VIRTUAL CAIM

USDWSWAPROUTER

Smart Contract Review

Deliverable: Smart Contract Audit Report

Security Assessment

February 2025

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Report Summary

Title	**USDWSWAPROUTER Smart Contract Audit**		
Project Owner	USDWSwapRouter		
Classification	Public		
Reviewed by	Virtual Caim Private Limited	**Review date**	06/02/2025
Approved by	Virtual Caim Private Limited	**Approval date**	06/02/2025
		N° Pages	**36**

Overview

Background

USDWSwapRouter's team requested Virtual Caim to perform an Extensive Smart Contract Audit of their 'USDWSWAPROUTER' Smart Contract.

Project Dates

The following is the project schedule for this review and report:

- **February 03**: Smart Contract Review Started *(Completed)*
- **February 06**: Initial Delivery of Audit Findings *(Completed)*

Coverage

Target Specification and Revision

For this audit, we performed the project's basic research, investigation by discussing the details with the project owner and developer and then reviewed the smart contracts of USDWSWAPROUTER.

The following documentation & repositories were considered in -scope for the review:

USDWSWAPROUTER Smart Contract (Deployed on Mainnet)	https://bscscan.com/address/0x25913e686fd819da7ba43c2752bb2153a96a61b9#code Checksum: - (A2032c616934aeb47e6039f76b20d231)
USDWSWAPROUTER Smart Contract (Deployed on Testnet)	https://testnet.bscscan.com/address/0x6b69e63d0d7F19EA1b4C4C35839Fab11F750E038#code

Introduction

Given the opportunity to review USDWSWAPROUTER's Contracts related smart contract source code, we in the report summary our methodical approach to evaluate all potential common security issues in the smart contract implementation, expose possible semantic irregularities between smart contract code and design document, and provide additional suggestions or recommendations for improvement. Our results show that the given version of smart contracts is ready to be used after resolving the mentioned issues and done functional testing by owner/developer themselves, as there might be issues related to business logic, security or performance which only can found/understand by them.

About Audit

Item	Description
Issuer	USDWSWAPROUTER
Type	BEP-20
Language	Solidity
Audit Test Method	Whitebox Testing
Latest Audit Report	February 06, 2025

Token Overview:

Item	Description
Fees	20-100%
Fee Privilege	Owner
Ownership	Owned
Minting	None
Max Tx	No
Blacklist	No

Information about Test Methods



Vulnerability Severity Level Information

Level	Description
Critical	Critical severity vulnerabilities will have a significant effect on the security of the DeFi project, and it is strongly recommended to fix the critical vulnerabilities.
High	High severity vulnerabilities will affect the normal operation of the DeFi project. It is strongly recommended to fix high-risk vulnerabilities.
Medium	Medium severity vulnerability will affect the operation of the DeFi project. It is recommended to fix medium-risk vulnerabilities.
Low	Low severity vulnerabilities may affect the operation of the DeFi project in certain scenarios. It is suggested that the project party should evaluate and consider whether these vulnerabilities need to be fixed.
Weakness	There are safety risks theoretically, but it is extremely difficult to reproduce in engineering.

List of Check Items

Basic Coding Bugs

- Constructor Mismatch
- Ownership Takeover
- Redundant Fallback Function
- Overflows & Underflows
- Reentrancy
- MONEY-Giving Bug
- Blackhole
- Unauthorized Self-Destruct
- Revert DoS
- Unchecked External Call
- Gasless Send
- Send Instead of Transfer
- Costly Loop
- (Unsafe) Use of Untrusted Libraries
- (Unsafe) Use of Predictable Variables
- Transaction Ordering Dependence
- Deprecated Uses

Semantic Consistency Checks

- Semantic Consistency Checks

Advanced DeFi Scrutiny

- Business Logics Review
- Functionality Checks
- Authentication Management
- Access Control & Authorization
- Oracle Security
- Digital Asset Escrow
- Kill-Switch Mechanism
- Operation Trails & Event Generation
- ERC20 Idiosyncrasies Handling
- Frontend-Contract Integration
- Deployment Consistency
- Holistic Risk Management

Additional Recommendations

- Avoiding Use of Variadic Byte Array
- Using Fixed Compiler Version
- Making Visibility Level Explicit
- Making Type Inference Explicit
- Adhering To Function Declaration Strictly
- Following Other Best Practices

Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) Classifications Used in this Audit.

