(**deleuze1983**)   6.318Enregistrement   (**deleuze1983**)   section.6.3

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MASTER'S THESIS

Contents

Acronyms

AI Artificial Intelligence. 4, 10, 13

genAI Generative Artificial Intelligence. 7, 10, 13

ML Machine Learning. 10

1

Introduction

1.1 *utku*

I will try to focus on specific bits wethout concerning about the network they are or might be connected to.

1.2 *(U) A word about institution*

Capitalism reterritorialises with one hand what it deterriorialises with the other. But it is the delegation to specific institutional entities doing the reterritorialisation. AI in its application is a part of the reterritorialisation, but in its own unique structure by keeping the borders of the socius in its own past and structure.

MacKenzie and Porter 2021 argument that in thw institutional framework of the control societies, subjectivity construction operates on the basis of dividualised subjects without the formation of a subjective centre (ibid., p. 14).

This work only partly relies on the works of Antoniette Rouvroy and Gerald Raunig because both the exploration of the Algorithmic Governmentality and the institutional formation in control societies does not include a structural analysis, especially an analysis on the level of the algorithm itself, neither any of them are looking for a "bit element" in the current formation of capitalism

[1]

1.3 *Cognitive Capitalism*

If this is cogntive capitalism and this is the attention economy, then we need to immediately turn to the subjectivity construction, as it is what defines the nature of the attention.

Generative Artificial Intelligence (genAI)

[1] Although this statement somewhat aligns with 2021's claim, I do not agree that the 2 authors are not exploring the concepts they've initiated far enough. The problem rather lies in still not distinguished branches in the algorithmic critique, that would allow us to position ourselves around completely different disciplines and goals despite being on the same surface.

2

Theoretical Framework

One could argue that artificial intelligence is *no longer an engineering discipline* (**dignum2020**), if it has ever truly been one.

2.1 Research Question

RQ: How does the development of the current AI algorithms, particularly those of generative AI models (genAI), embody, extend, or contradict Gilles Deleuze's concept of societies of control by modulating subjectivity through its probabilistic, non-linear operation structures?

RQ (Alternative): To what extent can the processes of meaning-production in generative AI algorithms, particularly the transformer architecture be understood through Gilles Deleuze's concepts of control and modulation, especially in relation to subjectivity construction via their probabilistic, non-linear operational structures?

Hypothesis 1: The distributional structure of generative AI, which produces content based on joint probability distributions, creates a dynamic of non-linear causality that reflects modulation without control, where subjectivity isiiiii formed through continuous, data-driven modulation rather than direct causative action in the absence of directional control. [1]

Hypothesis 2: Despite their current state, future genAI models offer unique ways for individuals to create lines of flight and support the becoming of nomadic subjects. [2]

2.2 State of the Art

While there are various attempts to adapt the notion of control to modern digital developments, such as those by Brusseau 2020, or partially or completely rejecting the concept of control as an inadequate explanation of current digital power structures (see, for example, Hui 2015), these works either overlook the novelty and potential of genAI mechanisms or fail to explore the *dividual* dimension. Furthermore, earlier works focusing specifically on the aspect

[1] In line with Deleuze's own argument in his other works: Capitalism decodes, but does not necessarily recode. The dividualising process also functions as a mechanism to keep movements built on these parts within specific thresholds or asymptotes; "Your ethnicity has been recognised, buy a flag".

[2] This aligns with the construction of schizo connections as described in *Anti-Oedipus* 1983.

Mention;
- Rouvroy n.d.
- Pasquinelli 2023

of dividualisation (see e.g. Cheney-Lippold 2011; Van Otterlo 2013) are, unfortunately, temporally limited as they were unable to analyse generative models that had not yet reached the level of advancement we see today.

Other theorists focus on various aspects of genAI models, with a common tendency to analyse ethical considerations, their application under neoliberal governmentality, and their role within surveillance capitalism (see e.g. Gillespie 2024; Haggerty and Ericson 2000; Zuboff 2019). While these aspects are not outside the scope of this research, they were central to my previous bachelor's thesis. This current study specifically focuses on the structure of probabilistic models, particularly examining their construction at present (and speculatively in the future), without delving into how their misuse (or intentional use) may play out.

