VITALBlock security.

Blockchain Security | Smart Contract Audit | KYC Certification | SAFU | CEX Listing | Marketing

MADE IN CANADA

MATARA TOKEN

AUDIT

SECURITY ASSESSMENT

16th September 2025

For

MATARA

Making Blockchain, Defi And Web3 A Safer Place.

Smart Check | SLITHER | TRAIL OF BITS | MythX

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INTRODUCTION

Auditing Firm	**VITAL BLOCK SECURITY**
Client Firm	**MATARA TOKEN**
Methodology	**Automated Analysis, Manual Code Review**
Language	**Solidity**
Contract Address	0x494fa2a89376d23bd7ba5938ef3d1d126422d2b1
Source Code Light	**Verified**
Centralization	**Active ownership**
Compiler Version	v0.8.15+commit.e14f2714
Blockchain	**BINANCE CHAIN**
Website	https://www.matarakingdom.com/
Twitter	https://x.com/Captainmatara
Telegram	https://t.me/MATARA_TOKEN
Medium	https://medium.com/@mataratoken
Prelim Report Date	**September 15TH 2025**
Final Report Date	**September 16TH 2025**

Verify the authenticity of this report on our GitHub Repo: https://www.github.com/vital-block

Document Properties

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Auditors	Akhmetshin Marat, James BK, Ben Partrick , C. John
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Version	Date	Author(s)	Description
1.0	September 16TH , 2025	C. John	Final Release
1.0-AP	September 16TH , 2025	C. John	Release Candidate

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In the following, we show the specific pull request and the commit hash value used in this audit.

- **MATARA TOKEN** (MZZS6RETT)
- BEP-20 Token | Address: 0x6844B2e9...68650F214 | BscScan (421178POS)

About Vital Block Security

Vital Block Security provides professional, thorough, fast, and easy-to-understand smart contract security audit. We do in-depth and penetrative static, manual, automated, and intelligent analysis of the smart contract. Some of our automated scans include tools like ConsenSys MythX, Mythril, Slither, Surya. We can audit custom smart contracts, DApps, NFTs, etc (including the service of smart contract auditing). We are reachable at Telegram (https://t.me/vitalblock), Twitter (http://twitter.com/Vb_Audit), or Email (info@vitalblock.org).

Table 1.2: Vulnerability Severity Classification

Impact \ Likelihood	*High*	*Medium*	*Low*
High	Critical	High	Medium
Medium	High	Medium	Low
Low	Medium	Low	Low

Methodology

To standardize the evaluation, we define the following terminology based on the OWASP Risk Rating Methodology.

- Likelihood represents how likely a particular vulnerability is to be uncovered and exploited in the wild;
- Impact measures the technical loss and business damage of a successful attack;
- Severity demonstrates the overall criticality of the risk.

SCOPE OF WORK

Vital Block was consulted by MATARA TOKEN to conduct the smart contract audit of its. SOLIDITY (SOL) source code. The audit scope of work is strictly limited to the mentioned .Sol file only:

O.MATARA.SOL

External contracts and/or interfaces dependencies are not checked due to being out of scope.

Verify audited contract's contract address and deployed link below:

Public Contract Address	
0x6844B2e9afB002d188A072A3ef0FBb068650F214	
Contract Name	MATARA TOKEN
Ticker	**$MARS**
Total Supply	**690,000,000,000**

AUDIT METHODOLOGY

Smart contract audits are conducted using a set of standards and procedures. Mutual collaboration is essential to performing an effective smart contract audit. Here's a brief overview of Vital Block Security auditing process and methodology:

CONNECT

- **The onboarding team gathers source codes, and specifications to make sure we understand the size, and scope of the smart contract audit.**

AUDIT

- **Automated analysis is performed to identify common contract vulnerabilities. We may use the following third-party frameworks and dependencies to perform the automated analysis:**
  - **Remix IDE Developer Tool**
  - **Open Zeppelin Code Analyzer**
  - **SWC Vulnerabilities Registry**
  - **DEX Dependencies, e.g., Pancakeswap, Uniswap**
- **Simulations are performed to identify centralized exploits causing contract and/or trade locks.**
- **A manual line-by-line analysis is performed to identify contract issues and centralized privileges. We may inspect below mentioned common contract vulnerabilities, and centralized exploits:**

