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A DIVISION OF CENTER FOR INTERNET SECURITY

CIS Oracle Database Server 11g R2 on Oracle

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Overview

This document is intended to address the recommended security settings for the Oracle 11g, r2 Database ©, running on either an x86 (32-bit) or x64 (64-bit) AMD/Intel chip platform. Specifically, the requirements included in this document have been designed for and tested against the Intel x64 chip running a 64-bit version of Oracle Linux © 2.6.18-194 configured as a stand-alone system, running as a "Database server," including all Oracle CPUs up through April 15, 2012. Future Oracle 11g r2 critical patch updates (CPUs) may impact the recommendations included in this document.

To obtain the latest version of this guide, please visit http://benchmarks.cisecurity.org. If you have questions, comments, or have identified ways to improve this guide, please write us at feedback@cisecurity.org.

Intended Audience

This benchmark is intended for system and application administrators, security specialists, auditors, help desk, and platform deployment personnel who plan to develop, deploy, assess, or secure solutions that incorporate Oracle Database Server 11g R2 on Oracle Linux 5.

Consensus Guidance

This benchmark was created using a consensus review process comprised of volunteer and contract subject matter experts. Consensus participants provide perspective from a diverse set of backgrounds including consulting, software development, audit and compliance, security research, operations, government, and legal.

Each CIS benchmark undergoes two phases of consensus review. The first phase occurs during initial benchmark development. During this phase, subject matter experts convene to discuss, create, and test working drafts of the benchmark. This discussion occurs until consensus has been reached on benchmark recommendations. The second phase begins after the benchmark has been released to the public Internet. During this phase, all feedback provided by the Internet community is reviewed by the consensus team for incorporation in the benchmark. If you are interested in participating in the consensus review process, please send us a note to feedback@cisecurity.org.

Typographical Conventions

The following typographical conventions are used throughout this guide:

Convention	Meaning
`Stylized Monospace font`	Used for blocks of code, command, and script examples. Text should be interpreted exactly as presented.
`Monospace font`	Used for inline code, commands, or examples. Text should be interpreted exactly as presented.
<italic font in brackets>	Italic texts set in angle brackets denote a variable requiring substitution for a real value.
Italic font	Used to denote the title of a book, article, or other publication.
Note	Additional information or caveats

Scoring Information

A scoring status indicates whether compliance with the given recommendation impacts the assessed target's benchmark score. The following scoring statuses are used in this benchmark:

Scored

Failure to comply with "Scored" recommendations will decrease the final benchmark score. Compliance with "Scored" recommendations will increase the final benchmark score.

Not Scored

Failure to comply with "Not Scored" recommendations will not decrease the final benchmark score. Compliance with "Not Scored" recommendations will not increase the final benchmark score.

Profile Definitions

The following configuration profiles are defined by this Benchmark:

- **Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5**

  Items in this profile intend to:

  - be practical and prudent;
  - provide a clear security benefit; and
  - not negatively inhibit the utility of the technology beyond acceptable means.
- **Level 2 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5**

  This profile extends the "Level 1" profile. Items in this profile exhibit one or more of the following characteristics:

  - are intended for environments or use cases where security is paramount.
  - acts as defense in depth measure.
  - may negatively inhibit the utility or performance of the technology.
- **Level 1 - 11.x on any platform**
- **Level 1 - 11.2 on any platform**
- **Level 1 - 11.2 on Windows**

Acknowledgements

This benchmark exemplifies the great things a community of users, vendors, and subject matter experts can accomplish through consensus collaboration. The CIS community thanks the entire consensus team with special recognition to the following individuals who contributed greatly to the creation of this guide:

Author
Alan Covell, *Qualys, Inc*

Editor
Stephen Willis, *Qualys, Inc*

TBD

This section defines the scoring statuses used within this document. The scoring status indicates whether compliance with the given recommendation is discernible in an automated manner.

Scored

The platform's compliance with the given recommendation can be determined via automated means.

Not Scored

The platform's compliance with the given recommendation cannot be determined via automated means.

Recommendations

1 Oracle Database Installation and Patching Requirements

One of the best ways to ensure secure Oracle security is to implement Critical Patch Updates (CPUs) as they come out, along with any applicable OS patches that will not interfere with system operations.

1.1 Change the Oracle default account passwords

Depending from the chosen installation method, Oracle 11gR2 creates a number of well-known, default accounts with default passwords, which are normally locked and expired. The majority of these default accounts are powerful and allow to overtake the database if the account is open. That's why the passwords of these accounts should be changed immediately to avoid that unlocking and unexpiring the account opens a security hole in the database.

Any of these accounts that are not required can potentially be deleted, but extensive testing should be should be done in a non-Production environment prior to removing a default account, to avoid breaking critical processes associated with legacy applications.

A password change in Oracle 11 could be done using 3 different ways (alter user, grant or password). The disadvantage of the alter user and grant syntax is that the password is transferred in cleartext over the network.

The SQL*Plus password command is transferring the encrypted password over the network but the Oracle client has to be compatible to the database (e.g. 11.2.0.2 client can't use the password against 11.2.0.3 due to API changes in the appropriate OCI call).

If the alter user syntax is used, the command should be executed on the database server itself.

1.1.1 Change the default password for 'APEX_040000' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The APEX_040000 account owns the greatest part of the objects created by the database during the installation of Oracle Database Application Express (ODAE).

Rationale:

Some pre-installed versions of APEX 4.0 come with a default password and can provide a point for database access/control by unauthorized users, opening up the tables, views, etc..

Audit:

```
select 'defaultpwd' as defaultpassword
from sys.user$
where name='APEX_040000'
      and
substr(spare4,3,40)=rawtohex(utl_raw.cast_to_varchar2(sys.dbms_crypto.hash(utl_raw.cas
t_to_raw('oracle')||hextoraw(substr(spare4,43,20)), 3)))
union
select 'defaultpwd' from sys.user$ where name name='APEX_040000' and
password='EE7785338B8FFE3D';
```

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password apex_040000

Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for apex_040000
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

1.1.2 Change the default password for 'APPQOSSYS' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The `APPQOSSYS` account manages/owns all Quality of Service objects and provides an intuitive, policy-driven system to manage service level requirements.

Rationale:

As the default `APPQOSSYS` account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can provide a point for database access by unauthorized users if left at the default setting, this value should be changed according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select 'defaultpwd' as defaultpassword
from sys.user$
```

```
where name='APPQOSSYS'
      and
substr(spare4,3,40)=rawtohex(utl_raw.cast_to_varchar2(sys.dbms_crypto.hash(utl_raw.cas
t_to_raw('appqossys')||hextoraw(substr(spare4,43,20)), 3)))
union
select 'defaultpwd' from dba_users_with_defpwd where username='APPQOSSYS';
```

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password appoqssys

Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for appqossys
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

1.1.3 Change the default password for 'CTXSYS' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The `CTXSYS` is used to administer Oracle Text.

Rationale:

As the default `CTXSYS` account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can provide a point for database access by unauthorized users if left at the default setting, this value should be changed according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select 'defaultpwd' as defaultpassword
from sys.user$
where name='CTXSYS'
      and
substr(spare4,3,40)=rawtohex(utl_raw.cast_to_varchar2(sys.dbms_crypto.hash(utl_raw.cas
t_to_raw('ctxsys')||hextoraw(substr(spare4,43,20)), 3)))
union
select 'defaultpwd' as defaultpassword
from sys.user$
where name='CTXSYS'
      and
substr(spare4,3,40)=rawtohex(utl_raw.cast_to_varchar2(sys.dbms_crypto.hash(utl_raw.cas
t_to_raw('change_on_install')||hextoraw(substr(spare4,43,20)), 3)))
union
select 'defaultpwd' from dba_users_with_defpwd where username='CTXSYS';
```

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password ctxsys
```

```
Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for ctxsys
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e10575/tdpsg_user_accounts.htm#TDPSG20030

1.1.4 Change the default password of 'DBSNMP' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The `DBSNMP` account is used by the Oracle Enterprise Manager to monitor and manage the database.

Rationale:

Depending from the installation, the default `DBSNMP` account created by Oracle could have a well-known password and can be potentially used to retrieve the Oracle password hashes.

Audit:

```
select 'defaultpwd' as defaultpassword
from sys.user$
where name='DBSNMP'
      and
substr(spare4,3,40)=rawtohex(utl_raw.cast_to_varchar2(sys.dbms_crypto.hash(utl_raw.cas
t_to_raw('dbsnmp')||hextoraw(substr(spare4,43,20)), 3)))
union
select 'defaultpwd' from dba_users_with_defpwd where username='DBSNMP';
```

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password dbsnmp

Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for dbsnmp
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e10575/tdpsg_user_accounts.htm#TDPSG20030

1.1.5 Change the default password for 'DIP' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The `DIP` account supports the operation of the Oracle Internet Directory and Oracle Label Security.

Rationale:

As the default `DIP` account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can provide a point for database access by unauthorized users if left at the default setting, this value should be changed according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select 'defaultpwd' as defaultpassword
from sys.user$
where name='DIP'
      and
substr(spare4,3,40)=rawtohex(utl_raw.cast_to_varchar2(sys.dbms_crypto.hash(utl_raw.cas
t_to_raw('dip')||hextoraw(substr(spare4,43,20)), 3)))
union
select 'defaultpwd' from dba_users_with_defpwd where username='DIP';
```

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password dip

Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for dip
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/statviews_5082.htm#REFRN23725

1.1.6 Change the default password for 'EXFSYS' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The EXFSYS account accesses the EXFSYS schema, which facilitates use of the Rules Manager and Expression Filter feature and allows the user to build complex PL/SQL rules and expressions.

Rationale:

As the default EXFSYS account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can provide a point for database access by unauthorized users if left at the default setting, this value should be changed according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select 'defaultpwd' as defaultpassword
from sys.user$
where name='EXFSYS'
      and
substr(spare4,3,40)=rawtohex(utl_raw.cast_to_varchar2(sys.dbms_crypto.hash(utl_raw.cas
t_to_raw('exfsys')||hextoraw(substr(spare4,43,20)), 3)))
union
select 'defaultpwd' from dba_users_with_defpwd where username='EXFSYS';
```

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password exfsys

Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for exfsys
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

1.1.7 Change the default password for 'MDDATA' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The MDDATA account owns the schema used by Oracle Spatial for storing Geocoder and router data, which allows the plotting of datapoints, such as market locations/types, against latitude and longitude on a map, in a way similar to a GPS presentation.

Rationale:

As the default MDDATA account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can be potentially corrupted to allow the installation of malware disguised as a business process, this value should be reset according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select 'defaultpwd' as defaultpassword
from sys.user$
where name='MDDATA'
      and
substr(spare4,3,40)=rawtohex(utl_raw.cast_to_varchar2(sys.dbms_crypto.hash(utl_raw.cas
t_to_raw('mddata')||hextoraw(substr(spare4,43,20)), 3)))
union
select 'defaultpwd' from dba_users_with_defpwd where username='MDDATA';
```

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password mddata

Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for mddata
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

1.1.8 Change the default password for 'MDSYS' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The `MDSYS` is the user in that operationalizes the Oracle Multimedia Locator, which serves as part of the storage, management, and retrieval of audio/video images.

Rationale:

As the default `MDSYS` account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can be potentially corrupted to allow the installation of malware disguised and AV plugins, this value should be reset according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select 'defaultpwd' as defaultpassword
from sys.user$
where name='MDSYS'
      and
substr(spare4,3,40)=rawtohex(utl_raw.cast_to_varchar2(sys.dbms_crypto.hash(utl_raw.cas
t_to_raw('sys')||hextoraw(substr(spare4,43,20)), 3)))
union
select 'defaultpwd' as defaultpassword
from sys.user$
where name='MDSYS'
      and
substr(spare4,3,40)=rawtohex(utl_raw.cast_to_varchar2(sys.dbms_crypto.hash(utl_raw.cas
t_to_raw('mdsys')||hextoraw(substr(spare4,43,20)), 3)))
```

```
union
select 'defaultpwd' from dba_users_with_defpwd where username='MDSYS';
```

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password mdsys

Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for mdsys
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

1.1.9 Rejected - Change the default password for 'APEX_040100' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The LBACSYS account administers the Oracle Label Security (OLS) feature.

Rationale:

As the default LBACSYS account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can provide a point for database access/control by unauthorized users, opening up the tables, views, etc. This value should be changed according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select 'defaultpwd' as defaultpassword
from sys.user$
where name='LBACSYS'
      and
substr(spare4,3,40)=rawtohex(utl_raw.cast_to_varchar2(sys.dbms_crypto.hash(utl_raw.cas
t_to_raw('lbacsys')||hextoraw(substr(spare4,43,20)), 3)))
union
select 'defaultpwd' from dba_users_with_defpwd where username='LBACSYS';
```

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password lbacsys

Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for lbacsys
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

1.1.10 Change the default password for 'OLAPSYS' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The `OLAPSYS` account owns the online analytical processing (OLAP) catalog. OLAP applications are developed/operate to use business intelligence and data warehousing systems and OLAP is optimized for this type of application.

Rationale:

As the default `OLAPSYS` account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can be potentially corrupted to allow the installation of malware disguised as a business process, this value should be reset according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select 'defaultpwd' as defaultpassword
from sys.user$
where name='OLAPSYS'
      and
substr(spare4,3,40)=rawtohex(utl_raw.cast_to_varchar2(sys.dbms_crypto.hash(utl_raw.cas
t_to_raw('manager')||hextoraw(substr(spare4,43,20)), 3)))
union
select 'defaultpwd' from dba_users_with_defpwd where username='OLAPSYS';
```

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password olapsys

Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for olapsys
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

1.1.11 Change the default password for 'ORACLE_OCM' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The `ORACLE_OCM` account supports the operation of the Configuration Manager with the instance and MyOracleSupport.

