1 The birth of Anfu China, East Asia's first party-state: Toward a constitutional dictatorship of the gentry, 1916–1918

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The Anfu Regime has an evil reputation in modern Chinese history, being the embodiment of the absence of morals, ideals, or achievement, and for having brought destruction and misery to the country. It was seen as having begun a long warlord era and was thus a stain on the already dismal record of China's Republican era. Despite the many attempts at re-evaluating events and personages such as Yuan Shikai [*Yuan Shih-k'ai* 袁世凱] and Chiang Kai-shek, Anfu has been deliberately and singularly left out.

Yet the Anfu Regime had in fact been greatly misunderstood; the years 1917–20 were indeed marked by brutal internal strife, but the state possessed a progressive vision of establishmentarian reform. It should be seen as a classic case of failed developmental state-building, comparable to other military-dominated, single-party "developmental dictatorships" in the twentieth century Third World. This paper focuses on the origins of the Anfu Regime in State Organicism and State Corporatism. Another paper has dealt with legislation by and political struggles in the Anfu Parliament in 1918–20 (Yan and Leung 2022), and a further article will concern the two waves of developmentalist economic policies in late-1917 and mid-1920 respectively (for a preliminary treatment see Leung 2021).

The Anfu Club [*Anfu Julebu* 安福俱樂部] governed in 1918–20 on the foundations of a political system and economic strategy laid down by men from the erstwhile Progressive Party in late 1917. The "Progressive-Anfu System" thus attempted to build a disciplined party with centralized decision-making, based on a stable alliance between interest groups. This enabled the emergence of a militarily supported, "constitutional dictatorship" of the gentry, which in the process of hoping to transform itself into an industrial class, required support from the state's expanding corpus of technocrats. With the help of German legal theories transmitted through Japan, they attempted to justify greater representation for themselves within government institutions – most notably demonstrated in a late-1917 attempt to reform the Senate into a chamber of functional constituencies – which, had it been materialized, would have been East Asia's first corporatist Parliament. Meanwhile, the Anfu "entrepreneurial regime," intent on building State Capitalism, was influenced

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via Japan by early developmentalist theories such as Listianism and German State Socialism. However, the attempt was inconclusive, as many of these ideas failed to come to fruition.

Anfu's reputation owes itself to the fact that the regime alienated and incurred the wrath of every single subsequently important political force, from rival factions within the northern military establishment, to Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang, to the CCP and even the Proto-Fascists (the Young China Party). Historians also seem to have the unfortunate and rarely questioned habit of using as evidence sensationalist political pamphlets, mostly published under pseudonyms in the immediate aftermath of Anfu's collapse in 1920. Many for instance agree that Anfu was not even a political party, had no concrete organization, political vision or ideology, nor even a charter (Chang 2007b: 128–129). This paper intends to provide some evidence to the contrary, focusing on the construction of Anfu as a party and the ideology of its institutional design. Such evidence could never possibly be complete – much of the documentation has been lost or was deliberately destroyed[2] – but it should be able to demonstrate how Anfu attempted to be a coherent state-building project. Anfu's highly disciplined organization was unprecedented in late-imperial early republican politics, and utterly remarkable considering that the Manchu Empire had been dissolved only six years prior. Being an alliance of several parliamentary and bureaucratic factions, its highest executive organ was the 86-member Club Council, comparable to the CCP's Central Committee. On the second tier was the "Club Congress of Parliamentarians of Both Chambers." These decided all matters regarding the Club and Parliament, and concentrated all political and legislative deliberation in the high Anfu elites, chosen on the basis of their ability to represent interest groups. Anfu MPs were then obliged to follow the Club's resolutions and act accordingly in Parliament (Xitang Yeshi 1920: 20–21).

Unlike a Leninist party, Anfu did not control the military; rather, it relied on it, controlling in turn the civil service and legislature; General Xu Shuzheng [Hsu Shu-cheng 徐樹錚] once said that "Since the start of the Republic in 1912, government has been puppeted by Parliament, resulting in sheer disorder. Why can't we organize a party for ourselves, like training and organizing an army? If we have our own army of children, they will be puppeted by us" (Zhang 1979, 194). This system, whereby the army runs the party, is similar to many developmental dictatorships.[3] But the Club later increasingly acquired a mind of its own as when it cut the military budget by 20% (see Yan and Leung 2022). Finally, what also deserves attention is the overwhelmingly foreign – mostly Japanese – education background of the Progressive and Anfu elites. Duan Qirui [Tuan Ch'i-jui 段祺瑞] had been trained in artillery at the Berlin War College and had interned at Krupp in 1889–90. This scientific training distinguished him from his subordinates, mostly trained in law and political science, if not only schooled in the classics or even being outright illiterates. The Anfu Regime had every reason to be highly accomplished, but fell foul of its own missteps plus the many structural and external problems which this three-part series will attempt to explain.

In historical institutionalist analysis, the state is seen as "an idea," "a legal system" and an "organised expression of hegemony."[4] In that sense, it is a natural tendency of the state, quite independently of malice, to be all-encompassing in its bureaucracy, to assume the guise of absolute authority in executing the law, to monopolize political decision through its branches of power, to settle social conflict, provide public services, administer the economy, and ultimately, to repress by force if necessary. Anfu's fortunes and defeat were determined by its quest to be an "organised expression of hegemony" – to alienate everyone in its quest to be hegemon, and to end up consigned to the dustbin of history when it ultimately failed to deliver that hegemonic ability. It was never going to be a successful totalitarian regime even if it wished to be, when it preserved relatively large spheres of freedom and declined to suppress despite being able to. Anfu never announced what its official ideological platform was, but it fitted well into Juan Linz' definition of an authoritarian regime:

> Authoritarian regimes are political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism; without elaborate and guiding ideology (but with distinctive mentalities); without intensive nor extensive political mobilization (except some points in their development); and in which a leader (or occasionally a small group) exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones.
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> (Linz 1970, 255)

The "Anfu Era" at a glance

During 1917–20, the Peking (or "Beiyang" [Peiyang 北洋]) Republican Regime was subordinated to the control of men who created the "Anfu Club" in 1918, and to Anhui [Anhwei 安徽 / Wanxi 皖系] Clique military leaders such as Premier Duan Qirui and Army Vice Minister Xu Shuzheng, as well as Beiyang bureaucrats including President Xu Shichang [Hsu Shih-ch'ang 徐世昌] and Senate leader Liang Shiyi [Liang Shih-i 梁士詒]. The so-called "Beiyang" ("North Sea") establishment had been a group of late-imperial military and bureaucratic modernizers, mostly born and raised under traditional circumstances, but whom during the late-nineteenth century had received an education that was to varying extents western-influenced. They had worked under Viceroys Li Hongzhang [Li Hung-chang 李鴻章] and Yuan Shikai to build the "North Sea Fleet," which was sunk in 1895 during the Sino-Japanese War; subsequently, their focus transitioned toward establishing a new western-styled army, modern administration, and promoting state-led economic development.

In the desperation of the 1911 Republican Revolution, revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen offered his position as Provisional President to anyone who could make Emperor Puyi abdicate. Duan Qirui then led a petition of 143 imperial generals to force Puyi to step down, thus becoming his "first

making of the republic." The Empire was dissolved, and the last Imperial Prime Minister, Yuan Shikai, duly accepted the Republican Presidency; but by 1915 he had grown disillusioned with Republicanism and attempted to enthrone himself as the new emperor. Duan bitterly opposed this, and Yuan, who sacked Duan for being disloyal, reappointed him as Premier during his dying days in 1916 – thus Duan had made the republic a second time. Duan revived the Kuomintang-dominated "1912 Parliament" that Yuan had dissolved in 1914, and attempted to transition toward a pluralist constitutional order. That failed when his relations with Parliament ruptured on various questions surrounding the draft constitution, provincial autonomy, personnel appointments, corruption accusations, and China's participation in the First World War.

At the nadir of the political chaos in June–July 1917, Zhang Xun [Chang Hsun 張勳] a mid-ranking Beiyang leader, forced a second dissolution of Parliament and launched a coup to restore Puyi. He was quickly defeated by Duan's forces entering from Tientsin. Duan had thus "made" the Republic a third time, and himself a national hero, sweeping away at one stroke both the radicals and the ultra-conservatives. Duan then made the fateful decision that a fundamental reform to the constitutional order was necessary, upon consulting Liang Qichao [*Liang Ch'i-ch'ao* 梁啟超], a Statist theorist and leader of the late-imperial constitutional monarchist movement – which had become the "Progressive Party" after the Republic was established. According to him, the 1912 Parliament should not be reconvened; instead, a new "Provisional Senate" should be organized to redraft electoral legislation. Duan's cabinet was made up mostly of ex-Progressives. Yet between Duan and Liang schisms emerged, and Duan's cabinet resigned in November 1917. This was whilst Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang government in Canton went to war with Peking.

When Yuan died in 1916, both the Kuomintang and the Progressive Party [*Jinbudang* 進步黨] had dissolved themselves in a spirit of cordiality, having opposed Yuan's monarchism together. Factions then emerged. By early 1917 the resultant factionalism was regretted universally, and the ex-Progressives (known at the time as the "Research Clique") worked to reform itself into a "Grand Progressive Party," holding a special conference for that purpose on 27 July, 1917, but nothing came out of it.[5] By late August, news began to abound that there were plans to create an "all-controlling" party that would rise above both the Kuomintang and the Progressive Party.[6] From that time, Anfu men started to gain control of the legislature and executive, whilst the Progressive men faded out by the end of November.

With the help of Xu Shuzheng, Duan began to consolidate his own power base in the Provisional Senate and various branches of government, and the "Anfu Club," named after the alley (*hutong*) where its Peking headquarters were based, was created on 8 March, 1918. Various names had been proposed for the Club, including the "Republican Club," "Democratic Club" and Popular Constitutional Club" [*Minxian julebu* 民憲俱樂部],[7] but they

all fell through due to the initial uncertainty over the orientation of the seemingly provisional organization. When made Premier again in March 1918, Duan oversaw the expansion of a sprawling Anfu empire, which proceeded to control two-thirds of the new Parliament in August 1918. Yet a complete "Anfu Cabinet" was never formed, and it did not manage to help Duan win the Presidency, in the face of competition from his main Beiyang rival, Acting President and Zhili [*Chihli* 直隸 / *Zhixi* 直系] Faction leader, General Feng Guozhang [Feng Kuo-chang 馮國璋].

