Security Assessment AANN.ai

Verified On March 13th, 2024















TABLE OF CONTENTS

| TABLE OF CONTENTS | 3 |
|-------------------------|----|
| DOCUMENT PROPERTIES | 4 |
| ABOUT VBS | 5 |
| SCOPE OF WORK | 6 |
| AUDIT METHODOLOGY | 7 |
| AUDIT CHECKLIST | 9 |
| EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | 10 |
| CENTRALIZED PRIVILEGES | 11 |
| RISK CATEGORIES. | 12 |
| AUDIT SCOPE | 13 |
| AUTOMATED ANALYSIS | 14 |
| KEY FINDINGS | 19 |
| MANUAL REVIEW | 20 |
| VULNERABILITY SCAN | 28 |
| REPOSITORY | 29 |
| INHERITANCE GRAPH | |
| PROJECT BASIC KNOWLEDGE | 31 |
| AUDIT RESULT | 32 |
| REFERENCES | |





INTRODUCTION

| Auditing Firm | VITAL BLOCK SECURITY |
|--------------------|---|
| Client Firm | AANN.ai |
| Methodology | Automated Analysis, Manual Code Review. |
| Language | Solidity |
| Contract | ANToken.sol ANTokenMultichain.sol |
| Source Code Light | Open Source |
| License | MIT |
| Centralization | Active ownership |
| Compiler Version | ^0.8.19 |
| Network | BSC NETWORK |
| Website | https://aann.ai/ |
| Telegram | https://t.me/aann_network |
| Twitter | https://twitter.com/aann_ai |
| Doc | https://aann-ai.gitbook.io/social-authenticity-network/ |
| Prelim Report Date | MARCH 12th 2024 |
| Final Report Date | MARCH 13 TH 2024 |

[] Verify the authenticity of this report on our GitHub Repo: https://www.github.com/vital-block





Document Properties

| Client | AANN.ai |
|----------------|---|
| Title | Smart Contract Audit Report |
| Target | AANN.ai |
| Audit Version | 1.0 |
| Author | Akhmetshin Marat |
| Auditors | Akhmetshin Marat, James BK, Benny Matin |
| Reviewed by | Dima Meru |
| Approved by | Prince Mitchell |
| Classification | Public |

Version Info

| Version | Date | Author(s) | Description |
|---------|-------------------------------|-------------|-------------------|
| 1.0 | March 13 th , 2024 | James BK | Final Released |
| 1.0-AP | March 13 th , 2024 | Benny Matin | Release Candidate |

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


In the following, we show the specific pull request and the commit hash value used in this audit.

- https://github.com/aann-ai (AANR87221)
- https://github.com/aann-ai/contracts/tree/main/contracts (AAN7752)

About Vital Block Security

Vital Block Security provides professional, thorough, fast, and easy-to-understand smart contract security audit. We do indepth and penetrative static, manual, automated, and intelligent analysis of the smart contract. Some of our automated scans include tools like ConsenSys MythX, Mythril, Slither, Surya. We can audit custom smart contracts, DApps, Rust, NFTs, etc (including the service of smart contract auditing). We are reachable at Telegram (https://t.me/vital_block), Twitter (https://twitter.com/Vb_Audit), or Email (info@vitalblock.org).



Methodology (1)

To standardize the evaluation, we define the following terminology based on the OWASP Risk Rating Methodology [4]:

- <u>Likelihood</u> represents how likely a particular vulnerability is to be uncovered and exploited in the wild:
- · Impact measures the technical loss and business damage of a successful attack;
- <u>Severity</u> demonstrates the overall criticality of the risk.





SCOPE OF WORK

Vital Block was consulted by AANN to conduct the smart contract audit of its Sol source code. The audit scope of work is strictly limited to mentioned .SOL file only.

O.ANToken.sol
O.ANTokenMultichain.sol

■ External contracts and/or interfaces dependencies are not checked due to being out of scope.

Verify audited contract code Repo.