Rationale:

As the default ORACLE_OCM account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can provide a point for database access by unauthorized users if left at the default setting, this value should be changed according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select 'defaultpwd' as defaultpassword
from sys.user$
where name='ORACLE_OCM'
      and
substr(spare4,3,40)=rawtohex(utl_raw.cast_to_varchar2(sys.dbms_crypto.hash(utl_raw.cas
t_to_raw('oracle_ocm')||hextoraw(substr(spare4,43,20)), 3)))
union
select 'defaultpwd' from dba_users_with_defpwd where username='ORACLE_COM';
```

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password oracle_ocm

Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for oracle_ocm
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/statviews_5082.htm#REFRN23725

1.1.12 Change the default password for 'ORDDATA' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The ORDDATA user operationalizes/owns the Oracle Multimedia DICOM modality: Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine (DICOM), which is the industry standard for medical imaging, enables the Database to store, manage, and manipulate all DICOM format medical content.

Rationale:

As the default ORDDATA account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can be potentially corrupted to allow the installation of malware disguised as AV plugins, or cause a Denial-of-Service condition by deleting the account, this value should be reset according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select 'defaultpwd' as defaultpassword
from sys.user$
where name='ORDDATA'
      and
substr(spare4,3,40)=rawtohex(utl_raw.cast_to_varchar2(sys.dbms_crypto.hash(utl_raw.cas
t_to_raw('orddata')||hextoraw(substr(spare4,43,20)), 3)))
union
select 'defaultpwd' from dba_users_with_defpwd where username='ORDDATA';
```

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password orddata

Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for orddata
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

1.1.13 Change the default password for 'ORDPLUGINS' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The `ORDPLUGINS` provide the plugins to enable the database to store, manage, and retrieve audio/video images, such as the DICOM medical data format.

Rationale:

As the default `ORDPLUGINS` account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can be potentially corrupted to allow the installation of malware disguised and AV plugins, this value should be reset according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select 'defaultpwd' as defaultpassword
from sys.user$
where name='ORDPLUGINS'
      and
substr(spare4,3,40)=rawtohex(utl_raw.cast_to_varchar2(sys.dbms_crypto.hash(utl_raw.cas
t_to_raw('ordplugins')||hextoraw(substr(spare4,43,20)), 3)))
union
select 'defaultpwd' from dba_users_with_defpwd where username='ORDPLUGINS';
```

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password ordplugins
```

```
Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for ordplugins
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

1.1.14 Change the default password for 'ORDSYS' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The `ORDSYS` user functions as the Oracle Multimedia administrator. DICOM modality: Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine (DICOM), which is the industry standard for medical imaging, enables the Database to store, manage, and manipulate all DICOM format medical content.

Rationale:

As the default `ORDDATA` account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can be potentially corrupted to allow the installation of malware disguised as AV plugins, or cause a Denial-of-Service condition by deleting the account, this value should be reset according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select 'defaultpwd' as defaultpassword
from sys.user$
where name='ORDSYS'
      and
substr(spare4,3,40)=rawtohex(utl_raw.cast_to_varchar2(sys.dbms_crypto.hash(utl_raw.cas
t_to_raw('ordsys')||hextoraw(substr(spare4,43,20)), 3)))
union
select 'defaultpwd' from dba_users_with_defpwd where username='ORDSYS';
```

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password ordsys

Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for ordsys
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

1.1.15 Change the default password for 'OUTLN' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The OUTLN user helps preserve application stability by preventing changes to the database environment from overly impacting system performance characteristics.

Rationale:

As the default OUTLN account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can provide a point for database access by unauthorized users if left at the default setting, this value should be changed according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select 'defaultpwd' as defaultpassword
from sys.user$
where name='OUTLN'
      and
substr(spare4,3,40)=rawtohex(utl_raw.cast_to_varchar2(sys.dbms_crypto.hash(utl_raw.cas
t_to_raw('outln')||hextoraw(substr(spare4,43,20)), 3)))
union
select 'defaultpwd' from dba_users_with_defpwd where username='OUTLN';
```

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password outln

Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for outln
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/statviews_5082.htm#REFRN23725

1.1.16 Change the default password of 'OWBSYS_AUDIT' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The OWBSYS_AUDIT account handles access to the OWBSYS audit/logging tables, which record Warehouse Builder workspace and user analysis/query operations.

Rationale:

As the default OWBSYS_UDIT account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can be potentially used to take alter the audit/logging tables to alter/delete forensic data that can reveal unauthorized access/alteration of data, this value should be reset according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select 'defaultpwd' as defaultpassword
from sys.user$
where name='OWBSYS_AUDIT'
      and
substr(spare4,3,40)=rawtohex(utl_raw.cast_to_varchar2(sys.dbms_crypto.hash(utl_raw.cas
t_to_raw('owbsys_audit')||hextoraw(substr(spare4,43,20)), 3)))
union
select 'defaultpwd' from dba_users_with_defpwd where username='OWBSYS_AUDIT';
```

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password owbsys_audit

Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for owbsys_audit
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

1.1.17 Change the default password of 'OWBSYS' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The OWBSYS account handles Oracle Warehouse Builder database administrative tasks, which is created during installation and defines the language of repository for the Warehouse Builder workspaces and user analysis/query operations.

Rationale:

As the default OWBSYS account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can be potentially used to take over the database warehouse structures or access user queries, this value should be reset according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select 'defaultpwd' as defaultpassword
from sys.user$
where name='OWBSYS'
      and
substr(spare4,3,40)=rawtohex(utl_raw.cast_to_varchar2(sys.dbms_crypto.hash(utl_raw.cas
t_to_raw('owbsys')||hextoraw(substr(spare4,43,20)), 3)))
```

```
union
select 'defaultpwd' from dba_users_with_defpwd where username='OWBSYS';
```

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password owbsys

Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for owbsys
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

1.1.18 Change the default for 'SI_INFORMTN_SCHEMA' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The `SI_INFORMTN_SCHEMA` functions as the location for storing plugins supplied by Oracle and all other third-party plugins.

Rationale:

As the default `SI_INFORMTN_SCHEMA` account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can be potentially corrupted to allow the installation of malware disguised as third-party multimedia plugins, this value should be reset according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select 'defaultpwd' as defaultpassword
from sys.user$
where name='SI_INFORMTN_SCHEMA'
      and
substr(spare4,3,40)=rawtohex(utl_raw.cast_to_varchar2(sys.dbms_crypto.hash(utl_raw.cas
t_to_raw('si_informtn_schema')||hextoraw(substr(spare4,43,20)), 3)))
union
select 'defaultpwd' from dba_users_with_defpwd where username='SI_INFORMTN_SCHEMA';
```

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password si_informtn_schema

Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for si_informtn_schema
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

1.1.19 Change the default password of 'SPATIAL_CSW_ADMIN_USR' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The `SPATIAL_CSW_ADMIN_USR` account owns the Catalog Services for the Web (CSW) capabilities, which are used by Oracle to load record-type metadata and instances from the DB into the main memory when these records are cached.

Rationale:

As the default `SPATIAL_CSW_ADMIN_USR` account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can be potentially corrupted to allow the installation of malware disguised as a business process, this value should be reset according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select 'defaultpwd' as defaultpassword
from sys.user$
where name='SPATIAL_CSW_ADMIN_USR'
      and
substr(spare4,3,40)=rawtohex(utl_raw.cast_to_varchar2(sys.dbms_crypto.hash(utl_raw.cas
t_to_raw('spatial_csw_admin_usr')||hextoraw(substr(spare4,43,20)), 3)))
union
select 'defaultpwd' from dba_users_with_defpwd where username='SPATIAL_CSW_ADMIN_USR';
```

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password spatial_csw_admin_usr

Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for spatial_csw_admin_usr
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

1.1.20 Change the default password of 'SPATIAL_WFS_ADMIN_USR' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The SPATIAL_WFS_ADMIN_USR account owns the Web Feature Service (WFS) capabilities, which are used by Oracle to load feature instance/metadata from the DB into the main memory when these are pulled from a cache.

Rationale:

As the default SPATIAL_WFS_ADMIN_USR account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can be potentially corrupted to allow the installation of malware disguised as a business process, this value should be reset according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select 'defaultpwd' as defaultpassword
from sys.user$
where name='SPATIAL_WFS_ADMIN_USR'
      and
substr(spare4,3,40)=rawtohex(utl_raw.cast_to_varchar2(sys.dbms_crypto.hash(utl_raw.cas
t_to_raw('spatial_wfs_admin_usr')||hextoraw(substr(spare4,43,20)), 3)))
union
select 'defaultpwd' from dba_users_with_defpwd where username='SPATIAL_WFS_ADMIN_USR';
```

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password spatial_wfs_admin_usr

Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for spatial_wfs_admin_usr
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

1.1.21 Change the default password for 'SYS' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The SYS account is the highest level user created by the database installation.

Rationale:

Older versions of Oracle had a well-known password and with the "SYS and SYSDBA" login provides the most powerful a point for an unauthorized user if left at the default setting, this value should be changed according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select 'defaultpwd' as defaultpassword
from sys.user$
```

```
where name='SYS'
      and
substr(spare4,3,40)=rawtohex(utl_raw.cast_to_varchar2(sys.dbms_crypto.hash(utl_raw.cas
t_to_raw('manager')||hextoraw(substr(spare4,43,20)), 3)))
union
select 'defaultpwd' as defaultpassword
from sys.user$
where name='SYS'
      and
substr(spare4,3,40)=rawtohex(utl_raw.cast_to_varchar2(sys.dbms_crypto.hash(utl_raw.cas
t_to_raw('change_on_install')||hextoraw(substr(spare4,43,20)), 3)))
union
select 'defaultpwd' from dba_users_with_defpwd where username='SYS';
```

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password sys

Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for sys
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/statviews_5082.htm#REFRN23725

1.1.22 Change the default password for 'SYSTEM' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The `SYSTEM` user is created for administrative purposes during the database installation.

Rationale:

In older versions of Oracle the default `SYSTEM` account had a well-known password and can provide a point for full dba access by unauthorized users if left at the default setting, this value should be changed according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select 'defaultpwd' as defaultpassword
from sys.user$
where name='SYSTEM'
      and
substr(spare4,3,40)=rawtohex(utl_raw.cast_to_varchar2(sys.dbms_crypto.hash(utl_raw.cas
t_to_raw('manager')||hextoraw(substr(spare4,43,20)), 3)))
```

```
union
select 'defaultpwd' from dba_users_with_defpwd where username='SYSTEM';
```

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password system

Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for system
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/statviews_5082.htm#REFRN23725

1.1.23 Change the default password of 'WK_TEST' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The `WK_TEST` account handles access to Oracle Ultrasearch

Rationale:

As the default `WK_TEST` account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can be potentially used to take alter the tables or alter/delete forensic data, this value should be reset according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select 'defaultpwd' as defaultpassword
from sys.user$
where name='WK_TEST'
      and
substr(spare4,3,40)=rawtohex(utl_raw.cast_to_varchar2(sys.dbms_crypto.hash(utl_raw.cas
t_to_raw('wk_test')||hextoraw(substr(spare4,43,20)), 3)))
union
select 'defaultpwd' from dba_users_with_defpwd where username='WK_TEST';
```

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password wk_test

Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for wk_test
New password:
```

```
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

1.1.24 Change the default password of WKPROXY (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The `WKPROXY` account handles the Oracle 9i Application Ultra Search.

Rationale:

As the default WKPROXY account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can be potentially used to take alter the tables or alter/delete forensic data, this value should be reset according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select 'defaultpwd' as defaultpassword
from sys.user$
where name='WKPROXY'
      and
substr(spare4,3,40)=rawtohex(utl_raw.cast_to_varchar2(sys.dbms_crypto.hash(utl_raw.cas
t_to_raw('change_on_install')||hextoraw(substr(spare4,43,20)), 3)))
union
select 'defaultpwd' as defaultpassword
from sys.user$
where name='WKPROXY'
      and
substr(spare4,3,40)=rawtohex(utl_raw.cast_to_varchar2(sys.dbms_crypto.hash(utl_raw.cas
t_to_raw('wkproxy')||hextoraw(substr(spare4,43,20)), 3)))
union
select 'defaultpwd' from dba_users_with_defpwd where username='WKPROXY';
```

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password wkproxy

Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for wkproxy
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

1.1.25 Change the default password for 'WKSYS' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The WKSYS account is the Ultra Search administrator.

Rationale:

As the default WKSYS account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can provide a point for database access by unauthorized users if left at the default setting, this value should be changed according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select 'defaultpwd' as defaultpassword
from sys.user$
where name='WKSYS'
      and
substr(spare4,3,40)=rawtohex(utl_raw.cast_to_varchar2(sys.dbms_crypto.hash(utl_raw.cas
t_to_raw('wksys')||hextoraw(substr(spare4,43,20)), 3)))
union
select 'defaultpwd' from dba_users_with_defpwd where username='WKSYS';
```

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password wksys

Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for wksys
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

1.1.26 Change the default password for 'WMSYS' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The WMSYS account stores manages all metadata for the Workspace manager, which provides a virtual environment to isolate workspaces, such as a collection of changes to production data, or keep a changes history, allowing the creation of "what if" scenarios.

Rationale:

As the default WMSYS account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can provide a point for database access by unauthorized users if left at the default setting, this value should be changed according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select 'defaultpwd' as defaultpassword
from sys.user$
where name='WMSYS'
      and
substr(spare4,3,40)=rawtohex(utl_raw.cast_to_varchar2(sys.dbms_crypto.hash(utl_raw.cas
t_to_raw('wmsys')||hextoraw(substr(spare4,43,20)), 3)))
union
select 'defaultpwd' from dba_users_with_defpwd where username='WMSYS';
```

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password wmsys

Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for wmsys
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

1.1.27 Change the default password for 'XDB' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The `XDB` account enables high-performance storage and retrieval of XML data.

