leper settlement at Reunion. His main work on Zanzibar was with freed slaves, who needed to establish a way of life of their own and, in order to help this, Horner tried to develop little self-supporting agricultural colonies or villages for them. The first of these followed from the mission he began at Bagamoyo in 1868, and from it others sprang. By 1877 Father Horner had penetrated 100 miles, inland, with another station at Mhonda near Morogoro.

Frere Town

The most important settlement for freed slaves was that at Frere Town, near Mombassa, which had been started by the crisis in 1875, following the abolition of the slave-trade in East Africa in 1873. This followed the suggestions of Sir Bartle Frere, who had inspected the mission stations, and recommended the site, and suggested that in this work the British Consul should give financial help. Concern for the slaves also caused the Society of Friends to start their mission on Pemba, just before slavery was finally abolished in Zanzibar.

The Universities Mission to Central Africa

After Livingstone had returned from his first expedition across Africa he appealed in 1857 to Cambridge University for help in opening the continent for peaceful commerce and Christianity. As a result, the Universities Mission to Central Africa began, but its first attempt to start a mission in the Shire Highlands, in 1863 was thwarted by the death-rate of those who went and the hostility of the Yao, who depended on slaving.

Bishop Tozer was forced to move to Zanzibar. Like all missionaries, he met with great friendliness from the Sultan and again, like other missionaries, he regarded Zanzibar as a Headquarters from which to establish bases on the mainland, the first of which was at Magila in Usambara, in 1868. From this centre they opened up a number of mission posts with schools and hospitals, and in 1876 they went further a field, led by the energetic Dr. Steere.

He helped to restore some of his freed slaves to their own country around Lake Nyasa, but they refused to travel beyond Masaai, where they set up a further mission.

The London Missionary Society

The way in which the missions, the explorers, the industrialists and the new inventions worked together was shown by an extraordinary offer made by Robert Arthington of £ 5, 000 to buy a streamer to carry on peaceful trade on Lake Tanganyika. Generous though it was, this offer completely upset the previous missionary principle of establishing bases from the coast-a walk long enough, hot enough, and dangerous enough to daunt anyone, although it lay along the well- worn trade- route. But the L.M.S. took up the challenge, and reached Ujiji in 1877, setting up a number of stations along the lake.

It was magnificent in its determination but it was not a practical proposition. The death – rate was even higher than usual, the climate was horrible, and the length of the communications route seemed to stretch out to the crack of doom. So the group began to open up a route towards Lake Nyasa and eventually, transferred their centre to Northern Rhodesia (Central Africa).

The Advance on Buganda:

The political repercussions of the missionary activity in Buganda warranted a detailed coverage of it under Buganda as a pre- colonial state.

Although the attempt to establish missions in the heart of Africa failed on Lake Tanganyika, it succeeded in the northern shore of Lake Victoria. Stanley-the rough, tough journalist of African exploration, who had looked upon the face of David Livingstone at Ujiji and never forgotten it had taken the opportunity of introducing Christianity to the Kabaka Mutesa of Buganda, when he visited him in 1875.

Mutesa showed interest, so Stanley sent a letter to the Daily Telegraph appealing for missionaries. An anonymous offer of £5.000 (may be from Arthington again) was received by the C.M.S. within three days and others followed. The C.M.S was alarmed at leaping inland, but eight missionaries volunteered and landed at Bagamoyo in July 1876. Within a year only two of the original parties were still alive, but others came to give support, including the most influential, Alexander Mackay, who was an engineer by profession, and was much respected by the Kabaka.

As it happened, the C.M.S was not the only missionaries to enter Buganda at this time. In 1868 the Roman Catholic Church had also started a special missionary society, the solute Fathers, to work in Africa. The original scene of activity was in Algeria, but Cardinal Lavigerie, the founder, had been impressed by Leopold's association for civilizing Central Africa and had obtained permission from the Pope to send missionaries to Ujiji and Buganda. They arrived just after the C.M.S.

Complications:

As already shown in the earlier chapter on Buganda, complications followed on. Both groups of missionaries were obliged to stay at Mutesa's court and the leaders, Mackay and Father Lourdel, were not men who were fond of compromise, so that each misunderstood, and opposed, the teaching of the other, causing fierce rivalry between the missions. To add to the confusion, the Muslim Arabs were enemy to both and they also were influential in the Kabaka's court. Not surprisingly, Mutesa was a confused.

In any case it is unlikely that religion was the main interest, for to him (Kabuka Mutesa the different religious represented political powers from whom he hoped to get military aid. When no armies came, and when the danger from Egypt decreased, because of the withdrawal of the garrisons from Bunyoro in 1879, the Kabaka lost interest, and the old cult of Lubalism revived.

Yet, despite the difficulties and dangers of their position, the missionaries and missions in Buganda remained, and were to exercise a profound influence.
(See Chapter on Buganda for details).

The effects of the Missions (on Buganda and East Africa)

The political tensions which developed in Buganda were the exception. Generally, the missionaries were not politically minded, Dr. Kraft, a German, worked for the English C.M.S., Sir Bartle Frere, sent out by England recommended that the British consul should subsidize missions dealing with freed slaves regardless of nationality. Nevertheless, the Arabs elsewhere did not, in Buganda on Lake Tanganyika and the coast the Arabs were hostile.

This was not surprising, for the missionaries had not only come to preach Christianity. They also became the leaders of the anti- slavery campaign and much of their early work was trying to help freed slaves. Their efforts appeared to undermine the whole structure of society, so far as the Arabs were concerned. Consequently, there was often open hostility to the missionaries but, although attacks were made, the vow of the Mombassa Arabs to make soup of the missionaries' livers was never actually carried out.

Besides rehabilitating the slaves, the schools and hospitals were also on mission stations, and the exploitation of the continent and the study of its languages also was encouraged by them. So was trade, for it was firmly believed that the development of peaceful commerce would help to end the slave trade and bring benefit to all.

To achieve these objects, missionaries volunteered in astonishing numbers, and the remaining gravestones in mission stations tell the story of how briefly many of them were able to withstand the climate and disease.

Upon their efforts the governments of Europe looked with approval. They did not realize that these same efforts would quite soon help to involve them in responsibilities which they did not want- colonization.

Examination Questions

1. How did Christian missionary activities enable Africans to adapt to the changes brought about by colonial rule in this period? Answer with reference to either to either, central or west Africa.

2. "The charge that Christian missions were agents of imperialism distorts their role and achievement in Africa". Discuss this claim.

3. Describe and explain the political and social results of the presence of Christian missions in Buganda between 1879 and 1900.

4. Analyse the impact of Christian missionary activity in one of the following areas before 1900:
   a) Buganda
   b) Malawi
   c) Yorubaland

CHAPTER 8

MISSIONARIES IN CENTRAL AFRICA

Learning objectives

After studying the chapter, the student should be able to:

(i) Explain how Christian churches and schools influenced change of culture in Africa.

(ii) Examine the effects of missionary education on nationalism.

(iii) Discuss missionary activities in Malawi.

Background

Missionary work in Central Africa was largely pioneered by Dr David Livingstone, the Scottish adventurer-cum missionary who first came to Africa in 1840 to take up a missionary post in Bechuanaland. Livingstone believed that the Zambezi River was "God's Highway" into the interior of central Africa. He believed that white settlement in the vast "unoccupied parts" of the African interior would make indigenous people benefit greatly from the principles of the western civilization. He also believed that the Zambezi valley would produce enough cotton to make Lancashire independent of the slave-grown cotton of the American South. These were powerful motives for coming to Africa and to fulfill them. David Livingstone began wondering in central Africa. These wonderings took the form of three great expeditions, the first one being from 1853- 1856; the second stretching from 1858 to 1864 and the last one occurring between 1866 and 1873, when he met his death.

The white settlers, argued Livingstone, would tap the mineral and agricultural potential of Africa which the "natives had been too lazy to harness for the benefit of all mankind." He particularly hated the "slothful" Arabs, not simply because the Arabs indulged in the inhuman traffic in slaves, but because of the "roaring trade" which these "brown brutes" were doing in the heart of "savage Africa." The trade, according to Livingstone, could only be "Legitimate" if it fell into the hands of the "more responsible" white races. This tone of racial bigotry, jealousy and greed might have shocked more genuine men of God, but it worked for Livingstone. His anti-slave trade campaigns, heavily flavoured with racial undertones, imperialist interest and an exaggerated view of African suffering, succeeded in attracting various persuasions of missionaries and pseudo-missionaries to central Africa.

Nevertheless, the above analysis might tend to paint an overly pessimistic picture of David Livingstone's aims and motives. It must be emphasized that his influence and speeches abroad attracted some of the most genuine missionary responses into Malawi, Zambia and Botswana. It was a notable pattern, however, that missionary presence invariably attracted European settler rule. In some cases as in Matabeleland, the missionaries worked actively to encourage the destruction of the Ndebele state by the British South Africa Company.

Khama III and the London Missionary society: 1840s to 1920s.

Khama Boikano, or "Khama the Good." Was a paramount chief of the Bamangwato. He ruled his kingdom for over fifty years.

Khama's baptism in 1858 put him in conflict with his father who viewed the Christian religion as acceptable to whites but not fitting the personality of Africans. In addition, Khama rejected the power of traditional divines and healers, which also brought him conflict with the local leaders. However, his skills as a warrior and hunter stood him in good stead, and he led his people to several important military victories. The London Missionary Society church he helped create was very much a state church for the Bamagwato and indeed no rival was allowed. Missionaries who offended Khama were soon ordered out of his kingdom.

Like many Christian converts, Khama balanced his activities as a tribal chief and the demands of the new faith. He rejected the demand for male circumcision, which caused controversy with trivial elders. Likewise, he opposed arranged marriages that benefitted lineages rather than representing a lasting commitment between a woman and a man. He was popularly quoted as saying:

> "I refuse on account of the Word of God to take a second wife."
> He once told another chief

Khama was publicly praised by the LMS for his prohibition of the liquor trade and the drinking of spirits, his observance of the Sabbath and his curtailing of traditional ceremonies such as rainmaking and the initiation rites for youth. When he found some drunken white traders, he arraigned them before the native court and told them,

> "You think you can despise my
> laws because I am a black
> man. Take everything you have,
> strip the iron off the roofs,
> gather all your possessions and go!
> I am trying to lead my people according
> to the Word of God, which we have
> received from you white people,
> and you show us an example of
> wickedness."

The chief began each day with prayers together with his immediate entourage, after which he sat under a palaver tree to serve as judge, give orders, and make decisions, as runners arrived with news. Sometimes European traders came to his court to ask for permission to set up a store in his territory. At other times traditional shamans and diviners discussed with him the conducting of their ceremonies, which Khama allowed as long as they did not conflict with new Christian teachings. Once during a prolonged draught people clamoured to their leader to reintroduce traditional rainmaker practices. Khama's answer was that he failed to see how a traditional god who ate grain porridge could help people in such dire circumstances.

Khama's later decades were filled with activity. In 1895 Khama, together with other chiefs travelled to England to oppose the division of his Kingdom between the Cape Colony and Rhodes' BSA Company. Khama had accepted British protection in 1885 but Cecil John Rhodes was demanding administrative rights over the protectorate. It is important to note that the missionaries widely supported Khama's position, which prevailed.

In 1914 Khama was responsible for building a large new stone church and a nearby school. He approved only the presence of a single mission group, the London Missionary society, in his lands. This was because he wanted to keep warring mission factions from competing in the territory which he governed.

Khama Boikano was an important African leader advancing the Christian religion among his people. His conflicts were ones that thousands of other African leaders encountered

joining the church but alienating his father, negotiating intense competition among missionaries, deciding how much leeway to allow diviners, rain makers and other ritual practitioners, and being caught in a power struggle between the European colonial government and a chartered company.

Khama became an ally of Britain during the scramble for Africa. He was clever enough to realize that he would not resist and win against the British. He therefore welcomed British protection and thus benefited in that he still remained as a figurehead among the Tswana in the new political dispensation.

Khama was for a long time a close associate of the LMS missionary John Mackenzie in attempting to Christianize the Ngwato country. He was also ready to take John Mackenzie's advice who genuinely wanted Britain to protect the Ngwato from occupation by the Transvaal Boers. He also accommodated British occupation because he realized that this would break the power of traditional rulers in other Tswana states, hence, paving the way for the spread of Christianity.

MISSIONARIES IN NYASALAND

The Universities Mission to Central Africa (UMCA) was founded directly as a result of Livingstone's lecture at Cambridge in 1857. It drew support from the High Anglicans who sent a team of missionaries headed by Bishop Mackenzie to set up a mission station in the Shire highlands, south of Lake Nyasa. The Shire Highlands had been the scene of European activity from the time of Livingstone's first visit in 1859. That same year had seen the arrival of the Ngoni people to settle in the area to the West of Lake Nyasa. The Yao also increased their penetration of the Shire highlands. Both these groups were well known slave raiders and were therefore, from the onset, likely to interfere with missionary work in the area.

In its attempt to establish itself in the Shire Highlands, the UMCA encountered several health hazards and acute difficulty in communication. Several missionaries died of tropical fever, including Mackenzie. As indicated above, slave traders were also a menace to the mission station. Bishop Tozer, who had succeeded Mackenzie, had to withdraw the station to Zanzibar in 1863.

LIVINGSTONIA MISSION

In 1873, owing to the enthusiasm of Dr Stewart of Lovedale, the Free Church of Scotland agreed to establish a new mission in this area. It was to be called the Livingstone Mission (in memory of Livingstone). In 1875 the Mission, led by Edward Young of the Royal Navy settled at Cape Maclear to the South of the lake on the land donated by the Yao chief Mponda. The mission's second- in- command was Dr Robert Laws of the United Presbyterian Church. Soon, Cape Maclear was abandoned due to its malarial climate. Dr Laws who in the meantime had taken charge of the station moved to Bandawe on the western shore where he started to work among the Tonga, who were constantly raided by the Ngoni. Dr Laws visited the Ngoni chief to plead for peace. His influence over the chief

helped to pave the way for mission work. Hence, missionaries in most of Nyasaland worked tirelessly to suppress the slave trade.

In 1882, William Koyi, a Lovedale-trained Zulu evangelist who had joined the Livingstonia mission in 1876 managed to enter Mombera's territory and gained his confidence He was soon joined by two European missionaries, Dr Elmslie and James Sutherland. They made a lot of progress in Mombera in that they were allowed to build schools and preach Christianity. In a few years'- time, a number of churches, schools and hospitals were built. The work was further expanded when the mission was moved from Bandawe to the present site of Livingstonia in 1894. From here the Free Church extended its work into Zambia in 1895. In this way therefore, the Livingstonia proved to be a watershed to all the areas of central Africa.

The Blantyre Mission: (1875)

A year after the setting up of Livingstonia mission in 1875, a Church of the Scotland Mission -the Blantyre Mission, settled on a ridge near Ndirande. This area was given to the mission by Kapeni, another Yao chief. The Blantyre mission developed in 1880s under the leadership of David Clement Scott. The Portuguese harassed the mission on the grounds of trespass on their territory. The mission was therefore beginning to face a new set of problems such as slave invasions.

The Scottish Missionaries at Blantyre in the south, and Livingstonia in the north, were helped by an evangelical Glasgow businessman who set up a trading company to develop the commerce of the lake country. The company was at first named after Livingstone but soon changed the name to African Lakes Company. It began work in 1878. Its aim was to answer Livingstone's call to combat the slave trade by Christianity and commerce. Though short of capital, the company acted as an important counter to Arab influence and extended its trading operations across the Tanganyika Plateau.

The London Missionary Society

The London Missionary society (LMS) opened a station at Ujiji on Lake Tanganyika. In 1881 a Scottish businessman, Stevenson, gave some money for making a road between the lakes – Lake Tanganyika and Lake Malawi. This would enable the missionaries at Ujiji to get their supplies from the African Lakes Company. This route, named the Stevenson Road, served two other stations the LMS at Fwamba and the Free Church Mission at Mwinwanda. In order to supply these new stations and to collect ivory from the northern end of the lake, the Company decided to establish a permanent trading station at Karonga.

This move invited trouble because the Arab and Swahili traders attracted by the chance to sell ivory to the company decided to settle in the area. But the Arabs and the Swahilis, viewing the lake-side missions as the chief critics of their other form of trade- the slave trade, now threatened the latter with violence and annihilation. Mlozi, the leading Arab tycoon, was as not at all happy with the presence of the missionaries in Karonga. Moreover, the threat of Portuguese interference from the south-east was always real. In the face of mounting opposition, British missionaries in the late 1880s began to campaign for some form of British protection.

It is important to note that John Moir, the founder of the Lakes Company, obtained the signatures of a number of chiefs to be sent to the Queen for her protection or if that was refused, the protection of a chartered company in this case, the Africa Lakes Company. Predictably, the request was refused on account of the financial responsibilities it might involve the British government in. At this stage, Cecil John Rhodes offered to shoulder the administrative costs of the country under the British South African Company's charter. But the African Lakes company's (A.L.C) supporters and the Scottish missionaries were strongly opposed to the idea of South African involvement. Such a stance taken by the missionaries to oppose BSACo takeover was based on the knowledge of the previous atrocities committed by the South Africans in the mining sector in the South African mines. It shows that their Malawian missionaries were tenderer in their regard and treatment of Africans.

The British government did, however, eventually reverse its earlier stand to accept administrative responsibility over Nyasaland. The British could no longer take lightly the dangerously proximate Portuguese presence and the growing German interest in East Africa in the 1880s. Moreover, the victory of the Mahdi in Sudan in 1885 had created another fear. Salisbury thought that Sudan was urging the Arabs in the lake country to drive the missionaries and other white men into the sea and conquer the whole region for Islam. Increased Arab militancy and greater show of intolerance did probably give grounds for fears of the Mahdist revolution's demonstration effect on central African Muslins. The British Government was therefore not going to just watch passively from a distance.

Hence, in May 1891 the British government took action and declared a Protectorate over Nyasaland. Johnston was appointed her majesty's Commissioner and Consul-General to the territories under British influence north of the Zambezi. His expenses and those of the other aspects of the administration of the new Protectorate were to be borne by Cecil Rhodes Company a situation that was not completely satisfactory to the missionaries. It is important to note therefore that there were more pressures which necessitated the declaration of a protectorate over Nyasaland other than just missionary invitation.

MISSIONARIES IN BAROTSELAND (Zambia)

Perhaps no one paved the way for missionaries greater than George Westbeech did in Barotseland. He was a seasoned white hunter and trader. He arrived in Barotseland in 1871 and the Lozi soon found that his weapons were superior to any they had handled so far. Abhorring slaves as a means of carrying his ivory, he used OX- Wagons. As a businessman he was usually more trustworthy than many. This earned him permission to conduct business from a permanent camp at Pandamatenga, a little way south of the Victoria Falls.
The Lozi, now more interested in contact with the south, drafted him as an adviser.

In 1878, Lewanika, fresh on the throne gained through considerable struggle, was visited by Coillard, a French Missionary from the south. When Coillard's time for departure arrived, the king encouraged him to return. In 1881 Jesuit missionaries visited Lewanika, but were turned away on account of their disregard for the king. For instance, in 1879 they had tried to set up a mission among the Ila without the King's permission. A year later, another missionary, Arnot, came from the south. Westbeech helped him gain favour with the King.

Arnot tried to persuade Lewanika to make an alliance, not with the Ndebele, but with Khama, the leading Bechuanaland chief who was already a strong protestant.

By the early 1880s Lewanika had come to the conclusion that he stood to gain by a more friendly attitude towards the missionaries, and allowed Coillard to find a mission in his country. He was persuaded that this would mean a valuable new kind of education for his people, or at least for his sons and those of other Lozi chiefs. Once this education was firmly under his control, his position as an insecure ruler, might be strengthened.

Missionaries had a profound influence on the Lozi and their King Lewanika. Coillard acted as the King's unofficial adviser. He strongly advised the Lozi King to accept British moves towards colonization in order to avoid the violent destruction of his Kingdom. It has been noted elsewhere in the study pack that Coillard played a central role in Lewanika's signing of the Lochner Treaty which placed his kingdom under the protection of the British South Africa Company. Lewanika gave the Company mining rights throughout his Kingdom while the company promised to protect the country from outside attacks, to pay the King £2000 a year, to develop trade and to build schools and telegraphs.

Missionaries in Southern Rhodesia

From 1859 missionaries of the London Missionary Society were permanently established in Matabeleland. The Ndebele made use of them in various ways; to mend guns, inoculate cattle and give medical treatment to men and to write letters and interpret. But the Ndebele had no intention of allowing them to achieve a position of influence within their society for several reasons. Mzilikazi, and later on Lobengula, saw clearly that missionaries' teachings would undermine the basis of the Ndebele state which depended upon raiding and class system.

Secondly, the two kings did not feel the need for literacy, as Lewanika and Khama did. The administration of the centralized Ndebele state was highly efficient without western education. Moreover, the Ndebele, really strictly speaking, feared nobody and had therefore no real need for security.

Furthermore, the Ndebele did not feel any desire to become involved with the economic system of southern Africa, out of which the missionaries came. Finally Lobengula did not admire the teaching of the missionaries, which advocated he said, "Putting everything on Christ that he would bear our sins for us." Such a doctrine, he thought, was only suitable for white men.

The Shona were Lobengula's subjects. He reused permission for mission stations to be set up in Mashonaland. The Boer and Portuguese hostility blocked alternative approaches to Mashonaland. In 1877 Coillard tried to set up a mission station in western Mashonaland. He was summoned before Lobengula and warned never to repeat the attempt. Eventually, missionaries lost interest in trying to get to Mashonaland. This position of missionaries in Matabeleland and Mashonaland had important results.

Results of non-accommodation of missionaries

Missionaries became hostile to the Ndebele system because they were excluded from it. They believed that no progress could be made until the Ndebele system was broken down, and this could only be done by force. Therefore, they welcomed the arrival of the British South Africa Company in Mashonaland, and a notable number of missionaries played a key role in the destruction of the Ndebele state. John smith Moffat and Charles Helm, for example, played instrumental roles in the signing of the Moffat Treaty and Rudd Concession which led to the overthrow of Lobengula by the white settlers.

Missionary support was a major source of strength to Rhodes in his advance into Central Africa. They entered Mashonaland with white settlers and as their allies. "The hateful Matabele rule, observed one missionary, "is doomed. We as missionaries, with our thirty years history behind us, have little to bind our sympathies to Matabele people, neither can we pity the fall of their power."

Due to the fact that the Ndebele imposed stringent conditions of operation among the missionaries, only a few converts were made in either Mashonaland or Matabeleland before 1896. In that year, the Ndebele and the Shona rose against the whites and mission stations were made the object of attack. The Ndebele had never, trusted the missionaries and the latter's alliance with Cecil John Rhodes who was bent on colonizing their country seemed to be conclusive coincidence that they were enemies.

Examination Questions

1. To what extent did Christian missionary churches and schools provide the chief means for Africans to pass from a traditional to a European way of life?

2. Account for the successes of Christian Missionary activities in Malawi during this period.

3. Evaluate the work of Christian Missions in Malawi during this period.

4. Discuss the effect of Missionary education upon the rise of nationalism in Central Africa.

CHAPTER 9

MISSIONARY ACTIVITIES IN WEST AFRICA:

Learning objectives

After studying the chapter, the student should be able to:

(i) Discuss the career and importance of Samuel Ajayi Crowther in West Africa.
(ii) Explain why some African rulers accepted Christian Missionaries.
(iii) Examine the relationship between Christian Missionary work and colonial ambitions.

Introduction:

Christianity spread more rapidly in West Africa than in any other region. By 1900, there were 29 Missions, 518 foreign missionaries, 2,538 African missionaries, nearly 2,000 churches and mission stations and 250,000 Christians. All Christian missionary activity was concentrated along narrow strips of the coast under close British political and colonial domination.

In Sierra Leone the free slaves and their descendents embraced Christianity enthusiastically. Their own gods had left them and failed to protect them in their homeland.

Christopher Fyde (Sierra Leorian historian), has described how they came up from the hold of the slave ship like Jona from the whale, cut off this old life, ready to be re-born into the new. They felt grateful to the White man for freeing them and readily adopted his religion.

They felt thankful to the English and joined the Church of England in vast numbers. Their colony was administered on the parish basis. The Church Missionary Society provided schools and churches.

Main characters of the black Sierra Leonian Missionaries, were Bishop Samuel Ajayi Crowther and Bishop Jones (Holy Johson).

Crowther (Samuel Ajayi)

He was born in about 1808 in Yorubaland and was captured in the slave raid. Crowther was sold to Portuguese traders and freed in the mid- Atlantic by a British Warship in 1821. he was baptized in 1825 and joined the new Christian Training Institute at Fourah Bay where he trained as a school teacher.

In 1841, he went on the British government's Niger expedition and wrote a famous journal about the expedition. In 1843, he was ordained as an Anglican minister. He then went to Abeokuta in Yorubaland as a missionary. Between 1854 and 1857, he went to two more voyages up the Niger.

Crowther helped to establish missions at Lybebe at the Niger-Benue confluence and at Onitsha. He studied several African languages and translated some Bible books into Yoruba and these were published in Yoruba, Igbo and Nupe.

In 1864, Crowther was made Bishop of an immense Diocese covering West Africa. He held the post until his death in 1891. He was the first black African Protestant Bishop appointed to the high position of the 19th century era of "Ethiopianism" in the Anglican Church, thus advocating the idea that self- governing black African churches should be established.

Reverend Henry Vem was Secretary of the CMS from 1842-1872. Vem hoped that Crowther would oversee the work of the CMS both on the Niger and in Yorubaland and

Crowther was involved in missions in both areas. The Niger mission took most of his time and attention.

Problems he faced.

(a) Communication
(b) Discipline
(c) Misunderstood

When Crowther became Bishop, the following missions were established: Onitsha, and another at Igbebe.

Onitsha Mission:

This was gradually expanded to the surrounding areas. A station was also established at Boung in 1864, Brass (1868) and mass conversions between 1876 and 1879. Kalabar and Okrika received mission status in 1874 and 1879 respectively.

Crowther's missionary technique:

(a) To build a mission house a little way from the town.
(b) Build a school as a means of evangelizing.
(c) Introduced the Niger Mission to a number of areas by getting the rulers interested in education.
(d) More reliant than European missions on local finance.

The Niger Mission: Problems**:**

Traditional Religious Authorities:

In Bonny, the worship of the lizard, was publicly denounced in 1867. There was revulsion of feeling against Christianity.
In November 1875 Joshua Hart became a martyr when he was thrown into the river and battered to death with pebbles. There was also persecution in Bonny during 1881 to 1886. In 1889 a short service the "Juju House" in the town was pulled down. 40 years before, King William Pepple had asserted that the people of Bonny would never consent to their Juju House being destroyed.

Crowther's attempts.

He tried to act as a pastor or had agents but was too gentle a man to stamp his authority firmly on the mission. When his agents were found guilty on some offense against Christian morality and teaching he readily forgave them. If they showed repentance their punishment was little or brief suspension from duty.

Criticisms against Crowther.

Crowther was later criticized by white missionaries for his leniency as they wished to be ruthless than Crowther who believed that charges before man should be found before dismissal Europeans felt suspensions were sufficient.

Crowther was viewed as an over indulging father protecting his children. He also came to be criticized by newly arriving white missionaries because they believed he was over-emphasizing education and civilization and not giving sufficient emphasis to preaching.

Actions:

Enquiries were made in 1890 into the activities of Crowther and this led to division of the Niger mission into two, the Sudan and the Upper Niger mission and the Delta and lower Niger Mission. New White European missionaries were denying his authority and because of this he resigned. The foundations laid by Crowther formed the base upon which Christianity was built in Nigeria.

James "Holy" Johnson: (African Church Leader)

He was born of freed slave near Free – Town in 1837. He was educated at the C.M.S. Gramma School in Freetown and at Furah Bay. In 1863 he was ordained in the Anglican Church.

Between 1863 and 1873 (attached to Freetown Parish), he became an associate of Blyden in an African cultural Liberation movement.

His Aims:

Johnson wanted the church to liberalize its attitude towards African culture and customs. He was a strong opponent of any accommodation with polygamy. "Holy" Johnson because of his unfailing asceticism and passionately Christian personal life, was sent to Lagos in 1873 and then to the Abeokata mission in Yobaland.

He made a number of converts among the Yoruba. Between 1880 and 1900, Johnson was pastor of St Paul Breadfruit Church in Lagos. He advocated the transformation of religion to suit local conditions. The hyms were sung in traditional tunes. Johnson hoped that such singing and compositions could spread to other stations.

Johnson encouraged Christian parents to baptize their children with local names. He believed that the church must recognize those things that were good in local culture and adapt them for use in Christian worship.

He did not believe that a man needs to become completely divorced from his culture to become a Christian, although he had to abandon some parts of that culture.

Problems.

Johnson was always misunderstood by English missionaries, but he was an ardent Anglican and he never ceceeded from that Church though many of his colleagues and his flock did so.

He never openly opposed English political rule in Africa although he bravely condemned Golernos Carter of Lagos's expedition against Ifeby in 1892. From 1900 to 1917, he served as assistant Bishop of Niger. He was more successful than Crowther. Christians were drawn from the lower levels of society.

"Educational systems unsuitable to African needs were often produced."

There was a heavy pro- Europe bias in these schools and as Michael Tidy observes: "Mission education, in spite of its successes, had its negative aspects and its limitations. The knowledge that it imported and rarely went beyond the "three RS" of reading, writing and imparted arithmetic … in Nigeria, for example, the Protestant Churches were extremely reluctant to introduce an education system that prepared their converts for professions outside the Church.

By setting up schools, the Christian missionaries unwittingly played a major role in fostering early African nationalist opposition to colonial rule.

Oliver and Atmore: noted that, "The first instructors were, of course, European missionaries, but the brighter pupils who emerged from the system were given further training as catechists into a popular movement, in which foreign missionaries occupied only the supervisory positions and in which most of the teaching and evangelistic posts were held by Africans. These educated men constituted a new and very real kind of leadership rivaling that of the traditional chiefs. In the Africa of 1900-1914 those mission teachers were the man and woman who understood and felt at ease in the new world of colonial period. These missions – educated Christian were, in fact the first real African nationalist."

Indeed, eventually, as Paul Thatcher notes, "Mission Education produced an educated elite highly critical of colonial rule." Michael Tidy sums up: "A paradoxical result of mission education was that, inspite of its assault on African culture and its provision of a basic minimum or lower grade clerical personnel to serve the colonial system, it began the undermining of this system. Eventually the mission trained Western educated elite of Church Pastors and teachers in largely mission schools would make a significant, and in many colonies, major contribution to the struggle for racial equality and political reforms."

CHIEFS/ RULERS WHO REJECTED MISSIONARY ACTIVITY: WEST AFRICA

In many parts of Yorubaland, many chiefs and people believed that missionaries in their capacity as white men belonged to a world of spirits and was unnatural because of the white skin. For example (Jebu was horrified by the appearance of James White of the C.M.S. to the extent of sacrificing goats and sheep to appease the gods.)

Awujale of Ijebu was contemptuous enough not to shake hands with the White men. Asante troops in 1869 captured the two Basel evangelical missionaries and ridiculed them as closer

to horses than man because of White writer's idea of inferiority of the Negro race. They were associated with famine or natural disaster if they were to be welcomed in Yorubaland

Dahomey, Opobo and Ijebuland enjoyed peace and believed Whites to be a source of weakness. For example, Gezo did not believe that Queen Victoria was superior and confined European activities to the coast and administered European Residents efficiently. He made it compulsory for them to witness the annual customs which so much affected their moral and social values.

However he did not oppose their activities at Wydah among repatriates from Brazil as they were not real Dahomeans.

Jaja of Opobo saw no benefit from missionaries and opposed the establishment of a mission in Bonny in 1864. Thus he refused any of their works in Opobo and used all his power to oppose Christianity in the Niger Delta.

Awujale of Ijebu saw their benefits purely on trade and he persuaded neighbours Onolo, Egba and Ibadan to drive them away and their wards. He saw them as a threat to their authority as their religion was condemned.

In the delta City states of Brass, Bonny and Calabar composed of former slaves the rulers were alarmed at the threat at which the white men's doctrine began to have as it had hope and liberty on them. Thus in 1854, King Eyro Honest II an influential Efik ruler experienced disobedience of his laws by his subject people because of Christianity which encouraged slave converts of Brass to stage a successful coup against their masters.

Chiefs who Patronized Missionaries

(i) They found them as an asset-to help them do away with their local enemies, for example, Egba which was surrounded by enemies in all direction that is, Ibadan, Dahomey (West Ijebu (north and east).

(ii) In Ijaye a Yoruba town destroyed by Ibandan, the ruler believed that their presence would enhance his prestige and draw traders to his capital.

(iii) The need for gifts which missionaries made in an effort to court the good will of African rulers for example Aante paramount chief came to terms when he was offered a carriage and gifts from the Queen.

(iv) They wanted to use them to transmit their grievances to British agents for example Thomas Bach Freeman-West Nigeria in the Gold Coast.

Missionaries as Imperial Agents:

The rulers who opposed missionaries strained relations. Even those chiefs who were initially pro-missionary for example in Yorubaland former patrons became persecutors of Christian teachers. In 1859 up to 1867, the Egba looted mission stations and destroyed libraries and expelled white missionaries.

In 1890 the Dahomean ruler instructed his troops to capture French priests and sisters on the coast and imprisoned them in Abomey. In Sierra Leone the Susu burned down missionary stations fearing that the missionaries were spies of their own governments.

Initially the missionaries were not eager for African politics but the atmosphere they say was objectionable and contrary to Bible teaching led them to seek support of chiefs on the spot and later appealed to Headquarters (H.Q.) in Europe which hired the imperial- minded agents to the coast.

Missionaries hoped this would do away with the obstacle of chiefs not wanting to be converted to the faith. Missionaries became advocates of the use of force with military subjugation of anti- missionary chiefs in a bid to create a suitable environment to preach the gospel, for example, bombardment of Lagos in 1851 was hailed by missionaries as a providential blessing that would open the way to African administration.

British expedition against Asante in 1896 was described by one missionary as a "Righteous war" - "war is a means of opening the gospel to enter a country, a sword of steel often goes before a sword of spirit" though they were not all that happy with the carnage it incurred on Africans.

Missionaries began to think in terms of the sphere of influences for their respective metropolitan states, thus being imperial minded, for example, a port missionary said.

"Under government with the agents of the Kingdom of heaven would work in greater freedom and force in our own."

This missionary imperialism was encouraged by competition amongst missionaries themselves that is between French Catholics and British Protestants for example Britain had a greater impact in Sierra Leone and the French in Dahomey.

An official who watched and offered patriotic services of the French Catholics commented.

"We bow to them as for most champions of civilization presiding and sustaining the flag of France for which they consciously die for simply as duty".
In Nigeria Protestants and French Catholics strove vigorously to win areas of influence for their countries. In 1848 the U.P. Church of Scotland mission encouraged the Efik Chiefs to reject French influence and German influence in Old Calabar in 1890.

French priests attempted to secure Abeokuta for France in 1888 and attempted to replace British influence in the Niger Delta. Johnson relating the influence of the Anglo – missionaries to win Nigeria is noted as saying:

"In fact the C.M.S. for good or for ill has done much to create British Nigeria than the British government."

Traditional rulers of West Africa were unaware of close relations between missionaries and imperial minded agents on the coast. The missionaries never hid the fact that they had common identity with their secular country men and this made chiefs aware that any molestation of missionaries would be avenged by their governments in Europe.

So, it became natural for Africans to preach of the gospel for imperialism and colonialism. Relations between missionaries and traditional rulers can be put as:

"Deliver the people from chiefly tyranny and into our hands of God."

Asante:
Relations between Weslean and the Bresel, with Asantehene on the other side were favourable (after a lot of resistance) for them to establish a mission in Kumasi were sound.

Missionaries convinced chiefs that Christianity would not only convey economic profit but would make Asante powerful, as part of propaganda to convince the Asantehene to accept Anglo-over lordship. In all of (Thomas Freeman) Weslean missionary's visits to Kumasi he never went purely in his religious capacity but gave the impression that he was an agent of Britain.

In all cases, he reported fully on his visits and passed valuable information to the British on the Cape Coast. Freeman became an informal adviser in the Anglo-Fante and Anglo- Asante relations. In 1873 the Anglo-government made a special request to the Weslean Missionary Society for permission to use Freeman's services for information that would lead to victory over Asante. When in 1874 the British attacked the Asante, the mission hailed the attack as a step in the right direction that it would reduce the authoritarian hold of the Asantehene over his subjects.

In 1894, missionaries claimed that the whole of Asante was in need of British protection and anxious to be freed from despotic rule of their tyranny-a high imperialist view point. The Weslean and Besel missions were imposed on Asante by the bayonet.

Effects of Missionaries in West Africa:

(i) Emergence of a new class of Africans, educated and with European tastes in clothing, food, drink and a new religion (Christianity) - the educated elite.
(ii) Development of agriculture: plantations and experimental farms-taught new methods of producing and preparing commodities for export. For example, in Ghana the Methodists established Coffee, clove, orange plantations and others in the Cape East and in Benloech 7 miles from Cape Coast in the 1840s.
(iii) Besel Missionaries set up cocoa plantations at Akropang from which they supplied pods and seedlings to farmers although their efforts in this field failed.
(iv) Development of legitimate trade and raising the standard of living of the Africans.
(v) Some societies formed trading companies to buy African products. For example, the Besel in Ghana informed the Besel trading Company in 1859.
(vi) Nigeria's West African Company of the C.M.S. in 1863 tried to persuade Africans and kings to stop some of their inhuman customs like human sacrifice.

