

Chapter – 3

Engineering as Social Experimentation

3.0 ENGINEERING AS EXPERIMENTATION

Before manufacturing a product or providing a project, we make several assumptions and trials, design and redesign and test several times till the product is observed to be functioning satisfactorily. We try different materials and experiments. From the test data obtained we make detailed design and retests. Thus, design as well as engineering is iterative process as illustrated in Fig. 3.1.




Fig. 3.1 Design as an interactive process

Several redesigns are made upon the feedback information on the performance or failure in the field or in the factory. Besides the tests, each engineering project is modified during execution, based on the periodical feedback on the progress and the lessons from other sources. Hence, the development of a product or a project as a whole may be considered as an experiment.

3.0.1 Engineering Projects VS. Standard Experiments

We shall now compare the two activities, and identify the similarities and contrasts.

A. Similarities

1. *Partial ignorance*: The project is usually executed in partial ignorance. Uncertainties exist in the model assumed. The behavior of materials purchased is uncertain and not constant (that is certain!). They may vary with the suppliers, processed lot, time, and the process used in shaping the materials (e.g., sheet or plate, rod or wire, forged or cast or welded). There may be variations in the grain structure and its resulting failure stress. It is not possible to collect data on all variations. In some cases, extrapolation, interpolation, assumptions of linear behavior over the range of parameters, accelerated testing, simulations, and virtual testing are resorted.
2. *Uncertainty*: The final outcomes of projects are also uncertain, as in experiments. Some times unintended results, side effects (bye-products), and unsafe operation have also occurred. Unexpected risks, such as undue seepage in a storage dam, leakage of nuclear radiation from an atomic power plant, presence of pesticides in food or soft drink bottle, an new irrigation canal spreading water-borne diseases, and an unsuspecting hair dryer causing lung cancer on the user from the asbestos gasket used in the product have been reported.
3. *Continuous monitoring*: Monitoring continually the progress and gaining new knowledge are needed before, during, and after execution of project as in the case of experimentation. The performance is to be monitored even during the use (or wrong use!) of the product by the end user/beneficiary.
4. *Learning from the past*: Engineers normally learn from their own prior designs and infer from the analysis of operation and results, and sometimes from the reports of other engineers. But this does not happen frequently. The absence of interest and channels of communication, ego in not seeking information, guilty upon the failure, fear of legal actions, and mere negligence have caused many a failure, e.g., the Titanic lacked sufficient number of life boats—it had only 825 boats for the actual passengers of 2227, the capacity of the ship being 3547! In the emergent situation, all the existing life boats could not be launched. Forty years back, another steamship Arctic met with same tragedy due to the same problem in the same region. But the lesson was learned. In most of the hydraulic systems, valves had been the critical components that are least reliable. The confusion on knowing whether the valve was open or closed, was the cause of the Three-Mile Island accident in 1979. Similar malfunctioning of valves and mis-reading of gauges have been reported to have caused the accidents else where in some power plants. But we have not learnt the lesson from the past. The complacency that it will not happen again and will not happen 'to me' has lead to many disasters.

B. Contrasts

The scientific experiments in the laboratory and the engineering experiments in the field exhibit several contrasts as listed below:

1. *Experimental control*: In standard experiments, members for study are selected into two groups namely A and B at random. Group A are given special treatment. The group B is given no treatment and is called the ‘controlled group’. But they are placed in the same environment as the other group A.

This process is called the *experimental control*. This practice is adopted in the field of medicine. In engineering, this does not happen, except when the project is confined to laboratory experiments. This is because it is the clients or consumers who choose the product, exercise the control. It is not possible to make a random selection of participants from various groups. In engineering, through random sampling, the survey is made from among the users, to assess the results on the product.

2. *Humane touch*: Engineering experiments involve human souls, their needs, views, expectations, and creative use as in case of social experimentation. This point of view is not agreed by many of the engineers. But now the quality engineers and managers have fully realized this humane aspect.
3. *Informed consent*: Engineering experimentation is viewed as Societal Experiment since the subject and the beneficiary are human beings. In this respect, it is similar to medical experimentation on human beings. In the case of medical practice, moral and legal rights have been recognized while planning for experimentation. Informed consent is practiced in medical experimentation. Such a practice is not there in scientific laboratory experiments.

