


SMART CONTRACT CODE REVIEW AND SECURITY ANALYSIS REPORT



Date: October 28th, 2020



This document may contain confidential information about IT systems and the intellectual property of the customer as well as information about potential vulnerabilities and methods of their exploitation.

The report containing confidential information can be used internally by the customer or it can be disclosed publicly after all vulnerabilities fixed - upon a decision of the customer.

Document

Name	Smart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis Report for Unbound
Туре	Token swap
Platform	Ethereum / Solidity
Approved by	Andrew Matiukhin CTO Hacken OU
Methods	Architecture Review, Functional Testing, Computer-Aided Verification, Manual Review
Archive Name	SmartContract-main.zip
SHA256	C9CEF58CBA4E8AD8EB61D0304D54D66D327B60D8973554FD6174D80A380B7748
Checksum	
Timeline	26 [™] OCT 2020 - 28 [™] OCT 2020
Changelog	28™ OCT 2020 - Initial Audit






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Introduction

Hacken OÜ (Consultant) was contracted by Unilayer (Customer) to conduct a Smart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis. This report presents the findings of the security assessment of Customer's smart contract and its code review conducted between October 26^{th} , 2020 – October 28^{th} , 2020.

Scope

The scope of the project is smart contracts in the repository:
Archive Name - SmartContract-main.zip
SHA256 Checksum -

c9cef58cba4e8ad8eb61d0304d54d66d327b60d8973554fd6174d80a380b7748

We have scanned this smart contract for commonly known and more specific vulnerabilities. Here are some of the commonly known vulnerabilities that are considered:

Category	Check	Item
Code review	•	Reentrancy
		Ownership Takeover
		Timestamp Dependence
		Gas Limit and Loops
		DoS with (Unexpected) Throw
		DoS with Block Gas Limit
		Transaction-Ordering Dependence
	_	Style guide violation
	•	costly loop
	•	ERC20 API violation
	•	Unchecked external call
	•	Unchecked math
	•	Unsafe type inference
	•	Implicit visibility level
	•	Deployment Consistency
	•	Repository Consistency
	•	Data Consistency
Functional review	•	Business Logics Review
	•	Functionality Checks
	•	Access Control & Authorization
	•	Escrow manipulation
	•	Token Supply manipulation
	•	User Balances manipulation
	•	Data Consistency manipulation
	•	Kill-Switch Mechanism
	•	Operation Trails & Event Generation



Executive Summary


According to the assessment, the Customer's smart contracts do not have high vulnerability and can be considered secure. Some fixes are recommended though.

Insecure	Poor secured	Secured	Well-secure

Our team performed an analysis of code functionality, manual audit, and automated checks with Mythril and Slither. All issues found during automated analysis were manually reviewed and important vulnerabilities are presented in the Audit overview section. A general overview is presented in AS-IS section and all found issues can be found in the Audit overview section.

Security engineers found 1 low and 2 lowest severity issues during audit.

Graph 1. The distribution of vulnerabilities.





Severity Definitions

Risk Level	Description	
Critical	Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to assets lose or data manipulations.	
High	High-level vulnerabilities are difficult to exploit; however, they also have significant impact on smart contract execution, e.g. public access to crucial functions	
Medium	Medium-level vulnerabilities are important to fix; however, they can't lead to assets lose or data manipulations.	
Low	Low-level vulnerabilities are mostly related to outdated, unused etc. code snippets, that can't have significant impact on execution	
Lowest / Code Style / Best Practice	Lowest-level vulnerabilities, code style violations and info statements can't affect smart contract execution and can be ignored.	



AS-IS overview

unilayer.sol

Description

UniLayer is a contract for operating swap orders.

Imports

UniLayer contract has 7 imports:

- SafeMath from OpenZeppelin;
- *TransferHelper* from Uniswap;
- *IUniswapV2Factory* from Uniswap;
- *IUniswapV2Router01* from Uniswap;
- *IUniswapV2Router02* from Uniswap;
- Context from OpenZeppelin;
- Ownable from OpenZeppelin;

Inheritance

UniLayer contract inherits Ownable.

Usings

UniLayer contract use:

• SafeMath for uint256;

Enums

UniLayer contract has 2 enums:

- enum OrderState {Created, Cancelled, Finished}
- enum OrderType {EthForTokens, TokensForEth, TokensForTokens}

Structs

UniLayer contract has 1 data struct:

- Order
 - OrderState orderState an order state;
 - OrderType orderType an order type;
 - address payable traderAddress an address of trader;



- address assetIn an address of asset in;
- address assetOut an address of asset out;
- uint assetInOffered an amount of asset in;
- uint assetOutExpected an amount of asset out;
- uint executorFee an executor fee;
- ∘ *uint stake* a stake value;
- ∘ *uint id* the id of an order;
- uint ordersI the index of an order;

Fields

UniLayer contract has 9 fields:

- IUniswapV2Router02 public immutable uniswapV2Router an interface of Uniswap Router V2;
- IUniswapV2Factory public immutable uniswapV2Factory an interface of Uniswap Factory V2;
- uint public STAKE_FEE a multiplier of stake fee;
- uint public EXECUTOR_FEE an executor fee;
- uint[] public orders a list of active orders ids;
- *uint public ordersNum* the next order id;
- address public stakeAddress an address of stake;
- mapping(uint => Order) public orderBook an order book;
- mapping(address => uint[]) private ordersForAddress a mapping of orders ids for an address;

Functions

UniLayer has 14 functions:

constructor

Description

Initializes contract.
Sets uniswapV2Router, uniswapV2Factory fields.