Rationale:

As the default `XDB` account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can provide a point for database access by unauthorized users if left at the default setting, this value should be changed according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select 'defaultpwd' as defaultpassword
from sys.user$
where name='XDB'
      and
substr(spare4,3,40)=rawtohex(utl_raw.cast_to_varchar2(sys.dbms_crypto.hash(utl_raw.cas
t_to_raw('xdb')||hextoraw(substr(spare4,43,20)), 3)))
union
select 'defaultpwd' as defaultpassword
from sys.user$
where name='XDB'
      and
substr(spare4,3,40)=rawtohex(utl_raw.cast_to_varchar2(sys.dbms_crypto.hash(utl_raw.cas
t_to_raw('change_on_install')||hextoraw(substr(spare4,43,20)), 3)))
union
select 'defaultpwd' from dba_users_with_defpwd where username='XDB';
```

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password xdb

Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for xdb
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

1.1.28 Rejected - Change the default password of MGMT_VIEW (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The `MGMT_VIEW` account handles Oracle Enterprise Manager (OEM) database administrative tasks, which can create and modify other EM admin accounts as well as admin the database instance itself.

Rationale:

As the default `MGMT_VIEW` account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can be potentially used to take over the database instance, this value should be reset according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT * FROM DBA_USERS_WITH_DEFPWD WHERE USERNAME='MGMT_VIEW';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> ALTER USER MGMT_VIEW IDENTIFIED BY newpassword;
```

1.1.29 Rejected - Change the default password for XS$NULL (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `XS$NULL` represents the "absent user" that might occur in a session and can only be accessed by the database instance.

Rationale:

As the default XS$NULL account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can be potentially corrupted to cause a Denial-of-Service incident, this value should be changed according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT * FROM DBA_USERS_WITH_DEFPWD WHERE USERNAME='XS$NULL';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> ALTER USER XS$NULL IDENTIFIED BY newpassword;
```

1.1.30 Rejected - Change the default password of WK_TEST (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The WK_TEST is the account that handles access to the Oracle Ultra Search instance (WK_INST) and schema.

Rationale:

As the default WK_TEST account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can be potentially used to discover information about the instance, this value should be reset according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SELECT * FROM DBA_USERS_WITH_DEFPWD WHERE USERNAME='WK_TEST';
```

Remediation:

```
ALTER USER WK_TEST IDENTIFIED BY newpassword;
```

1.1.31 Rejected - Change the default password for 'ANONYMOUS' (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The ANONYMOUS account provides HTTP access for the XML portion of the Oracle database and enables the Oracle Application Express (APEX) , which comes pre-installed from version 11g onwards.

Rationale:

As the default ANONYMOUS account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can provide a point for database access by unauthorized users if left at the default setting, this value should be changed according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password anonymous

Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for anonymous
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

1.1.32 Rejected - Change the default password for 'APEX_030200' (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The APEX_030200 account owns the greatest part of the objects created by the database during the installation of Oracle Database Application Express (ODAE).

Rationale:

As the default APEX_030200 account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can provide a point for database access/control by unauthorized users, opening up the tables, views, etc. created during the ODAE creation process, this value should be changed according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password apex_030200

Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for apex_030200
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

1.1.33 Rejected - Change the default password for 'APEX_PUBLIC_USER' (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The APEX_PUBLIC_USER account is the connect user for Oracle APEX.

Rationale:

As the default APEX_PUBLIC_USER account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can provide a point for database access by unauthorized users if left at the default setting, this value should be changed according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password apex_public_user

Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for apex_public_user
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

1.1.34 Rejected - Change the default password of 'SYSMAN' (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The SYSMAN account handles Oracle Enterprise Manager (OEM) database administrative tasks, which can create and modify other EM admin accounts as well as admin the database instance itself.

Rationale:

As the default SYSMAN account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can be potentially used to take over the database instance, this value should be reset according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password sysman

Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for sysman
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

1.1.35 Rejected - Change the default password for 'APEX_040100' (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The APEX_040100 account owns the greatest part of the objects created by the database during the installation of Oracle Database Application Express (ODAE).

Rationale:

As the default APEX_040100account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can provide a point for database access/control by unauthorized users, opening up the tables, views, etc. created during the ODAE creation process, this value should be changed according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password apex_040100

Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for apex_040100
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

1.1.36 Rejected - Change the default password for 'APEX_040100' (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The APEX_040200 account owns the greatest part of the objects created by the database during the installation of Oracle Database Application Express (ODAE).

Rationale:

As the default APEX_040200 account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can provide a point for database access/control by unauthorized users, opening up the tables, views, etc. created during the ODAE creation process, this value should be changed according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password apex_040200

Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for apex_040200
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

1.1.37 Rejected - Change the default password for 'FLOWS_FILES' (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The `FLOWS_FILES` account owns the greatest part of the objects created by the database during the installation of Oracle Database Application Express (ODAE) specific to `modsql` document conveyance.

Rationale:

As the default `FLOWS_FILES` account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can provide a point for database access/control by unauthorized users, opening up the tables, views, etc. created during the ODAE creation process, this value should be changed according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password flows_files

Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for flows_files
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

1.1.38 Rejected - Change the default password for 'FLOWS_030000' (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The `FLOWS_300000` account owns the greatest part of the objects created by the database during the installation of Oracle Database Application Express (ODAE).

Rationale:

As the default `FLOWS_030000` account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can provide a point for database access/control by unauthorized users, opening up the tables, views, etc. created during the ODAE creation process, this value should be changed according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password flows_030000

Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for flows_030000
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

1.1.39 Rejected - Change the default password for 'FLOWS_030100' (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The `FLOWS_030100` account owns the greatest part of the objects created by the database during the installation of Oracle Database Application Express (ODAE).

Rationale:

As the default `FLOWS_030100` account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can provide a point for database access/control by unauthorized users, opening up the tables, views, etc. created during the ODAE creation process, this value should be changed according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password flows_030100

Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for flows_030100
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

1.1.40 Rejected - Change the default password for 'LBACSYS' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The LBACSYS account administers the Oracle Label Security (OLS) feature.

Rationale:

As the default LBACSYS account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can provide a point for database access/control by unauthorized users, opening up the tables, views, etc. This value should be changed according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select 'defaultpwd' as defaultpassword
from sys.user$
where name='LBACSYS'
      and
substr(spare4,3,40)=rawtohex(utl_raw.cast_to_varchar2(sys.dbms_crypto.hash(utl_raw.cas
t_to_raw('lbacsys')||hextoraw(substr(spare4,43,20)), 3)))
union
select 'defaultpwd' from dba_users_with_defpwd where username='LBACSYS';
```

Remediation:

```
Execute the following command to change the password
SQL> password lbacsys

Enter the new password twice:
Changing password for lbacsys
New password:
Retype new password:
Password changed
```

1.2 Remove Oracle Sample Users

Oracle sample schema are not needed for the operation of the database. That's why the Oracle sample users (BI,HR,OE,PM,IX,SH, SCOTT) should be removed after checking the the schema are really sample schema.

1.2.1 Remove the sample user 'BI' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The `BI` account owns the Business Intelligence (BI) sample schema.

Rationale:

As the default `BI` account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can be potentially used to alter the database to launch exploits against Production to gain unauthorized access to user data, this value should be reset according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT username||' ['||created||']' FROM ALL_USERS WHERE USERNAME='BI';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> DROP USER BI CASCADE;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e10575/tdpsg_user_accounts.htm#TDPSG20303

1.2.2 Remove the sample user 'HR' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The `HR` account is used to manage the HR (Human Resources) sample schema.

Rationale:

As the default `HR` account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can be potentially used to alter the database to launch exploits against Production to gain unauthorized access to user data, this value should be reset according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT username||' ['||created||']' FROM ALL_USERS WHERE USERNAME='HR';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> DROP USER HR CASCADE;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e10831/scripts.htm#autoId3

1.2.3 Remove the sample user 'IX' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The `IX` account is used to manage the Information eXchange (IX) sample schema.

Rationale:

As the default IX account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can be potentially used to alter the database to launch exploits against Production to gain unauthorized access to user data, this value should be reset according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT username||' ['||created||']' FROM ALL_USERS WHERE USERNAME='IX';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> DROP USER IX CASCADE;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e10831/scripts.htm#autoId9

1.2.4 Remove the sample user 'OE' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The `OE` account is used to manage the Order Entry (OE) sample schema.

Rationale:

As the default `OE` account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can be potentially used to alter the database to launch exploits against Production to gain

unauthorized access to user data, this value should be reset according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT username||' ['||created||']' FROM ALL_USERS WHERE USERNAME='OE';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> DROP USER OE CASCADE;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e10831/scripts.htm#autoId5

1.2.5 Remove the sample user 'PM' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The `PM` account is used to manage the product media (PM) sample schema for Business-to-Business.

Rationale:

As the default `PM` account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can be potentially used to alter the database to launch exploits against Production to gain unauthorized access to user data, this value should be reset according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT username||' ['||created||']' FROM ALL_USERS WHERE USERNAME='PM';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> DROP USER PM CASCADE;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e10831/scripts.htm#autoId7

1.2.6 Remove the sample user 'SCOTT' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The SCOTT account is used in examples throughout the Oracle database.

Rationale:

As the default SCOTT account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can be potentially used to alter the database or to launch exploits against Production to gain unauthorized access to user data, this value should be reset according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT username||' ['||created||']' FROM ALL_USERS WHERE USERNAME='SCOTT';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> DROP USER SCOTT CASCADE;
```

1.2.7 Remove the sample user 'SH' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The SH account is used to manage the SH sales schema, which stores business data.

Rationale:

As the default SH account created by Oracle has a well-known password and can be potentially used to alter the database to launch exploits against Production to gain unauthorized access to user data, this value should be reset according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT username||' ['||created||']' FROM ALL_USERS WHERE USERNAME='SH';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> DROP USER SH CASCADE;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e10831/scripts.htm#autoId11

1.3 Ensure the latest version/patches for Oracle software is installed (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle installation version, along with the patch level, should be the most recent that is compatible with the organizations' operational needs.

Rationale:

As using the most recent Oracle database software, along with all applicable patches can help limit the possibilities for vulnerabilities in the software, the installation version and/or patches applied during setup should be established according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
# opatch lsinventory -detail
```

Remediation:

```
Check the results of opatch against the current list of Oracle patches on metalink
```

References:

1. http://www.oracle.com/us/support/assurance/fixing-policies/index.html

1.4 Lock the default Oracle software owner account (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle installation requires a software account owner, which is named `oracle` by default. This account should be locked.

Rationale:

The Oracle user should not be accessed remotely (e.g. SSH, telnet, FTP).

Audit:

```
$ TBD
```

Remediation:

```
# TBD
```

1.5 Rejected - Ensure that the tkprof tool is removed or restricted (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `TKPROF` program allows conversion of the trace files into a human-readable text, to allow diagnostics of database problem areas.

Rationale:

As retaining TKPROF on a Production system could allow an unauthorized user to discover database weaknesses, it should be removed or restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
# find $ORACLE_HOME -name tkprof
# (path for tkprof)
```

Remediation:

```
# cd (path for tkprof)
# rm tkprof
OR
# chmod 700 tkprof
# ls -ald tkprof | awk '{print $1,$3,$4,$9}'
# drwxr-x--- oracle oracle  tkprof
```

1.6 Rejected - Ensure the Oracle listener default name is changed (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle `listener` provides network connections to the database with the name of the connection, protocol addresses, and services offered by the database.

Rationale:

As the default name of the listener is well known and could facilitate network-based Denial-of-Service attacks against its bandwidth capabilities, it should be renamed according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep "default = listener"
$ ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/listener.ora
```

Remediation:

```
$ if [ "`grep '^LISTENER = listener' $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/listener.ora`" ]; then
awk '/^LISTENER/ { $3 = "" } {print}' $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/listener.ora >
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/listener.ora.new;  mv
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/listener.ora.new $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/listener.ora;
fi
```

1.7 Rejected - Ensure the Oracle listener file uses IPs instead of hostnames (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5
- Level 2 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle `listener` provides network connections to the database with the name of the connection, protocol addresses, and services offered by the database. The `listener.ora` file can contain connection information based on host names or IP addresses.

Rationale:

As using host names in `listener.ora` file could allow DNS server cache-poisoning to facilitate a network-based Denial-of-Service attacks on the system, the requisite hostnames should be listed as IP addresses, according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep "HOST = " $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/listener.ora | awk '{print $6,$7}'
```

Remediation:

```
Use vi or another editor to change the hostnames in the listener.ora file to IP
addresses
```

*1.8 Rejected - Ensure the Oracle otrace *.dat files are removed (Scored)*

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle "Trace" (otrace) utility provides a way to trace SQL statement executions, as well as data on the duration, frequency, and resources the database uses for all parse, execution, and fetch events

Rationale:

As the `*.dat` files generated by the `otrace` utility contain sensitive information that could facilitate attacks on the system, these files should be removed according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
# cd ORACLE_HOME/otrace/admin
# ls -alt *.dat
```

Remediation:

```
# cd $ORACLE_HOME/otrace/admin
# rm -f process.dat regid.dat
```

1.9 Rejected - Ensure third-party accounts put on Oracle get new passwords (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5
- Level 2 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

Various third-party programs create well-known default `DBA_USER` accounts on the Oracle database during their installation, which leaves them open to exploitation of the account privileges by unauthorized users.

Rationale:

As the default accounts created on Oracle by third-party software often have well-known passwords and can provide a point for access by unauthorized users if the passwords are unchanged, all the accounts remaining after unnecessary ones have been deleted or locked should have the default passwords changed according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT * FROM DBA_USERS_WITH_DEFPWD; SELECT USERNAME, ACCOUNT_STATUS FROM
DBA_USERS;
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> ALTER USER <username> IDENTIFIED BY <password>;  or
ALTER USER <username> ACCOUNT LOCK PASSWORD EXPIRE;
```

1.10 Rejected - Change the Oracle default service identifier (sid) (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle installation creates a default site identifier value (`orcl`).