The Presidency went instead to a figure agreeable to the entirety of the Beiyang establishment, ex-Manchuria Governor and Yuan-era Premier Xu Shichang, who had been aide to Yuan since the 1890s. Duan and Feng both "retired" from politics, Duan only nominally, being still in charge of the "War Participation Supervisory Office" [*Duban canzhan shiwuchu* 督辦參戰事務處]. The Anfu Regime collaborated extensively with Japan, and received substantial loans through the State Socialist thinker Nishihara Kamezō 西原龜三, aide to Prime Minister Terauchi Masatake 寺內正毅. These were meant to induce rapid, planned industrial growth and the creation of an "East Asian Economic League"; the funds went instead to repay debts and fund the campaign against the south. After a civil war was declared by the southern military junta based in Canton, directed by Sun Yat-sen, the Beiyang Government deployed vast forces and resources in a war that saw widespread atrocities, and was reluctant to come to the bargaining table despite Zhili Faction generals refusing to fight further. During the May Fourth Movement, the Anfu Club came under widespread condemnation for its prior pro-Japanese stance, yet the government quickly released the students arrested during the violent protests. Two months later the Anfu Club effectively announced its intention to transition towards socialism, and by mid-1920 a series of State Socialist reforms affecting a number of economic sectors had been proposed (see Leung 2021). On 14 July 1920 war broke out between the Zhili and Anhui Factions, resulting in the defeat of the latter and Duan's unsuccessful suicide attempt on 21 July 1920 (Hu 2006, 179). The Anfu Regime collapsed and President Xu ordered Anfu Club's disbandment on 3 August 1920.

The road to State Corporatism, 1916–17

In what theoretical context should Anfu be understood? "Corporatism," as the antonym to "Pluralism," might be a suitable framework. These two are opposing solutions to the increasingly diversified interests and differentiated structures in the "modern polity"; while pluralists "place their faith in the shifting balance of mechanically intersecting forces; corporatists appeal to the functional adjustment of an organically interdependent whole" (Schmitter 1974, 97). Philippe C. Schmitter has pointed out that all too often, analysts of corporatist and authoritarian regimes "merely mourn the passing or degeneration of pluralism and either advocate its return"

(Schmitter 1974, 95–96). This is precisely the case with Chinese historians, beginning in the 1930s, who lament how Anfu killed off competitive, pluralist parliamentary politics. To Schmitter, this does no justice to Corporatism as an alternative model (Schmitter 1974, 93–94).

Schmitter proceeds to distinguish between two forms of Corporatism based on different premises – "State Corporatism," which happens mostly in "anti-liberal, delayed capitalist, authoritarian, neomercantilist" (Schmitter 1974, 105) states, whereby the government chooses and appoints representatives of interest groups to form the government, and consciously plans the make-up of representative institutions in order to ascertain the source and composition of state authority, rather than letting this be determined by free, competitive elections. Opposed to this was Social Corporatism for the "postliberal, advanced capitalist, organized democratic welfare state," with competitive elections within interest sectors.

The Anfu Club itself was not explicitly made up of sectors or corporations beyond provincial ones. It was, however, a powerful corporation in itself[8] that bound together consciously into one centralist organization the representatives of bureaucratic and parliamentary factions, as well as consciously choosing men of different professions to lead expert committees. By doing so, it was able to ensure the stable operation of the three branches of government for almost three whole years, including a legislature that according to the original plans would have had an economic and ethnically corporatist Senate, and which, after the plans were defeated, still ensured adequate representation for the leading mandarin literati class. It achieved monopolization through de facto uncontested elections, and made possible reciprocal support between politicized soldiers and the industrializing literati. The Anfu Regime was decidedly State Corporatist. Indeed, it could be seen as the precursor of the mode of political organization after the 1920s, under the Kuomintang and the CCP, which has been characterized by Corporatism (Tsui 2018, 37, 41, 73, 231).

Many such Corporatist regimes, including Spain under Franco or Indonesia under Sukarno and Suharto, have been referred to, or promoted themselves as "Organic States" or "Organic Democracies" (Linz 1970, 254). A whole philosophical tradition existed in Germany, notably counting Hegel amongst its ranks, that sees the state as an organism or body. The "Organic State Theory" (Bluntschli 1885b) of the Swiss-German jurist Johann Kaspar Bluntschli from 1875–76 entered East Asian consciousness very early on, though the works of Katō Hiroyuki 加藤弘之 and Liang Qichao. Organicism believes that "political communities (or states) function like natural organisms in which the parts […] exist to contribute to the well-being of the whole," and that "collective interests take precedence over individual or sectional interests and consensus takes precedence over institutionalized conflict" (Bourchier 2019, 600). The late-Qing intelligentsia, such as the Constitutional Monarchist Yang Du [*Yang Tu* 楊度],[9] already possessed Statist, Corporatist, and Organicist inclinations in their idea of political

parties – a corpus with a unified, directional ideology representing universal interests seeking to be a single group dominating all of politics, as opposed to parties under pluralism having "broad aggregate goals, low party discipline and absence of strong partisan ideologies" (Schmitter 1974, 101). The party must become the leader of the organic national totality thus formed.

It is true that organicism was against legal theories that threatened to weaken the state. Yet organicism prioritized clearly defined legislation which bureaucrats must follow, to prevent them from becoming oppressors. Organicism greatly influenced American Progressives at the turn of the twentieth century, including Woodrow Wilson and the constitutionalist Frank Goodnow, who provided theoretical support to Yuan Shikai's monarchical restoration in 1915. They all saw need to replace rotten nineteenth-century liberalism, and looked up to the German model of the strong bureaucratic executive state and the "visible hand" in the economy. Executive power must be expanded, and since the separation of powers threatened the organic integration of society, it would have to be modified (Rosser 2014, 100–101, 103, 106).

The Progressives and Anfu did not seem to have directly quoted State Organicism in their official documents, but in 1916-17, by the time the "Progressive-Anfu System" was being set-up, the theory was certainly in vogue amongst its members, and was in fact so embedded in their consciousness that it often featured without warning in their remarks on various matters.[10] Lin Baishui [*Lin Pai-shui* 林白水], editor of *Fair Comment* [*Gongyanbao* 公言報], an army newspaper which later became Anfu's official newspaper, wrote in September 1917 that "the state must not lack an organic composition and a unified hierarchy throughout."[11] Organicism was cited on several occasions by *L'Impartial* 大公報 [*Ta-kung Pao*] editor and later Anfu "extra-parliamentary member" Hu Zhengzhi [Hu Cheng-chi 胡政之], under his pseudonym "Cold Observer" [*Lengguan* 冷觀].[12] Hu's editorial *A Chance for National Awakening* on 16 August 1917, soon after war was declared, adopted the stance of "Social Organicism" [*shehui you jiti lun* 社會有機體論] and expounded on what would become the Anfu worldview of how China should deal with the pressures of imperialism, economic warfare and national industrial development.

The prelude to the establishment of the "Progressive-Anfu System" was the failed transition in 1916–17 toward pluralist politics. Since the 1912 Provisional Constitution was modeled upon the 1875 French Third Republic Constitutional Laws, this had the effect of introducing to Peking politics all the inherent instabilities of French multi-party politics and the frequent changes of cabinet, in addition to all sort of constitutional deadlocks, notably between the Presidential Palace and the Premier's State Council (cabinet). Such "Palace-Council Struggles" [*Fuyuan zhi zheng* 府院之爭] became a staple of Peking political life until the Anfu Club came along. Duan Qirui's battles with President Li Yuanhong [*Li Yuan-hung* 黎元

洪] and his allies in the Kuomintang-dominated Parliament, concerned the make-up of the initial Beiyang-Kuomintang-Progressive coalition cabinet, provincial autonomous powers in the new constitution, the severance of relations with and declaration of war against Germany and Austria, and the composition of the wartime "National Defence Cabinet" meant to be a grand coalition of political factions. Whilst Duan was allied with the Japanese civilian government under Prime Minister Terauchi and Nishihara, Li was under the influence of the Japanese Army, which did not wish China to enter the war (Dickinson 1999, 169–171).

The factional situation then was dizzying and ever-changing, with the Kuomintang split into four factions, each with sub-groups, whilst the Beiyang *Tuchuns* 督軍 (*provincial commanders*) formed a Congress but were also fractious. Executive-legislative relations were in a protracted deadlock. In October 1916, the largest Kuomintang faction split on the question of whether to elect as Vice President a northern general, Feng Guozhang, or a southerner, Lu Rongting [*Lu Jung-t'ing* 陸榮廷]; the position went to Feng. By obstructing cabinet appointments, the *Tuchuns* prevented Duan from gaining the support of the Kuomintang, and their relations soured. Matters improved briefly in March 1917, when under Liang Qichao's encouragement, Duan pushed for the severance of relations with Germany and Austria, and in a rare stroke of luck for Duan, the bill passed in Parliament. Duan then decided to promote again the idea of having more Kuomintang ministers, in exchange for passing the bill to declare war – an initiative promptly blocked by the *Tuchuns*' Congress.

The Kuomintang majority took Duan's goodwill for granted, perceived him as a hypocrite, and thought the *Tuchuns* to be carrying out Duan's real plot. With the exception of the Political Science Society [*Zhengxuehui* 政學會], the most moderate of the Kuomintang factions, all of them mustered their full strength to topple Duan. Any compromise was predicated on Duan resigning. Presidential Secretary Ding Shiyi [Ting Shih-i 丁世嶧], a member of the Kuomintang radical group, the "People's Friends Society" [*Minyoushe* 民友社], reportedly announced that "To be honest, I am for China's participation in the war. But since it is Duan's policy, I will oppose it to the end" (Tao 1971, 62; in Xu 2005, 221). In addition were corruption charges in Spring 1917 brought forth by multiple factions, including Duan's Beiyang rivals, against their opponents, affecting the Finance, Communications, and Naval Ministries. Matters had become a direct threat to Duan.