Centralized Exploits	○ **Token Supply Manipulation** ○ **Access Control and Authorization** ○ **Assets Manipulation** ○ **Ownership Control** ○ **Liquidity Access** ○ **Stop and Pause Trading** ○ **Ownable Library Verification**

Common Contract Vulnerabilities

- Integer Overflow
- Lack of Arbitrary limits
- Incorrect Inheritance Order
- Typographical Errors
- Requirement Violation
- Gas Optimization
- Coding Style Violations
- Re-entrancy
- Third-Party Dependencies
- Potential Sandwich Attacks
- Irrelevant Codes
- Divide before multiply
- Conformance to Solidity Naming Guides
- Compiler Specific Warnings
- Language Specific Warnings

REPORT

- The auditing team provides a preliminary report specifying all the checks which have been performed and the findings thereof.
- The client's development team reviews the report and makes amendments to the codes.
- The auditing team provides the final comprehensive report with open and unresolved issues.

PUBLISH

- The client may use the audit report internally or disclose it publicly.

ℹ It is important to note that there is no pass or fail in the audit, it is recommended to view the audit as an unbiased assessment of the safety of solidity codes.

Table 1.0 The Full Audit Checklist

Category	Checklist Items
Basic Coding Bugs	Constructor Mismatch
	Ownership Takeover
	Redundant Fallback Function
	Overflows & Underflows
	Reentrancy
	Money-Giving Bug
	Blackhole
	Unauthorized Self-Destruct
	Revert DoS
	Unchecked External Call
	Gasless Send
	Send Instead Of Transfer
	Costly Loop
	(Unsafe) Use Of Untrusted Libraries
	(Unsafe) Use Of Predictable Variables
	Transaction Ordering Dependence
	Deprecated Uses
Semantic Consistency Checks	Semantic Consistency Checks
Advanced DeFi Scrutiny	Business Logics Review
	Functionality Checks
	Authentication Management
	Access Control & Authorization
	Oracle Security
	Digital Asset Escrow
	Kill-Switch Mechanism
	Operation Trails & Event Generation
	ERC20 Idiosyncrasies Handling
	Frontend-Contract Integration
	Deployment Consistency
	Holistic Risk Management
Additional Recommendations	Avoiding Use of Variadic Byte Array
	Using Fixed Compiler Version
	Making Visibility Level Explicit
	Making Type Inference Explicit
	Adhering To Function Declaration Strictly
	Following Other Best Practices

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Vital Block Security has performed the automated and manual analysis of the MATARA TOKEN Sol code. The code was reviewed for common contract vulnerabilities and centralized exploits. Here's a quick audit summary:

Status	Critical ! 🔴	Major " 🟠	Medium # 🟡	Minor $ 🟢	Unknown % 🟤
Open	0	0	2	1	0
Acknowledged	0	0	1	2	0
Resolved	0	0	0	0	0
Noteworty OnlyOwner Privileges	Set Taxes and Ratios, Airdrop, Set Protection Settings, Set Reward Properties, Set Reflector Settings, Set Swap Settings, Set Pair and Router				

MATARA TOKEN Smart contract has achieved the following score: 92.0

i Please note that smart contracts deployed on blockchains aren't resistant to exploits, vulnerabilities and/or hacks. Blockchain and cryptography assets utilize new and emerging technologies. These technologies present a high level of ongoing risks. For a detailed understanding of risk severity, source code vulnerability, and audit limitations, kindly review the audit report thoroughly.

i Please note that centralization privileges regardless of their inherited risk status - constitute an elevated impact on smart contract safety and security.

RISK CATEGORIES

Smart contracts are generally designed to hold, approve, and transfer tokens. This makes them very tempting attack targets. A successful external attack may allow the external attacker to directly exploit. A successful centralization-related exploit may allow the privileged role to directly exploit. All risks which are identified in the audit report are categorized here for the reader to review:

Risk Type	Definition
Critical	These risks could be exploited easily and can lead to asset loss, data loss, asset, or data manipulation. They should be fixed right away.
Major	These risks are hard to exploit but very important to fix, they carry an elevated risk of smart contract manipulation, which can lead to high-risk severity.
Medium	These risks should be fixed, as they carry an inherent risk of future exploits, and hacks which may or may not impact the smart contract execution. Low-risk re-entrancy-related vulnerabilities should be fixed to deter exploits.
Minor	These risks do not pose a considerable risk to the contract or those who interact with it. They are code-style violations and deviations from standard practices. They should be highlighted and fixed nonetheless.
Unknown	These risks pose uncertain severity to the contract or those who interact with it. They should be fixed immediately to mitigate the risk uncertainty.

