

Blockchain Security | Smart Contract Audit | KYC Certification | SAFU |

CEX Listing | Marketing

MADE IN CANADA

SECURITY ASSESSMENT

4th MAY 2025





Making Blockchain, Defi And Web3 A Safer Place.























CONTENTS

| TABLE OF CONTENTS | 3 |
|-------------------------|----|
| DOCUMENT PROPERTIES | A |
| ABOUT VBS | 5 |
| SCOPE OF WORK | 6 |
| AUDIT METHODOLOGY | 7 |
| AUDIT CHECKLIST | 9 |
| EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | 10 |
| CENTRALIZED PRIVILEGES | 11 |
| RISK CATEGORIES. | 12 |
| AUDIT SCOPE | 13 |
| AUTOMATED ANALYSIS | 14 |
| KEY FINDINGS | |
| MANUAL REVIEW | |
| VULNERABILITY SCAN | |
| REPOSITORY | |
| INHERITANCE GRAPH | 30 |
| PROJECT BASIC KNOWLEDGE | 31 |
| AUDIT RESULT | 32 |
| REFERENCES | |





INTRODUCTION

| Auditing Firm | VITAL BLOCK SECURITY |
|--------------------|------------------------------------------------|
| Client Firm | AQUATIC |
| Methodology | Automated Analysis, Manual Code Review |
| Language | Solidity |
| Contract Address | 0x13f2131b772D74a3c343a2bd09422f4cd969DcB0 |
| Source Code Light | Verified |
| Centralization | Active ownership |
| Compiler Version | v0.8.28+commit.7893614a |
| Blockchain | SONIC CHAIN |
| Website | https://aquatic.games/ |
| Twitter | https://x.com/aquatic_game |
| Telegram | https://t.me/aquatic_game |
| Doc | https://aquatic-games.gitbook.io/aquatic-games |
| Prelim Report Date | MAY 2 ND 2025 |
| Final Report Date | MAY 4 TH 2025 |

■ Verify the authenticity of this report on our GitHub Repo: https://www.github.com/vital-block





Document Properties

| Client | AQUATIC |
|----------------|----------------------------------------------------|
| Title | Smart Contract Audit Report |
| Target | AQUATIC |
| Version | 1.0 |
| Author | Akhmetshin Marat |
| Auditors | Akhmetshin Marat, James BK, Ben Partrick , C. John |
| Reviewed by | Dima Meru |
| Approved by | Prince Mitchell |
| Classification | Public |

Version Info

| Version | Date | Author(s) | Description |
|---------|----------------------------|-----------|-------------------|
| 1.0 | MAY 2 ND , 2025 | C. John | Final Release |
| 1.0-AP | MAY 4 TH , 2025 | C. John | Release Candidate |

Contact

For more information about this document and its contents, please contact Vital Block Security Inc.

| Name | Akhmetshin Marat |
|-----------|---------------------|
| Phone (S) | +1 (579) 817-7049 |
| Email | info@vitalblock.org |





In the following, we show the specific pull request and the commit hash value used in this audit.

- AQUATIC · Token (AQ2276UO95)
- https://sonicscan.org/address/0x13f2131b772D74a3c343a2bd09422f4cd969DcB0 (8221JUTLS)

About Vital Block Security

Vital Block Security provides professional, thorough, fast, and easy-to-understand smart contract security audit. We do in-depth and penetrative static, manual, automated, and intelligent analysis of the smart contract. Some of our automated scans include tools like ConsenSys MythX, Mythril, Slither, Surya. We can audit custom smart contracts, DApps, NFTs, etc (including the service of smart contract auditing). We are reachable at Telegram (https://t.me/vitalblock), Twitter (https://t.me/vitalblock.org).

High Critical Medium High Medium High Medium Low Low Medium Low Low Medium High Low Likelihood

Table 1.2: Vulnerability Severity Classification

Methodology

To standardize the evaluation, we define the following terminology based on the OWASP Risk Rating Methodology.