Public Contract Code Link:

https://github.com/aann-ai/contracts/blob/main/contracts/ANToken.sol

https://github.com/aann-ai/contracts/blob/main/contracts/ANTokenMultichain.sol





AUDIT METHODOLOGY

Smart contract audits are conducted using a set of standards and procedures. Mutual collaboration is essential to performing an effective smart contract audit. Here's a brief overview of Vital Block Security auditing process and methodology:

CONNECT

 The onboarding team gathers source codes, and specifications to make sure we understand the size, and scope of the smart contract audit.

AUDIT

- Automated analysis is performed to identify common contract vulnerabilities. We may use the following third-party frameworks and dependencies to perform the automated analysis:
 - Remix IDE Developer Tool
 - Open Zeppelin Code Analyzer
 - SWC Vulnerabilities Registry
 - DEX Dependencies, e.g., Pancakeswap, Uniswap
- Simulations are performed to identify centralized exploits causing contract and/or trade locks.
- A manual line-by-line analysis is performed to identify contract issues and centralized privileges.
 We may inspect below mentioned common contract vulnerabilities, and centralized exploits:

| | Token Supply Manipulation |
|----------------------|--|
| | Access Control and Authorization |
| | o Assets Manipulation |
| Centralized Exploits | Ownership Control |
| Ochtranized Exploits | o Liquidity Access |
| | Stop and Pause Trading |
| | Ownable Library Verification |
| | |





Common Contract Vulnerabilities

- Integer Overflow
- Lack of Arbitrary limits
- Incorrect Inheritance Order
- Typographical Errors
- Requirement Violation
- Gas Optimization
- Coding Style Violations
- Re-entrancy
- Third-Party Dependencies
- Potential Sandwich Attacks
- Irrelevant Codes
- Divide before multiply
- Conformance to Solidity Naming Guides
- Compiler Specific Warnings
- Language Specific Warnings

REPORT

- The auditing team provides a preliminary report specifying all the checks which have been performed and the findings thereof.
- o The client's development team reviews the report and makes amendments to the codes.
- The auditing team provides the final comprehensive report with open and unresolved issues.

PUBLISH

- o The client may use the audit report internally or disclose it publicly.
- It is important to note that there is no pass or fail in the audit, it is recommended to view the audit as an unbiased assessment of the safety of solidity codes.





Table 1.0 The Full Audit Checklist

| Category | Checklist Items | |
|-----------------------------|---|--|
| | Constructor Mismatch | |
| | Ownership Takeover | |
| | Redundant Fallback Function | |
| | Overflows & Underflows | |
| | Reentrancy | |
| | Money-Giving Bug | |
| | Blackhole | |
| | Unauthorized Self-Destruct | |
| | Revert DoS | |
| Basic Coding Bugs | Unchecked External Call | |
| | Gasless Send | |
| | Send Instead Of Transfer | |
| | Costly Loop | |
| | (Unsafe) Use Of Untrusted Libraries | |
| | (Unsafe) Use Of Predictable Variables | |
| | Transaction Ordering Dependence | |
| | Deprecated Uses | |
| Semantic Consistency Checks | Semantic Consistency Checks | |
| | Business Logics Review | |
| | Functionality Checks | |
| | Authentication Management | |
| | Access Control & Authorization | |
| | Oracle Security | |
| Advanced DeFi Scrutiny | Digital Asset Escrow | |
| Advanced Deri Scruttily | Kill-Switch Mechanism | |
| | Operation Trails & Event Generation | |
| | ERC20 Idiosyncrasies Handling | |
| | Frontend-Contract Integration | |
| | Deployment Consistency | |
| | Holistic Risk Management | |
| | Avoiding Use of Variadic Byte Array | |
| <u> </u> | Using Fixed Compiler Version | |
| Additional Recommendations | Making Visibility Level Explicit | |
| | Making Type Inference Explicit | |
| | Adhering To Function Declaration Strictly | |
| | Following Other Best Practices | |






EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Vital Block Security has performed the automated and manual analysis of the AANN Sol code. The code was reviewed for common contract vulnerabilities and centralized exploits. Here's a quick audit summary:

| Status | Critical ! | Major " 🤴 | Medium # | Minor 🐀 | Unknown 🌑 |
|--|------------|-----------|----------|---------|-----------|
| Open | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Acknowledged | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 |
| Resolved | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| Noteworthy OnlyOwner Privileges Set Taxes and Ratios, Airdrop, Set Protection Settings, Set Reward Properties, Set Reflector Settings, Set Swap Settings, Set Pair and Router | | | | | |

AANN.ai Smart contract has achieved the following score: 98.5



- Please note that smart contracts deployed on blockchains aren't resistant to exploits, vulnerabilities and/or hacks. Blockchain and cryptography assets utilize new and emerging technologies. These technologies present a high level of ongoing risks. For a detailed understanding of risk severity, source code vulnerability, and audit limitations, kindly review the audit report thoroughly.
- Please note that centralization privileges regardless of their inherited risk status constitute an elevated impact on smart contract safety and security.





CENTRALIZED PRIVILEGES

Centralization risk is the most common cause of cryptography asset loss. When a smart contract has a privileged role, the risk related to centralization is elevated.

There are some well-intended reasons have privileged roles, such as:

- Privileged roles can be granted the power to pause() the contract in case of an external attack.
- Privileged roles can use functions like, include(), and exclude() to add or remove wallets from fees,
 swap checks, and transaction limits. This is useful to run a presale and to list on an exchange.

Authorizing privileged roles to externally-owned-account (EOA) is dangerous. Lately, centralization-related losses are increasing in frequency and magnitude.

- The client can lower centralization-related risks by implementing below mentioned practices:
- Privileged role's private key must be carefully secured to avoid any potential hack.
- Privileged role should be shared by multi-signature (multi-sig) wallets.
- Authorized privilege can be locked in a contract, user voting, or community DAO can be introduced to unlock the privilege.
- Renouncing the contract ownership, and privileged roles.
- o Remove functions with elevated centralization risk.
- I Understand the project's initial asset distribution. Assets in the liquidity pair should be locked.

 Assets outside the liquidity pair should be locked with a release schedule.





RISK CATEGORIES

Smart contracts are generally designed to hold, approve, and transfer tokens. This makes them very tempting attack targets. A successful external attack may allow the external attacker to directly exploit. A successful centralization-related exploit may allow the privileged role to directly exploit. All risks which are identified in the audit report are categorized here for the reader to review:

| Risk Type | Definition |
|------------|---|
| Critical ! | These risks could be exploited easily and can lead to asset loss, data loss, asset, or data manipulation. They should be fixed right away. |
| Major " | These risks are hard to exploit but very important to fix, they carry an elevated risk of smart contract manipulation, which can lead to high-risk severity. |
| Medium # | These risks should be fixed, as they carry an inherent risk of future exploits, and hacks which may or may not impact the smart contract execution. Low-risk reentrancy-related vulnerabilities should be fixed to deterexploits. |
| Minor \$ | These risks do not pose a considerable risk to the contract or those who interact with it. They are code-style violations and deviations from standard practices. They should be highlighted and fixed nonetheless. |
| Unknown % | These risks pose uncertain severity to the contract or those who interact with it. They should be fixed immediately to mitigate the riskuncertainty. |

All statuses which are identified in the audit report are categorized here for the reader to review:

| Status Type | Definition |
|--------------|--|
| Open | Risks are open. |
| Acknowledged | Risks are acknowledged, but not fixed. |
| Resolved | Risks are acknowledged and fixed. |