The first State Corporatist solution was suggested at this critical juncture. Duan proposed a "National Defence Cabinet" that would incorporate all main factions and lead China's central government during the world war. This idea had come from Zhang Shizhao [Chang Shih-chao 章士釗], a member of the Political Science Society and a personal friend of Duan's. He suggested setting up an "Extraordinary State Council" (ESC) [*Tebie guowu huiyi* 特別國務會議] composed of ministers without portfolio representing various parties, on the lines of Herbert Asquith's May 1915 cabinet

reshuffling, which Chang argues had made "Britain's military plans […] most swift and flexible." The ESC would also include Chief of Staff Wang Shizhen [Wang Shih-chen 王士珍], one of Duan's Beiyang rivals (Zhang 2000 [1917-03-12], 46–47). Duan was wary of this proposal, for it would also have allowed southwestern political forces to penetrate into Peking. In March he set up an "International Political Council" [*Guoji zhengwu pingyihui* 國際政務評議會] that had corporatist functions but included only second-tier factional leaders, satisfying therefore none of the factions.

With his failure to bring Kuomintang men into the cabinet, Duan by May had to prevent a dissolution of Parliament, perceived then to be a suicidal act for the military. He announced on 8 May 1917 to all factions at a meeting at the State Council that once the War Bill was passed in Parliament, he would set up the National Defence Cabinet (Ding and Zhao 2010, 426). Yet on the night of 9 May, the Political Science Society held a heated four-hour meeting to debate the issue, where the motion to support the War Bill was voted down by a small margin, which meant that the last moderate Kuomintang faction had decided to give Duan a vote of no confidence. The next morning, when Parliament resumed its session, thousands of thugs and beggars calling themselves the "Citizens' Corps," organized by Duan's two lieutenants notorious for their brashness, Jin Yunpeng [Chin Yun-p'eng 靳雲鵬] and Fu Liangzuo [Fu Liang-tso 傅良佐], surrounded the houses of Parliament and beat up Kuomintang legislators. Some reports suggest that the Kuomintang had sent in their own agent provocateurs.[13] This became the last straw on executive-legislative relations, and the whole cabinet save for Duan himself resigned in protest. One *Tuchun*, Zhang Xun, then pressured President Li into dissolving Parliament and restored Emperor Puyi for a week, before he too was defeated by Duan's forces entering from Tientsin.

From the point of view of the Beiyang leaders, pluralist politics created a situation that was as uncontrollable as it was beyond comprehension. Beiyang officials like Zeng Yujun [Tseng Yu-tsün 曾毓雋] still insisted, in his old age in the 1950s and as an advisor to the PRC government, that politicians in 1916–17 "were of too low a quality and were too easily swayed" (Zeng 1988, 32). Understandably, even the more open-minded amongst them would have asked why it was necessary to pay an extraordinary political price to maintain a frequently gridlocked pluralist system, when so much needed to be done. On the other hand, information flow was incomplete, even when a major political crisis was at hand. Some bureaucrats showed signs that they only half understood the ground-level facts in the factional struggle.[14] The task for Beiyang now was to design a non-factional political system. Any future political arrangement would need to resemble the ESC proposal, as well as incorporating the army more organically into it. Duan turned to Liang Qichao and the Progressives for advice; they had advocated Statism in its charter as early as 1913, and Liang was widely known since the 1900s for promoting the idea of an "enlightened despotism."

Whom would Duan and Liang's "National Defence State" have benefitted, beyond the narrow confines of the Beiyang establishment? If we are to trust the judgment of the historian Chang P'eng-yuan [Zhang Pengyuan 張朋園], then Liang's designated ruling class "undoubtedly was the gentry" (Chang 2007a, 19). Facing the chaos of pluralism and anxious about their replacement by immature political forces such as the young revolutionaries, the gentry, or mandarin literati, were eager to reinvigorate their political strength by building a controlling political party, and to foster a German and Japanese-styled protectionist economic policy (Chang 2007b, 15). Liang detested pluralism, stating that in competitive politics, "worthless" people uttering "worthless" words, like certain "self-proclaimed publicists," would only create chaos. Liang explained his "theory of the national central core class" [*Guojia zhongjian jieji lun* 國家中堅階級論] as thus –

> they must be a small, excellent and noble minority, that earns the respect and adoration of the citizenry, so that their words may carry the greatest weight in the world […] In fact, majority politics is still governed by a minority […] any parliament in the world, any party in the world – are they directed and commanded by a majority or a minority? […] Where their followers are numerous, every raising of the hand, and every movement of the foot, carries enormous weight.
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> (Liang 1936, "Duoshu zhengzhi zhi shiyan" 多數政治之實驗 [Experimentation in majoritarian politics], 35–36)

Liang believed that "since the last generation of mandarin literati possessed both a traditional Confucian upbringing and up-to-date western knowledge, they bore the brunt of the mission to save China, and did so without hesitation" (Chang 2007a, 19). But he claims that effective government "depends on whether, for any issue, public opinion could be neatly divided into two camps, one of which must then assume the majority. […] Only then could governance be systematic and non-collisional" (Liang 1936, "Duoshu Zhengzhi zhi Shiyan", 37).

Liang's true intentions are only clear when his words are viewed as a system. He seemed to want a dualistic political system – a two-party system perhaps – but wanted only one core class, leading if necessary two parties. As such, what he really wanted was a monist political system. The fact of a single-party system could be achieved without explicitly calling it as such. Liang had strict requirements when it came to party discipline. He proposed something akin to "democratic centralism," understandable considering that he wanted nothing less than a vanguard party of the mandarin literati. In 1912–13 he issued these guidelines for his Republican Party (later merged into the Progressives) –

> Rule IV – Party members must refrain from free action. […] For a party is like an army, and party strategy is like war strategy, […] Thus the

> interdiction on free action in the party is the same as the interdiction on free action in the army. […] Should the citizenry refuse to be the mechanical apparatus of the nation, the nation would have no foundation on which to stand; should the party member refuse to be the mechanical apparatus of the party, the party would not live. […] One can be a mechanical part on one hand and still be the subject on the other. How? When the party decides its course, its members must all be in attendance, and freely express their opinions. A vote of majority is then taken, and once a resolution is made, it should be followed. Much as there shall be no freedom after the deliberation, there must be complete freedom during the deliberation.
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> (Liang 1936, "Gonghedang zhi diwei yu qi taidu" 共和黨之地位與其態度 [The position and attitude of the Republican Party], 26–27)

The concept of incorporating multi-focal interests under a wartime national unity system had come from Europe to China soon after the outbreak of war in August 1914, and soon became a "hip" term signifying all that was new about the age of war.[15] After the outbreak of WWI, Liang deeply admired the German wartime state, and under the influence of what he imagined of Walther Rathenau's industrially mobilized state, described his ideal state as being a machine (Liang 1914, 100–101). He analyzed in 1915 the various European national unity governments, suggesting that declaring war could help sooth ethnic and socialist struggles as long as it implemented reformist policies (Liang 1915, 22). Japan's "national unity system" [J. *Kyokoku icchi taisei;* C. *Juguo yizhi tizhi* 舉國一致體制] naturally also became an inspiration. The populist Prime Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu 大隈重信 had performed poorly during his tenure both domestically and diplomatically, as shown by the brash Twenty-One Demands for China, an attempt to turn China into a Japanese protectorate. The Meiji elder Yamagata Aritomo 山縣有朋 subsequently replaced Ōkuma with Terauchi Masatake, a general who had studied in France, in the Bluntschlian hope that he would use his "neutral" position to deepen Japan's internal strength and to "unite and guide the people without bias" (Dickinson, 1999, 157).

The anti-pluralist strategy was widely reported to be a success in the Chinese media, notably Anfu's own outlets like *L'Impartial*.[16] Even Vice-President Feng Guozhang mentioned the concept in his speech when arriving in Peking on 1 March 1917, in the presence of Duan, the State Council, legislators, and even Wang Jingwei. "In these treacherous times," he said, "we must strive under national unity, and place the new Chinese State amongst the ranks of the powers."[17] Yet by mid-1917, Liang had given up on co-opting the recalcitrant Kuomintang "young turks"; only mature representatives of the gentry were to be included. He blamed the failure of pluralism on "the defective elements in Parliament" (Ding 1958 [1936] in Chang 2007a, 81), and opposed any suggestion of reconvening the 1912 Parliament, opting instead to appoint a new, unicameral Provisional Senate

which would pave way for the domination of power by a new, regrouped Progressive Party at the head of a monolithic wartime state. Editor of *L'Impartial* Hu Zhengzhi still hoped in February 1917 that, with Yuan dead, different factions might rally under National Unity and seek progress to "meet the trends of the new world," despite the existing regime being less than ideal.[18] After the bitter struggles of mid-1917, Hu had evidently lost his patience, and exclaimed –

> Now if we are to consider the long-term benefits of this country, we should take advantage of the "Third Making of the Republic", and establish a national strategy for the next century. We should, in the spirit of National Unity, seek a solution for our legislature. In the case of the old Parliament, it has been disbanded twice in the same session, and has lost all sacred dignity and respect from within and without. One should no more recover spilled water than to go through this all over again.[19]

The Old Guard, the Corrective Revolution, and the New Order

The restoration of Emperor Puyi by Zhang Xun was itself a reaction against what he perceived to be the republican disorder of the "bad partisan habits" – pluralism – and in the nine theses announced on July 1st, he promised to design a political system on the best practices of constitutional monarchies worldwide. The coup that Duan Qirui in turn launched on 3 July 1917 against Zhang, with the help of Liang Qichao and a host of early technocrats – the so-called "Third Making of the Republic" – paved way for a new, *renovationist* political system to be designed by a newly appointed Provisional Senate, dominated by Statist elites. When fleets of trains spirited Duan's troops from Tientsin into Peking, where they launched East Asia's first air raid against Zhang's "Pig-tail Army," it was not only a "revolution" against a traditionalist monarchism rendered increasingly anachronistic by the Chinese revolution of 1911 and the Russian revolution of February 1917 but an act that also put the final nail into the coffin of radicalism and pluralism, and as we shall see, economic liberalism. In the sense that this "Corrective Revolution" – a term that in Middle Eastern politics refers usually to centrist military coups defeating rightwing reaction or leftwing adventurism – expelled from Peking the Kuomintang "young turks" and recalcitrant monarchists and re-installed the mandarin literati modernizers, though within the institutions of a constitutional republic and in alliance with a rising class of technocrats to promote a vast programme of modernization, this could be understood as a case of the "Old Guard, New Order," which was how Robert O. Paxton (1972) described Vichy France and Marshal Pétain's National Revolution. As such, the "Progressive-Anfu System" was the most class-based of Beiyang-era regimes, and was designed to allow an autocratic republic of gentry landlords to evolve into a modern bourgeois dictatorship.