Configuration	• Weaknesses in this category are typically introduced during the configuration of the software.
Data Processing Issues	• Weaknesses in this category are typically found in functionality that processes data.
Numeric Errors	• Weaknesses in this category are related to improper calculation or conversion of numbers.
Security Features	• Weaknesses in this category are concerned with topics like authentication, access control, confidentiality, cryptography, and privilege management. (Software security is not security software.)
Time and State	• Weaknesses in this category are related to the improper management of time and state in an environment that supports simultaneous or near-simultaneous computation by multiple systems, processes, or threads.
Error Conditions, Return Values, Status Codes	• Weaknesses in this category include weaknesses that occur if a function does not generate the correct return/status code, or if the application does not handle all possible return/status codes that could be generated by a function.

Resource Management	• Weaknesses in this category are related to improper management of system resources.
Behavioral Issues	• Weaknesses in this category are related to unexpected behaviors from code that an application uses.
Business Logics	• Weaknesses in this category identify some of the underlying problems that commonly allow attackers to manipulate the business logic of an application. Errors in business logic can be devastating to an entire application.
Initialization and Cleanup	• Weaknesses in this category occur in behaviors that are used for initialization and breakdown.
Arguments and Parameters	• Weaknesses in this category are related to improper use arguments or parameters within function calls.
Expression Issues	• Weaknesses in this category are related to incorrectly written expressions within code.
Coding Practices	• Weaknesses in this category are related to coding practices that are deemed unsafe and increase the chances that an ex pilotable vulnerability will be present in the application. They may not directly introduce a vulnerability, but indicate the product has not been carefully developed or maintained.

Findings

Summary

Here is a summary of our findings after scrutinizing the USDWSWAPROUTER Smart Contract Review. During the first phase of our audit, we studied the smart contract source code and ran our in-house static code analyzer through the Specific tools. The purpose here is to statically identify known coding bugs, and then manually verify (reject or confirm) issues reported by tools. We further manually review business logics, examine system operations, and place DeFi-related aspects under scrutiny to uncover possible pitfalls and/or bugs.

Severity	No. of Issues	Current Status
Critical	0	-
High	2	2
Medium	1	1
Low	4	4
Total	**7 (Currently Open Issues)**	



We have so far identified that there are potential issues with severity of **0 Critical, 2 High, 1 Medium, and 4 Low**. Overall, these smart contracts are well-designed and engineered.

Functional Overview

($) = payable function # = non-constant function	[Pub] public [Ext] external [Prv] private [Int] internal

+ [Lib] TransferHelper
  - [Int] safeApprove #
  - [Int] safeTransfer #
  - [Int] safeTransferFrom #
  - [Int] safeTransferETH #

+ [Int] IPancakeRouter01
  - [Ext] factory
  - [Ext] WETH
  - [Ext] addLiquidity #
  - [Ext] addLiquidityETH ($)
  - [Ext] removeLiquidity #
  - [Ext] removeLiquidityETH #
  - [Ext] removeLiquidityWithPermit #
  - [Ext] removeLiquidityETHWithPermit #
  - [Ext] swapExactTokensForTokens #
  - [Ext] swapTokensForExactTokens #

```
    - [Ext] swapExactETHForTokens ($)
    - [Ext] swapTokensForExactETH #
    - [Ext] swapExactTokensForETH #
    - [Ext] swapETHForExactTokens ($)
    - [Ext] quote
    - [Ext] getAmountOut
    - [Ext] getAmountIn
    - [Ext] getAmountsOut
    - [Ext] getAmountsIn

 + [Int] IPancakeRouter02 (IPancakeRouter01)
    - [Ext] removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens #
    - [Ext]
removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens #

 + [Int] IPancakeFactory
    - [Ext] feeTo
    - [Ext] feeToSetter
    - [Ext] getPair
    - [Ext] allPairs
    - [Ext] allPairsLength
    - [Ext] createPair #
    - [Ext] setFeeTo #
    - [Ext] setFeeToSetter #
    - [Ext] INIT_CODE_PAIR_HASH
```