All statuses which are identified in the audit report are categorized here for the reader to review:

Status Type	Definition
Open	Risks are open.
Acknowledged	Risks are acknowledged, but not fixed.
Resolved	Risks are acknowledged and fixed.

CENTRALIZED PRIVILEGES

Centralization risk is the most common cause of cryptography asset loss. When a smart contract has a privileged role, the risk related to centralization is elevated.

There are some well-intended reasons have privileged roles, such as:

- **Privileged roles can be granted the power to** pause() **the contract in case of an external attack.**
- **Privileged roles can use functions like,** include(), **and** exclude() **to add or remove wallets from fees, swap checks, and transaction limits. This is useful to run a presale and to list on an exchange.**

Authorizing privileged roles to externally-owned-account (EOA) is dangerous. Lately, centralization-related losses are increasing in frequency and magnitude.

- **The client can lower centralization-related risks by implementing below mentioned practices:**
- **Privileged role's private key must be carefully secured to avoid any potential hack.**
- **Privileged role should be shared by multi-signature (multi-sig) wallets.**
- **Authorized privilege can be locked in a contract, user voting, or community DAO can be introduced to unlock the privilege.**
- **Renouncing the contract ownership, and privileged roles.**
- **Remove functions with elevated centralization risk.**

ℹ️ **Understand the project's initial asset distribution. Assets in the liquidity pair should be locked. Assets outside the liquidity pair should be locked with a release schedule.**

AUTOMATED ANALYSIS

Symbol	Definition
	Function modifies state
	Function is payable
	Function is internal
	Function is private
	Function is important

MATARA	Interface			
└	totalSupply	External		NO
└	decimals	External		NO
└	symbol	External		NO
└	name	External		NO
└	getOwner	External		NO
└	balanceOf	External		NO
└	transfer	External	"	NO
└	allowance	External		NO
└	approve	External	"	NO
└	transferFrom	External	"	NO

IFactoryV2	Interface		
└	getPair	External		NO
└	createPair	External	"	NO

IV2Pair	Interface		
└	factory	External		NO
└	getReserves	External		NO
└	sync	External	"	NO

IRouter01	Interface	
└	factory	External ❗ | NO❗
└	BNB	External ❗ | NO❗
└	addLiquidityBNB	External ❗ | # NO❗
└	addLiquidity	External ❗ | " NO❗
└	swapExacBNBTokens	External ❗ | # NO❗
└	getAmountsOut	External ❗ | NO❗
└	getAmountsIn	External ❗ | NO❗
IRouter02	Interface	IRouter01
└	swapExactTokensForBNBSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External ❗ | " NO❗
└	swapExactBNBForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External ❗ | # NO❗
└	swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External ❗ | " ! 🛑 NO❗
└	swapExactTokensForTokens	External ❗ | " NO❗
Protections	Interface	
└	checkUser	External ❗ | " ! 🛑 NO❗
└	setLaunch	External ❗ | " NO❗
└	setLpPair	External ❗ | " NO❗
└	**MARS**	External ❗ | "! 🛑 NO❗ !
└	removeSniper	External ❗ |!" 🛑 NO❗
Cashier	Interface	
└	setRewardsProperties	External ❗ | " NO❗
└	tally	External ❗ ! " 🛑 NO❗
└	load	External ❗ ! 💵 NO❗
└	cashout	External ❗ | " ! 🛑 NO❗
└	giveMeWelfarePlease	External ❗ | " ! 🛑 NO❗
└	getTotalDistributed	External ❗ | ! NO❗
└	getUserInfo	External ❗ | ! NO❗
└	getUserRealizedRewards	External ❗ | ! NO❗