Informed consent has two basic elements:

1. *Knowledge*: The subject should be given all relevant information needed to make the decision to participate.
2. *Voluntariness*: Subject should take part without force, fraud or deception. Respect for rights of minorities to dissent and compensation for harmful effect are assumed here.

For a valid consent, the following conditions are to be fulfilled:

1. Consent must be voluntary
2. All relevant information shall be presented/stated in a clearly understandable form
3. Consenter shall be capable of processing the information and make rational decisions.
4. The subject’s consent may be offered in proxy by a group that represents many subjects of like-interests

Informed consent when bringing an engineering product to market, implies letting the customer know the following: (a) the knowledge about the product (b) risks and benefits of using the product and (c) all relevant information on the product, such as how to use and how not to use (do’s and don’ts). The relevant factual information implies, that the engineers are obliged to obtain and assess all the available information related to the fulfillment of one’s moral obligations (i.e., wrong or immoral use of a product one designs), including the intended and unintended impacts of the product, on the society. Still there exists a possibility of a

large gap of understanding between the experimenter and the subjects (public). Sometimes, the managements have not been willing to disseminate the full information about the project or product beyond the legal requirements, because of the fear of potential competitions and likely exposure to potential litigation.

People object to *involuntary risks* wherein the affected individual is neither a direct participant nor a decision maker. In short, we prefer to be the subjects of our own experiments rather than those of somebody else. If it is an asbestos plant or nuclear plant to be approved, affected parties expect their consent to be obtained. But they are ready to accept *voluntary risks* as in the case of stunts and amazing races.

In case of Koodangulam power project as well as the Sethusamudram Canal Project, Tamil Nadu, several citizen groups including Fishermen Forums have responded. The Central government was able to contain many harsh apprehensions and protracted legal and political battles, by providing all relevant information.

4. *Knowledge gained:* Not much of new knowledge is developed in engineering experiments as in the case of scientific experiments in the laboratory. Engineering experiments at the most help us to (a) verify the adequacy of the design, (b) to check the stability of the design parameters, and (c) prepare for the unexpected outcomes, in the actual field environments. From the models tested in the laboratory to the pilot plant tested in the field, there are differences in performance as well as other outcomes.

3.1 ENGINEERS AS RESPONSIBLE EXPERIMENTERS

Although the engineers facilitate experiments, they are not alone in the field. Their responsibility is shared with the organizations, people, government, and others. No doubt the engineers share a greater responsibility while monitoring the projects, identifying the risks, and informing the clients and the public with facts. Based on this, they can take decisions to participate or protest or promote.

The engineer, as an experimenter, owes several responsibilities to the society, namely,

1. A conscientious commitment to live by moral values.
2. A comprehensive perspective on relevant information. It includes constant awareness of the progress of the experiment and readiness to monitor the side effects, if any.
3. Unrestricted free-personal involvement in all steps of the project/product development (autonomy).
4. Be accountable for the results of the project (accountability).

3.1.1 Conscientiousness

Conscientious moral commitment means: (a) Being sensitive to full range of moral values and responsibilities relevant to the prevailing situation and (b) the willingness to develop the skill and put efforts needed to reach the best balance possible among those considerations. In short, engineers must possess open eyes, open ears, and an open mind (i.e., moral vision, moral listening, and moral reasoning).

This makes the engineers as social experimenters, respect foremost the safety and health of the affected, while they seek to enrich their knowledge, rush for the profit, follow the rules, or care for only the beneficiary. The human rights of the participant should be protected through voluntary and informed consent.

3.1.2 Comprehensive Perspective

The engineer should grasp the context of his work and ensure that the work involved results in only moral ends. One should not ignore his conscience, if the product or project that he is involved will result in damaging the nervous system of the people (or even the enemy, in case of weapon development)

A product has a built-in obsolete or redundant component to boost sales with a false claim. In possessing of the perspective of factual information, the engineer should exhibit a moral concern and not agree for this design. Sometimes, the guilt is transferred to the government or the competitors. Some organizations think that they will let the government find the fault or let the fraudulent competitor be caught first. Finally, a full-scale environmental or social impact study of the product or project by individual engineers is useful but not possible, in practice.

