

Security Assessment

MAROSCACOIN

Verified **On May 24th**, 2024

 @Vital-Block

 @VB_Audit

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PREPARED FOR:
HODLPAD






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INTRODUCTION

| | |
|---------------------------|--|
| Auditing Firm |  VITAL BLOCK SECURITY |
| Client Firm |  MAROSCACOIN |
| Methodology | Automated Analysis, Manual Code Review. |
| Language | Solidity |
| Contract | 0xf9f842f855E76B23fC2E48c87348995ca65Cfa92 |
| Source Code Light | Verified |
| License | MIT |
| Centralization | Active ownership |
| Compiler Version | v0.8.16+commit.07a7930e |
| Blockchain |  BINANCE SMART CHAIN |
| Website | https://www.marosca.cc/ |
| Telegram Group | https://t.me/marosca_coin |
| Twitter | https://x.com/maroscacoin |
| Doc | https://marosca.gitbook.io/marosca |
| Prelim Report Date | MAY 24 th 2024 |
| Final Report Date | MAY 24 th 2024 |

 Verify the authenticity of this report on our GitHub Repo: <https://www.github.com/vital-block>



Document Properties


| | |
|-----------------------|---|
| Client | MAROSCACOIN |
| Title | Smart Contract Audit Report |
| Target | MAROSCACOIN |
| Audit Version | 1.0 |
| Author | Akhmetshin Marat |
| Auditors | Akhmetshin Marat, James BK, Benny Matin |
| Reviewed by | Dima Meru |
| Approved by | Prince Mitchell |
| Classification | Public |

Version Info

| Version | Date | Author(s) | Description |
|---------|-----------------------------|-------------|-------------------|
| 1.0 | MAY 24 TH , 2024 | James BK | Final Released |
| 1.0-AP | MAY 24 TH , 2024 | Benny Matin | Release Candidate |

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In the following, we show the specific pull request and the commit hash value used in this audit.

- <https://bscscan.com/token/0xf9f842f855e76b23fc2e48c87348995ca65cfa92> (MOD8410)
- <https://bscscan.com/token/0xf9f842f855e76b23fc2e48c87348995ca65cfa92#code> (HODH511)

About Vital Block Security

Vital Block Security provides professional, thorough, fast, and easy-to-understand smart contract security audit. We do in-depth and penetrative static, manual, automated, and intelligent analysis of the smart contract. Some of our automated scans include tools like ConsenSys MythX, Mythril, Slither, Surya. We can audit custom smart contracts, DApps, Rust, NFTs, etc (including the service of smart contract auditing). We are reachable at Telegram (https://t.me/vital_block), Twitter (http://twitter.com/Vb_Audit), or Email (info@vitalblock.org).

Table 1.2: Vulnerability Severity Classification

| Impact | High | Medium | Low |
|------------|----------|--------|--------|
| | Critical | High | Medium |
| | High | Medium | Low |
| Low | Medium | Low | Low |
| Likelihood | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |

Methodology (1)

To standardize the evaluation, we define the following terminology based on the OWASP Risk Rating Methodology [4]:

- Likelihood represents how likely a particular vulnerability is to be uncovered and exploited in the wild;
- Impact measures the technical loss and business damage of a successful attack;
- Severity demonstrates the overall criticality of the risk.

SCOPE OF WORK

Vital Block was consulted by **MAROSCACOIN** to conduct the smart contract audit of its Sol source code. The audit scope of work is strictly limited to mentioned .SOL file only:

O. MAROSCACOIN.Sol

 External contracts and/or interfaces dependencies are not checked due to being out of scope.

Verify audited contract code Repo.

Public Contract Link

<https://bscscan.com/token/0xf9f842f855e76b23fc2e48c87348995ca65cfa92#code>



AUDIT METHODOLOGY

Smart contract audits are conducted using a set of standards and procedures. Mutual collaboration is essential to performing an effective smart contract audit. Here's a brief overview of Vital Block Security auditing process and methodology:

CONNECT

- The onboarding team gathers source codes, and specifications to make sure we understand the size, and scope of the smart contract audit.