(vii) They introduced new architecture suitable for the tropics–first to introduce bricklaying, stone houses and corrugated iron roofing in the West Coast.

(viii) Introduced elementary schools as well as training colleges–1841 C.M.S. and 21 elementary in Sierra Leone, 1868 two secondary schools and Fourah Bay from 1827. Wesleans – four girl's schools and 21 boys schools in Ghana.

In 1876 they opened the first Sunday school in Ghana Besel opened a number of boarding schools and in 1856 Akropang Training College. The College focused on linguistic studies for teaching converts even to read in vernecular. By 1850 most African products languages had been ready for writing, grammar books and dictionaries had been prepared. They also established printing press for example the Presby Press in Ghana and the C.M.S. in Nigeria.

The Impact of Christian Missionaries of African Society:

From the earliest attempt by Portuguese missionaries to introduce Christianity into various parts of Africa in the 16th century (for example the Goncalo da Silveria mission of Zimbabwe) Christian missionaries have over the years had a profound impact on African society. Let us look at some of both the positive and negative effects of the missionaries' involvement in Africa.

(a) The Christian missionaries were generally closely linked with capitalist, imperialist forces and played a major role in imposing alien political, social and economic values on African society.

As Paul Thatcher notes: "The activities of European missionaries involved European governments more and more in African affairs and in many ways paved the way for the establishment of colonial rule (for example British rule in such areas as Malawi, Buganda and Yorubaland was partly the result of British missionaries."

David Livingstone, with his famous book Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa (1857), and other missionaries helped prepare European public opinion for large-scale European involvement in Africa. These missionaries thought commerce and Christianity had to go hand in hand as commercial development would undermine the slave trade.

In fact, blatant exploitation of Africans usually followed closely in the wake of European commerce, but as Michael Tidy notes, it is not fair to blame the missionaries entirely for the exploitation of Africans. But, it is fair to criticize the missionaries for subscribing to the prevailing European belief in the absolute-moral superiority over African peoples.

David Livingstone wrote in his private journals, for example, that, "African savages possess neither courage, patriotism, natural affection, honour, nor honesty. They have no stimulus for any mental improvement."

Elizabeth Isichei notes that in West Africa there arose "tensions between African traditional culture and Christianity, which had been brought to West Africa along

with its strongly European cultural background. The first Christians, like the missionaries themselves, tended to identity the various aspects of this cultural background, such as European dress and European given names, with Christianity."

As P.E.N. Tindall observes: "The early missionaries were not inspired by political motives but when in the 1880s the governments of Europe became rivals in the "scramble" to establish colonies, the missionaries sometimes found themselves forced by circumstances into a political role."

As we have seen earlier, during the colonial period in Southern Rhodesia, most missionaries were hostile to the Shona and Ndebele. According to D.E. Needham with Dr. Elleck Mashingaidze and Dr. N. Bhebe. From Iron Age to independence, notes. "J.S. Moffat, first head of Inyathi Mission turned strongly against the Ndebele. Charles Helm, Lobengula's trusted **"Umfundisi"** (teacher) helped the imperialist, Cecil John Rhodes, to obtain a mining concession from Lobengula by deceitful means, and did not protest when the Whites killed Africans with the Maxim gun. The Catholic Father, also supported the crushing of the Ndebele in 1893.

(b) The Christian missionaries generally showed very little respect far African culture and generally undermined traditional African society.

As Michael Tidy notes, European Christian missionaries" erroneously considered Africa to be lacking in religion, and therefore, a land where Christianity could be written on a blank slate." Because of the very nature of Christianity, it had the effect of revolutionarizing African Society.

Michael Tidy explains: "To Africans, Christianity was far more than a religion: it presented itself as a new and revolutionary social ethic. Christianity, as it was brought to Africa in the late 19th century, was steeped in individualism. The individual African who became a Christian now saw the person for his existence in his relationship to God rather than his family, clan or wider ethnic group."

Paul Thatcher notes that, "in many areas (for example the Niger Delta and Buganda) the presence of missionaries increased divisions within society thus lessening the ability to resist colonial attack later in the century."

Michael Tidy also points out that, "the solidarity of communal society was broken up by the division between Christians and non- Christians and by divisions among Christian themselves. It was necessary for an African Christian to adopt a new social and economic outlook. If he abandoned the basis of prosperity in the traditional economy and of prestige in the traditional society, it was important for him, therefore, to learn a trade or take up cash -crop farming as compensation."

As Elizabeth Isichei observes, "The conflict which so often existed in the individual heart and mind could also be seen in whole communities. Many Christian converts

were young and found themselves in conflict with their elders. Some communities were bitterly divided on denominational lines with Catholics pitted against Protestants.

(c) The Christian missionaries helped eliminate some evil practices in Africa, especially slavery, and they sometimes criticized the colonial authorities when they were guilty, of abuses of against Africans.
Christian missionaries were in the forefront of the struggle that led to the eventual abolition of slavery and the slave trade. Michael Tidy notes, for example, that the missionary David Livingstone "has an understandable and imperishable achievement to his credit: the abolition of the slave trade by Zanzibar."

It should be noted also that while European missionaries in Africa were strong supporters of European political control in general, they often supported African grievances against the colonial administration, settlers and European companies.

In Leopold's Congo, for example, the missionaries were some of the strictest critics of the abuses of the colonial authorities. Similarly, in German East Africa, Germany missionaries constantly opposed exploitation of Africans by European settlers. Also in Malawi the missionaries pressed for better working and living conditions and higher wages for African workers.

(d) Many Christian Missionaries actively promoted health – care advancement in Africa.

As historian Norah Lathan notes: "Missionaries were in the fore – front of the study of tropical medicine."

Michael Tidy points out those missionaries "built and ran hospitals out of a spirit of humanitarian service but also as assault on the values of traditional society. The medical mission came to be regarded as an essential and integral part of the Christian community in its fight to destroy the influence of the "witchdoctor" in African life. It was, of course, essential that the African Christian who could no longer turn to the traditional diviner should have access to medical help."

In Nigeria, a number of medical missions were opened before 1914, including the Church Mission Society Tyl Enn Hospital in Onitsha, the Baptist Hospital in Ogbomosho, the Wesleyan Guild Hospital in Ilesha, and the Scared Heart Hospital of the Society of African Missions in Abeokuta.

(e) The Christian Missionaries also actively promoted educational advancement albeit with a heavy European bias.

As Oliver and Atmore note; "The main means used by all Christian missions in their evangelism was to found networks of village schools (the so- called "bush schools") in which children of all ages could be given a very simple education in reading, writing and arithmetic."

P.E.N. Tindall notes that at these schools, the missionaries did an immense amount of work on the structure of African language, reducing them to written form with the alphabet. They produced grammar books translated religious and educational books into the vernaculars and published such works at the mission printing presses."

As we have seen, Bishop Samuel Ajayi Crowther's Niger Delta Mission carried out a lot of valuable pioneer work in education. But it was in Igoboland in Easter Nigeria that missionary education had its biggest success, especially for the Catholics.

Michael Tidy explains," "The Igbo had an intense desire for Western education. Igbo eagerly went to mission schools to get the white man's knowledge as the means for attaining higher status in society as clerks, teachers or engineers. Enrolment increased rapidly; in 1899 there were, in Igboland only seven Western Schools with 334 pupils. By 1906, the numbers had increased to 24 schools and 2,591 pupils."

The missionary schools are given credit for some positive achievement such as spreading literacy and helping to preserve African language. But it must also be noted that these missionaries speasr headed the colonisation of African states. NB: This point does not suggest that missionary schools spearheaded colonialism.

Examination Questions

1 Write an appraisal of the career and work of Samuel Ajayi Crowther and show his significance in the history of the Christian church in West Africa.
2. For what reasons did some African rulers welcome Christian Missionaries to their territories and others ban them?
   Answer with reference to West Africa.
3. Explain the emergence and assess the impact of independent African churches in West Africa.
4. How valid is the claim that the work of Christian missionaries and the spread of colonial rule were mutually supportive?

CHAPTER 10

AFRICAN RELIGIOUS RESPONSES TO COLONIALISM: INDEPENDENT AFRICAN CHURCHES.

Independent Churches in Tropical Africa

Learning Objctives

After studying the chapter, the student should be able to do the following:

1. Explain the emergence of African independent churches in West and Central Africa.

2. Trace the life stories of such outstanding and outspoken individuals as John Chilembwe, Charles Domingo, Elliot Kamwana, Joseph Booth, Wade Harris.
3. Discuss the link between the grievances of the Independent churches in Africa and the abuses of colonial rule in general.
4. Examine the similarities and differences between the African independent churches and the old Christian mission which had been set up during the pre-colonial era.

Definition

Independence is the state of being free and having separate existence. An independent African church is therefore any movement or organization whose inspiration was originally Christian, which either breaks away from the mission churches, or is founded independently, and which is under African control. However, independency is not only an African phenomenon: separation and schism is a kind of thing which runs through the whole history of any great religion (Assa Okoth), A history of Tropical Africa: 1855- 1914, p 61.

The above thorough definition is augmented by Michel Tidy who simply puts across the view that the independency movement occurred when African Christians broke away from European churches to form independent (separate) African churches (M. Tidy): A History of Africa: 1800- 1914 Vol Two, P 181.

Why did African converts enter into this drastic form of protest?

The first generation of converts, argues M. Tidy, was often closely related to their missionaries. However, the situation began to change from the 1880s onwards when European missionaries were increasingly reluctant to Africanize the priesthood or promote African priests to bishops.

With the exception of Sierra Leone where the independent church movement started way before the colonial era in 1820, in most arts of tropical Africa, the advent of independent churches was a protest against European discrimination, whether racial or religious.

Types of independency

Due to their varying reasons for schism or foundation, it is not easy to group or classify independent churches. Bishop Sunoller of South Africa in 1945 saw independent churches in three categories. These categories are not in themselves rigid, but provide a useful basis for studying independencies in African churches. They are:

a) The Ethiopian churches
b) Zionist churches
c) Messianic churches

a) **The Ethiopian Type**

The term "Ethiopian" to describe a church, was first used in South Africa in the 1890s when the first independent churches were created. It was used by the churches themselves, claiming they had inherited what had been promised to Ethiopia in the Old Testament Book of psalm 68v 31: "Ethiopia shall soon stretch forth her hands unto God."

This they interpreted to mean that Ethiopia would at some time in the future become the centre of world attraction and help, the territory from which the rest of the world would learn of wonderful human and godly values. They equated Ethiopia with Africa and the Ethiopians with the Negro race.

Ethiopian churches have been characterized by four features. First, Most of them have been created by separation, either from mission churches or independent churches. The usual reasons for breaking away have been conflict over leadership and control rather than disagreement about doctrine. They have tended to preserve the doctrine and liturgy of the churches from which they separated.

Furthermore since they are led by mission-trained pastors and teachers, they tended to be modernizing among African societies being deeply concerned with education and respectability in general. They believe very strongly in the possibility of improving society by human action. Finally, they are intensely concerned with being recognized by either Church: their appeal to Ethiopia is aimed at drawing recognition of their connection with ancient church in a bid for legitimacy.

b) **The Zionist Type**

The Zionist churches originally broke off from the American Pentecostal missionaries, who themselves came from the Zionist city of Illinois. They differ from Ethiopian Churches in several ways. First, they are much less concerned with leadership and organization, and their reasons for cessation have been doctrines, especially on purity. Secondly, they tend to be much smaller and loosely organized, and usually congregate around a leader with special gifts, especially gifts of healing. Thirdly, the leaders tend to be much less educated than those of the Ethiopian churches. They are much less concerned with education and respectability is more concerned with spiritual purity of members, and particularly of leaders. So, they have a tendency to withdraw from the world, with its competitions and evils, and to concentrate on the Millennium. In other words they have a tendency to expect change of the world by outside forces. Fourthly, whereas Ethiopian churches look for legitimacy by seeking recognition, Zionist legitimacy follows from their spiritual purity.

c) **The Messianic Type**

These churches are less Christian, and occasionally outright against Christianity. This is because of their belief that Christ was a messiah for the Jews and Europeans and that it has no significance for Africans. Among the Zulu, the movement revolved around Isaiah Shembe, whose church was called the Nazarite church.

Shembe was a man of intense spirituality. He believed himself to be a healer, holding annual ceremonies with ten to fifteen thousand followers. At his death his followers believed he would be resurrected. He was viewed as the Moses who would come back to save his people. Since 1930 his followers have become convinced that Shembe was a Zulu Messiah.

In tropical Africa, among the very messianic leadership was that of Simon Kimbangu, who was, following the Antonic tradition, messiah to the Congo. In the 1880s, Kimbangu was trained as a catechist and in 1900 he "received" a vision telling him to preach. He, however, did not believe himself to be a messiah but healed in Christ's name. Very soon after the movement started, he was arrested by the Belgians and sentenced to death but ultimately imprisoned for life. But his followers believed he would return some day as a messiah.

INDEPENDENT CHURCHES IN WEST AFRICA

In West Africa, independent African church movements were not as greatly established as in Central Africa. Most of the comparable movements in West Africa were therefore largely Ethiopian in Character.

1. Nigeria:- **The United Native African Church**

One of the best examples of independent churches in Nigeria, before 1914 was the United Native African Church, founded by nine Yoruba Anglican Methodists. Like many before and after them, these Yoruba Anglicans broke away from the parent mission because of the mission's destructive approach to African traditions. They also felt that the African was being neglected to an inferior position as compared to European missionaries. The treatment accorded to Bishop Crowther and their other brethren in the Niger Mission was still fresh in their minds.

While the basic doctrine for the new Church remained the same as that of the parent body, it permitted polygamy and showed respect to some African traditions and customs, emphasizing the fact that there was nothing incompatible between certain African traditions and modernization. It was the resolution of the leaders that "a purely African church was to be founded for evangelization and ameliorisation of our race, to be governed by Africans." Africans themselves must carry the torchlight of salvation for their fellow Africans.

1. French West Africa: Wade Harris Movement

In French West Africa, independent African churches were not important and with the exception of the William Wade Harris movement, a Liberian working in the Ivory Coast, independency in religion was almost absent. This was because while in British West Africa the breakaways were from the protestant church. In French West Africa the Roman Catholic Church was the dominant denomination, and the church's activities were strictly controlled by the state.

In 1910, William Wade Harris claimed that he had seen a vision of the angel Gabriel and had been instructed to go and preach to the "heathens." In 1913 he appeared in the Ivory Coast. The French viewed with concern his successes in Abidjan, Bassam, Grand Lahou and Assinie. When his followers began to diffuse a rumour that the coming war in 1914 would force the French out, Harris was expelled from the Ivory Coast as a source of alarm and despondency. But the French later found out that they should have supported the efforts of this man who had no harm, and who had only preached about the existence of only one God and the need to abolish all the others. He had significantly contributed to law and order in an area where the French had only recently imposed their administration and instituted taxation with difficulty. His movement had been so successful that by 1926 a conservative estimate of 120 000 Harrisite Christians could be counted. Harris thus inspired the greatest Christian mass movement in West African history.

Independent churches in east Africa

In east Africa, independent churches only developed after 1914. In Kenya, for example, the earliest independent church movement was the Nomiya Luo Mission which was founded by Johana Owalo in 1914. By 1925 the movement had drawn about 500 members. In Uganda the earliest separatist was the Bamalaki (people of Malaki) or Katonda Omu Ainza Byonza (the society of one Almighty God). It broke away from the Church Missionary society led by Joswa Kate Mugema- a close friend of the early martyrs, who became convinced that recourse to medical assistance implied a lack of trust in God. For several years he practiced his convictions privately, but finally broke with the Anglican Church in 1914 and launched a mass movement which by 1921 numbered 9100 members in Buganda alone.

A few years later, a much younger man Reuben Spartans, an outstanding example of the new intellectual elite, who, after theological training became dissatisfied with the Anglican position, and in 1929 formed a branch of the African orthodox Church, which had been started in America by Marcus Garvey. Subsequently Spartas' search for theological truth led him to accept reunion with the Alexadrian Patriarchs of the Greek Orthox Church.

Thus the roots of separatism in Uganda and especially in the two Baganda movements were primarily religious, but political aspects were also present. In Mugema's case there was a long-standing feud with the Katikiro, Apolo Kaggwa had a profound rejection of the land settlement in the 1900 Uganda Agreement, and for Spartas here was an early desire to launch a cultural liberation movement of Pan-African significance.

Independent churches in Central Africa

In the period 1855 to 1914, central Africa probably had the greatest phenomenon of independent church movements in Tropical Africa. The origins of independency in Central Africa lay in South Africa.

In 1892 a group of mission- trained African Methodists broke away from the South African Wesleyan church. Led by Mangena Makone they welcomed people of all tribes and religious backgrounds. Makone vigorously reached the "Ethiopian" message and control. The message got across to Barotseland through Willie J. Mokalapa.

(i) Mokalapa and the Ethiopian church of Barotseland

Mokalapa was a Suto who had been trained at the Lovedale Missionary Institute in South Africa. He had assisted the French Huguenot, Francois Coillard to advance the cause among the Lozi of Barotseland in today's Zambia. Round about 1899, he and other Suto colleagues claimed publicly that they were looked down upon by the white missionaries. They had furthermore demanded, and were refused, a rise in their salaries. At every stage, their initiative in the church leadership was being deliberately thwarted. They therefore sought means whereby they could play a more significant role in the political and religious life of Barotseland.

During a visit to South Africa Mokalapa had come into contact with and got interested in the Ethiopian church movement. He had joined and become an elder of the church. Retuning to Barotseland, he appealed to Lewanika, the Lozi king, to grant him permission to establish an independent African church. His application was intercepted by Coillard, who proceeded to attempt to dissuade the King from accepting Mokalapa's idea. Lewanika considered the matter and eventually agreed even to sponsor an Ethiopian church among the Lozi on the promise of Mokalapa building a school where "written and spoken English would be taught,." and a church that Africans would control. Lewanika provided a good mission site in the Zambezi valley and plenty of free labour to help Mokalapa in building his church and schools.

Soon, Mokalapa was getting converts by their hundreds and by 1904 succeeded in rebaptising many former adherents of Coillard's Paris Missionary society. The missionaries moaned over this 'invasion" of their preserve. They lamented that the work of "nearly twenty years is threatened with extinction."

The British administration was also alarmed at this meteoric upsurge of African leadership in a sphere so influential and complained that among the more pernicious doctrines being spread (by the new church) was the equality of the white and black races." However, the movement continued to survive because Lewanika would not yield to pressures to outlaw it.

However, the movement came to an abrupt stop. Lewanika sent Mokalapa to Cape Town to buy equipment for his new schools. Mokalapa got swindled of £750 by Cape Town's unscrupulous merchants and never returned to Barotseland. Without his inspiration and devoted leadership, his movement began to collapse. By 1907-8 it had disintegrated completely. With Mokalapa out of the way, the traditional missionaries regained their influence over the King and over their members.

Independent African Churches in Nyasaland

Joseph Booth was one of the most important sources of inspiration to independency in Malawi. He was an independent evangelist not particularly indentified with any European mission group. He had been a farmer in England and New Zealand but had heard "the call for religious vocation. He had then come to Central Africa where he began to evangelize lamenting at the rough treatment accorded to the poor, "almost naked natives," by the white missionaries who were themselves splendidly dressed. He advocated for the betterment of the African peoples who were being ignored by the white governments. It was against this

background of Booth's propaganda that the existing missions in Malawi began to be increasingly seen as deliberately frustrating their African adherents. Leading in this respect was the Livingstonia Mission.

Frustration caused by the Livingstonia Mission

The Livingstonia Mission was established in northern Malawi among the Tonga people. The first area of frustration lay in the selective nature of the Mission's relations with Tonga villages. Certain villages gained much more than others from their association with the mission. Tonga was a highly competitive society where educational and economic achievements played an important role in determining a man's status. It was therefore very frustrating to certain villages that these facilities should be made on a selective basis when most of them were loyal and ardent members of Livingstonia.

Even more frustrating to the Tonga was the contradictory character of Livingstonia's policy. The period 1895- 1909 had witnessed intensified evangelization resulting in enthusiastic conversions, with several people coming forward to be baptized. But in spite of this the missionaries were decidedly reluctant to have mass conversions.

There laid the contradiction. The missionaries insisted that admission to the church could only be granted to those who had served lengthy apprentices, to those of good character, who were fully instructed in their beliefs through lengthy grades of catechumen; and those who had paid cash levies to test the sincerity of their faith. The result of the requirement of these rather curious qualifications was that by 1908 there were thousands of catechumens who had waited to be baptized for two or more years. This contradiction between appeals to Africans to accept the new faith and the reluctance to fully accept the believers into the church was a source of great frustration.

In addition, the growing reluctance by the missionaries to transfer authority to Africans in the face of the basic off-repeated aim of Livingstonia to create a "self- growing and self-extending Native Church" was disturbing to the Lovedale-trained graduates. As the British colonial power increased, there was a growing unwillingness to employ Africans to an equal level with Europeans, and Lovedale men were being rejected. Those who were employed never saw, and never gained any prospects for promotion. Ordination of African clergy- to - be was often postponed on unconvincing grounds of lack of adequate congregations which would support them financially.

Elliot Kamwana and the Watch Tower Movement

Elliot Kernan Kamwana was a Tonga from Chifira village. He had been a pupil of Bandawe Mission of Free Church and had later received vocational education there at the Church's Overtoun Institution. He later abandoned the Scottish Church (Livingstonia) when they introduced educational fees. He then became associated with Joseph Booth's church and later travelled with him to South Africa where he became acquainted with Ethiopianism. But unlike Willie Mokalapa, he never got seriously involved in the movement. Instead he joined the Watch Tower Bible and Tract society whose followers were called Jehovah's witnesses.

In 1908, Kamwana returned to Malawi and began to preach among the Tonga the Watch Tower message, whose substance had a gripping effect. In the truest tradition of the Zionist type of independency, the movement believed in the Second Coming, the Apocalypse due by implication in 1914; a Final judgment, the everlasting Kingdom of the elect- who would inherit the New Jerusalem- a doctrine which in essence advocated some kind of religious socialism, a peaceful uprising of the masses which would result in world-wide overthrow of man-made governments.

Kamwana understood and capitalized on his people's discontent and had within a few months won more than a thousand followers. This immediate success can be explained in three ways.

First, most of his followers were from that sector of society which was frustrated by its failure to get into the church and had been refused, or perhaps were unable to pay the financial price of admittance.

Secondly, Kamwana prophesied a series of millennium which was expected in 1914. At the time of the Second Advent, he said, Christ would abolish colonial rule; the whites would depart together with their hated taxes and Africans would govern themselves. Thirdly, Kamwana's success was due to the generous accommodation his movement offered. He baptized everybody who came forward, without any discrimination or requirement of any special qualification- financial or moral. What he preached and his success caused much alarm to the colonial authorities. In 1909 he was restricted, then deported and was not allowed to return to the district until after 1933. Despite his deportation, the Watch Tower Movement continued as one of the strongest independent churches in Central Africa. It remained critical of colonial rule and its abuses.

Charles Domingo and the Seventh Day Baptists

Born around 1875, Charles Domingo spent two years at a local school before proceeding to Lovedale Institution which many considered as the best school in sub-Saharan Africa at that time. Domingo thus received an excellent theological and academic education.
W.P. Livingstone's early Law's biography states that Domingo was an elder in the church even though not officially ordained. He also became a gifted lead singer and a soloist. He was formally licensed to preach in 1903. A thanksgiving service at the time of the Laws' silver wedding anniversary was conducted by Domingo. He was, however, never ordained by the Presbyterians partly because of the racism of the time.

Like Kamwana, Domingo was also a victim of the frustration in the Livingstonia Mission. Having completed his theological training in 1900, he soon became frustrated by unexplained postponement of his ordination. In 1907, he began to see the New Jerusalem from the African view-point: another Zionist church was in the offering in northern Malawi. He quarreled with the Scottish missionary, Donald Farser, left Livingstonia, and began to preach on his own. It was through some of his Lovedale Colleagues that he got in touch with the doctrinal approach of Joseph Booth.

In 1909 Domingo joined the Seventh Day Baptists and between 1910-16 organized a series of separatist churches and independent schools in northern Ngoni. Joseph Booth, together with American Seventh Day Baptists supplied the funds and religious literature. From the pulpit Domingo and his pastors attacked the colonial government and gave vent to the people's animosity towards the whites. In 1911, in one of his famous statements Domingo expressed his critical dissatisfaction with the colonial society:

"There is too much failure among all Europeans in Nyasaland"
He asserted, "The three combined bodies, Missionaries, Government

And companies, or gainers of money- do form the same rule to look upon the native with monkey eyes. It sometimes startles us to see that the three bodies combined bodies, are from Europe, and along with them there is a title Christendom. If we had power enough to communicate ourselves to Europe, we would advise them not to call themselves "Christendom" but "Eurodom." Therefore the life of the three combined bodies is altogether too cheaty, too thefty, too mockery."

Domingo's insight into the character of the colonial life in Malawi was plainly acute. Neither was this not noticed by the government which consequently exiled him in 1916 for taking an active part in political agitation of Africans

Dr Robert 1 Rotberg tells us of a letter written to Booth in February 1916 in which Domingo summed up his convictions."The world should have equality of representation in the respective assemblies or councils and be fully eligible to all sorts of loveliness in the commencement of the New Heaven (on) Earth. May His Majesty the King of Great Britain-defender of the weak ones and his Government, attend to the pleadings of his African subjects.

Rev John Chilembwe and the Providence Industrial Mission

Unlike Kamwana and Domingo's movements, the Providence Industrial Mission was not Zionist. Its uncritical respect for European values makes it a little difficult to classify, but its emphasis on modernization, and its use of the liturgy of a foreign church (in this case the Baptist Church) which had some influence on its leadership, place it nearer Ethiopianism than anywhere else. This leadership was provided by Rev. John Chilembwe – a son of a Yao tribesman and a direct product of Booth's influence. Chilembwe became acquinted with Booth at the age of ten in 1892. He was Booth's servant, a devoted companion of his children and later a fellow traveler. In 1897 he accompanied Booth to the USA where he attended a Negro Baptist Seminary in Virginia. His experiences with American Negro intellectuals greatly influenced his future approach to the whites.

In 1900 he returned to Malawi and backed by the powerful national (Negro) Baptist Convection of America, established a station at Chiradzulu, where he began to preach the Gospel of Christ. With the aid of the same financial backers, Chilembwe was able to transform the station into a flourship settlement. He emphasized the value of growing improved crops, and of imbibing (absorb) European mannerisms, clothes and aspects of

civilization. He was determined to improve the lot of his people and discounted political agitation as a useful tool for the job, as it was possible, he believed, in working for his people within the colonial framework.

In 1914, however, Chilembwe had lost all confidence in the government of Nyasaland. The European settlers in the Shire Highlands (where he worked) had alienated most of the African land and turned Africans into squatters. The discontent over land was deepened by the famine of 1913. Furthermore, Africans were used as beasts of burden, and flogging was rampant. Settler mistreatment of Africans was no longer bearable. Chilembwe himself felt hurt on a tender spot when having been allowed to build churches on their farms, the white settlers later turned around and burnt them down.
Then came recruitment for the First World War of 1914- 18. Hitherto, Malawi Africans had been recruited to help the British in their campaigns against the Somali and the Asante Chilembwe now felt it was unfair to expose Africans to the dangers of any more wars when Africans had nothing to gain in them. In November 1914, he wrote to a local paper complaining about the injustices inherent in forced African [participation:

"Let the rich men, bankers,
titled men storekeepers,
farmers and landlords go to
war and get shot. Instead
the poor Africans who have
nothing to own in this present
world who in death leave
only a long line of widows
and orphans in utter want
and dire distress are
invited to die for a cause
which is not theirs."

In the face of all this he began to organize his people- the followers of the Providence. Industrial Mission- for the purpose of registering African resentment by violence. In January 1915, the Chilembwe Rising began and three Europeans lay dead. It was suppressed with much cruelty and Chilembwe himself was shot dead as he tried to escape. His lieutenants were also quickly eliminated.

Chilembwe's movement is significant because it was the first protest in Malawi by an educated African against white rule. It also demonstrated, however, that the educated elite were not yet in a position to lead a successful protest movement against the whites. Nevertheless, this was the first movement to accept European attributes while at the same time resisting foreign rule.

Significance of independency

David Barret in his African Initiatives in Religion (1971) looks at independency as a result of lack of charity (agape) on the part of the missionaries. Africans found themselves involved with mean people who lacked consideration and therefore decided to separate from them to form their own churches. But this does not explain why there were differences in the distribution of independent churches.

T.O. Ranger in his book Aspects of Central African History argues that independent churches are the way which Africans have expressed protest in a Christian context. Where normal protest has been impossible or had had no success, then protest has taken the form of separatist church movement.

R. Rotberg in his book The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa has further explained Ranger's standpoint:

> "Where the reaction to
> colonialism could not be
> expressed directly or
> where healthy protest
> failed to bring about
> any appreciable amelioration,
> the conquered people
> cloaked their rejection
> of colonialism in religious
> garb"

As a first step in this kind of protest, schools were built and run independently by Africans, then independent churches were started to go along with them. These served as a forum on which rejection of European rule was voiced

Independency demonstrated that the Africans were capable of managing their affairs without the supervision of white missionaries.

Exam Type Questions

1. Why were there so many African independent churches in West and Central Africa after 1900?
2. With reference to either Malawi or British West Africa, explain why and with what results African Christians developed independent churches in the last twenty years of this period?
3. Analyse the impact of African Christian indepependent churches before 1914.
4. Did African Chsitians who formed independent churches have any more cause rather than religious protest?
5. For what reasons, and in what ways did Christian missionaries become critics of European administrators in colonial rule?
6. Why did African Independent Churches emerge in Bitish ruled colonies and not French ruled colonies before 1914?

CHAPTER 11

AFRICAN REACTION TO THE PARTITION OF AFRICA

Learning objectives

After studying the chapter, the student should be able to:

(i) Account for the colonial motives behind the partitioning of Africa.
(ii) Examine the significance of the Berlin Colonial Conference on the partition of Africa agenda.
(iii) Compare and contrast any African rulers who resisted and co-operated with colonialists.
(iv) Discuss forms of primary resistance to colonialism in East and Central Africa.

BACKGROUND

Before 1880 European governments showed considerable reluctance to occupy Tropical Africa. After 1880 there was a great surge of enthusiasm for colonies in Africa. Why did such a sudden interest in the scramble for colonies in Tropical Africa take place?

To answer the above question, we should first view the scramble as a world-wide phenomenon, affecting all the tropical areas throughout the world, propelled therefore, not so much by conditions in Africa per se, as some historians have argued, but by economic, social and political forces operating in Europe and Africa during the second half of the nineteenth century. Of course the relative importance of the economic, social and political factors to the scramble differed, but their Euro-centric nature was at the centre of the "scramble" for Africa. It is important to point out at this juncture, that events in Africa accelerated more the process that was already in motion as opposed to causing the beginning of the scramble for Africa. However, it must be pointed out that there is considerable debate on this point of view.

This chapter may not necessarily fully answer all the questions on the "scramble" and partition' of Africa, but it explores, examines, interprets and evaluates the various theories that have been put forward by historians on the topic. It is important to consider the following study questions that have been put forward by one historian (Michael Tidy in his book,- A History of Africa: 1880- 1914 Vol 2).

i) Why did this partition of Africa by European countries take place?
ii) Why did the partition occur in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and not before?
iii) What were the factors, in Africa, which induced the Europeans to take up colonies there?

The process of rushing for colonies and its suddenness has often been known as the 'scramble' for Africa. The fact that there was a scramble for colonies in the last quarter of the 19th century made historians and students more curious to apply theoretical frameworks in a bid to arrive at some historical truth. The "partition" of Africa usually followed the scramble for colonies, but the processes sometimes occurred concurrently. The "partition" was the parceling out of African territory among the European colonial powers.

Bismarck and the rise of Germany

The scramble for Africa was partly the result of European rivalry resulting from the rise of Germany and Bismarck's opportunism. A. J.P. Taylor has argued that Bismarck's genius was at the core of the scramble and partition of Africa. Before 1870, Germany was split up into numerous states dominated by France and Austria. In a rapid military campaign, the German states were united by Bismarck. A humiliating defeat was inflicted on France and Austria as Bismarck united the semi-independent German states. In 1871 Bismarck captured Paris and dictated terms to the defeated French. Two French provinces, Alsace and Lorraine, rich in coal and iron, were now absorbed into the German nation.

It is important to note that the rise of Germany had significant implications in the European balance of power in general and the scramble for Africa in particular. Contemporaries called it the "German Question." It revolved around how Germany would behave as the most

powerful military and economic power in a reshaped Europe. By the 1870s Germany not only rivaled France militarily, but she also challenged, and in some cases exceeded Britain industrially. Germany therefore, out of newly found- strength turned to the scramble for Africa. Her bid for colonies was not based on any substantial interest that she had built up in Africa beforehand, but it was a simple assertion of her new position among the world powers. According to Roland Oliver and Anthony Atmore in their book: Africa since 1800 (fourth Edition), page 106-107, it is submitted that,

> "There is much truth in the
> view that Bismarck himself took
> part in the scramble mainly
> to dominate the international
> politics of the European powers
> which were connected with it.
> He wanted to turn French
> ambitions away from the recovery
> of her lost provinces, and the
> best way to do was to
> involve her in rivalries with
> other powers for overseas
> territories."

The truth of the above quotation can be easily demonstrated. Bismarck supported French claims in West Africa and the Congo basin and made German annexations in places which would as much as possible, not threaten French claims.

But it was a constant German fear that France, having been so shamed by the 1871 defeat might ally with Britain and wage a "revengist" war against her. Bismarck saw solutions in two areas: to seek friendship with both, and in the meantime foment conflict between the two. During such a conflict Germany would hold the balance of power. An opportunity to achieve both, and probably more arose over Egypt. Here, circumstances apparently played into Bismarck's hands and his skill in manipulating them fuelled the scramble and partition.

THE EGYPTIAN QUESTION

Robinson and Gallagher in their book, Africa and the Victorians, have stated that the Egyptian question explains both the reason and timing of the scramble and partition:

> "Without the occupation of Egypt
> There is no reason to suppose that any international scrambles for
> Africa, either west or east, would
> have begun when they did."

What then was the Egyptian Question? How valid is this argument for the scramble and partition of Africa?

The story begins with the construction and final opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 in which a French technician, Ferdinand de Lesseps played a leading role. The eclipse of England's commercial monopoly in the Atlantic during the eighteenth century had given way to the

development of interest in the Indian Ocean. The opening of the Suez Canal therefore provided an important commercial gate-way with India.

The greatest weakness of Khedive Ishmael of Egypt was his fiscal policy. He depended on foreign loans from Britain and France, and was not famous for his ability to repay loans in time.

Seeing that the interests of their citizens were at stake, the two powers intervened by appointing an international Debt commission, whose duty was to regulate the Egyptian financial policy in a way that would make it possible for the Egyptian government to repay its debts. Soon the Commissioners clashed with the Khedive and he dismissed them.

European reaction was therefore immediate. They pressured the Sultan to depose him, and this was done in June 1879, leaving room for the appointment of his son Tawfiq as his successor. Under the puppet regime of Tawfiq, Egypt was now effectively ruled by the Commissioners. An army mutiny followed soon after these events. In 1880, Col Ahmad Urabi (Urabi Pasha), representing the sentiments of many, Egyptians against foreign domination, led a revolt against Tawfiq. Britain reacted by invading Egypt in 1882, apparently without consulting, her partner in Egypt, France.

Britain did this first on the instigation of Bismarck who hoped to create conflict between Britain and France. Secondly, because Britain wanted to have a monopoly over the affairs of the Suez, but British rule in Egypt was dependent, at every turn, on the goodwill of the International Debt Commission, on which, since the French opposition to the continued British occupation was certain, the German vote was of the utmost importance. Britain seeing that the French were temporarily engaged in dealing with a Tunisian revolt saw the opportunity for outdoing France in securing for herself this all-important link with her eastern empire.

Bismarck, throughout the vital years of the Egyptian crisis, supported British rule in Egypt. His price was British acceptance of Germany's new annexation and of his support of the claims of France and King Leopold to the north and south of the lower Congo. By the British occupation of Egypt, Bismarck scored his first victory. France was thoroughly annoyed with the British for their behavior.

French Reaction to Occupation of Egypt

After the humbling defeat in the hands of the Germans in the war of 1871, the French saw political expansion in Africa increasingly as a means of compensation. Thus a French political economist, Paul Lerroy- Beaulieu stressed for instance, that it was "a matter of life and death." For France had to became a "great African power or in a century or two she will be no more than a secondary European power and will count for about as much in the world as Greece or Romania" henceforth, the British conduct in Egypt convinced the French that they must seek for colonies in Africa, especially around the Nile. On the other hand, the British believed that their success in forcing Egypt to pay her debts would depend on their

ability to control the Nile waters. This is exactly what made the British to later on declare protectorates over Sudan, Uganda and Kenya.

The French also now believed that if they could get control of the Upper Nile, they would be in a position to divert its waters and drive the British out by turning Egypt into a desert. Furthermore, the first modern census was showing the French military strategists that Germany had a younger and larger population and that the German birthrate was higher than that of the French. It thus became obvious that the balance of manpower was turning against France. An empire from where to recruit soldiers would be one remedy. The Egyptian Question thus set a chain reaction that ended in the partition.