To be granted a seat in the Provisional Senate, one would have needed to have a university degree or its equivalent, or pay in tax Mex $100 or more, or have real estate of Mex $50,000 or more. In a country rife with poverty, notes Chang P'eng-yuan, this was equivalent to creating a new aristocracy (Chang 2007b, 112–113). The Provisional Senate was therefore the epitome of an extreme elitism, and was equivalent to a House of Peers. The number of provincial deputies decreased from 220/274 in the 1912 Senate (the actual elected total being 263) to 110/168 in the Provisional Senate. Seats for the clearly corporatist "Central Academic Caucus" [*Zhongyang xuehui* 中央學會] increased from 8 to 30, representing "old high-ranking bureaucrats, the rich, Manchu and Muslim aristocrats, educators, and academics possessing a degree and who had worked for three years or more in academic institutions or have published academic works" (Chang 2007b, 113). Given that no elections were held in the South, and the final number of senators was only 140, the Central Academic Caucus constituted 21% of the Provisional Senate, at a time when nationwide literacy was only around 20%. Property requirements for voters were also vastly increased, with the electoral law passed in late 1917 for the New Parliament stipulating that voters must be males above 25 years of age, having resided in the constituency for two years or more, paying taxes of Mex $4 or more, or having real estate of Mex $500 or above, in addition to having graduated from primary school or its equivalent. In that sense, only the propertied and the educated would have any political power (Chang 2007b, 115–116).

As a result, in Jilin [Kirin 吉林] Province, where the percentage of voters was highest, it stood at a mere 0.166%; in Gansu [Kansu 甘肅] Province, where it was lowest, it was a pitiful 0.01%. These were even lower than the levels for the late-Imperial elections for the Advisory Council. The "Progressive-Anfu System" thus totally achieved the purpose of concentrating political power in the "central core" gentry class through the use, rather than rejection of, constitutional republican institutions (Xiong 2011, 176).

Liang's cry of war was echoed by many provincial commanders and local elites.[20] The next step was to co-opt them permanently; and corporatism, which could be "the product of a 'new order' following from a fundamental overthrow of the political and economic institutions of a given country and created by force or special 'collective spirit'" (Malherbe 1940, 13–14, in Schmitter 1974, 105) was naturally taken up. Given how the gentry had discovered the merits of investing in modern industry and commerce during the wartime economic boom, it was clear that any future arrangement would have to take into consideration the transitional nature of the gentry. In late-1917, Duan's cabinet proposed a *Parliament Organisation Act Amendment Bill* [*Xiuzheng guohui zuzhifa cao'an* 修正國會組織法草案], which would have seen the Senate reformed into a chamber of economic, ethnic, and socio-cultural corporations, resembling the Irish and Estonian Senates after their 1930s reforms. This has its origins in early 1917, when Parliament debated the draft constitution; some thought it odd that the Kuomintang-dominated Senate behaved more radically than the House of Representatives. Liang, noting such opinion, suggested that the Senate should be formed of functional

constituencies and government representatives, and that the object should be to prevent revolution[21] (Ding and Zhao 2010 [1936], 420).

The Provisional Senate held its opening ceremony on 10 November 1917, and Duan spoke on behalf of the State Council, pointing out that the preceding political chaos had been due to unsatisfactory legislation on elections and parliamentary organization, and that the task of the Provisional Senate was precisely to modify such laws. Duan's speech was a clear manifestation of his eclectic thinking, using traditional knowledge to support modern aims. For example, to boost morale, he argued on the basis of the *I Ching* that matters progressed in a zig-zag fashion and that setbacks necessarily happen. Next he switched to using mechanical political discourse, popular since the French Revolution (which produced terms such as "reaction"). Quoting the physics that he learnt during his artillery training – in this case statics and the laws of motion – he encouraged the senators to legislate in the direction of seeking an equilibrium between political forces, especially between the branches of power which should complement rather than to check and balance each other, and thus to determine the proper "track" of forward motion for government, which would bring wellbeing to China's 400 million population.[22]

The bill was however doomed from the outset when Duan and other Progressive cabinet members resigned at the end of November. Chief of Staff Wang Shih-chen became Premier, and Jiang Yong [*Chian Yung* 江庸] (Waseda) Justice Minister. On 28 November the Senate Review Committee decided on bicameralism after a two-hour debate.[23] Cabinet Legislation Bureau Chief Fang Shu 方樞 (Waseda), who had contributed to late-Imperial reforms, and who would later become an Anfu Extraparliamentary Member, was responsible for drafting the *Amendment Bill*. On 13 December the cabinet voted to send the Bill to the Provisional Senate, where three Legislation Bureau members explained the document and responded to queries.[24]

The Bill, patterned on Liang's ideas, established the principle that the upper chamber, by incorporating "classes and forces," would be more temperate than the lower chamber. Its "Explanatory Note" appears to have quoted at length a textbook first published in 1908 entitled *Political Science* written by Satō Ushijirō 佐藤丑次郎, Assistant Professor of Law at Kyoto Imperial University, especially on vocational representation and bicameralism under constitutional monarchies (Satō 1908, 380–381). The Note cited the British legalist James Bryce, best known for his works on the US political system, that most unicameralist countries revert eventually back to bicameralism.[25] It holds that since China was not a federalist country like Germany or the US, it did not have to replicate its political design, creating a situation where the two chambers served the same purpose and "might as well have been one chamber." However, unicameralism was proven to be only practical in small states. Bicameralism would be a brake on the radicalism of the lower chamber, which could reduce conflict between the executive and the legislature. Thus, the two chambers must be "utterly different, with the lower chamber representing the common folk, and the upper chamber representing

special forces," elected by "special bodies" including the Central Academic Caucus or the Overseas Chinese Caucus.[26]

The Bill proceeded to propose that of the 134 seats in the Senate, 57 (42.5%) would be "Enterprise Representatives"; 37 (27.5%) would be "High-ranking Officials of the Judiciary and Executive"; 12 (9%) would be Academic Representatives; 16 (12%) would be chosen by Manchu, Mongolian, and Muslim aristocrats; and 4 (3%) elected respectively by those with state honors; by Overseas Chinese; and by the Lhasa electoral college. The last would be formed of the Dalai and Panchen Lamas and senior officials of the Lhasa government, the precondition being that they understood Chinese and could participate in parliamentary discussions.[27] Enterprise Representatives would have been elected by the economic sector –

> These deputies will be produced by enterprise bodies in agriculture, industry and commerce. This is designed with reference to various countries such as Prussia having Reichstag deputies recommended by Junkers, and deputies in the Japanese and Italian Parliaments representing large taxpayers. […] Thus all sectors, agriculture, industry, commerce and mining could be included. In our case we are different from these systems in that they provide for overall representation whilst we propose representation specific to each constituent group. Since the start of the 20th Century, we have entered an epoch of economic representation. Politics in any country are always influenced by the power of economic bodies. Thus modern academics like Schäffle have advocated vocational representation as the way of electing parliamentary deputies. Such vocations may be economic entities or otherwise, and amongst the economic entities he has specified peasants, industrialists and businessmen, handicrafts workers, and labourers. This matches the spirit of our enterprise representatives being produced by agricultural, industrial and commercial bodies – the rationale for including 57 enterprise representatives in the Senate, for unless it is as numerous as that, given the breadth of Chinese territory, with some 26 provinces and special administrative regions, distribution will be difficult.[28]

The intention of this Bill to introduce corporatist representation, and considered even the issue of representation for laborers, in the context of stemming extra-parliamentary conflict, is no coincidence considering the State Socialist "economic spurt" (a concept explained in Gerschenkron 1962) that Duan and Liang were planning at the time. Albert Schäffle, a German legalist and sociologist quoted in the Explanatory Note, was a State Socialist vocal in his opposition against Marxism and Communism. In the 1880s he had participated in the drafting of social legislation under Bismarck (Siewert 2020, 311), and as the author of *The Theory and Policy of Labour Protection* (Schäffle 1893), advocated the establishment of a "rational social state." To build it and to establish the right kind of socialism, the state in the

eyes of Schäffle would need to balance various interests and bring the various parts of the organism into harmony. Neither large-scale nationalization nor universal suffrage, as demanded at the time by the Social Democrats, would therefore be advisable. Universal suffrage to him over-emphasises the individual, creating imbalance.

Schäffle pointed out that education, church, art, and science – the "major branches of the national economy" (and indeed the sources of productivity according to Friedrich List) – were unrepresented in constitutions; in proper socialism, however, both functional and local representation would be necessary.[29] (Schäffle 1894, 146; 1896, 585). Bluntschli had also complained earlier on about universal suffrage providing incomprehensive representation, (Bluntschli 1885a, 58) and this would have been an influence on Schäffle, who argued that half of any legislature (or two-thirds, even three-fifths) should comprise of *Berufskörperschaften,* or "vocational corporations"; only such bodies make up the socio-economic organic fabric, and only when they were represented, would "complete representation" be achieved. (Schäffle 1894, 133) This was known as the "Principle of Functional Representation." It was Satō's book which first suggested the formula "peasants, industrialists and businessmen, handicrafts workers and labourers" taken up by the 1917 "Explanatory Note," in an elaboration of Schäffle's ideas.[30]

Schäffle's principles appear to have been immediately defeated. In contrast to the Note, the Bill stipulated not a system like future Fascist Italy whereby legally prescribed vocational corporations produced deputies, but one large electoral college for eligible voters from all sectors electing Enterprise Representatives – in effect an "economic aristocracy." This was far from Schäffle's State Socialist vision, which would have also included labourers and handicraft workers. The Note made instead reference to the property requirements of the Belgian and Swedish upper chambers.[31] The new non-economic sectors included the Academic Electoral College designed on the basis of Spanish, Italian and Peruvian practice, and was much stricter in its provisions than the Central Academic Caucus of the 1918 New Senate.[32] Representatives of "High-ranking Officials of the Judiciary and Executive" was an extension of Liang's idea of having official members of parliament, and partially satisfied some calls in 1916-7 for a "Chamber of Elders" [*Yuanlaoyuan* 元老院]; this is whilst the actual points of reference were Hungary and Italy, and proposed to "net in conservatively inclined talent with rich experience and knowledge." They were to be produced from electoral colleges at central and local levels for officials appointed by the two levels of government. Yet the candidates could not be officials in active duty, and this meant that the system was reserved for retired officials, or that it was meant to be some sort of "revolving door."[33]

All this suggests that the December 1917 *Parliament Organisation Act Amendment Bill* was a complete manifestation of the conservative vision of the late-Imperial Constitutional Monarchist movement under Liang, as revised for the Republican era – the belief in a hierarchical society and the

need for an aristocracy, and thus the need for a House of Peers idealistically made up of conservative, experienced men. Had this Bill been voted into existence, this could have been the start of China's march toward a Corporatist Developmental State, and was in every way a milestone for intellectual history. Had the system survived into the 1920s, it could have been the very point of embarkation of the proto-Fascistisation of the Anfu Regime. It already resembled, in its 1917 form, the Irish Senate from 1936 to the present; and with minor modifications it could have turned into an Italian or Estonian-styled legislature. In fact, the concept of Functional Representation was still popular after WWII, as shown notably in Indonesia.