AUDIT

- Automated analysis is performed to identify common contract vulnerabilities. We may use the following third-party frameworks and dependencies to perform the automated analysis:
 - Remix IDE Developer Tool
 - Open Zeppelin Code Analyzer
 - SWC Vulnerabilities Registry
 - DEX Dependencies, e.g., Pancakeswap, Uniswap
- Simulations are performed to identify centralized exploits causing contract and/or trade locks.
- A manual line-by-line analysis is performed to identify contract issues and centralized privileges.

We may inspect below mentioned common contract vulnerabilities, and centralized exploits:

| | |
|----------------------|---|
| Centralized Exploits | <ul style="list-style-type: none">○ Token Supply Manipulation○ Access Control and Authorization○ Assets Manipulation○ Ownership Control○ Liquidity Access○ Stop and Pause Trading○ Ownable Library Verification |
|----------------------|---|

Common Contract Vulnerabilities

- **Integer Overflow**
- **Lack of Arbitrary limits**
- **Incorrect Inheritance Order**
- **Typographical Errors**
- **Requirement Violation**
- **Gas Optimization**
- **Coding Style Violations**
- **Re-entrancy**
- **Third-Party Dependencies**
- **Potential Sandwich Attacks**
- **Irrelevant Codes**
- **Divide before multiply**
- **Conformance to Solidity Naming Guides**
- **Compiler Specific Warnings**
- **Language Specific Warnings**

REPORT

- **The auditing team provides a preliminary report specifying all the checks which have been performed and the findings thereof.**
- **The client's development team reviews the report and makes amendments to the codes.**
- **The auditing team provides the final comprehensive report with open and unresolved issues.**

PUBLISH

- **The client may use the audit report internally or disclose it publicly.**


 **It is important to note that there is no pass or fail in the audit, it is recommended to view the audit as an unbiased assessment of the safety of solidity codes.**








Table 1.0 The Full Audit Checklist


| Category | Checklist Items |
|------------------------------------|---|
| Basic Coding Bugs | Constructor Mismatch |
| | Ownership Takeover |
| | Redundant Fallback Function |
| | Overflows & Underflows |
| | Reentrancy |
| | Money-Giving Bug |
| | Blackhole |
| | Unauthorized Self-Destruct |
| | Revert DoS |
| | Unchecked External Call |
| | Gasless Send |
| | Send Instead Of Transfer |
| | Costly Loop |
| | (Unsafe) Use Of Untrusted Libraries |
| | (Unsafe) Use Of Predictable Variables |
| | Transaction Ordering Dependence |
| | Deprecated Uses |
| Semantic Consistency Checks | Semantic Consistency Checks |
| Advanced DeFi Scrutiny | Business Logics Review |
| | Functionality Checks |
| | Authentication Management |
| | Access Control & Authorization |
| | Oracle Security |
| | Digital Asset Escrow |
| | Kill-Switch Mechanism |
| | Operation Trails & Event Generation |
| | ERC20 Idiosyncrasies Handling |
| | Frontend-Contract Integration |
| | Deployment Consistency |
| | Holistic Risk Management |
| Additional Recommendations | Avoiding Use of Variadic Byte Array |
| | Using Fixed Compiler Version |
| | Making Visibility Level Explicit |
| | Making Type Inference Explicit |
| | Adhering To Function Declaration Strictly |
| | Following Other Best Practices |



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Vital Block Security has performed the automated and manual analysis of the **MAROSCACOIN** Sol code. The code was reviewed for common contract vulnerabilities and centralized exploits. Here's a quick audit summary:

| Status | Critical !  | Major "  | Medium #  | Minor \$  | Unknown %  |
|--|--|---|---|--|---|
| Open | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 |
| Acknowledged | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Resolved | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Noteworthy OnlyOwner Privileges | | | | | |
| Set Taxes and Ratios, Airdrop, Set Protection Settings, Set Reward Properties, Set Reflector Settings, Set Swap Settings, Set Pair and Router | | | | | |

MAROSCACOIN Smart contract has achieved the following score: **95.0**



-  Please note that smart contracts deployed on blockchains aren't resistant to exploits, vulnerabilities and/or hacks. Blockchain and cryptography assets utilize new and emerging technologies. These technologies present a high level of ongoing risks. For a detailed understanding of risk severity, source code vulnerability, and audit limitations, kindly review the audit report thoroughly.
-  Please note that centralization privileges regardless of their inherited risk status - constitute an elevated impact on smart contract safety and security.



CENTRALIZED PRIVILEGES

Centralization risk is the most common cause of cryptography asset loss. When a smart contract has a privileged role, the risk related to centralization is elevated.