The French Activities in the Congo and West Africa.

One of the greatest critics of the Robinson and Gallagher Egyptian thesis has been Jean Stengers in the Journal of African History, Vol. 3 N0. 3 1962. Stengers contends that in the search for "real initiatives." of the scramble, we must turn to France. This is where the real fundamental moves for the scramble began. These "real" initiatives were two;

a) The conclusion of the de-Brazza- Makoko Treat and its ratification in 1882
b) The declaration of protectorates in West Africa from January 1883. According to Stingers, the scramble and Partition revolved around these two issues.

a) **The Brazza- Makoko Treaty, 1880**

Savorgnan de Brazza was an Italian adventurer in the service of France. He wandered in the Congo region, and in 1882 returned to France with what he called a "treaty" which he had obtained from a Congolese King, Makoko. The "treaty" was in fact two documents, in crude legal form, dated September- October 1880. In the first one the explorer declared that he had obtained from King Makoko, reigning sovereignty north of Stanley Pool the "cession of his territory to France." Makoko had apparently put his "mark" on this declaration.

In the second one he declared that he had occupied, in the name of France, part of this territory situated on the edge of Stanley Pool itself (i.e what became Brazzaville). This treaty installed France in a small territory whose commercial and strategic importance was great, being situated at the doorstep of the navigable Congo.

The treaty was presented to the French Chamber of Deputies for ratification in 1882. The government considered several things, among them its weakening position in Europe. But even more important was the question of national pride that had so repeatedly been bruised. A competition was now open in Africa between de Brazza and Stanley, and France had to support her champion to the end. There was an opportunity to level the scores with England, whose treacherous success in the occupation of Egypt had stirred the French public opinion in favour of compensatory

colonies. De Brazza himself did a lot to whip up public opinion. During a ceremony at the Sorbonne, for instance he declared:

> "A speaker who receded me said that the English
> have left us behind everywhere. There is, however,
> one area where we have put our mark before them;
> that is the Congo (prolonged) applause, noted the report)
> The French flag flies over this land, and the parliament has only to say the word for it to be our forever."

Here was a golden chance to occupy territory in Africa, accompanied by compelling reasons for doing so. The Parliament would not only be letting everybody down by ignoring the chance, but would also be committing a political sin by not appropriately responding to overwhelming public opinion. The treaty was ratified in 1882. This action set off the scramble for Africa by arousing anxiety and fear among the European powers.

b) **Policy of French protectorates in West Africa 1883.**

Limited occupations of parts of the West Coast for commercial purposes had been going on for many years. The re-establishment in 1882 of the French Protectorate over Porto Novo, was the last of these local manouvres carried out to support "national commerce." But in January 1883 the designs were apparently enlarged.
A new policy was defined by the Ministry of Marine and the colonies new political programme entailed four main things:

- The establishment of a protectorate on the coast of the Gold coast to Dahomey
- Making of political treaties on the Benue River
- Signing agreements with the chiefs in the eastern delta of the Niger and eventually the establishment of protectorates at Bonny, Old Calabar, and signing of treaties to the south of the Cameroon estuary.

However, the fulfillment of these plans had only limited success. To the west of Dahomey, action was reduced to really very little. It was put off essentially for fear of diplomatic complications. Further to the east in the Niger and Cameroons, the inadequacy of the means to execute the policy reduced it to a failure. In short these moves were insignificant.
But the little that the French did was sufficient in the same way as the ratification of the Brazza-Makoko treaty set off the scramble for Africa.

Results of French Initiatives

Michael Tidy, in his book cited above on this chapter has also come in support of Jean Stengers' criticism of Robinson and Gallager's theory that, "within the occupation of Egypt, there is no reason to suppose that any international scrambles for Africa, either east or west would have begun when they did." M. Tidy, page 9, states categorically that

> "This is probably overestimating
> the impact of the British
> occupation of Egypt. Various

> factors in Europe and Africa were building up pressure towards a European scramble for African territory as the 1889s and 1890s."

However, it must be admitted that one of the immediate results of Britain's occupation of Egypt without French help was that France ratified the De Brazza-Makoko treaty and sent De Brazza back to the Congo as Governor of a new French colony. In turn, the De Brazza-Makoko Treaty had radical effects. Leopold and Stanley had an excuse for stepping up their activities on the south bank of the Congo and many more trading stations were set up. In 1884 the Congo Free State was openly constituted and recognized by the USA.

As a chain- reaction to the above, Leopold's activities stimulated the making of the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1884 in which Britain supported Portuguese control of the estuary in return for Portugal promising free trade on the Congo. The treaty was, however, not ratified by the British parliament because of missionary society protests that the Portuguese in Angola were lax on abolishing slavery. Also Germany's support for the French annexation of the north Congo was a further discouragement to the British. But Portugal then gained Britain's support by suggesting a Berlin International conference to settle the question of the Lower Congo. The idea was taken up by Bismarck who, as part of his new foreign policy in Europe, wanted a better opportunity to show that Germany was friendly to France.

It is important to note that events in the Congo began independently of those in Egypt. On the other hand, events in Egypt gave impetus to events in the Congo. It came to happen that the ripple effects of events in the Congo came to have greater impact in both the scramble and partition of Africa. Hence, historians have tended to agree that Robinson and Gallagher somewhat exaggerated the role played by the Egyptian crisis in the Scramble for Africa.
The debate on the role played by the Egyptian on the Congo crises rages on. Michael Crowder has stated in his book, West Africa Under Colonial Rule that the De-Brazza-Makoko treaty only precipitated the scramble but did not necessarily cause it. This is because, it made European powers face the realities of a situation that had been developing over the past three years. Respectable as he is, Michael Crowder's line of argument is difficult to prove.

As a matter of fact Stengers contends that it was the French initiatives in the two areas that drove the British government to act. He provides an illustration of the British reaction to these initiatives.

(i) **British Reaction**

The De Brazza- Makoko treaty had begun to create fears in two areas: first, for the Congo. Britain feared that if France were to establish herself on the Congo she would prevent other powers from "free trade." On the river, Portugal was the most affected since she laid claim to the whole Congo area. So, Britain and Portugal negotiated an agreement that would do two things: acknowledge Portugal's claims over the Congo mouth; and in return get Britain a guarantee of freedom of trade on the river. This

agreement painted Britain as a greedy power with dangerous ambitions in the Congo area- an image that was not likely to get her liked by the powers.

Secondly, the treaty had also begun (De Brazza-Makoko) to create fears for west Africa, for what guarantee was there that De Brazza's manouvres might not be repeated elsewhere, for instance, on the Niger? A British trader was articulating a most practical suspicion of many of his countrymen when he warned the Foreign office:

"The tactics of M. de Brazza
may be imitated on the Niger,
and that great highway into
the interior of Africa be converted
into a French river."

Moreover, several events which tended to confirm this suspicion followed in rapid succession. First, came the news of the re-establishment of the French Protectorate at Port Novo. Then, came the announcement that a French worship was at Bonny, and that officers of the ship were trying to secure treaties from the African chiefs.

On the other hand, the British began to take more seriously earlier warnings about French manouvres. From June 1883 Percy Anderson in the Foreign Office summarized the British position vis- a-vis the French activities around the mouth of the Oil Rivers, when he said,

"Action seems to be forced on us.
Only one course seems possible
that is to take on ourselves the
protectorate of the native states
at the mouth of the Oil rivers,
and the adjoining coast. Protectorates
are unwelcome burdens, but in
this case it is a question
between British protectorates which
would be unwelcome, and French
protectorates, which would be fatal."

This reasoning forced the British to act.
Britain's reaction was to form more colonies of her own. In order to forestall a possible German advance from the Cameroons, or Friendly occupation of the lower Niger with the support of Germany, the British consul Hewett speeded up his making of protection treaties in the Niger delta, and Goldie made similar treaties with the Muslim emirs of the interior. In 1885 Britain set up the Niger Coast Protectorate. Britain was also alarmed by the creation of a German protectorate in East Africa under Karl Peters. Hence an Anglo- German Agreement of 1886, which split East Africa from the coast as far as Lake Victoria into two "spheres of influence." Germany got the lion's share because Salisbury, the then British prime minister was not very interested in East Africa at this time, and wanted German diplomatic support against France for the British position in Egypt.

If the partition of East Africa gave Britain at least a reasonable, share it was because Bismarck wanted her support in Europe. In 1886 there was a crisis in the Balkans and a possibility of a war between German, Austria and Italy on the one side, and France and Russia on the other. Germany wanted the British Navy to protect Italy against the French Navy. Thus lines were drawn across Africa to suit the convenience of the European diplomatic power game.

Nationalism and Racialism

Another important factor in the partition of Africa was the emergence of public opinion in support of national pride in the acquisition of colonies in Europe. The governments had to pay more attention to their electorates than earlier in the century. Voters generally had little knowledge of colonial matters, but were strongly in favour of their country acquiring colonies. Part of the reason why the French Assembly ratified the De-Brazza- Makoko Treaty was because of the pressure of public opinion. Assa Okoth, in his book, A History of Tropical Africa 1855-1914 quotes a prominent French politician in 1885 thus:

> "It is necessary that our country put itself in a position to so what the others are doing, and because colonial expansion is the most important means at this time used by all the European powers, it is necessary that we play our part."

Moreover, M. Tidy in his History of Tropical Africa Vol II cites the fact that public opinion was at the centre of what influenced Bismarck to seek colonies in Africa. In 1884 there were elections in the Reichstag (parliament) and Bismarck realized that if his supporters were going to be elected he would have to change his previous policy of opposition to colonization. As noted earlier he created German protectorates in South West Africa, Togo, the Cameroon and Tanganyika.

Moreover, the influence of the press and colonial societies led many Europeans to favour imperial polices. In England the Daily Mail was becoming the most popular paper and it was strongly imperialistic. The Times was widely read by the British ruling class and one of its journalists was Flora Show, who later married Lugard. She strongly favoured the expansion of the British empire in Africa and wrote articles supporting such men as Goldie, Rhodes, Johnston and Lugard, M. Tidy also gives examples of active societies for colonization in Europe. For instance, the Primrose League encouraged the Conservative Party to support imperial policies. On the other hand, the most active colonial society in Germany was the society for German Colonization, founded in 1884 by Karl Peter.

In France and Italy various geographical societies and newspapers supported imperialism in Africa.

Two racial factors were also responsible for the scramble for Africa. In the first place, industrialization gave rise to theories of racial superiority of the white man. Europeans advanced the theory that because Africa had not yet industrialized, Africans must be inferior to whites, who in turns were commissioned by history to dominate them. Jules Ferry asserted again to the French Chamber;

> "It must be said openly that
> the superior (white) races in effect
> have a right vis-a –vis
> the inferior (black) races"

In the same sort of belief, Caprivi, the German Chancellor in 1890 is quoted saying that,

> "One believes that if we
> had colonies, and bought
> an atlas and coloured Africa
> blue, we would then be a great people."

In the second place, explorers' and missionaries' tales of the relatively backward condition of Africa made humanitarians feel and hear the voice of providence summoning them to save the black man. Even Livingstone, that shady character who is sometimes regarded as the doyern of missionary efforts in Central Africa, failed to disguise his extremely benevolent and paternalistic attitude to the Africans. To him Africans were,

> "Merely grown up children,
> A race that will only attain
> the maturity of other
> men after they have been
> persuaded to stop worshipping
> hills, wood rivers and
> malignant spirits of their
> own dead." Cited from Assa
> Okoth, A History of Tropical Africa.

His countrymen responded by arriving to do the "persuading" and subsequently invited or encouraged their home government to put under its protection, the "dark" lands of Africa occupied by human beings so much in need of European "light."

It must be emphasized that while public opinion and racial beliefs certainly caused the scramble for colonies, they were not as important as, for instance, the rise of Germany on the humiliation of France. Public opinion and racial beliefs were important in the sense that they increased a public awareness of the need to acquire colonies. One can argue convincingly that they came as an added impetus to a process that had already begun and was in motion. Before looking at actors which encouraged the scramble for Africa in various provinces, it is necessary to look at another general European event which had momentous results on the scramble for Africa as a whole.

THE BERLIN WEST AFRICA CONFERENCE, 1884-1885: LEOPOLD II OF BELGIUM.

May be what reveals that the Congo had the most competitiveness on the Scramble for Africa was the fact that the Berlin West Africa Conference had to be convened in order to resolve the counter- claims which surrounded this region.

Leopold, King of the Belgians intended to exploit the economic potential of the Congo (ivory and rubber) for personal gain. He set up the African International Association in 1877 to open up the region and this attracted widespread support in Europe. This was mainly because the African International Association purported to establish commercial and scientific stations in central Africa. These were to be attached to missionary stations and protected by military garrisons. Thus far, Leopold's intentions looked noble, for the first of these stations were set up in 1878 and 1879 at the white Fathers' Missions at Tabora and Lake Tanganyika in order to enhance efforts to abolish the slave trade. However, Leopold's humanitarian motives soon changed to grim profit making adventures. How did this happen?

(i) The Role of Henry Morton Stanley

Stanley, the journalist who had met Livingstone at Ujiji in 1871 had tried to carry on Livingstone's work by exploring the Lualaba area. In 1879 Stanley made an agreement with Leopold to explore the vast area of the Congo in exchange for a vast sum of money.

Between 1879 and 1884 Stanley therefore travelled up the Congo establishing road and river communications from Kisangani to the coast and building a solid base in the Congo basin for Leopold's future commercial enterprise. But he was not the only one in the field. Savorgan de Brazza was in 1882 busy obtaining a treaty from Chief Makoko of the Teke whose lands were north of the river. In this treaty, as noted earlier in the chapter, Makoko apparently ceded his territory to France. Therefore Leopold suddenly became aware that his efforts to run the area would suddenly come to nothing unless he first assumed political control of the area. Stanley was consequently instructed to make treaties with the Vii chiefs south of the river.

ii) Leopold's diplomatic moves

Leopold immediately became aware of the sharp interests which the other European rival powers had over the Congo. These included Britain, France Germany, Portugal and, nominally, America. His network of diplomacy eventually explained why he emerged as the winner in the Congo.

Leopold dealt with possible French opposition by signing a secret treaty with France in which he promised them to take over the Congo if he failed to run it. He made the French believe that he had financial difficulties, hence the French landed their support to Leopold.

German support was obtained by a show of favourable views on Bismarck's claims to the other parts of Africa. In this way, Bismarck backed Leopold's claims on the Congo. Moreover, Leopold secured American support when his American secretary, Stanford, told the American Government that Leopold's main aim was to abolish the slave trade in the area.

Lasting opposition to Leopold's manouvres in the Congo came from Britain. Britain was deeply worried about the safety of Baptist missionaries there. In February 1884 Britain signed a treaty with Portugal giving the Portuguese control of the Congo estuary: this cut Leopold off from the coast. Leopold therefore responded by offering profitable contracts to British, merchants and by promising, Britain that he would be more understandings in the Congo and more cooperative in abolishing the slave trade than the French and the Portuguese. In the face of this persuasion, Britain abandoned her agreement with Portugal, but would not give full support to Leopold's claims in the Congo.

iii) The Berlin Conference, 1884-85.

The network of secret diplomacy between Leopold and other European powers as well as counter-claims over the Congo by Britain, France and Portugal threatened to degenerate into chaos. The Bolivi conference was called by Bismarck to resolve these areas of tension. During this session, H.M. Stanley argued a strong case, for Leopold. The treaties he had obtained from the Vari Chiefs were absolutely valid since they had undisputed rights over the land which they held. The Conference therefore bequeathed to Leopold most of the Congo Basin down to the Congo-Zambezi watershed. His territory thus included the mineral-rich Katanga-which was to be collectively known as the Congo Free State.
Moreover, the Berlin Conference also gave formal recognition to the claims of Portugal, France, Germany and Britain, France and Britain were also given part of the Congo Basin and the division was recognized by all the powers. The Niger Basin was split between Britain and France. The occupiers of all these areas were to allow free trade as well as enforce the abolition of the slave trade. Bismarck's earlier acquisitions were recognized as well during the Berlin conference.

The Berlin Conference was important, M. Tidy argues, in favour of the impetus it gave to European occupation of Africa. This is because the conference laid down the doctrine of effective occupation of Africa. Under this doctrine a European power could only claim African territory if it could prove first that it actually administered it or could move in and do the same. Therefore this doctrine was a powerful stimulus to actual European invasion on the ground in order to make good the claims made on maps. Hence between 1885 and 1912 all the continent, except Liberia and Ethiopia, was overrun by European-led military forces and brought under European colonial rule.

Moreover, the doctrine of effective occupation was also intended to put a stop to Britain's practice of asserting a vague right to "influence" over many parts of Africa. It thereby obliged the powers to prove their possession of many parts of the

continent through two measures. First, all claims had to be backed by valid treaties made prior to occupation by African chiefs. Secondly, all claims could remain invalid except if they were followed up by eventual occupation. Such inducements no doubt gave the scramble a feverish step as European powers rushed to obtain treaties within the areas which they originally laid claim on some of these treaties, due to the urgency in which they were obtained, turned out to be an absolute fraud which eventually led to military conflict with the African chiefs.

It is important to note that the Berlin conference did not partition Africa along exact boundary lines. Rather, it defined spheres of influence near the coast and left vast areas of the interior unallocated to any European power. However, later colonial treaties between European powers enabled precise boundaries to be drawn. The conference hence, laid down some important ground rules which enabled the processes of the scramble and partition of Africa to run generally smoothly without any war between the European powers themselves.

EXPLANATIONS FOR IMPERIALISM

Economic interpretations

A famous British economist, JA. Hobson, and following after him V.I Lenin- attributed the colonial explanations to some economic forces that were at work in the industrializing nations of Europe. J.A Hobson's economic explanation of the urge to imperialism is usually taken to mean that the root cause behind any political religious or any explanation offered, was capitalistic greed for cheap raw materials, advantageous markets, good investments and fresh fields of exploitation. Hobson termed it the "economic transport of imperialism" and "excessive capital in search of investment," and that this excessive capital came from over saving made possible by the unequal distribution of wealth. David Thomson, in his book, Europe since Napoleon, has quoted Hobson expounding his theory further saying,

"If the consuming public in
this country raised its
standard of consumption to
keep pace with every rise
of productive powers,
there could be no excess of
goods or capital clamours
to use imperialism in
order to find market."

Very closely related in many ways and almost an expansion of the same argument was Lenin's theory published in his pamphlet, Imperialism the Highest stage of Capitalism, (1916) He also emphasized the fact that finance capital, rather than industrialization was in need of new and fresh outlets for investment.

It is undeniable that the search for lucrative yet secure investment overseas played an extremely important part in the European urge for colonies at the end of the 19th century. Of

course, we realize that it was more of the hope of finding such markets and outlets that the scramble for African territory was made. A.A Boahen in his book, Topics on West African History even goes further to illustrate that the actual market realized in Africa amounted to only 2%. Nevertheless, colonies had been conquered in order to secure such vital sources of raw materials, markets and investment.

The above argument, whilst relevant and accurate is not totally convincing. It is actually remarkable to note that countries such as Germany, Italy and Portugal did not necessarily boast of any excessive capital or anything near it which they wanted to invest. Rather, Italy and Portugal were actually some of the poorest countries in Europe and yet they were at the forefront to acquire colonies. It simply meant that other reasons other than a "glut" in capital were at the core of their search for colonies.

Moreover, France and Germany went into a feverish mood to search for colonies after 1880. The economic balance sheets of these countries show the opposite of excessive production. Both countries perhaps achieved full industrialization just before 1890, way after they had acquired colonies. It is undeniable that political, rather than economic factors, as already highlighted, were surely more responsible for the clamour for colonies.

Moreover, David Thomson alludes to some very interesting argument. Sweden and Denmark, countries had high standard of living in latter part of the 19th century but had no colonies at all. But where the standard of living was low, such as in France, Belgium and Portugal, large colonial acquisitions were made. While economic causes certainly played a part in the urge for colonies, it is important to note that they came second to political considerations. One cannot deny the fact that the competition for the Congo the Niger and even the Nile was for economic and strategic considerations, but it is important to realize that Hobson and Lenin's arguments were essentially flawed and widely generalized.
Needless to re-echo the non- economic considerations of the urge to imperialism at this stage since the greater part of this chapter has been devoted to that.

The Partition of West Africa.

(i) George Goldie and the Royal Niger Company

George Goldie Taubman, better known by his later title of Sir George Goldie, was the founder of the Royal Niger Company. Goldie arrived in Nigeria in 1877 and found three other companies operating in that area James Pinnock of Liverpool, The West African company of Manchester and Alexander Milter Brothers of Glasgow. He quickly studied their problem and established that the four British firms and a few French firms were engaged in fierce competition and yet realized little profit.

Goldie's decision was to amalgamate all these firms through buying them off, elimination through competition, and setting up a trade monopoly. However, Goldie could not get rid of African merchants and middlemen in the area. The solution to this was to secure political control over the Oil Rivers. In this way, the flag followed trade on the Niger.

Moreover, Goldie managed to persuade the four British companies to come together and form the United African Company, pooling their assets, ships, stores and staff for a more

economical and profitable operation. In this way, the British United African Company increased its bargaining power by fixing the price of palm oil and other products which they could pay to African producers and middlemen. Thus the new company hoped to raise the capital needed to open regular trading relations with Hausaland. Eventually, Goldie hoped he would be able to add the region of the Niger to the British Empire. However, French competition from the French agent Comte de Semelle and his company Campaini-e Francais de (Afrique Equatriale was so great that by 1882 these French and British companies were almost at par in economic strength.

However, Goldie tried to ward off the French threat in two ways. First, he proposed that his company would establish a protectorate over the Niger following the acquisition of a charter from the British Queen. As a result the National African Company was formed in 1882 with a view to receiving a charter in order to exclude competition in that region by political means.

Secondly, Goldi-e tried to persuade the French Companies to amalgamate with his own. When they refused to cooperate, he declared a prince war against them, using most of his personal fortune and undercutting their prices by as much as twenty- five percent. He also undertook a large expansion in the number of stations. These measures proved highly successful and by 1844 the French firms had been driven into bankruptcy and were subsequently bought out by Goldie's company. Hence military and economic tactics were used by Goldie in securing the Niger for the exclusive use by the British.

The other source of competition was the Germans. But they were forestalled by the presence of British gun-boats on the Niger, plus Goldie's shrewd treaty- making campaigns with the interior states of Nupe, Sokoto, Brass, Bonny and Benin. These treaties which also ceded to the company "the whole territories of the signatories" were also designed to prove to Britain how much authority the company had gained in the Niger Delta and even beyond The Company was accordingly granted a charter in 1886 and changed its name from National African Company to the Royal Niger Company.

Henceforth the Charter empowered the company to administer justice and maintain order in the areas where it was authorized to do so by the treaties between it, and African chiefs required it to abolish the slave trade, but not to interfere with the laws, customs and religions of Africans. It was also forbidden from practicing monopoly on the Niger.

Impact

The impact of the take-over of the Niger by the Royal Niger Company was immense. Brass' trade for instance, declined. Smuggling in the Niger territories was put down by forming company police action. Brass traders were even unable to collect debts from Ijo palm oil producers in company territory. The Company seized food canoes bringing yams and cassava from its territories to Brass, and the people of Brass began to starve. The King of Brass, Ebeja continued to support the British but when he died, his successor, Koko led a thousand canoes in a fight against the British. The city of Akassa which was situated next to Nembe, Brass's capital was poorly defended and therefore was thoroughly run over.

However, the Company mounted an even more violent revenge against Nembe, the capital of Brass. War canoes were confiscated and the inhabitants of Nembe went into destitution. Eventually, as M-Tidy points out, the company's charter was taken away by the British government, but the oppression of Brass was not the reason for this. The government had become unhappy at the use of the company's police on punitive expeditions against African communities which challenged the company's monopolistic practices. The government was also unhappy with exclusion of rival white British traders and British African traders from Sierra Leone, Lagos and the delta.

However, Colonial secretary Joseph Chamberlain was unhappy about the fact that the company failed to prevent French expansion into northern Nigeria. He decided that direct action by the British government was required. He set up the West Africa Frontier Force under Lugard in 1897 to stop the French advance in Bongu and then settled boundaries of Northern Nigeria by making the Anglo- French agreement of 1898. Since the British taxpayer was now doing Goldie's work for him, Britain ended the charter of the Royal Niger Company on January 1, 1900 and began to administer its territories directly with Lugard as high Commissioner for Northern Nigeria.

RESPONSE TO COLONIAL ENCROACHMENT: THE NDEBELE STATE

The general character of the scramble in Matabeleland was determined by the nature of the Matabele state on the one hand and by the nature of the European intrusion on the other. According to historian Richard Brown, writing in The Zambesian Past: Studies in Central African History (by E. stokes and R. Brown (editors), a highly centralized and militarilised society faced a powerful European advance aiming not at a mere "paper protectorate," but at the rapid establishment of a colony of settlement. He argued that it was the interaction of these two factors which made it highly improbable that the Ndebele state would survive even partly intact. Matabeleland was a key area in the whole strategy of the scramble in Southern Africa and once the imperial government had decided to give virtually free reign to the Cape Colony's expansive movement led by Cecil John Rhodes, a military conflict was almost inevitable.

The white capitalist intrusion represented mainly by the British South Africa company (BSACo) had a well-known military strength and political determination to take over, not only Matabeleland, but the sub-region as well. The strength of the movement which set up the British South Africa Company rule south of the Limpopo was well known and the fact that Mzilikazi had suffered defeat at the hands of the Boers in 1839, somewhat helped to frame future Ndebele policy towards all white encroachment. They became suspicious and afraid of the whites, and always treated them with great caution.

In the period before the scramble, the Ndebele state was regarded as one of the leading African powers south of the Zambezi. The colonial governments of South Africa, treated, with marked deference and recognized that white hunters and traders who visited Matabeleland put themselves under the exclusive sovereignty of a king. They equally respected Ndebele military power. It is important therefore to note that both the Ndebele and the encroaching groups had mutual fear and suspicion of each other. Ndebele response to

the whites advancement was therefore partly determined by this fear and restraint which Lobengula had, and it was also determined by the popular pressures which were brought to bear upon him by his subordinates.
The great dependence of the economy and social organization on continual success in war was vitally significant in determining Ndebele responses to the scramble. By the 1880's there was an evident feeling that the existing raiding grounds were more or less exhausted. At the same time, the fact that there was an increase in the supply of guns into the interior of the country made

Ndebele raids less successful. Nevertheless by the time of the scramble, raiding was still an integral part of the Matabele system. The economy relied heavily on cattle captured in war and large numbers were slaughtered for meat and skins. Control of the cattle was normally in the hands of the king, but they ere used to reward followers, and milk from the herds placed in the charge of regimental towns was an important part of their diet. Richard Brown further writes that it was the subordinate leaders, especially the younger men with a position still to win that sought captives as a means of building up their power and prestige, while the regiments had first to win in battle in order to be allowed to marry. Not surprisingly, therefore, it was the younger members of the two dominant sections of the people, in particular, the amatjahar, unmarried soldiers, who were mostly opposed to the white advance. The raiding system, Lobengula accurately claimed, "was indispensably necessary to the preservation of his power and the political existence of his people."

However, Ngwavi Bhebhe, in his article, "Ndebele Politics during the Scramble," has given more insight into Lobengula's responses to white colonial penetration. He argues that while it is true that some young men (amatjaha) were burning for a clash with the white intruders, it cannot be doubted that it was not necessarily the desire to achieve manhood. That was less important. Rather, it appears their desire for war derived mainly from their fear of western economic penetration as well as the need to preserve their way of life. Bhebhe further indicates that the issue that seems to have vexed the people most during this period of the scramble was not one of kingship but the question of how best to solve the problem of intruding foreigners. It is well known that the coming of the whites split the Ndebele ruling class, with one faction advocating a solution that would enable the state to come to terms with the Europeans while preserving as much of their way of life as possible and the second calling for violent means of excluding the white men from Matabeleland.

However, it must be noted that these groups were not so clearly defined as is implied by the above generalization. The very nature of their activities which often took the form of intrigue against each other and the fact that many Ndebele debates took place in the absence of Europeans who might have recorded the proceedings, make it almost impossible to study them with much certainty. Ndebele response to the European advances can therefore be best analyzed through the behavior of the leading politicians during the era of the scramble.

Some of the dominant figures in the 1880s and 1890s were Lobengula himself, Lotshe Hlabangana, Sikombo, Gambo, Sithole and Mlegisane Mzezie. Before discussing the responses of these key individuals during the scramble, let us focus briefly on the attitudes

of the white visitors who came to Matabeleland during the era of the scramble, mainly 1885 and beyond.

Attitudes of white visitors to the Ndebele state.

In many parts of Africa pre-colonial contacts with whites had an important bearing on the position of African societies at the time of the partition. Among the Ndebele, such contacts were fairly extensive. Almost without exception, the whites who came into contact with the Matabele denounced the raiding system. The traders denounced it because it led to a semi-parasitic economy which inhibited the growth of trade. The preachers hated it because it appeared to stand in the way of conversion. The colonial governments of South Africa, on the other hand, sharply criticized it because it stood in the way of commerce and the migration of labour to that country. Hunters were the most welcome visitors at the King's kraal but their impact on the Ndebele state was limited.

Not surprisingly, in view of the nature of the state, the majority of the Ndebele were fervent opponents of European influences. At the same time, Mzilikazi and Lobengula were well aware that it was dangerous to quarrel with whites in the circumstances of 19th century South Africa. Indeed, it is clear that both kings followed political developments in the sub-continent as closely as they could. They saw certain advantages in limited co-operation. Lobengula shrewdly manipulated the European influences around him to gain support in his struggle to retain the throne, but like his father, saw that the outright cooperation practiced by a chief like Khama would lead to rebellion in Matabeleland. In short, Matabeleland proved highly resistant to the twin influences of Christianity and commerce which elsewhere in Africa so often smoothed the way to European control.

With some reluctance, Mzilikazi permitted the setting up of a mission in Matabeleland in 1859. John Smith Moffat, one of the founders of the mission, believed that,."
"There is no blinking of the fact that the
Tendency of Christianity is to overturn native government."

But he also saw that the missionary impact varied greatly, depending on the type of African society involved, and that Matabeleland was a vastly different case from Bechuanaland. His attitudes were justified for although the missionaries were occasionally made use of in diplomatic, technical and medical affairs, they were never allowed to gain any real influence, with the people. The suggestion that a fourth member should join the mission, brought a firm refusal from, Mzilikazi, on the grounds that the Ndebele would certainly murder a newcomer.

"He did not wish to act in opposition to the desire of his people who had set their faces firmly against any further opening of the country to foreigners" wrote Mzilikazi." John Smith Moffat how Asked know it was that he allowed the Boers to go were they pleased. He said, ", they come to trade and hunt' and then go about their business." It is to these people settling in the country that the Matabele object." He added that some of his people were asking that we too might be sent away."

Lobengula permitted the opening of a second mission station soon after his succession in 1870, but was almost certainly part of his policy of winning European support against a rival claimant to the throne, and hopes of a new era soon faded as Lobengula resumed his fathers policy towards the missionaries. When John smith Moffat returned to the country in 1887 after twenty-one years absence, he commented.

"I fear things are very little further than when I left. It is a remarkable case. I fear that there will be no change for the better until there has been a breaking- up of the Matabele power and a change in the whole regime."

The almost complete failure of missionary endeavour had a direct bearing on the situation during the scramble. The missionaries' lack of support made them supporters of Rhodes and their hatred of the raiding system made them silent witnesses of measures against the Matabele which they could not approve, but would not oppose. This was very different from Bechuanaland and Nyasaland where missionaries, as a result of their success became critics of their fellow whites. The attitude of the Matabele missionaries was strikingly confirmed by their superior, Rev R.W. Thompson, Foreign secretary of the London Missionary society. On the outbreak of war in 1893 he wrote."

"I am conscious also that there is good reason for saying that the missionary interest has been on the side of the chartered company. The fact is, some of us who have been pretty closely connected with work in Matabeleland for many years past have been sorely troubled as to the attitude we ought to take."

He had long been convinced that a war was inevitable and that the existing Matabele system made missionary work impossible. "All that is needed is that the tyranny under which they live should be broken and a different government substituted for it "Thompson pointed out.
The Ndebele were nearly as indifferent to the trade as to the religion brought by the whites. The activities of the hunters and traders who entered the country with increasing frequency after 1852 were also strictly controlled. In particular, the law against prospecting was almost always enforced. By the 1880s a handful of traders had settled permanently in Matabeleland, but they were very dependent on Lobengula and their trade was precarious.

They had to pay a heavy blackmail to influential officials at court, while the king frequently helped himself to their goods without payment. The traders were said to be facing bankruptcy until Rhodes, for the purposes of enlisting them as spies, began to subsidize them.

Moreover, the Ndebele entered the period of the scramble without allies whether black or white. According to F.S. Arnot, an early historian writing on Matabeleland sometime between 1882 and 1884, Lobengula asked Lewanika of Barotseland" to join with the Matabele in resisting the invading white man." But the call was refused, Lewanika preferring to look to Khama in Bechuanaland as an ally. Khama himself had a double motive in cooperating with Rhodes since he hoped to end the threat of Matabele raids and extend territorially at Matabele expense. In the Matabele hour of crisis in1893 both Khama and Lewanika were willing to join their hands with Rhodes against their old raiders.

As far as the whites were concerned all the purposes for which they came to central Africa were thwarted by the nature of the Ndebele society. The Ndebele state stood in the line of their advance since it occupied a region of great strategic importance, expected mineral wealth and known pastoral potential. The whites thus plotted the Ndebele's downfall.
Lobengula himself realized, together with his chief men closest to him, the great dangers threatening the Matabele Kingdom. However the unjustified self-confidence of his subjects as a whole was a factor of some significance in the policies he was forced to pursue.

Lobengula clearly tried to thwart the white advance, but felt unable to check it completely. He was in a great dilemma. His internal position was not precarious that it led him as it led Lewanika to a large measure of cooperation with the whites, nor was it sufficiently strong to enable him to act decisively. To resist outright the mounting pressures from the Cape was to risk being violently overthrown by Rhodes and his part. On the other hand, outright cooperation would provoke his overthrow from within his own empire.

Lobengula's reaction to political encroachment.
It is important to note at the outset that Lobengula wanted a peaceful solution with the whites to avoid a violent destruction of his kingdom. His search for a peaceful compromise with the Europeans also emanated from his unwar like nature. Lobengula was a man who relied on diplomacy and negotiations rather than on military solutions. A traditionalist has contrasted Lobengula, whom he says "was lever at trying cases" with his father Mzilikazi, a soldier, who often led his army into battle.
One of the most important aspects of this topic is to understand clearly why Lobengula signed treaties with the white concession seekers during 1887 and twice in 1888. One thing certain was that Lobengula disliked signing any agreements for fear that he would find himself entrapped into something more than he would have agreed to. J.S. Moffat found Lobengula to be shrewdly anxious to guage what effect a treaty with the English was likely to have on his relations, first with his own subject and also with the Boers.

Historian Richard Brown writes that Lobengula was frightened by J.S. Moffat about the extensive rights the Transvaal claimed on the basis of the Grobler Treaty (1887), obtained through Piet J. Grobler. Whatever Lobengula's reasons for agreeing to the Moaffat Treaty, it should be noted that the terms were minimal and could have appeared entirely in accord with a policy of excluding white influences since it would only come into effective operation if the king wished to give away his country, which he was clearly not intending to do. Even if Lobengula knew that in the eyes of the outside world the long-term implications of the treaty were that he had virtually reserved his dominious as a sphere of British interests, he hoped that a mild British protectorate such as what Khama was experiencing would be extended to Matabele land. He was totally unaware that the full force of Rhodes' ambitious scheme for colonization and dispossession was being considered behind his back!

Why did Lobengula sign the Rudd Concession?
The Rudd concession was the key event in the scramble for Matabeleland: it provided the basis' for the application for a Royal Charter which led to thirty- three years of chartered company rule. In light of the known attitude of the Ndebele towards white penetration, the

granting of such an extensive concession as claimed by Rudd seems to mark a complete reversal of the king's earlier policies, especially as the private reports of Moffat who was the most reliable observer in Matabeleland show that earlier Matabele attitudes to foreign influences were being strongly maintained in the months before the concession was signed. It is important therefore to try and discover what lay behind this apparent shift in policy.

1. It has been suggested, that one of the main reasons why Charles Dunnell Rudd and his colleagues Richard K Thompson and Rotchfort Maguire owed their success to the support they received in their negotiations from imperial officials such as sir Hercules Robinson, Governor of the Cape and High Commissioner; J.s. Moffat and shippard. Although Robinson denied the claims by pointing out that both Moaffat and Shippard had left the country before the Rudd concession had been signed, this has long proven to be false. This is because the Rudd party started the negotiations on 26 September 1888 Shippard only left the country on 23 October 1888 and Moffat three days later, while the concession was signed on 30 October. This clearly shows that both Shippard and Moaffat were actively involved in the negotiations prior to the actual signing of the Rudd concession. The actual dates of signing the concession as well as their departure are therefore immaterial.
2. In Addition, Robinson himself was urging, in July 1888, Moffat's immediate return to Matabeleland, not only to counteract Transvaal activity but also "to prevent Lobengula from making any more promises or concessions of any kind except they are sanctioned by the British High commissioner. This exactly met the wishes of Rhodes who already was thinking of a charter had seen his first attempt to obtain a concession fail. Rhodes informed shippard that he was now afraid "Lobengula may give away his whole country to bogus companies who will do nothing for government and what is left for that country will not be worth our De Beer Co. while to make any offer to pay expenses of good government." Hence Shippard was asked to pass on to Moffat the ideas which Rhodes was evolving in the hope that Moffat might be able to prevent the king granting concessions "to a lot of adventurers who will do nothing but the country up."