Yet the Bill suffered a miscarriage. On 18 December the Provisional Senate's Committee of the Whole convened, and the intentions of the Senate Reform were immediately discerned. Hu Jun [Hu Chün 胡鈞] (Berlin) pointed out after the Legislation Bureau representatives had spoken that the Senate "would, I'm afraid, in this sense create a caste system."[34] On 23 December the Provisional Senate decided that the New Senate would still be elected from Provincial Assemblies and local or other electoral colleges.[35] This provided Anfu men and the Progressives with greater political certainty, given their existing hold on many Provincial Assemblies. The two parties continued to confront each other over the method for electing Senators, where both suggested different corporatist solutions. The Progressives argued that the 1912 election law should be maintained, with direct elections from the Provincial Assemblies, where it was sure of its dominance. Anfu MPs instead proposed local election colleges bypassing existing Provincial Assemblies. The Progressives, outnumbered in the Provisional Senate, changed tact and began to issue "policy papers" to arouse public attention – whilst the Anfu bribed its way through the weaker elements of the Progressives, and struck out the names of the paper authors from an internal list of supported candidates for the 1918 election (Liu 1998).

Eventually, a compromised was reached and the method of local electoral colleges was adopted, on the understanding that the Kuomintang elements which remained in the Provincial Assemblies would need to be eliminated from the process (Xiong 2011, 96–100). In the elections of May–June 1918, the Anfu Club took a total of 330 seats in both chambers; the allied New Communications Clique another 20 seats; the Old Communications Clique, which was at the time on good terms with Anfu, 50 seats; whilst the Progressives (now known as the "Research Clique") took only 20 seats (Mao 1991, 118). Electoral irregularities were widespread. Numbers in voter registers were often inflated, and on election day, beggars and even children turned up to vote. The Research Clique spent huge sums of money aiming at becoming the governing majority but was still defeated, and Liang Qichao bitterly regretted his involvement in setting up the political system (Chang 2007b, 116). Yet one must also see that this election achieved what Liang set out to accomplish, and that the beggars and children served only as "voting cattle" (as Engels would have called them) for the deputies of the gentry, and for the military, which lent them support. The legislators voted in were almost all

from lists predetermined by local commanders or even Xu Shuzheng at the Army Ministry and his Anfu headquarters (ZKJYJZB 1963, 205–206, in Zhou 2011, 229–230).

These lists were not made up of random, unrepresentative names; the men chosen were often the equivalent of Japanese local leaders or *meibōka*. In this sense, compared to Japan's attempt in 1940 to build a single-party state, which failed due to its strategy of circumventing the local leaders, Xu's strategy of incorporating such elements by means of "non-competitive nominations" was much more successful. On 24 March 1918, Xu telegrammed Anhui commander Ni Sichong [Ni Ssu-ch'ung 倪嗣沖], one of the three generals who led troops to crush Zhang Xun, asking him to make sure that pro-military candidates would "yield total victory in a dozen provinces,"[36] and sent Anfu staff armed with huge sums of money to the provinces to control election results. The Club also "secretly liaised with heads of local administration to control nominations."[37] Yan and Leung (2022) believe that the socio-economic background and relative maturity of the Anfu MPs were later conducive to efficient, "conservative legislation."

Also accused of vote-buying, the Central Academic Caucus actually carefully vetted its voters and asked for certification of their qualifications, not forgetting in the process to eliminate potential radicals. The qualifications held included the French Army Cavalry School, the Belgian École des mines de Mons, Cornell University and in China, the Peking, Beiyang, and Shanxi Universities.[38] The industrialist Chen Jihua [Ch'en Ch'i-hua 陳濟華] sponsored a banquet where Anfu member and former Minister to Belgium Wu Zonglian [*Wu Tsung-lien* 吳宗濂] and Zhejiang Education Association Chairman Sun Zengda [Sun Tseng-ta 孫增大] were invited to make speeches.[39] Some voters invented a new form of protest, of deliberately casting flawed ballots. In a way not dissimilar to late-Soviet voters who also wrote their dissatisfactions on the ballots, voters in 1918 with their wry sense of humor wrote the names of prostitutes, or dead politicians like Yuan Shikai, or the wrong characters for the candidates' names, and even the insult "big turtle" (*bastard*) or drawing a turtle on it (Xiong 2011, 191–192).

To this, one might ask why Duan and Xu did not scrap elections altogether, and appoint another Parliament as they had done in 1917. It has been recently argued that authoritarian states including the Soviet Union also hold elections, not only to preserve a façade of constitutionality but also as one mechanism to maintain the scarcity of places in the "winning coalition" – the group that would benefit from being in government. This would make such identity – be it the membership of a party, government, or parliament – a valuable commodity, and something to be held onto precariously; it could also be terminated anytime when the person in question "misbehaves." Support for his re-election could be withdrawn, or he could be shunted aside in a controlled campaign, and replaced by someone else from the "talent pool" (de Mesquita 2003, 54–55). Indeed, this was how the Research Clique was eliminated, and the same could have been done for any unruly Anfu elements.

The design of the Anfu Club

The design of the Anfu Club's internal organization also served to bolster the gentry's monolithic rule, by being a corporatist organ co-opting all political factions, save for the Progressives (Research Clique), and the Zhili Faction military leaders, who hated Duan's Anhui Faction. This was both Anfu's main strength and the fatal weakness. The factions that were co-opted were not random associations of politicians, which congregated only because of personal reasons, as some suggested, but were interest groups differentiated according to their functions and properties. The Anfu Club Charter, which has usually been assumed to have been lost or never to have existed, actually stipulated that "The Headquarters holds monthly congresses, but where major issues arise, the Chairman, or Councillors, or 20 or more club members, can request an extraordinary congress" ("Anfu Club Charter," Xitang Yeshi 1920, 4).

The Club Council – Anfu's de facto central committee – "holds meetings twice a month, but an extraordinary meeting can be convened by the President of the Council, or five or more Councillors, or 10 or more club members" ("Provisional Regulations for the Club Council," in Xitang Yeshi 1920, 22). The councillors came in two categories – parliamentary and extra-parliamentary, the second having one-third of the number of seats of the first ("Anfu Club Charter," in Xitang Yeshi 1920, 3). Every five legislators chose one Parliamentary Councillor (PC), and the Parliamentary Councillors then elected the Extra-Parliamentary Councillors (EPC). It would seem that although inner-party democracy was proclaimed, the PCs did no more than to approve a pre-determined list of EPCs. The qualifications of the leading members of the Club Council and the EPCs reveal that most of them had been trained in modern administration or studied abroad, mostly in Japan. A glance at the list of EPCs also shows them to be representatives of different factions, of which the most important were the Old Communications Clique [*Jiu jiaotong xi* 舊交通系, *OCC*], which controlled the railways and their associated financial institutions such as the Bank of Communications before Yuan's death in 1916.

This was in addition to the New Communications Clique [*Xin jiaotong xi* 新交通系, *NCC*], which took over the reins of such departments and finances when Yuan and his proteges fell from power. These men had been educated in Japan as legalists, and had been appointed to the late-Imperial political reform planning agency and facility for training new bureaucrats, the humbly named Constitutional Compilation Commission [*Xianzheng biancha guan* 憲政編查館]. As new intellectuals who worked under huge constraints – notably ethnic – to reform the Empire, they possessed an ultra-realistic worldview that permanently prepared them for setbacks, as well as being pro-Japanese as a conditional reflex. In addition to them were pro-Duan (D) men who were at the head of the military, judiciary, and even the Metropolitan Police, in addition to the legislature. Anfu's attempts to co-opt the OCC, notably its leader Liang Shiyi who briefly served as Senate President, did not turn out to be particularly successful, but another of its leaders, Ye Gongchuo [Yeh Kung-cho 葉恭綽], served as Vice Minister of Communications and took part in deciding the lists of provincial parliamentary candidates in 1918.

