



Security Assessment HADA TOKEN

Vital Block Verified on Sep 1st, 2023

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PREPARED FOR:
HACIENDA



INTRODUCTION

Auditing Firm	 VITAL BLOCK SECURITY
Client Firm	 HACIENDA TOKEN
Methodology	Automated Analysis, Manual Code Review
Language	Solidity
Contract	TOKEN 0x7bdaf7a6e6eaa846b69da14ed2c7ca7457069df3
Blockchain	Binance Smart Chain
Centralization	Active ownership
Website	https://hacienda.tech/en/
Telegram	https://t.me/hacienda_hada_en
Twitter	https://twitter.com/hacienda_hada
Discord	https://discord.gg/mzQKPARH35
Prelim Report Date	Sep 1st , 2023
Final Report Date	Sep 1st , 2023



Verify the authenticity of this report on our GitHub Repo: <https://www.github.com/vital-block>




EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Vital Block Security has performed the automated and manual analysis of the Sol code. The code was reviewed for common contract vulnerabilities and centralized exploits. Here's a quick audit summary:

Status	Critical ! 🔴	Major " 🟡	Medium # 🟡	Minor \$ 🟢	Unknown % 🟤
Open	0	0	0	2	0
Acknowledged	0	0	1	3	0
Resolved	0	0	0	0	0
Noteworthy onlyOwner Privileges	Set Taxes and Ratios, Airdrop, Set Protection Settings, Set Reward Properties, Set Reflector Settings, Set Swap Settings, Set Pair and Router				

HACIENDA Smart contract has achieved the following score: **97.0**



i Please note that smart contracts deployed on blockchains aren't resistant to exploits, vulnerabilities and/or hacks. Blockchain and cryptography assets utilize new and emerging technologies. These technologies present a high level of ongoing risks. For a detailed understanding of risk severity, source code vulnerability, and audit limitations, kindly review the audit report thoroughly.

i Please note that centralization privileges regardless of their inherited risk status - constitute an elevated impact on smart contract safety and security.



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SCOPE OF WORK

Vital Block Security was consulted by HACIENDA to conduct the smart contract audit of its .Sol source code. The audit scope of work is strictly limited to mentioned .SOL file only:

○ HACIENDA.Sol

☐ External contracts and/or interfaces dependencies are not checked due to being out of scope.

Verify audited contract's contract address and deployed link below:

Public Contract Link

0x7bdaf7a6e6eaa846b69da14ed2c7ca7457069df3

Contract Name	HACIENDA
Token Symbol	HADA
Decimals	18
Total Supply	100,000,000



AUDIT METHODOLOGY

Smart contract audits are conducted using a set of standards and procedures. Mutual collaboration is essential to performing an effective smart contract audit. Here's a brief overview of Vital Block auditing process and methodology:

CONNECT

- The onboarding team gathers source codes, and specifications to make sure we understand the size, and scope of the smart contract audit.

AUDIT

- Automated analysis is performed to identify common contract vulnerabilities. We may use the following third-party frameworks and dependencies to perform the automated analysis:
 - Remix IDE Developer Tool
 - Open Zeppelin Code Analyzer
 - SWC Vulnerabilities Registry
 - DEX Dependencies, e.g., Pancakeswap, Uniswap
- Simulations are performed to identify centralized exploits causing contract and/or trade locks.
- A manual line-by-line analysis is performed to identify contract issues and centralized privileges.

We may inspect below mentioned common contract vulnerabilities, and centralized exploits:

Centralized Exploits	<ul style="list-style-type: none">○ Token Supply Manipulation○ Access Control and Authorization○ Assets Manipulation○ Ownership Control○ Liquidity Access○ Stop and Pause Trading○ Ownable Library Verification
----------------------	---

Common Contract Vulnerabilities

- Integer Overflow
- Lack of Arbitrary limits
- Incorrect Inheritance Order
- Typographical Errors
- Requirement Violation
- Gas Optimization
- Coding Style Violations
- Re-entrancy
- Third-Party Dependencies
- Potential Sandwich Attacks
- Irrelevant Codes
- Divide before multiply
- Conformance to Solidity Naming Guides
- Compiler Specific Warnings
- Language Specific Warnings

REPORT

- The auditing team provides a preliminary report specifying all the checks which have been performed and the findings thereof.
- The client's development team reviews the report and makes amendments to the codes.
- The auditing team provides the final comprehensive report with open and unresolved issues.

