



Security Assessment Laari Finance

Vital Block **Verified** on September 28th, 2023

 @Vital-Block

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PREPARED FOR:
Laari Finance



INTRODUCTION

Auditing Firm	 VITAL BLOCK SECURITY
Client Firm	 Laari Finance
Methodology	Automated Analysis, Manual Code Review
Language	Solidity
Contract	0x236f9ebE3A40F3b24CEa63a880704c712d5EC760
Source Code Light	Verified
License	MIT
Centralization	Active ownership
Compiler Version	v0.8.9+commit.e5eed63a
Blockchain	 BASE NETWORK
Website	http://www.laari.finance
Discord	https://discord.gg/laarifinance
Twitter	https://twitter.com/LaariFinance
Doc	https://laari-finance.gitbook.io/laari-finance/
Prelim Report Date	Sep 27 th 2023
Final Report Date	Sep 28 th 2023

 Verify the authenticity of this report on our GitHub Repo: <https://www.github.com/vital-block>




EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Vital Block Security has performed the automated and manual analysis of the LAARI FINANCE Sol code. The code was reviewed for common contract vulnerabilities and centralized exploits. Here's a quick audit summary:

Status	Critical ! 🔴	Major " 🟡	Medium # 🟡	Minor \$ 🟢	Unknown % 🟤
Open	0	0	1	3	0
Acknowledged	0	0	1	2	0
Resolved	0	0	0	0	3
Noteworthy onlyOwner Privileges	Set Taxes and Ratios, Airdrop, Set Protection Settings, Set Reward Properties, Set Reflector Settings, Set Swap Settings, Set Pair and Router				

LAARI FINANCE Smart contract has achieved the following score: **95**



i Please note that smart contracts deployed on blockchains aren't resistant to exploits, vulnerabilities and/or hacks. Blockchain and cryptography assets utilize new and emerging technologies. These technologies present a high level of ongoing risks. For a detailed understanding of risk severity, source code vulnerability, and audit limitations, kindly review the audit report thoroughly.

i Please note that centralization privileges regardless of their inherited risk status - constitute an elevated impact on smart contract safety and security.



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SCOPE OF WORK

Vital Block was consulted by LAARI FINANCE to conduct the smart contract audit of its. Sol source code. The audit scope of work is strictly limited to mentioned .Sol file only:

O.Laari.sol

 External contracts and/or interfaces dependencies are not checked due to being out of scope.

Verify audited contract's contract address and deployed link below:

Public Contract Address	
https://basescan.org/address/0x236f9ebE3A40F3b24CEa63a880704c712d5EC760	
Contract Name	LAARI FINANCE
Token Symbol	Laari
Decimals	18
Total Supply	200,000,000



AUDIT METHODOLOGY

Smart contract audits are conducted using a set of standards and procedures. Mutual collaboration is essential to performing an effective smart contract audit. Here's a brief overview of Vital Block

Security auditing process and methodology:

CONNECT

- The onboarding team gathers source codes, and specifications to make sure we understand the size, and scope of the smart contract audit.

AUDIT

- Automated analysis is performed to identify common contract vulnerabilities. We may use the following third-party frameworks and dependencies to perform the automated analysis:
 - Remix IDE Developer Tool
 - Open Zeppelin Code Analyzer
 - SWC Vulnerabilities Registry
 - DEX Dependencies, e.g., Pancakeswap, Uniswap
- Simulations are performed to identify centralized exploits causing contract and/or trade locks.
- A manual line-by-line analysis is performed to identify contract issues and centralized privileges.

We may inspect below mentioned common contract vulnerabilities, and centralized exploits:

Centralized Exploits	<ul style="list-style-type: none">○ Token Supply Manipulation○ Access Control and Authorization○ Assets Manipulation○ Ownership Control○ Liquidity Access○ Stop and Pause Trading○ Ownable Library Verification
----------------------	---



Common Contract Vulnerabilities

- Integer Overflow
- Lack of Arbitrary limits
- Incorrect Inheritance Order
- Typographical Errors
- Requirement Violation
- Gas Optimization
- Coding Style Violations
- Re-entrancy
- Third-Party Dependencies
- Potential Sandwich Attacks
- Irrelevant Codes
- Divide before multiply
- Conformance to Solidity Naming Guides
- Compiler Specific Warnings
- Language Specific Warnings

REPORT

- The auditing team provides a preliminary report specifying all the checks which have been performed and the findings thereof.
- The client's development team reviews the report and makes amendments to the codes.
- The auditing team provides the final comprehensive report with open and unresolved issues.