Rationale:

As the default ports created by Oracle can provide a target for exploits by unauthorized users, the ports should be changed according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$grep -i "^orcl" /etc/oratab
$ orcl:/home/oracle/app/oracle/product/11.2.0/dbhome_2:Y
```

Remediation:

```
Change the Oracle 11gR2 sid:

1.      First, make certain to have a complete cold backup.
Then ALTER DATABASE BACKUP CONTROLFILE TO TRACE AS
'/home/oracle/something/create_ctl.sql';
```

```
2.  Extract the "create controlfile" command from the
    background-dump-destination tracefile.

3.  Shutdown the DB cleanly: shutdown immediate.

4.  Change the DB Name in your init<SID>.ora to the new SID
    value in init<NEWSID>.ora .

5.  Change the SID in /etc/oratab or /var/opt/oracle/oratab

6.  Change the SID in your environment and source it.

7.  Startup the database to mount-status: startup mount

8.  Re-Create the control file with the statement from number 2

9.  Do an: alter database rename global_name to <SID> .

10. Change the listener and network configurations accordingly:
   $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/*.ora  files
```

2 Oracle Directory and File Permissions

The role of access control through file ownership and permissions is self-evident--the major difficulty with Oracle is determining which files it is critical to control OS-based access to. In the below, the names **"orauser"** and **"oragroup"** will substitute for whatever the organization has chosen for the primary Oracle user/group names. The primary criterion for compliance in this regard is that the instance has had the user/group names changed from the default values given by Oracle.

2.1 Rejected - Verify/set permissions for any files listed as an ifile target

The IFILE setting is used to embed another parameter, to specify an alternate file target for a prior location, within the listener.ora, init.ora, or tnsnames.ora file(s).

2.1.1 Verify/set permissions for any ifile targets in listener.ora (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

Rationale:

As lax permissions on any target file(s) listed as IFILE=* could allow unauthorized users to overwrite the file(s) listed as IFILES and through launch exploits, access to these should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ cat $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/listener.ora | grep -i ^IFILE
```

Remediation:

```
$ chown IFILE target(s)
$ chmod 750 IFILE target(s)
```

2.1.2 Verify/set permissions for any ifile targets in init.ora (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

Rationale:

As lax permissions on any target file(s) listed as IFILE=* could allow unauthorized users to overwrite the file(s) listed as IFILES and through launch exploits, access to these should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ cat $ORACLE_HOME/dbs/init.ora | grep -i ^IFILE
```

Remediation:

```
$ chown IFILE target(s)
$ chmod 750 IFILE target(s)
```

2.1.3 Verify/set permissions for any ifile targets in tnsnames.ora (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

Rationale:

As lax permissions on any target file(s) listed as IFILE=* could allow unauthorized users to overwrite the file(s) listed as IFILES and through launch exploits, access to these should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ cat $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/tnsnames.ora | grep -i ^IFILE
```

Remediation:

```
$ chown orauser IFILE target(s)
$ chmod orauser.oragrpoup IFILE target(s)
```

2.2 Verify/set ownership of the $ORACLE_HOME/bin directory (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `ORACLE_HOME/bin` directory contains all the primary system binaries.

Rationale:

As lax permissions on this directory could allow unauthorized users to alter/substitute the directory contents to launch exploits, access should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ ls -ald $ORACLE_HOME/bin
$ drwxr-xr-x 2 orauser oragrp 12288 $ORACLE_HOME /bin
```

Remediation:

```
$ chown orauser $ORACLE_HOME/bin
$ chgrp oragrp $ORACLE_HOME/bin
$ chmod 755 $ORACLE_HOME/bin/*
```

2.3 Verify/set the umask for the oracle user (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `umask` setting can be in a number of places, such as the users' "`*.rc`" shells, to set the default permissions for all files created by that user or in `/etc/profile`, to provide a basic umask for all users.

Rationale:

As lax umask settings could allow access to unauthorized users who could alter/substitute the contents of any with the wrong permissions file to launch exploits, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

$ umask

Remediation:

$ sed -e 's/umask 022/umask 027/' </etc/profile> /etc/profile.new mv /etc/profile.new /etc/profile

OR

If the above Audit script produced no output use:

$ echo umask 027 >> /etc/profile

If using sed is discouraged, the vi text editor can add the "umask 027" value to the /etc/profile or the /etc/skel/.bashrc

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e16543/guidelines.htm#DBSEG501

2.4 Verify/set permissions for the init.ora file (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `init.ora` file contains all the primary system startup (`init`) settings. This file is stored in the `$ORACLE_HOME/dbs` directory and can have between 200-300 instance startup parameters.

Rationale:

As lax permissions on this file could allow unauthorized users to alter/substitute the contents of the file to launch exploits, access should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ ls -ald $ORACLE_HOME/dbs/init.ora
$ -rw-r--r-- 1 orauser oragrp (truncated)
```

Remediation:

```
$ chown orauser $ORACLE_HOME/dbs/init.ora
$ chgrp oragrp $ORACLE_HOME/dbs/init.ora
$ chmod 644 $ORACLE_HOME/dbs/init.ora
```

2.5 Verify/set permissions for the database datafiles (*.dbs) (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The ORACLE_HOME/dbs directory contains configuration files, such as the "`/u01/oracle/prod/rbs01.dbs`," "`/u01/oracle/prod/users01.dbs`,"and "`/u01/oracle/prod/temp01.dbs`," which hold sensitive user information.

Rationale:

As lax permissions on this directory could allow unauthorized users to overwrite the files to launch exploits, access should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ ls -ald $ORACLE_HOME/dbs
$ drwxr-xr-x 2 oracle oracle
```

Remediation:

```
$ chmod 750 $ORACLE_HOME/dbs
$ chown orauser $ORACLE_HOME/dbs/*
$ chgrp oragroup $ORACLE_HOME/dbs/*
```

2.6 Verify/set permissions for the audit_file_dest file target (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `audit_file_dest` log file in `init.ora` target specifies the location where the DB instance's audit dump files are kept, which is set to `$ORACLE_BASE/admin/orcl/adump` by default. It is also the location where the `audit_sys_operations`, records for the full auditing of SYS, are written.

Rationale:

As lax permissions on `audit_file_dest` file target could allow unauthorized users to overwrite the file(s) and launch exploits to corrupt the log files, access to the log file should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ ls -ald $ORACLE_BASE/admin/orcl/adump
$ drwxr-x--- 2 orauser oragrp  (output truncated)
```

Remediation:

```
$ chmod 750 $ORACLE_BASE/admin/orcl/adump
```

2.7 Verify/set permissions for the diagnostic_dest file target (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `diagnostic_dest` directory parameter identifies the location of the Automatic Diagnostic Repository (ADR), which contains data such as the alert log, dumps, [db health] monitor reports, and traces and is set to the `$ORACLE_BASE` directory by default. In Oracle 11gR2 the Diagnostic Destination replaces the initialization parameter settings for background dump, user dump, and core dump destinations.

Rationale:

As lax permissions on `diagnostic_dest` directory target could allow unauthorized users to overwrite the file(s) and launch exploits to corrupt the log files, access to the log file should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ ls -ald $ORACLE_BASE
$ drwxr-xr-x 9 orauser oragrp  (output truncated)
```

Remediation:

```
$ chmod 750 $ORACLE_BASE
```

2.8 Verify/set permissions for the control_files file target (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The database `control_files` parameter sets the "physical" structure of the database in the way a complex building's creation is specified by engineering drawings. The `*.ctl` file's contents are absolutely essential to the DB's operation and may contain, but are not limited to the following:

- Archive log mode setting,
- Archive log history,
- DB information (RESETLOGS SCN and their time stamp),
- DB name,
- Redo log threads, and
- Tablespace/datafile records-- checkpoints, filenames, on/offline, etc.

Rationale:

As lax permissions on the `control_files` file targets could allow unauthorized users to overwrite the file(s) and launch exploits to corrupt/destroy the database, access to the control files should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL: SELECT NAME FROM V$CONTROLFILE;
  (Then check the resulting file paths from the SQL CLI)
$ ls -al /control/file/path/name(s)
```

Remediation:

```
$ chown orauser /control/file/names(s)
$ chgrp oragrp /control/file/names(s)
$ chmod 750 /control/file/names(s)
```

2.9 Verify/set permissions on the $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/ directory files (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin` directory holds all the files that are restricted to the `dba` group.

Rationale:

As lax permissions on the `$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin` directory files could allow unauthorized users to overwrite these file(s) and launch exploits to corrupt/destroy the database, directory access should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ ls-ald $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/*
```

Remediation:

```
$ chmod 644 $ORACLE_HOME /network/admin/*
$ chown orauser.oragrp $ORACLE_HOME /network/admin/*
```

2.10 Verify/set permissions on the log_directory_server= target (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `sqlnet.ora` file contains many database and system parameters, including the `log_directory_server=`(directory target) to specify the database server's trace file destination directory.

Rationale:

As lax permissions on the `log_directory_server=`(directory target) could allow unauthorized users to overwrite the database server's log file(s) and corrupt/obscure any forensic evidence within it, access to this file target should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep log_directory_server  \ $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora
$ log_directory_server=dirpath
```

Remediation:

```
$ chmod 750 dirpath
$ chown orauser.oragrpoup log_directory_server dirpath
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e10835/sqlnet.htm#NETRF187

2.11 Verify/set permissions on the trace_directory_server target (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `sqlnet.ora` file contains many database and system parameters, including the `log_directory_server=`(directory target) to specify the database server's trace file destination directory.

Rationale:

As lax permissions on the `log_directory_server=`(directory target) could allow unauthorized users to overwrite the database server's trace file(s) and corrupt/obscure

any forensic evidence within it, access to this file target should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep log_directory_server \
  $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora
$ trace_directory_server=dirpath
```

Remediation:

```
$ chmod 750 dirpath
$ chown orauser.oragrp trace_directory_server dirpath
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e10835/sqlnet.htm#NETRF243

2.12 Verify/set permissions on the listener.ora file (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `listener.ora` file contains the name of the listener file and the network protocol/ address combinations offered by the database services.

Rationale:

As lax permissions on the `listener.ora` file could allow unauthorized users access to obtain, corrupt, or obscure any forensic evidence within it, access to this target should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ ls -al $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/listener.ora
```

Remediation:

```
$ chmod 660 $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/listener.ora
$ chown orauser.oragrp $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/listener.ora
```

2.13 Verify/set permissions on the log_file_listener file (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `log_file_listener=(` filename) is the name of the listener log file.

Rationale:

As lax permissions on the `log_file_listener=(` file target) could allow unauthorized users to corrupt/obscure any forensic evidence within it, access to this target should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep log_file_listener \
  $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/listener.ora
$ log_file_listener=$ORACLE_HOME/network/log/listener.log
  (This is the default value)
```

Remediation:

```
$ chmod 750 orauser.oragrp log_file_listener filename
```

2.14 Verify/set permissions on the trace_directory_listener_name directory target (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `trace_directory_listener_name=`(directory target) is the location of the directory for listener trace file.

Rationale:

As lax permissions on the `trace_directory_file_listener_name=`(directory target) could allow unauthorized users to corrupt/obscure any forensic evidence within it, access to this target should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep trace_directory_listener_name \ $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/listener.ora
$ TRACE_DIRECTORY_listener=$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/tracedir
```

Remediation:

```
$ chmod 660 $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/tracedir
$ chown orauser.oragrp $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/tracedir
```

2.15 Verify/set permissions on the trace_file_listener_name file target (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The trace_file_listener_name=(file target) is the location/name of the listener for the trace file.

Rationale:

As lax permissions on the trace_file_listener_name=(file target) could allow unauthorized users to corrupt/obscure any forensic evidence within it, access to this target should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep trace_file_listener_name \
  $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/listener.ora
$ $ORACLE_HOME/network/trace/list.trc (default) $ ls -al (resulting file path)
```

Remediation:

```
$ chown orauser.oragrp (resulting file path)
$ chmod 660 (resulting file path)
```

2.16 Verify/set permissions on the trace_directory_client target (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `sqlnet.ora` file contains many database and system parameters, including the `trace_directory_client=`(directory target) as the client's destination directory for the trace log files.

Rationale:

As lax permissions on the `trace_directory_client=`(directory target) could allow unauthorized users to overwrite the client trace file(s) and corrupt/obscure any forensic evidence within it, access to this target should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep log_directory_client \
  $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora
$ trace_directory_client=dirpath
```

Remediation:

```
$ chmod 640 dirpath
$ chown orauser.oragrp trace_directory_client dirpath
```

2.17 Verify/set permissions on the log_directory_client= target (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `sqlnet.ora` file contains many database and system parameters, including the `log_directory_client=` (directory target) as the destination directory for the client's log files.

Rationale:

As lax permissions on the `log_directory_client=(dirpath)` could allow unauthorized users to overwrite the client log file(s) and corrupt/obscure any forensic evidence within it, access to this file target access should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep log_directory_client \
  $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora
$ log_directory_client=dirpath
```

Remediation:

```
$ chmod 640 dirpath
$ chown orauser.oragrp log_directory_client dirpath
```

2.18 Verify/set permissions for the log_archive_dest_n file targets (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `log_archive_dest_n` initialization parameter provides from 1-10 destinations that specify where each of the `LOCATION` or the `SERVICE` attributes are given that point to where redo data will be archived. If the Enterprise Edition is being used and the new `log_archive_dest_n` has not been applied, the deprecated form that uses the `log_archive_dest` is still valid.

Rationale:

As lax permissions on the `log_archive_dest(_n)` file targets could allow unauthorized users to overwrite the file(s) and launch exploits to corrupt/destroy the database, access to the control files should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep -i log_arcive_dest $ORACLE_HOME/dbs/init.ora

OR

SQL> SHOW PARAMETER log_archive_dest;
(Then check the resulting file paths from the OS/SQL CLI)

$ ls -al $ORACLE_HOME/dbs/log_archive_dest pathname(s)
$ The default is "" or NULL.
```

Remediation:

```
After using vi or SQL to set the paths, change the ownership/permissions as follows:

$ chmod 750 $ORACLE_HOME/dbs/log_archive_dest pathname(s)
$ chown orauser.oragrp $ORACLE_HOME/dbs/log_archive_dest pathname(s)
```

2.19 Verify/set permissions for the spfileorcl.ora file (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5
- Level 2 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

When creating an Oracle database via the Database Configuration Assistant, a "Server Parameter File" (SPFILE) is created from the "Initialization Parameter File," then the initialization parameter file is renamed. Oracle will not recognize the former initialization file on future DB startups, nor is it used after the instance is started. This new SPFILE is located in the `$ORACLE_HOME\dbs` directory by default. The new SPFILE filename is `spfileorcl.ora`, which contains all the Oracle Database configurations for the Automatic Storage Management (ASM) instance in a separate server parameter file (SPFILE).