Anfu Club Council Leaders and Extra-Parliamentary Councillors [*yuanwai pingyiyuan* 院外評議員][40]

Name		*Education/training*	*Portfolio*
Tian Yinghuang [T'ien Ying-huang]	田應璜	Late Imperial New Civil Service Examination – Special Subject of Economics	Council President; Vice President of the Senate
Wang Yinchuan [Wang Yin-chuan]	王印川	Political Economy, Waseda; LLB, Hōsei. Ex-Progressive.	Council Vice President; Speaker, House of Representatives
Xu Shuzheng (D) [Hsu Shu-cheng]	徐樹錚	Imperial Japanese Army Academy	Army Vice Minister; Anfu Organizer
Duan Zhigui (D) [Tuan Chih-kuei]	段芝貴	Imperial Japanese Army Academy	Army Minister; Peking Regional Commander
Wu Bingxiang (D) [Wu Ping-hsiang]	吳炳湘	Imperial Qing New Army	Metropolitan Police Commissioner
Li Sihao (D) [Li Ssu-hao]	李思浩	Peking Grand Academy (now Peking University)	Finance bureaucrat
Yao Guozhen (D) [Yao Kuo-chen]	姚國楨	Transport Academy (*Jiaotong chuanxisuo* 交通傳習所, now Jiaotong University)	Railway technocrat
Yao Zhen (D) [Yao Chen]	姚震	Waseda University	Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; Magistrate, Higher Tribunal for PoWs
Zeng Yujun (OCC) [Tseng Yu-tsün]	曾毓雋	Traditional Civil Service Examination	Railway technocrat
Cao Rulin (NCC) [Tsao Ju-lin]	曹汝霖	Tokyo Vocational School (*Tōkyō senmon gakkō* 東京專門學校, now Waseda University)	Minister of Finance
Lu Zongyu (NCC) [Lu Tsung-yu]	陸宗輿	Waseda University	Finance bureaucrat and diplomat
Ding Shiyuan (NCC) [Ting Shih-yuan]	丁士源	Shanghai St. John's University; Legal training in Britain.	Railway technocrat and police administrator
Wu Dingchang (O/NCC) [Wu Ting-chang]	吳鼎昌	Tokyo Higher Commercial School (now Hitotsubashi)	President of the Government Mint

The term "Club" certainly did not mean that Anfu was any less serious about itself; Clause 22 of the Club Charter stipulates that anyone who had contravened the orders of the headquarters or had committed criminal offences would be expelled after a vote in the Club Congress ("Anfu Club Charter," in Xitang Yeshi 1920, 4). Yet certain behaviors in the Club would be difficult to comprehend today; for example, some sources insist that the Anfu headquarters had been a place to "hold banquets and summon prostitutes,"[41] and had recreational facilities. By extension therefore, it was argued that Anfu was never a serious political organization. But this had less to do with the Club's politics than most historians from a Marxist tradition would imagine. Early political parties both in the West and Japan often doubled as elite social clubs, or had been evolved from them. This was particularly the case with French political parties before the Third Republic and for a short time after its establishment, which had begun life mostly as salons or elite clubs for politicians and intellectuals.[42] These clubs soon began to discover, during their foray into parliamentary politics, the importance of public speaking and debate training. The fact that Anfu had a special panel in its Recreational Section for that purpose, is a clear sign that Anfu was the inheritor of these traditions.

As for its political manifesto, especially with regard to economic policy, Anfu remained hesitant until its final days to show its State Socialist inclinations. As we have seen, it was not until July 1919 that Anfu began to openly warm up to the idea of building socialism; this was followed by a package of proposed reforms until the regime was toppled in mid-1920 (see Leung 2021). The Charter contained only the slogans "Guarding national unity, consolidating republicanism, exercising constitutionalism, and protecting popular livelihood." This shows that Anfu deliberately adopted, as a "big tent" strategy, an indistinct platform that offended no one, and which contained only values that could no longer be disputed after the fall of Zhang Xun (republicanism, constitutionalism, and unification) or which scarcely required debate (statism). This was a strategy appropriate for the 1918 elections, but which would become anathema after May Fourth. The internal organization of Anfu displayed influences from Japanese political parties, and indeed terms such as Liaison (J. *kōsai,* C. *jiaoji* 交際) appears to have been taken directly from them. Its think tank was the very Japanese-sounding Political Investigation Committee [*zhengwu diaocha hui* 政務調查會] of which the sub-committees – Industrial, Communications, Military etc. –

> …resembled the ministries of the state, and the President of the Political Investigation Committee (PIC) mirrored the Premier of the State Council, whilst the chairmen and vice-chairmen of the sub-committees could be regarded as the ministers and deputy ministers of state. Its research methods were even more comprehensive than cabinet meetings, to the point where any matter that was not deliberated by the PIC was

> thought to be the cause of quarrels and disputes. Its source of support came from the Congress of Parliamentarians of Both Chambers. Any important resolution would have to be passed by the Congress before it could be adopted by the Club. […] The Speakers of both chambers of Parliament, Li Shengduo [*Li Sheng-to* 李盛鐸], Tian Yinghuang, Wang Yitang [*Wang I-t'ang* 王揖唐] and Liu Enge [*Liu En-ko* 劉恩格], and the secretaries of both chambers of Parliament, Liang Hongzhi [*Liang Hung-chih* 梁鴻志], Wang Yinchuan and Zang Yinsong [Tsang Yin-sung 臧蔭松], all belonged to the Anfu Club.
>
> (Xitang Yeshi 1920, 17)

Li Shengduo, Presidentof the PIC, had been one of five ministers sent in 1905–6 by the Imperial Qing Government to some 14 countries to "investigate constitutionalism." PIC Internal Affairs Sub-Committee Chairman, Senator Zhang Yuanqi [Chang Yuan-ch'i 張元奇] would be appointed as President of the Economic Investigation Bureau in 1920, the "Economic General Staff" of the Anfu Regime responsible for proposing a substantial number of State Socialist reforms. Some of the panels were run by professionals. Wu Zesheng [Wu Tse-sheng 烏澤聲], (Waseda) "Acting Full-time Executive" [*daixing zhuanren ganshi* 代行專任幹事] of the Secretariat's Press Division, had been a legislator since 1912, and was President of the *New People's Daily* 新民報 in Peking. Translation Division Executive Chen Huanzhang [Ch'en Huan-chang 陳煥章] had earned his PhD from Columbia University, and had written a work in English, *The Economic Principles of Confucius and His School* (1911), praised by John Maynard Keynes (1912) (Figure 1.1).

Other Anfu executives achieved notoriety or legendary status. Wang Zhilong [Wang Chih-lung 王郅隆], the main Anfu benefactory who had a "rags to riches" story unusual for the era, was Accounting Section Chief. He was the well-known General Manager of Yuyuan 裕元 Textiles Mill in Tientsin, the city's largest, built with Japanese loans and counting amongst its shareholders Duan and many other Beiyang leaders. Zang Yinsong, Secretary of the House of Representatives, was Planning Division Full-time Executive under Wang. The Liaison Section was responsible not only for dealing with domestic and foreign politicians and businessmen but also according to the Charter had to "investigate" matters, which likely meant assembling intelligence.

The Liaison Section's subsidiary, the Diplomatic Liaison Division (DLD), was led by Li Guojie [Li Kuo-chieh 李國杰], a late-Imperial diplomat and constitutional monarchist friend of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's. DLD Executive Wei Sijiong [Wei Ssu-chiung 魏斯炅] (Chūō) was best known as the husband of the politically conscious former courtesan Sai Jinhua [Sai Chin-hua 賽金花], who was previously married to a Chinese diplomat sent to Germany. She had reportedly met Bismarck, spoke several European languages, and had saved Wei from Yuan Shikai during the Second Revolution in 1913. Bian Yinchang [Pien Yin-ch'ang 卞蔭昌], also a DLD Executive and a late-imperial official,



Figure 1.1 Organisation Chart of the Anfu Club.

had led the Chinese delegation to the Panama World Exposition in 1915 representing Tientsin's industries and businesses. In 1916 when French authorities detained Chinese police and forcibly expanded their concession, Bian led the Tientsin Council for the Upholding of National Rights and Territory [*Tianjin guoquan guotu weichi hui* 天津國權國土維持會] to rally against the French (Bian 1917). Anfu's choice of these accomplished and experienced men was well-considered, reflecting the growing clout of what is today called the "foreign policy public" – a globally informed community in high politics; their placement in Parliament was therefore a strategic act.

Anfu was intent on establishing branches on both provincial and prefectural levels, and drafted the corresponding provisions, but they appear to have never materialized. The Club intended to establish "Correspondence Offices" at each province prior to the formal establishment of a branch, and stated in its Charter that the "Office Establishment Commissioner" would be elected by Anfu members in Peking. A formal branch would be set up when each Office reaches 100 members, pending approval from the Peking HQ. The Chairman of each branch would be appointed by the superior party organization, but the rest of the branch's leaders (eg. Executive Commissioner, Executives, Council President, and Councillors) would be

elected from amongst its members, and they would then appoint the branch's staff. The branches would need to report to the HQ (and prefectural branches to the provincial HQ) regularly on its affairs, the membership roll, the list of staff, resolutions passed, budget and expenses, and other matters. These were subject to a number of detailed charters and regulations (Xitang Yeshi 1920, 6–9).

However in the end Anfu appeared to have settled on commanding over satellite organizations at provincial level, such as the Chenglu Club [*Chenglu julebu* 澄廬俱樂部] in the Zhejiang [Chekiang 浙江] Provincial Assembly, established with Mex $2,000,000 of funds provided by the Peking HQ. This fought against the "Society of the Good" [*Liang she* 良社] set up by ex-Kuomintang members. They were also divided on prefectural lines, with Chenglu representing legislators from Taizhou, Wenzhou, and Chuzhou in eastern Zhejiang, and the "Society of the Good" representing west Zhejiang. Yet the satellite organizations appeared to have never reached the level of discipline seen in Peking. When the election for the Zhejiang Assembly President was held on 22 October 1918, Ruan Xingcun [*Juan Hsing-tsun* 阮性存], the candidate supported by Chenglu, was observed to be distinctly lacklustre in his campaign, refusing to treat his supporter to banquets or to buy votes. As a result, the Wenzhou legislators defected and Zhou Jiying [Chou Chi-ying 周繼濚], the "Society of the Good" candidate, was elected instead; Zhou would later come to regret that his own campaign had been dirtier than Ruan's, despite the latter being an Anfu politician (Shen 2005, 225–228). It was a rare defeat compared to Anfu's hold on the vast majority of Provincial Assemblies.