3.1.3 Moral Autonomy

A detailed discussion is available in # 2.5. Viewing engineering as social experimentation, and anticipating unknown consequences should promote an attitude of questioning about the adequacy of the existing economic and safety standards. This proves a greater sense of personal involvement in one's work.

3.1.4 Accountability

The term Accountability means:

1. The capacity to understand and act on moral reasons
2. Willingness to submit one's actions to moral scrutiny and be responsive to the assessment of others. It includes being answerable for meeting specific obligations, i.e., liable to justify (or give reasonable excuses) the decisions, actions or means, and outcomes (sometimes unexpected), when required by the stakeholders or by law.

The tug-of-war between of causal influence by the employer and moral responsibility of the employee is quite common in professions. In the engineering practice, the problems are:

- (a) The fragmentation of work in a project inevitably makes the final products lie away from the immediate work place, and lessens the personal responsibility of the employee.
- (b) Further the responsibilities diffuse into various hierarchies and to various people. Nobody gets the real feel of personal responsibility.
- (c) Often projects are executed one after another. An employee is more interested in adherence of tight schedules rather than giving personal care for the current project.
- (d) More litigation is to be faced by the engineers (as in the case of medical practitioners). This makes them wary of showing moral concerns beyond what is prescribed by the institutions. In spite of all these shortcomings, engineers are expected to face the risk and show up personal responsibility as the profession demands.

3.2 CODES OF ETHICS

The 'codes of ethics' exhibit, rights, duties, and obligations of the members of a profession and a professional society. The codes exhibit the following essential roles:

1. *Inspiration and guidance.* The codes express the collective commitment of the profession to ethical conduct and public good and thus inspire the individuals. They identify primary

responsibilities and provide statements and guidelines on interpretations for the professionals and the professional societies.

2. *Support to engineers.* The codes give positive support to professionals for taking stands on moral issues. Further they serve as potential legal support to discharge professional obligations.
3. *Deterrence (discourage to act immorally) and discipline (regulate to act morally).* The codes serve as the basis for investigating unethical actions. The professional societies sometimes revoke membership or suspend/expel the members, when proved to have acted unethical. This sanction along with loss of respect from the colleagues and the society are bound to act as deterrent.
4. *Education and mutual understanding.* Codes are used to prompt discussion and reflection on moral issues. They develop a shared understanding by the professionals, public, and the government on the moral responsibilities of the engineers. The Board of Review of the professional societies *encourages moral discussion for educational purposes*.
5. *Create good public image.* The codes present positive image of the committed profession to the public, help the engineers to serve the public effectively. They promote more of self regulation and lessen the government regulations. This is bound to raise the reputation of the profession and the organization, in establishing the trust of the public.
6. *Protect the status quo.* They create minimum level of ethical conduct and promotes agreement within the profession. Primary obligation namely the safety, health, and welfare of the public, declared by the codes serves and protects the public.
7. *Promotes business interests.* The codes offer inspiration to the entrepreneurs, establish shared standards, healthy competition, and maximize profit to investors, employees, and consumers.

Limitations: The codes are not remedy for all evils. They have many limitations, namely:

1. General and vague wordings. Many statements are general in nature and hence unable to solve all problems.
2. Not applicable to all situations. Codes are not sacred, and need not be accepted without criticism. Tolerance for criticisms of the codes themselves should be allowed.
3. Often have internal conflicts. Many times, the priorities are clearly spelt out, e.g., codes forbid public remarks critical of colleagues (engineers), but they actually discovered a major bribery, which might have caused a huge loss to the exchequer.
4. They can not be treated as final moral authority for professional conduct. Codes have flaws by commission and omission. There are still some grey areas undefined by codes. They can not be equated to laws. After all, even laws have loopholes and they invoke creativity in the legal practitioners.
5. Only a few enroll as members in professional society and non-members can not be compelled.
6. Even as members of the professional society, many are unaware of the codes
7. Different societies have different codes. The codes can not be uniform or same! Unifying the codes may not necessarily solve the problems prevailing various professions, but attempts are still made towards this unified codes.
8. Codes are said to be coercive. They are sometimes claimed to be threatening and forceful.