PUBLISH

- The client may use the audit report internally or disclose it publicly.

 It is important to note that there is no pass or fail in the audit, it is recommended to view the audit as an unbiased assessment of the safety of solidity codes.



RISK CATEGORIES

Smart contracts are generally designed to hold, approve, and transfer tokens. This makes them very tempting attack targets. A successful external attack may allow the external attacker to directly exploit. A successful centralization-related exploit may allow the privileged role to directly exploit. All risks which are identified in the audit report are categorized here for the reader to review:

Risk Type	Definition
Critical 🚨	These risks could be exploited easily and can lead to asset loss, data loss, asset, or data manipulation. They should be fixed right away.
Major 🟡	These risks are hard to exploit but very important to fix, they carry an elevated risk of smart contract manipulation, which can lead to high-risk severity.
Medium 🟡	These risks should be fixed, as they carry an inherent risk of future exploits, and hacks which may or may not impact the smart contract execution. Low-risk re-entrancy-related vulnerabilities should be fixed to deter exploits.
Minor 🟢	These risks do not pose a considerable risk to the contract or those who interact with it. They are code-style violations and deviations from standard practices. They should be highlighted and fixed nonetheless.
Unknown 🟤	These risks pose uncertain severity to the contract or those who interact with it. They should be fixed immediately to mitigate the risk uncertainty.

All statuses which are identified in the audit report are categorized here for the reader to review:

Status Type	Definition
Open	Risks are open.
Acknowledged	Risks are acknowledged, but not fixed.
Resolved	Risks are acknowledged and fixed.



CENTRALIZED PRIVILEGES

Centralization risk is the most common cause of cryptography asset loss. When a smart contract has a privileged role, the risk related to centralization is elevated.

There are some well-intended reasons have privileged roles, such as:

- **Privileged roles can be granted the power to `pause()` the contract in case of an external attack.**
- **Privileged roles can use functions like, `include()`, and `exclude()` to add or remove wallets from fees, swap checks, and transaction limits. This is useful to run a presale and to list on an exchange.**

Authorizing privileged roles to externally-owned-account (EOA) is dangerous. Lately, centralization-related losses are increasing in frequency and magnitude.






- **The client can lower centralization-related risks by implementing below mentioned practices:**
- **Privileged role's private key must be carefully secured to avoid any potential hack.**
- **Privileged role should be shared by multi-signature (multi-sig) wallets.**
- **Authorized privilege can be locked in a contract, user voting, or community DAO can be introduced to unlock the privilege.**
- **Renouncing the contract ownership, and privileged roles.**
- **Remove functions with elevated centralization risk.**

 Understand the project's initial asset distribution. Assets in the liquidity pair should be locked.

Assets outside the liquidity pair should be locked with a release schedule.



AUTOMATED ANALYSIS

Symbol	Definition
	Function modifies state
	Function is payable
	Function is internal
	Function is private
	Function is important

```

**Laari Finance** | Interface | |||
| L | totalSupply | External | ! | NO |
| L | decimals | External | ! | NO |
| L | symbol | External | ! | NO |
| L | name | External | ! | NO |
| L | getOwner | External | NO |
| L | balanceOf | External | ! | NO |
| L | transfer | External | " ! ! | NO |
| L | allowance | External | ! | NO |
| L | approve | External | " ! ! | NO |
| L | transferFrom | External | " | NO |
|||||
**IFactoryV2** | Interface | |||
| L | getPair | External | NO | |
| L | createPair | External | " | NO |
|||||
**IV2Pair** | Interface | |||
| L | factory | External | NO | |
| L | getReserves | External | NO |
| L | sync | External | " | NO |