   Directly in response to Rhodes' pleas, Moffat reported a week later that "I, have put the chief in possession of the view and wishes of the Government respecting the grant of concession…He will in all probability be unconsciously influenced by what I have said to adopt the course we desire." He further wrote on the same day to shippard, privately, "I do not think the chief has any serious intention of handing over his country to any one, and he is getting impatient of the crowd of concession seekers and would be glad of some way of getting rid of them all. I may be able to take advantage of this state of mind but it all requires time." These revelations clearly indicate the intricate role played by Moffat. He took advantage of the trust which he had got from Lobengula when he came to Matabeleland and worked as a missionary between 1859 and 1865. The fact that he had now returned to Matabeleland as a government official working steadfastly for the destruction of the Ndebele state was totally unknown to Lobengula. Moaffat was truly the chameleon

at work! Lobengula unwittingly revealed all his fears to Moaffat not knowing that such revelations were to be used as a web to trap him.

3. Nevertheless, the fact that Britain's representatives urged Lobengula to accept Rudd's proposals, though no doubt important, is not a sufficient explanation of his decision. Thompson thought that it was the boldness of the ammunitions clause, under which Lobengula would receive 1000 modern rifles and 100 000 rounds of ammunition, coupled with the assurances that no land was sought, which had most appeal.

   Another reason why Lobengula signed the Rudd concession may have been due to the persuasion he received from his chief induna. Bhebhe and R. Brown are agreed on this point. R. Brown suggests that Lotje, Hlabangana, and Sikombo may have been offered rewards for their assistance in the negotiations. N. Bhebhe, on the other hand, explains more vividly in corroboration of the same point. He asserts that during the negotiations for the Rudd concession. Lotshe, Hlabangana, Magwegwe Fuyana of Bulawayo, a faithful induna of Lobengula, and one Sikombo retired from an indaba to a private hut where the king was and persuaded the king to sign the Rudd Concession.
   Hlabangana's motives for wanting the whites to come in according to Professor Stanlake Samkange may have been varied. First, he may have been "bribed by Thompson and promised a sum of three hundred gold sovereigns for his support in securing the concession." Secondly, Samkange points out that the induna wanted the guns promised in the concession to modernize the weapons of the Ndebele army, which was loosing the balance of power to its neighbours who were increasingly relying on firearms.
4. Be that as it may, it is not adequate to explain why Lobengula eventually agreed to sign the Rudd Concession. It is important to note that on the eve of the concession Lobengula was faced with what appeared to be two great pressures in the scramble for Matabeleland. All the information at his disposal led him to believe that his kingdom was in imminent danger of being overrun by land-hungry Boers from the Transvaal. His second problem concerned the mounting influence of Europeans inside Matabeleland. Any policy which opened the country to further European penetration, which was one way of diffusing the threat from Transvaal, heightened internal opposition. This was clear at the time of Shippard's visit in October 1888, Moffat greeted him with the news that the soldiers of one regiment had been trying to persuade Lobengula to let them massacre all the white men in Matabeleland. "Their argument was that although there are about 30 white men here now, who as they said would be a mere breakfast for them, thousands may come hereafter unless the few are killed, so as to frighten the others; and they also clamoured to be led against the white men's towns," said Moffat. Another regiment was asking for permission to kill their indunas "who they said, are old women and cowards, and to elect others who would not be afraid to lead them against the white men."

Lobengula's answer to these demands was, "You want to drive me into the Lion's mouth." Shippard write to Robinson.

5. Lobengula must have been persuaded to sign the Rudd Concession, one school of thought says mainly because of the existence of verbal clauses which the King was made to believe that they would be binding. Three of these clauses were quite central to Lobengula: that any white miners should be bound to fight in defence of the country that no miners or equipment machinery should be introduced before the first installment of rifles had been delivered; and that notices would be put in South African and English papers to keep speculators out of the country. All these verbal undertakings must have helped to reassure Lobengula and his indunas, but the most significant undertakings of all is not mentioned by Rudd.

   However, in March, 1889 when the concession had become a matter of great controversy among rival white groups as well as with the Matabele themselves, the Rev Charles D. Helm informed the London Missionary society of his interpretation of the concession which includes the following important statement:
   "They promised that they would not bring more than 10 white men to work in his country; that they would not dig anywhere near towns etc and that they would abide by the laws of his country and in fact be as his people.
   If true, this verbal promise of limiting the number of whites who were to come into the country to ten men must surely alter Lobengula's motives in reaching an agreement. Helm is unlikely to have made this up since he was himself closely connected with the concession. He welcomed the plans for the concession outlined by Rudd, agreed to be first to put them to Lobengula unaccompanied by any of Rudd's party, was the interpreter throughout the two day long Indaba which preceded the signing of the concession, and later consistently upheld its validity. Moreover, on two separate occasions Lobengula referred to this particular promise when refusing to recognize the written concession; in one case actually mentioning the figure 'ten' and it seems unlikely that he could have derived this particular idea from any other source than the one indicated by Helm.

   In the light of the verbal promises Lobengula must have felt that he had gone a long way towards solving both his problems. On the one hand he was to receive a powerful armory which could be used if the threats of Boer or Portuguese agents ever surfaces; and on the other at the price of only 10 white men in the country, who were to be under his authority, his country was to be sealed against further white penetration. In addition he was to receive a handsome royalty of £100 per lunar month and a gun boat on the Zambezi or £500. It was too good to be true.

   However, it is not difficult to imagine that Lobengula believed that in signing the concession he had reconciled the irreconcilable and dealt satisfactorily with the external threat without at the same time unduly heightening that from within. It was not unrealistic on his part to believe that ten white men with a Matabele labour force

would be all that would be required to carry on mining. The mines at Tati had been running on and off since 1869 on that kind of scale.

6 It is also possible that Lobengula's often-repeated claim that he that he was giving away rights to "one hole" was genuine and allayed whatever fears he might have had and went on to sign the Rudd concession. E.A Maund after he had become the firm ally of Rhodes stated, "Everything goes to prove that the document was "rushed out of him as even Helm, who backed the paper was sound admits that the king only thought he was giving away a "hole." Maund wrote to Rhodes on 25 December 1889.

Whatever the exact details, there can be no doubt that there was a fundamental discriminancy between Lobengula's understanding of the concession and the use Rhodes intended to make of it. To Lobengula, the concession and its verbal promises were to limit severely the activities of whites in his kingdom. To Rhodes the written concession alone was valid and was to be the key to opening both Matabeleland and Mashonaland to commercial company rule.

The subsequent struggle over the concession should be seen against these strikingly opposed views. Lobengula failed to sustain his version, but his evasive tactics in the end succeeded in forcing Rhodes to concentrate solely on Mashonaland.

What was the impact of the singing of the Rudd Concession?

(i) Upon Lobengula?

(ii) Matabeleland and Mashonaland?

(iii) The Scramble and Partition of Southern Africa?

Lobengula soon became aware that he had not, after all, reconciled his problems when rival concession seekers pointed out to him what was being printed about the Rudd concession in the South African papers. The document itself contained, following the sole mineral rights clause, the highly ambiguous phrase "together with full power to do all things necessary to win and procure the same." It was capable of a restricted definition which Helm, mindful of the verbal clauses, insisted upon, or of a much more extensive interpretation, easily stimulated by the newspaper reports such as was pressed by Rhodes' rivals and which came to be believed by a large number of Ndebele indunas (not so incorrectly as matters turned out).

The main deficiency of the written concession in the eyes of the Ndebele was the impossibility of showing categorically that it granted no rights to land. Lobengula was now caught between the pressure of the concessionaires who tried to uphold the written concession and a strong Matabele party who refused to accept the concession. Direct confrontation, however, was postponed while Rhodes for a royal charter. In the meanwhile the written document was first suspended and then repudiated by the King.

Following Lobengula's repudiation of the Rudd concession, the next thing was to send as notice to the newspapers on 18 January 1889. In this notice Lobengula announced that he

was suspending all action on the concession. However the notice was immediately dismissed by the Rhodes' party as fraudulent because of the absence of independent witnesses. Nevertheless, the written concession was never properly reinstated from that day forward.

It is important to note that Lobengula did not deny that he had made an agreement, but he refused to recognize the concession document as accurate. His point of view was indicated by accepting the £100 per lunar month and rejecting delivery of the guns. The whole matter must first be reconsidered.

Lobengula's search for redress went further when he sent his two indunas Babiyane and Commander in chief Mtshane accompanied by E.A Maund as early as December 188. Maund was at this point (immediately after the signing of the Rudd Concession) was a rival of Rhodes. Lobengula sent his party to England to seek audience with the Queen. The embassy reached England on 27 February 1889, a month before Rhodes arrived in search of a charter, and he received a message from the Colonial Office containing the clear implication that Lobengula should lessen the scope of the written concession.

However unknown to Lobengula, Maund changed loyalties whilst still in London, accompanying Lobengla's indunas! Rhodes contacted him and informed him through an agent of the BSACo that he should do the best to advance Rhodes' interests and defend the Rudd concession. This is because Rhodes had just amalgamated Maund's principals in the Bechuanaland Exploration Company with the BSACo. Maund simply delayed return with the indunas while Rhodes continue to negotiate for the Charter. The details of Lobengula's relations with the imperial government cannot be followed here, but it is clear that long before Maund's eventual return to Matabeleland in August 1889, Lobengula was losing the battle in London.

Moreover, once Lord Salisbury had decided to use Rhodes and a charter as the instrument of its southern African policies, Lobengula's freedom of manoeuvre had become menacingly limited. In the short term, however, Lobengula still had the option to adopt three possible outcomes. He could have fully recognized the written concession, allow unlimited numbers of British South Africa Company miners into the country, and delegate jurisdiction over them to the company: This course of action was the one desired by the company and the British Government. It was the one most unlikely to be followed, however, since Lobengula's purge of the pro-European faction. This was symbolized by the order of the induna Lotshe Hlabangana in September 1889 for his part in being too friendly with Rudd and Thompson during the negotiating process. This was a clear indication of the continued hostility to foreign influences which the king could ignore only at his peril.

Secondly, Lobengula might absolutely refuse to reinstate the concession, an action which would undoubtedly be popular with his people but which, the king shrewdly guessed might bring forth the aggression latent in the white advance.

The third and most likely outcome, since it was the continuation of earlier policies, was that Lobengula would continue his evasive tactics in the hope that the white advance would be

halted or diverted without the Matabele being crushed; Which of these three possibilities took place depended on how the king dealt with the three new agents which Rhodes sent to Matabeleland in October 1889, determined to reinstate the written concession. These were Jameson, Dyle and Maxwell.

Jameson was soon convinced that Lobengula would never agree to sign any new document which did not limit mining activities to "one hole," nor did he believe that the king would agree to a direct ratification of the existing written document which was continually denounced by Lobengula as being Thompson's words and not his own. Jameson and his colleagues therefore sought to implement the concession indirectly by getting Lobengula's verbal agreement to begin prospecting in places selected by the king.

Moreover, the representative of the British South Africa Company also had great hopes that the penetration of Mashonaland by the Portuguese would force Lobengula to accept the guns and call on the company for support. If he attempted to tackle the Portuguese alone, they believed, the Ndebele were bound to be defeated. The king was therefore urged to deal with the Portuguese penetration, but the indunas insisted that any action must be by the Ndebele alone. In the event, nothing at all was done.

There appeared to be a stalemate. Jameson, who hoped to resolve the impasse peacefully, was prepared to recommend military action if the "word of mouth "policy on the concession failed. He also informed J.R. Harris, South African Secretary for the BSACo: "I have spoken freely to Helm and Carnegie (Both LMS Missionaries) and they with Moffat, are convinced that Rhodes is right in his decision that he will never be able to work peacefully alongside the natives and that the sooner the brush is over, the better." Lobengula was aware of this position because Moffat had informed him that once Rhodes had been granted the Charter, it would mean that he would be on the same position with the British government and thus would be authorized to raise forces to confront the Matabeles.

However, Lobengula insisted that some minimal demands would have to be met in order to appease his subjects. He had countless meetings with the indunas and they openly criticized him for his accommodation of the white men. At one explosive meeting, Jameson reported to Harris that:" all the indunas were against us (i.e BSACo) but the king told them "I am going to give the white men a hole to dig- you told me you were afraid of guns against you- the white men will bring guns and horses. If you go against me I will have to call the white men to help me- they are my friends, and if I must kraal against kraal I must." It must be noted that this threat of calling in the whites to assert his authority seems to make a new stage in the relations between Lobengula and his indunas. Previously when they had challenged his decisions in relation to the white advance, he had been able to overcome their opposition by offering to let any who wished to go and fight the whites at Kimberley. This was the first occasion on record on which Lobengula used the potential of white intervention to prop up his own position. The result of this threat was that Lobengula gave a grudging recognition of the concession to Jameson, though more on his restricted version of the concession of 'One hole, than on Rudd's.

Hoping to avoid clashes with his kingdom, Lobengula gave Jameson permission to prospect in the empire. He further allowed him freeway to prospect, but not occupy Mashonaland if no gold was found in the South of Matabeleland.

The Pioneer Column Enters Mashonaland

The company, aware that it would have much more freedom in Mashonaland, did not attempt to prospect for gold in the south of Matabeleland. Rhodes immediately entered into a secret agreement with Frank Johnson and Maurice Heany, who had also been recently dismissed from Matabeleland. Rhodes representing the BSACo on 7 December 1889 agreed with Johnson and Heany that in return for £150 000 and a 50 000 mortgage of land rights, they would raise a European force of 500 men,

> "To carry by sudden assaults
> all the principal strongholds
> of the Matabele nation
> and generally to break up the power of the
> Amandebele as to render their raids on
> surrounding tribes impossible, to effect the
> emancipation of all their slaves and further
> to reduce the country to such a condition as to enable
> the prospecting, mining and commercial staff of the
> British South Africa Company to conduct their operations in
> Matabeleland in peace and safety."

An auxiliary African force was to be obtained from Khama, whose reward was to be an extension of his boundaries into Matabele territory. The whole dramatic set up was to be a manufactured dispute between the Shashi and Macloutsie Rivers which was claimed by both Lobengula and Khama. It is quite curious to note that almost the same strategy was used by the whites in the quest to destroy the Ndebele state; the Victorian incident was taken as an excuse to destroy the Ndebele state once and for all.

J. R. Harris gives more insight into the grim treachery which characterized the BSACo encroachment during this period. Harris was the sole witness to the agreement and he wrote to J.D Hepburn, a missionary and Khama's chief political advisor"

"An armed road making party, with Khama's consent and assistance, will commence making a wagon road to Mt Hampden. Permission to build this road will only be asked from Khama, in so far as it runs through his territory, but Lobengula's permission will not be asked, he will simply be informed by Mr. Moffat of the fact that we start at once making it. If he (Lobengula) attacks us, he is doomed, if he does not… the pressure of civilization on all borders will press more and more heavily upon him and the desired result, the disappearance forever of the Matabele as a power, if delayed is yet the more certain."

It is clear from this letter that Lobengula had averted immediate catastrophe by a narrow margin, and that future events would depend greatly upon him. The significance of the maneuverings of the late 1889 is that the British South Africa Company failed to gain full recognition of the written concession from the Matabele king and therefore abandoned the

attempt for the time being to include Matabeleland within its sphere of operations. Instead the BSACo concentrated ts attention on Mashonaland, where no powerful African polity stood in the way of the rapid development which a colonizing company was imposing.

Lobengula by his refusal to cooperate fully with the chartered company without rejecting the agreement altogether, had won or striking, if limited, victory. Provided he could prevent his warriors from attacking the occupation column, he had won all that the situation allowed, a breathing space. Lobengula struggled by diplomatic means to prevent the occupation of Mashonaland from taking place, but he stuck to his view that an armed conflict with the whites would be fatal in the face of opposition from his subjects.

Moffat had been sent back to Matabeleland in July 1890 with the task of trying to keep the peace. His reports give some idea of how Lobengula dealt with the situation. However, Moffat himself was generally inclined to the view that war was inevitable. The situation also depended on the company response, they had to be "wise and patient" Lobengula himself seemed to have dealt with the situation with great skill and kept out the appearance of decisive action in the eyes of his subjects to the last he was able to keep the 'amajaha' restrained from war. They had even talked of giving the pioneer column "a slap" but the king told them to calm down until he calls them for action.

As was expected, the older men and Lobengula himself were inclined to acquiesce in the occupation of Mashonaland once it had occurred. When talk of fighting among the 'amajaha' revived in October 1890, the older men argued that the whites in Mashonaland were doing no harm and that fighting would bring destruction on themselves. But the young men stuck to the view that Lobengula had let Mashonaland go easily.

Another interesting development was when the trader James Dawson, acting on behalf of the company, tried to offer Lobengula a gold claim in Mashonaland as a way of linking him to the activities in Mashonaland. Lobengula adamantly refused to grant the company rights of jurisdiction. This suggests that he was still struggling to maintain his sovereignty intact. Indeed, as his negotiations with Lippert over the land question show, he was casting around for ways to undermine the position of the company. However Lobengula was simply thwarted because Rhodes moved in to buy the Lippert Treaty and the land rights which it had offered the Germans.

Between the occupation and the outbreak of war in 1893, relations between the Matabele and the company were inherently unstable. The Company seemed to have hoped that the core of the Ndebele state would disintegrate from within through the action of labour migration and the development of Mashonaland. This did not happen because the imagination of a "Second Rand." Proved to be an illusion.

In the three years before the 1893 war, raids on raids on Mashonaland and other outlaying areas continued and eventually culminated in the so-called Victoria Incident of July 1893. The anti-white young induna Mgandani, may have thought himself out of sight of the pacific faction and provoked the Victoria incident which was seized upon by the whites as a cause for war, resulting in the fall of the Ndebele Kingdom.

The Company and the settlers in Mashonaland viewed the Victoria incident as providing the opportunity and justification for setting the "Matebele question." On the other hand, the incident revealed a sad picture that Lobengula no longer had full control over the actions of his subordinates.

However, it was the Company which pushed the issue to a war. The end of the Kingdom, direct rule by Europeans and large- scale land appropriations followed the Matabele defeat-results which were confirmed by the outcome of the rebellion of 1896. These together with the drawing of the former kingdom firmly into the new colonial structure that was soon to be called southern Rhodesia, were undoubtedly the most important historical effects of the struggle between an avaricious colonizing movement and an African raiding state.

Lewanika & The Lozi (Barotse)

Barotseland's Scramble for Protection: Part I

Source: Journal of African History No. 10, 1969.

While many African peoples had foreign domination thrust upon them, others seized the initiative and actively sought European protection. The concession signed between King Lewanika and the company. (B.A.S.C.) was the most important example of African collaboration in Central Africa.

The main focus of the paper will be an attempt to explain why the Lozi King chose to follow the path Khama of the Ngwato, rather than of Lobengula in meeting the challenge of European penetration.

The kingdom was highly centralised but characterised by intrigue at every level. No man from King to the most subordinate councilor, enjoyed secure tenure of office. The succession to Kingship for example was not rigidly fixed: any male descendent in the patrilineal line of the first legendary King was eligible to succeed, thus giving rise to intense competition for succession. Neither were Chief's titles hereditary.

The King selected his own chiefs and since the more senior the chieftainship, the great the amount of land, wealth, status and dependants were which attached to it, the King's power was formidable, while at the same time disappointed chiefs received a great incentive to rebel.

The Kingdom was very extensive, but the Lozi themselves were concentrated in the Upper Zambezi Valley – Bulozi or Barotseland proper. The twenty five smaller ethnic groups who lived in the surrounding region were under a form of indirect rule, Lozi influence being exerted through representative chiefs from the valley appointed by the King. Their function was to ensure a regular supply of tribute in trading goods and perhaps, slaves to the valley: otherwise the provinces cherished a considerable degree of local autonomy.

After 1840 with Kingdom weakened by succession struggle following the death of the great King Mulambwa, the Kololo, a powerful Sotho group which had fled north as a result of the Tshakan revolution, easily overrun Barotseland, using the sophisticated military organization and superior weaponry and tactic which their South African experience had produced. The Lozi, ruling class split into three groups, one remaining in Barotseland as collaborators of the conquerors, two others fleeing to the north and west to set up governments in exile.

The Kololo were cast out in 1864

The Unity of purpose which the Lozi were able to show in the face of a common enemy was soon shattered by a host of new problems which now presented themselves: struggles for the throne and for the senior chieftainships, the return of the émigrés rights to land, reconstruction of the political system, the on- going threat of the Ndebele raiding from south of the river and not least, the question of how to deal with white traders, hunters and missionaries who were beginning to seek access to the Kingdom. Division over these disputes endangered the stability of the state.

Sipopa the first restored King was assassinated. His successor, Mwanawina, was forced to flee and Lubosi (Lewanika) who succeeded him in 1878 was driven into exile in 1885, regaining the throne in 1886 hence sobriquet "Lewanika" – "to join, to add together."

By the beginning of 1886 Lewanika had managed to dislodge from their positions of power and influence all those in his Kingdom who had supported the usurpers during the rebellion. The King was/profoundly impressed by the traumatic events of the previous two years. They seemed to suggest that new circumstances had arisen in which a reign of fifty years such as his paternal grandfather Mulambwa had enjoyed, was no longer possible for a Lozi King functioning independently widening his personal empire.

For isolation itself – a policy maintained by both Sipopa and Mwanawina was no longer feasible. The external threat from the Ndebele, the increased accessibility of arms, the penetration by Portuguese from the north- west and English traders and French missionaries from the south- west all tended to weaken those elements in the Lozi Social structure which had once allowed Mulambwa to satisfy most of subjects and to eliminate as a threat those whose ambitions were not fulfilled.

Moreover the King's rivals may in collaboration with some whites attempt a new coup. Like all men of power, Lewanika's first priority was to safeguard his own position and his experiences had suggested to him a means by which he hoped to achieve this goal.

The politics of survival which he fostered upon followed the Ngwato and Ganda rather than that of the Ndebele and Yao. Lewanika's chosen weapon by which to resist the palpable military superiority of encroaching white power was accommodation rather than confrontation. He would seek the protection of a European nation to safeguard himself against internal opposition and his Kingdom against a Ndebele invasion. And he would attain for his song and those of his trusted councilors a European education, by which he

hoped to create a loyal elite capable of preventing his white protectors from undermining his sovereignty and competent to build in Batotseland an autocratic, prosperous nation.

A conservative faction of the ruling class feared the consequences of inviting powerful Europeans to "protect" the nation, while opponents of the King believed that his white allies would effectively eliminate the possibility of a new coup. Both factors were therefore hostile to the missionaries whom Lewanika used to educate his young people, and who were also regarded as the advance guard of white power. Despite this opposition the King eventually succeeded in attaining his first objective of foreign protection.

But he soon discovered that white protecting power had no intention of allowing him to realize his second great aim of developing on the Upper Zambezi a self- sufficient nation built with the aid of European technology.

E.T. Stokes, In Zambezian Past:

Political Organisation:

Barotseland was the most advanced Kingdom in pre-colonial times. It had a well developed society – probably of Lunda origin in Congo. There was a divine right of Kingship-King's person sacred and associated with religion. The Kingdom was highly centralised.

The dichotomy inherent in African traditional society was not there in Barotseland. There was no division or breakaway in the Kingdom, because of the well developed economy (interdependence) which resulted in cohesion. Local loyalty was cut across by administrative divisions sectors system used.

In local disputes, there could be an appeal to the Kuta or King's council. The Kuta had a sophisticated legal system. The Queen's store houses were scattered throughout the Kingdom. The Kololo conquered the Lozi for a generation and impose the Sotho language although later wiped out, the Sotho language remained.

The Sotho reformed the administration which was later improved by the Lozi. The Litunga lived at his capital. There were a sort of two societies, the other led by the Makwae, but the Litunga had overall power. The Litunga had his Ngambela or Prime Minister. Thus although Barotseland did not avoid civil war, they averted the disintegration of the Kingdom.

The IIa were a sophisticated and "savage like" ethnic group. The country was a polyglot country. The Lozi were proud of national unity. However, as noted by Coillard, there was discrimination and brutal treatment of subordinate people.

Lewanika: Biography:

The Elite of Barotseland 1878-1969 (Caplan)

Lubosi, later Lewanika, (the escaped one) was born in the 1840s. The National Council (Kuta) elected him as successor to Mwanawina becoming King in 1878.

Lewanika was fully aware that he was the third King of Barotseland within three years, and quickly took steps to strengthen and consolidate his position. He appointed his known supporters to important offices in the Kingdom.

He had the Kuta agree to replace Mwanawina's Ngambela, Ngenda, with his own preferences, Silumbu. His Matanika was appointed Mulena Mukwae. Several chiefs were promoted to higher titles and a number of commoners were made minor chiefs.

The King's next step was to initiate the restoration of the Makalo system ignored during Kololo rule-a traditional Lozi system by which Lewanika hoped to deprive potentially subversive councilors of any followers.

The King had chiefs as undertakers of physical labour instead of raiding other tribes for slaves-this may have been a tactic for minimizing the number of legitimate occasions the chiefs had to collect a strong armed band.

These then were the means by which the new King hoped to achieve his overriding objective, his own self-preservation. But inextricably connected to this goal was the preservation of his Kingdom from another external invasion.

To this end a series of alliances, or at least agreements, with outside powers seemed necessary, even if they meant an end to the traditional Lozi policy of isolationism. For in these early years of Lewanika's reign, no fewer than four alien sources – two European and two African offered themselves as allies of the Lozi Ruler.

It is probable that Lozi foreign policy at the time of Lewanika's accession was, in general, based on the assumption that the greatest external danger to the Lozi State emanated from the Ndebele, and that the Ngwato of Khama were potential allies. The Ndebele were a constant threat to Barotseland as they often invaded the IIa, Tonga and Tonga peoples who were within the Lozi sphere of influence and there was few Ndebele attack on the Barotse Valley.

They found that they shared with the Ngwato a common interest in containing Ndebele power. Contact between the Ngwato and Lozi began when Sipopa became King. The Lozi were therefore in a position to know that he wished as much as they to end the Ndebele raids.

Khama and Lobengula, thus represented two diametrically opposed policies for dealing with the Whites appearing in Central Africa: the first was to find an accommodation with these men and hopefully, manipulate them and harness the power they embodied in the interests of oneself and one's state. The second was to resist them on the grounds that their superior power could result only in the undermining of one's own power and one's state. Infact, as their histories proved (Ndebele, Ngwato and Lozi) neither resistance nor accommodation to White power would save of the sovereignty of their respective nations.

Lewanika briefly considered an alliance with Lobengula between 1882 and 1884 but Lozi distrust of the Ndebele was too deep rooted to allow such an alliance. Alliance with the Whites was also no easy thing as some councilors were equally suspicious of the White man, in fact out of fear for the sovereignty of their nations and partly because they feared White power could buttress the King's own position.

And there was the problem of determining which Whitemen to deal with. The Lozi ruling class was split over this whole question. Lewanika's position became insecure from his opponents within the Lozi nation. He now stood chances of assassination or even being deposed or exiled for having allowed Coillard into Barotseland.

Lewanika had welcomed Coillard into the country as a representative of "Strong Friends" who would protect him from his enemies within the valley.

Whatever the immediate cause, late in August 1884, Matua's men surrounded the palace in Lealui, forcing King Lewanika to flee. It was not until March 1885 that Lewanika's supporters overthrew Matua and Lewanika reclaimed his thrown.

The Scramble for Protection: Part II

Khama invited British protection and tried to exploit it to secure his own position. Lewanika too requested British protection. This request very nearly led to his overthrow again, and because his protectors took a decade to materialize, his position during that period remained extremely insecure.

The "politics of survival" which Lewanika adopted followed the pattern of the Ngwato and Ganda, rather than that of the Ndebele and Yao. Lewanika's chosen weapon by which to resist the military superiority of encroaching white power was accommodation rather than confrontation.

He would seek the protection of a European nation to safeguard himself against internal opposition and for his sons and the sons of the trusted councilors a European Education, he hoped to create a legal elite capable of preventing his white protectors from usurping his sovereignty and competent to develop in Barotseland an economically viable self – sufficient nation.
Lewanika's first steps after recovering his throne were the traditional ones for a new monarch he uprooted his enemies from positions of influence and replaced them with his own supporters. The new National Council was filled entirely with those who had refused to recognize Akufuna as King.

With integration of Seshebe in Barotseland proper for the first time the formal pacification of the Kingdom was completed. Lozi mistrust of the Ndebele never wavered, and during the remainder of the decade their canoes were stationed on the Zambezi to defend against a possible Ndebele invasion. A British Protectorate was declared over Khama's country on 1885.

By 1886, Lewanika was already determined to seek similar protectorate status for himself and Coillard was the obvious agent through who to make contact with the British governments.

A great section of the Kuta was strongly opposed to the missionaries presence in Barotseland and demanded explanation. Lewanika secretly contacted the British government through Coillard and allowed the missionaries to stay although their position was very insecure. In addition Lewanika remained anxious for Coillard to begin a school. Through learning the Whiteman's superior skills, his people would, he hoped, be better equipped to deal with the increased numbers of Europeans who were bound to appear. In March 1887, with his approval the first Paris Missionary Society at Sefula was inaugurated. The new school was essentially the private domain of the elite.

Among its students were two of the King's sons, five of Lewanika's "nephews" and the sons of several chiefs.

In a special meeting summoned by Lewanika, the Kuta was shocked to hear that Lewanika had sought for missionaries as well as white soldiers. The divergence of interests between the King and a segment of the Kuta soon produced serious hostility between them.

"The missionaries, yes, then we understand…. But we will not have foreigners to rule over us."

The mission could remain as long as it did not move from its proper duties, but they were determined to preserve the sacrosanct nature of the Lozi Kingship if necessary against the King himself. Lewanika used force to suppress opposition.

On 18 January 1899, Coillard finally wrote Sir Sydrey Shippard the Administrator of British Bechuanaland, informing him that the Lozi wished to be placed under British protection. He added another request on behalf of the King's concerning a threatened invasion by the Matabele."

Lobengula's troops had raided Tonga and IIa territory in 1888, "and they have boastfully declared that their next war path would be this year 1889, in invade Barotseland." Since Lewanika had heard that Lobengula had come under British protection-a badly distorted interpretation of the Rudd Concession- he hoped the Queen's representative would, "do your utmost to prevent the Matabele invading his country and spreading terror and dissolution among the tribes north of the Zambezi."

Lewanika seized the first chance to consummate his plan. In June 1889, Hurry Ware arrived in Lealui searching for mineral rights for a South African Company and emphasizing his lack of interest in buying land, in IIa country and north from the Zambezi, covering Toka country.

Ware was to pay Lewanika £120 per year plus 4% of total output of minerals (precious stones. Lewanika must have considered the Ware Concession as a great personal victory. Within weeks he received a letter of encouragement for Khama and Shippard. Lewanika thought he had taken the first step towards British protection.

Coillard understood nothing about Rhodes and a Chartered Company and so did Lewanika and it was at this time that he heard about it (from Shippard's letter) Middleton. (An agent for South African Company) worked against Rhodes's agent Lockner and tried to make Lewanika abrogate the Ware Concession. He told the King that the King had been duped by the missionaries into selling his own country and Lochner also wanted to buy it.

Lochner had an advantage. He had been accompanied by Khama's regular messenger to Lewanika (Makaatsa) and had the full co-operation and support of Coillard and Jalla two missionaries closest to Lewanika. Coillard had a great reputation for neutrality. Lochner claimed to be a special envoy of the Queen and implied that the company was a representative of the British government. He intimated that it was the company which was protecting Khama, although of course had no status in Bechuanaland.

Lockner used his "nice scruples" first to convince the missionaries, then to have them convince the King, that company protection was testament to the Queen's protectorate.

The King at last summoned the full National Council on 22 June 1890. At the crucial moment of the negotiations when the success of Lochner's mission was trembling in the bala. Khama's messenger, Makaotse entered the Kuta and delivered his suit, whereby he proclaimed Khama's threat to take action if Lewanika was opposed and overthrown. This was decisive in silencing the chiefs. Makaotse had been promised a present from the company by Lochner (bribery) if the mission succeeded so Makaotse had disappeared earlier to reappear with this strategy in order to gain the present.

On 27 June 1890, Lewanika his son Lita, Ngambela, Munuka and 38 chiefs signed the concession which was to be considered as a treaty between the Barotse (Lozi) and the British government. Though the company was granted no administrative rights it received "the sole, absolute, exclusive and perpetual right and power" to search for, dig, win and keep" any and all minerals in Barotseland. In effect, though the Lockner Concessions the Company assumed the whole of what was to become North-Western Rhodesia, its authority over all the peoples named by Lewanika rested solely on its agreement with the Lozi, no independent agreements were ever signed by chiefs of the Lunda, Luvale, IIa, Tonga or Toka, who nevertheless had to submit to company overrule.

In return for this vast accession to Rhodes' empire the company undertook to "protect the said King and nation from all outside interference and attack but pledged not to "interfere in any matter concerning the King's power and authority over any of his own subjects."

To King and councilors alike, the annual payment of £2000 with which they could buy weapons against the Ndebele must have seemed fair compensation for mineral rights. For the King himself, two further clauses were of critical importance. By the first "The

Company further agrees that it will aid in the education and civilization of the native subjects of the King, by the establishment, maintenance and endowment of schools and industrial establishment."

Here at last seemed to be the means by which his dynamic policy for modernization of the nation could be implemented. Secondly Lewanika's conviction that he could manipulate white power to buttress his own position seemed to be implied on the promise that the company would "appoint and maintain a British Resident with a suitable suite and escort, to reside permanently with the King."

In the years that followed, the Company managed to renege, temporarily or permanently, on nearly every commitment it made: the powers of both the King and the Kuta were severely circumstances no payment was made for the first seven years, no school or industrial establishment with company money, and its resident arrived only in 1897, with a tiny and unimpressive suite and escort, and he soon moved his headquarters far from the Barotse Valley. In short, the worst fears of those who opposed the Concession vindicated, white the brightest hopes of the King failed to materialize.

The significance of the Lochner Concession was that the Lozi had taken an independent initiative to open a window on the modern world with results which profoundly affected the subsequent course of history in Central Africa. There is no doubt that the responsibility for taking the original., initiative belonged entirely to the Lozi that white power must one day be confronted and that by making initial overture himself, he might be able to harmness that power both to secure his own position and to help develop his nation along European lines.

Khama's satisfaction with British protection and Coillard's role had a great influence in convincing the Lozi that Lochner represented the 'great Queen." Khama, Coillard and Lockner all represented in the final analysis a distant white power structure for which all Lozi had come to fearful respect. It is possible that Khama's envoy informed the Lozi of Rhodes plan of 1889, in which Khama was deeply implicated for a private force of European mercenaries to crush the Ndebele, a thing which could possibly happen to the Lozi in he near future. Almost alone, among the powerful Kings of Central Africa. The Bemba, the Ndebele, Mpezeni's Ngoni-colonial rule came to the Lozi peacefully and for their King at least with great relief.

Opposition of dissident chiefs soon rematerialized after Lochner's departure. Moreover, Lewanika soon discovered that he had not been placed under the British government's protection, so that history of Barotseland during the next thirty years is an attempt to over throw of company rule. Up to 1897 Lewanika struggled to get a British resident who would be a physical manifestation of his unassailable position before his opponents were able to depose him.

Middleton arrived and told Lewanika that by the Lochner Concession the Missionaries had deceived him into selling his country to a commercial concern and Lewanika became "crazy with anger." So far as Lewanika was concerned, the company had no rights in Barotseland,

and early in 1892 two of its agents were refused permission to cross the Zambezi from Pandamatenga into his country.

The King demanded his resident and the £2000 a year. Tales were being told as well that both white traders and Ndebele warriors were trying to enter Barotseland, and therefore "a large village has been founded at Kazungula in order to watch the ford and to control the crossing of any stranger."

In November 1892 with reports of an imminent Ndebele raid becoming more urgent, Lewanika forbade the handful white traders and hunters at Kazungula and Pandamatenga-who he feared would aid the Ndebele-from crossing into Barotseland.

The King was outraged that despite the concession all the subsequent assurances of its validity, he should still have to fear Ndebele attacks. Lewanika's personal position became even more tenuous as a result of a brutal Ndebele invasion in Barotseland in August 1893, and was only saved by the out break of war between the Ndebele and the Company. Yet the War against the Ndebele must have been viewed by the Lozi as a mixed blessing.

Firstly, it meant that the company would continue to be absorbed south of the Zambezi, to the consequent neglect of Barotseland. Secondly the Company was demonstrating in no uncertain terms how it dealt with resistant African rulers. Almost certainly, the Lozi were highly intimidated by the power which Rhodes' men had unleashed against Lobengula, and much of their subsequent dealings with the Company in the years that followed can only be understood if considered on this light.

By the end of 1894, Lewanika's position seemed to be in real jeopardy. Several leading chiefs, as had been seen, now believed that his foreign policy could lead only to disaster-whether at the hands of Europeans or the Ndebele and equally resented his intimate relationship with the missionaries.

It was missionary influence, they believed which not only kept him faithful to the Lochner Concession but which appeared also to be convincing him of certain dangerously heretical Christian nations.

The initiative came from London where the European Office had become concerned that the Lochner Concession did not adequately prove Britain's right to claim Barotseland as against the contrary claims of Portuguese. Rhodes responded with speed and announced that Hubert Hervey, a company official on Mashonaland, would be sent as "Resident Commissioner" to Barotseland early in 1896.