PUBLISH

- The client may use the audit report internally or disclose it publicly.






 It is important to note that there is no pass or fail in the audit, it is recommended to view the audit

as an unbiased assessment of the safety of solidity codes.



RISK CATEGORIES

Smart contracts are generally designed to hold, approve, and transfer tokens. This makes them very tempting attack targets. A successful external attack may allow the external attacker to directly exploit. A successful centralization-related exploit may allow the privileged role to directly exploit. All risks which are identified in the audit report are categorized here for the reader to review:

Risk Type	Definition
Critical ! 	These risks could be exploited easily and can lead to asset loss, data loss, asset, or data manipulation. They should be fixed right away.
Major " 	These risks are hard to exploit but very important to fix, they carry an elevated risk of smart contract manipulation, which can lead to high-risk severity.
Medium # 	These risks should be fixed, as they carry an inherent risk of future exploits, and hacks which may or may not impact the smart contract execution. Low-risk re-entrancy-related vulnerabilities should be fixed to deter exploits.
Minor \$ 	These risks do not pose a considerable risk to the contract or those who interact with it. They are code-style violations and deviations from standard practices. They should be highlighted and fixed nonetheless.
Unknown % 	These risks pose uncertain severity to the contract or those who interact with it. They should be fixed immediately to mitigate the risk uncertainty.

All statuses which are identified in the audit report are categorized here for the reader to review:

Status Type	Definition
Open	Risks are open.
Acknowledged	Risks are acknowledged, but not fixed.
Resolved	Risks are acknowledged and fixed.



CENTRALIZED PRIVILEGES

Centralization risk is the most common cause of cryptography asset loss. When a smart contract has a privileged role, the risk related to centralization is elevated.

There are some well-intended reasons have privileged roles, such as:

- **Privileged roles can be granted the power to `pause()` the contract in case of an external attack.**
- **Privileged roles can use functions like, `include()`, and `exclude()` to add or remove wallets from fees, swap checks, and transaction limits. This is useful to run a presale and to list on an exchange.**


Authorizing privileged roles to externally-owned-account (EOA) is dangerous. Lately, centralization-related losses are increasing in frequency and magnitude.

- **The client can lower centralization-related risks by implementing below mentioned practices:**
- **Privileged role's private key must be carefully secured to avoid any potential hack.**
- **Privileged role should be shared by multi-signature (multi-sig) wallets.**
- **Authorized privilege can be locked in a contract, user voting, or community DAO can be introduced to unlock the privilege.**
- **Renouncing the contract ownership, and privileged roles.**
- **Remove functions with elevated centralization risk.**

 **Understand the project's initial asset distribution. Assets in the liquidity pair should be locked. Assets outside the liquidity pair should be locked with a release schedule.**



AUTOMATED ANALYSIS

Symbol	Definition
	Function modifies state
	Function is payable
	Function is internal
	Function is private
	Function is important

```

**HACIENDA** | Interface | |||
| L | totalSupply | External | ! | NO |
| L | decimals | External | ! | NO |
| L | symbol | External | ! | NO |
| L | name | External | ! | NO |
| L | getOwner | External | NO |
| L | balanceOf | External | ! | NO |
| L | transfer | External | " ! ! | NO |
| L | allowance | External | ! | NO |
| L | approve | External | " ! ! | NO |
| L | transferFrom | External | " | NO |
|||||
**IFactoryV2** | Interface | |||
| L | getPair | External | NO | |
| L | createPair | External | " | NO |
|||||
**IV2Pair** | Interface | |||
| L | factory | External | NO | |
| L | getReserves | External | NO |
| L | sync | External | " | NO |

```



|||||

| ****IRouter01**** | Interface | |||

| L | factory | External ¶ | |NO¶|

| L | BNB | External ¶ | |NO¶|

| L | addLiquidityBNB | External ¶ | # |NO¶|

| L | addLiquidity | External ¶ | " |NO¶|

| L | swapExactBNBForTokens | External ¶ | # |NO¶|

| L | getAmountsOut | External ¶ | |NO¶|

| L | getAmountsIn | External ¶ | |NO¶|

|||||

| ****IRouter02**** | Interface | IRouter01 |||

| L | swapExactTokensForBNBSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External ¶ | " |NO¶|

| L | swapExactBNBForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External ¶ | # |NO¶|

| L | swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External ¶ | " ! ● |NO¶|