Furthermore, while this study addresses the political implications of current generative AI usage, its focus is primarily on the analysis of power operations and, within this context, relevant to questions of democracy only insofar as they relate to the operation of power. This study does not, however, aim to provide a comprehensive analysis of democratic risks associated with AI, as explored by others (see e.g. Coeckelbergh and Gunkel 2024; Zarkadakēs and Tapscott 2020).

This research, therefore, is focused on three primary areas of debate: (1) an analysis of genAI models as entities deploying power, examining their mechanisms (see e.g. Amoore et al. 2024; Konik 2015; MacKenzie and Porter 2021); (2) modern reflections on Deleuze's theory (see e.g. **mischke2021c**; Poster, Savat, and Deleuze 2010); and (3) sources analysing algorithmic structures with technical expertise (see e.g. **vaswani**; Bender et al. 2021).

3
Algorithm, AI, Connective Synthesis

Every Telling Has a Taling

Joyce (1975)

3.1 *Intelligence vs. Plagiarism (Alternative: The Intelligence Question)*

As Chomsky, Roberts, and Watumull often emphasised that he perceives the genAI nothing but a statistical plagarism machine that in comparison with the sophisticated functioning of the human brain that operates efficient and elegantly with little data drawing brute correlations from a vast amount of data.

While Chomsky mainly focuses of the ethical and techno-moral aspects of the issue (see Montanari 2025), the question is rather; *but why does it work so well then*?

This is rather like a section where we discuss accusations and bullshit

3.2 *Introduction to Algorithm (Algo History?)*

Similar to [14], we understand the term language model (LM) to refer to systems which are trained on string prediction tasks: that is, predicting the likelihood of a token (character, word or string) given either its preceding context or (in bidirectional and masked LMs) its surrounding context. Bender et al. 2021, p. 610

As the profile of algorithms has grown and as their actions become the source of discussion, we might want to avoid thinking of them as good and bad algorithms and think instead about how these media forms mesh human with machine agency and what this means.

At the end genAI employs Machine Learning (ML) techniques to identify and internalise patterns in the vast datasets. However, as we have seen in the case of the social media algorithms the patterns derived might not be the ones playing well with the rules of the game.

3.2.1   Transition to GenAI

An in-depth analysis of the steps in development of AI models is rarely meaningful in its whole extention outside of the areas dealing with AI development. While only few relatively distinctive steps had a relevance for the uninitiated, also, some categorical differences might sound arbitrary [1]

Previous AI algorithms that assesed relevance and association.

The GenAI evolves the AI operation from the association of context, and association of agents into the *meaning creation* (Dishon 2024, p. 964).

3.3   Algorithmic Architecture

3.3.1   Transformer

[2]

3.3.2   Algorithmic Understanding

As we discuss in §5, LMs are not performing natural language understanding (NLU), and only have success in tasks that can be approached by manipulating linguistic form. Bender et al. 2021, p. 610

[1] E.g. difference between *neural networks* to *deep neural networks*, or *language model* to *large language model*.

[2] INCORPORATED

4
Deleuze; Disjuntive Synthesis

4.1 An Account about Micropolitics

4.2 IDEA:Institution

There is an idea about institutions I do not know how to explore just yet. The roots are in the following part of AO:

> The two kinds of fantasy, or rather the two regimes, are therefore distinguished according to whether the social production of "goods" imposes its rule on desire through the intermediary of an ego whose fictional unity is guaranteed by the goods themselves, or whether the desiring-production of affects imposes its rule on institutions whose elements are no longer anything but drives. If we must still speak of utopia in this sense, a la Fourier, it is most assuredly not as an ideal model, but as revolutionary action and passion. In his recent works Klossowski indicates to us the only means of bypassing the sterile parallelism where we flounder between Freud and Marx: by discovering how social production and relations of production are an institution of desire, and how affects or drives form part of the infrastructure itself. For they are part of it, they are present there in every way while creating within the economic forms their own repression, as well as the means for breaking this repression.Deleuze and Guattari 1983, p. 63.