| ID | Repo | Comment | File | SHM321 Checksum |
|-----|-----------------------------|----------|------------------------|--|
| LBY | contracts/ANToken | cC512486 | ANToken.sol | 6788099YIRHVSK853PKFMGHEF443092 00KDHFCBUGIJN |
| LBI | contracts/ANToken | cC512486 | ANToken.sol | 347520JHDB7549H22H3BVDIOETYUHF 009JBIKBDI33BJ4 |
| LBW | contracts/ANToken | cC512486 | ANToken.sol | 1988Y73HUGFDINN353840NFMTEJER7 3649RGFIMDIDH |
| LBG | contracts/ANTokenMultichain | cC512486 | ANTokenMultichain.sol | 4438648TEOHBF6378309EHROECNEPO EJDNETE8EYEU3 |
| LBL | contracts/ANTokenMultichain | cC512486 | ANTokenMultichain.sol | 66390028765RVNKDBYFTGW553T2KO EHIUUJJIJE |
| LBA | contracts/ANTokenMultichain | cC512486 | ANTokenMultichain.sol | 09825539BDYG543DVNKOMIKEBYR JUFHHFHJFIE333222 |
| LBJ | contracts/interfaces | cC512486 | IANToken.sol | 8654RJVT3DWI865YK26437903JJDGGD HGWY6E |
| LBE | contracts/interfaces | cC512486 | IANToken.sol | 7763888636TGYGFFTFHBETT66TFTCTV YBHBYT |
| LBP | contracts/interfaces | cC512486 | IANToken.sol | 88530486494YRHFTEICBGEIEGWTWY WUHEJEHEIE33U3 |
| LBM | contracts/interfaces | cC512486 | IANTokenMultichain.sol | 1209873KHJLKJNFJHGE9876399002977 4BCUHHDUU239 |
| LBV | contracts/interfaces | cC512486 | IANTokenMultichain.sol | 23456UGFYUHE98756EFHJHE7654ESDF GHGERTYUJ3897 |
| LBQ | contracts/interfaces | cC512486 | IANTokenMultichain.sol | 37889UHBIONEO7TYRDFGVBN5678939 IJWSFVDYUHDCI |
| LBS | contracts/interfaces | cC512486 | IWormholeReceiver.sol | 678903098TFHJKFCPOIUGFGHJKE9865 ERGBEIVBHE8767 |
| LBR | contracts/interfaces | cC512480 | IWormholeReceiver.sol | 98765SDFGBNFCOI56789UIYHGGHEJDI UYTRDCVBN3459 |
| LCD | contracts/interfaces | cC512481 | IWormholeReceiver.sol | 3348y9808hgtrusvnmu43100ejfojg fnut8496230hb574he |
| LHU | contracts/interfaces | cC512481 | IWormholeRelayer.sol | 9864byf5f379eig28ffre64085jv161 3251guhkdmue87 |
| LGG | contracts/interfaces | cC512481 | IWormholeRelayer.sol | 7ej2d8jg765tjfiowg538ij74dwftyv6 478ij3gs820 |
| LTR | contracts/interfaces | cC512481 | IWormholeRelayer.sol | 864fr46de438hdguw903rfdcb246d buhb2917enk |



Key Findings

Overall, these contracts are well-designed and engineered, though the implementation can be improved by resolving the identified issues (shown in Table 2.1), 0 medium-severity vulnerabilities, 3 low-severity vulnerabilities, and 1 informational recommen- dations.

Table 2.1: Key AANN Audit Findings

| ID | Severity | Title | Category | Status |
|--------|---------------|---|--------------------------------------|--------------|
| AN-01 | Low | In updateForOwner, Relevant Function Snippet | Coding Practice | Fixed |
| AN-002 | Informational | In Unchecked Transfer, the following equation is used inside an unchecked block | Business Logic | Fixed |
| AN-03 | Low | In updateForMinter, the following equation is used inside an unchecked block | Status Mathematical Operations | Acknowledged |
| AN-04 | Low | In updateForAmount, Relevant Function Snippet | Multiple Contracts | Acknowledged |


Beside the identified issues, we emphasize that for any user-facing applications and services, it is always important to develop necessary risk-control mechanisms and make contingency plans, which may need to be exercised before the mainnet deployment. The risk-control mechanisms should kick in at the very moment when the contracts are being deployed on mainnet. Please refer to page 10 for details.