| L | swapExactTokensForTokens | External ¶ | " |NO¶|

|||||

| ****Protections**** | Interface | |||

| L | checkUser | External ¶ | " ! ● |NO¶|

| L | setLaunch | External ¶ | " |NO¶|

| L | setLpPair | External ¶ | " |NO¶|

| L | **HADA** | External ¶ | " |NO¶|

| L | removeSniper | External ¶ | " |NO¶|

|||||

| ****Cashier**** | Interface | |||

| L | setRewardsProperties | External ¶ | " |NO¶|

| L | tally | External ¶ | " |NO¶|

| L | load | External ¶ | # |NO¶|

| L | cashout | External ¶ | " |NO¶|

| L | giveMeWelfarePlease | External ¶ | " |NO¶|

| L | getTotalDistributed | External ¶ | |NO¶|

| L | getUserInfo | External ¶ | |NO¶|

| L | getUserRealizedRewards | External ¶ | |NO¶|



```

| L | getPendingRewards | External | | | NO | |
| L | initialize | External | | " | NO |
| L | getCurrentReward | External | | | NO |
|||||
| **SOL** | Implementation | SafeMath | |||
| L | <Constructor> | Public | | # | NO |
| L | transferOwner | External | | " | onlyOwner |
| L | renounceOwnership | External | | " | NO |
| L | setOperator | Public | | " | NO |
| L | renounceOriginalDeployer | External | | " | NO |
| L | <Receive Ether> | External | | # | NO |
| L | totalSupply | External | | | NO |
| L | decimals | External | | | NO |
| L | symbol | External | | | NO |
| L | name | External | | | NO |
| L | getOwner | External | | ! | NO |
| L | balanceOf | Public | | ! | NO |
| L | allowance | External | | ! | NO |
| L | approve | External | | " ! | NO |
| L | _approve | Internal | $ | " | |
| L | approveContractContingency | Public | | " ! | onlyOwner |
| L | transfer | External | | " | NO |
| L | transferFrom | External | | " | NO |
| L | setNewRouter | External | | " ! | onlyOwner |
| L | setLpPair | External | | " ! | onlyOwner |
| L | setInitializers | External | | " ! | onlyOwner |
| L | isExcludedFromFees | External | | | NO |
| L | isExcludedFromDividends | External | | | NO |
| L | isExcludedFromProtection | External | | | NO |
| L | setDividendExcluded | | Public | | ! | onlyOwner |
| L | setExcludedFromFees | | Public | | ! | onlyOwner |

```



Vulnerability Scan

REENTRANCY

Severity

Minor ●

Issue Location in Code

Certain

Vulnerability Description

NOTE: In a re-entrance attack, a malicious contract calls back into the calling contract before the first invocation of the function is finished. This may cause the different invocations of the function to interact in undesirable ways, especially in cases where the function is updating state variables after the external calls.

Scanning Line:

Low level call in

```
ERC1967UpgradeUpgradeable._functionDelegateCall  
ll(address,bytes) [REDACTED]  
(ERC1967UpgradeUpgradeable.sol#198-204): -  
(success, returndata) = target.delegatecall(data)  
(ERC1967UpgradeUpgradeable.sol#202)
```

```
function _functionDelegateCall(address target,  
bytes memory data) private returns (bytes  
memory) { [REDACTED]  
require(AddressUpgradeable.isContract(target),  
"Address: delegate call to non-contract"); // solhint-  
disable-next-line avoid-low-level-calls (bool success,  
bytes memory returndata) = [REDACTED]  
target.delegatecall(data); return [REDACTED]  
AddressUpgradeable.verifyCallResult(success,  
returndata, "Address: low-level delegate call  
failed"); }
```

Repository:

<https://github.com/HACIENDA>

All Audited Files

HACIENDA.sol

Contract Creator

0x53b824334c4462aad8cf7b31fa2c873f5f438f89

Creator Txn Hash

0xf203b20ce1090f6424099378cee804c4de42465b44f970030a8e0ddf2e4ae1c

Contracts:

Contract:

TOKEN: **0x7bdaf7a6e6eaa846b69da14ed2c7ca7457069df3**



Identifier	Definition	Severity
CEN-02	Initial asset distribution	Minor 

```
function initialize() initializer public {  
    __ERC20_init("Hacienda", "HADA"); __Ownable_init();  
    __UUPSUpgradeable_init(); _mint(msg.sender, 100000000 *  
    10 ** decimals()); }
```

Description:

Floating point calculations can vary across different architectures.