| └ | getPendingRewards | External ❗ | | ❗ | NO❗ |

| └ | initialize | External ❗ | " | ❗ | 🛑 | NO❗ |

| └ | getCurrentReward | External ❗ | | | NO❗ |

||||||

| **BNB** | Implementation | **SafeMath** |||

| └ | <Constructor> | Public ❗ | | ❗ | #️⃣ | NO❗❗ |

| └ | transferOwner | External ❗ | " | ❗ | 🛑 | onlyOwner |

| └ | renounceOwnership | External ❗ | " | ❗ | 🛑 | NO ❗ |

| └ | setOperator | Public ❗ | " | ❗ | 🛑 | NO❗ |

| └ | renounceOriginalDeployer | External ❗ | " | 🛑 | NO❗ |

| └ | <Receive WBNB> | External ❗ | | ❗ | #️⃣ | NO❗❗ |

| └ | totalSupply | External ❗ | | ❗ | NO❗ |

| └ | decimals | External ❗ | | ❗ | NO❗ |

| └ | symbol | External ❗ | | ❗ | NO❗ |

| └ | name | External ❗ | | ❗ | NO❗ |

| └ | getOwner | External ❗ | | ❗ | NO❗ |

| └ | balanceOf | Public ❗ | | ❗ | NO❗ |

| └ | allowance | External ❗ | | ❗ | NO❗ |

| └ | approve | External ❗ | " | ❗ | 🛑 | NO❗ |

| └ | _approve | Internal $ | "🔒 | 🛑 | |

| └ | approveContractContingency | Public ❗ | " | ❗ | 🛑 | onlyOwner |

| └ | transfer | External ❗ | " | ❗ | 🛑 | NO❗ |

| └ | transferFrom | External ❗ | " | ❗ | 🛑 | NO❗ |

| └ | setNewRouter | External ❗ | " | ❗ | 🛑 | onlyOwner |

| └ | setLpPair | External ❗ | " | ❗ | 🛑 | onlyOwner |

| └ | setInitializers | External ❗ | " | ❗ | 🛑 | onlyOwner |

| └ | isExcludedFromFees | External ❗ | | ❗ | NO❗ |

| └ | isExcludedFromDividends | External ❗ | | ❗ | NO❗ |

| └ | isExcludedFromProtection | External ❗ | | ❗ | NO❗ |

| └ | setDividendExcluded | Public ❗ | "❗ | 🛑 | onlyOwner |

| └ | setExcludedFromFees | Public ❗ | "❗ | 🛑 | onlyOwner |

MATARA TOKEN - 01 POSSIBLE OVERFLOW

Category	Severity ●	Location	Status
Status Mathematical Operations	**Minor**	./src/MARS.Sol	**Acknowledged**

Description

In **updateForMinter** , the following equation is used inside an unchecked block

```
function _mint(address account, uint256 amount) internal virtual {
        require(account != address(0), "ERC20: mint to the zero address");
        _beforeTokenTransfer(address(0), account, amount);

        _totalSupply = _totalSupply.add(amount);
        _balances[account] = _balances[account].add(amount);
        emit Transfer(address(0), account, amount);
    }
```

Minter can **Not** issue more **$MARS** tokens indefinitely.
Note that as of the date of publishing, the above review reflects the current understanding of known security patterns as they relate to the **$MARS** contract.

Recommendation

We recommend either checking for overflow in this case, or ensuring that the **PairsIn** is close enough it will never cause an overflow.

MATARA TOKEN - 02 POSSIBLE OVERFLOW

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Inconsistency	**Informational**	./src/MARS.Sol	Acknowledged

Description

In **updateForOwner**, Relevant Function Snippet

```
 constructor() {
    address msgSender = _msgSender();
    _owner = msgSender;
    emit OwnershipTransferred(address(0), msgSender);
}


function owner() public view returns (address) {
    return _owner;
}

modifier onlyOwner() {
    require(_owner == _msgSender(), "Ownable: caller is not the owner");
```

To ensure ownership efficiency, the MATARA TOKEN Team has implemented a reserve cache mechanism. This system standardizes the procedures for managing reserve ownership data across various scenarios, including tax generation, data updates, and final persistence.

Recommendation

Revise the above functions to following a consistent approach to use the reserve cache mechanism.