+ [Lib] SafeMath
  - [Int] add
  - [Int] sub
  - [Int] mul

+ [Int] IPancakePair
  - [Ext] name
  - [Ext] symbol
  - [Ext] decimals
  - [Ext] totalSupply
  - [Ext] balanceOf
  - [Ext] allowance
  - [Ext] approve #
  - [Ext] transfer #
  - [Ext] transferFrom #
  - [Ext] DOMAIN_SEPARATOR
  - [Ext] PERMIT_TYPEHASH
  - [Ext] nonces
  - [Ext] permit #
  - [Ext] MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY
  - [Ext] factory
  - [Ext] token0
  - [Ext] token1
  - [Ext] getReserves

- [Ext] price0CumulativeLast
- [Ext] price1CumulativeLast
- [Ext] kLast
- [Ext] mint #
- [Ext] burn #
- [Ext] swap #
- [Ext] skim #
- [Ext] sync #
- [Ext] initialize #

+ [Lib] PancakeLibrary
- [Int] sortTokens
- [Int] pairFor
- [Int] getReserves
- [Int] quote
- [Int] getAmountOut
- [Int] getAmountIn
- [Int] getAmountsOut
- [Int] getAmountsIn

+ [Int] IERC20
- [Ext] name
- [Ext] symbol
- [Ext] decimals
- [Ext] totalSupply

- [Ext] balanceOf
- [Ext] allowance
- [Ext] approve #
- [Ext] transfer #
- [Ext] transferFrom #

+ [Int] IWETH
- [Ext] deposit ($)
- [Ext] transfer #
- [Ext] withdraw #

+ USDWSwapRouter (IPancakeRouter02)
- [Pub] <Constructor> #
- [Ext] <Receive Ether> ($)
- [Int] _addLiquidity #
- [Ext] addLiquidity #
  - modifiers: ensure
- [Ext] addLiquidityETH ($)
  - modifiers: ensure
- [Pub] removeLiquidity #
  - modifiers: ensure
- [Pub] removeLiquidityETH #
  - modifiers: ensure
- [Ext] removeLiquidityWithPermit #
- [Ext] removeLiquidityETHWithPermit #

- [Pub] removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens #
  - modifiers: ensure
- [Ext] removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens #
- [Int] _swap #
- [Ext] swapExactTokensForTokens #
  - modifiers: ensure
- [Ext] swapTokensForExactTokens #
  - modifiers: ensure
- [Ext] swapExactETHForTokens ($)
  - modifiers: ensure
- [Ext] swapTokensForExactETH #
  - modifiers: ensure
- [Ext] swapExactTokensForETH #
  - modifiers: ensure
- [Ext] swapETHForExactTokens ($)
  - modifiers: ensure
- [Pub] quote
- [Pub] getAmountOut
- [Pub] getAmountIn
- [Int] countFees
- [Ext] setadminsWallet #
  - modifiers: adminOnly
- [Ext] withdrawBNB #
  - modifiers: adminOnly