Recommendation: Replace with sdk.Dec.

Alleviation:






This exhibit was acknowledged and ultimately discarded by the **HACIENDA** team due to low severity. We consider the exhibit fully attended to as it doesn't impose any meaningful security concerns.

RECOMMENDATION

Project stakeholders should be consulted during the initial asset distribution process.



OPTIMIZATIONS | HACIENDA

ID	Title	Category	Status
H2T- 007	Logarithm Refinement Optimization	Gas Optimization	Acknowledged 
H2D- 323	Checks Can Be Performed Earlier	Gas Optimization	Acknowledged 
H2K- 679	Unnecessary Use Of SafeMath	Gas Optimization	Acknowledged 
H2B- 122	Struct Optimization	Gas Optimization	Acknowledged 
H2S-067	Unused State Variable	Gas Optimization	Acknowledged 

General Detectors



Public Functions Should be Declared External

Some functions in this contract should be declared as external in order to save gas.



Attention
Required



Numeric Notation Best Practices

The numeric notation used in this contract is unconventional, possibly worsening the reading/debugging experience



Attention
Required



Uninitialized Local Variables

This contract's local variables are not all initialized, potentially resulting in lost funds or other exploits.



Attention
Required

- | | |
|--|--|
| ✓ No compiler version inconsistencies found | ✓ No tautologies or contradictions found |
| ✓ No unchecked call responses found | ✓ No faulty true/false values found |
| ✓ No vulnerable self-destruct functions found | ✓ No inaccurate divisions found |
| ✓ No assertion vulnerabilities found | ✓ No redundant constructor calls found |
| ✓ No old solidity code found | ✓ No vulnerable transfers found |
| ✓ No external delegated calls found | ✓ No vulnerable return values found |
| ✓ No external call dependency found | ✓ No uninitialized local variables found |
| ✓ No vulnerable authentication calls found | ✓ No default function responses found |
| ✓ No invalid character typos found | ✓ No missing arithmetic events found |
| ✓ No RTL characters found | ✓ No missing access control events found |
| ✓ No dead code found | ✓ No redundant true/false comparisons found |
| ✓ No risky data allocation found | ✓ No state variables vulnerable through function calls found |
| ✓ No uninitialized state variables found | ✓ No buggy low-level calls found |
| ✓ No uninitialized storage variables found | ✓ No expensive loops found |
| ✓ No vulnerable initialization functions found | ✓ No bad numeric notation practices found |
| ✓ No risky data handling found | ✓ No missing constant declarations found |
| ✓ No number accuracy bug found | ✓ No missing external function declarations found |
| ✓ No out-of-range number vulnerability found | ✓ No vulnerable payable functions found |
| ✓ No map data deletion vulnerabilities found | ✓ No vulnerable message values found |



Vulnerability Run check

Hacienda / HADA

01/09/2023 02:38 AM UTC+8

Contract Info

Total supply	100000000
Transaction Tax	Buy 0.00 % / Sell 0.00 %
Dex 1	PancakeV2
Dex 2	Pancake V3

Risk Analysis

✔ Contract source code verified

This token contract is open source. You can check the contract code for details. Unsourced token contracts are likely to have malicious functions to defraud their users of their assets.

✔ No mint function

Mint function is transparent or non-existent. Hidden mint functions may increase the amount of tokens in circulation and effect the price of the token.

✔ Owner cant change balance

The contract owner does not have the authority to modify the balance of tokens at other addresses.

✔ Proxy contract

This contract is an Admin Upgradeability Proxy. The proxy contract means the contract owner can modify the function of the token and could possibly effect the price. There is possibly a way for the team to Rug or Scam. Please confirm the details with the project team before buying.

✔

No function to retrieve ownership

If this function exists, it is possible for the project owner to regain ownership even after relinquishing it.



✔ No trading cooldown

The token contract has no trading cooldown function. If there is a trading cooldown function, the user will not be able to sell the token within a certain time or block after buying.

✔ No Anti Whale

There is no limit to the number of token transactions. The number of scam token transactions may be limited (honeypot risk).

✔ No whitelist function

Whitelist function found

✔ No blacklist function

No blacklist function is included.