Rationale:

As lax permissions on this file could allow unauthorized users to overwrite the file to launch exploits, access should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ ls -ald $ORACLE_HOME/dbs/spfileorcl.ora
$ -rw-r--r-- 1 orauser oragrp (truncated)
```

Remediation:

```
$ chown orauser $ORACLE_HOME/dbs/spfileorcl.ora
$ chgrp oragrp $ORACLE_HOME/dbs/spfileorcl.ora
$ chmod 640  $ORACLE_HOME/dbs/spfileorcl.ora
```

2.20 Verify/set permissions on the sqlplus binary (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `sqlplus` binaries support the operations of the Oracle command-line utility program SQL and PL/SQL, which can perform any database operation.

Rationale:

As lax permissions on the `sqlplus` binaries directory could allow unauthorized users to launch exploits against the database, access to this target should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ which -a sqlplus
$ $ORACLE_HOME/bin/sqlplus (default result)
$ ls -ald $ORACLE_HOME/bin/sqlplus
$ -rwxr-x--x 1 orauser oragrp (output truncated)
```

Remediation:

```
$ chown orauser.oragrp  $ORACLE_HOME/bin/sqlplus
$ chmod 750 $ORACLE_HOME/bin/sqlplus
```

2.21 Rejected - Verify/set permissions on the sqlnet.ora file (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `sqlnet.ora` file contains the parameters for communication between the networked user and the server containing the database instance.

Rationale:

As lax permissions on the `sqlnet.ora` file could allow unauthorized users to overwrite the file(s) and launch exploits to corrupt/destroy the database, file access should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ ls -al $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora
```

Remediation:

```
$ chmod 644 $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora
$ chown orauser.oragrp \
  $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora
```

2.22 Rejected - Verify/set permissions on the postDBCreation.log file (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `postDBCreation.log` file contains the printout from the database creation. It also contains a printout of the passwords for the `DBSNMP` and/or `SYSMAN` users if either of those two accounts have a password that contains one or more exclamation points.

Rationale:

As printouts of the passwords for the `DBSNMP` and/or `SYSMAN` users could allow unauthorized users to launch privilege escalation exploits against the database, access to the `postDBCreation.log` should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ ls -al \ /home/oracle/app/oracle/cfgtoollogs/dbca/orcl/postDBCreation.log $ -rw-r---
-- 1 orauser oragroup (output truncated)
```

Remediation:

```
$ chmod 640 /home/oracle/app/oracle/cfgtoollogs/dbca/orcl/postDBCreation.log
$ chown orauser oragroup \
/home/oracle/app/oracle/cfgtoollogs/dbca/orcl/postDBCreation.log
```

2.23 Rejected - Verify/set the umask for the oracle system in the /etc/skel/.bash_profile file (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5
- Level 2 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The umask setting can be in a number of places, such as the users' "`*.rc`" shells, to set the default permissions for all files created by that user or in `/etc/skel/.bash_profile`, to provide a basic umask for all users.

Rationale:

As lax umask settings could allow access to unauthorized users who could alter/substitute the contents of any with the wrong permissions file to launch exploits, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ cat /etc/skel/.bash_profile | grep umask
$ umask 022
```

Remediation:

```
$ Use a text editor to add the "umask" 027 value in the system /etc/skel/.bash_profile
or the profile in the oracle user's ~/.bashrc ~/.cshrc

Or use the following script for /etc/skel/.bash_profile:

$ if [ "`grep -i '^umask' /etc/skel/.bash_profile`" ]; then awk '/umask/ { $2 = "027"
} {print}' /etc/skel/.bash_profile > /etc/skel/.bash_profile.new; mv
/etc/skel/.bash_profile.new /etc/skel/.bash_profile; else echo umask 027 >>
/etc/skel/.bash_profile; fi
```

2.24 Permissions settings for the radius.key file (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `radius.key` file in the `ORACLE_BASE\ORACLE_HOME\network\security\directory` contains the shared-secret password (16 characters or less) that is used to participate in the RADIUS client-server authentication, to authenticate remote client connections; this process treats each Oracle server as a Client connecting to the RADIUS server.

Rationale:

As protecting the contents of this file is critical to maintaining the confidentiality of the remote connection process, the file permissions value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ ls -al $ORACLE_HOME/network/security/radius.key
```

Remediation:

```
$ chmod 440 $ORACLE_HOME/network/security/radius.key
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e10746/asoradus.htm#ASOAG9622

3 Oracle Parameter Settings

The operation of the Oracle database instance is governed by numerous parameters that are set in specific configuration files and are instance-specific in scope. As alterations of these parameters can cause problems ranging from denial -of-service to theft of

proprietary information, these configurations should be carefully considered and maintained.

Note:

For all files that have parameters that can be modified with the OS and/or SQL commands/scripts, these will both be listed where appropriate.

3.1 listener.ora Settings

Settings for the TNS Listener listener.ora

3.1.1 Setting for the 'inbound_connect_timeout_listener_name' parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 2 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `inbound_connect_timeout_`*`listenername`* setting in the `listener.ora` file determines how long "half-open" connections will be maintained before the connection is closed by the database.

Rationale:

As the maintenance of half-open connections uses up database networking resources and can ultimately result in a denial-of-service condition, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep inbound_connect $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/listener.ora
$ (not set by default)
```

Remediation:

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e10835/sqlnet.htm#NETRF210

3.1.2 Setting for 'secure_control_listener_name' parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `SECURE_CONTROL_listener_name` setting determines the type of control connection the Oracle server requires for remote configuration of the listener.

Rationale:

As listener configuration changes via unencrypted remote connections can result in unauthorized users sniffing the control configuration information from the network, these control values should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep  SECURE_CONTROL \
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/listener.ora
```

Remediation:

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e10835/listener.htm#NETRF327

3.1.3 Setting for 'extproc_dlls' parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `EXTPROC_DLLS` setting determines whether or not the Oracle server will allow external DLLs and/or libraries to be loaded into the database when external procedures are called. These external procedures work through external routines and allow communication with external applications through PL/SQL.

Rationale:

As allowing external DLLs and/or libraries to be loaded into the database when external procedures are called could allow system security protocols to be overwritten or

corrupted, this capability should be restricted/disabled according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep  -i extproc_dlls \
  $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/listener.ora
```

Remediation:

```
Use a text editor such as vi to set the EXTPROCS_DLLS =ONLY value along with absolute
pathnames, to set values such as
ENV="EXTPROC_DLLS=ONLY:<custom_dll_directory>/<custom_shared
_library>,LD_LIBRARY_PATH=<oracle_home_directory>/lib")
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e10836/advcfg.htm#NETAG0132

3.1.4 extproc configuration in listener.ora (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

remove extproc

Rationale:

remove extproc

Audit:

```
$ grep  -i extproc \
  $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/listener.ora
```

Remediation:

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e10836/advcfg.htm#NETAG0132

3.1.5 Setting for 'secure_register_listener_name' parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `SECURE_REGISTER_listener_name` setting determines the type of protocol the Oracle server requires for remote registration connections to the listener.

Rationale:

As registration connections to the listener via unencrypted remote connections can result in unauthorized users sniffing the registration information from the network, these protocol values should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep  SECURE_REGISTER \
  $ORACLE_HOMRE/network/admin/listener.ora
```

Remediation:

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e10835/listener.htm#NETRF328

3.1.6 Setting for 'secure_protocol_listener_name' parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `SECURE_PROTOCOL_listener_name` setting determines the type of protocol the Oracle server requires for remote administrative connections to the listener.

Rationale:

As administrative connections to the listener via unencrypted remote connections can result in unauthorized users sniffing the administrative information from the network, these protocol values should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep  SECURE_PROTOCOL \
  $ORACLE_HOMRE/network/admin/listener.ora
```

Remediation:

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e10835/listener.htm#NETRF329

3.1.7 Settings for the 'admin_restrictions_listener_name' parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The `admin_restrictions_listener_name` setting in the `listener.ora` file can require that any attempted real-time alteration of the parameters in the `listener` via the `set` command file be refused unless the `listener.ora` file is manually altered then restarted by a privileged user.

Rationale:

As blocking unprivileged users from making alterations of the `listener.ora` file, where remote data/services are specified, will help protect data confidentiality, this value should be set to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep admin_restrictions_listener_name \
  $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/listener.ora
$ (not set by default)
```

Remediation:

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e10835/listener.htm#NETRF310

3.1.8 Setting for the 'logging_listener_name' parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `logging_listener_name` setting in the `listener.ora` file requires that all listener actions be logged to create an audit trail.

Rationale:

As the logging of all actions by the listener will create an audit trail that is invaluable to forensic investigations of unauthorized activities, this value should be set to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep logging_listener_name $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/listener.ora $ (not set by
default)
```

Remediation:

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e10835/listener.htm#NETRF1914

3.1.9 Setting for 'passwords_listener_name' parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle `listener` provides network connections to the database with the name of the connection, protocol addresses, and services offered by the database. In database versions prior to 11gr2, there was an option to include a password in the `listener.ora` file or to have OS-based authentication for `listener` connections; now only OS-based authentication is allowed and `listener.ora` file password use has been deprecated.

Rationale:

As using the default OS-based authentications for `listener` connections can remove the need to include a clear-text password in the `listener.ora` file, any password in this file should be removed according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
grep PASSWORDS_LISTENER=
 $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/listener.ora file
```

Remediation:

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e10836/listenercfg.htm#NETAG459

3.1.10 Change the default port numbers that connect to Oracle (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle installation creates a number of well-known ports for connections to the `listener` service; these ports which are often targeted by unauthorized users' automated exploits.

Rationale:

As the default ports created by Oracle can provide a target for exploits by unauthorized users, the ports should be changed according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep 1521 $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/listener.ora
```

Remediation:

(new port example is "1527")

```
$ sed -e 's/1521/1527/' <$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/listener.ora>
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/listener.ora.new  mv
```

```
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/listener.ora.new $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/listener.ora;
fi
```

3.1.11 Setting for parameter 'secure_register_listener_name' parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `SECURE_REGISTER_listener_name` setting specifies the protocols which are used to connect to the TNS listener.

Rationale:

As listener configuration changes via unencrypted remote connections can result in unauthorized users sniffing the control configuration information from the network, these control values should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep  SECURE_CONTROL \
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/listener.ora
```

Remediation:

```
Use a text editor such as vi to set the SECURE_CONTROL_listener_name=TCPS or
SECURE_CONTROL_listener_name=IPC under the SECURE_CONTROL_listenername= parameter
found in $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/listener.ora
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e10835/listener.htm#NETRF328
2. https://support.oracle.com/epmos/faces/ui/km/DocumentDisplay.jspx?id=1453883.1
3. https://support.oracle.com/epmos/faces/ui/km/DocumentDisplay.jspx?id=1340831.1
4. http://www.joxeankoret.com/download/tnspoison.pdf

3.1.12 Rejected - Dynamic listener registration settings in listener.ora (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The DYNAMIC_REGISTRATION_*listener_name* setting determines whether or not the Oracle server will accept all registration connections to the listener.

Rationale:

As unauthorized registration connection requests to the listener, which have the same name as a pre-existing instance, if successful, are treated as "valid" RAC or Cluster servers for that instance and load-balance the traffic between the unauthorized and authorized servers, facilitating attacks where unauthorized users can sniff the database transmissions from the network, this capability should be restricted/disabled according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep  DYNAMIC_REGISTRATION \
  $ORACLE_HOMRE/network/admin/listener.ora
```

Remediation:

```
Use a text editor such as vi to set the DYNAMIC_REGISTRATION_listener_name=off
parameter found in $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/listener.ora
```

3.1.13 Setting for 'ADR_BASE_listener_name' parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

tbd

Rationale:

tbd

Audit:

```
xxx
```

Remediation:

3.2 sqlnet.ora settings

Settings for sqlnet.ora

3.2.1 Setting for the 'sqlnet.expire_time' parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 2 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `sqlnet.expire_time` setting in the `sqlnet.ora` file determines how long database connections that are inactive remain open, before the connection is expired by the database.

Rationale:

As the maintenance of open connections uses up database networking resources and can ultimately result in a denial-of-service condition, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep sqlnet.expire_time \
  $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora
$ (not set by default)
```

Remediation:

```
$ if [ `grep '^sqlnet.expire_time =.*' $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora` ]; then
awk '/^ sqlnet.expire_time/ {$1 = "sqlnet.expire_time=10"} {print}'
<$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora>  $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new; mv
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new  $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora; else
echo sqlnet.expire_time=10 >> $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora; fi
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e10835/sqlnet.htm#NETRF209

3.2.2 Setting for the 'sqlnet.inbound_connect_timeout' parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 2 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `sqlnet.inbound_connect_timeout` setting in the `sqlnet.ora` file determines how long "half-open" connections will be maintained, awaiting the completion of authentication, before the connection is closed by the database.