- [Ext] transferAnyERC20Token #
  - modifiers: adminOnly
- [Ext] setFees #
  - modifiers: adminOnly
- [Int] swapRewardDistribute #
- [Pub] setRewardToken #
  - modifiers: adminOnly
- [Pub] setMinTransactionLimit #
  - modifiers: adminOnly
- [Pub] setRewardAmount #
  - modifiers: adminOnly
- [Pub] getAmountsOut
- [Pub] getAmountsIn
- [Pub] setUsdtAddress #
  - modifiers: adminOnly
- [Pub] setUsdwAddress #
  - modifiers: adminOnly

Inheritance Tree



Graph for USDWSWAPROUTER



Detailed Results

Ownership Privileges

- The owner can set the admin wallet address including zero address.
- The owner can withdraw BNB.
- The owner can transfer any ERC20 tokens.
- The owner can set the fees to 100%.
- The owner can set a reward token address.
- The owner can set a minimum transaction limit.
- The owner can set the reward amount to 100%.
- The owner can set the usdt/usdw addresses..

Issues Checking Status

1. **Centralization – Missing threshold for min transactions.**

- Severity: High
- Overview: The contract contains the functionality in which the admin of the contract can update any arbitrary value in the minimum transaction limit amount, including zero, which can lock the swapping functionality in the contract if the value is set to zero.
- Status: Open
- POC:

```
0 references | 7f81e739 | Control flow graph | 1 reference | ftrace | funcSig
function setMinTransactionLimit(uint256 _count) public adminOnly {
    MINTXLIMIT = _count;
}
```

- Suggestion: There must be a threshold limit so that the value will lie at that range to exclude this risk from the contract.

2. Centralization – The owner can set fees of more than 25%

- Severity: High
- Overview: The owner can set the total fees of more than 100% in the contract which is not recommended.
- Status: Open
- POC:



- Suggestion: The fees in the contract should not be more than 25% so that the user does not lose his token value.

3. Centralization – Liquidity is added to EOA

- Severity: Medium
- Overview: Liquidity is added to EOA. It may be drained by the msg.sender.
- Status: Open
- POC:

```
function addLiquidity(address tokenA↑, address tokenB↑, uint amountADesired↑, uint amountBDesired↑, uint
amountAMin↑, uint amountBMin↑, address to↑, uint deadline↑) external virtual override ensure(deadline↑) returns
(uint amountA, uint amountB, uint liquidity) {
    (amountA, amountB) = _addLiquidity(tokenA↑, tokenB↑, amountADesired↑, amountBDesired↑, amountAMin↑,
    amountBMin↑);
    3 references
    address pair = PancakeLibrary.pairFor(factory, tokenA↑, tokenB↑);
    TransferHelper.safeTransferFrom(tokenA↑, msg.sender, pair, amountA);
    TransferHelper.safeTransferFrom(tokenB↑, msg.sender, pair, amountB);
    liquidity = IPancakePair(pair).mint(to↑);
}
```

- Suggestion: It is suggested that the address should be a contract address or a dead address.

4. Centralization – Missing Zero Address

- Severity: Low
- Overview: functions can take a zero address as a parameter (0x00000...). If a function parameter of address type is not properly validated by checking for zero addresses, there could be serious consequences for the contract's functionality.
- Status: Open
- POC:

```
0 references | d7cd6eee | Control flow graph | 1 reference | ftrace | funcSig
function setadminsWallet(address _adminWallet) external adminOnly {
    adminwallet = payable(_adminWallet);
}
```

- Suggestion: It is suggested that the address should not be zero or dead.

5. Centralization – Missing Events

- Severity: Low
- Overview: They serve as a mechanism for emitting and recording data onto the blockchain, making it transparent and easily accessible.
- Status: Open
- POC:

```
function setFees(uint _fees) external adminOnly {
        FEES = _fees;
    }
function setadminsWallet(address _adminWallet) external adminOnly {
        adminwallet = payable(_adminWallet);
    }
function setRewardToken(address _tokenAddress) public adminOnly {
        require(_tokenAddress != address(0), "invaid address found");
        REWARDTOKEN = IERC20(_tokenAddress);
    }

    function setMinTransactionLimit(uint256 _count) public adminOnly {
        MINTXLIMIT = _count;
    }
```

- Suggestion: Add an event to these important functions where an address update is happening. This can also be marked as an indexed event for better off-chain tracking.