4.3 Subordination to Voice

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5t1vTLU7s4o

5
Disjunctive Synthesis

[1]

We should definitely ask ourselves whether the giant AI corporations would baulk at putting the levers of mass correlation at the disposal of regimes seeking national rebirth through rationalised ethnocentrism (McQuillan 2019). Both in terms of capability, resources and power, they are the ones running the show after all. However, even in the currently breadcrumb collecting process of the common involvement in open development in AI models, we also need to be capable of having a genealogy and critique in the very mechanism of the generative core of the AI models. After all, their only meaning is not just the profatibility for the humanity, through its historical imaginary and contemporary discussions we are seeing possibility of our downfall but also contingency, and resistance; finally we also haven't completely forgot about its implication of emancipation in some part of the fiction.

How do the algorithm create meaningless attributes, like not stepping on the lines between tiles, or a tic. Can AI curse in a sense as reachtion?

As Slavoj Zizek exclaims, "Hegel mentions we live in language but we are not comfortable, we are not at home in language" (Berggruen Institute 2025) .

Deleuze notes that the transition between the primitive machine and the despotic machine notes the subordination of a sign system to the *voice*. Primitive societies had a symbolic system but it wasn't used to mimic what the voice was saying, societal inscription was separated under oral tradition and a system of signs. Writing was the ultimate subordination of a sign system to the voice becoming the unified method of inscription, a reterritorialisation of signs. genAI is subordination in a different sense.

5.1   Revolutionary possibilities?

The experiencer aspect of the system, however, emerges through its engagement with external feedback loops. For example, the AI receives feedback from scientific evaluations of its predictions, critiques from researchers, and integrations of previously unseen data sets. Through this feedback,

the AI refines its internal representations, enhancing the accuracy and scope of its models. As it adapts, the system begins to map these localized understandings onto a more abstract, global framework—capturing phenomena that may not align neatly with human interpretative schemas, such as non-linear and chaotic interactions between various ecological systems. In this iterative process, the AI system constructs transjective subjectivity: its ability to generate me[48;61;220;2074;352otaning that bridges internal, computational representations and external, relational dynamics. [[@rijos]] These dynamics underscores the potential of computational systems to engage in a co-creative process with humans, not merely solving problems but redefining the frameworks of meaning itself. [[@rijos]]

Given the dispersed nature of these relationships, a singular weight doesn't hold any conceptual content; instead, it obtains relevance through extensive interaction patterns. [@maas] -> He is referring to Cilliers(2002) but it also connects with Deleuze

A central aspect of social movement formation involves using language strategically to destabilize dominant narratives and call attention to underrepresented social perspectives. Social movements produce new norms, language, and ways of communicating. This adds challenges to the deployment of LMs, as methodologies reliant on LMs run the risk of 'value-lock', where the LM-reliant technology reifies older, less-inclusive understandings. Bender et al. 2021, p. 614

5.2 Follow-up on discreteness and continuity

Human Consciousness is entirely productive It process links partial objects together fragmented by history into lines of rational thoughts and belief that become expressed as some whole that we kind of say in whatever we do, in arts, statements, dogmas opinions... And this whole is made by desire. Lines of reason, lines of belief are flows of desire. Reality is the productive flow that connects what is fragmanented. This is the process, this is the human mind. **AI** prominent shift that eliminates desire. It fills all spaces with information/knowledge/data. And what are those fillings? Those are dogmas of state, science of status-quo, capital as a body without Hegemonic Reproduction.. Revolutionary politics loses its impetus. **All that remains is reception, the acceptance of State, Science, Capital** Creative Philosophy 2023

I disagree, the **AI** answers desire, it claims the answer was always there. It doesn't block desire, it definitely doesn't kill desire, it rewires it, in a loop that feeds itself.

Not that the desire doesn't want to fulfil itself, but the creative flows benefit from the desire being fluid. The subject of desire shouldn't be this well-defined in order to breed creation.

As McQuillan 2019 notes

> It needs to be more than debiasing datasets because that leaves the core of AI untouched. It needs to be more than inclusive participation in the engineering elite because that, while important, won't in itself transform AI. It needs to be more than an ethical AI, because most ethical AI operates as PR to calm public fears WHILE INDUSTRY GETS ON WITH IT. It needs to be more than ideas of fairness expressed as law, because that imagines society is already an even playing field and obfuscates the structural asymmetries generating the perfectly legal injustices we see deepening every day. ibid.

...

> Real AI matters not because it heralds machine intelligence but because it confronts us with the unresolved injustices of our current system. An antifascist AI is a project based on solidarity, mutual aid and collective care. We don't need autonomous machines but a technics that is part of a movement for social autonomy.

