



WEBSITI

https://aptoslaunch.io/

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SMART CONTRACT AUDIT

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What is a Vital Block Audit report?

- A document describing in detail an in-depth analysis of a particular piece(s) of source code provided to Vital Block Solidity by a Client.
- •An organized collection of testing results, analysis and inferences made about the structure, implementation, and overall best practices of a particular piece of source code.
- •Representation that a Client of Vital Block Solidity has indeed completed a round of auditing with the intention to increase the quality of the company/ product's IT infrastructure and or source code.

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Overview



Project Summary

Project Name	APTOSLAUNCH	
COMMUNITY-DRIVEN LAUNCHPAD POWER APTOS WEB 3.0 ECONOMY – EMPOWERING PROJECTS WITH THE ABILITY TO RAISE LI ON THE SAFEST AND MOST SCALABLE LAYI BLOCKCHAIN.		
Platform	APTOS NETWORK	
Mainnet Address:	0xc2551e38e8d2aaf71b6f8b69458e6ebe5d649d4014 fb90e546c95a394ca1f2f7 *Token Sale* (Aptoslaunch)	
Files:	Aptoslaunch.Move	
Audit Summary		
Delivery Date	October 28 2022	
Method of Audit	Security Static Analysis	
Timeline	Story Points 100	
Vulnerability Summary Total Issues Found		
Total Issues Resolved	1	
Total Critical	0	
Total High	0	
Total Medium	2	
Total Low	0	
Total Informational	3	

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Executive Summary



Our Audit Methodology

• STEP 1

A manual line-by-line code review to ensure the logic behind each function is safe and secured against common attack vectors.

• STEP 2

Simulation of hundreds of thousands of Smart Contract Interactions on a test and Mainnet blockchain using a combination of automated test tools and manual testing to determine if any security vulnerabilities exist.

STEP 3

Consultation with the project team on the audit report pre-publication to implement recommendations and resolve any outstanding issues.

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Grading



The following grading structure is used to assess the level of vulnerability found within all Smart Contracts:

THREAT LEVEL	DEFINITION
Critical	Severe vulnerabilities which compromise the entire protocol and could result in immediate data manipulation or asset loss.
High	Significant vulnerabilities which compromise the functioning of the smart contracts leading to possible data manipulation or asset loss.
Medium	Vulnerabilities which if not fixed within in a set timescale could compromise the functioning of the smart contracts leading to possible data manipulation or asset loss.
Low	Low level vulnerabilities which may or may not have an impact on the optimal performance of the Smart contract.
Informational	Issues related to coding best practice which do not have any impact on the functionality of the Smart Contracts

Description



APTOSLAUNCH: AptosLaunch is the first decentralized launchpad on the Aptos Network. With Aptos building the safest and most scalable Layer 1 blockchain for the next billion users, AptosLaunch is engineered from the ground up to empower Aptos project owners.


TOKEN NAME: AptosLaunch Token

Ticker: ALT

Chain/Standard: Aptos Chain and Ethereum ERC20

Max supply: 100,000,000 (ALT)







Vulnerability 0:No important security issue detected.

Threat level: Low

Description:

Not a honeypot transaction simulation is success at the moment. Always DYOR before investing.

INFO! There is no liquidity with Contract. Results with non-APT pair may differ. If the token is not live yet, results may be different once the token is live. It is common for tokens to have 0% taxes before launching on DEX!

```
Q
                       S Apotoslaunch.sol X
      A Home
          public entry fun add_to_whitelist(new_investor: &signer) acquires Investors{
              let new_investor_addr = signer::address_of(new_investor);
              assert!(!exists<UserRecord>(signer::address_of(new_investor)), EALREADY_HAS_RECORD);
              let t = borrow global mut<Investors<u64, address>>(MODULE OWNER);
              let key = table with length::length(&t.t);
              table with length::add(&mut t.t, key, new investor addr);
              move to(new investor, UserRecord { allocation : 100000000000, invested amount : 0, insurance : 0});
          fun get_status(): bool acquires TotalPurchased {
              borrow global<TotalPurchased>(MODULE OWNER).status
          public entry fun update_status(module_owner: &signer, status: bool) acquires TotalPurchased{
              assert!(signer::address of(module owner) == MODULE OWNER, ENOT MODULE OWNER);
              let status_ref = &mut borrow_global_mut<TotalPurchased>(MODULE_OWNER).status;
              *status ref = status;
          fun get_total_investment(): u64 acquires TotalPurchased {
              borrow_global<TotalPurchased>(MODULE_OWNER).investment
          fun get total insurance(): u64 acquires TotalPurchased {
0 0
Type the library name to see available commands.
```