6. Centralization – Outdated Compiler version

- Severity: Low
- Overview: Using an outdated compiler version can be problematic, especially if there are publicly disclosed bugs and issues that affect the current compiler version.
- Status: Open
- POC:

```
pragma solidity =0.6.6;
```

- Suggestion: It is recommended to use a recent version of the Solidity Compiler.

7. Centralization – Missing non-reentrant

- Severity: Low
- Overview: A “non-reentrant” modifier is a common mechanism in Solidity to prevent reentrancy attacks, where an external call can invoke the same function before the first call finishes. Without this protection, attackers can repeatedly call sensitive functions (like withdrawals) and drain contract funds. A well-known solution is OpenZeppelin’s ReentrancyGuard contract, which provides a nonReentrant modifier to ensure only one execution of a function can occur at a time.
- Status: Open

8. Optimization

- Severity: Optimization
- Overview: Unused variables are allowed in Solidity, and they do. not pose a direct security issue. It is the best practice though to avoid them.
- Status: Open
- POC:

```
function safeApprove(address token, address to, uint value) internal {
        // bytes4(keccak256(bytes('approve(address,uint256)')));
        (bool success, bytes memory data) =
token.call(abi.encodeWithSelector(0x095ea7b3, to, value));
        require(success && (data.length == 0 || abi.decode(data, (bool))),
'TransferHelper: APPROVE_FAILED');
    }
```