MATARA TOKEN - 03 POSSIBLE OVERFLOW

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Status Mathematical Operations	**REENTRANCY IN**	Lines 944–1000 (*swapAndSendDividends*)	Acknowledged

Description

The function calls *address(dividendTracker).call{value: dividends}("")* — an external call with value — without reentrancy guard. After this call, it proceeds to send funds to *marketingWallet* and *devWallet* using *call{value: ...}("")*.

```
if (dividends > 0) {
   (success, ) = address(dividendTracker).call{value: dividends}(""); // ← EXTERNAL CALL WITHOUT GUARD
}
...
uint256 marketingPayout = ...;
if (marketingPayout > 0) {
   (successOp1, ) = address(marketingWallet).call{value: marketingPayout}(""); // ← SECOND EXTERNAL CALL}
```

Note: ⚠ This is identical to The DAO reentrancy hack. The swapping flag only protects swapAndLiquify, not swapAndSendDividends.

Recommendation

Wrap entire *swapAndSendDividends()* in a ReentrancyGuard modifier:

```
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/security/ReentrancyGuard.sol";

contract Matara is ERC20, Ownable, ReentrancyGuard { ... }

function swapAndSendDividends(uint256 tokens) private nonReentrant {    ...}
```

Also: Use Address.sendValue() for ETH transfers instead of raw .call{value:}("").

OPTIMIZATIONS | $MARS

ID	Title	Category	Status
FHB	**Logarithm Refinement Optimization**	Gas Optimization	Acknowledged
FLO	**Checks Can Be Performed Earlier**	Gas Optimization	Acknowledged
FDE	**Unnecessary Use Of SafeMath**	Gas Optimization	Acknowledged
VOY	**Struct Optimization**	Gas Optimization	Acknowledged
FAC	**Unused State Variable**	Gas Optimization	Acknowledged

GAS OPTIMIZATION RECOMMENDATIONS

ISSUE	FIX
`balanceOf(address(this))` called multiple times	Cache in local variable
`buyAmount.add(sellAmount)` repeated	Store as `totalFees`
`address(this).balance` used 3x	Cache in `uint256 ethBalance = address(this).balance`
`IUniswapV2Router02` interface calls	Cache router address in immutable
`getStakingBalance()` called in every transfer	Consider caching per-block

General Detectors

Missing Zero Address Validation

Some functions in this contract may not appropriately check for zero addresses being used.

Attention Required

Inconsistent Solidity Version

This contract uses an unconventional or very old version of move dependency

Attention Required

- No compiler version inconsistencies found
- No unchecked call responses found
- No vulnerable self-destruct functions found
- No assertion vulnerabilities found
- No old solidity code found
- No external delegated calls found
- No external call dependency found
- No vulnerable authentication calls found
- No invalid character typos found
- No RTL characters found
- No dead code found
- No risky data allocation found
- No uninitialized state variables found
- No uninitialized storage variables found
- No vulnerable initialization functions found
- No risky data handling found
- No number accuracy bug found
- No out-of-range number vulnerability found
- No map data deletion vulnerabilities found
- No tautologies or contradictions found
- No faulty true/false values found
- No innacurate divisions found
- No redundant constructor calls found
- No vulnerable transfers found
- No vulnerable return values found
- No uninitialized local variables found
- No default function responses found
- No missing arithmetic events found
- No missing access control events found
- No redundant true/false comparisons found
- No state variables vulnerable through function calls found
- No buggy low-level calls found
- No expensive loops found
- No bad numeric notation practices found
- No missing constant declarations found
- No missing external function declarations found
- No vulnerable payable functions found
- No vulnerable message values found

Vulnerability Scan

REENTRANCY

No reentrancy risk found

Severity	Minor
Confidence Parameter	Certain

Vulnerability Description

RENOUNCED: No additional amount of staking token can be minted by a private wallet or contract.
(Which is normal for major contract utility options)

Scanning Line:

```
    constructor() {
        address msgSender = _msgSender();
        _owner = msgSender;
        emit OwnershipTransferred(address(0), msgSender);
    }

    function owner() public view returns (address) {
        return _owner;
    }

    modifier onlyOwner() {
        require(_owner == _msgSender(), "Ownable: caller is not the
owner");
        _;
    }

    function renounceOwnership() public virtual onlyOwner {
        emit OwnershipTransferred(_owner, address(0));
        _owner = address(0);
    }
```