- <u>Likelihood</u> represents how likely a particular vulnerability is to be uncovered and exploited in the wild;
- Impact measures the technical loss and business damage of a successful attack;
- · Severity demonstrates the overall criticality of the risk.





SCOPE OF WORK

Vital Block was consulted by AQUATIC to conduct the smart contract audit of its. SOLIDITY (SOL) source code. The audit scope of work is strictly limited to the mentioned .Sol file only:

O. AQUATIC.SOL

External contracts and/or interfaces dependencies are not checked due to being out of scope.

Verify audited contract's contract address and deployed link below:

| Public Contract Address | |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| 0x56bdf0857574ba | neb7645ce1f067860d08fdeb522561304cbfa1fea1578297873 |
| Contract Name | AQUATIC |
| Ticker | \$AQUA |
| Total Supply | 1,000,000,000 |





AUDIT METHODOLOGY

Smart contract audits are conducted using a set of standards and procedures. Mutual collaboration is essential to performing an effective smart contract audit. Here's a brief overview of Vital Block

Security auditing process and methodology:

CONNECT

 The onboarding team gathers source codes, and specifications to make sure we understand the size, and scope of the smart contract audit.

AUDIT

- Automated analysis is performed to identify common contract vulnerabilities. We may use the
 following third-party frameworks and dependencies to perform the automated analysis:
 - Remix IDE Developer Tool
 - Open Zeppelin Code Analyzer
 - SWC Vulnerabilities Registry
 - DEX Dependencies, e.g., Pancakeswap, Uniswap
- o Simulations are performed to identify centralized exploits causing contract and/or trade locks.
- A manual line-by-line analysis is performed to identify contract issues and centralized privileges.
 We may inspect below mentioned common contract vulnerabilities, and centralized exploits:

| | Token Supply Manipulation |
|----------------------|------------------------------------------------------|
| | Access Control and Authorization |
| | o Assets Manipulation |
| Centralized Exploits | o Ownership Control |
| ocitianzea Exploits | o Liquidity Access |
| | Stop and Pause Trading |
| | o Ownable Library Verification |
| | |





Lack of Arbitrary limits

Integer Overflow

Incorrect Inheritance Order

Typographical Errors

Requirement Violation

Gas Optimization

Coding Style Violations

Re-entrancy

Third-Party Dependencies

Potential Sandwich Attacks

Irrelevant Codes

Divide before multiply

Conformance to Solidity Naming Guides

Compiler Specific Warnings

Language Specific Warnings

REPORT

Common Contract Vulnerabilities

- The auditing team provides a preliminary report specifying all the checks which have been performed and the findings thereof.
- o The client's development team reviews the report and makes amendments to the codes.
- o The auditing team provides the final comprehensive report with open and unresolved issues.

PUBLISH

- o The client may use the audit report internally or disclose it publicly.
- It is important to note that there is no pass or fail in the audit, it is recommended to view the audit as an unbiased assessment of the safety of solidity codes.





Table 1.0 The Full Audit Checklist

| Category | Checklist Items | | |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------------|--|--|
| | Constructor Mismatch | | |
| | Ownership Takeover | | |
| | Redundant Fallback Function | | |
| | Overflows & Underflows | | |
| | Reentrancy | | |
| | Money-Giving Bug | | |
| | Blackhole | | |
| | Unauthorized Self-Destruct | | |
| | Revert DoS | | |
| Basic Coding Bugs | Unchecked External Call | | |
| | Gasless Send | | |
| | Send Instead Of Transfer | | |
| | Costly Loop | | |
| | (Unsafe) Use Of Untrusted Libraries | | |
| | (Unsafe) Use Of Predictable Variables | | |
| | Transaction Ordering Dependence | | |
| | Deprecated Uses | | |
| Semantic Consistency Checks | Semantic Consistency Checks | | |
| | Business Logics Review | | |
| | Functionality Checks | | |
| | Authentication Management | | |
| | Access Control & Authorization | | |
| | Oracle Security | | |
| Advanced DeFi Scrutiny | Digital Asset Escrow | | |
| Advanced Del I Sciutilly | Kill-Switch Mechanism | | |
| 166 | Operation Trails & Event Generation | | |
| | ERC20 Idiosyncrasies Handling | | |
| | Frontend-Contract Integration | | |
| | Deployment Consistency | | |
| | Holistic Risk Management | | |
| | Avoiding Use of Variadic Byte Array | | |
| | Using Fixed Compiler Version | | |
| Additional Recommendations | Making Visibility Level Explicit | | |
| | Making Type Inference Explicit | | |
| | Adhering To Function Declaration Strictly | | |
| | Following Other Best Practices | | |





EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Vital Block Security has performed the automated and manual analysis of the AQUATIC Sol code. The code was reviewed for common contract vulnerabilities and centralized exploits. Here's a quick audit summary:

| Status | Critical ! | Major " 🔴 | Medium # 🛑 | Minor \$ | Unknown % |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|------------|----------|-----------|
| Open | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 |
| Acknowledged | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| Resolved | 0 | o | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Noteworty OnlyOwner Privileges | Set Taxes and Ratios, Airdrop, Set Protection Settings, Set Reward Properties, Set Reflector Settings, Set Swap Settings, Set Pair and Router | | | | |

AQUATIC Smart contract has achieved the following score: 92.0



- i Please note that smart contracts deployed on blockchains aren't resistant to exploits, vulnerabilities and/or hacks. Blockchain and cryptography assets utilize new and emerging technologies. These technologies present a high level of ongoing risks. For a detailed understanding of risk severity, source code vulnerability, and audit limitations, kindly review the audit report thoroughly.
- i Please note that centralization privileges regardless of their inherited risk status constitute an elevated impact on smart contract safety and security.





RISK CATEGORIES

Smart contracts are generally designed to hold, approve, and transfer tokens. This makes them very tempting attack targets. A successful external attack may allow the external attacker to directly exploit. A successful centralization-related exploit may allow the privileged role to directly exploit. All risks which are identified in the audit report are categorized here for the reader to review:

| Risk Type | Definition |
|-----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Critical | These risks could be exploited easily and can lead to asset loss, data loss, asset, or data manipulation. They should be fixed right away. |
| Major 🛑 | These risks are hard to exploit but very important to fix, they carry an elevated risk of smart contract manipulation, which can lead to high-risk severity. |
| Medium # | These risks should be fixed, as they carry an inherent risk of future exploits, and hacks which may or may not impact the smart contract execution. Low-risk reentrancy-related vulnerabilities should be fixed to deterexploits. |
| Minor 9 | These risks do not pose a considerable risk to the contract or those who interact with it. They are code-style violations and deviations from standard practices. They should be highlighted and fixed nonetheless. |
| Unknown 🗩 | These risks pose uncertain severity to the contract or those who interact with it. They should be fixed immediately to mitigate the riskuncertainty. |

All statuses which are identified in the audit report are categorized here for the reader to review:

| Status Type | Definition |
|--------------|----------------------------------------|
| Open | Risks are open. |
| Acknowledged | Risks are acknowledged, but not fixed. |
| Resolved | Risks are acknowledged and fixed. |





CENTRALIZED PRIVILEGES

Centralization risk is the most common cause of cryptography asset loss. When a smart contract has a privileged role, the risk related to centralization is elevated.

There are some well-intended reasons have privileged roles, such as:

- Privileged roles can be granted the power to pause()the contract in case of an external attack.
- Privileged roles can use functions like, include(), and exclude() to add or remove wallets from fees,
 swap checks, and transaction limits. This is useful to run a presale and to list on an exchange.

Authorizing privileged roles to externally-owned-account (EOA) is dangerous. Lately, centralization-related losses are increasing in frequency and magnitude.