Automated Tool Results

Slither: -

```
INFO:Detectors:
USDWSwapRouter.setadminsWallet(address) (USDWSwapRouter.sol#650-652) should emit an event for:
        - adminwallet = address(_adminWallet) (USDWSwapRouter.sol#651)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-events-access-control
INFO:Detectors:
USDWSwapRouter.setFees(uint256) (USDWSwapRouter.sol#662-664) should emit an event for:
        - FEES = _fees (USDWSwapRouter.sol#663)
USDWSwapRouter.setMinTransactionLimit(uint256) (USDWSwapRouter.sol#677-679) should emit an event for:
        - MINTXLIMIT = _count (USDWSwapRouter.sol#678)
USDWSwapRouter.setRewardAmount(uint256) (USDWSwapRouter.sol#681-683) should emit an event for:
        - REWARDTOKENAMOUNT = _reward (USDWSwapRouter.sol#682)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-events-arithmetic
INFO:Detectors:
USDWSwapRouter.setadminsWallet(address)._adminWallet (USDWSwapRouter.sol#650) lacks a zero-check on :
                - adminwallet = address(_adminWallet) (USDWSwapRouter.sol#651)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-zero-address-validation
INFO:Detectors:
Reentrancy in USDWSwapRouter._swap(uint256[],address[],address) (USDWSwapRouter.sol#459-483):
        External calls:
        - IPancakePair(PancakeLibrary.pairFor(factory,input,output)).swap(amount0Out,amount1Out,to,new bytes(0)) (USDWSwapRouter.sol#477)
        - swapRewardDistribute() (USDWSwapRouter.sol#480)
                - REWARDTOKEN.transfer(msg.sender,REWARDTOKENAMOUNT) (USDWSwapRouter.sol#668)
        State variables written after the call(s):
        - totalTx += 1 (USDWSwapRouter.sol#481)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-2
INFO:Detectors:
Version constraint =0.6.6 contains known severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html)
        - MissingSideEffectsOnSelectorAccess
        - AbiReencodingHeadOverflowWithStaticArrayCleanup
        - DirtyBytesArrayToStorage
        - NestedCalldataArrayAbiReencodingSizeValidation
        - SignedImmutables
        - ABIDecodeTwoDimensionalArrayMemory
        - KeccakCaching
        - EmptyByteArrayCopy
        - DynamicArrayCleanup
        - MissingEscapingInFormatting
        - ArraySliceDynamicallyEncodedBaseType
        - ImplicitConstructorCallvalueCheck.
INFO:Detectors:
Low level call in TransferHelper.safeApprove(address,address,uint256) (USDWSwapRouter.sol#9-13):
        - (success,data) = token.call(abi.encodeWithSelector(0x095ea7b3,to,value)) (USDWSwapRouter.sol#11)
Low level call in TransferHelper.safeTransfer(address,address,uint256) (USDWSwapRouter.sol#15-19):
        - (success,data) = token.call(abi.encodeWithSelector(0xa9059cbb,to,value)) (USDWSwapRouter.sol#17)
Low level call in TransferHelper.safeTransferFrom(address,address,address,uint256) (USDWSwapRouter.sol#21-25):
        - (success,data) = token.call(abi.encodeWithSelector(0x23b872dd,from,to,value)) (USDWSwapRouter.sol#23)
Low level call in TransferHelper.safeTransferETH(address,uint256) (USDWSwapRouter.sol#27-30):
        - (success,None) = to.call{value: value}(new bytes(0)) (USDWSwapRouter.sol#28)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#low-level-calls
INFO:Detectors:
Function IPancakeRouter01.WETH() (USDWSwapRouter.sol#35) is not in mixedCase
Function IPancakeFactory.INIT_CODE_PAIR_HASH() (USDWSwapRouter.sol#162) is not in mixedCase
Function IPancakePair.DOMAIN_SEPARATOR() (USDWSwapRouter.sol#194) is not in mixedCase
Function IPancakePair.PERMIT_TYPEHASH() (USDWSwapRouter.sol#195) is not in mixedCase
Function IPancakePair.MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY() (USDWSwapRouter.sol#212) is not in mixedCase
Parameter USDWSwapRouter.setadminsWallet(address)._adminWallet (USDWSwapRouter.sol#650) is not in mixedCase
Parameter USDWSwapRouter.setFees(uint256)._fees (USDWSwapRouter.sol#662) is not in mixedCase
Parameter USDWSwapRouter.setRewardToken(address)._tokenAddress (USDWSwapRouter.sol#672) is not in mixedCase
Parameter USDWSwapRouter.setMinTransactionLimit(uint256)._count (USDWSwapRouter.sol#677) is not in mixedCase
Parameter USDWSwapRouter.setRewardAmount(uint256)._reward (USDWSwapRouter.sol#681) is not in mixedCase
Parameter USDWSwapRouter.setUsdtAddress(address)._usdt (USDWSwapRouter.sol#712) is not in mixedCase
Parameter USDWSwapRouter.setUsdwAddress(address)._usdw (USDWSwapRouter.sol#717) is not in mixedCase
Variable USDWSwapRouter.WETH (USDWSwapRouter.sol#334) is not in mixedCase
Variable USDWSwapRouter.FEES (USDWSwapRouter.sol#336) is not in mixedCase
Variable USDWSwapRouter.MINTXLIMIT (USDWSwapRouter.sol#339) is not in mixedCase
Variable USDWSwapRouter.REWARDTOKEN (USDWSwapRouter.sol#340) is not in mixedCase
Variable USDWSwapRouter.REWARDTOKENAMOUNT (USDWSwapRouter.sol#341) is not in mixedCase
Variable USDWSwapRouter.USDT (USDWSwapRouter.sol#342) is not in mixedCase
Variable USDWSwapRouter.USDW (USDWSwapRouter.sol#343) is not in mixedCase
Variable USDWSwapRouter.DECIMAL_DIFF (USDWSwapRouter.sol#344) is not in mixedCase
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions
INFO:Detectors:
USDWSwapRouter.constructor() (USDWSwapRouter.sol#356-366) uses literals with too many digits:
        - REWARDTOKENAMOUNT = 10000000000000000 (USDWSwapRouter.sol#365)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#too-many-digits
INFO:Detectors:
USDWSwapRouter.DECIMAL_DIFF (USDWSwapRouter.sol#344) should be constant
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-constant
INFO:Slither:USDWSwapRouter.sol analyzed (10 contracts with 93 detectors), 59 result(s) found
```