But two problems remained, firstly, the colonial office decided that Lochner Concession did not confer any administrative rights on the company and that a new concession was accordingly necessary. Secondly, the boundary dispute between Britain and Portugal over Barotseland had not been settled. A plot to murder all white men and have their wives taken as brides by Lozi men, was crushed by Lewanika.

Lewanika was gratified by the arrival in the Capital Lealui of Robert Coryndon in October 1897. However conspicuous in its absence was the sum of £14 000 which was now owed to the King by the terms of Lochner Concession, and which he in fact never received.

The Struggle between the King and his opponents then appeared to have been resolved in favour of the former. The dynamic elite had defeated the static elite. The modernizers had won out against the conservatives. However, for Lewanika, disillusionment was quick to set in, for the worst fears of his opponents were soon realized.

Lewanika's Achievement:

According to Mutumba B.M, the Lozi State and the central kingship was greatly undermined during the first half of the nineteenth century by the serious succession crisis which followed the death of Mulambwa, the tenth ruler (King No. 10) of Bulozi by internal political instability, and by the invasion and conquest of Bulozi by the Kololo. In 1864 the Kololo were overthrown but military victory alone was no substitute for internal stability.

Moreover, the restored Lozi State was, then more than ever before, required to absorb and adjust to numerous alien and external forces, which included not only the conquered Kololo groups, but also the Mambunda immigrants from Angola, the Ndebele raiders from South of the Zambezi, and the ever increasing European presence in Central Africa.

The Kingship in the restored Lozi Kingdom first to Litunga Sipopa, who ruled from 1864 to 1876. Sipopa was succeeded by Mwanawina II, who ruled for only two years.

Lubosi Lewanika succeeded Mwanawina in 1878 and apart from the short time he spent in exile in 1884-1885, ruled Bulozi until his death in death in 1916.

The seriousness of the problems Lewanika and his predecessors had to face were reflected in the history of Bulozi during the first 20 years following the Kololo overthrow. These twenty (20) years of political strife produced three successful attempts to overthrow the ruler. Both Sipopa and Mwanawina fell from power as result of violent rebellions while in 1884 Lubosi Lewanika was compelled to flee to exile in Mashi for a year before he finally succeeded in establishing his Kingship position.

Lewanika's success in holding his own was inevitably dependent on the success with which he handled and solved the problems which had plagued Bulozi since the beginning of the understanding and handling of the new and foreign external forces.

From the 1880s the traditional political balances of power in Central Africa were upset by the advance of the forces of European expansion, principally, from the South. Most African societies fell without resistance before this advance or like the Ndebele were forced into military resistance. So far, Lewanika is best known as Central African King who chose to accommodate the forces of the scramble for Africa, and by negotiations and treaties successfully carried the core of the Lozi Kingdom through the critical period of transition into the colonial era. Lewanika's treaties also provided the basis for the claims of the B.S.A. Company to what was later as North-Western Rhodesia.

Through a number of reforms, renovations and revivals of old Lozi institutions which had fallen into disuse during the Kololo occupation, Lewanika strengthened the position of the Lozi monarchy and revived and reinforced the Lozi State, extending its influence to its widest limits. For Bulozi this was Lewanika's greatest achievement. It is an achievement which has to be fully understood before one can attempt to follow how the Lozi- totally unable to stand up to the challenge posed by the Kololo in the mid- 19th century and divided and exiled for nearly twenty years, and rose to the challenges of the Scramble for Africa.

For twenty years following the overthrow of the Kololo in 1864, Bulozi was gripped by political strife which produced three successful attempts to overthrow the ruler. There was continuous factional conflict. In January 1885 while Lewanika was still in exile, the missionary Coillard was greeted by the Mulena Mukwae Moibiba with the words.

"Ours is a land of blood, Kings and Chiefs succeeded each other here like shadows. They are never allowed to grow old" - (Francois Coillard, on the Threshold of Central Africa).

Mukwae Maibiba who had succeeded Lewanika was in power for less than a year before their support collapsed. Towards the end of 1885 Lewanika mounted a successful counter-coup. Once back in Bulozi, Lewanika was determined to avoid a repetition of 1884. He immediately carried purge to rid himself of known rivals in the royal family and opponents among the chiefs. But even a thorough massacre could not have solved most of the problems which lay behind the persistent political instability in the restored Lozi Kingdom. The solution to Lewanika's dilemma was to identify these problems and to find remedies to them, one by one.

The internal weakness in the Lozi State were already making themselves felt by the end of the 18th century after the defeat by the Kololo. At the time of the invasion the Lozi failed to present a united resistance to the Kololo as the country was gripped by civil war-a result of a succession dispute between Sihumelume and Mubukwane, two of Mulambwa's sons. A lack of well defined rulers and procedures for the succession was clearly one of the contributory causes of the internal weakness of the Lozi State. First of all, the principles governing succession to Kingship tended to favour intense rival within the royal family. Every male member of the royal family tracing his ancestry in the male line back to the ancestress leader Mbuyu was in theory eligible for the Lozi throne. The result of having such a wide candidature meant that there was a crisis at every succession, sometimes resulting in civil war.

This problem was felt even more acutely after 1864 for the Lozi had divided themselves into three separate groups during the Kololo interregnum, one group remaining in the Zambezi Valley and the two other groups going to exile, one at Nyenga and the other one at Lukwakwa. Each of these three groups had some to identify itself closely with certain sections of the royal family.

Lewanika sought a solution to this problem first by a process of elimination. In this way, the children of Sipopa were killed soon after Lewanika's accession to the throne, and long before 1884 rebellion. Sipopa's children were killed in 1879 and 1880 all four of them.

This however, was only the first of a series of precautionary measures taken by Lewanika to secure his position. Later he sought security for his person and position in a close alliance first with missionary and later with the colonial administration.

The second problem that Lewanika had to face was that of the over powerful chiefs who had become almost King makers. Initially the chiefs had been a basis of strength for the person of the King, into that they looked to him for appointment to office, promotion and favour. But his bureaucracy had gradually grown powerful and by the early 19th century it appears that the original balance between the King and the Chiefs was already upset.

The King became dependent on the popularity he enjoyed among the Chiefs. This was particularly pronounced at the time of succession when each royal candidate looked for support among them. The effect of his on the Lozi State was to weaken the central Kingship and to heighten the factional struggles, as various chiefs supported those princes under whom they believed their interests would be best safeguarded or furthered.

Lewanika recognizing the important role the chiefs, made very effort to win the most influential to his cause, while at the same time carrying out a purge to eliminate those who were opposed to him. Lewanika's purge was so thorough and bloody that, according to Coillard, it would "make anyone's hair stand on end." The missionary was amazed that Lewanika was capable of such severity. Vengence was carried out not only against the leaders of the of the 1884 rebellion, but on all their kin, women and children."

To strengthen his position further, Lewanika elevated to chieftainships and other positions of influence in the state those who had fought for him and supported his cause in the 1884 rebellion. In his way the bureaucracy came to consist mainly of Lewanika's men. The number of Likombwa (i.e. chiefs in charge of the royal household who also represented the King's interests in the Kuta – national Council and in all policy matters) was increased.

And for the first time the Likombwa, these personal supporters and stewards of the King, were given leadership in the military and labour divisions of the nation. This move was deliberately taken to counteract the influence of the chiefs who headed the administration, the judiciary and the military divisions, and who regarded themselves as representing public interests as opposed to the interest of the King and royalty in general.

To strengthen the royal position against the chiefs Lewanika increased the number of seats that were occupied by members of the royal family in the Kuta, the national council at the capital Lealui. Princes in general – male members of the royal family who could trace descent through the male line to Mbuya had-their representation greatly increased under Lewanika.

Lewanika then introduced a new group of representatives into the Kuta in the form of husbands of princesses in general and husbands of daughters of former ruling Kings. These husbands got the Kuta seats as representatives of the princesses and helped to swell the ranks of the royal family against those of the chiefs.

Lewanika then set about establishing Kutas in the provinces on the exact line of the Lealui Kuta. Appointment to the chieftainship of these provincial Kutas came under the direct control of Lewanika, as did the appointments to chieftainships.Closely linked with Lewanika's administrative reforms was his land settlement policy.

Lewanika introduced a measure which came to be known as the "Redemption law," whose purpose was to restore the pre- Kololo position as far as possible. All land holders were required to revert the situation before the arrival of the Kololo. Although the redemption law was partly political in purpose, it was also prompted by the realization that territorially any regional administrative reforms could only be effective with a stable settled population. It followed the revival of the old territorial division into administrative units – which were later adopted by the British administration.

To all these reforms and the re-establishment of Kingship institutions and stature, Lewanika added the glory of victorious campaigns leading into the capture of great booty. In 1882 Lewanika curved out a highly successful raid against the Tonga and IIa. The trader George Westbeech, reported from Lealui that "the King must have brought about 20 000 herd of cattle --- exclusive of what have died along the road." This was followed by another equally successful campaign in 1888, which lasted five months and advanced as far as Chisekesi in Chief Monze's area. Coillard reported ruefully that: "An immense quantity of cattle and slaves" was captured. The resources of the cattle-rich Tonga plateau were contested with the Lozi by the Ndebele *impis* who raided there regularly from across the Zambezi. The Lozi were no equals for the Ndebele, who sometimes threatened even the southern limits of the Lozi Kingdom. This threat however, was removed in 1893, following the crushing of the Ndebele by the B.S.A. Company forces. The wealth drawn by Lewanika from the IIa, Toka and Tonga tribute-paying groups was boosted by the successful intervention of the Lozi in the land between the Lunda of Shinde and the Luvale in 1812. In July 1892, Coillard reported the successful return of the expedition against the Luvale, "bringing hundreds of women and children as booty---."

Thus so for scholars of Lozi History have been primarily preoccupied with assessing Lewanika's career with assessing Lewanika's career within the context of European penetration. Whereas it is time that the extension of British protection to Bulozi and north-Western Rhodesia came finally to be based on the treaties with Lewanika, for the Lozi State and for Lewanika himself this was solution to only one of a number of problems. And indeed to some sections of Lozi Society, Lewanika's accommodation of the forces of the Scramble for Africa was not his greatest achievement.

The Lozi Central Kingship had collapsed in the middle of the 19th Century as a result of internal political instability, a senior succession crisis, and a military defeat by the Kololo. Before the establishment any effective colonial control, however, Lewanika had succeeded

in establishing a great degree of personal control, exalted Lozi Kingship above the level ordinary people, and extended Lozi influence to the widest limits.

Yet Lewanika's strategies, so carefully executed to strengthen the royal position within the traditional context, were never put to any sustained test. The arrival of the forces of colonization brought changes in every aspect of the fight for dominance by the Lozi King. The first treaty signed by Lewanika with the B.S.A. Company was that granted in 1890 to Frank Lockner, acting on behalf of the company.

This treaty, however, was lost or lapsed, partly because for seven years, up to 1897, the Company was unable to meet its commitments, and partly because certain clauses in the treaty were not keeping with the Charter through which the Company was empowered to negotiate with Africa rulers.

In 1898, a new agreement was drawn up, which was based on the Lockner Concession. The final treaties were eventually drawn up and signed in 1900. It is interesting to compare the signing of 1890 and 1900 treaties. The procedures for obtaining Lozi assent differed widely. In 1890 it was found necessary to summon all the national representatives to the Kuta and when the assent was obtained, the document was itself signed by no less than thirty nine chiefs excluding Lewanika and his son Lika.

This should be seen as the most crucial stage in testing Lewanika's strength in the Kingdom. Had Lewanika not succeeded in a establishing a great degree of personal control within Bulozi before the arrival of the British, he would not have carried the Lockner Concession through the Kuta. Perhaps the crisis over this concession would have led to his deposition for a second time.

So British contribution to Lewanika's internal strength should not be carried far. However in 1900 only twenty seven chiefs of the capital were present, while the actual concessions were signed by eight people only excluding the witnesses.

Thus Lewanika was far stronger in 1898 and 1900 than in 1890, and could then deal with the Whites alone with only his advisors. Perhaps the Lockner Concession also did something to contribute to a consolidation of the already existing supremacy of Lozi Kingship under Lewanika.

African Initiative and Resistance: West Africa:

African initiative and Resistance:

Europeans were not diabolically clever manipulators of divided and outmatched Africans. Every sort of African Society resisted.

Significance of Resistance:

1) Proves Africans did not acquiesce placidly in a European "pacification."

2) Resistance was neither despairing nor irrational but often proved by rational and innovative ideologies.
3) Resistances were not futile, it had significant consequences in their time and still have significant resonances today.

Ideology of Resistance:
Colonial Apologists:
Stressed the irrationality and desperation of armed resistance. They claimed it was a result of superstition and people content to accept colonial rule had been worked upon by witch doctors.

Concept of Sovereignty:
According to Jacob Ajayi this was "the most fundamental" hence to be noted down.
1) Resistances were motivated by the desire of a ruling class to retain its exploitative power.
2) On a much wider scale, which were often directed as much against the authoritarianism of African rulers as against colonial oppression.

Economic resistance: Samir Amin Arguments:

1. Crucial West African resistances to Europe came in the late 17th and 18th century-dismisses the resistances of the Scramble period itself as half-hearted rearguard actions of on already compromised ruling class.
2. In Amin's eyes what was essentially at stake in the confrontation between Africa and Europe was not formal political control but Europe's attempts at economic manipulation.
3. African resistance was directed against economic manipulation.
4. Amin argues that trade across the Sahara had strengthened state centralisation and stimulated progress.
   "The European Trade on the other hand did not give rise to any productive forces: on the contrary this caused a disintegration of society of which Africans were oppressed. Islam served a basis of resistance --- Muslim priests tried to organize a resistance movement, their aim was to stop the slave trade that i.e. the export of the labour force but not internal slavery --- Islam change its character from being a religion of a minority group of traders. It became a popular movement of resistance."
5. Three important resistances of the above kind identified by Amin.
   (i) Wars of 1673 to 1677
   (ii) Torodo Revolution 1776-which overthrew the military aristocracy and ended the slave trade."
   (iii) Dule (a Prophet) movement 1830 in the Kingdom of Waalo which failed "in the face of French military intervention."

6. Economic resistance-Nana Olamu of Itsekiri in the Niger Delta described by A.G. Hopkins as the very type of the "hom-economics."

African initiatives and resistance in West Africa 1880-1914

Reactions to European advancement were determined by the local African situation.

(a) Variables included the nature of polity.
   (i) Centralised or not
   (ii) Domination by another African power or not.
   (iii) On the upswing/ decline.

(b) Nature of the leadership provided.
(c) Extent of penetration of European of political, religious and economic influences. By the 1870s and the experiences gained from this.
(d) Method adopted by the European Imperialists in the establishment of their control.

2. The Period 1880-1900 was the high water mark of European Conquest and occupation of West Africa. Invasions and campaigns were launched on African states.

   (i) French Campaigns in Western Sudan
   (ii) Ivory Coast and Dahomey between 1860-1898
   (iii) British campaigns in Asante
   (iv) Niger Delta between 1895-1905.

3. (i)Africans had some objectives that is defending their sovereignity and traditional way of life.
   (ii) Africans had three options:
      - Confrontation
      - Alliance (accommodation), collaboration
      - Acquintence or submission

Confrontation:
(a) Involved in warfare
(b) Guerilla tactics
(c) Sleges
(d) Scorched earth policy.
(e) Diplomacy.

In West Africa all the 3 were resorted to:
Conquest and reaction in French West Africa 1880-1900.
In their conquest/ or occupation of West Africa the French resorted almost exclusively to the method of military conquest. In terms of African reaction all options were resorted to- Submission, alliance and confrontation.

Opposition was more protracted in cases where confrontation was opted for two reasons:

(i) French used method of military confrontation almost exclusively which consequently evoked militant reaction.

(ii) People were far islamised than those of other parts of West Africa as Crowther pointed out since "for Muslim societies of West Africa the imposition of white rule meant submission to the infidel which was intolerable to any good Muslim," they

tended to resist the Europeans with added fervour and tenacity often lacking among non-Muslims.

A Senegambia:

Lat Dior Diop:

He was expelled from Coyer in 1864, nevertheless chose the stategy of confrontation in the struggle against the French. After the defeat of France by Prussia in 1871, the governor of Senegal abandoned the annexation of Cayor and recognized Lat Dior once again as Damelo. Friendly relations were established. In 1879 the French were given permission to build a road connecting Dakar & St Locis.

When Lat Dior realized that this was the construction of a railway line, he declared for the line would end his independence.

He took steps to this end:

(i) Orders to all chiefs to punish severely any Cayor subject whose subject supplied anything what-so-ever to the French workmen.

(ii) Dispatched emissaries to Ely Emir of Trana, Abdul Boka Kane of Futa Toro and Alboury NI Diaye Dyollof. Lat invited them to them to join a Holy Alliance and to synchronise their struggle in order to facilitate the eviction of the French from the land of their forefathers.

(iii) In November 1882 he forbade the construction of the railway line even in the areas or the territory that was an integral part of Cayor-he declared, "As long as I live, be well assured, I shall oppose with all my mighty the construction of this railway line."

(iv) Noting the Governor's persistence in the issue Lat Dior.
   (a) Forbade cultivation of groundnuts, with the conviction that if the French could not get ground- nuts they would return home.
   (b) He ordered his subjects living near the French posts to resettle in the Cayor heartland.
   (c) Defaulters were burnt and possessions confisticated.

(v) December 1882 Colonel Wendling invaded Cayor at the head of an expeditorinary column composed mainly of Africans, but Lat Dior having fought since 1861 withdrew to Djoloff. Colonel Wendling put Lat Dior's cousin Samba Yaya Fall on the throne. Later on Lat Dior worked a compromise with his Kinsmen who in 1885 authorised him to return to Cayor.

(vi) After the death of Samba Fall, Governor decided to abolish the Kingship.
   (a) Title of Dameh - Cayor was divided into Co- provinces which were entrusted to former captives of the state.
   (b) A decree was passed expelling Lat Dior from Cayor.
   (c) Lat Dior furious, mobilized 300 partisans who had remained faithful but released from the oath all those who were not resolved to die with him and to the field against the French. He headed to Djoloff and one of his bold counter

-matches, he managed to slip undetected into a position between his enemies and the railway.

On October 27 he launched a surprise attack on the French and their allies at the Well of Dekhle and inflicted heavy losses on them. He fell there and his death naturally spelled the end of Cayor's independence and facilitated French seizure of the country.

B **<u>Tukulor/ Tokolor Empire</u>:**

Ahmadu, who succeded his father Al- Hajj Umar founder of the Empire was like many African rulers determined to ensure the survival of his state and maintain its independence.

(a) He chose the strategies of alliance and militant confrontation but unlike other rulers relied more on alliances. From his accession until 1890 he stuck to his policy of alliance or co-operation with the French. It was only in the last 2 years that he resorted to warfare.
Ahmadu chose alliance and controntation since the economic and political realities facing him left no alternative. Politically right from the beginning of his reign, he was forced to fight on two fronts.
(i) Against his brothers who contested his authority.
(ii) Against, Bambara, Mandinka Fulani and others who deeply detested new Tokolor masters and wanted independence, that is to recover it by force.
(iii) Against the French.

b) The situation was made worse for the army had become weakened numerically and numbering only 4 000 students, 11 000 sofas but he did not have the same sought of control over it nor could he inspire it to the same extent as his father had been able to do.

His immediate concern was dealing with his half brothers thus consolidating his position for in 1872 they had made an attempt on his person- thus;
(i) Ensuring the survival of the Empire by suppressing the rebellious raging among subject people especially Bambara.

(c) To do this he needed arms and ammunition as well as financial resources through trade both of which necessitated friendly relations with the French.
(ii) Most of his talibes (students) were recruited from the Futa Toro the homeland of his father. This area was under the French. He had to win their co-operation.

(d) To confront these problems, it is not surprising that he negotiated with French. In return of a cannon and recognition of his authority Ahmadu was to allow French traders to operate in his empire.

Unfortunately for Ahmadu, the Treaty was not recognized and the French traders continued their acts of sabotage but Ahmadu continued his friendly attitude. This enabled him to quell the rebellions of his brothers in 1874 and those in the Bambara territories of Segu and Kaarta by the late 1870s.

(e) He readily agreed for negotiations with the French who preparing to conquer the area between Senegal and the Niger and needed the co-operation of Ahmadu. Under terms of treaty:

(i) Ahmadu undertook to allow the French to build railway lines and maintain trade routes through his empire.
(ii) He granted them permission to build and sail steamboats on the Niger.
(iii) French recognized the sovereignty or existence of his empire.
(iv) The French gave him access to Futa Toro – and
(v) Promised not to invade his territory or build any fortifications.
(vi) Payment of 4 field guns, 1 000 rifles, rent of 200 rifles, 200 barrels of gunpowder 200 artillery hells and 50 000 flints.

(f) Mango treaty diplomatic was victory for Ahmadu had the French ratified it. His Empire would have survived. But the French government nor Gallieni himself was not to implement or ratify it. French under Desbordles began invasion of the Empire in 1881 and by February 1883 had occupied Bamako without any opposition.

Ahmadu's only reaction was to forbid the sale of any item whatsoever to the French in 1884 he went to besiege Nioro.

(g) (i) Attack of Ahmadu on brother is evidence that he was not in full control of the territory and that he still needed French support, a need strengthened by the fact that the siege on Nioro further depleted his military resources.
(ii) French on their part were also desperate for an alliance with Ahmadu. In 1885 and 1888 they were engaged in suppression of Mamadou Lamine and anxious to prevent any alliance between the two.

C Treaty of Gori concluded – 12 May 1887:

Ahamdu put his Empire under the nominal protection of the French. France pledged not to invade her territories and remove ban on sale of arms to Ahmadu.

By 1888 Lamine suppressed, another treaty was concluded with Samori Toure so the French did not need an alliance with Ahmadu. This fact and the aggressiveness of France led assumption of the offenses against Ahmadu signified by attack in Tokolor fortress of Kundian in February 1889. It took French 8 hours to breech the walls with their Archinard's 80 mm mountain guns.

The Tokolor put up a fierce resistance to the French. Many perished with their weapons in their hands.

Grippled with internal difficulties he transferred the struggle to the religious plane. Ahmadu appealed to all Muslims of the Empire to take up arms in defence of the faith. He requested help from Djolloff, Mauritaria and Futa in vain.

The capital of Tokolor was captured and from there the French went on to Onessebongon defended by the Bambara loyal to Ahmadu. All were killed though not without inflicting heavy losses on their assailants. 2 of the 27 Europeans were killed and 3 of them wounded 13 African soldiers were killed and 876 wounded.

From there Archinard captured Koniakary. After having beaten the Tokolor garrisons, Archinard called a halts and requested Ahmadu to capitatulate and to go and settle in Dinguiray village as a mere private individual.

At this point Ahmadu abandoned his weapon of diplomacy in favour of a military one in June 1890. His soldiers attacked the railway at Talaari and engaged the French in numerous skirmishes between Koyes and Bafulabe. In one of skirmishes France lost 43 killed out of a force of 125. In September taking the advantage of the isolation of Koniakary by flood they attempted but failed reconquest.

His attempt of defending Nioro was a fiasco and Ahmadu retreated to Masina after a hard fought battle of Kori Kori. Even in exile in Hausa territory he mounted an altitude of uncompromising independence towards the French.

Examination Questions

1. Why did European nations want to partition Africa in the last quarter of the nineteenth century?

2. Which event had more significance in the scramble for Africa: British occupation of Egypt (1882); Leopold's activities in the Congo (1879-1880); the Berlin West Africa Conference; 1884-1885?

3. How accurate is the view that African political and military weakness led to their defeat in the face of European imperialism?

4. How important was the Berlin West Africa Conference (1884-85) in the scramble and partition of Africa?

5. Analyse and illustrate with reference to either East or Central Africa the different types of primary response that Africans made to colonial rule in this period.

1. Why did ht European partition of Africa accelerate after 1875?
2. For what reasons did the European powers partition Africa n the nineteenth century? When and why, did the partitions become a scramble"?
3. Explain the failure of Samori Toure and the success of Menelik II in resisting European conquest f their territory.

4. Assess the view that "Africans who resisted Europeans were bound to fail; those who collaborated were certain to gain." Answer with reference to the history of Central and East Africa.
5. What economic and political considerations led to the "Scramble for Africa"? Assess the results of the "Scramble" for Africa.
6. Explain why the British invaded Asante in 1896 and why the Asante did not resist.
7. What do you understand by the terms "informal empire" and "formal empire" in Africa? When and why, did the latter replace the former?
8. How and why did the interests of European Powers in Africa change between 1875 and 1900?
9. Compare and contrast Lewanika and Preupeh I's responses to colonial penetration in their respective territories.
10. How and why did European powers achieve the partition of Africa without a war among themselves? Illustrate your answer with examples from either a) East Africa or b) West Africa.
11. Who emerged greater in African History during the period of the scramble for Africa? Samori Toure or Menelik II?

CHAPTER 12

THE FRENCH AND BRITISH METHODS OF COLONIAL RULE IN WEST AFRICA

Learning objectives

After studying the chapter, the student should be able to:

(i) Assess the system of indirect rule in West Africa.
(ii) Discuss why the French abandoned the system of assimilation in favour of association.
(iii) Discuss the concepts of assimilation and association with reference to French colonial motives.
(iv) Assess the advantages and disadvantages of indirect rule in Tropical Africa.

BACKGROUND

Historians have traditionally contrasted the French approach to colonial rule (in its black African colonies) to the British approach. According to this view, (expressed notably by the distinguished British historian, Michael Crowder), French "direct rule" inclined towards the destruction of indigenous customs and institutions. Or at least it reduced them to mere cogs in a unitary and centralized administrative system, the ultimate objective of which was assimilation to the French republican model.

British indirect rule on the other hand, was said to be more pragmatic, more decentralized and more diverse in nature, reflecting greater respect for local chiefs and a greater willingness to adapt to local customs and institutions. This view of Michael Crowder has been challenged by French historians, notably by the French colonial administrator- turned-historian, Hubert Deshamps, who argued that, irrespective of the theories, French and British rule were similar (not identical) in practice.

This chapter thus explores and assesses some of the historiography on British and French rule in the light of these current questions: Were British and French systems of colonial rule as different in practice as they appeared in theory? Was the British system of colonial rule more tolerant than that of the French? Did the Africans living under British rule find life and opportunities better than those living under the French rule during the same colonial period; 1900- 1914 (approximately)?

FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE METHODS

Between 1895 and 1899, the French West African Federation was created with a total of eight constituent colonies. The Federation was headed by a Governor - General below whom were Lieutenant-Governors who were in charge of constituent colonies. Each colony was divided into a number of "Cercles" which were roughly equivalent to provinces in the British administered Nigeria. At the head of the "Cercle" administration was the commandant de Cercle." He was the equivalent of a British Resident. "Cercles" were in turn divided into subdivisions and administered by French 'Chefs de subdivision.' These were equivalent to British District Officers. Below them were ordinary African chiefs.
None of the Lieutenant-Governors could correspond directly with the minister of colonies except through the Governor- General. This meant that the Governor-General had to sanction all their requests for approval of major policy-decisions. The Lieutenant-Governor on their part dealt with day to day political affairs and supervised the administration of their subjects.

The Policy of 'Assimilation'

According to Michael Tidy-in his book A History of Africa Vol II (1880-1914), assimilation was the absorption of the African into European culture and European acceptance of the African as a partner in government, business and missionary enterprise."

Through assimilation, France transformed its African colonies into complete dependencies that relied on France for survival. Many elites in French West Africa, looked up to Paris as "home." This was because to become "assimile," one had to show signs of being "civilized." This implied being able to speak French, eating French food, dressing French, being Christian, being literate and abandoning what was called "primitive African cultures." Moreover, the "assimiles" in French Africa represented what Frantz Fanon calls the "benis oui oui" or "yes yes man." For example, Houphouet Boighny opposed independence for the Ivory Coast on grounds that the colony still needed more guidance from France.

The French practiced assimilation only in the four communes of Senegal, that is, st Lois, Dakar, Goree and Rufisque where citizenship had been granted to all Africans long before

the colonial era. Only in St Louis did even a small percentage of West Africans come to participate in French national affairs. Outside this area, West Africans had become subjects (subjects), not citizens. That was as far as the policy of assimilation went, because in practice it was bedevilled with many problems and the French gradually abandoned it. Part of the reason was that while the British sought to improve and modernize African culture and institutions, the French policy of assimilation aimed to turn Africans, mainly through western education, into black Frenchmen who were then accorded all the rights and privileges of French citizens.

Apart from that, once an African became a French citizen, he was subject to French law and had access to French courts. Above all, this meant that the citizens were exempted from what was rightly described as "the most hated feature of the colonial system in French West Africa," the indigenat. This was a legal system which enabled any French administrative officer to sentence any African for up to two years without trial.

Further advantages of French citizenship were that one could forego compulsory labour by making a monetary payment. Moreover, in theory, one could be appointed to any post in France and in the colony. In practice, however, such cases were limited. The clearest and most senior appointment made by the French was that of Blaise Diagne who became the first African to sit in the French Chamber of Deputies in 1914. Even that right which Diagne enjoyed from 1914 onwards simply symbolized an ultimate political equality with whites, but not a right to self-government. Moreover, this representation proved to be a failure because there was no parity (equality) in representation in proportion to the population, and very few African delegates sat in the assembly. Those who did, usually served French, rather than African interests. In fact, the Assembly had very little interest in Africa or the colonies generally. Very few Africans were qualified to vote in National Assembly elections. As late as 1937 out of 15 million Africans in French West Africa, only 80500 were French citizens and hence could vote. Of that 80500, in fact 78000 had acquired citizenship because they were born in the four communes of Senegal. This clearly indicates that assimilation was, on the whole a failure.

The French Re-thinking Assimilation

There were, according to A.A. Boahen, in Topics in West African History, two main reasons for failure. First, the French neglected the spread of higher western education for the Africans, who, as a result, could not qualify for citizenship rights. Secondly, the few qualified Africans refused to apply for citizenship for fear of being ostracized by their fellow Africans.

Moreover, Assa Okoth has brought up several reasons why assimilation was abolished. He suggests that one of the reasons was that French administrators were intolerant to the democratic assemblies set up as per the assimilationist policy and dominated by Africans. This is because these assemblies were often vocal in their criticism of the French policies.
Furthermore, Assa Okoth points out that an assimilationist policy was expensive if followed to its conclusions. This was because Africans would enjoy the privileges of French citizens such as education. But the resources available to the French in West Africa were clearly not sufficient even to begin assimilating Africans to the same economic and social standards as

obtained in France, and France was itself unwilling to pay the cost of implementation of such a policy from its Metropolitan budget.

In addition the French scrutinized with concern, the cultural disparity between France and the overseas territories. For instance, in France nearly everyone spoke French, whereas the people in West Africa spoke no French; in France polygamy was forbidden, but most Africans practiced polygamy; in France most people were Christians or practiced no religion, but West Africans were not Christians but mostly traditionalists and Muslims, in France everyone accepted the French civil law whereas the people of West Africa all observed their customary law in matters of inheritance, land cases and marriages. Hence many Frenchmen were increasingly wondering how much such people could be assimilated.

Because of these problems experienced during implementation of the policy of assimilation (with the exception of the four communes of Senegal), rigid assimilation was abandoned as the basis for administering Africans. In the Senegalese Protectorate and other colonies which constituted French West Africa, that is, Sudan, Niger, Guinea, Dahomey, Mauritania, Ivory coast and Upper Volta, Africans were not citizens but subjects (before 1920). The system of administration used to govern them was some form of toned-down assimilation that was at one time called "association" (or paternalism).

In "association," the goal of creating French citizens out of Africans was not abandoned but was just made more distant and much more difficult to achieve. Secondly, there was a high degree of administrative centralization on the mother country, which was not compatible with a policy of association. Some elements of assimilation continued to be practiced. Moreover, the French were not prepared to undertake the massive work of social transformation which would make assimilation a reality in West Africa.
"Association" as a system of government was, from the start, one- sided and unequal. The theory of this system was that the French would govern and economically exploit west Africa to the mutual advantage of the metropolis and the African. But the practice of it was what Michael Crowder has termed "paternalism" for its lack of partnership implied by "association" and the preponderance of French condescension instead. Moreover, since there were very few western educated Africans in the interior of French West Africa, traditional rulers had to be used as agents of the administration. As already indicated, these chiefs were barely respected and they could be demoted, transferred or even dismissed as the French saw fit.

In practice, association often resembled indirect rule because under both systems, the Europeans used traditional African chiefs in their respective administrations. However the differences were important. Unlike the chiefs under British administration, the chiefs in French West Africa did not have their own courts or local authorities. They were officials of the French administration appointed to office and lacking hereditary claims to chieftaincy. Sometimes they did not even come from the same ethnic group over which they were chiefs. They were often appointed just because they had obtained some education and could speak French, or because they had proved their loyalty to France as clerks or as old soldiers.

It is important to note the similarities with the "warrant", chief system under the British administration. The fact that both chiefs under the reigns of the British (Igboland) and the French (in the interior of West Africa) had no claim to heredity was similar. But the British always respected their appointees and supported them in their operations. The French gave no such respect and in fact chiefs under French administration were often flogged in public for failing to collect tax or to round up laborers for the mines and the roadworks.

Another major difference in the manner in which chiefs were employed by the two colonial powers was that the French eliminated or reduced the powers of the paramount chiefs. This was the case in the Almamies of Fouta Djallon and the Emperor of Mossi. In the case of Dahomey, the kingship was eventually, abolished altogether. In Dahomey King Behanzin, who had led a resistance to French occupation was deposed and exiled. He was replaced by a French stooge, Agoli-Agbo who in turn was deposed in 1900 for trying to assert his independence of the French by opposing direct taxation. After this no successor was appointed altogether. The same situation was experienced in the Tokolor Empire where the French appointed Aguibu, a brother of the defeated Emperor Ahmadu, because he was an ally of the French. But in 1902 Aguibu was retired because he sought to revive some traditional authority. The kingship was abolished, just like in Dahomey.

The above scenario was very different from the British system of administration. The British even tried to create kingships where they never existed before, as in the case of segmentary societies such as Igboland. Although this was done without much success, they remained respectful of the line of royalty and often tried to trace the hereditary claims in order to avoid conflict.

Why did the French have such flagrant disregard for African traditional authority? The first reason concerned the centralizing tendency in France's metropolitan administration, and in particular, its dislike for delegating power to local government authorities. The administration of the territories overseas must conform to the pattern at home. They were opposed to the notion of chiefs holding independent power other than that derived from the administration itself.

Secondly, the French opposed African kingship, as M. Tidy argued, because kings were seen as obstacles to colonial despotism. At the canton and village level, the French used the traditional political system because the local rulers were considered much less of a threat to French control than kings. Although, for instance, in Dahomey many of the surviving members of the royal family even held office in the local colonial administration, the way in which the French used them, local traditional rulers had, the effect of undermining their traditional authority with the people. The French forced them to become agents of colonialism and this turned them against the people.

Moreover, French chiefs were poorly paid and this made them resort to corruption in order to survive. They were generally rough and harsh despots in their operations, either collecting tax or recruiting labour, because if they made any slight delays, they were publicly humiliated, flogged or dismissed.

Moreover, the French administrators who came to West Africa were Republicans and they distrusted monarchies. The French had overthrown the monarchy in the 1789 Revolution and had established a Republic. With this republican background and distrust of things, monarchial and aristocratic, the French administrations had a basic resentment for the institution of chieftaincy in West Africa.

The fact that the French had used military conquest to take over colonies in West Africa meant that they later put in place military administrations whose sole authority rested with the Commandant de Cercle, who had jurisdiction over all fields of administration. The chiefs could not fit into this military pattern and gradually lost most of their former powers. Hence chiefs in essence lacked the legitimacy and authority of the pre-colonial times and could even be imprisoned in the same manner as their people. As Geoffrey Gorer noted in Africa Dances, (London, 1935):,

> "In theory these local chiefs rule under the guidance of the local administration: In practice they are the scapegoats who are responsible for the collection of money and men… unless they are completely subservient (to their French master) they risk dismissal, prison and exile."

The nature and Impact of French Administrative style

a) The Judicial Style

The system of law which was used was called "native justice," but it had no roots in customary law. The French administrators had much greater judicial powers than their British counterparts: All criminal cases came under their jurisdiction, though African assessors sat in their tribunals. Their powers were further enhanced by the system of summary administrative justice known as the "indigenat." Under this system, an African who was not a French citizen could be arrested and imprisoned or fined without trial by the French administrator. In the early days of the "indigenat," maximum prison sentence was fifteen days, though it was later reduced to five.

b) **Introduction of Forced labour**

Slave labour for African masters was replaced by forced labour for the new French masters. There were two main forms of forced labour; labour in the "villages of Liberte" (Liberty Villages) and "subjects" labour (labour by subjects).

"Villages de Liberte" was the name given to villages which had been created by Gallieni as early as 1887 because of the desperate need for labour. They were settled with captives obtained as a result of French conquest mainly on the supply lines of the slave administrative posts. Freed slaves were settled in them but they were made to work for the French administration and army. Forced labour was then extended from the "villages de ; liberte" to all villages in French Africa. The inmates of these villages were not referred to as slaves, but the manner in which their labour was exploited was slave-style. Anyone leaving the villages faced severe punishment.