Rationale:

As the maintenance of half-open connections uses up database networking resources and can ultimately result in a denial-of-service condition, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep sqlnet.inbound_connect_timeout / $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora
$ (not set by default)
```

Remediation:

```
$ if [ `grep '^sqlnet.inbound_connect_timeout=.*'
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora` ]; then awk '/^ sqlnet.inbound_connect_timeout
/ {$1 = " sqlnet.inbound_connect_timeout=3"} {print}'
<$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora>  $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new; mv
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new  $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora; else
echo sqlnet.inbound_connect_timeout=3 >> $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora; fi
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e10835/sqlnet.htm#NETRF210

3.2.3 Setting for the 'sqlnet.allowed_logon_version' parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 2 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The setting for the `SQLNET.ALLOWED_LOGON_VERSION` setting in the `sqlnet.ora` file specifies the versions of the Oracle client that are allowed login privileges.

Rationale:

As the pre-11versions of the Oracle client do not use strong authentication for client login and could allow unauthorized users to break credentials sniffed from the network, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep -i SQLNET.ALLOWED_LOGON_VERSION  / $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora
```

Remediation:

```
$ if [ `grep '^sqlnet.allowed_logon_version=.*' $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora`
]; then awk '/^ sqlnet.allowed_logon_version/ {$1 = "
sqlnet.allowed_logon_version=11"} {print}' <$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora>
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new; mv
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new  $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora; else
echo sqlnet.allowed_logon_version=11 >> $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora; fi
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e10835/sqlnet.htm#NETRF196

3.2.4 Setting for the 'tcp.validnode_checking' parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 2 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The *tcp.validnode_checking* setting in the sqlnet.ora file allow for the testing of incoming connections to see if these match the "invited" and "exluded" systems list.

Rationale:

As limiting connections to system by listing invited and excluded hosts will sharply limit the number of systems that can connect to the instance, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep tcp.validnode $ORACLE_HOME/admin/network/sqlnet.ora
$ (not set by default)
```

Remediation:

```
$ if [ `grep '^tcp_validnode_checking=.*' $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora` ];
then awk '/^tcp_validnode_checking/ {$1 = "tcp_validnode_checking=YES"} {print}'
<$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora>  $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new; mv
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new  $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora; else
echo tcp_validnode_checking=YES >> $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora; fi
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e10835/sqlnet.htm#NETRF238

3.2.5 Settings for the 'tcp.excluded_nodes' parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 2 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `tcp.excluded_nodes` setting in the `sqlnet.ora` file provides a list, based on hostname and/or ip addresses, of nodes not allowed to make incoming connections to the Oracle listener.

Rationale:

As limiting connections to the system by listing excluded nodes will sharply limit the number of systems that can connect to the instance, thus reducing attack surfaces, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep tcp.excluded_nodes $OACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora
$ (not set by default)
```

Remediation:

```
$ if [ `grep '^tcp.excluded_nodes=.*' $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora` ]; then
awk '/^ tcp.excluded_nodes/ {$1 = " tcp.excluded_nodes=your_org_ips"} {print}'
<$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora>  $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new; mv
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new  $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora; else
echo tcp.ecluded_nodes=(your_org_ips) >> $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora; fi
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e10835/sqlnet.htm#NETRF236

3.2.6 Rejected - Settings for the tcp.invited_nodes parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 2 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `tcp.invited_nodes` setting in the `sqlnet.ora` file provides a list, based on hostname and/or ip addresses, of nodes permitted to make incoming connections to the Oracle listener.

Rationale:

As limiting connections to the system by listing invited nodes will sharply limit the number of systems that can connect to the instance, thus reducing attack surfaces, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

(The host ip addresses will vary according to your organization)

```
$ grep tcp.invited_nodes $OACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora
$ (not included as default)
```

Remediation:

```
$ if [ `grep '^tcp.invited_nodes=.*' $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora` ]; then
awk '/^ tcp.invited_nodes/ {$1 = " tcp.invited_nodes=your_org_ips]"} {print}'
<$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora>  $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new; mv
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new  $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora; else
echo tcp.invited_nodes=(your_org_ips) >> $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora; fi
```

3.3 Settings for the 'audit_sys_operations' parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on any platform

Description:

The `AUDIT_SYS_OPERATIONS` setting provides for the auditing of all user activities conducted under the `SYSOPER` and `SYSDBA` accounts.

Rationale:

If the parameter `AUDIT_SYS_OPERATIONS` is FALSE all statements by SYSDBA/SYSOPER users are not audited.

Audit:

```
SQL> select value from v$parameter where upper(name)='AUDIT_SYS_OPERATIONS';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> ALTER SYSTEM SET AUDIT_SYS_OPERATIONS = true SCOPE=SPFILE;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/initparams015.htm#REFRN10005

3.4 Settings for the 'audit_trail' parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `audit_trail` setting determines whether or not Oracle's basic audit features are enabled. These can be set to "Operating System"(OS), "DB," or "DB EXTENDED."

Rationale:

As enabling the basic auditing features for the Oracle instance permits the collection of data to troubleshoot problems, as well as providing value forensic logs in the case of a system breach, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> select value
 from v$parameter
 where upper(name)='AUDIT_TRAIL'
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> alter system set audit_trail = DB,extended  scope = spfile;
or
SQL> alter system set audit_trail = OS  scope = spfile;
or
SQL> alter system set audit_trail = XML  scope = spfile;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/initparams017.htm#REFRN10006

3.5 Settings for the 'global_names' parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 2 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `global_names` setting requires that the name of a database link matches that of the remote database it will connect to.

Rationale:

As not requiring database connections to match the domain that is being called remotely could allow unauthorized domain sources to potentially connect via brute-force tactics, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> select value from v$parameter where upper(name)='GLOBAL_NAMES'
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> alter system set global_names = true scope = spfile;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/initparams096.htm#REFRN10065

3.6 Settings for the 'local_listener' parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `local_listener` setting specifies a network name that resolves to an address of the Oracle TNS listener.

Rationale:

The TNS poising attack allows to redirect TNS network traffic to another system by registering a listener to the TNS listener. This attack can be performed by unauthorized users with network access. By specifying the IPC protocol it is no longer possible to register listeners via TCP/IP.

Audit:

```
SQL> select value from v$parameter a where upper(name) = 'LOCAL_LISTENER';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> alter system set local_listener='(DESCRIPTION=(ADDRESS=
(PROTOCOL=IPC)(KEY=REGISTER))' scope = both;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/initparams118.htm#REFRN10082
2. https://support.oracle.com/epmos/faces/ui/km/DocumentDisplay.jspx?id=1453883.1

3. https://support.oracle.com/epmos/faces/ui/km/DocumentDisplay.jspx?id=1340831.1
4. http://www.joxeankoret.com/download/tnspoison.pdf

3.7 Settings for the 'remote_listener' parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `remote_listener` setting determines whether or not a valid listener can be established on a system separate from the database instance.

Rationale:

As permitting a remote listener for connections to the database instance can allow for the potential spoofing of connections and that could compromise data confidentiality and integrity, this value should be disabled/restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep remote_listener=$ORACLE_HOME/dbs/init.ora
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> alter system set remote_listener ='' scope = spfile;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/initparams208.htm#REFRN10183

3.8 Settings for the 'o7_dictionary_accessibility' parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `O7_dictionary_accessibility` setting is a database initializations parameter that allows/disallows with the EXECUTE ANY PROCEDURE and SELECT ANY DICTIONARY access to objects in the SYS schema; this functionality was created for the ease of migration from Oracle 7 databases to later versions.

Rationale:

As leaving the SYS schema so open to connection could permit unauthorized access to critical data structures, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> select value from v$parameter where upper(name)='O7_DICTIONARY_ACCESSIBILITY';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> ALTER SYSTEM SET O7_DICTIONARY_ACCESSIBILITY=FALSE scope=spfile;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/initparams157.htm#REFRN10133

3.9 Settings for the 'os_roles' parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `os_roles` setting permits externally created groups to be applied to database management.

Rationale:

As allowing the OS use external groups for database management could cause privilege overlaps and generally weaken security, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> select value from v$parameter where upper(name)='OS_ROLES';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> ALTER SYSTEM SET OS_ROLES=false SCOPE=SPFILE;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/initparams175.htm#REFRN10153

3.10 Settings for the 'remote_os_roles' parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The remote_os_roles setting permits remote users' OS roles to be applied to database management.

Rationale:

As allowing remote clients OS roles to have permissions for database management could cause privilege overlaps and generally weaken security, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> show parameter remote_os_roles;
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> ALTER SYSTEM SET REMOTE_OS_ROLES=false SCOPE=SPFILE;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/initparams211.htm#REFRN10186

3.11 Settings for the 'remote_os_authent' parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `remote_os_authent` setting determines whether or not OS 'roles' with the attendant privileges are allowed for remote client connections.

Rationale:

As permitting OS roles for database connections to can allow the spoofing of connections and permit granting the privileges of an OS role to unauthorized users to make connections, this value should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> select value from v$parameter where upper(name)='REMOTE_OS_AUTHENT';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> alter system set remote_os_authent = false scope = spfile;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/initparams210.htm#REFRN10185

3.12 Setting for the 'remote_login_passwordfile' parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on any platform

Description:

The `remote_login_passwordfile` setting specifies whether or not Oracle checks for a password file during login and how many databases can use the password file.

Rationale:

As the use of this sort of password login file could permit unsecured, privileged connections to the database, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> select value from v$parameter where upper(name)='REMOTE_LOGIN_PASSWORDFILE';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> ALTER SYSTEM SET remote_login_passwordfile = none scope = spfile;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/initparams209.htm#REFRN10184

3.13 Settings for the 'utl_file_dir' parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `utl_file_dir` setting allows packages like utl_file to access (read/write/modify/delete) files specified in utl_file_dir. (This is deprecated but usable in 11g.)

Rationale:

As using the `utl_file_dir` to create directories allows the manipulation of files in these directories.

Audit:

```
SQL> select value from v$parameter where upper(name)='UTL_FILE_DIR'
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> ALTER SYSTEM SET UTIL_FILE_DIR = '' SCOPE=SPFILE;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/initparams266.htm#REFRN10230

3.14 Settings for the 'sec_return_server_release_banner' parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The information about patch/update release number provides information about the exact patch/update release that is currently running on the database.

Rationale:

As allowing the database to return information about the patch/update release number could facilitate unauthorized users' attempts to gain access based upon known patch weaknesses , this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> select value from v$parameter where
upper(name)='SEC_RETURN_SERVER_RELEASE_BANNER';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> ALTER SYSTEM SET sec_return_server_release_banner=false scope=spfile;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/initparams226.htm#REFRN10275

3.15 Settings for the 'sec_case_sensitive_logon' parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on any platform

Description:

The `SEC_CASE_SENSITIVE_LOGON` information determines whether or not case-sensitivity is required for passwords during login. Due to the security bug CVE-2012-3137 it is recommended to set this parameter to FALSE.

Rationale:

Oracle 11g databases without CPU October 2012 patch or later are vulnerable to CVE-2012-3137 if case-sensisitve SHA-1 password hashes are used. To avoid this kind of attack the old DES-hashes have to be used.

Audit:

```
SQL> select value from v$parameter where upper(name)='SEC_CASE_SENSITIVE_LOGON';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> ALTER SYSTEM SET SEC_CASE_SENSITIVE_LOGON=FALSE scope=spfile;
```

Impact:

If SEC_CASE_SENSITIVE_LOGON is FALSE, all user with SHA-1 hashes only ("select name,password,spare4 from sys.user$ where password is null and spare4 is not null") are no longer able to connect to the database. In this case the password for all users without DES hash have to set again.

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/initparams222.htm#REFRN10299

2. https://support.oracle.com/epmos/faces/DocumentDisplay?id=1492721.1
3. http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2012-3137

3.16 Settings for the 'sec_max_failed_login_attempts' parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `SEC_MAX_FAILED_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS` parameter determines how many failed login attempts are allowed before Oracle closes the login connection.

Rationale:

As allowing an unlimited number of login attempts for a user connection can facilitate both brute-force login attacks and the occurrence of Denial-of-Service, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> select value from v$parameter where upper(name)='SEC_MAX_FAILED_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> ALTER SYSTEM SET SEC_MAX_FAILED_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS = $xxx scope=spfile;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/initparams223.htm#REFRN10274

3.17 Settings for the 'sec_protocol_error_further_action' parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The `SEC_PROTOCOL_ERROR_FURTHER_ACTION` setting determines the Oracle's server's response to bad/malformed packets received from the client.

Rationale:

As bad packets received from the client can potentially indicate packet-based attacks on the system, such as "TCP SYN Flood" or "Smurf" attacks, which could result in a Denial-of-Service condition, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> select value from v$parameter where
upper(name)='SEC_PROTOCOL_ERROR_FURTHER_ACTION';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> ALTER SYSTEM SET SEC_PROTOCOL_ERROR_FURTHER_ACTION = delay,3 scope=spfile ;

OR

SQL> ALTER SYSTEM SET SEC_PROTOCOL_ERROR_FURTHER_ACTION = drop,3 scope=spfile ;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/initparams224.htm#REFRN10282

3.18 Settings for the 'sec_protocol_error_trace_action' parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `SEC_PROTOCOL_ERROR_TRACE_ACTION` setting determines the Oracle's server's logging response level to bad/malformed packets received from the client, by generating `ALERT`, `LOG`, or `TRACE` levels of detail in the log files.

Rationale:

As bad packets received from the client can potentially indicate packet-based attacks on the system, such as "TCP SYN Flood" or "Smurf" attacks, which could result in a Denial-of-Service condition, this diagnostic/logging value for `ALERT`, `LOG`, or `TRACE` conditions should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> select value from v$parameter where
upper(name)='SEC_PROTOCOL_ERROR_TRACE_ACTION';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> ALTER SYSTEM SET SEC_PROTOCOL_ERROR_TRACE_ACTION=LOG scope=spfile;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/initparams225.htm#REFRN10283

3.19 Settings for the 'sql92_security' parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `sql92_security parameter` setting `FALSE` allows to grant only `UPDATE` or `DELETE` privileges without the need to grant SELECT privileges.

Rationale:

The default value FALSE of the parameter `sql92_security` is secure out-of-the-box. Several security guides recommend the unsecure setting TRUE. This unsecure setting TRUE allows users which need only UPDATE/DELETE privileges to select data directly instead of guessing it.

Audit:

```
SQL> select value from v$parameter where upper(name)='SQL92_SECURITY'
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> ALTER SYSTEM SET sql92_security=FALSE SCOPE=SPFILE;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/initparams246.htm#REFRN10210

3.20 Settings for undocumented '_trace_files_public' parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `_trace_files_public` setting determines whether or not the public user can read the system's trace file.