Basic Coding Bugs

No.	Name	Description	Severity	Result
1.	Constructor Mismatch	Whether the contract name and its constructor are not identical to each other.	Critical	PASSED
2.	Ownership Takeover	Whether the set owner function is not protected.	Critical	PASSED
3.	Redundant Fallback Function	Whether the contract has a redundant fallback function.	Critical	PASSED
4.	Overflows & Underflows	Whether the contract has general overflow or underflow vulnerabilities	Critical	PASSED
5.	Reentrancy	Reentrancy is an issue when code can call back into your contract and change state, such as withdrawing ETHs	High	PASSED
6.	MONEY-Giving Bug	Whether the contract returns funds to an arbitrary address	High	PASSED
7.	Blackhole	Whether the contract locks ETH indefinitely: merely in without out	High	PASSED
8.	Unauthorized Self-Destruct	Whether the contract can be killed by any arbitrary address	Medium	PASSED
9.	Revert DoS	Whether the contract is vulnerable to DoS attack because	Medium	PASSED

		of unexpected revert		
10.	Unchecked External Call	Whether the contract has any external call without checking the return value	Medium	PASSED
11.	Gasless Send	Whether the contract is vulnerable to gasless send	Medium	PASSED
12.	Send Instead of Transfer	Whether the contract uses send instead of transfer	Medium	PASSED
13.	Costly Loop	Whether the contract has any costly loop which may lead to Out-Of-Gas exception	Medium	PASSED
14.	(Unsafe) Use of Untrusted Libraries	Whether the contract use any suspicious libraries	Medium	PASSED
15.	(Unsafe) Use of Predictable Variables	Whether the contract contains any randomness variable, but its value can be predicated	Medium	PASSED
16.	Transaction Ordering Dependence	Whether the final state of the contract depends on the order of the transactions	Medium	PASSED
17.	Deprecated Uses	Whether the contract use the deprecated tx.origin to perform the authorization	Medium	PASSED
18.	Semantic Consistency Checks	Whether the semantic of the white paper is different from the implementation of the contract	Critical	PASSED

Conclusion

In this audit, we thoroughly analyzed USDWSwapRouter's 'USDWSWAPROUTER' Smart Contract. The current code base is well organized but there were some high-level issues found in this phase of testing of Smart Contract.

Meanwhile, we need to call attention to the fact that smart contracts are still in an early but exciting stage of development. To improve this report, we greatly appreciate any constructive feedback or suggestions on our methodology, audit findings, or potential gaps in scope/coverage.

About Virtual Caim

Just like our other parallel journey at eNebula Solution, we believe that people have a fundamental need for security and that the use of secure solutions enables every person to use the Internet and every other connected technology more freely. We aim to provide security consulting services to help others make their solutions more resistant to unauthorized access to data & inadvertent manipulation of the system. We support teams from the design phase through production to launch and surely after.

The Virtual Caim is specifically incorporated to handle all kind of Security related operations, our Highly Qualified and Certified security team has skills for reviewing coding languages like Solidity, Rust, Go, Python, Haskell, C, C++, and JavaScript for common security vulnerabilities & specific attack vectors. The team has been reviewing the implementations of cryptographic protocols and distributed system architecture, including in cryptocurrency, blockchains, payments, and smart contracts. Additionally, the team can utilize various tools to scan code & networks and build custom tools as necessary.

Although we are a small team, we surely believe that we can have a momentous impact on the world by being translucent & open about the work we do.

For more information about our other security services and consulting,
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