Under the French colonial rule all Africans who were not French citizens (all those living outside the four communes of Senegal) were liable to forced labour. Labour by "subjects" took two forms; the first form was "prestation" which was a tax in labour. Each adult was liable to twelve days labour, redeemable at three francs a day. But few had the means to pay for the thirty six francs a month and so had to undertake labour.

The second form was compulsory labour in return for a daily underpayment. In this category of exploitative labour were three main forms. Of these, the most hated was the "covee", which was compulsory labour on the roads. The "covee" had been one of the grievances for the French peasants before the 1789 Revolution. In French West Africa it continued up to 1946.

Next to the "covee", cultivation of crops for the administration was the other most hated form of compulsory labour.

Finally, there was conscription into the army. Able-bodied men were subject to conscription into the French army. During the First World War vast numbers of Africans, about 150 000, were sent to the European front to fight for a French cause. They had been recruited to argument the small French army, and in pursuit of the assimilationist policy.

c) **Direct Taxation:- Its emphasis and role**

The French administration had its most impact on the African in the collection of direct taxes. Prior to European administration Africans maintained an equilibrium between production of their subsistence crops and crops that would enable them to earn money to purchase imported goods. Under the French colonial system, taxation was imposed at such a level that the farmer had to grow, cash crops in many cases in order to be able to pay his taxes.

This system had serious consequences. In areas where cash crops could not be produced in sufficient quantities, especially the Sudan and what is now Upper Volta, men had to sell the only commodity they had, i.e. labour. Thus taxation forced farmers in the Sudan to migrate seasonally to Senegal to work in the groundnut fields, while hundreds migrated from Upper Volta to the Cocoa plantations and gold mines of the Ivory Coast and the then Gold Coast respectively. In his report to the International Colonial congress of 1900, " M. Duchene, summed up the role of taxes as follows.

"The idea that seems the best for achieving the employment of native labour would be to impose on the blacks relatively high taxes… and in default of payment they would incur a sentence of forced labour."
Hence, there was a complimentary relationship between taxation and forced labour. Either the taxes, so ran the argument, or forced labour, would make the overseas

territories self- reliant and self-sufficient, and bring them to something near economically assimilable standards.

d) **Resident administrators**

As the French administrators carried on their duties, the French civilizing mission was not abandoned, and though education was sparse, it was modelled on the French system. Children spoke French from the day they entered school. No concession was made to teaching in the vernacular as was the case in the British territories. Moreover, individual territories were not considered as having special characters, so that the same administrative organization was imposed on all.

Political officers would be posted from one territory to the other, sometimes every other year, which gave them little time to learn the local language or customs. On the other hand, the British political officer remained in the same territory for a long period of time, and in the case of Nigeria, in the same region and in addition promotion depended, in part, on the ability of the political officers to learn indigenous languages and customs. Thus under the French system, the political officer was the French language and culture while for the British officer every encouragement, was given to him to understand the local culture. This, to a large extent, goes a great deal to demonstrate why the French official were less popular than their British counterparts in their tours of duty.

The British system of Colonial Rule

Background

In 1900 Britain had six dependencies on the West Coast of Africa, namely Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast and three Nigerian Colonies (the Colony and Protectorate, Northern Nigerian Protectorate and Southern Nigerian Protectorate). In 1906 Lagos was integrated with southern Nigeria and in 1914 the south and the north were amalgamated to form the single colony of Nigeria.

From the start it was obvious that a centralized political administration, as was practiced by French West Africa, would be impossible. For one thing, each British colony was separated from its neighbour by French territory. For another the territories differed substantially in size, in contrast to the standardized French ones. Each of the British territories was divided into Colony and Protectorate. The Colony represented the land acquired before the scramble (1880-5), and their African inhabitants were regarded as British citizens and subjects. The Protectorate on the other hand, represented the lands acquired after the scramble. Its inhabitants were

protected persons who could not enter Britain without special authorization of the British government.

In strong contrast to the situation in French West Africa, "native" administration in British West Africa took a variety of alternative forms. But two main types came to be dominant. The first was Direct Administration, which was practiced in Benin and Asante. The second was "Indirect Rule" which was applied with the greatest success in Northern Nigeria.

The Policy of Indirect Rule

J.B Webster et- al in their book, Revolutionary Years: West Africa since 1800, have defined Indirect Rule as "ruling through the aristocracy of the conquered people."

Indirect Rule in West Africa was a brainchild of lord Lugard. In his book. The Dual mandate in Tropical Africa, Lugard summed up the system in these words:

> "The President acts as a sympathetic
> advisor to the native chief,
> being careful, not to interfere
> so as to lower his prestige,
> or cause him to lose interest
> in his work. His advice on
> matters of general policy must
> be followed, but the native
> ruler issues his instructions
> to his subordinate chiefs and
> district heads- not as the
> orders of the Resident
> but as his own."

In other words Indirect Rule meant three things. First, that African chiefs should govern their people, not as independent, but as dependent rulers. Second, that the orders of the Government were not conveyed to the people through them but were to emanate from them in accordance with instructions received through the Resident. Third, that when the chiefs themselves were controlled by Government in policy and matters of importance, their people were controlled by them in accordance with that policy.

Reasons for the adoption of Indirect Rule

In establishing Indirect Rule, Lugard was influenced by the scarcity of British officials available to him. In May 1900, the British government in London had approved only forty-two officials for the Protectorate. This number included doctors and other non-administrative officers of the number approved; only thirty-one had actually been appointed

and sent out to Nigeria. According to Lugard, many of these thirty-one were unable to carry out their duties because of ill- health. It was always difficult to target men who would agree to serve in the tropics even long after the discovery of quinine. With so few men and little money, it was impossible for Lugard to rule the vast area conquered directly through British officers.

Linked to the above point is the fact that while Lugard was desperately short of manpower, the emirate system, with its well-trained and efficient local administration, tax collection and well respected chiefs was already in place in Northern Nigeria. Indirect rule as a policy of administering the conquered territories would just solve all his related problems concerning shortage of staff and inadequate finance. He therefore appointed new emirs to the thrones left vacant as a result of the Caliphate wars of 1903 which had led to the death of some of the emirs and the removal or banning of others who had refused to cooperate with the British.

Furthermore, the British assumed that African societies had been static for centuries and that their political institutions were fixed. They also assumed that the population was very conservative and disliked change. Lugard concluded that it was best that African societies were left to themselves to deal with their customs and traditions, whilst the colonialists concentrated on economic exploitation. Such an approach would prevent unnecessary civil wars, revolts or schisms within the colonies. Of course they were wrong! Many African societies had passed through important political, economic and social upheavals in the nineteenth century. While the British believed that change could only come from the top through powerful emirs in the Sokoto Caliphate and the Oba of Benin who were running centralized systems. The situation then changed as indirect rule was applied outside Northern Nigeria and Benin. In Yorubaland, Asante and Borno, although the monarchy appeared powerful, this power was actually divided in a complicated way in the society.
This proved that African societies were in fact dynamic and different. The performance of indirect rule would therefore vary from society to society, far from what the British had assumed.

Indirect Rule in Northern Nigeria

The British in Northern Nigeria, which became the model for indirect rule, believed that it was their task to conserve what was good in indigenous institutions and assist them to develop on their own lines. The relation between the British political officer and the chief was, in general, that of an adviso, who, only in extreme cases, interfered with the chief and the native authority under him.

The emirs were permitted to administer traditional justice, with the bigger cases being referred to the British Resident. They could even try cases of murder but the sentence of death could only be passed by the British resident. They administered political units which corresponded to those they would have administered before the arrival of the colonial power. They were elected to office by traditional methods of selection and only in the case of the election of an unsuitable candidate to office would the colonial office refuse recognition. Moreover, taxation was collected by the emir's agents and the larger emirates

such as Sokoto, Kano and Zaria were allowed to keep up to 70percent of their taxes for salaries and local development (roads, bridges schools etc).

The British also confined the authority of the Amir al-Muminin to strictly religious matters. His power was drastically reduced, and in his place the British Resident took charge such that all the emirs would now report to the Resident as opposed to the Amir al-Muminin. In that way the Residents were able to boost their own importance as the "real power behind the throne."
Indirect rule in Northern Nigeria was regarded by the British as a success because it produced peace, order and tranquility. There was little trouble and new arguments for disputes. But while trouble could indicate rapid social change, tranquility might mean nothing more than stagnation. A number of factors combined to isolate the caliphate from the great twentieth century world movements, westernization and anti-European nationalism.

One of the reasons for the success of Indirect Rule in Northern Nigeria was that the British did not interfere with the Muslim religion as they had promised not to do during the conquest and surrender of the region. Non-interference with Islam was interpreted to mean that even Christian missions would not be encouraged. Thus the isolation of Northern Nigeria was increased.

This is because Christianity in other areas of Southern Nigeria worked as the main agent for Westernization. The British had not seen that shielding the people from the stimulating influence of Christianity would slow down the process of change. However, the British did allow mission activities in non-Muslim areas, many of which had not been brought within the Caliphate in the nineteenth century. Relatively backward areas during the nineteenth century, through their acceptance of Western education, became the most progressive areas in the nineteenth century. The British did set up a few non-religious schools for the Hausa-Fulani aristocracy, but they were never popular because they were in competition with the already existing Islamic system. Such status-quo, while preserving peace in Northern Nigeria, was however, not a positive move for future development in that it prevented the emergence of western educated elite to take up posts in the colonial civil service as clerks, secretaries, postal and railway services.
Such workers had to be hired from other regions such as southern or eastern Nigeria where the prevalence of Western education had produced an excess of manpower in search of jobs.

Indirect Rule in Yorubaland

The Yoruba had well-developed kingship patterns on which the British could build a system of indirect rule. The British residents were able to push for political, social and economic innovation after councils of chiefs were set up across Yorubaland. One was set up in Oyo in 1898 Ibadan- 1897 and Ilesha, Ekiti in 1900.

These councils were quite influential in their operations. They tried cases, administered day to day affairs as well as take charge over the collection of tax and land distribution. They were headed by a British Resident who settled disputes among the chiefs as well as making tours of inspection to ensure that loyalty prevailed. Nevertheless, he left much authority in

the hands of the council. It is important to note, as Michael Tidy points out in his History of Africa 1880- 1914 Vol. 2 that the councils were not mere British rubber stamps. Instead, they actively debated the issues tabled before them and often had their resolutions passed. For instance M. Tidy cites a case in which the Ibadan council debated the abolition of tolls for three years, from 1903 to 1906 and eventually convinced the Lagos government that they needed to be compensated and that was done.

A second typical case which M-Tidy also sites is when the British Cotton Growing Association requested a grant of 15000 acres of land to establish cotton plantations. The council could only agree to allocate the Association 5000 instead of the 15000 acres. In that case the Ibadan council successfully defended African land rights of its peasant producers in the region.

Nevertheless indirect rule in Yorubaland was not as successful story as it had fared in Northern Nigeria. Part of the reason was that the paramount chieftaincy position of Oyo was mistaken by the British to be similar to the one enjoyed by the Amiratat Muminin of the Sokoto Caliphate. The Ohafin of Oyo's position was only in an honourary position and when the British attempted to subject vassal states such as Ibadan, the Bale of Ibadan actually committed suicide in protest. But this was during the inception of indirect Rule. Once councils of elders were created and generally agreed rulers appointed, indirect rule fared well in Yorubaland.

Probably no governor in the history of Nigeria was so intensely hated by the Western educated Yoruba elite as Lugard. He made it very plain that he was not interested in the services of the western educated because he feared that they would stir up revolts in the region.

They criticized Lugard thus, as quoted in J.B's West Africa since 1800, The Times of Nigeria, 1914.

> "His legislative measures, his political
> administration, his educational methods
> are so entirely unBritish like that
> one could hardly conceive where to
> draw the line of distinction
> between the system of our governor-
> general and the system of German
> colonial rule in Africa….Is it that
> the Anglo Saxon fears the rapid
> intellectual and industrial strides
> the darker races have made?"

The Lagos Weekly Record also claimed that:

> Lugard "was obsessed with the
> maintenance of white prestige"

The same paper also heavily criticized the dual mandate in Tropical Africa, published by Lugard, that it was nothing but;

> "a tissue of misrepresentation."

The above sentiments of the Western educated in Yorubaland indicate the serious weaknesses of the system of indirect rule in its attempt to sideline the Western-educated. That was the darker side of the system in Yorubaland. In fact most of the councils of Elders actively received advice from the Western educated and in some cases the western- educated had been appointed as Obas (chiefs). No matter how many times the British attempted to dissolve such councils of Elders which had been influenced by the Western educated, it did not prove fruitful.

Lugard's successor, Clifford, admitted that "the government and the intelligent sections of the public are almost divorced from one another."
The Lagos Weekly Record had the last word about Lugard's system of administration,

> "For six long years, we have had
> the sword of Damocles dangling
> over our heads; for six
> long years we have lived
> under the cramped condition of
> A military dictatorship when the
> law from being a means of
> protection had become an
> instrument of crime and oppression in
> the hand of unscrupulous officials…
> the last administration has made
> the very name of the whiteman
> stink in the nostrils of the native."

Such strong sentiments did not go well for indirect rule in Yorubaland. We can safely conclude that it had mixed results. Indirect Rule could be practiced in Yorubaland but it aroused a flurry of criticism from and among the western educated elite.

Indirect Rule among the Igbo (south-east Nigeria)

British system in Igboland was a series of failures followed by attempted reorganizations. The British had found that the society had a segementary political pattern. Here real power was in the hands of the people and not the village elders, the Amaala.
In 1891 Macdonald, the British governor, introduced a warrant chief system in the Niger deta and the system was later applied to Igboland M. Tidy points out that the warrant chiefs derived their authority from the "Warrant" or certificate which was given to them by the British upon their appointment, authorizing them to rule.

However the warrant chief system was a miserable failure because often the British appointed Warrant chiefs from among the most uncommon people of the society. Moreover the system of rule was made more complicated by the fact that both the Niger Delta and Igboland were decentralized societies in which lineage patterns were complex to trace. Hence the warrant chiefs were appointed to administer areas which they traditionally never laid claim to. But since the British believed that the power of the chiefs had to be guaranteed, some warrant chiefs became rich and corrupt due to inadequate supervision. Usually, just like in Northern Nigeria, all complaints against the warrant chiefs had to be made in their presence, a system which often condoned their misdeeds.

Eventually the British set up councils of chiefs, most of which were not even village heads. Those who were village heads were often given authority over villages where traditionally they had no authority at all. Often if villagers were asked to elect warrant chiefs they got men who had western education as a way of trying to check on the corruption of some of the clerks and fellow warrant chiefs. False arrests, bribes and extortions were common in south-eastern Nigeria. All this is evidence that the British system was a failure in this region. Only a system of democratically elected councils would have worked in this region. However, Lugard rejected it on the basis that it was too progressive. The warrant chiefs continued, and they had unrestrained authority over the courts and they were viewed by the communities which they served as miniature tyrants.

Why did the system of indirect rule fail to take root in South-eastern Nigeria? One key element was the preoccupation which the model set up in Northern Nigeria. The system, or its proponents proved to be inflexible to adapt to changing conditions in West Africa. This was a serious weakness in the system of indirect rule.

Indirect Rule: an assessment

Much praise of the system of Indirect Rule was by the British. It had many serious flaws. In the first place, although the system of indirect rule was to leave "in existence the administrative machinery which had been created by the natives themselves" in place, it, in practice, did no such thing. The traditional paramount ruler or sultan was no more the head of social and political order but was rather a subordinate of the British overlord who used him to implement such unpopular measures as compulsory labour, taxation and military enlistment for two world wars. Even Northern Nigeria was somewhat modified. The Amir al-Muminin was destooled and a British Resident took over his political and judicial functions. The same went for Yorubaland. Some Obas had their powers enhanced because they cooperated with the British whilst those who questioned certain decisions and moves, were either demoted, removed or even punished. Probably a clear case where the British changed the socio-political set-up was that of south- eastern Nigeria. Instead of finding a far-sighted solution to a complex social and political system of that region, unpopular warrant chiefs were appointed, who had neither claim nor legitimacy. They turned out to be corrupt social misfits in the region.

Moreover, those traditional rulers who had armies, lost control over their armies while they also had no say in the conduct of foreign affairs and legislation. The courts of the traditional rulers were also brought under those of the British and every subject could appeal to the British courts. Furthermore, the British could despose traditional rulers and replace them with their own nominees.

Apart from that, the British often interfered with the existing paramountancies by breaking some of them up and raising subordinate chiefs to the status of paramount chiefs as they did in Sierra Leone. In all these ways, then, the system of indirect rule did weaken the traditional administration rather than preserve it as the policy states in The Dual Mandate, authored by Lugard himself. More importantly, far from just supervising and advising the

traditional rulers, the British district officers, in practice, often dictated to them and treated them as employees of the government.

Interestingly, for fear that the traditional ruling families would become "denationalized." Members of the royal families were in most cases not encouraged to attend the new schools that were introduced. Indeed, in areas such as northern Nigeria and Northern Ohara, the introduction of western education was officially discouraged. Under the system of Indirect rule, therefore the traditional rulers were not given the sort of education that would enable them to cope with the new problems of providing concrete wells, buildings roads, bridges, dispensaries and even schools. This failure made them even more dependent on the district commissioners and British technical officers.

A.A. Boahen in Topics on West African History has argued that the greatest fault in the policy of indirect rule was that it excluded from local government the African educated elite whose number increased over the years. This greatly annoyed members of that group and turned against, not only the British overlords, but also against the traditional rulers.

Thus, the system of indirect rule failed to promote the welfare and development of the ordinary people while it made the traditional authorities not only backward-looking but also very unpopular both with the educated elite and the ordinary people from whom they collected taxes on behalf of the British. The system was maintained until the Second World War because the British found it relatively cheap and every easy system to use. As one authority has described "it, it was the most indirect method of ruling directly".

The French and British Administrations: A summary comparison of styles.

Britain and France dominated most of colonial West Africa. They adopted different administrative policies. Indirect Rule and Assimilation, both of which have been described and explained above. This summary highlights features of the British and French administrative styles and impact that can be compared and contrasted.

The British were inspired by the concept of separate development for their African territories. They believed that it was their task to preserve what was good in indigenous institutions and assist them to develop in their own lines. The British in West Africa were also faced with the potential threat of inflated administration expenses that would be at variance with the current budgetary mood at home. Furthermore their important territories, notably, Nigeria, had viable and pre-existing political institutions that could be utilized for administrative purposes to offset the shortage in personnel.

The French, for their part, were inspired by the concept of assimilation which embraced the political, administrative, economic and personal spheres. But the policy was abandoned because a lot of work would be involved in making it a reality in parts beyond the four communes of Senegal, that is- St. Louis, Goree, Rafisque and Dakar. It was succeeded by "association" which, however, still had many elements of assimilation. For instance, it was still French policy to attempt to create French citizens out of Africans emphasising on the French language was not abandoned in the fields of education and administration.

It is also possible to juxtapose the roles of the political officers- the British Governors and the French Governor- Generals. On the whole, the British colonial Governor in the West Coast had more independence of action than his French counterpart. The Governor of Gambia or Nigeria had more opportunity for initiative than the Governor General of French West Africa. He could for instance, originate a legislation and be fairly certain that he would not be let down by the Crown, a situation which contrasts sharply with the French in West Africa. Here, all legislation emanated in France usually in the form of a Decree by the Head of state. Thus the Governor-General had to request legislation whereas Governors in British West Africa legislated, and only hoped no one in the Colonial Office would object.

Mention should also be made of the British administrative diversity as contrasted to the French administrative uniformity. Whereas the administrations of the French constituent colonies were standardized and uniform, in British West Africa, even in the same colonies the systems of administration varied according to the existing local circumstances. The result was that a French Lieutenant- Governor had no opportunity of developing the administration along the lines he thought best. He had to conform to the set administrative jacket in Paris.

Perhaps the most important area where the two administrative styles widely differed and had the greatest impact on the life of the African, was in British and French attitudes towards the role of indigenous chiefs.

The British system depended on the advisory relationship between the political officer and the native authority-usually a chief that headed a local government area which corresponded to the pre-colonial political units. Of course there were exceptions to the rule. As already demonstrated above, the warrant chiefs or councils of chiefs in Igboland were appointed to rule over areas they never had traditional authority over. In general, however, the British attempted to make chiefs as legitimate as possible. One critical area of difference in the chiefs under indirect rule was that they had the unwavering support of the British Resident.
Unlike their British counterparts, chiefs in French West Africa did not have their own courts or local authorities. Besides, they did not have an income of their own as did British West African chiefs. They controlled no local revenue of any sort, except that they collected the tax. They received pittances from the French and had to supplement these by illegal levies on the people, which aroused resentment against them. Once caught indulging in illegal activities they could be jailed, flogged in public or sent into exile. While the British were sempulous in their respect for traditional methods of selecting chiefs, the French were more concerned with their potential efficiency than legitimacy. This had no exception under the French. The French officer never respected an African chief as his equal, although he was able to establish relationships with the educated African.

Examination Questions

1. How adaptable was the British system of Indirect Rule to the different communities of British West Africa where it was applied?

2. What effects did the rule of concessionaire companies have on African territories? Answer with reference to the Congo, or East Africa, or West Africa.

3. Why and with what results did the French gradually abandon the system of assimilation in favor of association?

4. What were the main differences between the French policies of assimilation and association?

5. "When Indirect Rule was exported from Northern Nigeria, the results were disastrous? Do you agree with this statement either for other West African regions or East or Central Africa?

6. Compare and contrast the French system of association or paternalism with the British system of indirect rule as policies of governing Africans in West Africa.

7. What were the advantages and disadvantages of indirect rule as a form of colonial administration in Tropical Africa?

CHAPTER 13

COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION AND ECONOMIC EXPLOTATION IN EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA

Chapter objectives

By the end of this chapter students should be able to achieve the following:

a) Illustrate colonial economic policies in Central and East Africa.
b) Compare and contrast the changing policies as implemented by the British from region to region.
c) Explain why the British adopted indirect or direct rule to administer their domains.
d) Trace and explain the various patterns of colonial economic exploitation in East and Central Africa.

British adminstration in Southern Rhodesia

The British established themselves firmly in Southern Rhodesia after the defeat of the Ndebele and Shona 1896-7. A move to restrict company control was started in 1989 by the appointment of a Resident Commissioner to act as a British Government "watch- dog" His duties included supervision of the police force.

By the British Order-in- Council of 1898, Southern Rhodesia was given a new constitution to ensure a sound basis for its administration. It combined Mashonaland and Matabeleland under one administration, with headquarters in Salisbury. It also provided for the establishment of an Executive Council consisting of the Resident Commissioner and four members nominated by the Company, and a Legislative Council consisting of five settlers appointed by the Company and four elected ones. The Company Administrator was to preside over both the executive council and the Legislative Council.

The Legislative Council could make laws subject to approval of the South African High Commissioner, who might also legislate any proclamation. This constitution was largely the work of the able, Sir Alfred Milner. He hoped, as did Rhodes that southern Rhodesia would one day join with the four self- governing Southern Africa countries in some form of Union or Federation, which would tip the balance in favour of British interests over Afrikaner nationalist ones. For this reason, he set southern Rhodesia on the road to self-government by providing for the settlers an early position of dominance. Franchise was to be racial in practice. The settlers began to see no reason why they should not be granted independence and stepped up their agitation even more when Rhodes died in 1902.

Was British rule indirect rule? The answer is yes! Chiefs were employed and assigned duties either by the Executive Council or Legislative Council. They were at the bottom end of the hierarchy of the colonial administration. African chiefs had their traditional powers stripped though, so that they would directly report to the colonial officers.

The day-to- day administration of the colony and the setting up of a social and political colour bar was entirely in the hands of the settler- dominated white government, assisted locally by magistrates, Native commissioners and chiefs. Magistrates dealt with issues affecting settlers such as land applications. Native commissioners, scattered throughout the country, kept law and order among Africans, collected taxes, recruited labour and tried legal cases involving Africans. Chiefs could be deposed and their chiefdoms divided or joined to other chiefdoms.

Their work now was to assist Native Commissioners. The Chiefs were no longer the true leaders of their people. It is important to note that the BSA Company steadily lost interest in governing Rhodesia because of the high costs involved. By 1913 there were more settlers in the Legislative Council than there were company members. In 1923 the BSACo gave up the country to the British Government who in turn gave the settlers the option of either running the country themselves or joining with South Africa. The settlers chose to run the country themselves.

Indirect Rule in Rhodesia was different from the system practiced in West Africa, let alone in Northern Nigeria. This is because Rhodesia was a settler country; there was no such thing as a shortage of white men because the climate was ideal for white settlement. Hence, the white administrative officers, usually took over the functions of paramount chiefs. African chiefs therefore remained relegated to the mundane tasks of recruiting labour and collecting tax. Although they also heard cases and ran courts as their West African counterparts, they almost always did that in the presence of a white official, especially when dealing with relatively bigger cases. African chiefs who showed signs of independence were dismissed. This was very different

from West Africa where some traditional chiefs ended up becoming more powerful than they had been during the pre-colonial period.

Economic development

After laying down the foundations of administration, the BSA Company was in a position to devote its main energies to economic expansion. Prospects for mining and farming were good, but only if vital transport problems were overcome. The most urgent task was the completion of the railway line which could carry heavy machinery, food and equipment to the developing country so far from the sea ports. The line from Beira on the East Coast reached Umtali in 1898, and in the following year reached Salisbury.

The Cape railway had meanwhile been extended North of Mafeking and reached Bulawayo in 1897. From there it was continued to Wankie where rich coal deposits had been identified by a trader on a hunting trip and on the Victoria Falls in 1904. The line was continued via the rich lead and Zinc mine at Broken Hill to the borders of the Belgian Congo in 1909. These transport networks were extremely vital in stimulating production as well as in facilitating trade links with the sub-region.

The Company invested much money in mining. Mining of coal began at Wankie in 1900 and the demand posed by the whole rail-network of Central Africa, and later the Belgian Congo and Portuguese East Africa too, ensured that production rose rapidly. Shortly afterwards, the production of other important minerals began; chrome and asbestos. Extensive deposits of chrome were discovered along the Great Dyke Peak mine in 1906. High grade asbestos was mined at Shabani from 1908. Prices at first were low and developed gradually, but these, minerals soon formed an important part of Southern Rhodesian exports.

British Administration in Northern Rhodesia (Zambia)

Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) was also under the control of the BSA Company. In 1899 the BSA Company's territory north of the Zambezi had been divided into two: that is North- eastern Rhodesia (Barotseland) and North-Western Rhodesia. In 1911 the two parts were united to form Northern Rhodesia (Zambia). The country remained under the rule of the Company Administrator and a council of Company officials. This administration was subject to ultimate British control and a Resident Commissioner was appointed, as in Southern Rhodesia, to act as imperial representative on the spot.

The amalgamation of the two parts of northern Rhodesia had a tremendous political and social impact on the African. The status and function of chiefs were now subordinated to a handful of British officials. In theory they were little more than policemen, though they were denied appropriate wages. In practice they continued to hold courts. The administration upheld traditional rules of chiefly succession. But it also insisted on appointing chiefs even in areas where they had never existed before, like in Tongaland.

Although Lewanika's territory was, in practice, considerably reduced, the Lozi system of government continued to function independently. Lozi chiefs had to collect tax for the company but they were the only chiefs in the whole of central Africa to receive a fixed percentage of taxes paid by their subjects. These were probably the fruits of Lewanika's co-operation with the whites. The Lozi in fact gained a head start in education over other Africans in Northern Rhodesia. Coillard

had been permitted by the King to found a school and by 1900 there were several young Lozi who were literate.

The new administration also introduced a system of wage-labour. The European officials and their small police force had to be paid in cash. To do it, it was necessary to raise money through taxation of Africans.

Economic Exploitation of Northern Rhodesia

The stimulus to acquire Northern Rhodesia for Britain came from Cecil Rhodes. But on its own, the region appeared economically sterile to the Company. For five years after 1900, prospectors examined the surface deposits of copper in Northern Rhodesia, but these were not substantial. The company had failed to gain possession of minerals in Katanga, and hopes of finding gold in these areas proved futile. Therefore, under Company rule Northern Rhodesia was only economically important as a link between the Congo and Southern Africa. By 1898, there were as few as 100 whites in the country.

In 1904 the railway was brought across the Zambezi from Southern Rhodesia, just below the Victoria Falls. In 1909, it had been extended to link up with the Congo systems. Hence forth, coke from Wankie in Southern Rhodesia passed to the Katanga copper mines while copper from Katanga passed to Mozambique. The only mine of any consequence in Northern Rhodesia was the lead mine at Broken Hill, and that did not really get underway until the First World War.

On the whole, the prevalence of tse tse flies discouraged European settlement in Northern Rhodesia. In the far north, however, the company appropriated large blocks of land and allocated these to the Europeans, who raised maize and beef for sale in Katanga. From 1914 tobacco was grown successfully near Fort Jameson in the East.

THE PROTECTORATE OF NYASALAND

The protectorate of Nyasaland was proclaimed in May 1891. Harry Johnson was appointed Her Majesty's Commissioner and Consul-General to the territories under British influence north of the Zambezi, with wide administrative powers. He was to administer Nyasaland for the British Government and was to exercise similar powers on behalf of the BSA Company over the territories west of the protectorate.

In 1897 Johnston was replaced by Sharpe as Commissioner and Governor. Sharpe's administration is famous for granting to the protectorate a typical crown colony constitution. This provided for a Governor, an Executive Council of three senior officials, and a Legislative Council in which members of the Executive Council sat with three nominated non-official members.

ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION OF NYASALAND

Nyasaland had no valuable minerals and consequently little industrial development and few European immigrants.

Less African land was taken in Malawi than in Zambia or Zimbabwe: fifteen percent in all. The earliest land-grabbing took place when a few whites "bought" land from Malawi chiefs with such things as calico, beads, copper wire and liquor. The African Lakes Company was "granted" three and a half million acres by chief Kapeni. In these areas Africans were treated harshly; they had to pay rent either in cash or in labour under the "thangata" system, and some were moved out of the white areas,

which caused overcrowding in other areas, especially around Blantyre. The overcrowding was made worse when a railway company took land in the overcrowded area, and later when Mukua- Lomwe people migrated into the Mlanje area to escape from the harsh Portuguese regime in Mozambique.

The whites as usual took the best land, in the Shire Valley and Highlands with small enclaves at Karonga in the north and Nchen in the centre of Malawi. On their big plantations the whites grew cash crops like coffee, tea, cotton and tobacco. Coffee was important around the turn of the century when prices were high in England. For instance 907 tonnes of coffee were produced in Malawi in 1900 due to the growing demand. However, production later on dropped due to drought, shortage of fertilizer, poor seed and poor wages which caused low labour supplies. Only 45 tonnes of coffee were produced in 1915. Tea was also produced at a small scale before 1914.

As in the rest of Central Africa, African farmers were not given the same encouragement as whites. The missionaries encouraged them to grow cotton, but until 1910 the colonial government would not supply enough seed; it also refused to finance an experimental farm and did nothing to alleviate transport difficulties which made marketing difficult. Middlemen could buy cotton from farmers in the villages at less than the market price and then resell it at a profit.

In 1910, due to increased demand for Cotton in Britain, the British government granted ℓ10,000 per year for five years to encourage cotton growing in all its protectorates. The British cotton Growing Association provided seed for African cotton growers in Malawi. It also set up ginneries at Port Herald, Chiromo and Karonga and improved marketing facilities to cut out the profiteering middlemen.

BRITISH RULE IN BECHUANALAND (Botswana)

In the Bechuanaland protectorate indirect rule was employed as the preferred system of administration first. In 1885 Sydney Shippard, a Cape colony judge, was appointed Resident Commissioner. Shippard did not interfere with Khama's rule of the Ngwato or the rule of other Tswana communities by their rulers. But something approaching direct rule was established by the 1891 Order- in- Council which set up full-scale British administration with assistant resident commissioners, magistrates, police officers, courts of law and so on. Since European courts could hear purely African cases, the British government had almost complete powers of administration and legislation, but in practice after 1891 Khama still ruled in the traditional manner.

Technically, Khama was a colonial chief under direct rule. Yet right up to his death in 1923 Khama was in reality a king. He saw himself not as a colonial administrator but as an independent ruler in alliance with the British government which not only protected the Ngwato from the Boers and the British South Africa Company, but also helped him against his traditional internal rivals. The European administrators allowed Khama to conduct himself as an independent ruler because he saw eye to eye with them on most matters. His aim of "improvement," the spread of Christianity, and the development of agriculture and trade was identical to those of the British.

In actual fact, the coming of colonization to Botswana saw Khama's royal power and that of the Ngwato monarchy increase. His use of British officials in his struggles against internal rivals increased his own power. When his ambitious son Sekhoma

tried to get Khama to retire as chief and give way to him in 1898, Khama had him exiled until 1921 when the king celebrated his 50 year jubilee. Many lesser chiefs or headmen opposed Khama's westernizing innovations. As a result of this, Khama placed various territorial districts under the control of non-Ngwato headmen on whom he could rely, or men he had appointed directly from his capital. He was, in many ways, a centralizing traditional autocrat, not necessarily a colonial ruler whose authority was constantly checked. Hence among the Ngwato, indirect rule led to the enhancement of the Paramount chief's power.

Administration and Economic exploitation of the Congo Free State

From 1885-1908, the area constituting the Congo 'Free' state was under the personal government of Leopold II Belgium had no say in its administration and that was why it was really a "free" nation. Leopold II considered the state as his personal property and called himself its "proprietor." A one man government has to be highly centralized if it is going to hold, and this was the position in the Congo. Leopold continued to reside in the Congo but sent administrators to the Congo who were directly responsible to him.

At the head of the government was a Governor. He had under him administrators in the outlying districts who carried out the wishes of the sovereign conveyed to them through the Governor. The Belgian Code replaced the African customary law in the courts. The courts, besides other short comings, were understaffed, adding to the faulty nature of the administration of justice. In the army, the ranks of commissioned officers were held by Belgians, while Africans were used in supervising and punishing their fellow Africans during the collection of rubber.

The early years of the Congo "Free" state were also its hardest, for this new and young creation did not have an immediate source of revenue. The basic problem seemed to be that all the Congo was owned not by a metropolitan power which could be expected to help by a grant-in-aid as was happening in other colonies, but an individual. Thus its success would have to depend on the private fortune of this sovereign. This fortune and the trade in ivory made the colony weather its rough financial days until 1890, when Leopold, realizing that he could no longer run the empire without assistance, appealed to the Belgian Parliament for a loan which he promised would be repaid by 1900. But in 1891 it was discovered that the Congo Free State had abundant resources of rubber which could fetch the state a lot of money and probably make it self-supporting. This discovery became even more useful between 1895 and 1905 when the demand for rubber experienced a tremendous rise following the invention of the pneumatic tyre.

The way these wild resources were exploited gave the Congo Free State another notorious feature of its own. By policies of 1891-92 summarized in what was called "regime domanial" the state was declared the proprietor (owner) of all the vacant land. Vacant land was defined as land neither occupied nor exploited by the indigenous people. Be that as it may, in Africa there would never be vacant land or any land that belonged to nobody at any point in time. All land would be collectively owned by the community and would be parceled out by the King on the community's behalf. Land would simply lie "fallow" or "reserved" for grazing as opposed to "vacant".

However, the two important products of the Congo, that is ivory and rubber, came from the domanial land and it was illegal to buy or sell anything from this domanial land. In such a way therefore, the regime domanial policy was out rightly monopolistic.

Although selling and buying of land had been prohibited, the Congo Free State affirmed that it had not restricted Free State in the territory. Leopold left capital intensive projects in the hands of private businesses because he realized that he did not have the money to fund such heavy projects as mining and railway construction. Hence, Leopold contracted the services of concessionaire companies and in exchange for their services, he allocated vast tracts of land to them.

The 'concessionaire' companies were paid to do a certain job such as build a railway and in return they were given land or mineral rights in lieu of monetary payment. In 1886 for instance, Leopold made a contract with the C.C.C.I (Compagnie du Congo pour le Commerce et I' Industire). The C.C.C.I was to build a railway from Leopoldvile (Kinshasa) to Matadi. By 1898 the line was complete and C.C.C.I had been given more than 775 000 hectares of African territory. Two other railways were built in the same way: one from Congo to Lake Tanganyika; the other form the Kasai River to Katanga.

In 1891 Leopold made a contract with the Champagne du Katanga. The Company was to occupy Katanga, an area in which the British Imperialist Cecil Rhodes was showing interest. In return for taking over the area, the company would get one third of the land and mineral rights.

The conquest of Katanga lasted from 1891-4 and the Belgians met stiff opposition from the Swahili in Eastern Congo, and from Msiri in Katanga. The Swahili and Yeke were not prepared to give up their powerful trading kingdoms. Msiri told the Belgians,

> "I am the master here, and as long
> as I live, Garenganja (the Yeke
> Kingdom) shall have no other."

Msiri did, however, allow the Belgians to set up a post near his capital. Bunkeya, and in 1891 he was shot dead during a scuffle with some Belgian soldiers led by Captain Stairs. In 1906 a company named "Union Miniere du Haut Katanga" was formed to exploit Katanga copper.

It was not, however, simply enough to acquire the monopoly of the nominal resources or to engage private or concessionaire companies for development projects; cheap labour must be obtained to make the monopoly a meaningful realty. A scheme must be worked out to make Africans work for the companies and especially for the state. Accordingly taxes were imposed which Africans were only supposed to pay in kind by being compelled to work every two weeks in the rubber jungles. To make certain that no one defaulted in rendering these services any kind of runaway on the part of Africans was punishable with severe flogging in public, and sometimes, amputation of limbs, as an example to the rest. Ruth Slade has tried to explain the driving force behind this brutality:

"State and company agents were
at one and the same time
administrators and traders; their

> basic salaries were low but they
> received large bonuses scaled
> according to the amount of
> Rubber and other products
> which they were able to collect.
> There was thus no incentive to
> check the methods employed by
> their African subordinates, whose
> instructions encouraged them to force
> the local populations to furnish ever-increasing
> quantities of these products."