AUTOMATED ANALYSIS

| Symbol | Definition |
|----------|-------------------------|
| <u></u> | Function modifies state |
| # | Function is payable |
| Şì | Function is internal |
| % | Function is private |
| 1 | Function is important |







```
\Pi\Pi\Pi\Pi
| **IRouter01** | Interface | | | |
| L | factory | External | |
| L | ETH | External | | NO | |
| L | addLiquidityETH | External | | # |NO| |
| L | addLiquidity | External | | " | NO | |
| L | swapExacETHForTokens | External | | # |NO| |
| L | getAmountsOut | External | |
                                  INO
| L | getAmountsIn | External | |
                                     INO!
ШШ
| **IRouter02** | Interface | IRouter01 |||
L | swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | "
                                                                            INO!
L | swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | | # |NO| |
| L | swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | | "
                                                                            ■ INOI I
| L | swapExactTokensForTokens | External | | " | NO | |
| **Protections** | Interface | | | |
| L | checkUser | External | | "
                                ■ INOI I
| L | setLaunch | External | | " !
                               ■ INO! I
| L | setLpPair | External | | "
                               ■ INOI I
| └| AN
                     | External | | " | NO | |
| L | removeSniper
                 | External | | " | NO | |
\Pi\Pi\Pi\Pi
| **Cashier** | Interface | | | |
| L | setRewardsProperties | External | | "
                                              INO
| L | tally
            | External | | " | NO | |
| L | load
           | External | | # |NO | |
| L | cashout | External | | " | NO | |
| L | giveMeWelfarePlease | External | | " | NO | |
| L | getTotalDistributed | External | | NO | |
| L | getUserInfo | External | | NO| |
| L | getUserRealizedRewards | External | |
                                               INO
```





```
| L | getPendingRewards | External | | NO | |
| L | initialize | External | | " | NO | |
| L | getCurrentReward | External | | NO | |
\Pi\Pi\Pi\Pi
| **SOL** | Implementation | SafeMath |||
| L | <Constructor> | Public | | # |NO| |
| L | transferOwner | External | | " | onlyOwner |
| L | renounceOwnership | External | | " | NO!
| L | setOperator | Public | | "
                                 |NO||
| L | renounceOriginalDeployer | External | | "
                                                INOLI
| L | <Receive Ether> | External | | # |NO| |
| L | totalSupply | External | | NO | |
| L | decimals | External | | NO | |
| L | symbol | External | | NO| |
| L | name | External | | NO | |
                               INO. I
| L | getOwner | External | |
                              INOI
| L | balanceOf | Public | |
                                INO
| L | allowance | External | |
                            INO!
| L | approve | External | | "
| L | approve | Internal $ | " | |
| L | transfer | External | | " | NO | |
| L | transferFrom | External | | " | NO | |
| L | setNewRouter | External | | " | onlyOwner |
| L | setLpPair | External | | " | onlyOwner |
| L | setInitializers | External | | " | onlyOwner |
| L | isExcludedFromFees | External | | NO | |
| L | isExcludedFromDividends | External | | NO | |
| L | isExcludedFromProtection | External | | NO | |
| L | setDividendExcluded
                        | Public | | " | onlyOwner |
| L | setExcludedFromFees
                        | Public | | "
                                       | onlyOwner |
```





OPTIMIZATIONS AANN

| ID | Title | Category | Status |
|-----|-----------------------------------|------------------|----------------|
| CTV | Logarithm Refinement Optimization | Gas Optimization | Acknowledged |
| СОР | Checks Can Be Performed Earlier | Gas Optimization | Acknowledged • |
| CDP | Unnecessary Use Of SafeMath | Gas Optimization | Acknowledged • |
| CWY | Struct Optimization | Gas Optimization | Acknowledged • |
| ССТ | Unused State Variable | Gas Optimization | Acknowledged • |





General Detectors

🔢 Transfer Limit

The max/min amount of token transferred can be limited (max could be set to 0).

DoS with Failed Call

This contract uses external calls that may fail, resulting in loss of functionality

Division Before Multiplication

The order of operations used may result in a loss of precision.