- The client can lower centralization-related risks by implementing below mentioned practices:
- Privileged role's private key must be carefully secured to avoid any potential hack.
- o Privileged role should be shared by multi-signature (multi-sig) wallets.
- Authorized privilege can be locked in a contract, user voting, or community DAO can be introduced to unlock the privilege.
- Renouncing the contract ownership, and privileged roles.
- Remove functions with elevated centralization risk.
- Understand the project's initial asset distribution. Assets in the liquidity pair should be locked.
 Assets outside the liquidity pair should be locked with a release schedule.





AUTOMATED ANALYSIS

| Symbol | Definition |
|-----------|-------------------------|
| • | Function modifies state |
| # | Function is payable |
| <u>\$</u> | Function is internal |
| <u>%</u> | Function is private |
| 1 | Function is important |

```
| **AQUATIC** | Interface | | | |
| L | totalSupply | External | |
                                    INO!
| L | decimals | External | |
                                 |NO!
| L | symbol | External | |
                                INO!
| L | name | External | |
                              INO!
| L | getOwner | External | |
                                 |NO|
                                 INO!
| L | balanceOf | External | |
                                ■ INO! !
| L | transfer | External | | "
| L | allowance | External | |
                                 INO!
| L | approve | External | | "
                               ■ |NO! !
| L | transferFrom | External | | "
                                        INO!
111111
| **IFactoryV2** | Interface |
                                 111
| L | getPair | External | |
                                 INO!
| L | createPair | External | | "
                                      INO!
| **IV2Pair** | Interface |
                              Ш
| L | factory | External | |
                                 INO!
| L | getReserves | External | |
                                     |NO.
| L | sync | External | | "
                                INO. I
```





```
\Pi\Pi\Pi\Pi
| **IRouter01** | Interface | | | |
| L | factory | External | |
                              INO!
| L | S| External | |
                           INO. I
| L | addLiquidityS| External | |
                                     # |NO. |
| L | addLiquidity | External | | "
                                     INOLI
| L | swapExacSorTokens | External | |
                                          # |NO. |
| L | getAmountsOut | External | | NO | |
| L | getAmountsIn | External | |
                                   INO
\Pi\Pi\Pi\Pi
| **IRouter02** | Interface | IRouter01 |||
| L | swapExactTokensForSSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | | "
                                                                         |NO|
| L | swapExactSForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | |
                                                                      # |NO] |
| L | swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | | "
                                                                        ■ INOI I
| L | swapExactTokensForTokens | External | | "
                                                INO! I
| **Protections** | Interface | | | |
| L | checkUser | External | | "
                              ■ INOI I
      | L | setLaunch | External | | " | NO | |
                   | External | | " | | | | | | |
| L | setLpPair
| L | AQUA
                  | External | | "! 💮 | NO | |
                  | External | |!" | NO! |
| L | removeSniper
\Pi\Pi\Pi\Pi
| **Cashier** | Interface |
| L | setRewardsProperties | External | | "
                                            INOLI
            | External | | " 🔴 | NO |
| L | tally
           | External | | INO! |
| L | load
| L | getUserInfo | External | | NO! |
| L | getUserRealizedRewards | External | | ...
                                            INO!
```





```
| L | getPendingRewards | External | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| L | getCurrentReward | External | | NO!! |
ШШ
| **S ** | Implementation | SafeMath |||
| L | <Constructor> | Public | | ! # | NO !!
| L | renounceOriginalDeployer | External | | "
| L | <Receive S> | External | | #9|NO
| L | decimals | External | | NO | |
| L | symbol | External | | NO | |
| L | name | External | | NO | |
                        |NO]|
| L | getOwner | External | |
                       INOI
| L | balanceOf | Public | |
                        INO!
| L | allowance | External | |
                        INO! I
| L | approve | External | | "
| L | approve | Internal $ | " 🍙
| L | approveContractContingency | Public | | "
                                    | onlyOwner |
| L | transfer | External | | " | | | | NO | |
| L | setNewRouter | External | | " | GolyOwner |
| L | isExcludedFromFees | External | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| L | isExcludedFromDividends | External | |
                                  INO! I
| L | setDividendExcluded
                 | Public | | " ! 🔴 | onlyOwner |
| L | setExcludedFromFees | Public | | " ! • | onlyOwner |
```