Rationale:

As permitting the `public` user to read the instance's trace files file could release sensitive information about instance operations, this value should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL>  select value
 from v$parameter where lower(name)='_trace_files_public';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> SQL> alter system set "_trace_files_public"=false scope=spfile;
```

References:

1. http://asktom.oracle.com/pls/asktom/f?p=100:11:0::::P11_QUESTION_ID:4295521746131

3.21 Rejected - Setting account access for the application schema owner (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `application schema owner` represents the Oracle user that owns all database objects in a given application's `schema`, such as fields, packages, relationships, tables, views, etc. , as well the structural definitions that relate the objects in the database.

Rationale:

As allowing continuous schema owner access can potentially allow an unauthorized user to connect as the schema owner, resulting in the compromise of the entire application, this capability should be disabled/restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT <APPLICATION_SCHEMA_OWNER (username)>, ACCOUNT_STATUS FROM DBA_USERS;
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> ALTER USER <APPLICATION_SCHEMA_OWNER (username)> ACCOUNT LOCK PASSWWORD EXPIRE;
```

3.22 Rejected - Login requirements settings by version (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `PASSWORD_VERSIONS` settings information indicates what version of Oracle login a given DBA user account has been created or set at--Oracle 10g where case-sensitivity is not enforced or Oracle 11g, where case-sensitivity is enforced.

Rationale:

As requiring the database to use case-sensitivity during DBA-level login increases the symbol space necessary for unauthorized users to successfully complete brute-force login attacks, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT username, password_versions FROM dba_users;

USERNAME                       PASSWORD
------------------------------ --------
TEST                           10G 11G
SPATIAL_WFS_ADMIN_USR          10G 11G
SPATIAL_CSW_ADMIN_USR          10G 11G
SYSTEM                         10G 11G
SYS                            10G 11G
. . . .

OUTPUT TRUNCATED
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> ALTER SYSTEM SET SEC_CASE_SENSITIVE_LOGON = TRUE scope = spfile ; (ABOVE)
```

```
and:

Require all with 10g password settings to change passwords.
```

3.23 Rejected - Setting for the spfile<sid>.ora parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The spfile setting for dispatchers in the `spfile<sid>.ora` file provides ports for TCP connections for `ftp` (2100) and locally generated `http` (8080).

Rationale:

As leaving these ports open can provide attack vectors into the database instance, this value should be set/removed according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

(Database sid is "orcl")

```
$ grep -i dispatchers=(PROTOCOL=TCP) \
  $ORACLE_HOME/dbs/spfileorcl.ora
$ Binary file $ORACLE_HOME/dbs/spfileorcl.ora matches
```

Remediation:

```
SQL>  ALTER SYSTEM SET dispatchers=off SCOPE=SPFILE;
```

3.24 Settings for the os_authent_prefix parameter (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 2 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The os_authent_prefix setting in the init.ora file specifies the prefix Oracle uses to authenticate connection attempts. (Oracle concatenates this parameter out of the value of the user's OS account name/password.)

Rationale:

As allowing the use of an authentication prefix can permit the roles of the DBA and OS System Administrators to overlap, violating the principle of separation of duties, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep os_authent_prefix= $ORACLE_HOME/dbs/init.ora
$ os_authent_prefix=OP$  (this is the legacy default)

OR

SQL> show parameter os_authent_prefix


NAME                                 TYPE        VALUE
------------------------------------ ----------- -------------
os_authent_prefix                    string      OP$
```

Remediation:

```
$ if [ "`grep '^os_authent_prefix=.*' $ORACLE_HOME/dbs/init.ora`" ]; then awk
'/^os_authent_prefix/ { $1 = "os_authent_prefix=\"\"" } {print}'
<$ORACLE_HOME/dbs/init.ora> $ORACLE_HOME/dbs/init.ora.new; mv
$ORACLE_HOME/dbs/init.ora.new $ORACLE_HOME/dbs/init.ora; else echo
os_authent_prefix=\"\" >> $ORACLE_HOME/dbs/init.ora; fi

OR

SQL> alter system set os_authent_prefix = NULL scope = spfile;
```

3.25 Rejected - Settings for successful redo log disk writes (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `LOG_ARCHIVE_MIN_SUCCEED_DEST` setting in the `init.ora` file shows the requirement for the successful writing of redo log information to two or more of the physical location(s) of the redo log files.

Rationale:

As conforming that successful writes to the redundant redo logs do occur as specified, to ensure redo logs are available in the event of a disk failure, this value should be set to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SHOW PARAMETER LOG_ARCHIVE_MIN_SUCCEED_DEST;

NAME                                               TYPE        VALUE
-------------------------------------------------- ----------- ------
log_archive_min_succeed_dest                       integer     1
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> alter system set LOG_ARCHIVE_MIN_SUCCEED_DEST=[x>=2] scope=spfile;
```

3.26 Rejected - Settings for the redo log on duplexed physical disk locations (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `LOG_ARCHIVE_DUPLEX_DEST` setting in the `init.ora` file shows the physical disk location(s) of the redo log files used for system recovery.

Rationale:

As having a separate physical disk location for the redundant redo logs can help ensure the ability to recover the system transactions in the event of a disk failure, this value should be set to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SHOW PARAMETER log_archive_duplex_dest;
NAME                                 TYPE        VALUE
------------------------------------ ----------- --------------------
log_archive_duplex_dest              string
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> ALTER SYSTEM SET PARAMETER log_archive_duplex_dest=paths  scope=spfile;
```

3.27 Rejected - Setting the DB_SECUREFILE parameter in init.ora (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The DB_SECUREFILE setting in init.ora determines whether or not Large Object (LOB) files can be de-duplicated, encrypted, or compressed during file creation/update operations.

Rationale:

As setting the DB_SECUREFILE parameter to ALWAYS allows the database to return information about the patch/update release number in init.ora to de-duplicate, encrypt, or compress files at need, while files with a BASIC setting do not have this capability, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> show parameter DB_SECUREFILE;

NAME                                 TYPE        VALUE
------------------------------------ ----------- ------
db_securefile                        string      PERMITTED
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> ALTER SYSTEM SET DB_SECUREFILE=ALWAYS scope=spfile;
```

3.28 Rejected - Remote Administration via the Oracle Connection Manager (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The REMOTE_ADMIN settings for the database specifies whether or not a remote Oracle Connection Manager Control utility session would be allowed to access the Oracle Connection Manager

Rationale:

As the allowing Oracle Connection Manager Control utility session to connect remotely could facilitate remote system break-in attempts, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
C:\>grep REMOTE_ADMIN $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/cman.ora
```

Remediation:

```
$ if [ `grep '^REMOTE_ADMIN=.*' $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/cman.ora` ]; then awk
'/^REMOTE_ADMIN/ {$1 = "REMOTE_ADMIN=NO"} {print}'
<$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/cman.ora>  $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/cman.ora.new; mv
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/cman.ora.new  $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/cman.ora; else
echo REMOTE_ADMIN=NO >> $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/cman.ora; else echo
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/cman.ora file not found; fi
```

4 Possibly Rejected - Encryption-specific Requirements and Settings

The encryption of the contents of the data tables and traffic can help to ensure hat even if the data is compromised by network sniffing or unauthorized access, the data will remain unintelligible to the recipient due to its encrypted state.

4.1 Advanced Security Options

Oracle Advanced Security Options is a non-free security feature.

4.1.1 Encryption of server-to-client communications in sqlnet.ora (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `SQLNET.ENCRYPTION_SERVER` setting in `sqlnet.ora` enables the encryption for the database server, which will then allow, reject, request, or require encryption for all client connections.

Rationale:

As the lack of encryption on connection requests could make the traffic vulnerable network sniffers, this capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep SQLNET.ENCRYPTION_SERVER  \
  $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora
```

Remediation:

```
$ if [ "`grep -i '^SQLNET.ENCRYPTION_SERVER=.*' $ORACLE_HOME/
network/admin/sqlnet.ora`" ]; then awk '/^SQLNET.ENCRYPTION_SERVER/ { $1 =
"SQLNET.ENCRYPTION_SERVER=required" } {print}' <$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora>
$ORACLE_HOME/ network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new; mv $ORACLE_HOME/
network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new $ORACLE_HOME network/admin/sqlnet.ora; else echo
SQLNET.ENCRYPTION_SERVER=required >> $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora; fi
```

4.1.2 Encryption of client-to-server communications in sqlnet.ora (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `SQLNET.ENCRYPTION_CLIENT` setting in `sqlnet.ora` enables the encryption for the client to the database server, which will then allow, reject, request, or require encryption for all connections.

Rationale:

As the lack of encryption on connection requests could make the traffic vulnerable network sniffers, this capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$grep SQLNET.ENCRYPTION_CLIENT  \ $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora
```

Remediation:

```
$ if [ "`grep -i '^SQLNET.ENCRYPTION_CLIENT=.*' $ORACLE_HOME/
network/admin/sqlnet.ora`" ]; then awk '/^SQLNET.ENCRYPTION_CLIENT/ { $1 =
"SQLNET.ENCRYPTION_CLIENT=required" } {print}' <$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora>
$ORACLE_HOME/ network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new; mv $ORACLE_HOME/
network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new $ORACLE_HOME network/admin/sqlnet.ora; else echo
SQLNET.ENCRYPTION_CLIENT=required >> $ORACLE_HOME/ network/admin/sqlnet.ora; fi
```

4.1.3 Integrity of server-to-client communications in sqlnet.ora (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The SQLNET.CRYPTO_CHECKSUM_SERVER setting in sqlnet.ora specifies the checksum requirement for the database server, which will then accept, reject, request, or require a checksum for all client connections to validate that the datastream is unaltered.

Rationale:

As the lack of checksum integrity checks on traffic can make the datastream vulnerable to undetected alteration, this capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep SQLNET.CRYPTO_CHECKSUM_SERVER \
  $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora
```

Remediation:

```
$ if [ "`grep -i '^SQLNET.CRYPTO_CHECKSUM_SERVER=.*'
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora`" ]; then awk '/^ SQLNET.CRYPTO_CHECKSUM_SERVER/
{ $1 = "SQLNET.CRYPTO_CHECKSUM_SERVER=REQUIRED" } {print}'
<$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora> $ORACLE_HOME/ network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new; mv
$ORACLE_HOME/ network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new $ORACLE_HOME network/admin/sqlnet.ora; else
echo SQLNET.CRYPTO_CHECKSUM_SERVER=REQUIRED >> $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora;
fi
```

4.1.4 Integrity of client-to-server communications in sqlnet.ora (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The SQLNET.CRYPTO_CHECKSUM_CLIENT setting in sqlnet.ora specifies the checksum requirement for the database client, which will then accept, reject, request, or require check summing for all server connections to validate that the datastream is unaltered.

Rationale:

As the lack of checksum integrity checks on traffic can make the datastream vulnerable to undetected alteration, this capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep SQLNET.CRYPTO_CHECKSUM_CLIENT \
  $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora
```

Remediation:

```
$ if [ "`grep -i '^SQLNET.CRYPTO_CHECKSUM_CLIENT=.*'
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora`" ]; then awk '/^ SQLNET.CRYPTO_CHECKSUM_CLIENT/
{ $1 = "SQLNET.CRYPTO_CHECKSUM_CLIENT=REQUIRED" } {print}'
<$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new> $ORACLE_HOME/ network/admin/sqlnet.ora; mv
$ORACLE_HOME/ network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new $ORACLE_HOME network/admin/sqlnet.ora; else
echo SQLNET.CRYPTO_CHECKSUM_CLIENT=REQUIRED >> $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora;
fi
```

4.1.5 Type of server-to-client integrity checks in sqlnet.ora (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `SQLNET.CRYPTO_CHECKSUM_TYPES_SERVER` setting in `sqlnet.ora` specifies the checksum requirement type, MD5 or SHA-1, to be used for the database server integrity process.

Rationale:

As the type of checksum used, the older MD5 vs. the stronger SHA-1, can make the datastream integrity validation process stronger or weaker, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep SQLNET.CRYPTO_CHECKSUM_TYPES_SERVER \
  $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora
```

Remediation:

```
$ if [ "`grep -i '^SQLNET.CRYPTO_CHECKSUM_TYPES_SERVER=.*'
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora`" ]; then awk '/^
SQLNET.CRYPTO_CHECKSUM_TYPES_SERVER/ { $1 = "
SQLNET.CRYPTO_CHECKSUM_TYPES_SERVER=\(SHA1\)" } {print}'
<$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora> $ORACLE_HOME/ network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new; mv
$ORACLE_HOME/ network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new $ORACLE_HOME network/admin/sqlnet.ora; else
echo SQLNET.CRYPTO_CHECKSUM_TYPES_SERVER=\(SHA1\) >>
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora; fi
```

4.1.6 Type of client-to-server integrity checks in sqlnet.ora (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `SQLNET.CRYPTO_CHECKSUM_TYPES_CLIENT` setting in `sqlnet.ora` specifies the checksum requirement type, MD5 or SHA-1, to be used for the client's connections to the database server for integrity checking process.

Rationale:

As the type of checksum used, the older MD5 vs. the stronger SHA-1, can make the datastream integrity validation process stronger or weaker, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep SQLNET.CRYPTO_CHECKSUM_TYPES_CLIENT \
  $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora
```

Remediation:

```
$ if [ "`grep -i '^SQLNET.CRYPTO_CHECKSUM_TYPES_CLIENT=.*'
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora`" ]; then awk
'/^SQLNET.CRYPTO_CHECKSUM_TYPES_CLIENT/ { $1 =
"SQLNET.CRYPTO_CHECKSUM_TYPES_CLIENT=\(SHA1\)" } {print}'
<$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora> $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new; mv
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora; else
echo SQLNET.CRYPTO_CHECKSUM_TYPES_CLIENT=\(SHA1\) >>
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora; fi
```

4.1.7 Encryption algorithm/strength of server-to-client connections (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `SQLNET.ENCRYPTION_TYPES_SERVER` setting in `sqlnet.ora` requires specific encryption algorithms to be used for database server connections, which can include varying strengths of DES, 3DES, and RC4.