```

|||||

| ****IRouter01**** | Interface | |||

| L | factory | External ¶ | |NO¶|

| L | Sol | External ¶ | |NO¶|

| L | addLiquidityETH | External ¶ | # |NO¶|

| L | addLiquidity | External ¶ | " |NO¶|

| L | swapExactETHorTokens | External ¶ | # |NO¶|

| L | getAmountsOut | External ¶ | |NO¶|

| L | getAmountsIn | External ¶ | |NO¶|

|||||

| ****IRouter02**** | Interface | IRouter01 |||

| L | swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External ¶ | " |NO¶|

| L | swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External ¶ | # |NO¶|

| L | swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External ¶ | " ! 🚫 |NO¶|

| L | swapExactTokensForTokens | External ¶ | " |NO¶|

|||||

| ****Protections**** | Interface | |||

| L | checkUser | External ¶ | " ! 🚫 |NO¶|

| L | setLaunch | External ¶ | " |NO¶|

| L | setLpPair | External ¶ | " |NO¶|

| L | **Larri** | External ¶ | " |NO¶|

| L | removeSniper | External ¶ | " |NO¶|

|||||

| ****Cashier**** | Interface | |||

| L | setRewardsProperties | External ¶ | " |NO¶|

| L | tally | External ¶ | " |NO¶|

| L | load | External ¶ | # |NO¶|

| L | cashout | External ¶ | " |NO¶|

| L | giveMeWelfarePlease | External ¶ | " |NO¶|

| L | getTotalDistributed | External ¶ | |NO¶|

| L | getUserInfo | External ¶ | |NO¶|

| L | getUserRealizedRewards | External ¶ | |NO¶|



```

| L | getPendingRewards | External | | | NO |
| L | initialize | External | | " | NO |
| L | getCurrentReward | External | | | NO |
|||||
| **SOL** | Implementation | SafeMath | |||
| L | <Constructor> | Public | | # | NO |
| L | transferOwner | External | | " | onlyOwner |
| L | renounceOwnership | External | | " | NO |
| L | setOperator | Public | | " | NO |
| L | renounceOriginalDeployer | External | | " | NO |
| L | <Receive ETH> | External | | # | NO |
| L | totalSupply | External | | | NO |
| L | decimals | External | | | NO |
| L | symbol | External | | | NO |
| L | name | External | | | NO |
| L | getOwner | External | | ! | NO |
| L | balanceOf | Public | | ! | NO |
| L | allowance | External | | ! | NO |
| L | approve | External | | " ! | NO |
| L | _approve | Internal | $ | " | NO |
| L | approveContractContingency | Public | | " ! | onlyOwner |
| L | transfer | External | | " | NO |
| L | transferFrom | External | | " | NO |
| L | setNewRouter | External | | " | onlyOwner |
| L | setLpPair | External | | " | onlyOwner |
| L | setInitializers | External | | " | onlyOwner |
| L | isExcludedFromFees | External | | | NO |
| L | isExcludedFromDividends | External | | | NO |
| L | isExcludedFromProtection | External | | | NO |
| L | setDividendExcluded | Public | | " | onlyOwner |
| L | setExcludedFromFees | Public | | " | onlyOwner |

```

LPV-01 POSSIBLE OVERFLOW

Category	Severity ●	Location	Status
Suboptimal	Minor	Contract/code/Laari.Sol	Acknowledged

Description

In **updateForToken**, the following equation is used inside an unchecked block

```
function _mint(address account, uint256 amount) internal virtual {
    require(account != address(0), "ERC20: mint to the zero address");

    _beforeTokenTransfer(address(0), account, amount);

    _totalSupply += amount;
    _balances[account] += amount;
    emit Transfer(address(0), account, amount);

    _afterTokenTransfer(address(0), account, amount);
}
```

Where parameters. Block **Token** Out Used is a this and override In is a this.
As these two are multiplied together in an unchecked block, they may overflow.

Recommendation

We recommend either checking for overflow in this case, or ensuring that the PairsIn is close enough it will never cause an overflow

LZT-02 POSSIBLE OVERFLOW

Category	Severity ●	Location	Status
Status Mathematical Operations	Minor	contracts/code/Laari.sol	Acknowledged

Description

In `updateForMinter`, the following equation is used inside an unchecked block

```
function _mint(address account, uint256 amount) internal virtual {
    require(account != address(0),

contract Laari is ERC20 {
    constructor() ERC20("Laari", "Laari") {
        _mint(msg.sender, 200_000_000e18);
    }
}
```

Minter can not issue more `Laari` tokens indefinitely.