AQUATIC - 01 POSSIBLE OVERFLOW

| Category | Severity • | Location | Status |
|--------------------------------|------------|----------------|--------------|
| Status Mathematical Operations | Minor | ./src/AQUA.SOL | Acknowledged |

Description

In **updateForMinter**, the following equation is used inside an unchecked block

```
contract Aquatic is ERC20 {    constructor() ERC20("Aquatic ", "AQUA") {
    _mint(msg.sender, 1_000_000_000 ether); }}
```

Minter can **Not** issue more **AQUA** tokens indefinitely.

Note that as of the date of publishing, the above review reflects the current understanding of known security patterns as they relate to the **AQUA** contract.

Recommendation

We recommend either checking for overflow in this case, or ensuring that the **PairsIn** is close enough it will never cause an overflow.





AQUATIC - 02 POSSIBLE OVERFLOW

| Category | Severity • | Location | Status |
|---------------|---------------|----------------|--------------|
| Inconsistency | Informational | ./src/AQUA.SOL | Acknowledged |

Description

In updateForOwner, Relevant Function Snippet

```
function transfer(address to, uint256 amount) public virtual override
returns (bool) {
    address owner = _msgSender();
    _transfer(owner, to, amount);
    return true;
}
```

For Ownership efficiency, the AQUATIC Team is engineered with the reserve cache mechanism, which necessitates the common steps to be followed when operating with the reserve Ownership data in different scenarios, including the tax generation, update, and eventual persistence.

Recommendation

Revise the above functions to following a consistent approach to use the reserve cache mechanism.





AQUATIC - 03 POSSIBLE OVERFLOW

| Category | Severity • | Location | Status |
|--------------------------------|------------|----------------|--------------|
| Status Mathematical Operations | Minor | ./src/AQUA.SOL | Acknowledged |

Description

In **UncheckedForTransfer**, the following equation is used inside an unchecked block

```
function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 amount) public
virtual override returns (bool) {
    address spender = _msgSender();
    _spendAllowance(from, spender, amount);
    _transfer(from, to, amount);
    return true;
}
```

Note: that as of the date of publishing, the above review reflects the current understanding of known security patterns as they relate to the contract.

Recommendation

We recommend either checking for overflow in this case, or ensuring that the PairsIn is close enough it will never cause an overflow.





OPTIMIZATIONS AQUATIC

| ID | Title | Category | Status |
|-----|-----------------------------------|------------------|----------------|
| FTV | Logarithm Refinement Optimization | Gas Optimization | Acknowledged |
| FOP | Checks Can Be Performed Earlier | Gas Optimization | Acknowledged • |
| FDP | Unnecessary Use Of SafeMath | Gas Optimization | Acknowledged • |
| FWY | Struct Optimization | Gas Optimization | Acknowledged • |
| FGT | Unused State Variable | Gas Optimization | Acknowledged • |





General Detectors

Missing Zero Address Validation

Some functions in this contract may not appropriately check for zero addresses being used.



🕕 Inconsistent Solidity Version

This contract uses an unconventional or very old version of move dependency



Attention Required

- No compiler version inconsistencies found
- No unchecked call responses found
- No vulnerable self-destruct functions found
- No assertion vulnerabilities found
- No old solidity code found
- No external delegated calls found
- ✓ No external call dependency found
- No vulnerable authentication calls found
- No invalid character typos found
- No RTL characters found
- No dead code found
- No risky data allocation found
- No uninitialized state variables found
- No uninitialized storage variables found
- No vulnerable initialization functions found
- No risky data handling found
- No number accuracy bug found
- No out-of-range number vulnerability found
- No map data deletion vulnerabilities found