Vulnerability 0: The owner of this smart-contract can modify Contract.

Threat level: Low

Vulnerability 1: Gas optimisation

Threat level 3: Informational

Description: this smart-contract can be Modified by Deployer

This can always change! Do your own due diligence.

INFO! Owner can't change trading tax fee. which is Really a normal function for most Smart

APTOSLAUNCH (ALT)

Contract.

No trading data available: either trading is disabled, or no Liquidity for the token Yet.

```
Q Q Mome
                       5 Apotoslaunch.sol X
          public entry fun add to whitelist(new investor: &signer) acquires Investors{
              let new_investor_addr = signer::address_of(new_investor);
              assert!(!exists<UserRecord>(signer::address_of(new_investor)), EALREADY_HAS_RECORD);
              let t = borrow_global_mut<Investors<u64, address>>(MODULE_OWNER);
              let key = table_with_length::length(&t.t);
              table with length::add(&mut t.t, key, new investor addr);
              move to(new investor, UserRecord { allocation : 100000000000, invested amount : 0, insurance : 0});
          fun get_status(): bool acquires TotalPurchased {
              borrow global<TotalPurchased>(MODULE OWNER).status
          public entry fun update_status(module_owner: &signer, status: bool) acquires TotalPurchased{
              assert!(signer::address_of(module_owner) == MODULE_OWNER, ENOT_MODULE_OWNER);
              let status_ref = &mut borrow_global_mut<TotalPurchased>(MODULE_OWNER).status;
          fun get_total_investment(): u64 acquires TotalPurchased {
              borrow_global<TotalPurchased>(MODULE_OWNER).investment
          fun get total insurance(): u64 acquires TotalPurchased {
0 0
 Type the library name to see available commands.
```



Vulnerability 0: All investor Funds can't be compromised on Dex

Threat level: Low

Vulnerability 0: Total Purchase

Threat level 0: Informational

Description: User Record on Address insurance

Info: The more ALT tokens a user has, the higher the tier the user is allocated to, the more lottery tickets the user can daim, the higher the allocation the user has.

APTOSLAUNCH (ALT)

The actual sales of projects will run on a First Come First Serve (FCFS) basis for the whitelisted participants following the tiers.

```
Q Q Mome
                          S Apotoslaunch.sol X
                 move to(from, UserRecord { allocation : 100000000000, invested amount : 0, insurance : 0});
                  assert!(exists<UserRecord>(from addr), ENO USER RECORD);
                  assert!(coin::balance<aptos coin::AptosCoin>(from addr) >= insurance, EINSUFFCIENT BALANCE);
                 let insurance_remaining = get_user_insurance_remaining(from_addr);
                 assert!(insurance <= insurance_remaining, EEXCEED_insurance_ALLOWANCE);</pre>
                  coin::transfer<aptos coin::AptosCoin>(from, MODULE OWNER, insurance);
                  update_user_insurance(from_addr, insurance);
                 update_total_insurance(insurance);
             public entry fun invest with insurance(from: &signer, invest: u64, insurance: u64) acquires UserRecord, TotalPurchased, Investors{
                        !(exists<TotalPurchased>(MODULE OWNER), ENOT YET PUBLISH LAUCHPAD);
                 let current_status = get_status();
                  assert!(current_status == true, EPURCHASE_DISABLED);
                  let from addr = signer::address of(from);
                 if(!exists<UserRecord>(signer::address_of(from))){
                  let t = borrow_global_mut<Investors<u64, address>>(MODULE_OWNER);
                  let key = table_with_length::length(&t.t);
                  table_with_length::add(&mut t.t, key, from_addr);
                  move to(from, UserRecord { allocation : 100000000000, invested amount : 0, insurance : 0});
> 0 0
                                     Q Search with transaction hash or address
    Type the library name to see available commands.
```