Note that as of the date of publishing, the above review reflects the current understanding of known security patterns as they relate to the Laari contract.

Recommendation

We recommend either checking for overflow in this case, or ensuring that the `PairsIn` is close enough it will never cause an overflow.

LZT-03 POSSIBLE OVERFLOW

Category	Severity ●	Location	Status
Inconsistency	Informational	Contract/code/Laari.Sol	Acknowledged

Description

In `updateForaddress`, the following equation is used inside an unchecked block

```
contract ERC20 is Context, IERC20, IERC20Metadata {
    mapping(address => uint256) private _balances;

    function transfer(address to, uint256 amount) public virtual override returns (bool) {
        address owner = _msgSender();
        _transfer(owner, to, amount);
        return true;
    }
}
```






The function `address ()` does not have the override specifier. It should be noted that since `price0 > a` function that overrides only a single interface function does not require the override specifier (see doc). However, all other instances of this in the code base contain the override specifier.

Recommendation

We recommend either checking for overflow in this case, or ensuring that the `PairsIn` is close enough it will never cause an overflow.



OPTIMIZATIONS | LAARI FINANCE

ID	Title	Category	Status
FTV	Logarithm Refinement Optimization	Gas Optimization	Acknowledged 
FOP	Checks Can Be Performed Earlier	Gas Optimization	Acknowledged 
FDP	Unnecessary Use Of SafeMath	Gas Optimization	Acknowledged 
FWY	Struct Optimization	Gas Optimization	Acknowledged 
FGT	Unused State Variable	Gas Optimization	Acknowledged 

General Detectors



Recently Deployed Contract

The smart contract was deployed less than 14 days ago



Attention
Required



Incorrect Solidity Version

This contract uses an unconventional or very old version of Solidity



Attention
Required

- | | |
|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">✓ No compiler version inconsistencies found✓ No unchecked call responses found✓ No vulnerable self-destruct functions found✓ No assertion vulnerabilities found✓ No old solidity code found✓ No external delegated calls found✓ No external call dependency found✓ No vulnerable authentication calls found✓ No invalid character typos found✓ No RTL characters found✓ No dead code found✓ No risky data allocation found✓ No uninitialized state variables found✓ No uninitialized storage variables found✓ No vulnerable initialization functions found✓ No risky data handling found✓ No number accuracy bug found✓ No out-of-range number vulnerability found✓ No map data deletion vulnerabilities found | <ul style="list-style-type: none">✓ No tautologies or contradictions found✓ No faulty true/false values found✓ No innacurate divisions found✓ No redundant constructor calls found✓ No vulnerable transfers found✓ No vulnerable return values found✓ No uninitialized local variables found✓ No default function responses found✓ No missing arithmetic events found✓ No missing access control events found✓ No redundant true/false comparisons found✓ No state variables vulnerable through function calls found✓ No buggy low-level calls found✓ No expensive loops found✓ No bad numeric notation practices found✓ No missing constant declarations found✓ No missing external function declarations found✓ No vulnerable payable functions found✓ No vulnerable message values found |
|--|---|



Vulnerability Scan

REENTRANCY

✓ No reentrancy risk found

Severity	Minor
Confidence Parameter	Certain

✗ **Not Mintable:** A large amount of this token can not be minted by a private wallet or contract.

```
function _mint(address account, uint256 amount)
internal virtual {
    require(account != address(0), "ERC20: mint
to the zero address");

    _beforeTokenTransfer(address(0), account,
amount);

    _totalSupply += amount;
    _balances[account] += amount;
    emit Transfer(address(0), account, amount);

    _afterTokenTransfer(address(0), account,
amount);
}

contract Laari is ERC20 {
    constructor() ERC20("Laari", "Laari") {
        _mint(msg.sender, 200_000_000e18);
    }
}
```

Vulnerability Description

Scanning Line:



Identifier	Definition	Severity
CEN-02	Initial asset distribution	Minor \$ 

```
function _spendAllowance(
    address owner,
    address spender,
    uint256 amount
) internal virtual {
    uint256 currentAllowance = allowance(owner, spender);
    if (currentAllowance != type(uint256).max) {
        require(currentAllowance >= amount, "ERC20: insufficient allowance");
        unchecked {
            _approve(owner, spender, currentAllowance - amount);
        }
    }
}
```

Description:

Floating point calculations can vary across different architectures.