Leopold's policies and administration were deplorable in the extreme and in 1905 public and government opinions in Britain and the United States began to pressure the Government to annex the territory and the monarch's personal rule and work towards reform in the Congo. Leopold was highly opposed to annexation but in 1908 was finally, forced to surrender all his claims to the Belgian Congo. The King himself died a year later, in 1909.

Impact of Leopold's Occupation

By the time of his surrender of the Congo, Leopold had created many problems. The concessionaire companies still owned vast tracts of land under contracts made with Leopold. They controlled the trade of a still large area. The Congo was heavily in debt, as the Belgian monarch's borrowing on the Congo's account was largely spent on big projects in Belgium. The result was that the Congo was still a poor country whose people had no income that could be taxed to pay for more development.

African opposition to Leopold was not abated by the arrival of the Belgian Government. The main source of opposition was the societies far removed from the centres of Belgian power and in which chiefs were traditional military leaders. These included the Azande of the Sudan border, whose main opposition was from 1892-1912; the Bashin in eastern Congo, 1900- 16; the Luba of Kasongo Nyemba, 1907-17 and the Yaka on the Angolan frontier. These rose against Leopold in 1795, 1902 and 1906.

There were also African risings against forced labour and against the cruelty of Belgian officials, the Bubua risings in the north, 1903-4 and 1910. There were also the Budja uprisings from 1903- 05. Apart from these, there were military uprisings as well. These included the Luluabourg Garrison Mutiny in 1898 and the mutiny of the Tetela from 1897-1908. These uprisings were against the white officers who were regarded as representatives of the evil brought by Leopold's rule.
However, Leopold II's successor, Albert I attempted to reverse the brutal policies that had been let loses by Leopold. By 1912, owing to Albert I's determination to improve and advance African interests, the conditions in the Congo actually looked different. The salaries of state officials had been raised, employees of commercial companies were no longer

agents of the administration, some checks on the abuses of power had been made. This resulted in the reorganization of the system and the labour tax imposed on Africans had been committed to a money tax which was a much lighter burden.

British Administration and Exploitation in East Africa

According to Michael Tidy, in his History of Africa, 1880- 1914, Vol II, the basis of British administration in Buganda was the 1900 agreement which introduced considerable modifications to the traditional Baganda political system.
The first British administrator for Buganda Lugard flavoured the introduction of indirect rule as a system of administering Buganda. He immediately recognized the role of the Kabaka and his chiefs in the new protectorate. Subsequent administrators who came after Lugard, such as Sir Harry Johnston, further confirmed and redefined the functions of the traditional Baganda rulers within Buganda through the 1900 Agreement. However, in the final analysis, indirect rule was not really practiced in Buganda, nor the areas surrounding it.

According to the 1900 Agreement, the Baganda were no longer allowed to receive tribute from neibouring communities, but their gains more than offset their losses. Buganda's recent annexation of several territories from Bunyoro was confirmed. The Kabakaship was also retained and so did his power to appoint chiefs.

Moreover, Buganda was given a parliament called Lukiko, whose members were the three regents (for the infant Kabaka DaudiChwa) twenty senior chiefs and sixty-six notables nominated by the Kabaka. The Lukiko was allowed to spend funds without supervision from the British. No further direct taxation in addition to the existing hut and gun taxes was to be imposed on the Baganda without the consent of the Kabaka and the Lukiko. Apart from that, the agreement strengthened the special position of Buganda within the larger Uganda as a reward for the loyalty of the Christian leaders to Britain.

M. Tidy however, argues that such measures outlined above did not necessarily amount to autonomy for Buganda. In reality, the Kabaka's powers were considerably weakened. He was deprived of his main sources of income i.e tribute and taxation- because all tax collected in Buganda was now to be merged with the income of the entire Uganda protectorate. Moreover, by deposing Mwanga in 1897 the British had thoroughly subjected the Kabaka to themselves. They also appointed an infant Daudi Chwa in his place and three pro-British regents alongside him. All this weakened the King's position.

Apart from that, the land tenure reform of the 1900 Agreement destroyed the traditional patronage system. By 1919, Daudi Chwa was actually complaining that even his own subjects were now regarding him as merely one of the British government's paid servants. While the Lukiko resembled the Kabaka's court, it was essentially a British-created institution and would certainly advance colonial interests. Hence its main function was to control the collection of colonial taxation. It was allowed to forward proposals for the approval of the Kabaka and the British Commissioner, but the commissioner was authorized to veto any proposals. In this way, the British had decided to use the cheap traditional administration of Buganda rather than introduce expensive British administration; yet

Buganda was to be simply one province of the British Protectorate of Uganda, subject, like any other provinces, to the laws, which the British made for the whole protectorate.

The real beneficiaries of the 1900 Agreement, M. Tidy proceeds with the argument, were neither the Kabaka nor the traditional Bataka clan chiefs whose influence was reduced, but the pro-British Christian Bakungu hierarchy of the Saza country. These chefs rose in prominence in the late re-colonial period. After the 1900 agreement the Bakungu chiefs had a new elevated role; they became the new style British administrators, as opposed to the old-style client chiefs of the Kabaka. In other words, the British did not so much use the Baganda traditional power structure as reorganized to suit their colonial needs.

The land tenure reform in the 1900 Agreement provided for all occupied land to be granted to the occupier in freehold. Freehold was a European concept. Formerly the Kabaka had disposed of land which in fact was owned by the community. Now the occupied land became freehold. The Christian Bakungu chiefs benefited most from the destruction of estates of freehold land, mainly because they had the pleasure of distributing it. Although the Kabaka got the largest share he could no longer distribute it as patronage. Hence the land reform was a practical demonstration of Britain's alliance with the dominant political group in Buganda, the Christian Bakungu chiefs. These became dependent on Britain in order for them to retain more effective control of the government against rivalry from the Kabaka and Kabaka clan chiefs.

It is important to note that peasants on the estate (mailo) land became tenants of the Bakungu chiefs. Thus the political power of the latter was strengthened because they could now evict tenants for political dissent. Unoccupied land became Crown land and could be distributed in any way the British administration thought fit. Much of it was made available for peasants to buy and thousands of ordinary Baganda thus gained new, freer status. At the same time the Kabaka clan- chiefs lost many workers, clients and tribute payers. In this way the 1900 Agreement assured the ascendancy of Apolo Kagwa's Protestant Party and completed the Christian revolution in Buganda's politics begun in 1887. The Agreement was a blow to the traditional political forces in Buganda.

The Baganda were used as colonial agents in Bunyoro, Busoga, Bukedi Bugisu and almost all of Uganda by the British Baganda agents were used by the British because the often segmentary societies surrounding Buganda, like the Nilotic communities of the north and the Kiga of Kigezi, had few or no political leaders resembling chiefs and they had no centralized political institutions. Even in Bunyoro where chiefs and centralization did exist, the British employed the Muganda agent Jemisi Miti as administrator because of Bunyoro hostility to the colonial regime and the refusal of most of their chiefs to co-operate with colonialism. Men like Miti gathered tax and recruited forced labour for the British though Bunyoro were sometimes used as forced labour for Baganda settlers in the disputed countries.

Men like Semei Kakungulu actually carried out colonial conquest for Britain in east Uganda. Thus Baganda agents were used by the British administration in newly occupied areas. Over each Muganda agent there was a superior British officer. The British fairly

quickly replaced the Baganda agents when the local people were considered to be ready to replace them. In some cases they were replaced when the local people showed persistent resistance to them and the British wanted to avoid an armed revolt. An example of this was seen in Bunyoros after the Kyanyangire passive resistance in 1907.

The various kings of Uganda such as those in Toro and Ankole who signed protection treaties with the British had no real power under the colonial regime. On one occasion King Kasagama of Toro was fined a thousand shillings and forced to write an apology and show public humility for organizing the sending of an "impertinent" letter to a European provincial commissioner. In these "special status" kingdoms, the traditional rulers possessed only ceremonial privileges.

The Bakungu chiefs in Buganda and the Baganda agents in the rest of Uganda were not greedy men who threw in their lot with the British for the sake of the loot nor were they simply Christians who indentified their future with the fortunes of their white co-religionists. There was a positive side to the work of the Baganda chiefs of the early colonial period as they introduced schools, enforced progressive measures like campaigning against sleeping sickness, by moving people from the lake shore, saving the quality of the Uganda cotton crop by decisive action and spreading new crops around the country- such as in bananas, coffee and Irish potatoes. The Baganda chief at this time were instruments of progress and the British were fortunate in having such an able group of men to work for them.

Colonial Administration in Kenya: M.Tidy: A History of Africa (1880- 1914, Vol 2)

Kenya had no obvious traditional chiefs upon which the policy of indirect rule could be based. As a result of that, the British had to create chiefs throughout most of Kenya save in Wanga where Nabungo Mumia was king. The British turned Mumia's tiny local state into a regional one by using Wanga's men as colonial agents (sub-imperialism) throughout Buluyia and in parts of the Luo country. Elsewhere in Kenya, the British appointed people that were outstanding in their communities as chiefs. As in Eastern Nigeria some of these individuals that were appointed had no traditional authority over their people.

Mumia had been an ally of Britain during the establishment of colonial rule in Kenya Between 1904 and 1927 Mumia was the ruler of north Nyariza District. Wanga agents throughout the district owed their appointment to Mumia and were either his relations or his followers. In 1909 Mumia was appointed Paramount Chief of North Nyanza as a reward for his colonial service. The position was, however, not a traditional one since only a small area of Buluyia had been tributary to Wanga. Mumia's authority rested on two key responsibilities which he had to discharge; he was the appeal judge in all "native" cases and he also had power to settle boundary disputes.

However, in the long run the Wanga agent system failed because the subject people also wanted their men to be chiefs. Wanga's men were gradually replaced as the Baganda were in Bunyoro.

In the Ukambani the British soon realized the pitfalls of appointing as chiefs men who, in a chiefless society, made up the rules as they went along. The first Kamba colonial chiefs looked on their work as an opportunity to amass wealth. They soon became corrupt through overcharging tax in order to get a bigger commission from the colonial administrators. Chiefs' courts were set up in Ukambani in 1908. The chiefs set their own scales of fees. In imitation of the European Magistrates Courts, they imposed fines of livestock, but they usually kept the animals for their own personal use, not for the government. Two Kamba government chiefs who did particularly well out of their duties between 1900 and 1901 were Musan waMwanza who in the period built a herd of 8000 cattle and Nthiwa waTawa who acquired fifteen wives.

However, one of the major drawbacks was corruption in the Kamba courts. K.R Dundas a reforming district commissioner had to resort to the use of the traditional Nzama or councils of elders as courts because there was too much corruption in the Kamba courts. He hoped to strengthen genuine traditional institutions in a chiefless society. This was a rare experiment in British colonial Africa. But it failed for the obvious reason that it was impossible to graft colonial laws and practices into a traditional democratic institution.

The elders were often reluctant to impose unpopular colonial measures such as handing over tax defaulters to the white man and sending young men to work outside Ukambani. Nor were they willing to abandon the practice of their customary law which had an emphasis on reconciliation and compensation in "criminal cases" in favour of the fines and imprisonment which the British administration demanded in such cases. Hence many elders refused to attend meetings of the Nzama under the auspices of the new colonial judicial approach.

Elsewhere in Kenya, the British had more success in finding outstanding individuals who could serve as chiefs, but they never really found men who were fully subservient. Karuri waGakure of Kikuyuland is a typical example. Karuri rose to prominence among the Kikuyu due to his skill in divination, trade with the Swahili and alliance with the European trader John Boyes who supplied him with guns and ammunition. In 1900 Karuri became a colonial chief in his home area. He helped the British conquer the surrounding Kikuyuland and in 1912 was appointed Paramount chief of the northern Kikuyu land unit. Although he was illiterate he saw the need for modernization. Through efficient tax collection he helped in the building of roads, bridges, schools and a factory. He was not a collaborator because in 1910 he held protests at land alienation and succeeded in resisting European settlement to the area, east of Muranga town (Fort Hall).

While in Buganda the traditional power base of the Kabaka was drastically rescued, the situation in Kenya was different. Chiefs were invented and empowered and often got so powerful that they ended up challenging the British administrators. This clearly shows that the British system of indirect rule did not achieve uniform results. Neither did the British officials maintain the same policy throughout their regions. In some cases as in central Africa (Rhodesia) they emasculated the traditional chiefs to a point where they ended up practising direct rule. In East Africa, however, the pattern was different, and so was it in West Africa.

Economic Exploitation in East Africa

Right form the beginning it had been declared by the British that Uganda was to develop primarily as an African country. This had two implications:

(i) That there was no large scale alienation of land to non-Africans such as had happened in Kenya. The 1900 Buganda Agreement had emphasized African ownership, so they could only be a small European settler population in Uganda.

(ii) It meant that economic development in Uganda would depend on peasant agriculture. So, unlike in Kenya, Africans were from an early time encouraged to grow cash crops like coffee and cotton. These, quickly became the mainstay of Buganda's economy.

The completion of the Uganda Railway in 1902 as far as Kisumu was a landmark in that it greatly reduced transport costs and provided a link with the outside world. The Jinja-Namasagali line was opened in 1912. This coincided with the expansion of the cotton crop in the eastern region. Roads radiating from Kampala, the capital, also began to proliferate in the early 1900s.

The Uganda Railway and Kenya Settlers

The Uganda Railway has been mentioned briefly elsewhere in the study pack. We refer to its impact in more vivid detail here.

The building of the Uganda Railways had three major aims.

a) First, it was necessary to pro vide the strategic link between Egypt and the East African Coast.

b) Second, it was built to protect Britain's strategic interest in East and North-Eastern Africa

c) Third, it was built for effective control and development of economic resources in Uganda, over which a protectorate had been declared.

Construction began in 1896 and the line reached Kisumu in 1902. It had employed 32000 Indian labourers; 5000 clerks and craftsmen, and cost Britain approximately ℓ8 million.

Consequences of the Railway

1. The immediate political result of the construction of the Uganda Railway was the bringing of the entire areas which it passed through from the Coast to Lake Victoria, under one administration. Hitherto, the boundary of the Uganda Protectorate extended to the region of Naivasha, while the British East African Protectorate was in charge of the country up to the coast. This in effect meant that part of the Railway was to be run by the Uganda protectorate, while part was to be run by the East African Protectorate. But this arrangement it did not make much financial and administrative sense and in 1902 it was decided that the running of the railway be removed from dual to single administration. Thus the present Kenya- Uganda Railway came into being.

2. The railway greatly improved communications with the hinterland. Hitherto the cost of transport was very high and only porter transport was available. Ivory had

therefore been the only commodity capable of transportation from the interior to the coast. Now transport was easier and cheaper and other, firms of trade e.g in the Uganda coffee, tea and cotton.

3. The Railway stimulated settler agriculture as well as the development of the interior of Kenya. The British Government had provided funds for the construction of the Uganda Railway and now left it to the East African Administration to evolve ways and means of making the railway pay for its own operation. Two possible ways seem to provide the answer: Exploitation of mineral deposits. However, it had been confirmed that no substantial mineral deposits existed in these regions. The other as alluded above, was agricultural production. Unfortunately most of the East African Protectorate was barren and unproductive. The areas that appeared to offer any prospects were the Kenya Highland, the Rift Valley and the area to the west of it.

   Essentially, the railway stimulated broader research on the agricultural viability of the East African Protectorate (Uganda and Kenya). Initially ordinary cash crop farming was attempted and later stock-rearing and cereal-growing were also experimented. Eventually, however, plantation farming proved to be the most viable for the Protectorate although it would require a huge influx of labour. Sisal and rubber and later on tea and coffee were the crops which were identified for plantation farming. However, coffee eventually became the most viable crop in plantation farming which became controlled by the European settlers.

Consequences of settler Agriculture

Many would- be plantation famers began as small-scale and relatively poor individuals. Thus one of the most important effects of the introduction of settler agriculture in the protectorate was forced labour. Just as in all the other colonies, settlers were not prepared to Higher African labour. This was despite the fact that The British Government had pledged that "the primary duty of Great Britain in East Africa is the welfare of the native races." Such a noble aspiration was shot down by the fact that the Protectorate Government was expected by the same colonial government to be self- supporting. Hence settlers began organized agitation for a position of dominance.

In line with settler agitation, the Colonist Association was formed in 1902 to encourage European settlement and secure large supplies of land and labour. It became Sir Charles Elliot's (Commissioner since 1901) main source of advice. Further to this, in 1903 the Planters and Farmers' Association was formed by Hugh Cholmondelery soon after his arrival. It played a leading role in the marketing of potatoes in South Africa, pressing for reservation of the highlands for white settlers and opposing the proposed Jewish settlement in the highlands.

Together, Delamere and Elliot became the leading champions of white interests, which they pursued with complete disregard for the Africans. Charles Elliot's view of Africans was fairly representative of that of many settlers when the settlers began to covet Masai land, for instance, he immediately declared and explained his approval, that,

> "There can be no doubt that the
> Masai and many other tribes must
> go under. It is a prospect which/
> view with clear conscience….
> (Masaindou) is a beastly bloody
> system founded on raiding
> and immorality."

Elliot was in 1904 succeeded by Sir Donald Stewart. Settler pressure for the fertile Masai land continued unabated. Stewart yielded and signed a sham Agreement with Lenana, the Masai chief. The Masai were said to have agreed to move into two reserves, Ngong and Laikipia. They were given assurance that the two areas would be theirs for ever. Provision was also made for a half-mile corridor between the reserves. However, the Masai strongly objected to the arrangement and they stuck to their traditional land. The British forcibly evicted them and the Rift Valley was freed for European settlement.

Increasing settler pressure resulted in the Protectorate coming under the colonial office in 1905. Sir James Hayes Sadler became first Governor. Under him, settlers achieved many concessions. For instance in 1906 the Colonial Secretary was pressurerised into agreeing to the setting up of executive and legislative councils. Members to both were to be Governor and non-officials nominated by the settlers. A Land Board was also set up and was soon dominated by official and settler representatives.

The Board was responsible for land allocation. The South African type of Masters and Servants Ordinance, introduced in 1906, made it easier for employers to control their African labourers. As predictable, as more and more settlers arrived into the protectorate, more and more Africans were displaced from the prime land. Unlike in Uganda where the Baganda themselves successfully produced cotton and thereby making the country self-sufficient in revenue generation, Kenya on the other hand continued to be in need of grants-in- aid because the colony presented revenue problems which could only be solved by encouraging settler plantations.

Roland Oliver and Anthony Atmore in their book Africa since 1800 have asserted that politically and socially the European settler introduced much more confusion into tropical Africa than the concessionaire company in that,

> "Whereas the company thought
> mainly of its profits, the settler was
> apt to think mainly of his children
> and grand children and of the position they would
> occupy in society."

This type of mentality obviously posed a problem which grew steadily more importantly during the years to and after the First World War It had then to be decided whether these parts of tropical Africa were to be developed in the interests

of the settlers or of the indigenous inhabitants. The former was almost always the rule.

THE PROTECTORATE OF ZANZIBAR

From the earliest days British influence in East Africa had its base in Zanzibar. In 1890 Britain declared a protectorate over Zanzibar and other dominions of the Sultan. Euen-Smith, British agent and Consul-General explained that the Protectorate would mean three things:

i) British officials would be in charge of Zanzibar foreign affairs.
ii) In return the British would undertake to protect the Sultan's throne and those of his successors
iii) The Sultan would continue to nominate his successor as per tradition, but this would be subject to British approval.

No mention was made of any intention to interfere with the internal administration of Zanzibar.

After this, Seyyid, Ali was persuaded to sign an Anti-slavery Decree in 1891. The Decree closed down slave markets and prohibited the sale of slaves. It also permitted slaves to purchase their freedom if able to do so. A few days after the Decree, Gerald Portal arrived to succeed Euen Smith. With him came a complete change of style.

(i) Portal's "Coup d' Etat", (1891).

Euen-Smith had tried to adopt a policy of non-interference in the internal administration of Zanzibar. Portal was a believer in total British involvement. Arab administration left a great deal to be desired, and for him it was "an embodiment' of all the worst and most barbaric characteristics of a primitive Arab despotism." The Protectorate could not passively stand by and watch this state of affairs. He decided to intervene in October 1891.

Portal seized control of the Sultan's finances and administration. Europeans were appointed to take charge of the Treasury, Customs, Police, Post office and public works. Lloyd Matthews was appointed to the unique post of "First Minister" to co-ordinate affairs. All these European officials were to be paid out of the Sultan's revenues.

The Sultan himself, having lost control over public revenue was now to be granted a fixed salary in the Civil service of 125000 rupees a year. The Imperial British East Africa Company had been paying an annual rent to the Sultan. At the same time, interest on the purchase money paid by Germany for her inland territories had also been going to the sultan. Now both were to be treated as public revenue, over which the Sultan had lost control.

This "coup" marked a major step in the gradual loss of Arab political control. Ignoring Arab displeasure and Britain's plea for caution, Portal implemented the

new policy immediately. At the end of 1892, he left for Uganda and Rennel Rodd became the new Consul-General. Already, the precedent for British domination for the political and economic affairs of the protectorate had been set in motion by Portal.

Rodd and Seyyid Hamid

Seyyid Ali died soon after Rodd's arrival. Rodd chose Seyyid Hamid bin Thwain as the new puppet Sultan. The new Sultan took an oath to the British Crown as sovereign:

a) To accept that European officials could only be dismissed by the Consul-general.
b) To accept all advice that the Consul-General would give regarding external and internal affairs, or slavery and the slave trade.
c) He also agreed to a reduction of his private income to 12000 rupees per year.

Seyyid Hamid therefore began his reign as a cooperative friend of the British. But the events of June 1895 forced him into hostility against them. These related to the winding up of the imperial British East Africa Company. As compensation a sum of ℓ250 000 was due to the company. The British decided that ℓ200 000 of this should come from Zanzibar. The result of this rather unfair burden on Zanzibar was that Hamid lost all the confidence and trust in the sincerity of British friendship. He began to build his power independently in preparation for a showdown with the British.

On December 17 1895, fighting broke out. The Sultan was defeated and he died a year later. Seyyid Khalib Bargash proclaimed himself Sultan and like his predecessor, was easily defeated. The new Sultan Muhammad was selected by the British and the issue of the abolition of the slave trade began to be tackled more seriously.

Hardinge and the Abolition of Slavery, (1897-1909)

In April 1897, abolition was finally put into law by a Decree signed by the Sultan. The Decree stipulated four things. First the slave would be responsible for claiming his freedom by applying to the district courts presided over by Arab "walis." This was in contrast to the position in British colonies whereby after abolition the institution of slavery became criminal offence and slaves automatically became free. Moreover, for each slave freed, the owner would get compensation and the freed slaves would be liable to the payment of taxation in future. Vagrancy became an offence. Lastly, concubines "suria" could claim their freedom only if they proved that they were being ill-treated and at the discretion of the court.

However, there were several snags to emancipation:

a) The Arab "walis" who administered the law were themselves an effective portion of the slave-holding class and would not willingly grant emancipation or willingly implement the Decree.

b) Most slaves were illiterate and could not read the Decree posted in public places. Furthermore, the fact that it was posted in public places meant that it would not be seen by most slaves who were away in the farms.

c) To many slaves freedom was not an attractive idea since there were no free lands upon which to settle while for wage-earning very few alternatives to clove plantations existed. Therefore for all these reasons only a small portion of slaves achieved emancipation. But the Decree had profound effects on slavery.

Effects of the Abolition Decree 1897

In the first place, by giving the slave power to free himself, it improved his status as a slave. Owners could no longer afford to inflict cruel practice on the slaves lest they sought freedom in the courts.

Furthermore, the decree also gave rise to the squatter system. This was a system whereby the slave populations were transformed into semi-servile tenants, owing labour services to the Arab landlord. For his part the sultan declared he would distribute holdings of land to his plantation slaves. In return they should work for him three days per week, spending the rest of their time working for wages or on their own plots. Many plantation owners followed this example.

The emergence of slave-tenants in turn served to create an acute labor shortage. This in turn created competition on the part of owners to attract labour, which could be best done by making it free and wage- earning. The result was the setting up of a labour bureau in 1901. The Nyamwezi began to come in for clove-harvesting, some settling permanently.

In 1909 complete abolition was carried through. The new decree said that no more compensation was to be paid after 1911 and concubines could also claim their freedom, provided they forfeited their rights over their children. Administration of the Decree was transferred from the district 'Walis' courts to slavery commissioners appointed by the First Minister.

British Administrative style in Zanzibar

In East Africa, three very distinct versions of the term "Protectorate" developed. In the British east African protectorate the variety and looseness of political systems called for direct administration. In Uganda, Buganda on its own being a unified political entity would have had indirect administration. But the addition of several other areas made it impossible to have the simple Zanzibar type structure. British influence was therefore only prominent in the offices of the state, leaving the Sultan as ruler.

From the beginning, the administrative policy emphasized preservations of Arab privilege. Perhaps no one believed more strongly in this policy than Arthur Hardinge Hardinge who comments that

"A native administrative element should

if possible be formed and trained up
out of the Arabs and higher Swahilis."

This idea was embodied in the Native Courts Decree of 1899. According to the Decree, Kadhis and Walis continued to run district courts though with limited powers. A new superior court was established composed of two Kadhis and two other Arabs with the Sultan having power to nominate a British judge to sit with them. The Supreme Court was the final court of appeal. To Hardinge, the efficiency of this court did not really matter so long as Arabs were pleased to be involved.

In 1913 Zanzibar was transferred from Foreign to Colonial Office administration. It in effect became a colony to be administered in the same manner as British East Africa, Uganda and British Smaliland. This marked a definite departure from past practices. The system of dual administration with the First Minister theoretically at the head of the Sultan's government was abolished and the new post of resident (British Resident) was created. The resident combined the functions of Consul-General and First Minister and was to be under the general supervision of Governor of the East African Protectorate. In addition, appeals from Zanzibar would in future be heard at the East Africa Court of Appeals in Mombasa, not Bombay.

The Sultan viewed all this as subordination of Zanzibar to the mainland and protested. The British however, quickly reassured him with a shame arrangement whereby he did not have much authority. There was to be a protectorate Council which the Sultan was to preside over, with the Resident as Vice President. The Chief Secretary, Treasurer and Attorney General would all be members. The functions of the council were deliberately left vague. It was neither an executive nor legislative council and this was done through to the Sultan from his former position of authority.

In one sense, British administration amounted to some form of indirect rule in that they still consulted the Sultan on daily issues of government. On the other hand, it can be argued that the British really adopted direct rule in that their officials were at every level of the administrative system, sidelining the sultan as much as possible.

Exam Type Questions

1. Why did the British adopt a system of indirect rule to administer their African colonies?
2. Examine the colonial administrative policies adopted by the British in East and Central Africa.
3. "The political composition of African societies determined the general framework of colonial rule "Discuss, either in relation to Nigeria or to Buganda.
4. Why were railways constructed in either West or Central or East Africa? Did they benefit the Africans?
5. Distinguish between indirect rule and direct rule as used by the British to administer their colonies in either East or Central Africa.

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CHAPTER 14

COLONIAL ECONOMIC POLICIES IN TROPICAL AFRICA

Learning objectives

After studying the chapter, the student should be able to:

(i) Account for the construction of the rail system in East and central Africa.
(ii) Examine how economic growth and exploitation were mutually beneficiary to each other during colonial rule.
(iii) Discuss how some Africans took benefit of colonialism.
(iv) Assess the impact of colonial economic policies in Africa.

Introduction

The conquest and colonization of most of Africa was immediately followed by exploitation of the continents agricultural and mineral resources. Right across Africa certain features were clearly noticeable and common to all settler powers. These include the following:

1. Economic exploitation of the colonies' resources done in order to enrich the imperial powers overseas.
2. The direction of the trade of the colonies in the interest of the imperial powers, not the colonies.
3. Total absence of modern manufacturing industrial development until or after the Second World War.
4. A policy of financing piecemeal development in the colonies out of the colonies' limited revenues.

5. The development of new and cheaper means of transport, especially the railways initially intended to facilitate the bulk export of raw materials.
6. Considerable initiative by African farmers and traders in the production of cash crops for export.
7. Domination of the export trade by great European monopoly combines at the expense of African farmers and traders.
8. Colonies were never intended to develop independently but were forever to serve the interests of the imperial powers.
9. Over- emphasis on the production of cash crops at the expense of food crops often leading to malnutrition, hunger and starvation.

RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION IN WEST AFRICA

The period from 1880 to 1914 has been regarded as the great age of railway building in West Africa. The railways were built, as in all the regions, to primarily facilitate the export of cash crops and minerals. However, railways then came to assume other functions such as communication network in the region. They were also used as a cheaper form of passenger transport, ferrying the British West Africa Frontier Force into the interior in order to restore order.

The Senegal railway was begun in 1881 and completed in 1923, linking Bamako to the coast. In the Gold Coast, the Sekondi – Kumasi line was completed in 1903, thus linking the vital Asanti goldfield with the coast. In Nigeria the railway moved inland from Lagos in 1886 and reached Kano, 711 miles away in 1911. The Freetown – Pendembu line in Sierra Leone was completed in 1906 while the Lome – Atakpame line in Togo was completed in1913. In Guinea, the Conakry – Kangan line was completed in 1914. What was the impact of such a railway revolution upon West Africa?

a) Reduced transport costs inevitably stimulated greater cash crop production. For instance, a head load from the coast to Kumasi which had cost 26s 6d cost only 4s by rail. Ghana's thirteen tones of cocoa exports in 1895 reached 4 000 tonnes in 1911 which brought an economic revolution to the whole country.
b) Expatriate commercial houses expanded between 1885 and 1914 and became dominant in the distributive system of West Africa.They soon began to amalgamate into sizeable companies that could defeat competitors like the Compagnie Francaise de l' Aftique Occidentale (CFAO) founded in 1887. These transferred abroad a large proportion of their trading profits and expatriate salaries instead of investing the money in West Africa. They paid low prices to African producers and low wages to their African workers, and at the same time, they charged high prices for their imported goods. For example, in 1946 French firms were buying oil for a little over 3,500 francs per tonne and selling it in France for 38,000 francs, thus receiving ten times more than they had paid the producers.
c) Another important result of harbour, railway and road building was the growth in population of port cities such as Dakar, Takoradi and Lagos. People from all ethnic groups travelled to the big cities looking for jobs and education. The

colonial governments were financially unable to undertake low cost housing and as a result vast sprawling slums developed. Discontent fanned by the press became widespread and new associations were formed, including churches, trade iunions, ethnic and progress unions and parties agitating for political change.

d) The railways, in conjuction with other areas of the colonial economy such as cash crop farming, induced Africans to migrate vast distances in order to find work. Over 4 000 Nigerians went to work on railways in the Gold Coast in the year 1901 alone. Thousands of Igbo migrated to Fernando Po to work in Spanish plantations. Between 1892 and 1897 over 3 000 Yoruiba left for the Congo Free State. The Mossi from the Upper Volta moved south to the cocoa plantations and gold mines of the Ivory Coast and the Gold Coast.These migrations were not forced, but the demands on Africans to pay tax indirectly, increased the volume of labour migration.

e) Forced labour was one direct result of railway building and maintenance. The colonial authorities had immediately abolished the internal slave trade but they soon introduced a new form of slavery: forced labour. The French extensively used forced labour to build the Dakar – Bamako railway and in Nigeria the British employed many forced labourers on railway construction. In French West Africa General Gallieni created the so- called villages de libertie' in 1887. Though initially intended or freed slaves, the villages were transformed into labour reserves as forced labour was then extended to the villages of liberty." Labin French West Africa took two forms. The first was a 'tax in labour.' Each adult was liable to twelve days labour per month redeemable at three francs a day. But few had the means to pay thirty francs a month and so had to undertake the labour. The second form was compulsory labour in return for underpayment. In this category, the most hated form was the "corvee" which was compulsory labour on roads. Africans were also expected to cultivate crops for the French administration, enlist for compulsory war effort and take part in Mining activities.

The British also insisted on forced labour and African adults were supposed to do obliged work on British projects for a minimum of 24 days a year. They would work on roads, railways, mines and were eligible for military conscription. However, the days for forces labour were fewer and the colonial wages were often higher than those obtainable under administration. It must be emphasized that forced labour, whether under the British or French, was most painful when engaged on railway construction, and Africans heavily resented this form of brutal exploitation.

RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION – EAST AFRICA

The Mombasa-Kisumu Railway was called the Uganda Railway because until 1902 Kisumu and almost all the land from a point about fifty miles west of Nairobi was in Uganda. The British built the railway for mainly political reasons but the results were economic. They wanted to exercise greater political control to their claims which had been made on paper under the Anglo-German Treaty of 1890. Lord Salisbury wanted to ease the burden of walking five months from the coast to the interior. The railway was built by British

engineers and 32 000 Indian labourers who had to be brought into West Africa because the local population resisted the scheme.

The railway had important economic results. A boom in African farming immediately followed the establishment of the railway. Uganda now possessed a quicker route to the coast for cotton exports. Although most of the Indian workers returned home, 6 700 stayed and many traders migrated from Gujirat in India to establish shops at various points along the railway. The Indians replaced the old trade in beads and wire, with trade in cloth, soap, iron and tobacco and introduced rupees as currency. Large numbers of Asians and Africans were employed as permanemt staff on the railway.Nairoi, Kisumu and Mombasa flourished into business centres.

Political effects were also quite significant:

i) In 1902 the British East Africa Company Protectorate (Kenya) was enlarged by the transfer of Uganda's Eastern Province in order to put the whole of the railway under one colonial administration and to ensure that the whole of the Kenya highlands were exclusively reserved for white settlement.

ii) In 1905, the capital of Kenya was transferred to the railway headquarters, Nairobi, was located near the geographical centre of the country.

iii) The railway made it easier for the British to exercise their authority because administrators and soldiers could be moved quickly along the railway. This was the case in 1905 when the British sent troops to crush the Nandi rebellion.

Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that as in all tropical Africa, forced labour on the railway, dams and roads was widely experienced in Kenya.

PEASANT AGRICULTURE: WEST AFRICA

African peasant farming played a major role in the growth of the West Africa economy up to 1914. The failure of European plantation agriculture in West Africa, with exceptions in parts of Dahomey and the Ivory Coast, opened the door to African producers. But what only kept the large scale European farmers out of West Africa was the success of African peasant producers in developing the production of export crops in the nineteenth century. Hence the innovative and thriving African peasant producers made European enterprise hardly necessary.

It is important to note that, the Gold Coast underwent an economic transformation between 1890 and 1914 due to African peasant production. However, it does not mean the white settlers ran out of business, they still controlled the reigns as middlemen merchants, in charge of the more lucrative export business. They also heavily concentrated on and monopolized the gold mining not only in the Gold Coast (Ghana) but throughout Tropical Africa. It is clear therefore that whilst African peasant producers experienced great success during the colonial period, they never excelled past the colonial settlers.

There was a cocoa farming revolution in the Gold Coast with exports rising from 43 000 in 1901 to 2 194 000 in 1914. However, the fixing of cocoa prices at low levels by European combines was a major draw back among the African producers. Although in 1914 same African farmers held back their crop and demanded higher prices, the protest was not well organized and it failed. Therefore much of the profit from cocoa farming was made by a few British businessmen in the export trade.

The Yoruba farmers became active, too, in cotton production. The British Cotton Growing Association set up fifteen buying stations in Yoruband by 191. Omu Okwei (1872-1943) grew to be a prominent female trader in Igboland when she developed a flourishing palm oil retail business. Her operations were later diversified to include transport, money – lending and property.

In French West Africa, African peasants in Senegal rose to the occasion to meet the demands of the international economy. In 1884-85, the export of groundnuts reached 45 000 tonnes, but the figure had exceeded 200 000 tonnes by 1914. The building of the Senegal railway boosted African groundnut farming which had begun as early as the 1850s.

However, over – emphasis on groundnut production led to the decline in the production of food crops. A country which had always been self- sufficient in food production was forced to import rice and other foods from French Indo- China (Vietnam). Between 1906 and 1915 the annual average figure for exports of rice from Indo- China to French West Africa was 29 000 tons, and nearly all of it went to Senegal.

Sadly of course, Dahomean peasant agriculture collapsed due to French colonial take-over. The French had adopted the pre- colonial method of centralized economic planning used by the Dahomean Kings. They dictated to the peasant farmers what crops to cultivate, where, when and how to sow- harvest and store them. Then they would market the crops to the French officials at low and fixed prices. Predictably, the farmers resisted such settler demands and this led to the fall of Dahomean peasant centred farming.

On the other hand, the Germans regarded Togo as their model colony. Peasant agriculture was rapidly developed due to an agricultural college which was set up to provide assistance to peasant farmers. Diversification away from one- crop economy based in palm oil was successfully carried out. While palm products accounted for 89% of exports in 1895, by 1911 they accounted for only 52%. Cotton exports rose from a mere 14 000 kilogrammes to 502 000 kilos in 1913 Coconuts, coffee, sisal, rubber and cocoa were also planted as a wider programme of achieving diversity.