There are some well-intended reasons have privileged roles, such as:

- **Privileged roles can be granted the power to `pause()` the contract in case of an external attack.**
- **Privileged roles can use functions like, `include()`, and `exclude()` to add or remove wallets from fees, swap checks, and transaction limits. This is useful to run a presale and to list on an exchange.**

Authorizing privileged roles to externally-owned-account (EOA) is dangerous. Lately, centralization-related losses are increasing in frequency and magnitude.






- **The client can lower centralization-related risks by implementing below mentioned practices:**
- **Privileged role's private key must be carefully secured to avoid any potential hack.**
- **Privileged role should be shared by multi-signature (multi-sig) wallets.**
- **Authorized privilege can be locked in a contract, user voting, or community DAO can be introduced to unlock the privilege.**
- **Renouncing the contract ownership, and privileged roles.**
- **Remove functions with elevated centralization risk.**

 Understand the project's initial asset distribution. Assets in the liquidity pair should be locked.

Assets outside the liquidity pair should be locked with a release schedule.

RISK CATEGORIES

Smart contracts are generally designed to hold, approve, and transfer tokens. This makes them very tempting attack targets. A successful external attack may allow the external attacker to directly exploit. A successful centralization-related exploit may allow the privileged role to directly exploit. All risks which are identified in the audit report are categorized here for the reader to review:

| Risk Type | Definition |
|--|---|
| Critical !  | These risks could be exploited easily and can lead to asset loss, data loss, asset, or data manipulation. They should be fixed right away. |
| Major "  | These risks are hard to exploit but very important to fix, they carry an elevated risk of smart contract manipulation, which can lead to high-risk severity. |
| Medium #  | These risks should be fixed, as they carry an inherent risk of future exploits, and hacks which may or may not impact the smart contract execution. Low-risk re-entrancy-related vulnerabilities should be fixed to deter exploits. |
| Minor \$  | These risks do not pose a considerable risk to the contract or those who interact with it. They are code-style violations and deviations from standard practices. They should be highlighted and fixed nonetheless. |
| Unknown %  | These risks pose uncertain severity to the contract or those who interact with it. They should be fixed immediately to mitigate the risk uncertainty. |

All statuses which are identified in the audit report are categorized here for the reader to review:

| Status Type | Definition |
|---------------------|--|
| Open | Risks are open. |
| Acknowledged | Risks are acknowledged, but not fixed. |
| Resolved | Risks are acknowledged and fixed. |



Key Findings






Overall, these contracts are well-designed and engineered, though the implementation can be improved by resolving the identified issues (shown in Table [2.1](#)), 1 medium-severity vulnerabilities, 2 low-severity vulnerabilities, and 1 informational recommendations.

Table 2.1: Key **MAROSCAVIN** Audit Findings

| ID | Severity | Title | Category | Status |
|---------|---------------|--|-----------------|--------|
| MAR-001 | Informational | In updateForOwner, Relevant Function Snippet | Coding Practice | Fixed |
| MAR-002 | Low | In updateFormapping , the following equation is used inside an unchecked block | Business Logic | Fixed |

Beside the identified issues, we emphasize that for any user-facing applications and services, it is always important to develop necessary risk-control mechanisms and make contingency plans, which may need to be exercised before the mainnet deployment. The risk-control mechanisms should kick in at the very moment when the contracts are being deployed on mainnet. Please refer to page [10](#) for details.

AUTOMATED ANALYSIS

| Symbol | Definition |
|---|-------------------------|
|  | Function modifies state |
|  | Function is payable |
|  | Function is internal |
|  | Function is private |
|  | Function is important |

```

**MAROSCACOIN** | Interface | |||
| L | totalSupply | External ! | ! | NO ! |
| L | decimals | External ! | ! | NO ! |
| L | symbol | External ! | ! | NO ! |
| L | name | External ! | ! | NO ! |
| L | getOwner | External ! | | NO ! |
| L | balanceOf | External ! | ! | NO ! |
| L | transfer | External ! | " ! ! | NO ! |
| L | allowance | External ! | ! | NO ! |
| L | approve | External ! | " ! ! | NO ! |
| L | transferFrom | External ! | " | NO ! |
|||||
**IFactoryV2** | Interface | |||
| L | getPair | External ! | | NO ! |
| L | createPair | External ! | " | NO ! |
|||||
**IV2Pair** | Interface | |||
| L | factory | External ! | | NO ! |
| L | getReserves | External ! | | NO ! |
| L | sync | External ! | " | NO ! |