Holders

Holder count	1121
0x80...3367	51554733.90 (51.55%)
🔒 PinkLock02	27000000.00 (27.00%)

Locked Details

No. 1 10000000.00 HADA

Start/Update Time : 2023-08-22 01:44:06 UTC+8
End Time : 2025-02-07 08:01:00 UTC+8

No. 2 8000000.00 HADA

Start/Update Time : 2023-04-18 17:40:35 UTC+8
End Time : 2024-04-01 08:00:00 UTC+8

No. 3 6000000.00 HADA

Start/Update Time : 2023-05-01 15:35:08 UTC+8
End Time : 2023-04-30 04:00:00 UTC+8

No. 4 3000000.00 HADA

Start/Update Time : 2023-04-18 17:34:38 UTC+8
End Time : 2023-10-01 08:00:00 UTC+8

🔒 0xc1...8e9f	9903215.81 (9.90%)
0xd3...6fff	4998989.00 (5.00%)
0xd6...51d1	2985000.20 (2.99%)
🔒 0xdc...9d37	1607869.41 (1.61%)
0xb6...ac97	1000000.00 (1.00%)
🔒 PancakeV2	902696.81 (0.90%)
0xbc...46cd	25867.01 (0.03%)
0x64...1c8a	5843.86 (0.01%)

Creator

OWNERSHIP NOT RENOUNCED

0x53...8f89	0.20 (0.00%)
-------------	--------------

Owner


...	0.00 (0.00%)
-----	--------------

Liquidity Pool

0x80...3367	99.98 %
🔒 0x0e...9706	0.02 %
🔒 Null Address	0.00 %



INHERITANCE GRAPH



Identifier	Definition	Severity
CEN-12	Centralization privileges of HACIENDA	Medium # 🟡

Vulnerability 0 : No important security issue detected.

Threat level: Low

```

8  /**
9   * @dev This contract implements an upgradeable proxy. It is upgradeable because calls are delegated to an
10  * implementation address that can be changed. This address is stored in storage in the location specified by
11  * https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1967[EIP1967], so that it doesn't conflict with the storage layout of the
12  * implementation behind the proxy.
13  */
14  contract ERC1967Proxy is Proxy, ERC1967Upgrade {
15      /**
16       * @dev Initializes the upgradeable proxy with an initial implementation specified by `_logic`.
17       *
18       * If `_data` is nonempty, it's used as data in a delegate call to `_logic`. This will typically be an encoded
19       * function call, and allows initializing the storage of the proxy like a Solidity constructor.
20       */
21      constructor(address _logic, bytes memory _data) payable {
22          assert(_IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT == bytes32(uint256(keccak256("eip1967.proxy.implementation")) - 1));
23          _upgradeToAndCall(_logic, _data, false);
24      }
25
26      /**
27       * @dev Returns the current implementation address.
28       */
29      function _implementation() internal view virtual override returns (address impl) {
30          return ERC1967Upgrade._getImplementation();
31      }
32  }
  
```

HZA-02 POSSIBLE OVERFLOW

Category	Severity ●	Location	Status
Status Mathematical Operations	Minor	CODE/HACIENDA.sol	Acknowledged

Description

In **UpdateForOwner**, the following equation is used inside an unchecked block

```
function initialize() initializer public { __ERC20_init("Hacienda", "HADA"); __Ownable_init();  
__UUPSUpgradeable_init(); _mint(msg.sender, 100000000 * 10 ** decimals()); }
```

Owner can not issue more **HADA** tokens indefinitely.

Note that as of the date of publishing, the above review reflects the current understanding of known security patterns as they relate to the **HADA** contract.

Recommendation

We recommend either checking for overflow in this case, or ensuring that the PairsIn is close enough it will never cause an overflow.

GZT-05 POSSIBLE OVERFLOW

Category	Severity ●	Location	Status
Inconsistency	Informational	CODE/HACIENDA.sol	Acknowledged

Description

In `UpdateForaddress`, the following equation is used inside an unchecked block

```
constructor(address _logic, bytes memory _data) payable {  
    assert(_IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT ==  
bytes32(uint256(keccak256("eip1967.proxy.implementation")) - 1));  
    _upgradeToAndCall(_logic, _data, false);  
}
```

The function `address ()` does not have the override specifier. It should be noted that since `payable0 >` a function that overrides only a single interface function does not require the override specifier (see doc). However, all other instances of this in the code base contain the override specifier.

Recommendation

We recommend either checking for overflow in this case, or ensuring that the `PairsIn` is close enough it will never cause an overflow.

MANUAL REVIEW

HACIENDA: HADA is an abbreviation for the Spanish word "Hacienda". This is the name of our unique project that was launched in 2021. It grew out of a small startup focused on generating income from rural real estate.