- No tautologies or contradictions found
- No faulty true/false values found
- No innacurate divisions found
- No redundant constructor calls found
- No vulnerable transfers found
- No vulnerable return values found
- No uninitialized local variables found
- No default function responses found
- No missing arithmetic events found
- No missing access control events found
- No redundant true/false comparisons found
- No state variables vulnerable through function calls found
- No buggy low-level calls found
- No expensive loops found
- ✓ No bad numeric notation practices found
- ✓ No missing constant declarations found
- No missing external function declarations found
- No vulnerable payable functions found
- No vulnerable message values found





Vulnerability Scan

REENTRANCY

No reentrancy risk found

Severity Minor

Confidence Parameter Certain

Vulnerability Description

Scanning Line:

NOT Mintable: No additional amount of staking token can be minted by a private wallet or contract.

(Which is normal for major contract utility options)

```
function transfer address from address to, uint256 amount)
internal virtual
       require(from != address(0) "ERC20: transfer from the zero
address");
       require to address(0), "ERC20: transfer to the zero
address"
        beforeTokenTransfer(from to amount)
       uint256 fromBalance = balances[from]
       require(fromBalance >= amount "ERC20: transfer amount exceeds
balance");
       unchecked {
           balances[from] = fromBalance - amount;
           // Overflow not possible: the sum of all balances is capped
by totalSupply, and the sum is preserved by
           // decrementing then incrementing.
           balances to amount;
       emit Transfer(from, to, amount);
       afterTokenTransfer(from, to, amount);
```





Vulnerability Run check

risk detection

Contract source code verified

This token contract is open source, see the contract code for details. Token contracts that do not provide source code are likely to have malicious functions to defraud users of assets.

No bonus issue

Additional issuance functions are transparent or non-existent. Hidden minting may increase the number of tokens in circulation and affect the price of tokens.

Owner cannot change balance

The contract owner does not have the right to modify the token balance of other addresses.

Pixiu risk

This doesn't seem to be Pixiu

We did not find any code preventing the token sale.

o no anti whale

There is no limit to the number of token transactions. The number of fraudulent token transactions may be limited (Pixiu risk).

o no whitelist feature

Discover whitelist functions

o no agency

There is no proxy in the contract. A proxy contract means that the contract owner can modify the functionality of the token and possibly affect the price.

Ontract permissions cannot be regained (false abandonment)

If this function exists, it is possible for the project owner to regain ownership even if they abandon it.



No trade cooldown

The token contract does not have a transaction cooling function. If there is a transaction cooling function, users will not be able to sell tokens within a certain period of time or generate blocks after purchase.

no blacklist function

Does not include whitelist functionality.





| Identifier | Definition | Severity |
|------------|----------------------------|----------|
| CEN-02 | Initial asset distribution | Minor \$ |

contract Aquatic is ERC20 {
 constructor() ERC20("Aquatic ", "AQUA") {
 _mint(msg.sender, 1_000_000_000 ether);
 }
}



Alleviation:

This exhibit was acknowledged and ultimately discarded by the AQUATIC team due to low severity. We consider the exhibit fully attended to as it doesn't impose any meaningful security concerns.

RECOMMENDATION

Project stakeholders should be consulted during the initial asset distribution process.





Contract Owner Address:

0xa351e731f00B8fE2636432945fAb378897b7e1C0

Audited Files

AQUATIC.SOL

Contracts
Creator Hash:

TXN HASH

0xfc83427889932adfb98cb6ac1026b62e31364744db9ea117e74d111b

Contracts:

Contract Address

AOUA 0x13f2131h772D74a3c343a2hd09422f4cd969DcB0





MANUAL REVIEW

AQUATIC: is a DeFi/ GameFi project built on the Sonic blockchain that blends NFT-based farming with a sustainable, player-owned economy. Players can purchase, farm, and trade unique aquatic creatures while earning real rewards through various play-to-earn mechanics.