```

|||||

| ****IRouter01**** | Interface | |||

| L | factory | External ! | |NO!|

| L | BNB | External ! | |NO!|

| L | addLiquidityBNB | External ! | # |NO!|

| L | addLiquidity | External ! | " |NO!|

| L | swapExactBNBForTokens | External ! | # |NO!|

| L | getAmountsOut | External ! | |NO!|

| L | getAmountsIn | External ! | |NO!|

|||||

| ****IRouter02**** | Interface | IRouter01 |||

| L | swapExactTokensForBNBSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External ! | " |NO!|

| L | swapExactBNBForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External ! | # |NO!|

| L | swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External ! | " ! |NO!|

| L | swapExactTokensForTokens | External ! | " |NO!|

|||||

| ****Protections**** | Interface | |||

| L | checkUser | External ! | " ! |NO!|

| L | setLaunch | External ! | " ! |NO!|

| L | setLpPair | External ! | " ! |NO!|

| L | **Marosca** | External ! | " |NO!|

| L | removeSniper | External ! | " |NO!|

|||||

| ****Cashier**** | Interface | |||

| L | setRewardsProperties | External ! | " |NO!|

| L | tally | External ! | " |NO!|

| L | load | External ! | # |NO!|

| L | cashout | External ! | " |NO!|

| L | giveMeWelfarePlease | External ! | " |NO!|

| L | getTotalDistributed | External ! | |NO!|

| L | getUserInfo | External ! | |NO!|

| L | getUserRealizedRewards | External ! | |NO!|








```

| L | getPendingRewards | External ! | | NO! |
| L | initialize | External ! | " | NO! |
| L | getCurrentReward | External ! | | NO! |
|||||
| **SOL** | Implementation | SafeMath |||
| L | <Constructor> | Public ! | # | NO! |
| L | transferOwner | External ! | " | onlyOwner |
| L | renounceOwnership | External ! | " | NO! |
| L | setOperator | Public ! | " | NO! |
| L | renounceOriginalDeployer | External ! | " | NO! |
| L | <Receive Ether> | External ! | # | NO! |
| L | totalSupply | External ! | | NO! |
| L | decimals | External ! | | NO! |
| L | symbol | External ! | | NO! |
| L | name | External ! | | NO! |
| L | getOwner | External ! | ! | NO! |
| L | balanceOf | Public ! | ! | NO! |
| L | allowance | External ! | ! | NO! |
| L | approve | External ! | " ! | NO! |
| L | _approve | Internal $ | " | |
| L | approveContractContingency | Public ! | " ! | onlyOwner |
| L | transfer | External ! | " | NO! |
| L | transferFrom | External ! | " | NO! |
| L | setNewRouter | External ! | " | onlyOwner |
| L | setLpPair | External ! | " | onlyOwner |
| L | setInitializers | External ! | " | onlyOwner |
| L | isExcludedFromFees | External ! | | NO! |
| L | isExcludedFromDividends | External ! | | NO! |
| L | isExcludedFromProtection | External ! | | NO! |
| L | setDividendExcluded | Public ! | " | onlyOwner |
| L | setExcludedFromFees | Public ! | " | onlyOwner |

```


OPTIMIZATIONS | MAROSCACOIN

| ID | Title | Category | Status |
|-----|-----------------------------------|------------------|--|
| BTV | Logarithm Refinement Optimization | Gas Optimization | Acknowledged  |
| BOP | Checks Can Be Performed Earlier | Gas Optimization | Acknowledged  |
| BDP | Unnecessary Use Of SafeMath | Gas Optimization | Acknowledged  |
| BWY | Struct Optimization | Gas Optimization | Acknowledged  |
| BGT | Unused State Variable | Gas Optimization | Acknowledged  |

General Detectors



Transfer Limit

The max/min amount of token transferred can be limited (max could be set to 0).



Attention
Required



Misuse of Boolean Constant

The usage of specific true/false values in this contract may lead to errors.



Attention
Required



Division Before Multiplication

The order of operations used may result in a loss of precision.