Alleviation:

This exhibit was acknowledged and ultimately discarded by the **LAARI** team due to low severity. We consider the exhibit fully attended to as it doesn't impose any meaningful security concerns.

RECOMMENDATION

Project stakeholders should be consulted during the initial asset distribution process.



Contract Owner Address:

<https://basescan.org/address/0x23e82e140dab7ec311f90ddaa35478c7f8012a71>

Audited Files

LARRI.SOL

Creator TX HASH

<https://basescan.org/tx/0xafdc0eb0603e7bf5c9748d78c3dec85e7033f07313353db6e178d2c36434ca09>

Contracts:

Contract:

LAARI: :0x236f9ebE3A40F3b24CEa63a880704c712d5EC760



Vulnerability Run check

Contract Security



Contract source code verified

This token contract is open source. You can check the contract code for details. Unsourced token contracts are likely to have malicious functions to defraud their users of their assets.



No proxy

There is no proxy in the contract. The proxy contract means contract owner can modify the function of the token and possibly effect the price.



No mint function

Mint function is transparent or non-existent. Hidden mint functions may increase the amount of tokens in circulation and effect the price of the token.



No function found that retrieves ownership

If this function exists, it is possible for the project owner to regain ownership even after relinquishing it



Owner can't change balance

The contract owner is not found to have the authority to modify the balance of tokens at other addresses.



No hidden owner

No hidden owner address was found for the token. For contract with a hidden owner, developer can still manipulate the contract even if the ownership has been abandoned.



This token can not self destruct

No self-destruct function found. If this function exists and is triggered, the contract will be destroyed, all functions will be unavailable, and all related assets will be erased.



No external call risk found

External calls would cause this token contract to be highly dependent on other contracts, which may be a potential risk.



This token is not a gas abuser

No gas abuse activity has been found.

Basic Info

Token Symbol	Laari
Token Name	Laari
Token Contract Address	0x236f...5EC760  
Contract Creator	0x23E8...012A71  
Contract Owner	--

Top 10 Holders

Token Holders: 1

Total Supply: 200000000.00

Top10 Holders Ratio


100.00%

0x23...2A71 200M (100.00%)

Owner's Holdings: 0.00 Percent: 0.00%


Creator's Holdings: 200000000.00 Percent: 100.00%

 Creator 0x23E8...012A71 200M (100.00%)

 Owner --




INHERITANCE GRAPH



Identifier	Definition	Severity
CEN-12	Centralization privileges of LAARI FINANCE	Medium # 🟡

Vulnerability 0 : No important security issue detected.

Threat level: Low



```

348  * Emits a {Transfer} event with to set to the zero address.
349
350  * Requirements:
351  *
352  * - `account` cannot be the zero address.
353  * - `account` must have at least `amount` tokens.
354  */
355  function _burn(address account, uint256 amount) internal virtual {
356      require(account != address(0), "ERC20: burn from the zero address");
357
358      _beforeTokenTransfer(account, address(0), amount);
359
360      uint256 accountBalance = _balances[account];
361      require(accountBalance >= amount, "ERC20: burn amount exceeds balance");
362      unchecked {
363          _balances[account] = accountBalance - amount;
364      }
365      _totalSupply -= amount;
366
367      emit Transfer(account, address(0), amount);
368
369      _afterTokenTransfer(account, address(0), amount);
370  }
371
372  /**
373   * @dev Burns `amount` tokens from the account.
374   * @param account The account to burn from.
375   * @param amount The amount to burn.
376   */
  
```

MANUAL REVIEW

Laari Finance: is a cutting-edge DeFi platform designed to empower crypto enthusiasts with the ultimate yield optimization experience. It stands out by supporting auto-compounding through mainstream LP and Lending Protocols, streamlining the process of growing your crypto assets.

TOKEN NAME: LAARI FINANCE

Ticker: Laari

Chain/Standard: BASE Network

LAUNGUGE: Solidity



The Laari Finance Platform Is Launching On the BASE Network

LAARI YIELD AGGREGATION

A Revolutionary Auto-Compounding Strategy for Yield Aggregation

The protocol is implemented as a set of smart contracts;
designed to prioritize censorship resistance, security, self-
custody, and maximum capital efficiency.