3.3 INDUSTRIAL STANDARDS

Industrial standards are important for any industry. Specification helps in achieving interchangeability. Standardization reduces the production costs and at the same time, the quality is achieved easily. It helps the manufacturer, customers and the public, in keeping competitiveness and ensuring quality simultaneously. Industrial standards are established by the Bureau of Indian Standards, in our country in consultation with leading industries and services.

International standards have become relevant with the development of the world trade. The International Standards Organization has now detailed specifications for generic products/services with procedures that the manufacturers or service providers should follow to assure the quality of their products or service. ISO 9000-2000 series are typical examples in this direction.

Table 3.1 gives a list of some types of standards with a few examples.

Table. 3.1 Industrial standards

Aspects	Purpose	Examples
1. Quality	Value appropriate to price	Surface finish of a plate, life of a motor
2. Quality of service	Assurance of product to ISO procedures	Quality of degrees according institutions by educational institutions
3. Safety	To safeguard against injury or damage to property	Methods of waste disposal
4. Uniformity of physical properties and functions	Interchangeability, ease of assembly	Standard bolts and nuts, standard time

3.4 A BALANCED OUTLOOK ON LAW

The ‘balanced outlook on law’ in engineering practice stresses the necessity of laws and regulations and also their limitations in directing and controlling the engineering practice. Laws are necessary because, people are not fully responsible by themselves and because of the competitive nature of the free enterprise, which does not encourage moral initiatives. Laws are needed to provide a minimum level of compliance.

The following codes are typical examples of how they were enforced in the past:

3.4.1 Code for Builders by Hammurabi

Hummurabi the king of Babylon in 1758 framed the following code for the builders:

“If a builder has built a house for a man and has not made his work sound and the house which he has built has fallen down and caused the death of the householder, that builder shall be put to death. If it causes the death of the householder’s son, they shall put that builder’s son to death. If it causes the death of the householder’s slave, he shall give slave for slave to the householder. If it destroys property, he shall replace anything it has destroyed; and because he has not made the house sound which he has

built and it has fallen down, he shall rebuild the house which has fallen down from his own property. If a builder has built a house for a man and does not make his work perfect and the wall bulges, that builder shall put that wall in sound condition at his own cost”

This code was expected to put in self-regulation seriously in those years.

3.4.2 Steam Boat Code in USA

Whenever there is crisis we claim that there ought to be law to control this. Whenever there is a fire accident in a factory or fire cracker’s store house or boat capsizes we make this claim, and soon forget. Laws are meant to be interpreted for minimal compliance. On the other hand, laws when amended or updated continuously, would be counter productive. Laws will always lag behind the technological development. The regulatory or inspection agencies such as Environmental authority of India can play a major role by framing rules and enforcing compliance.

In the early 19th century, a law was passed in USA to provide for inspection of the safety of boilers and engines in ships. It was amended many times and now the standards formulated by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers are followed.

3.4.3 Proper Role of Laws

Good laws when enforced effectively produce benefits. They establish minimal standards of professional conduct and provide a motivation to people. Further they serve as moral support and defense for the people who are willing to act ethically.

Thus, it is concluded that:

1. The rules which govern engineering practice should be construed as of responsible experimentation rather than rules of a game. This makes the engineer responsible for the safe conduct of the experiment.
2. Precise rules and sanctions are suitable in case of ethical misconduct that involves the violation of established engineering procedures, which are aimed at the safety and the welfare of the public.
3. In situations where the experimentation is large and time consuming, the rules must not try to cover all possible outcomes, and they should not compel the engineers to follow rigid courses of action.
4. The regulation should be broad, but make engineers accountable for their decisions, and
5. Through their professional societies, the engineers can facilitate framing the rules, amend wherever necessary, and enforce them, but without giving-in for conflicts of interest.