Attention
Required

- | | |
|--|--|
| ✓ No compiler version inconsistencies found | ✓ No tautologies or contradictions found |
| ✓ No unchecked call responses found | ✓ No faulty true/false values found |
| ✓ No vulnerable self-destruct functions found | ✓ No inaccurate divisions found |
| ✓ No assertion vulnerabilities found | ✓ No redundant constructor calls found |
| ✓ No old solidity code found | ✓ No vulnerable transfers found |
| ✓ No external delegated calls found | ✓ No vulnerable return values found |
| ✓ No external call dependency found | ✓ No uninitialized local variables found |
| ✓ No vulnerable authentication calls found | ✓ No default function responses found |
| ✓ No invalid character typos found | ✓ No missing arithmetic events found |
| ✓ No RTL characters found | ✓ No missing access control events found |
| ✓ No dead code found | ✓ No redundant true/false comparisons found |
| ✓ No risky data allocation found | ✓ No state variables vulnerable through function calls found |
| ✓ No uninitialized state variables found | ✓ No buggy low-level calls found |
| ✓ No uninitialized storage variables found | ✓ No expensive loops found |
| ✓ No vulnerable initialization functions found | ✓ No bad numeric notation practices found |
| ✓ No risky data handling found | ✓ No missing constant declarations found |
| ✓ No number accuracy bug found | ✓ No missing external function declarations found |
| ✓ No out-of-range number vulnerability found | ✓ No vulnerable payable functions found |
| ✓ No map data deletion vulnerabilities found | ✓ No vulnerable message values found |



Vulnerability Run check

Risk Analysis

✓ Contract source code verified

This token contract is open source. You can check the contract code for details. Unsourced token contracts are likely to have malicious functions to defraud their users of their assets.

✓ No mint function

Mint function is transparent or non-existent. Hidden mint functions may increase the amount of tokens in circulation and effect the price of the token.

✓ Owner cant change balance

The contract owner does not have the authority to modify the balance of tokens at other addresses.

✓ No Proxy

There is no proxy in the contract. The proxy contract means contract owner can modify the function of the token and possibly effect the price.

✓ No function to retrieve ownership

If this function exists, it is possible for the project owner to regain ownership even after relinquishing it.



Honeypot Risk

✓ This does not appear to be a honeypot

We are not aware of any code that prevents the sale of tokens.

✓ No trading cooldown

The token contract has no trading cooldown function. If there is a trading cooldown function, the user will not be able to sell the token within a certain time or block after buying.

✓ No Anti Whale

There is no limit to the number of token transactions. The number of scam token transactions may be limited (honeypot risk).

✓ No blacklist function

No blacklist function is included.

✓ No whitelist function

Whitelist function found

MAR-01 Key Findings

| Category | Severity ● | Location | Status |
|--------------------------------|------------|-------------------------|---------------|
| Status Mathematical Operations | Low | Maroscacoin.sol 257-268 | Informational |

Description

In **updateForMinter**, the following equation is used inside an unchecked block

```
contract Marosca is Context, IERC20, Ownable {
    using SafeMath for uint256;
    using Address for address;

    string private _name;
    string private _symbol;
    uint8 private _decimals;
    address payable public marketingWalletAddress;
    address payable public teamWalletAddress;
    address public deadAddress = 0x00000000000000000000000000000000dEaD;
    address public usdtAddress = 0x55d398326f99059fF775485246999027B3197955;
```

Minter can Not issue more **MAROSCACOINT** Token indefinitely.

Note that as of the date of publishing, the above review reflects the current understanding of known security patterns as they relate to the **MAROSCA** contract.

The contract may contain additional issuance functions, which could maybe generate a large number of tokens, resulting in significant fluctuations in token prices. It is recommended to confirm with the project team whether it complies with the token issuance instructions

Recommendation

Incorporate the following verification within process approve account to confirm that the token account's associated mint aligns with the mint for which the confidential transfer approval is sought.

MAR-02 Key Findings

| Category | Severity ● | Target | Status |
|----------------|------------|------------------------------------|--------|
| Business Logic | Medium | Contract/Maroscacoin.sol – 150/158 | Low |

Description

In **updateForOwner**, Relevant Function Snippet

```
contract Ownable is Context {
    address public _owner;

    event OwnershipTransferred(address indexed previousOwner, address indexed
newOwner);

    function owner() public view returns (address) {
        return _owner;
    }
}
```

Description

For Ownership efficiency, the **MAROSCACOIN** Team is engineered with the reserve cache mechanism, which necessitates the common steps to be followed when operating with the reserve Ownership data in different scenarios, including the tax generation, update, and eventual persistence.