Auto Contract Scan

Basic Info

Token Contract Address	0x6844...f214
Owner (Renounced)	0x0000...0000
Total Supply	690B

Risk Check

- contains a modifiable max sell limit
- Renounced, Slippage cannot be modified
- Renounced, Unable to set whitelist
- Renounced, Can not Mint
- Doesn't look like honeypot
- Contract is open source
- Owner can not tamper with balance
- Doesn't look like a proxy contract
- No blacklist
- Admin privileges abandoned
- Can not take back ownership
- No trading-cool-down mechanism

Mechanism Introduction

Buy Tax	4%
Sell Tax	4%

Sell detection

Wallets	Success	Failed	Siphoned
283	283	0	0

Tax	Ave Tax 3.9972%	
	Tax 3%	Count 279
	Tax 4%	Count 4

Token Holders Info

Token Holders: 1895

Top10 ratio(exclude blackhole) 18.51%

1. Cakev2: MARS/WBNB	99.85B (14.47%)
2. Blackhole/黑洞地址1	82.17B (11.91%)
3.0x...6d40	19.8B (2.87%)
4.0x...a0c6	14.61B (2.12%)
5.0x...2ccc	13.79B (2%)
6.0x...bb67	13.7B (1.99%)
7.0x...2f9a	13.57B (1.97%)
8.0x...5e18	12.61B (1.83%)
9. 0x...9544	12.35B (1.79%)
10.0x...a2db	12.08B (1.75%)

More Details

LP

LP Holders: 9 Total Supply: 1,194,359.4152

Percentage of LP locked 98.77%

1. UNCX:Lock				1.12M (93.75%)
Amount	Lock Date	Unlock Start	Unlock End	
1.12M	2025-08-24	2026-02-24	2026-02-24	

2. Blackhole/黑洞地址	59.98K (5.02%)
3.0x...dc1c	11.31K (0.95%)
4. 0x...34e4	2,246.1 (0.19%)
5.0x...1e94	790.51 (0.07%)
6.0x...4041	197.12 (0.02%)
7. 0x...9706	124.07 (0.01%)
8. 0x...d2b1	0 (0%)
9.0x...4ea9	0 (0%)

More Details

Identifier	Definition	Severity
CEN-02	Initial asset distribution	Minor $

```
constructor() ERC20("MATARA", "MARS") {
    marketingWallet = payable(0xdA99459b55D2478d5c0F9C32a20e00a99Cf591f5);
    devWallet = payable(0x7411139B3601eF24ED9eE9610bD3427721e434E4);
    address router = 0x10ED43C718714eb63d5aA57B78B54704E256024E;

    buyDeadFees = 1;
    sellDeadFees = 1;
    buyMarketingFees = 1;
    sellMarketingFees = 1;
    buyLiquidityFee = 1;
    sellLiquidityFee = 1;
    buyRewardsFee = 1;
    sellRewardsFee = 1;
    buyDevFee = 0;
    sellDevFee = 0;
    transferFee = 0;

    totalBuyFees = buyRewardsFee
      .add(buyLiquidityFee)
      .add(buyMarketingFees)
      .add(buyDevFee);
    totalSellFees = sellRewardsFee
      .add(sellLiquidityFee)
      .add(sellMarketingFees)
      .add(sellDevFee);
```

Alleviation:

The Distribution Wallet was acknowledged and ultimately discarded by the MATARA TOKEN team due to Earning severity. We consider the exhibit fully attended to as it doesn't impose any meaningful security concerns.

RECOMMENDATION

Project stakeholders should be consulted during the initial asset distribution process.

Contract Creator Address:

0x7411139B3601eF24ED9eE9610bD3427721e434E4

Audited Files

MARS.Sol

Contracts Creator Hash:

TXN HASH
0x6c42fc895de0b7850280a33426610a442adb72775b05672b391c9c73ce95358d

Contracts:

Contract Address:
MARS: 0x6844B2e9afB002d188A072A3ef0FBb068650F214

MANUAL REVIEW

MATARA: ✨Hope. Faith. Legacy. Memes.
A memecoin born from the legend of the Lion Warrior King, Matara fights hopelessness with the power of community, memes and purposes.