Concluding remarks

The lack of press coverage on the proceedings of the Anfu Club Council meetings and the lack of any documentation whatsoever on the functioning of its sections, panels, and sub-committees makes it very difficult to analyse the efficacy of Anfu operations. Yet it should be evident by now that the Anfu Club bore the hallmarks of a modern political party, and rather than being a "faction," it was the first Chinese party to actually attempt to dominate all of government and its operations. It is my intention however to insist that we should be careful not to judge it using the standards of a Leninist Party, as would be appropriate for Soviet-inspired parties such as the Kuomintang after the 1920s, but to parliamentary caucuses. Any progress toward being a Leninist organization was a plus, and that could partly explain the rapid expansion of Anfu abilities by 1920, when it tried to direct a second economic lift-off. Yet we must above all be wary of a "factionalist historiography" popular in China and which has centrally figured in the work of Andrew Nathan –

> …the failure of the republic taught the need for a strong, unambiguous single focus of loyalty. "Equality groups," in Lyon Sharman's phrase –

> non-hierarchical forms of organisation, with ambiguous loci of power – did not work in early twentieth-century China. The politicians were uncomfortable in such settings and, when thrust into them, arranged themselves in the congenial form of factions, which provided some sense of hierarchy and stable affiliation. […] A small elite with a political culture framed largely in the traditional society knew just enough about constitutions to believe that they were easy to operate and efficacious in supplying stable government. The early republicans hoped to avoid conflict by gathering consensus around a constitutional process. But the process mandated by any republican constitution is precisely a process of conflict. Not unnaturally, practicing politicians fell back on the tools at hand […] They formed factions…
>
> (Nathan 1976, 224)

Nathan's judgment is not entirely without ground, for it described the events of 1916–17 much better than the three Anfu years, which was the bulk of the period he covered in his book. When it came to the Anfu years, Nathan's conclusion serves only to confuse. Pluralism did not fail in early Republican China because politicians had a love for authoritarianism and that, being uncomfortable without it, had to form factions; rather, factions were the staple of pluralism, a process which some legislators found liberating, especially when it allowed them to challenge and attack the establishment for the first time in years without fear of reprisals. It also facilitated various regional interests. Yet Pluralism failed because it became a shambles, giving rise to all sorts of rent-seeking in 1917, and it was evident even then, to a country eager to enter into a war and to resolve all of its international problems at once, that it provided no basis on which China's many urgent problems could be solved. World War I and the initial success of National Unity governments across the west, compressing pluralist politics and phasing in monopolistic government, was to Anfu-era politicians the best evidence there was that having a unified and unambiguous focus of loyalty would deliver a much better deal for China. Pluralism simply presented no convincing case and did not create the conditions for its own success.

Nathan judged that "the early republic was the last traditional Chinese polity – the last in which the legitimate political voice belonged to a narrowly circumscribed elite" (Nathan 1976, 224). In this, he was only marginally correct. In the sense that Liang and Anfu sought to build a constitutional dictatorship for the gentry, rather than being a traditional Chinese polity, this was a traditional class asserting itself via modern means, rejecting in the course of it the need for a monarch. Also, rather than being a cluster of imperial mandarins who had minimal knowledge of constitutionalism, many Anfu-era politicians as we have seen, had studied law in Japan or even in the west, and were highly informed on legal and constitutional matters. The situation where a dazed Yuan Shikai asked the diplomat Wellington Koo [Gu Weijun 顧維鈞] "What exactly is a

Republic?" had evaporated a year after his death. The pluralism that these men witnessed in Japan was of course a limited one, and the system that they most looked up to, Imperial Germany, was no better at tolerating dissent. Various National Unity Governments in erstwhile liberal countries also served as examples for Chinese politicians. Thus, the miraculous act of looking so incredibly outward for resources for political design – a sign of the deep internationalization amongst political circles at the time and something that a decade earlier might have been unimaginable – led them in the direction of creating a monopolistic party regime (Linz 1970, 252) that helped the "conscience of the nation" – the mandarin literati – to re-emerge at the "Corrective Revolution" of 1917 as the guiding force of the country. That it subsequently had to resort to the most corrupt means to make sure the monopoly would be maintained as a matter of course but also a tragedy and irony.

China's official view holds that "The Anfu Parliament was a mutation of western parliamentary politics, and betrayed the principles of a democratic republic. This shows that the parliamentary system, appropriate for western capitalist politics, economics, and historical circumstances, was unworkable in China dominated by feudalistic production methods, feudalistic thinking, and the warlord-bureaucratic hegemony" (Zhou 2011, 238). Such views are simply what Lenin would have called an *embarras de richesses* (Lenin 1974 [1920]). One cannot insist enough that the Anfu Parliament, far from being a feudalistic product, was a product of high modernity, envisioned by thinkers like Liang Qichao, inspired by the discipline and efficacy of wartime states, notably again Germany and Japan. That it represented the declining gentry did not conceal the fact that Liang had wished to provide the conditions for the gentry's transition into being a class of entrepreneurs, as the December 1917 Senate reform would have helped induce. In this sense Liang, born of a gentry family that had declined in its fortunes and was mired in poverty, was China's François Guizot – and perhaps just as prejudiced and blinkered by his self-made success – guarding piously the system of electoral property requirements, telling the people that if they wished to enjoy political representation, they should work hard, save up and "enrich themselves."

It also seems in that "official view" that parliamentary politics were progressive as long as they functioned in the bourgeois West. That would in fact be a double standard – that somehow the "one-class democracy" Liang envisioned for an industrializing gentry was any worse than what they would have called "bourgeois dictatorships" of the west at the time. The fact is that corporatist constitutionalism became the key to the successful operation and indeed survival of many western republics. Taking into account how Schmitter also argues that State Corporatism also included the planning of the use of resources, and the expansion of bureaucratic institutions, a condemnation of Anfu vote-buying should not conceal the fact that it was a successful, modern political operation that was meant to deliver a State Corporatist system – one where the industrializing gentry would have a

stable environment in which to invest, and to receive technical support from technocrats, to emulate the practices of model factories and state farms, and to receive government guarantees of interest in the first years of investment, and to be reliant on the state's planned investment of Social Overhead Capital – to be explained in a future paper on Anfu's developmental policies.

Such an arrangement could only have been guaranteed under the conditions of a global war by a military-supported single-party regime, which sheltered these gentry elements from the challenge of a young generation of Kuomintang revolutionaries. And much as matters alienate themselves in the course of motion, the regime came eventually to harm the interests of some local gentry, as was the case of the army's atrocities in Hunan in 1918. Yet no successful attempt was made in Parliament to raise taxes for the gentry, even when domestic war spending far exceeded expectations. This alone explains the very nature of the Anfu regime – a conservative-revolutionary regime, and an Old Guard in a New Order. Yet the quest for a corporatist developmental state would continue under vastly changed circumstances. Given how many of them would contribute to the formation of the PRC – Yang Du became a CCP member – and would be appointed to executive, legislative or advisory positions after 1949 – including but not limited to quite a number of figures mentioned in this paper: Fang Shu, Fu Dingyi,[43] Jiang Yong, Li Sihao, Shao Cong'en, Ye Gongchuo, Zeng Yujun, Zhang Shizhao, etc. – Anfu was not the last New Order they created.

Notes

1 Many people have helped me research this topic over the past decade. I thank in particular Egas Moniz Bandeira, Simon Angseop Lee, Yan Quan, Jeremy Yellen, Benjamin Ng, Clemens Bűttner, Andrew Levidis, Xu Guoqi, Kwong Chi Man, and Zhang Yan for their enormous help and constant encouragement.

2 A pamphlet entitled "Anfu Club" [*Anfubu* 安福部] written by an unknown author, Xitang Yeshi 西塘野史 (The Unofficial Historian of the West Pond), has quoted many of Anfu's internal documents, including its organizational charter and various membership rolls, which fill a huge historical gap. Compared to others' emphasis on Anfu's impotence and disorganization, Xitang Yeshi has depicted a political organization that dealt with huge destruction due to its disciplined and strategic behavior. The Anfu Club also controlled the newspaper *Fair Comment* [*Kung-yen Pao* or *Gongyan Bao* 公言報], which was founded by Hsu Shu-cheng in July 1916 as an army-backed newspaper, becoming at some point in 1918 Anfu's de facto party newspaper and started to report in detail its various congresses and the texts of the speeches delivered, in addition to being even more precise-worded than the Government Gazette about the contents of cabinet meetings and the various pieces of legislation decreed, in addition to Anfu Club Congresses. What were intriguingly never reported were the meetings of the Anfu Club Council much as the Pravda or People's Daily would not usually report the contents of politburo meetings. Wang Zhilong [Wang Chih-lung 王郅隆], the Anfu Club's main sponsor and the chief of its Accounting Section, controlled the *Ta-kung Pao* 大公報, at the time known officially as *L'Impartial*. There was also the Japanese-owned *Shuntian Shibao* [*Shun-t'ien Shih-pao* 順天時報], which supported Anfu at times. The latter two are better known amongst

historians; only one historian, Deng Ye 鄧野, appears to have used *Fair Comment* in any meaningful way. One set of microfilms is known to exist at the Beijing National Library.

3 Notably Park Chung-hee's "Democratic-Republican Party" in South Korea; Suharto's "Golkar" in Indonesia; and the "Popular Movement of the Revolution" under Mobutu in Zaire.

4 Theda Skocpol's argument as summarized in Young and Turner (1985, 13–14).

5 "Jinbudang Huifu zhi Niyi" 進步黨恢復之擬議 [Proposals to Resurrect the Progressive Party], *Fair Comment* 1917-08-14, 3.

6 "Xinzu Dazhengdang Jiang Chuxian" 新組大政黨將出現 [A Newly Assembled Grand Political Party Will Soon Appear], *Shuntian Shibao* 1917-08-26, 2; see also "Zuzhi Dazhengdang Shuo You Fuhuo" 組織大政黨說又復活 [Rumours Resurrect Regarding the Formation of a Grand Political Party] *Shuntian Shibao* 1919-11-03, 2.

7 The Anfu called itself a Club, and was descended from the "Moderate Club" set up in 1916-17 by Xu Shuzheng as a pro-military parliamentary group. Yet this was at the time a proper name for political parties, when by 1916 the word "party" had been disgraced by the failure of partisan politics in 1912–14. It reflects influence from the Jacobin Club of the French Revolution. This was in turn adopted by Japanese political parties, where it remained in use into the 1920s with Inukai Tsuyoshi's "Reform Club" and Ōzaki Yukio's "Shinsei Club" [*Shinsei kurabu* 新正俱樂部].

8 Mihail Manoilescu, leader and financier of the Romanian Fascist "Iron Guard" Movement defined, in the 1930s, a "Corporation" as "a collective and public organization composed of the totality of persons (physical or juridical) fulfilling together the same national function and having as its goal that of assuring the exercise of that function by rules of law imposed at least upon its members" (Manoilescu 1936, 176, in Schmitter 1974, 94).