Visibility

public

Input parameters

 IUniswapV2Router02 _uniswapV2Router - an interface for Uniswap router V2;

Constraints



None

Events emit

None

Output

None

• setNewStakeFee

Description

Sets stake fee.

Visibility

external

Input parameters

∘ uint256 _STAKE_FEE - a stake fee;

Constraints

- \circ Only Owner can call it.
- Fee value mast be greater or equal 0.

Events emit

None

Output

None

setNewExecutorFee

Description

Sets executor fee.

Visibility

external

Input parameters

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uint256 _EXECUTOR_FEE - an executor fee;

Constraints

- o Only Owner can call it.
- o Fee value mast be greater or equal 0.

Events emit

None

Output

None

• setNewStakeAddress

Description

Sets stake address.

Visibility

external

Input parameters

address _stakeAddress - an address of stake;

Constraints

- o Only Owner can call it.
- Stake address can not be 0.

Events emit

None

Output

None

getPair

Description

Gets Uniswap pair.



Visibility

internal view

Input parameters

- o address tokenA an address of token;
- o address tokenB an address of token;

Constraints

o Token pair is available.

Events emit

None

Output

Returns pair address.

• updateOrder

Description

Updates an order.

Visibility

internal

Input parameters

- ∘ *Order memory order* an order;
- ∘ *OrderState newState* a new state of order;

Constraints

None

Events emit

None

Output

None



createOrder

Description

Creates an order.

Visibility

external payable

Input parameters

- OrderType orderType a type of order;
- address assetIn an address of asset in;
- o address assetOut an address of asset out
- uint assetInOffered an amount of asset in;
- uint assetOutExpected an amount of asset out;
- uint executorFee an executor fee;

Constraints

- \circ Asset in amount must be greater than 0.
- Asset out amount must be greater than 0.
- o executorFee must be greater or equal EXECUTOR_FEE.
- WETH as the assetIn must used for EthForTokens order type.
- Transaction value must cover asset in amount and all fees for *EthForTokens* order type.
- Transaction value must match executorFee.
- WETH as the assetOut must used for TokensForEth order type.

Events emit

logOrderCreated

Output

None

executeOrder

Description

Executes the order.

Visibility



external

Input parameters

o uint orderId the id of the order;

Constraints

- o traderAddress can not be 0.
- o Order state must be *Created*.

Events emit

logOrderExecuted

Output

Returns swap result.

• cancelOrder

Description

Cancels the order.

Visibility

external

Input parameters

o uint orderId the id of the order;

Constraints

- traderAddress can not be 0.
- o Only traderAddress can call it.
- o Order state must be *Created*.

Events emit

o logOrderCancelled

Output

None

calculatePaymentETH



Description

Calculates ETH payments.

Visibility

external view

Input parameters

∘ *uint ethValue* – an amount of ETH;

Constraints

None

Events emit

None

Output

Returns ETH payments.

getOrdersLength

Description

Gets orders length.

Visibility

external view

Input parameters

None

Constraints

None

Events emit

None

Output



Returns orders length.

getOrdersId

Description

Gets the id of the order.

Visibility

external view

Input parameters

 \circ uint i - an index of order;

Constraints

None

Events emit

None

Output

Returns the id.

• getOrdersForAddressLength

Description

Gets the length of orders for the address.

Visibility

external view

Input parameters

address _address - an address;

Constraints

None

Events emit



None

Output

Returns the length of orders for the address.

getOrderIdForAddress

Description

Gets the id of the order for the address.

Visibility

external view

Input parameters

- address _address an address;
- ∘ *uint index* an index;

Constraints

None

Events emit

None

Output

Returns the id.



Audit overview

■■■ Critical

No critical issues were found.

High

No high severity issues were found.

■ ■ Medium

No medium severity issues were found.

Low

1. *getOrdersId* function has no check that the index does not go beyond the bounds of the array.

■ Lowest / Code style / Best Practice

- 1. It is generally accepted to name the file by the name of the contract.
- 2. setNewStakeFee and setNewExecutorFee have unnecessary checks for the amount of fee. The minimum value for uint256 is 0.



Conclusion

Smart contracts within the scope was manually reviewed and analyzed with static analysis tools. For the contract high level description of functionality was presented in As-is overview section of the report.

Audit report contains all found security vulnerabilities and other issues in the reviewed code.

Violations in following categories were found and addressed to Customer:

Category	Check Item	Comments
Code review	Style guide violation	It is recommended to name files the same as contracts.
	Functionality Checks	<pre>getOrdersId need to check that index not out of array bounds. setNewStakeFee and setNewExecutorFee don't need to check that fee bigger than 0.</pre>

Security engineers found 1 low and 2 lowest severity issues during audit. It is recommended to fix it.



Disclaimers

Hacken Disclaimer

The smart contracts given for audit have been analyzed in accordance with the best industry practices at the date of this report, in relation to: cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in smart contract source code, the details of which are disclosed in this report, (Source Code); the Source Code compilation, deployment and functionality (performing the intended functions).

The audit makes no statements or warranties on security of the code. It also cannot be considered as a sufficient assessment regarding the utility and safety of the code, bugfree status or any other statements of the contract. While we have done our best in conducting the analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report only - we recommend proceeding with several independent audits and a public bug bounty program to ensure security of smart contracts.

Technical Disclaimer

Smart contracts are deployed and executed on blockchain platform. The platform, its programming language, and other software related to the smart contract can have own vulnerabilities that can lead to hacks. Thus, the audit can't guarantee explicit security of the audited smart contracts.