Conclusion



During the Vital block Audit process, the Aptoslaunch contract was analysed by manual review and automated testing. All issues identified was after deployment to mainnet. By submitting the contract for audit after Deployment, the team have displayed a strong commitment to security.

Whilst there are no obvious vulnerabilities or security risks identified within the main net contract, it is beyond the scope of this Vital Block Audit to comment upon any risks associated with tokenomics, adoption or platform longevity. Before placing funds in any defi protocol Vital Block encourages potential investors to exercise due diligence and research all projects thoroughly to assess plans for ongoing development and financial sustainability.

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Issues Checking St	tatus
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	Issue description	Checking status
1.	Compiler errors.	Passed
2.	Race conditions and Reentrancy. Cross-function race conditions.	Passed
3.	Possible delays in data delivery.	Passed
4.	Oracle calls.	Passed
5.	Front running.	Passed
6.	Timestamp dependence.	Passed
7.	Integer Overflow and Underflow.	Passed
8.	DoS with Revert.	Passed
9.	DoS with block gas limit.	Passed
10.	Methods execution permissions.	Passed
11.	Economy model of the contract.	Passed
12.	The impact of the exchange rate on the logic.	Passed
13.	Private user data leaks.	Passed
14.	Malicious Event log.	Passed
15.	Scoping and Declarations.	Passed
16.	Uninitialized storage pointers.	Passed
17.	Arithmetic accuracy.	Passed
18.	Design Logic.	Passed
19.	Cross-function race conditions.	Passed
20.	Safe Open Zeppelin contracts implementation and usage.	Passed
21.	Fallback function security.	Passed

Audit Result



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Appendix



Finding Categories

Gas Optimization

Gas Optimization findings refer to exhibits that do not affect the functionality of the code but generate different, more optimal EVM opcodes resulting in a reduction on the total gas cost of a transaction.

Mathematical Operations

Mathematical Operation exhibits entail findings that relate to mishandling of math formulas, such as overflows, incorrect operations etc.

Logical Issue

Logical Issue findings are exhibits that detail a fault in the logic of the linked code, such as an incorrect notion on how block.timestamp works.

Control Flow

Control Flow findings concern the access control imposed on functions, such as owner-only functions being invoke-able by anyone under certain circumstances.

Volatile Code

Volatile Code findings refer to segments of code that behave unexpectely on certain edge cases that may result in avulnerability.

Data Flow

Data Flow findings describe faults in the way data is handled at rest and in memory, such as the result of a structassignment operation affecting an in-memory struct rather than an instorage one.

Language Specific

Language Specific findings are issues that would only arise within Solidity, i.e. incorrect usage of private or delete.

Coding Style

Coding Style findings usually do not affect the generated byte-code and comment on how to make the codebase more legible and as a result easily maintainable.

Appendix



Inconsistency

Inconsistency findings refer to functions that should seemingly behave similarly yet contain different code, such as a constructor assignment imposing different require statements on the input variables than a setter function.

Magic Numbers

Magic Number findings refer to numeric literals that are expressed in the codebase in their raw format and should otherwise be specified as constant contract variables aiding in their legibility and maintainability.

Compiler Error

Compiler Error findings refer to an error in the structure of the code that renders it impossible to compile using the specified version of the project.

Dead Code

Code that otherwise does not affect the functionality of the codebase and can be safely omitted.

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