Germans also built 330 kilometres of rail in a small country of built in Lome which only got improved in 1968. Be that as it may, German merchants were given exclusive rights to import and export goods, a move which led to the destruction of the emerging African bourgeoisie. Much land was alienated to Europeans and forced labour and/ or taxation unsparingly resorted to. Finally, in 1910 the colonial administration annexed all unoccupied land on the false assumption that it was ownerless.

Hence, the colonial economic policies whilst having fostered remarkable economic growth in Tropical Africa, certainly contained the bitter pill of exploitation. The African producer remained an underdog in the whole process. African economic benefits, though in some cases considerable, remained somewhat limited in scope. Even where permanent developments were made, such as railway networks, there was always something negative about them: they did not inter-connect the different colonies, but merely connected the interior to the coast. This was because the British, French and Germans all used different gauges in their construction of the railways. In the medium to long term, this proved to be a major problem.

Examination Type Questions

1. For what reasons and with what results were railways built before 1914 in either West Africa, or East or Central Africa?
2. How valid is the view that both economic growth and exploitation took place during colonial rule?
3. Compare and contrast the methods used by Europeans to exploit and/ or develop economically two different regions of Africa: that is, East, West, or central Africa.
4. How, and with what success, did some African groups take advantage of the economic advantages created by colonialism?
5. How far did colonial economic policies make Africa and Africans better during the period 1890 to 1914?

CHAPTER 15

CENTRAL AFRICA - REACTIONS TO COLONIAL RULE.

Learning Objectives

After studying the chapter, the student should be able to:

(i) Compare and contrast initial primary resistance with post-pacification revolts.
(ii) Discuss African nationalist opposition to colonialism in Tropical Africa.
(iii) Discuss the methods used by Africans to show discontent with colonial rule.
(iv) Assess the courses and results of the Shona-Ndebele and Maji-Maji uprisings.
(v) Use examples to prove that building of railways benefited African Colonial economies.

Introduction

Armed uprising under traditional leaders: Why African societies resort to armed action.

Ndebele-Shona Risings

Background: The 1893 Anglo- Ndebele War:

The BSA Company failed to get enough gold in Mashonaland- Rhodes and friend's dream of the Second Rand was not fulfilled.

The mines in Fort Victoria and other parts of Mashonaland were already abandoned. Using local tradition mining technology, the Africans had removed all the gold near the ground. To get enough gold the company had to dig deeper. To dig deeper, more capital was required.

The Company was bankrupt.

The company turned to the Ndebele State-so the road to Matebelaland was open by now. Bere and Makamure Gomara to north of Victoria raided Ndebele cattle. The Rozvi ruler now under Ndebele authority pursued with other chiefs. The Rozvi ruler complained to Mgandane who told Lobengula to send amabutho.

The Ndebele amabutho scared workers in Fort Victoria from Zimuto. Jameson was ready to attack the Ndebele. Rhodes agreed and Mgundane was ordered away slowly and 30 Ndebele were short dead – but the British did not have enough weapons and enough men, so the attack was not done at once.

Jameson and Rhodes agreed to attack what Lobengula said, in September 1893, the British were still not ready. There was only publicity for example that the Southern Shona suffered from raids by the Ndebele.

Zimuto, Chirumanzu, Chivi and others accompanied Jameson to the Ndebele area. Three battles were fought. The British won two and lost one, that is the Shangani battle. Lobengula fled and the conquest was over.

Colonial rule in Mashonaland and Matebeleland:

Occupation and Conquest-D.N. Beach
Colonial rule affected people gradually. Fort Tuli, Fort Victoria, Charter and Salisbury were originally military occupations. The military forces were later disbanded as a police force.

A Settler Colony:

Mining turned out to be a distaster from Mazoe to Barwe. Before 1893 miners went on from place to place hoping to find the new of Second Rand. Towns also moved. Rhodes's column granted land to new settlers illegally.

Capitalist agriculture was a failure at first. The settlers failed to find markets for their produce. African peasants were at a better stand. Whites were not able to compete because most of the settlers lacked the experience in agriculture.

The African peasants produced efficiently and cheapily. Whites had to sell the land to others, hence there was very limited activity of white agriculture. Failure to find gold made life very difficult for the white settlers. They could not get money to buy imports and also to pay labourers.

Some of the Africans were already moving down south. The white settlers could only use volunteers from Malawi and the Zambezi Valley. Very few desperate people worked for the white farmers. The settlers tried to bribe rulers to provide labour. There were few cases of forced labour until 1894.

NB: The African rulers welcomed missionaries not because they wanted to become Christians. It was because missionaries brought the rulers goods. For non- religious reasons missionaries were welcome.

Post 1893 Period: Causes of the risings:

The Shona felt the presence of the whites. They benefited from selling their produce to the BSA Company mercenaries.

Bulawayo became the biggest town up to the 1940's. There was no time or attempt to touch the Ndebele after the conquest. This was because the amabutho of 1890 were not yet married. Mining was at a large scale. For two years it achieved 2/3 (two thirds) of Mashona production. With the taking, company pegged land to sell to new white comers. The Ndebele buildings remained where they were only to be burned later.

Reserves were created for propaganda reasons, for exmple the Gwai and Shangani. There was no attempt to move anybody. The BSA Company waited for British public opinion (but it was possible to move people). The Ndebele fought in 1896 before going to the reserves. The reserves were only a paper exercise.

The settlers raided cattle in Belingwe (Mberengwa) and Selukwe (Shurungwi) from 1893-1894, but the figures are not known). Later the company seized cattle from the Ndebele and Shona. It is fiction to claim that the cattle belonged to the Ndebele king. The Ndebele lost 2/3 of their cattle.

It was too bad for the Ndebele whose compounds were also guarded. Labour was a big factor in this case. The settlers wanted to live the Ndebele without any means of subsistence to force them into labourers.

NB: The Ndebele before 1896 were not paying tax. This was because of monarchical advantage. Izinduna administration was in place and Gambo Sithole collaborated with the Whites. Kuku, Nyamanda, heir to Lobengula was involved in secret meetings up to 1896 (J. Cobbing).

There were no cattle raids and forced labour. The situation was peaceful. The number of European/ White settlements increased. Jameson increased the police force. This was because the settlers feared a Boer attack.

The amount of mining increased considerably to about 3 or 4 times more than any other mining province. In Agriculture, farmers began to farm nearer to cities. Afrikaners were found around Chivhu and Africans were not seriously moved out.

The urban centres began to become permanent in 1895. Salisbury which looked just like an abandoned village changed to become a big town and this was due to tax. The BSA Company intended to take tax in 1892 but the British government proposed a delay of two years.

In 1894, tax was at 10 shillings per head in cash or in kind. This was a way of forcing the Shona to work for wages. There was no organization in tax collection. As a result little was taken in 1894. The Native Commissioner's role was to collect tax. It was worse in Ndebele and Gaza areas where they occasionally came.

In September 1894 to 1895, cattle were seized from Chivi, Fort Victoria, Gutu and Chirumanzu. These places were not yet visited by the Native Commissioner but it was painful for the natives to lose their live-stock.

In Buhera and other places, the Native Commissioner forced people to work. The impact varied from area to area. It depended on distribution. In Lomagundi, it was not much, and in Mazowe it went up. The Hlengwe and Barwe were still independent.

Fort Victoria people from Johannesburg paid in cash. The nature of politics went on as usual. Some Shona were allied to Whites for example Chirumanzu. In 1891 he was made ruler by Lobengula. In 1892 he made an alliance with Whites and in 1893 he attacked the Ndebele – so not all Africans resisted colonial rule. Some were collaborators.

The Ndebele were quiet in this period. The Shona frequently resisted. Sometimes a White employer got killed and peace then settled again. Nyandoro in the East of Salisbury traded with Whites and police in his areas were not resisted.

The Shona were not united. They used old fashioned warfare. Some were hostile to each other. After 1896 there were some changes. Until 1900 mining continued but the British were careful. A resident was to keep an eye on the company. Britain wanted to avoid a thing similar to the Jameson raid. The British settlers were committed on labour.

Reserves created after 1896 were some kind of refugee camps for example (in Chivhu). There were problems of land in Matebeleland. By 1896, the Ndebele were already being taxed.

NB: Shortage of land and taxation forced the Ndebele and Shona to become labourers.

The First Chimurenga in retrospect: A Critique

The war covered some parts of the country. The Chinurenga covered the whole of the Ndebele State and the North East. A certain part of Central Mashonaland was not affected.

T.O. Ranger gives much of the information of the First Chimurenga. Ranger did not use oral tradition. He borrowed a little bit of Chivanda, 1966 and documents. The other source of information is D.N. Beach. Beach used oral tradition, that is from old people who saw what was happening and other sources.

For the Whites, the First Chimurenga was a shock. Africans, first scattered, moved away because of forced labour. The British government officials were taking the labourers.

The mistakes of the B.S.A Company were two fold:

1. Africans were always against colonial rule hence they were to be taxed and forced to work.
2. Religion- the myth of the whites regardless of the good or bad, the Europeans wanted the world to believe that the war was caused by wicked witch-doctors for example Nehanda, Kaguvi, Mkwathi, and some the few known by Whites.

When the up-rising took place, whites thought these to have something to do with it. As a religious leader, Nehanda was persued possibly in 1897 and captured. Nehanda Charare Hwata was put to death. She was thought to have instigated the Chimurenga in Mazowe.

She died bravely, not converted to Christianity. There are limited sources which put Kaguvi in the same place with Nehanda. T.O. Ranger was a supporter of African nationalism. In general terms, Ranger wanted to see a better society. The nationalist historian also hoped for unity.

His school of thought affected his work as a historian accoding to Ranger all the people were united in the Chimurenga (D.N. Beach).



Ranger generalized things according to D.N. Beach. The interests of the elite were different from the interests of the ordinary people (i.e. the elite in African societies). According to Ranger people around Mazowe stopped gold working and trade. This was because time had changed.

Beach noticed something wrong about Ranger's assessment of the rising. He observed that under colonial rule, some people joined in the Chimurenga in 1896. From the Ndebele Gambo Sithole and some dynasties were on the side of the B.S.A. Company.

The reason was that, they had not been taxed. The other reason was local wars in 1873. Southern Ndebeles were attacked by northerners.

In Mutoko the Shona fought whites and changed sides in 1897. According to Cobbing, there is no evidence that the Mwari cult contributed something during the Chimurenga. This does not mean that the Mwari cult was in favour of White rule.

According to Beach, Mkwati did issue orders to the izindunas. The izindunas supported Nyamanda to be the new Nkosi (King). Nyamanda was accepted by the people as the rightful heir to the Ndebele throne. Mkwati was important just around Inyathi.

D.N Beach is of the view that Kaguvi's influence was in north and south of Salisbury (Harare) and Nehanda in the Mazowe area. There is no evidence that Mkwati had influence over the two or any other.

According to T.O. Ranger and Cobbing the rising of the Ndebele was preplanned (for example Nyamanda's secret meetings) Beach argued that there was no element of preplanning in Central Mashonaland. The people were angry with colonial rule but there was no gathering.

The rising started in Mangwende's area, Mashayamombe and Inyathi. It was used as a "medicine" for locusts. The rising began to spread from there. There was no organization covering the whole area.

Mberengwa (Belingwe) and Gwanda are a good example of what each had of its own sequence of events.

Summary of events:
The Ndebele were clear to rise in 1895 and at the turn of the year 1896. The Jameson raid and rinderpest were some of the causes. The Ndebele rose out of time. They were still in their original areas not the reserves and were not expected to rise.

The Ndebele fought heavily and the British army counter- attacked and destroyed Ndebele food supplies and crops in March. This forced the Ndebele in the Matopo hills where they were blasted by dynamite by the British army.

From September to October the fighting was concentrated in the Matopo area.

Rhodes and Peace:

Rhodes made false promises to force the Ndebele down the Matopo Hills. He also used to bribe the izindunas, for example, Gambo Sithole and others. Collaborators like Chivi, Gutu and Chirumanzu did not want the Ndebele to win. Their attitude scared the Njanja in Chivhu. The Manyika were rivals of Makoni so there was no unity. In Central Mashonaland, the Shona were disconted, for example, the resistence in Mutoko.

The Maji- Maji rising of Southern Tanzania 1905-1907

It is the thesis of this article that the Maji- Maji, as a mass movement originated in peasant grievances, then sanctified and extended by prophetic religion, and finally crumbled as the crisis compelled reliance on fundamental loyalities to kins and ethnic groups. This article considers successively the peasant origins of the movement, the religious beliefs through which it spread and its acceptance and transformation by the peoples outside the original nucleus.

The primary cause of the Maji- Maji rising of Southern Tanzania was German rule which Africans felt to be bad and oppressive. During court trials, indegenous people were beaten and imprisoned and they found German law harsh, especially taxation in the form of money.

Africans were an agricultural people, growing millet, maize, oil, groundnuts and they found it difficult to raise money to pay taxes. The people of Southern Tanzania were opposed to paying taxes to strangers and felt that the Germans themselves make offerings to their gods. But the Germans resorted to force and subjected African rulers and their people to harsh exploitation.

The Germans began to seek profit from south- eastern Tanzania by forcing people to grow cash crops for export to Europe. A few German settlers established cotton plantations while African rulers were forced to lay out smaller plots on which they would work. A sort of feudal system was established by the Germans with Africans being forced to work without pay in German plantations.

Whipping during work time was the order of the day, and every man had to work in either German settler plantations or the puppet chiefs (Jumbes and a- kidas) plantations for a fixed and compulsory number of days a week. Worse still, the introduction of this feudal system disrupted the economic way of life of the Africans.

Work in cotton plantations took four months. For the four months of chasing away wild pigs from the fields and any pigs killed provided meat for the African family for a greater part of the year. But now with men engaged in forced plantation work, women could not manage to chase the stubborn animals from their field crops.

Moreover, it was necessary for men to help wives in driving birds away from field crops, a task too difficult for a woman alone, especially with no children to take the place of the father. As a result Africans became furious and angry with the entire plantation system. They felt that it was better to rise and die fighting against their German oppressors than live in such feudal servitude and misery.

The various ethnic groups of Southern Tanzania had been defeated by the Germans and were afraid of rising up against superior weapons. At the same time, these ethnic groups were quite conscious of their disunity and helplessness. All this accounts for the delay in rising against German rule before 1905.

Then in 1904 a prophet Kinjikitile arose and began to proclaim a united rising championing the superiority of African values and medicine (Maji) against European weapons. By 1904 all the grievances against German rule had almost reached saturation point in every ethnic group of Southern Tanzania.

Kinjikitile, by simply responding to and articulating widespread grievances was simply sparking off a spirit of resistance which had reached the point of explosion. He was simply opening the floodgates of now uncontrollable resistance to the brutalities of German rule.

Kinjikitile's message spread like wild fire among the southern ethnic groups and 1904 became the year of decision. Kinjikitile was simply a personification of the spirit of resistance and therefore they spearheaded the Maji- Maji rising. In this way he helped to foster a united rising among the different ethnic groups of southern Tanzania.

People of different ethnic groups began to flock to Ngarambe to see Kinjikitile early in 1905.These pilgrimages were strictly voluntary because Kinjikitile was propounding popular sentiments and grievances. The prophet preached the popular sentiments for war against the Germans, and pilgrims are known to have joyously danced to war songs.

From Ngarambe the military movement grew, and Kinjikitile's message and the medicine he gave them promised ancestral spirit help against European rule. While he trained his people for war, Kinjikitile offered them leadersship, organization and unity. The people then began to uproot cotton crops in the German plantations and refused working in cotton fields.

The Maji- Maji rising had begun. Before July 1905 the whole of Southern Tanzania was at war against the Germans.

IIiffe and Swassa argue that the Maji- Maji movement had begun in answer to the religious message of the prophet. The power of the Maji (medicine)-power over European weapons- depended on religious faith. As the movement expanded away from the Rufiji valley during August and September 1905, it was again carried by prophets.

Those men called themselves Congo messengers. They carried Maji which they administered to the people. They promised unity and invulnerability. They called on all

black men to rise against European rule. Theirs was a revolutionary, or more accurately a millennial, message, a promise to rid the world of the evils of witchvcraft and European rule. It is likely that the people of Southern Tanzania had heard such millennial teachings before, but only as attacks on witchcraft.

Now this religious tradition was mobilized against the Germans. It was a revolutionary message because established leaders who opposed it often found themselves swept aside by the force of popular belief. But ILiffe and Swassa rather over emphasized its religious aspect. Essentially a peasant revolt against socio-economic grievances, the religious leaders simply responded to a popular outcry.

Religious leaders became the unifying force and leaders of popular peasant discontent. The Maji- Maji rising had no connection whatsoever with future African nationalism, as Nyerere was to claim falsely later. August 1905 was the month of victories against the Germans. By the end of August 1905, German forces existed only on the coast and in the four powerful military stations at Mahenge, Kilosa, Iringa and Songea. If they were to win, the Maji- Maji fighters had to capture these stations. But attempts to take Mahenge on 30 August 1905 failed and the Maji- Maji fighters retreated with heavy losses. The failure to take Mahenge was the turning point of the rising. New German forces moved into the area recaptured by German forces and the whole of Southern Tanzania was gradually pacified by suppressing each area in turn with superior German arms. By October 1905, three months after the rising had started; German forces were regaining the initiative. The African fighters tried guerilla warfare but the German forces responded by starving them, because military action was not very productive when faced with guerilla warfare.As a result of the ensuing famine people died in multitudes. Those who had fought and suffered turned in bitterness on their leaders especially the religious leaders, Kinjikitile the sacred Ngarambe place and the Maji itself. For the educated men of the time, Maji- Maji was a hideous lesson in European strength. They learnt that the European was not to be opposed by armed struggle with any prospects of success.

Nyerere in 1956, when he addressed the United Nations, showed that he was aware of this impact and the danger of trying to overthrow British rule by violent means. But Nyerere also claimed that Maji-Maji was an inspiration to Tanzanian nationalism-an inspiration which belonged truly to the people.

“There was no nationalist movement, no nationalist agitators, no westernized demagogues, or subversive communists who went about the country stirring up trouble against the Germans. The people fought because they did not believe in the White man’s right to govern and civilize the black. They rose in a great rebellion not through fear of a terrorist movement or a superstitions oath, but in response to a natural call, a call of the spirit, ringing in the hearts of all men, and of all times, educated or uneducated, to rebel against foreign domination. It is important to bear this in mind-in order to understand the nature of nationlist movement like mine. Its function is not to create the spirit of rebellion but to articulate it and show it a new techinique. The struggle against the Germans proved to our people the futility of trying to drive out their masters by force” (Nyerere to the United Nations Fourth Committee 20 December 1956.

The average minded Tanzania came to see the connection between Maji- Maji and Modern mass nationalism. This appears also to be the view if Iliffe and Swassa. They began to see continuity between Kinjikitile and Nyerere with his TANU. With independence men began to think about the 1905 rising. Iliffe believes there was a connection.

Like Ranger, this is **"whig history"**. Post independence Tanzania began to look to Maji-Maji as the beginning of the twentieth century nationalist struggle for freedom and independence. This however is linking history-trying to read the past in terms of the present.

Similarities and differences between the First Chimurenga of 1896-1897 and Maji-Maji of 1905-1907

The two examples of resistance against the institutional development of colonial capitalism had many obvious similarities. To a large extent the causes, aims and organization of the First Chimurenga 1896-97 and the Maji-Maji revolts 1905-07 were similar although the differences were important.
The following similarities can be noted for the facts raised in chapter 21:

The basic causes of both revolts were fundamentally similar. They were all against capitalism that is capitalist exploitation of their labour for the benefit of European settlers. They were also against alien rule and loss of independence.

Both saw immediate causes as intensification of relations of production along with use of cruelty and humiliating punishments. This was evidenced by the introduction in 1894 of the Native Department in Southern Rhodesia. European control is also seen spreading in both areas. It is also clear that both settler colonies used forced labour. In Southern Rhodesia it was used in both mining and agriculture. In Germany East Africa there was increased force in picking cotton.

Both revolts were based on traditional leadership backed by religious spirit mediums aiming at a return to precolonial times. The two revolts were led by chiefs and senior lineages. Also crystally clear is that there was close link between the altar and crown. This is shown by the political religious role of Mwari and Kalelo cult leaders giving the two revolts the rationale of ideology.

Also to be noted is the fact that the two revolts began among one ethnic group and then spread to others. The other parallel is the fact that two thirds of the Shona in Southern Rhodesia and Hehe in Southern Tanzania did not join the fight against the aliens.

Not to be ignored is another obvious similarity that is the fact that the method of warfare by the African fighters. The Ngoni and Ndebele were the same not only in terms of origina but also in terms of their traditional weapons. The two Nguni groups from different colonies also attacked isolated white targets.

The two uprisings only made the colonizer more determined than before. An intensification of European control is seen. In Southern Rhodesia a railway line was constructed to Bulawayo for economic as well as military reasons. The leaders of the uprisings were executed in both situations. Britain with holding of tax increases in Southern Rhodesia whilst on the other hand Germany sent symphathetic governors.

A number of differences can also be noted:

While accepting the role of capitalism, it must be realized that colonial rule in German East Africa was much more indirect than in Southern Rhodesia, thus affecting the nature of colonial experience. This is evidenced by the direct rule by the British South Africa company in Southern Rhodesia. In German East Africa, there were more groups beyond European control particularly away from the coast.

The immediate causes were very different. The Ndebele rose in much 1896, taking advantage of the opportunity offered by the Jameson Raid. Matumbi rose due to increased control and coercion.

Organisation can also be noted, particularly methods of creating unity. The Maji-Maji leaders organized a traditional oathing system to create secrecy and unity. The First Chimurenga had no such systems. In the Maji- Maji, religious leaders actually ran the revolt at first but if Cobbing and Beach are to be believed, this was not the case in Southern Rhodesia.

The main military difference was that the Maji- Maji believed Maji would protect them. The people believed that Maji (medicine) would turn bullets into water.

The immediate responses were very different-i.e. by the colonizers. The British tried to prevent fulltime famine and revenge. Germans used scorched earth policy and aimed to revenge the deaths by spreading starvation in German East African communities.

In conclusion, both revolts sprang out of widespread despair and anger at erosion of traditional economies and political structures as well as replacement by exploitative capitalism. It seemed the only way out of stopping such developments was to drive Europeans out of Africa. Ultimately, as in all other areas of Africa, apart from Ethiopia, the weapons or technology gap ensured European success.

THE CAUSES, COURSE AND RESULTS OF THE MAJI-MAJI RISING IN TANGANYIKA (1905-1907)

Main Issues of the topic

i) Causes

ii) Course/events

and iii) results of the Maji-Maji uprising in Tanganyika.

There is considerable debate with respect to the causes, course and results of the Maji-Maji uprising (1905-1907) in Tanganyika. Nevertheless this paper highlights, explores and evaluates some key aspects on the topic, which include the following:

a) The general causes of the uprising.
b) The timing of the uprising-July 1905
c) The role played by the spirit medium in organizing, motivating, and ideologising the uprising.
d) The aftermath of the rising i) on Africans
ii) on German administration
e) Its importance to African History.

It is interesting to note the earlier bias and distortion with regards to the causes of the Maji-Maji rising (1905-1907). The Germans viewed the rising as a conspiracy by the primitive, ultra-conservative elements of society: witchcraft and headmen.' These were thought to have been concerned with the headmen." These were thought to have been concerned with the need to restore their declining power and hence had instigated the ordinary people to rise against the Germans as a means of achieving their selfish ends. This conspiracy thereby viewed the rising as a 'savage' response to the progress and civilization introduced by European rule. This interpretation implicitly denies that a rational explanation to the risings was possible. However, this was official colonial dogma and misrepresentation of the facts. In fact, no evidence of a conspiracy was ever produced, and accounts from the areas which joined the rebellion in late August and September 1906 strongly suggest that the Africans had no prior knowledge that it would take place. Hence a more plausible explanation should be sought.

Henceforth, critics of the German colonial administration argued that the revolt was due to the resentment against forced labour and tax, and to the harsh treatment of the native inhabitants by the Germans and by minor Swahili and Arab officials. True, the above abuses could have caused the uprising in Tanganyika, but if this was the accurate explanation, it is surprising that the northern and central parts of the colony were not affected by the rising. W.O Henderson indicated that, an official German commission of inquiry enumerate 17 reasons for the uprising, but many of the grievances which were listed applied equally well to regions which remained loyal to the Germans. Further, since the abuses had existed for several years, (taxation had begun in 1898) there is no evident reason why resistance to them should have taken place in July 1905, and confined to the south of Tanganyika. Hence, these abuses of German administration should have been put into their proper historical context, that is, they generated an atmosphere of disgust and repudiation, but did not necessarily precipitate the outbreak of the war in Matumbi in July 1905.

What then, caused the outbreak of the Maji-Maji rising in1905? The outbreak of the rising in the Rufiji valley in Matumbi, in July 1905, seems to have been due, not so much to general misgovernment than it was to the bitterly resented cotton scheme in the south of Tanganyika. In fact, when Gotzen became Governor in 1901, Europeans were depressed in Tanganyika and government revenue was static. He, therefore, decided as an experiment, to introduce a scheme devised for the German West African colony of

Togo, by which African cultivators would be induced to grow cotton as a 'Volkskultur' – a people's crop. Since cotton experiments had failed in the north of the country, he decided to concentrate on the southern states. He believed that individual cultivators could grow cotton successfully and thus ordered that a plot be established at the headquarters of each village in the experimental area. The headmen's adult male subjects were supposed to work for some 28 days a year on these cotton schemes. Peasant farmers automatically found their pieces of land condemned to cotton production at the expense of any other food crop. This scheme was later introduced into Dar es Salaam district in 1902 and subsequently into all the southern coastal districts, proving to be a disastrous failure. In fact Dereck S. and D.A. Wilson have accurately observed that, "the heart of the problem was the government's attempt to force the people in the south to grow cotton," in East Africa Through a Thousand Years: A History of the years AD 1000 to the Present Day.

It is important to note that the cotton scheme imposed severe demands on the people of the southern districts. In a letter to the German Reichstag, Dernberg indicates that, "Labourers were obtained under circumstances which could not be distinguished form slave hunts." A similar observation concerning the extortion of African labour prevalent during the cotton scheme was made by Stahl "Although Britain had officially stopped the slave trade, the German traders imposed their will ruthlessly, placing the African under a new kind of bondage." Hence the preponderance of forced labour was heightened in the southern districts to a level where it could not be withstood any longer.

Worse still, the sums paid to the workers were so small that some workers refused them in frustration. The work required soon far exceeded the amount planned, and this seriously interfered with the subsistence farming, thus causing starvation. In fact, G.C.K Gwassa comments that the cotton scheme threatened to "decimate the economy for the waMatumbi especially as has become extremely scarce and maximum labour had to be put into effective production of the means of livelihood" This indicates that the cotton scheme threatened African economies far more seriously than did any demands by European settlers in the north. Hence it seems sufficient explanation for the outbreak of violence.

However, it is important to remember that the cotton scheme provoked violence but does not necessarily explain why the Maji-Maji rising became a mass movement, encompassing nine communities (20 ethnic groups). Indeed, it is more important to be analytical and discern the specific reasons why the southern districts individually joined the rising. Yes, the cotton scheme was the networking grievances as well. It is important to note that loss of independence especially among the Ngoni former slave raiders, was one of their bitterest grievances against the German administration. Apart from the fact that the cotton scheme imposed severe physical suffering, the WaNgoni also viewed it as a symbol of foreign domination and indignation. They had formerly ruled and terrorized all other tribes but were now forced to do compulsory labour in cotton plantations, side-by-side with the Situ, their former slaves. Hence the Ngoni chiefs viewed the outbreak as a chance to expel the foreigners and restore their old splendour.

The WaNgindo on the other hand, had, in addition to the cotton scheme, been begrudged against the German mercenaries who abused their wives. Due to increased forced labour born out of the cotton scheme, the German mercenaries, akidas and Jumbes victimized and abused affront to Ngindo husbands. Adultery in Ngindo was punishable by war and/or death against the offenders. Thus the Ngindo viewed the war as a crusade against the oppression, Ill-treatment by Swahili overseers and abuse of their women.

More important to note among the causes were, the effects of hut tax. As from 1901 the new German colonial decrees gradually brought matters to a head: the hut tax of three rupees a year, had to be paid in cash instead of in kind as, hitherto, Africans were thus convinced that payment in rupees meant a higher tax. However, as has been argued elsewhere in the paper, the levying of hut tax might not be directly linked with the timing of the war. But what is important to note for the southern districts is that the bitter effects of hut tax were inseparably linked with the cotton scheme in area. This was because the compulsory cotton scheme had become the Africans main mode of capital accumulation. Yet the product fetched such a deplorably low price that this resulted in bitter resentment and frustration. Worse still, the over-zelous akidas and jumbes often used corruption and brutality in the collection of the tax. W.O. Henderson argued that, "It was not so much the existence of tax or forced labour caused discontent as the way in which local officials collected the tax and set the Africans to work." Hence, it is crystal clear that the resented cotton scheme was at the centre of the crisis whilst other colonial abuses such as forced labour, ill- treatment, hut tax, abuse of African women and misgovernment of the local officials assisted in fanning that crisis. Cotton became a grievance which united precisely those people who rebelled when the 1905 picking season began. In fact, several rebel leaders were headmen who had suffered from the scheme, and one of their first actions in all the areas affected by the Maji-Maji was to pull out and burn the cotton crop as a declaration of war.

Having said this, it is important to note that even though the cotton scheme provoked violence, it does not explain the form and ideological content which the violence took. The explanation of the ideology and organisation for the rising can be attributed to the religious priests such as Kinjikitile Ngwale, also nicknamed Bokero,' a brother-in- law of Bokero, Abdulla Mpanda, the elephant hunter as well as Chaburuma, one of the disgruntled, Ngoni chiefs. As T.O. Ranger has demonstrated, the essence of mass rebellion during this period was characterised by an attempt to organize in a new way in order to fight more effectively than the purely tribal resistances to European invasion.

Henceforth, the Maji-Maji or water-water' obtained its name from Kinjikitile Ngwale who preached that the snake god called Kalelo which lived in the Pangani Rapids of the Rufiji River had brought 'Maji' (water) which could protect man against black magic. The belief slowly and secretly developed that water, strong enough to break black magic, must be strong enough to break European magic; bullets could turn into water! Kinjukitile was believable because he had been acting as a consulting centre for the Maji-Maji' water on their persons in small containers cut form millet or maize stalks. They were to drink a little at a time, and sprinkle it four times on the head, chest and feet. With this promise of immunity form German bullets, Africans embraced the dogma

with vigour and fanaticism, a factor which explains their blind courage in the face of a hailstorm of German bullets. Consequently, in mid-July 1905 the Africans in the Matumbi district, the home of Bokero, defied akida Kibata's ordered to pick cotton by forced labour. Instead of obeying they went to Kinjikitile Ngwale or advice and this resulted in the uprooting and burning of cotton stalks on the Matumbi hills. Kibata fled for his life and his home was besieged by the fighters. The rising had started. It quickly spread to the north of southern Tanganyika, Kitope and other districts. In this area, traditional doctor Ngameya, a brother-law of Kinjikitile Ngwale boasted of having saved a young man from a lake five days after he had vanished into it. This gave him credibility to distribute sacred water. He further ordered the Africans to rise against all foreigners, and they ruthlessly killed dispersed Europeans, Arab-Swahili akidas and jumbes who were off-guard. Africans also killed the local German collaborators and looted shops. The rising now spread like a bushfire.
In the centre of southern Tanganyika the leader of the rising was elephant hunter Abdulla Mpanda who went to Bokero to obtain the sacred mainly because the Germans had failed to make him a jumbe. On his way back to Liwale, Mpanda visited two German askaris as a friend, drugged them and carried them into the bush where he slit their throats. By this act, he set the war drum throbbing and the next morning the rising broke out at a caravan halting place 14 miles from Liwale. All former German askaris and traders were brutally murdered.

The German response to this wave of warfare was ruthless. On of the turning points of the revolt was proof that 'Maji-Maji after all did not turn bullets into water. Hence, Africans died in tier thousands. Some cried. "We've been cheated," but others rushed forward screaming even louder, "those killed have slept with as woman!" German response became even more brutal after the under of bishop Cassian Spiss of the Benedictine Order. Gotzen cabled to Berlin for reinforcements. Two cruisers and a company of marines were sent of immediately and it led to the ultimate suppression of the revolt. The leaders of the rising such as Bokero, Chaburuma and Abdulla Mpanda were either captured or they fled for their lives. Bokero was executed but he never gave in, and his last words were, "My death will make no difference, for my teaching has spread far and wide,' and indeed it had.

More striking to note is the fact that as the movement expanded, and failure of the Maji to provide immunity was realized, the character of the uprising changed. There was a shift from the blind idealism and wishful thinking to the established patterns of ethnic guerrilla warfare. These modifications were however, unsuccessful and Africans succumbed to defeat in large numbers.

Predictably, the aftermath of the rising was a sharp population decline. Massive deaths were either caused by German bullets or by a famine which covered the southern areas. The Germans doubly used the scorched earth policy to exhaust the Africans, as well as forcibly grab African reserves. This was the case in Songea where Captain Richter prevented cultivation and appropriated all the food for his troops, and further boasted that, "the fellows can just starve." Moreover depopulated due to both war and starvation, an Uvidunda was thought to have lost half its population: "What shall I rule?" asked

Chief Ngwira when he returned from prison. On the other hand, Gotzen estimated that more than half of the Matumbi had died in the uprising whilst a missionary reckoned that more than three –quarters of the Pangwa perished. But famine had worse long-term results on the surviving women. A careful study of the rebel areas made in the 1930s revealed that, "famine reduced the average fertility of the surviving women by over 25%. Hence famine almost put a death knell on the southern districts of Tanganyika. On the whole, Dr Gwassa estimates the total number of people who died during the war at 250,000- 300, 000 or perhaps one-thirds of the whole population of southern Tanganyika. In return the Africans killed 15 Europeans, 73 askaris and 316 auxiliaries.

Politically, the uprising resulted in major changes after the war, with loyalist groups inheriting power whilst former aristocrats, especially among the Ngoni were de-stooled. Maji- Maji destroyed the Ngoni military society. Nearly 100 Ngoni military aristocrats were hanged in Mputa and Songea, dashing any hopes of recovering their original splendour. Elsewhere, loyalists were rewarded and this was the case of the Kalimato who had betrayed the Mbanga in the uprising. Kaliamto became a leading chief of Umbunga and married a sister of Mlorere, the most prominent Pongoro loyalist. Loyalty also rehabilitated the Hebe who regained control of Usagara and parts of Usangu and the Ulanga valley.

More striking to note is the fact that the failure of the Maji sacred water, destroyed the foundations of indigenous faiths. Consequently, many Ngoni chiefs accepted baptism before their execution. Moreover, just after 1907, 500 people attended the returning missionary's first service at Milo in Ungoni and southern Highlands. However, some societies turned to Islam due to the lasting barrier between themselves and the missionaries. This was the case with the Nindo, the Mwera, the Ndendeveni and the Zaramo. But since the prophetic religious leaders preached a new faith which superseded old rivalries, the Maji- Maji rising therefore instilled the lesson of the importance of unity.

The Maji-Maji rising importantly caused the German colonial policy to reform. Soon after the war, Dr Bernhard Dernberg was hurriedly sent to Africa to investigate the causes of the Maji-Maji war. His recommendations led to three major changes: he ordered the officials, Planters and traders to put away the lash and to rely on common sense. Until then, hardly a German was to be seen in the colony without a whip which he resorted to freely. Secondly, he introduced labour guidelines which sought to safeguard Africans against exploitation at village level. The working hours were clearly defined. Moreover, African education was also widely promoted and by 1914, 99 schools has been set up, enrolling 8, 494 pupils. At the same time, there were 1,852 mission schools with 108, 550 pupils. Noteworthy, however, is the fact that German colonial education aimed at producing stereotyped Africans merely capable of carrying out administrative orders.

The foundations for economic development were also set up immediately after the uprising. Roads, bridges, and railways such as the Tanga-Moshi line, 352 km long; the Dar es Salaam to Kigoma line, 1, 252 km long; were both completed by 1914. It is also

notable that plantation agriculture had a lot of money allocated for its research and development. In this vein biological and horticultural research institutes were set up.

This rising is important to African History in that, just like the Shona-Ndebele war (1896-1897) it laid the seeds of future modern nationalistic struggles for liberation from foreign occupation.

Examinations Tpye Questions

1. What were the differences between 'initial primary resistance' and post-pacification revolts. With the aid of a case study illustrate the causes and results of each revolt.

2. With what justification is it possible to speak of "African nationalism" before 1914? In what ways, other than through religious movements did African nationalism manifest itself before 1914? Answers should be illustrated with reference to at least two different regions.

3. What were the reasons for African nationalist opposition in Tropical Africa before 1914?

4. Explain the emergence of nationalism and analyse the activities of the elite in West Africa before 1914?

5. For what reasons and in what ways did Christians become critics of European administrators in colonial rule?

6. Identify and illustrate with specific examples, two different forms in which Africans expressed their opposition to European influence and rule between 1885-1914?

7. Explain why there were early revolts against the imposition of European rule in one of the following regions?

   a) East Africa.
   b) Central Africa.
   c) West Africa.

8. What were the similarities and differences in the causes, course and results of the Shona, Ndebele risings and the Maji risings?

9. Why did Zanzibar remain so important to the economic, political and social well-being of the interior of East Africa?

10. With reference to either East Africa or West Africa or Central Africa show with specific examples how the building of railways contributed to both economic growth and exploitation in African colonial economy.

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