TOKEN NAME: MATARA TOKEN
Ticker: MARS

Chain/Standard: BINANCE NETWORK

LAUNGUGE: SOLIDITY

The MATARA TOKEN Platform Is Launching On the Binance Network



ISSUES CHECKING STATUS

VITALBlock security.

	Issue Description	Checking Status
1.	Compiler errors.	PASSED
2.	Race Conditions and reentrancy. Cross-Function Race Conditions.	PASSED
3.	Possible Delay In Data Delivery.	PASSED
4.	Oracle calls.	PASSED
5.	Front Running.	PASSED
6.	SOL Dependency.	PASSED
7.	Integer Overflow And Underflow.	PASSED
8.	DoS with Revert.	PASSED
9.	Dos With Block Gas Limit.	PASSED
10.	Methods execution permissions.	PASSED
11.	Economy Model of the contract.	PASSED
12.	The Impact Of Exchange Rate On the Move Logic.	PASSED
13.	Private use data leaks.	PASSED
14.	Malicious Event log.	PASSED
15.	Scoping and Declarations.	PASSED
16.	Uninitialized storage pointers.	PASSED
17.	Arithmetic accuracy.	PASSED
18.	Design Logic.	PASSED
19.	Cross-Function race Conditions	PASSED
20.	Save Upon Move contract Implementation and Usage.	PASSED
21.	Fallback Function Security	PASSED

AUDIT RESULT

PASSED

Identifier	Definition	Severity
CEN-02	Initial asset distribution	Minor

All of the initially minted assets are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This can be an issue as the deployer and/or contract owner can distribute tokens without consulting the community.

```
function _mint(address account, uint256 amount) internal virtual {
        require(account != address(0), "ERC20: mint to the zero address");

        _beforeTokenTransfer(address(0), account, amount);

        _totalSupply = _totalSupply.add(amount);
        _balances[account] = _balances[account].add(amount);
        emit Transfer(address(0), account, amount);
    }
```

RECOMMENDATION

Project stakeholders should be consulted during the initial asset distribution process.

RECOMMENDATION

Deployer and/or contract owner private keys are secured carefully.

Please refer to PAGE-09 CENTRALIZED PRIVILEGES for a detailed understanding.

ALLEVIATION

The MATARA project team understands the centralization risk. Some functions are provided privileged access to ensure a good runtime behavior in the project

CERTIFICATE BY VITAL BLOCK SECURITY

Identifier	Definition	Severity
COD-10	Third Party Dependencies	Minor

Smart contract is interacting with third party protocols e.g., Pancakeswap router, cashier contract, protections contract. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised, and exploited. Moreover, upgrades in third parties can create severe impacts, e.g., increased transactional fees, deprecation of previous routers, etc.

RECOMMENDATION

Inspect and validate third party dependencies regularly, and mitigate severe impacts whenever necessary.

DISCLAIMERS

Vital Block provides the easy-to-understand audit of Solidity, Move and Raw source codes (commonly known as smart contracts).

The smart contract for this particular audit was analyzed for common contract vulnerabilities, and centralization exploits. This audit report makes no statements or warranties on the security of the code. This audit report does not provide any warranty or guarantee regarding the absolute bug-free nature of the smart contract analyzed, nor do they provide any indication of the client's business, business model or legal compliance. This audit report does not extend to the compiler layer, any other areas beyond the programming language, or other programming aspects that could present security risks. Cryptographic tokens are emergent technologies, they carry high levels of technical risks and uncertainty. You agree that your access and/or use, including but not limited to any services, reports, and materials, will be at your sole risk on an as-is, where-is, and as-available basis. This audit report could include false positives, false negatives, and other unpredictable results.

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ABOUT VITAL BLOCK

Vital Block provides intelligent blockchain Security Solutions. We provide solidity and Raw Code Review, testing, and auditing services. We have Partnered with 15+ Crypto Launchpads, audited 50+ smart contracts, and analyzed 200,000+ code lines. We have worked on major public blockchains e.g., Ethereum, Binance, Cronos, Doge, Polygon, Avalanche, Metis, Fantom, Bitcoin Cash, Aptos, Oasis, etc.

Vital Block is Dedicated to Making Defi & Web3 A Safer Place. We are Powered by Security engineers, developers, UI experts, and blockchain enthusiasts. Our team currently consists of 5 core members, and 4+ casual contributors.

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

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