TOKEN NAME: HACIENDA

Ticker: HADA

Chain/Standard: Binance Smart Chain

Total Supply: 100,000,000



Outstanding features of HACIENDA Is Launching On Binance Smart Chain



Our aim

To provide HADA token holders with the opportunity to earn profits from real estate rental businesses.

To build an independent ecosystem of profitable real estate ventures worldwide.

To offer token holders benefits such as accommodation discounts, access to exclusive profit diversification tools, and other additional income streams.

[Read more](#)





ISSUES CHECKING STATUS

Issue Description

Checking Status

1.	Compiler errors.	PASSED
2.	Race Conditions and reentrancy. Cross-Function Race Conditions.	PASSED
3.	Possible Delay In Data Delivery.	PASSED
4.	Oracle calls.	PASSED
5.	Front Running.	PASSED
6.	Sol Dependency.	PASSED
7.	Integer Overflow And Underflow.	PASSED
8.	DoS with Revert.	PASSED
9.	Dos With Block Gas Limit.	PASSED
10.	Methods execution permissions.	PASSED
11.	Economy Model of the contract.	PASSED
12.	The Impact Of Exchange Rate On the solidity Logic.	PASSED
13.	Private use data leaks.	PASSED
14.	Malicious Event log.	PASSED
15.	Scoping and Declarations.	PASSED
16.	Uninitialized storage pointers.	PASSED
17.	Arithmetic accuracy.	PASSED
18.	Design Logic.	PASSED
19.	Cross-Function race Conditions	PASSED
20.	Save Upon solidity contract Implementation and Usage.	PASSED
21.	Fallback Function Security	PASSED



AUDIT RESULT

PASSED

SMART CONTRACT AUDIT OF HACIENDA

Identifier	Definition	Severity
CEN-02	Initial asset distribution	Minor \$ 

All of the initially minted assets are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This can be an issue as the deployer and/or contract owner can distribute tokens without consulting the community.

```
try IERC1822ProxiableUpgradeable(newImplementation).proxiableUUID()  
returns (bytes32 slot) {
```

RECOMMENDATION

Project stakeholders should be consulted during the initial asset distribution process.



RECOMMENDATION

Deployer and/or contract owner private keys are secured carefully.

Please refer to PAGE-09 CENTRALIZED PRIVILEGES for a detailed understanding.

ALLEVIATION

The HACIENDA project team understands the centralization risk. Some functions are provided privileged access to ensure a good runtime behavior in the project



CERTIFICATE BY VITAL BLOCK SECURITY



Identifier	Definition	Severity
COD-10	Third Party Dependencies	Minor 

Smart contract is interacting with third party protocols e.g., Pancakeswap router, cashier contract, protections contract. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised, and exploited. Moreover, upgrades in third parties can create severe impacts, e.g., increased transactional fees, deprecation of previous routers, etc..

RECOMMENDATION

Inspect and validate third party dependencies regularly, and mitigate severe impacts whenever necessary.



DISCLAIMERS

Vital Block provides the easy-to-understand audit of Solidity, Move and Raw source codes (commonly known as smart contracts).

The smart contract for this particular audit was analyzed for common contract vulnerabilities, and centralization exploits. This audit report makes no statements or warranties on the security of the code. This audit report does not provide any warranty or guarantee regarding the absolute bug-free nature of the smart contract analyzed, nor do they provide any indication of the client's business, business model or legal compliance. This audit report does not extend to the compiler layer, any other areas beyond the programming language, or other programming aspects that could present security risks. Cryptographic tokens are emergent technologies, they carry high levels of technical risks and uncertainty. You agree that your access and/or use, including but not limited to any services, reports, and materials, will be at your sole risk on an as-is, where-is, and as-available basis. This audit report could include false positives, false negatives, and other unpredictable results.

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Vital Block provides intelligent blockchain Security Solutions. We provide solidity and Raw Code Review, testing, and auditing services. We have Partnered with 15+ Crypto Launchpads, audited 50+ smart contracts, and analyzed 200,000+ code lines. We have worked on major public blockchains e.g., Ethereum, Binance, Cronos, Doge, Polygon, Avalanche, Metis, Fantom, Bitcoin Cash, Aptos, Oasis, etc.

Vital Block is Dedicated to Making Defi & Web3 A Safer Place. We are Powered by Security engineers, developers, UI experts, and blockchain enthusiasts. Our team currently consists of 5 core members, and 4+ casual contributors.

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