TOKEN NAME: AQUATIC

Ticker: AQUA

Chain/Standard: SONIC NETWORK

LAUNGUGE: SOLIDITY



The AQUATIC Platform Is Launching On the Sonic Network









Issue Description Checking Status

| 1. | Compiler errors | PASSED |
|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| 2. | Race Conditions and reentrancy. Cross-Function Race Conditions. | PASSED |
| 3. | Possible Delay In Data Delivery. | PASSED |
| 4. | Oracle calls. | PASSED |
| 5. | Front Running. | PASSED |
| 6. | SOL Dependency. | PASSED |
| 7. | Integer Overflow And Underflow. | PASSED |
| 8. | DoS with Revert. | PASSED |
| 9. | Dos With Block Gas Limit. | PASSED |
| 10. | Methods execution permissions. | PASSED |
| 11. | Economy Model of the contract. | PASSED |
| 12. | The Impact Of Exchange Rate On the Move Logic. | PASSED |
| 13. | Private use data leaks. | PASSED |
| 14. | Malicious Event log. | PASSED |
| 15. | Scoping and Declarations. | PASSED |
| 16. | Uhinitialized storage pointers. | PASSED |
| 17. | Arithmetic accuracy. | PASSED |
| 18. | Design Logic. | PASSED |
| 19. | Cross-Function race Conditions | PASSED |
| 20. | Save Upon Move contract Implementation and Usage. | PASSED |
| 21. | Fallback Function Security | PASSED |





| Identifier | Definition | Severity |
|------------|----------------------------|----------|
| CEN-02 | Initial asset distribution | Minor 🌑 |

All of the initially minted assets are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This can be an issue as the deployer and/or contract owner can distribute tokens without consulting the community.

RECOMMENDATION

Project stakeholders should be consulted during the initial asset distribution process.





RECOMMENDATION

Deployer and/or contract owner private keys are secured carefully.

Please refer to PAGE-09 CENTRALIZED PRIVILEGES for a detailed understanding.

ALLEVIATION


The AQUATIC project team understands the centralization risk. Some functions are provided privileged access to ensure a good runtime behavior in the project





CERTIFICATE BY VITAL BLOCK SECURITY









| Identifier | Definition | Severity |
|------------|--------------------------|----------|
| COD-10 | Third Party Dependencies | Minor 🏐 |

Smart contract is interacting with third party protocols e.g., Pancakeswap router, cashier contract, protections contract. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised, and exploited. Moreover, upgrades in third parties can create severe impacts, e.g., increased transactional fees, deprecation of previous routers, etc.

RECOMMENDATION

Inspect and validate third party dependencies regularly, and mitigate severe impacts whenever necessary.





DISCLAIMERS

Vital Block provides the easy-to-understand audit of Solidity, Move and Raw source codes (commonly known as smart contracts).

The smart contract for this particular audit was analyzed for common contract vulnerabilities, and centralization exploits. This audit report makes no statements or warranties on the security of the code. This audit report does not provide any warranty or guarantee regarding the absolute bug-free nature of the smart contract analyzed, nor do they provide any indication of the client's business, business model or legal compliance. This audit report does not extend to the compiler layer, any other areas beyond the programming language, or other programming aspects that could present security risks. Cryptographic tokens are emergent technologies, they carry high levels of technical risks and uncertainty. You agree that your access and/or use, including but not limited to any services, reports, and materials, will be at your sole risk on an as-is, where-is, and as-available basis. This audit report could include false positives, false negatives, and other unpredictable results.

CONFIDENTIALITY

This report is subject to the terms and conditions (including without limitations, description of services, confidentiality, disclaimer and limitation of liability) outlined in the scope of the audit provided to the client. This report should not be transmitted, disclosed, referred to, or relied upon by any individual for any purpose without InterFi Network's prior written consent.