Recommendation

Revise the above functions to following a consistent approach to use the reserve cache mechanism.

Vulnerability Scan

REENTRANCY

✓ No reentrancy risk found

Severity Major

Confidence Parameter Certain

✗ **NOT Mintable**: Minting in Solidity refers to the process of creating new tokens in a blockchain contract, typically achieved through function calls within the smart contract's code. (This is Essentially normal for most contracts)

```
function _transfer(address sender, address recipient, uint256
amount) private returns (bool) {

    require(sender != address(0), "ERC20: transfer from the zero
address");
    require(recipient != address(0), "ERC20: transfer to the zero
address");
    require(amount > 0, "Transfer amount must be greater than
zero");

    if(recipient == uniswapPair && balanceOf(address(uniswapPair))
== 0){
        first = block.number;
    }
}
```

Vulnerability Description

Scanning Line:



VERIFIED CONTRACT:

<https://bscscan.com/token/0xf9f842f855e76b23fc2e48c87348995ca65cfa92>

Audited Files

[Maroscacoin.sol](#)

Contract Creator Address

0x71F69CF570553Bff08028A73E5a56243cbf1d610

Deployed Contracts:


0xf9f842f855E76B23fC2E48c87348995ca65Cfa92

Creator TXH Contracts:

<https://bscscan.com/tx/0xcdefa75b496f5c72d2aad500c6710e5a24f96c203d1ce43bde8562133172f44f>




INHERITANCE GRAPH



| Identifier | Definition | Severity |
|------------|---|--|
| CEN-12 | Centralization privileges of MAROSCACOIN | Medium #  |

Vulnerability 0 : No important security issue detected.
Threat level: Low



```

158 }
159
160 modifier onlyOwner() {
161     require(_owner == _msgSender(), "Ownable: caller is not the owner");
162     _;
163 }
164
165 function waiveOwnership() public virtual onlyOwner { 30313 gas
166     emit OwnershipTransferred(_owner, address(0));
167     _owner = address(0);
168 }
169
170 function transferOwnership(address newOwner) public virtual onlyOwner { 30703 gas
171     require(newOwner != address(0), "Ownable: new owner is the zero address");
172     emit OwnershipTransferred(_owner, newOwner);
173     _owner = newOwner;
174 }
175
176 function getTime() public view returns (uint256) { 314 gas
177     return block.timestamp;
178 }
179

```

Solidity copilot not activated!

ISSUES CHECKING STATUS

| Issue Description | | Checking Status |
|-------------------|---|-----------------|
| 1. | Compiler errors. | PASSED |
| 2. | Race Conditions and reentrancy. Cross-Function Race Conditions. | PASSED |
| 3. | Possible Delay In Data Delivery. | PASSED |
| 4. | Oracle calls. | PASSED |
| 5. | Front Running. | PASSED |
| 6. | Sol Dependency. | PASSED |
| 7. | Integer Overflow And Underflow. | PASSED |
| 8. | DoS with Revert. | PASSED |
| 9. | Dos With Block Gas Limit. | PASSED |
| 10. | Methods execution permissions. | PASSED |
| 11. | Economy Model of the contract. | PASSED |
| 12. | The Impact Of Exchange Rate On the solidity Logic. | PASSED |
| 13. | Private use data leaks. | PASSED |
| 14. | Malicious Event log. | PASSED |
| 15. | Scoping and Declarations. | PASSED |
| 16. | Uninitialized storage pointers. | PASSED |
| 17. | Arithmetic accuracy. | PASSED |
| 18. | Design Logic. | PASSED |
| 19. | Cross-Function race Conditions | PASSED |
| 20. | Save Upon solidity contract Implementation and Usage. | PASSED |
| 21. | Fallback Function Security | PASSED |



MANUAL REVIEW

Marosca: is a MEME project named after the dog of world-famous soccer player Cristiano Ronaldo. Marosca is dedicated to combining blockchain technology with soccer sports culture to create a unique and engaging digital ecosystem that provides soccer fans and blockchain enthusiasts around the globe with a place to meet.