6
Undistributed sections

6.1 From external force to meaning-making

Dishon (2024) underlines it as the transition from a Frankesteinian imaginary to a kafkaesque process meaning-creation stallmate.
→ Thus, artificial life is portrayed as a discrete entity, largely mirroring human agency. In the Frankenstein imaginary, the construct is external to the what is human with human-like abilities. The concern of agency in this case reflects the possibility of the construct taking over.

> Though AI is depicted as possessing superior capabilities—both physically and mentally (the creature quickly learns to talk and read)—the overall logic governing pattens of meaning-making remains stable. This overall similarity serves as the background according to which certain differences can be appreciated and highlighted. Hence, it is not so much the rationale of agency or meaning-making that shifts, it is the actor who holds the privileged author position—the fear that machines will replace humans is embedded within current structures of meaning-making (Dishon 2024, p. 966) .

This is an anthropomorphic depiction of AI, and similarly associated with an anthropomorphic threat. The threat is as much as it is in depiction a discrete one. An external agent is getting in contact with the human manifesting anthropomorphic qualities, and the threat is either perfecting or advancing beyond anything anthropomorphic nature. The discrete threat introduces immediate concerns about humans' responsibilities of their own making. The question becomes one of survival, or at the very least about losing humanity's place on the *food chain*. The concern is that the AI can develop human desires, the threat is derived from AI possibly being too much of human nature than vice versa.
Dishon 2024 puts the process of Kafka's Trial as a counter analogy here. Contrary to the anthropo-

morpistic imlplications of the Frankenstein analogy, the court of the *Trial* "does not have a well-defined system or a reference to *truth*" (ibid., p. 970). It is completely driven by the qualities, interactions, and commitment of the subjectivity in interaction. The source of meaning-making in this sense is completely free of any form of agency. Moreover, as in the interaction of K. with the court the mechanism is working against any identifiable agency of the interactor themselves (ibid., see 970). The operation is rather blurring the existing agency itself instead of producing one.

The Court contradicts the externality of the Frankenstein metaphor in its nature of interaction with the subjectivity engaged with it. The interaction with The Court is necessary, but the effect of this interaction seems to be futile.

> Thus, paradoxically, the best way to arrive at a definite outcome is to make sure the process never ends. Interactions with the court are necessary and require constant maintenance, yet they cannot be controlled, predicted, or even expected to progress towards a resolution. The novel could be viewed as turning the meaning of a trial upside down—it is not meant to arrive at a verdict or outcome, rather it is the process itself on which one must center. [...] The Trial offers a depiction of control that relies on a different understanding of meaning-making—shifting from a stable and general model of meaning to an idiosyncratic and personalized one.
>
> – Dishon (ibid., pp. 970–972)

The meaning-making process K. is subjected to asking for his submission to the produced truth as it is tailored exactly for him, and there is no specific way to test its genuinity. And the product of the process seems to be signifying an inaccessability. This is a shift between internal and external aspects of agency, a blurring in between layers as well as the nature and perception on both sides' potential agency.

Through kafkaesque analogy GenAI becomes an internal agent instead of external entity leads to a blurring of agency and machinic intentionality. The human's struggle in the process is to constantly having to assess, to decipher AI's agency. Furthermore, the GenAI model is not necessarily trying to offer a right answer but to generate content without necessarily relying to veracity or accuracy leading to an amplification of human's endless search for meaning (ibid., see 977).

> The Trial is not about humans losing control over their creations, if they ever had control in the first place. Instead, it foreshadows GenAI's capacity to generate content that is personalized to every actor (and thus

> shaped by humans) yet is not amenable to control through explicit choices. This model of meaningmaking undermines the dichotomy between choice and coercion, no longer positioning the two as mutually exclusive. [...] Therefore, as in Before the Law, personalization does not inherently entail increased control over meaning-making, but rather its increased mediation according to what GenAI identifies, or perhaps determines, as our personal preferences.
>
> – Dishon (2024, p. 974)

GenAI offers in this sense an endless variation of meaning specifically personalised. What does it mean in term's of human's choice?

6.2   Instance

6.3   Enregistrement (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, p. 4)

6.4   Process

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