 [Launch Laari](#)

Built on  BASE  Linea






ISSUES CHECKING STATUS

Issue Description

Checking Status

1.	Compiler errors.	PASSED
2.	Race Conditions and reentrancy. Cross-Function Race Conditions.	PASSED
3.	Possible Delay In Data Delivery.	PASSED
4.	Oracle calls.	PASSED
5.	Front Running.	PASSED
6.	SOL Dependency.	PASSED
7.	Integer Overflow And Underflow.	PASSED
8.	DoS with Revert.	PASSED
9.	Dos With Block Gas Limit.	PASSED
10.	Methods execution permissions.	PASSED
11.	Economy Model of the contract.	PASSED
12.	The Impact Of Exchange Rate On the sol Logic.	PASSED
13.	Private use data leaks.	PASSED
14.	Malicious Event log.	PASSED
15.	Scoping and Declarations.	PASSED
16.	Uninitialized storage pointers.	PASSED
17.	Arithmetic accuracy.	PASSED
18.	Design Logic.	PASSED
19.	Cross-Function race Conditions	PASSED
20.	Save Upon Move contract Implementation and Usage.	PASSED
21.	Fallback Function Security	PASSED



AUDIT RESULT


PASSED

SMART CONTRACT AUDIT OF LAARI FINANCE

Identifier	Definition	Severity
CEN-02	Initial asset distribution	Minor 

All of the initially minted assets are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This can be an issue as the deployer and/or contract owner can distribute tokens without consulting the community.

```
constructor() {
    address msgSender = _msgSender();
    _owner = msgSender;
    emit OwnershipTransferred(address(0), msgSender);
}
```



RECOMMENDATION

Project stakeholders should be consulted during the initial asset distribution process.

RECOMMENDATION

Deployer and/or contract owner private keys are secured carefully.

Please refer to PAGE-09 CENTRALIZED PRIVILEGES for a detailed understanding.

ALLEVIATION

The LAARI FINANCE project team understands the centralization risk. Some functions are provided privileged access to ensure a good runtime behavior in the project



Identifier	Definition	Severity
COD-10	Third Party Dependencies	Minor 

Smart contract is interacting with third party protocols e.g., Pancakeswap router, cashier contract, protections contract. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised, and exploited. Moreover, upgrades in third parties can create severe impacts, e.g., increased transactional fees, deprecation of previous routers, etc.

RECOMMENDATION

Inspect and validate third party dependencies regularly, and mitigate severe impacts whenever necessary.



CERTIFICATE BY VITAL BLOCK SECURITY



DISCLAIMERS

Vital Block provides the easy-to-understand audit of Solidity, Move and Raw source codes (commonly known as smart contracts).

The smart contract for this particular audit was analyzed for common contract vulnerabilities, and centralization exploits. This audit report makes no statements or warranties on the security of the code. This audit report does not provide any warranty or guarantee regarding the absolute bug-free nature of the smart contract analyzed, nor do they provide any indication of the client's business, business model or legal compliance. This audit report does not extend to the compiler layer, any other areas beyond the programming language, or other programming aspects that could present security risks. Cryptographic tokens are emergent technologies, they carry high levels of technical risks and uncertainty. You agree that your access and/or use, including but not limited to any services, reports, and materials, will be at your sole risk on an as-is, where-is, and as-available basis. This audit report could include false positives, false negatives, and other unpredictable results.

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Vital Block provides intelligent blockchain Security Solutions. We provide solidity and Raw Code Review, testing, and auditing services. We have Partnered with 15+ Crypto Launchpads, audited 50+ smart contracts, and analyzed 200,000+ code lines. We have worked on major public blockchains e.g., Ethereum, Binance, Cronos, Doge, Polygon, Avalanche, Metis, Fantom, Bitcoin Cash, Aptos, Oasis, etc.

Vital Block is Dedicated to Making Defi & Web3 A Safer Place. We are Powered by Security engineers, developers, UI experts, and blockchain enthusiasts. Our team currently consists of 5 core members, and 4+ casual contributors.

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