TOKEN NAME: MAROSCA COIN


Ticker: MAROSCA

DECIMALS: 18

Total Supply: 10,000,000,000



The MAROSCA COIN Platform Is Launched On The BSC Network




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About Marosca

Get marosca with limited Transaction Fee and Benefit from a Planned Marketing & Buyback Push. Rest Easy Knowing We Plan to Publicly Renounce the Smart Contract to Prevent Rug-Pulling.



| Identifier | Definition | Severity |
|------------|----------------------------|---|
| CEN-02 | Initial asset distribution | Minor  |

All of the initially minted assets are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This is Normal for most deployer and/or contract owner .

```
function waiveOwnership() public virtual onlyOwner {  
    emit OwnershipTransferred(_owner, address(0));  
    _owner = address(0);  
}
```

RECOMMENDATION

Project stakeholders should be consulted during the initial asset distribution process.

RECOMMENDATION

Deployer and/or contract owner private keys are secured carefully.

Please refer to PAGE-7 CENTRALIZED PRIVILEGES for a detailed understanding.

ALLEVIATION

The MAROSCACOIN project team understands the centralization risk. Some functions are provided privileged access to ensure a good runtime behavior in the project



References

- 1 MITRE. CWE-1041: Use of Redundant Code. <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1041.html>.
- 2 MITRE. CWE-1099: Inconsistent Naming Conventions for Identifiers. <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1099.html>.
- 3 MITRE. CWE-561: Dead Code. <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/561.html>.
- 4 MITRE. CWE-563: Assignment to Variable without Use. <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/563.html>.
- 5 MITRE. CWE-663: Use of a Non-reentrant Function in a Concurrent Context. <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/663.html>.
- 6 MITRE. CWE-837: Improper Enforcement of a Single, Unique Action. <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/837.html>.
- 7 MITRE. CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow. <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/841.html>.
- 8 MITRE. CWE CATEGORY: Bad Coding Practices. <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1006.html>.
- 9 MITRE. CWE CATEGORY: Business Logic Errors. <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/840.html>.
- 10 MITRE. CWE CATEGORY: Concurrency. <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/557.html>.
- 11 MITRE. CWE VIEW: Development Concepts. <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/699.html>.
- 12 OWASP. Risk Rating Methodology. https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Risk_Rating_Methodology.



| Identifier | Definition | Severity |
|------------|--------------------------|---|
| COD-10 | Third Party Dependencies | Minor  |

Smart contract is interacting with third party protocols e.g., Pancakeswap router, cashier contract, protections contract. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised, and exploited. Moreover, upgrades in third parties can create severe impacts, e.g., increased transactional fees, deprecation of previous routers, etc.

RECOMMENDATION

Inspect and validate third party dependencies regularly, and mitigate severe impacts whenever necessary.



DISCLAIMERS

Vital Block Security provides the easy-to-understand audit of Solidity, Move and Raw source codes (commonly known as smart contracts).

The smart contract for this particular audit was analyzed for common contract vulnerabilities, and centralization exploits. This audit report makes no statements or warranties on the security of the code. This audit report does not provide any warranty or guarantee regarding the absolute bug-free nature of the smart contract analyzed, nor do they provide any indication of the client's business, business model or legal compliance. This audit report does not extend to the compiler layer, any other areas beyond the programming language, or other programming aspects that could present security risks. Cryptographic tokens are emergent technologies, they carry high levels of technical risks and uncertainty. You agree that your access and/or use, including but not limited to any services, reports, and materials, will be at your sole risk on an as-is, where-is, and as-available basis. This audit report could include false positives, false negatives, and other unpredictable results.

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ABOUT VITAL BLOCK

Vital Block provides intelligent blockchain Security Solutions. We provide solidity and Raw Code Review, testing, and auditing services. We have Partnered with 15+ Crypto Launchpads, audited 50+ smart contracts, and analyzed 200,000+ code lines. We have worked on major public blockchains e.g., Ethereum, Binance, Cronos, Doge, Polygon, Avalanche, Metis, Fantom, Bitcoin Cash, Aptos, Oasis, etc.

Vital Block is Dedicated to Making Defi & Web3 A Safer Place. We are Powered by Security engineers, developers, UI experts, and blockchain enthusiasts. Our team currently consists of 5 core members, and 4+ casual contributors.

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