- No compiler version inconsistencies found
- No unchecked call responses found
- No vulnerable self-destruct functions found
- No assertion vulnerabilities found
- No old solidity code found
- No external delegated calls found
- No external call dependency found
- No vulnerable authentication calls found
- No invalid character typos found
- No RTL characters found
- No dead code found
- No risky data allocation found
- No uninitialized state variables found
- No uninitialized storage variables found
- No vulnerable initialization functions found
- No risky data handling found
- No number accuracy bug found
- No out-of-range number vulnerability found
- No map data deletion vulnerabilities found

- No tautologies or contradictions found
- No faulty true/false values found
- No innacurate divisions found
- No redundant constructor calls found
- No vulnerable transfers found
- No vulnerable return values found
- No uninitialized local variables found
- No default function responses found
- No missing arithmetic events found
- No missing access control events found
- No redundant true/false comparisons found
- No state variables vulnerable through function calls found
- No buggy low-level calls found
- No expensive loops found
- No bad numeric notation practices found
- ✓ No missing constant declarations found
- No missing external function declarations found
- No vulnerable payable functions found
- No vulnerable message values found





Vulnerability Run check

Risk Analysis

Contract source code verified

This token contract is open source. You can check the contract code for details. Unsourced token contracts are likely to have malicious functions to defraud their users of their assets.

No mint function

Mint function is transparent or non-existent. Hidden mint functions may increase the amount of tokens in circulation and effect the price of the token.

Owner cant change balance

The contract owner does not have the authority to modify the balance of tokens at other addresses.

Honeypot Risk

This does not appear to be a honeypot

We are not aware of any code that prevents the sale of tokens.

No Anti Whale

There is no limit to the number of token transactions. The number of scam token transactions may be limited (honeypot risk).

No whitelist function

Whitelist function found

No Proxy

There is no proxy in the contract. The proxy contract means contract owner can modify the function of the token and possibly effect the price.

No function to retrieve ownership

If this function exists, it is possible for the project owner to regain ownership even after relinquishing it.



No trading cooldown

The token contract has no trading cooldown function. If there is a trading cooldown function, the user will not be able to sell the token within a certain time or block after buying.

No blacklist function

No blacklist function is included.





AN-01 Key Findings

| Category | Severity • | Target | Status |
|----------------|------------|------------------------------|--------|
| Business Logic | Medium | Contract/ANtoken.sol 400-402 | Low |

Description

In **updateForOwner**, Relevant Function Snippet

```
function allowance(address owner_, address spender_) external view returns (uint256) {
    return _allowances[owner_][spender_];
}
```

Description

For Ownership efficiency, the **Ai Social Authenticity Network** Team is engineered with the reserve cache mechanism, which necessi-tates the common steps to be followed when operating with the reserve Ownership data in different scenarios, including the tax generation, update, and eventual persistence.

Recommendation

Revise the above functions to following a consistent approach to use the reserve cache mechanism.





AN-02 Key Findings

| Category | Severity • | Location | Status |
|--------------------------------|------------|--|---------------|
| Status Mathematical Operations | Low | Contract/ANTokenMultichain.sol 195-198 | Informational |

Description

In **UncheckedForTransfer**, the following equation is used inside an unchecked block

```
function transfer(address to_, uint256 amount_) external returns (bool) {
    _transfer(msg.sender, to_, amount_);
    return true;
}
```

A transfer call made in this contract **might** be unstable and cause tokens to become stuck.

Note that as of the date of publishing, the above review reflects the current understanding of known security patterns as they relate to the **ANTokenMultichain** contract.

Recommendation

Incorporate the following verification within process approve account to confirm that the contract account's associated **transfer** aligns with the mint for which the confidential transfer approval is sought.





AN-03 POSSIBLE OVERFLOW

| Category | Severity • | Location | Status |
|--------------------------------|------------|----------------------|--------------|
| Status Mathematical Operations | Minor | Contract/ANToken.sol | Acknowledged |

Description

In **updateForMinter**, the following equation is used inside an unchecked block

```
function mint(address account_) external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
    if (account_ == address(0)) {
        revert ZeroAddressEntry();
    }
    if (isTradingEnabled) {
        revert ForbiddenToMintTokens();
    }
    unchecked {
        _totalSupply += MAXIMUM_SUPPLY;
        _balances[account_] += MAXIMUM_SUPPLY;
}
```

Minter can not issue more ANToken indefinitely.