3.5 CASE STUDY: THE CHALLENGER

3.5.1 What happened?

The orbiter of the Challenger had three main engines fuelled by liquid hydrogen. The fuel was carried in an external fuel tank which was jettisoned when empty. During lift-off, the main engines fire for about nine minutes, although initially the thrust was provided by the two booster rockets. These booster rockets are of the solid fuel type, each burning a million pound load of aluminum, potassium chloride, and iron oxide.

The casing of each booster rocket is about 150 feet long and 12 feet in diameter. This consists of cylindrical segments that are assembled at the launch site. There are four-field joints and they use seals

consisting of pairs of O-rings made of vulcanized rubber. The O-rings work with a putty barrier made of zinc chromate.

The engineers were employed with Rockwell International (manufacturers for the orbiter and main rocket), **Morton-Thiokol** (maker of booster rockets), and they worked for NASA. After many postponements, the launch of Challenger was set for morning of Jan 28, 1986. **Allan J. McDonald** was an engineer from Morton-Thiokol and the director of the Solid Rocket Booster Project. He was skeptic about the freezing temperature conditions forecast for that morning, which was lower than the previous launch conditions. A teleconference between NASA engineers and MT engineers was arranged by Allan.

Arnold Thompson and **Roger Boisjoly**, the seal experts at MT explained to the other engineers how the booster rocket walls would bulge upon launch and combustion gases can blow past the O-rings of the field joints (Fig. 3.2).




Fig. 3.2 a Challenger




Fig. 3.2 b Field joint before ignition




Fig. 3.2 c Field joint after ignition

On many of the previous flights the rings have been found to have charred and eroded. In freezing temperature, the rings and the putty packing are less pliable. From the past data gathered, at temperature less than 65 °F the O-rings failure was certain. But these data were not deliberated at that conference as the launch time was fast approaching.

The engineering managers **Bob Lund** and **Joe Kilminster** agreed that there was a safety problem. Boisjoly testified and recommended that no launch should be attempted with temperature less than 53 °F. These managers were annoyed to postpone the launch yet again. The top management of MT was planning for the renewal of contract with NASA, for making booster rocket. The managers told Bob Lund “to take-off the engineering hat and put on your management hat”. The judgment of the engineers was not given weightage. The inability of these engineers to substantiate that the launch would be unsafe was taken by NASA as an approval by Rockwell to launch.

At 11.38 a.m. the rockets along with Challenger rose up the sky. The cameras recorded smoke coming out of one of the field joints on the right booster rocket. Soon there was a flame that hit the external fuel tank. At 76 seconds into the flight, the Challenger at a height of 10 miles was totally engulfed in a fireball. The crew cabin fell into the ocean killing all the seven aboard.

Some of the factual issues, conceptual issues and moral/normative issues in the space shuttle challenger incident, are highlighted hereunder for further study.

3.5.2 Moral/Normative Issues

1. The crew had no escape mechanism. Douglas, the engineer, designed an abort module to allow the separation of the orbiter, triggered by a field-joint leak. But such a ‘safe exit’ was rejected as too expensive, and because of an accompanying reduction in payload.
2. The crew were not informed of the problems existing in the field joints. The principle of informed consent was not followed.
3. Engineers gave warning signals on safety. But the management group prevailed over and ignored the warning.

3.5.3 Conceptual Issues

1. NASA counted that the probability of failure of the craft was one in one lakh launches. But it was expected that only the 100000th launch will fail.
2. There were 700 criticality-1 items, which included the field joints. A failure in any one of them would have caused the tragedy. No back-up or stand-bye had been provided for these criticality-1 components.

3.5.4 Factual/Descriptive Issues

1. Field joints gave way in earlier flights. But the authorities felt the risk is not high.
2. NASA has disregarded warnings about the bad weather, at the time of launch, because they wanted to complete the project, prove their supremacy, get the funding from Government continued and get an applaud from the President of USA.
3. The inability of the Rockwell Engineers (manufacturer) to prove that the lift-off was unsafe. This was interpreted by the NASA, as an approval by Rockwell to launch.