NO FINANCIAL ADVICE

This audit report does not indicate the endorsement of any particular project or team, nor guarantees its security. No third party should rely on the reports in any way, including to make any decisions to buy or sell a product, service or any other asset. The information provided in this report does not constitute investment advice, financial advice, trading advice, or any other sort of advice and you should not treat any of the report's content as such. This audit report should not be used in any way





to make decisions around investment or involvement. This report in no way provides investment advice, nor should be leveraged as investment advice of any sort.

FOR AVOIDANCE OF DOUBT, SERVICES, INCLUDING ANY ASSOCIATED AUDIT REPORTS OR MATERIALS, SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED OR RELIED UPON AS ANY FORM OF FINANCIAL, TAX, LEGAL, REGULATORY, OR OTHER ADVICE.

TECHNICAL DISCLAIMER

ALL SERVICES, AUDIT REPORTS, SMART CONTRACT AUDITS, OTHER MATERIALS, OR ANY PRODUCTS OR RESULTS OF THE USE THEREOF ARE PROVIDED "AS IS" AND "AS AVAILABLE" AND WITH ALL FAULTS AND DEFECTS WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT PERMITTED UNDER APPLICABLE LAW, VITAL BLOCK HEREBY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, WHETHER EXPRESSED, IMPLIED, STATUTORY, OR OTHERWISE WITH RESPECT TO SERVICES, AUDIT REPORT, OR OTHER MATERIALS. WITHOUT LIMITING THE FOREGOING, VITAL BLOCK SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, TITLE AND NON-INFRINGEMENT, AND ALL WARRANTIES ARISING FROM THE COURSE OF DEALING, USAGE, OR TRADE PRACTICE.

WITHOUT LIMITING THE FOREGOING, VITAL BLOCK MAKES NO WARRANTY OF ANY KIND THAT ALL SERVICES, AUDIT REPORTS, SWART CONTRACT AUDITS, OR OTHER MATERIALS, OR ANY PRODUCTS OR RESULTS OF THE USE THEREOF, WILL MEET THE CLIENT'S OR ANY OTHER INDIVIDUAL'S REQUIREMENTS, ACHIEVE ANY INTENDED RESULT, BE COMPATIBLE OR WORK WITH ANY SOFTWARE, SYSTEM, OR OTHER SERVICES, OR BE SECURE, ACCURATE, COMPLETE, FREEOF HARMFUL CODE, OR ERROR-FREE.

TIMELINESS OF CONTENT

The content contained in this audit report is subject to change without any prior notice. Vital Block does not guarantee or warrant the accuracy, timeliness, or completeness of any report you access using the internet or other means, and assumes no obligation to update any information following the publication.





LINKS TO OTHER WEBSITES

This audit report provides, through hypertext or other computer links, access to websites and social accounts operated by individuals other than Vital Block. Such hyperlinks are provided for your reference and convenience only and are the exclusive responsibility of such websites and social accounts owners. You agree that Vital block Security is not responsible for the content or operation of such websites and social accounts and that Vital Block shall have no liability to you or any other person or entity for the use of third-party websites and social accounts. You are solely responsible for determining the extent to which you may use any content at any other websites and social accounts to which you link from the report.





ABOUT VITAL BLOCK

Vital Block provides intelligent blockchain Security Solutions. We provide solidity and Raw Code Review, testing, and auditing services. We have Partnered with 15+ Crypto Launchpads, audited 50+ smart contracts, and analyzed 200,000+ code lines. We have worked on major public blockchains e.g., Ethereum, Binance, Cronos, Doge, Polygon, Avalanche, Metis, Fantom, Bitcoin Cash, Aptos, Oasis, etc.

Vital Block is Dedicated to Making Defi & Web3 A Safer Place. We are Powered by Security engineers, developers, Ul experts, and blockchain enthusiasts. Our team currently consists of 5 core members, and 4+ casual contributors.

Website: https://Vitalblock.org

Email: info@vitalblock.org

GitHub: https://github.com/vital-block

Telegram (Engineering): https://t.me/vital_block

Telegram (Onboarding): https://t.me/vitalblock_cmo