Note that as of the date of publishing, the above review reflects the current understanding of known security patterns as they relate to the **ANTOKEN** contract.

Recommendation

We recommend either checking for overflow in this case, or ensuring that the PairsIn is close enough it will never cause an overflow.



AN-04 Key Findings

| Inconsistency | Informational | Multiple Contracts | Acknowledge |
|---------------|---------------|--------------------|-------------|
| Category | Severity • | Target | Status |

Description

In updateForAmount, Relevant Function Snippet

```
function withdrawAccumulatedCommission() external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
    uint256 commissionAmount = _balances[address(this)];
    if (commissionAmount > 0) {
        _transfer(address(this), commissionRecipient, commissionAmount);
        emit AccumulatedCommissionWithdrawn(commissionAmount);
    }
}
```

Description

The function **amount0**() does not have the override specifier. It should be noted that since **amount**0 > a function That overrides only a single interface function does not require the override specifier. However, all other instances of this in the codebase contain the override specifier.

Recommendation

We recommend adding the override specifier to **amount()** or removing the override specifier from all other functions this applies to for consistency.



Vulnerability Scan

REENTRANCY

No reentrancy risk found

Severity Major

Confidence Parameter Certain

Vulnerability Description

Wintable: More amount of the ANtoken can NOT be minted by a private wallet or contract. (This is Essentially normal for most contracts)

Scanning Line:

```
function _mint(address account_, uint256 amount_) private {
    _totalSupply += amount_;
    uint256 adjustedAmount =
amount_.div(cumulativeAdjustmentFactor);
    if (_burnProtectedAccounts.contains(account_)) {
        _balances[account_] += amount_;
    } else {
        _balances[account_] += adjustedAmount;
    }
    emit Transfer(address(0), account_, amount_);
}
```





Repository:

https://github.com/aann-ai

Audited Files

- O.ANToken.sol
- O.ANTokenMultichain.sol
- O.IANToken.sol
- O.IANTokenMultichain.sol
- O.IWormholeReceiver.sol
- 0.IWormholeRelayer.sol

Contract Creator Address

Not Established

Deployed Contracts:

Not Deployed


Creator TXH Contracts:

Not Refillable





INHERITANCE GRAPH



| Identifier | Definition | Severity |
|------------|-----------------------------------|----------|
| CEN-12 | Centralization privileges of AANN | Medium # |
| | | |

Vulnerability 0: No important security issue detected.

Threat level: Low





ISSUES CHECKING STATUS

Issue Description Checking Status

| 1. | Compiler errors. | PASSED |
|-----|---|--------|
| 2. | Race Conditions and reentrancy. Cross-Function Race Conditions. | PASSED |
| 3. | Possible Delay In Data Delivery. | PASSED |
| 4. | Oracle calls. | PASSED |
| 5. | Front Running. | PASSED |
| 6. | Sol Dependency. | PASSED |
| 7. | Integer Overflow And Underflow. | PASSED |
| 8. | DoS with Revert. | PASSED |
| 9. | Dos With Block Gas Limit. | PASSED |
| 10. | Methods execution permissions. | PASSED |
| 11. | Economy Model of the contract. | PASSED |
| 12. | The Impact Of Exchange Rate On the solidity Logic. | PASSED |
| 13. | Private use data leaks. | PASSED |
| 14. | Malicious Event log. | PASSED |
| 15. | Scoping and Declarations. | PASSED |
| 16. | Uninitialized storage pointers. | PASSED |
| 17. | Arithmetic accuracy. | PASSED |
| 18. | Design Logic. | PASSED |
| 19. | Cross-Function race Conditions | PASSED |
| 20. | Save Upon solidity contract Implementation and Usage. | PASSED |
| 21. | Fallback Function Security | PASSED |






MANUAL REVIEW

What is Social Authenticity (#SocAuth) and why is it so important for online social media? Simply explained, social authenticity is the act of being true to one's representation in online social environments and presenting a genuine version of yourself, business, community or brand to the world, or to your followers. Our modern society is often plagued by information distortion, and superficiality. The need for social authenticity in online interactions is growing every year due to the ensuing social trust crisis.