9 Yang Du, in his 1908 article on L'Impartial and in his book *A Theory of Gold and Iron* [*Jintie zhuyi shuo* 金鐵主義說] quoted legalists including Edmund Burke and Bluntschli, who advanced that parties, being a "union of comrades," should adopt a consistent ideology to take-over, when the chance comes, "all of politics," implement specific policies for national interest and popular livelihood, and to advance the benefit of all society. "Zhengdang zhi yiyi" 政黨之意義 (The Significance of Political Parties), *L'Impartial* 1908-04-15, 1; Yang 2015).

10 It was quoted by future Anfu MP Huang Yunpeng [Huang Yun-p'eng 黃雲鵬] during the Constituent Conference of early 1917, at a time when he was a member of the pro-military "Moderate Club." [*Zhonghe julebu*中和俱樂部] It was a speech in support of ex-police bureaucrat Sun Runyu [Sun Jun-yu 孫潤宇] who argued that "sovereignty rests in the state" [*zhuquan zai guo* 主權在國] and opposed direct democracy modeled upon Switzerland. ("Xianfa qicao weiyuanhui kaihui jishi" 憲法起草委員會開會紀事 [Minutes of the Conference of the Constituent Committee], *L'Impartial* 1917-02-01, 2).

11 "Gongyan bao zhounian zengkan" 公言報周年增刊 [Fair Comment 1st Anniversary Supplement], *Fair Comment* 1917-09-02.

12 Editorials by "Cold Observer" on *L'Impartial* include – "Zhengzhi zhi zhongxindian" 政治之中心點 [The centre-point of politics], 1916-12-20, 2; "Zhengfu yi zhengdun gesheng zhengzhi" 政府宜整頓各省政治 [The government should shake up provincial politics], 1917-03-02; "Guomin zijue zhi jihui" 國民自覺之機會 [A chance for national self-awakening], 1917-08-15 and 16.

13 "Zuori Zhongyiyuan bei wei ji" 昨日眾議院被圍記 [An Account of the Siege on the House of Representatives Yesterday], *Morning Bell* 1917-05-11, 2.

14 Zhang Guogan [Chang Kuo-kan 張國淦], for example, tried to persuade Tuan to incorporate in his National Defence Cabinet two men from the Kuomintang, two from the Progressives, and two from amongst the State Council bureaucrats. This totally ignored how the Kuomintang was itself a cluster of four factions – the Good Friends [*Yiyoushe* 益友社], the People's Friends, the Recreation Club, and the Political Science Society – all of which could be further subdivided. Only Zhang Shizhao's broadly corporatist Extraordinary State Council proposal could have resolved the problem, yet it was not taken up (Ding and Zhao 2010 [1936], 426–427).
15 For example, "Qingkan Ouzhou lieqing zhi juguo yizhi (1)" 請看歐洲列強之舉國一致 (一)" [Please look at the national unity of the European powers], *Shuntian shibao* 1914-08-13, 2; "Lieqiang zhi jingjizhan zhunbei" 列強之經濟戰準備 [Preparations for economic warfare among the powers], *L'Impartial* 1917-08-29.
16 See for example "Waijiao xingshi jinpo zhi zuowen" 外交形勢緊迫之昨聞 [News yesterday of the emergency on the diplomatic front], *L'Impartial* 1918-03-02.
17 "Zhengtuan huanying Feng fuzongtong zhi shengkuang" 政團歡迎馮副總統之盛況 [The spectacle of the reception for Vice-President Feng by political parties], *L'Impartial* 1917-03-02.
18 Cold Observer, "Ribenbao zhi guaifengshuo" 日本報之怪風說 [Strange rumours in the Japanese press], *L'Impartial* 1917-02-28.
19 Cold Observer, "Shanhou wenti" 善後問題 [The problem of the settlement], *L'Impartial* 1917-07-14.
20 "Gesheng zancheng Canyiyuan laidian xuzhi" 各省贊成參議院來電續誌 [Continued reports on telegrams of support for the new Senate from the provinces], *L'Impartial* 1917-08-04.
21 "Liang Rengong zhi xianfa zijian xuzhi " 梁任公之憲法意見續誌 [Continued report about the constitutional opinion of Liang Rengong], *L'Impartial* 1917-01-15. Incidentally the Kuomintang had, in 1913, been briefly advocates of a corporatist arrangement for the Senate. Their recommendations, published in July 1913, included a Senate that had representatives elected by local self-governing bodies, chambers of commerce, chambers of agriculture, chambers of industry and commerce and the Central Academic Caucus, whereas the Congress would have been elected by the common voter. The justification for this system was that the Senate should absorb "special social forces". But this was quietly dropped soon afterwards, and in August 1913 the Kuomintang Constitution Discussion Committee [*Guomindang xianfa taolun hui* 國民黨憲法討論會] resolved to abolish this recommendation, on the grounds that voter categorisation would be difficult especially when such professional bodies did not already exist, and suggested that the existing property requirements system for the Senate elections would be adequate. See *Xianfa xinwen* 憲法新聞 [Constitutional News] 1913, no. 13, 108-109 and 1913, no. 15, 133.
22 "Ji Linshi Canyiyuan kaimu qingxing" 記臨時參議院開幕情形 [On the opening ceremony of the Provisional Senate], *Fair Comment* 1917-11-11, 2.
23 "Guohui zuzhifa yu zhengfu" 國會組織法與政府 [The Parliament Organisation Act and the government], *L'Impartial* 1917-11-03; "Zuori liangfa shenchahui jiwen" 昨日兩法審查會紀聞 [Report on the deliberation cCommittees for the two bills], *L'Impartial* 1917-11-29.
24 These were Shao Cong'en [Shao Ts'ung-en 邵從恩] (Tokyo Imperial), a late-Imperial Ministry of Justice director; Zhong Gengyan [Chung Keng-yen 鍾賡言] (Tokyo Imperial), and Cheng Shude [Cheng Shu-teh 程樹德] (Hōsei). See "Zuori geyi jiwen" 昨日閣議紀聞 [Report on yesterday's cabinet decisions], *L'Impartial* 1917-12-14; "Canyiyuan kaihui pangting ji, Liu Enge dangxuan weiyuanzhang"

參議院開會旁聽記，劉恩格當選委員長 [Auditing the Senate conference; Liu Enge elected chairman], *L'Impartial* 1917-12-19.

25 The Explanatory Note quoted a US legalist whose name is given as "Gerui" 格芮 and it is a mystery as to who this is. It could refer to the turn-of-the-century US legalist John Chipman Gray, but he was not known to have made any judgments on the merits of bicameralism. However, many Japanese legal works at the time quoted James Bryce's *American Commonwealth*, which argued that most US states which tried unicameralism later found it to be brash, dictatorial and corrupt, and mostly reverted to unicameralism. This appears to have led to a misquote, whereby a corruption of Bryce, ブライス, led to "Grai" グライ. The Japanese legalist Hozumi Yatsuka, a major influence on China, quoted the works of Bryce, for example in Uesugi (1913, 523) and Minobe (1930, 112–113). I am greatly indebted, on this and the research about Albert Schäffle, to the help of Egas Moniz Bandeira and Simon Angseop Lee, who helped me with interpreting the German legal works.

26 "Qingkan xiuzheng Guohui zuzhifa cao'an quanwen" 請看修正國會組織法草案全文 [Please read the full text of the Parliament Organisation Act Amendment Bill], *Fair Comment* 1917-12-16, 3.

27 "Qingkan xiuzheng Guohui zuzhifa cao'an quanwen (xu)" 請看修正國會組織法草案全文 (續) [Please read the full text of the Parliament Organisation Act Amendment Bill (continued)], *Fair Comment* 1917-12-17, 3.

28 "Qingkan xiuzheng Guohui Zuzhifa Cao'an Quanwen," 3.

29 It deserves to be mentioned that the formula "school, church, art and science" came from Bluntschli, who in turn took it from the early promoter of social policies and the first to suggest social insurance, the French economist Jean-Charles-Léonard Sismonde de Sismondi, in his *Études sur les constitutions des peuples libres* (Bluntschli 1885a, 58-59; Chisholm 1911, 25:159).

30 It is strange that the Explanatory Note matched what Satō wrote in the 1935 edition of his 1908 book, which probably suggests that it made reference to Satō's lecture notes or other publications `during this period (Satō 1908, 465–468; 1935, 330–335).

31 "Xiuzheng Canyiyuan yiyuan xuanjufa'an liyoushu" 修正參議院議員選舉法案理由書 [Explanatory Note for the Senator Election Act Amendment Bill], *Fair Comment* 1917-12-18, 6.

32 One would have needed to be university teaching staff for two years or more (or three years, if one did not possess a degree), or had "specific academic inventions", by which what was probably meant were publications or patents. (Ibid.)

33 "Qingkan xiuzheng Guohui Zuzhifa Cao'an Quanwen," 3–4.

34 "Zuori Canyiyuan kaihui ji" 昨日參議院開會記 [The Senate proceedings yesterday], *Fair Comment* 1917-12-19, 6.

35 "Zuori Canyiyuan quanyuan weiyuanhui jiwen" 昨日參議院全院委員會紀聞 [Proceedings of the Senate Committee of the Whole yesterday], *Fair Comment* 1917-12-25, 6.

36 "Zhi Ni Sichong dian" 致倪嗣沖電 [Telegram to Ni Sichong], 1918-03-24, in ZKJYJZB 1963, 64.

37 Chang 2007b, 135.

38 *Zhengfu Gongbao* 政府公報 [Government gazette] May-June 1918, in Xiong (2011, 169–173).

39 "Zhongyang xuanju di 1 bu zhi lianhuahui" 中央選舉第一部之聯歡會 [Party organised by the Central No.1 Caucus], *Shenbao* 申報 1918-05-23, 3, in Chang (2007b, 137).

40 Wu Wenhan has been left out of this table since no background information on him is available.

41 The accusation comes from Zhou (2011, 222).
42 For studies of these salons and elite clubs, see Joana (1999).
43 Fu Dingyi [Fu Ting-i 符定一] was an Anfu Club Councillor and MP whom as Principal of the Hunan Higher Normal Academy was mentor to a young Mao Zedong.

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