With the rise of Artificial Intelligence in online social media, users are experiencing a growing need for trusted interactions, provable authenticity and realness. This is where we see the biggest shift is occurring, while it is important to note AI is playing an increasingly important role in ensuring online social authenticity as well. As the battle lines are drawn between AI for Good vs AI for social manipulation, this is a "war" that AN plans to help our users WIN!



The Ai Social Authenticity Network Platform Is Launching Soon.







| Identifier | Definition | Severity |
|------------|----------------------------|----------|
| CEN-02 | Initial asset distribution | Minor 🏐 |

All of the initially minted assets are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This is Normal for most deployer and/or contract owner.

```
function approve(address spender_, uint256 amount_) external returns (bool) {
    if (msg.sender == address(0) || spender_ == address(0)) {
        revert ZeroAddressEntry();
    }
    _allowances[msg.sender][spender_] = amount_;
    emit Approval(msg.sender, spender_, amount_);
    return true;
}
```

RECOMMENDATION

Project stakeholders should be consulted during the initial asset distribution process.





RECOMMENDATION

Deployer and/or contract owner private keys are secured carefully.

Please refer to PAGE-7 CENTRALIZED PRIVILEGES for a detailed understanding.

ALLEVIATION

The AANN project team understands the centralization risk. Some functions are provided privileged access to ensure a good runtime behavior in the project





References

- 1 MITRE. CWE-1041: Use of Redundant Code. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1041.
 html.
- 2 MITRE. CWE-1099: Inconsistent Naming Conventions for Identifiers. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1099.html.
- 3 MITRE. CWE-561: Dead Code. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/561.html.
- 4 MITRE. CWE-563: Assignment to Variable without Use. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/563.html.
- 5 MITRE. CWE-663: Use of a Non-reentrant Function in a Concurrent Context. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/663.html.
- 6 MITRE. CWE-837: Improper Enforcement of a Single, Unique Action. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/837.html.
- 7 MITRE. CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/841.html.
- 8 MITRE. CWE CATEGORY: Bad Coding Practices. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/
 1006.html.
- 9 MITRE. CWE CATEGORY: Business Logic Errors. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/840.html.
- 10 MITRE. CWE CATEGORY: Concurrency. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/557.html.
- MITRE. CWE VIEW: Development Concepts. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/699.
 httml.
- 12 OWASP. Risk Rating Methodology. https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP Risk Rating Methodology.





| Identifier | Definition | Severity |
|------------|--------------------------|----------|
| COD-10 | Third Party Dependencies | Minor 🏐 |

Smart contract is interacting with third party protocols e.g., Pancakeswap router, cashier contract, protections contract. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised, and exploited. Moreover, upgrades in third parties can create severe impacts, e.g., increased transactional fees, deprecation of previous routers, etc.

RECOMMENDATION

Inspect and validate third party dependencies regularly, and mitigate severe impacts whenever necessary.





DISCLAIMERS

Vital Block Security provides the easy-to-understand audit of Solidity, Move and Raw source codes (commonly known as smart contracts).

The smart contract for this particular audit was analyzed for common contract vulnerabilities, and centralization exploits. This audit report makes no statements or warranties on the security of the code. This audit report does not provide any warranty or guarantee regarding the absolute bug-free nature of the smart contract analyzed, nor do they provide any indication of the client's business, business model or legal compliance. This audit report does not extend to the compiler layer, any other areas beyond the programming language, or other programming aspects that could present security risks. Cryptographic tokens are emergent technologies, they carry high levels of technical risks and uncertainty. You agree that your access and/or use, including but not limited to any services, reports, and materials, will be at your sole risk on an as-is, where-is, and as-available basis. This audit report could include false positives, false negatives, and other unpredictable results.

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Vital Block is Dedicated to Making Defi & Web3 A Safer Place. We are Powered by Security engineers, developers, Ul experts, and blockchain enthusiasts. Our team currently consists of 5 core members, and 4+ casual contributors.

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