Rationale:

As the lack of encryption on connection requests could make data traffic vulnerable network sniffers, the encryption capability should be set at a high enough value, greater than or equal to a 128-bit key to ensure privacy, according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep SQLNET.ENCRYPTION_TYPES_SERVER \
  $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora
```

Remediation:

```
$ if [ "`grep -i '^SQLNET.ENCRYPTION_TYPES_SERVER=.*'
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora`" ]; then awk '/^
SQLNET.ENCRYPTION_TYPES_SERVER/ { $1 = " SQLNET.ENCRYPTION_TYPES_SERVER=\(rc4_128,
rc4_256, 3des_168\)" } {print}' <$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora>
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new; mv
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new $ORACLE_HOME network/admin/sqlnet.ora; else
echo SQLNET.ENCRYPTION_TYPES_SERVER=\(rc4_128, rc4_256, 3des_168\) >>
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora; fi
```

4.1.8 Encryption algorithm/strength of client-to-server connections (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `SQLNET.ENCRYPTION_TYPES_CLIENT` setting in `sqlnet.ora` requires specific encryption algorithms to be used for database server connections, which can include varying strengths of DES, 3DES, and RC4.

Rationale:

As the lack of encryption on connection requests could make data traffic vulnerable network sniffers, the encryption capability should be set at a high enough value, greater than or equal to a 128-bit key to ensure privacy, according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep SQLNET.ENCRYPTION_TYPES_CLIENT \ $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora
```

Remediation:

```
$ if [ "`grep -i '^SQLNET.ENCRYPTION_TYPES_CLIENT=.*'
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora`" ]; then awk '/^SQLNET.ENCRYPTION_TYPES_CLIENT/
{ $1 = " SQLNET.ENCRYPTION_TYPES_CLIENT=\(rc4_128, rc4_256, 3des_168\)" } {print}'
<$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora> $ORACLE_HOME/ network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new; mv
$ORACLE_HOME/ network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new $ORACLE_HOME/ network/admin/sqlnet.ora;
else echo SQLNET.ENCRYPTION_TYPES_CLIENT=\(rc4_128, rc4_256, 3des_168\) >>
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora; fi
```

4.1.9 Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) version setting in sqlnet.ora (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `SSL_VERSION` setting in `sqlnet.ora` requires the use of a specific release level/version of SSL to make valid connections using this type of encryption.

Rationale:

As versions of SSL earlier than 3.0 were known to have potential weaknesses in their algorithms, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep SSL_VERSION $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora
```

Remediation:

```
$ if [ "`grep -i '^SSL_VERSION=.*' $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora`" ]; then awk
'/^SSL_VERSION/ { $1 = "SSL_VERSION=3.0" } {print}'
<$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora> $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new; mv
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora; else
echo SSL_VERSION=3.0 >> $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora; fi
```

4.1.10 Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) cipher suites in sqlnet.ora (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `SSL_CIPHER_SUITES` setting in `sqlnet.ora` requires the use of specific encryption algorithms and varying key strength for SSL to make valid connections and can include DES (40/56-bits) up to AES (128/256-bits).

Rationale:

As legacy versions of SSL cipher suites are known to have potential weaknesses in their algorithms due to inadequate key length, these values should be set at *X*>= 128 bits, according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep SSL_CIPHER_SUITES $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora
```

Remediation:

```
$ if [ "`grep -i '^SSL_CIPHER_SUITES=.*' $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora`" ];
then awk '/^SSL_CIPHER_SUITES/ { $1 =
"SSL_CIPHER_SUITES=\(SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
SSL_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
SSL_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA\)" } {print}' <$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora>
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new; mv
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora; else
echo SSL_CIPHER_SUITES=\(SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
SSL_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
SSL_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA\) >> $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora; fi
```

4.1.11 SSL certificate Distinguished Name (DN) in sqlnet.ora (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `SSL_SEVER_CERT_DN` setting in `sqlnet.ora` provides the full Distinguished Name (DN) used in formal certificate identification, which is provided by a Certificate Authority (CA). The DN contains all of the individual names of the parent entries, going back to the root entry of the directory tree, such as CN=(Common Name), OU=(Organizational Unit), O=(Organization), L=(Location), ST=(State/Province), C=(Country), and DC=(Directory Context). This information helps block site masquerading.

Rationale:

As the Distinguished Name provided by the Certificate Authority can help prevent site masquerading and traffic interception via host impersonation, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep SSL_SEVER_CERT_DN $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/tnsnames.ora
```

Remediation:

This script assumes the existence of the "net_service_name" in the tnsnames.ora "SECURITY"section.

```
$ if [ "`grep -i '^SSL_CERT_DN=.*' $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/tnsnames.ora`" ]; then
awk '/^SSL_CERT_DN/ { $1 = "\(CN=$ORACLE_HOST, OU=SomeOU, C=OrgCountry, DC=some,
DC=orgname, DC=com\)\)\)" } {print}' <$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/tnsnames.ora>
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/tnsnames.ora.new; mv
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/tnsnames.ora.new $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/tnsnames.ora;
else echo "(CN=$ORACLE_HOST, OU=SomeOU, C=OrgCountry, DC=some, DC=orgname, DC=com)))"
>> $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/tnsnames.ora; fi
```

4.1.12 SSL Client certificate usage requirements in sqlnet.ora (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `SSL_CLIENT_AUTHENTICATION` setting in `sqlnet.ora` determines whether or not the client is required to authenticate connection requests using SSL.

Rationale:

As strong identification procedures may have limited impact on security unless the data transmission method used during the user connection procedures is equally robust, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep SSL_CLIENT_AUTHENTICATION \ $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora
```

Remediation:

```
if [ "`grep -i '^SSL_CLIENT_AUTHENTICATION=.*' $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora`"
]; then awk '/^SSL_CLIENT_AUTHENTICATION/ { $1 = "SSL_CLIENT_AUTHENTICATION=TRUE" }
{print}' <$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora>
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new; mv
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora; else
echo SSL_CLIENT_AUTHENTICATION=TRUE >> $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora; fi
```

4.1.13 SSL certificate revocation check requirements in sqlnet.ora (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The SSL_CERT_REVOCATION setting in sqlnet.ora determines whether or not certificate revocation checks are required to confirm client certificate authenticity prior to client connections.

Rationale:

As the absence of a confirmation on the current status of a Client certificate can mean that the client is no longer authorized to connect to or receive data, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep SSL_CERT_REVOCATION \ $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora
```

Remediation:

```
$ if [ "`grep -i '^SSL_CERT_REVOCATION=.*' $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora`" ];
then awk '/^SSL_CERT_REVOCATION/ { $1 = "SSL_CERT_REVOCATION=REQUIRED" } {print}'
<$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora> $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new; mv
$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora; else
echo SSL_CERT_REVOCATION=REQUIRED >> $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora; fi
```

4.1.14 SSL certificate Distinguished Name check in sqlnet.ora (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The SSL_SERVER_DN_MATCH setting in sqlnet.ora determines whether or not the Distinguished Name (DN) in the certificate matches the database server's DN.

Rationale:

As the absence of a confirmation of match between the DN for the certificate and the host it resides on can mean tampering with the SSL certificates or the host, with key values in the non-matching certificate being possibly fraudulent or otherwise exposed, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ grep SSL_SERVER_DN_MATCH \ $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora
```

Remediation:

```
$ if [ "`grep -i '^SSL_SERVER_DN_MATCH=.*' \ $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora`"
]; then awk \ '/^SSL_SERVER_DN_MATCH/ { $1 = "SSL_SERVER_DN_MATCH=YES" } {print}'
<$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora> \ $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new; \
mv $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new \ $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora;
else echo \ SSL_SERVER_DN_MATCH=YES >> \ $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora; fi
```

4.2 FIPS-compliant communications setting in fips.ora (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `SSLFIPS_140` setting in `sqlnet.ora` enables/disables the requirement for applying the FIPS 140-2 standard to the database server's communications; FIPS must be enabled on both server and client for this to be effective.

Rationale:

As the application of increasing levels of FIPS 140-2 can provide increasing levels of security, including authentication, encryption, and operational conditions, this capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$grep SSL_140 $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora
```

Remediation:

```
$ if [ "`grep -i '^SSL_140=.*' $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora`" ]; then awk
'/^SSL_140/ { $1 = "SSL_140=TRUE" } {print}' <$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora>
$ORACLE_HOME/ network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new; mv $ORACLE_HOME/
network/admin/sqlnet.ora.new $ORACLE_HOME network/admin/sqlnet.ora; else echo
SSL_140=TRUE >> $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora; fi
```

4.3 Certificate-request key size in the Oracle wallet (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle `wallet` is an encrypted container for storing authentication and/or signing credentials, which can include passwords, the Transparent Data Entry (TDE) master key, PKI private keys, certificates, and trusted certificates needed by SSL. The wallet can be

easily configured by using the command-line sequence "`$owm`" to start the Java-based GUI tool for configuration.

Rationale:

As a lack of encryption strength for the various keys associated with connection requests and data table encryption could make data more vulnerable to unauthorized access, this value should be set at a high enough value to serve the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ orapki cert display -cert /certificate/path/name/cert.txt -complete
```

Remediation:

```
Launch the GUI utility to create certificates with a bit value>=2048 value with the
command:

$ owm &

OR via CLI script:

$ orapki wallet add -wallet /your/walletpath/location -dn 'CN=whatever, C=wherever' -
keysize (GE 2048)
```

4.4 Auto-login to the Oracle wallet for SSL connections (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle `wallet`, an encrypted container for storing authentication and/or signing credentials, can be enabled for automatic PKI-based access to services, allowing single sign-on (SSO) access to multiple Oracle databases, without requiring multiple password entries.

Rationale:

As the wallet storage is a secure, centralized location for encryption certificates and can facilitate single sign-on processes by using the "auto-login" feature, which restricts configuration access to the wallet to the user who created it, this value should be set at a according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
Check the auto-login box using the Oracle wallet manager GUI
```

Remediation:

```
Check the box for auto-login after launching the Oracle Wallet Manager GUI

$ owm &

OR:

Use the following script to create a new wallet with auto-login

$ orapki wallet create -wallet \
/your/walletpath/location -auto_login
```

5 Oracle client/user connection and login restrictions

The restrictions on Client/User connections to the Oracle database help block unauthorized access to data and services by setting access rules; these security measures help to ensure that successful logins cannot be easily made through brute-force password attacks or intuited by clever social engineering exploits. By the use of the base profile, e.g. "DEFAULT," then assigning this profile to a client, the database administrator can set a standard policy for password security/resource use to all users assigned the 'DEFAULT' profile; however, this policy can still be overridden by local policy. All values assigned below are the recommended minimums or maximums; higher, more restrictive values can be applied at the discretion of the organization by creating a separate profile to assign to a different user group.

5.1 Rejected - Database Profile

Set and define database profiles for the different use cases (personal user vs. technical account vs. DBA account

5.2 Restrictions on failed login attempts via the default DB profile (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `failed_login_attempts` setting determines how many failed login attempts are permitted before the system locks the user's account. While different profiles can have different and more restrictive settings, such as USERS and APPS, the minimum(s) recommended here should be set on the DEFAULT profile.

Rationale:

As repeated failed login attempts can indicate the initiation of a brute-force login attack, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization (see **warning** below on a known bug that can make this security measure backfire).

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT PROFILE, RESOURCE_NAME, LIMIT FROM DBA_PROFILES WHERE PROFILE='DEFAULT'
AND RESOURCE_NAME='FAILED_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> ALTER PROFILE DEFAULT LIMIT FAILED_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS 5;
```

5.3 Requirements for account locking via on the default DB profile (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `PASSWORD_LOCK_TIME` setting determines how many days must pass for the user's account to be unlocked after the set number of failed login attempts has occurred.

Rationale:

As locking the user account after repeated failed login attempts can block further brute-force login attacks, but can create administrative headaches as this account unlocking process always requires DBA intervention, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT PROFILE, RESOURCE_NAME, LIMIT FROM DBA_PROFILES WHERE PROFILE='DEFAULT'
AND RESOURCE_NAME='PASSWORD_LOCK_TIME';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> ALTER PROFILE DEFAULT LIMIT PASSWORD_LOCK_TIME 1;
```

5.4 Restrictions on password duration via the default DB profile (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `password_life_time` setting determines how long a password may be used before the user is required to be change it.

Rationale:

As allowing passwords to remain unchanged for long periods makes the success of brute-force login attacks more likely, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT PROFILE, RESOURCE_NAME, LIMIT FROM DBA_PROFILES WHERE PROFILE='DEFAULT'
AND RESOURCE_NAME='PASSWORD_LIFE_TIME';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> ALTER PROFILE DEFAULT LIMIT PASSWORD_LIFE_TIME 90;
```

5.5 Restrictions on password history via the default DB profile (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `password_reuse_max` setting determines how many different passwords must be used before the user is allowed to reuse a prior password.

Rationale:

As allowing reuse of a password within a short period of time after the password's initial use can make the success of both social-engineering and brute-force password-based attacks more likely, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT PROFILE, RESOURCE_NAME, LIMIT FROM DBA_PROFILES WHERE PROFILE='DEFAULT'
AND RESOURCE_NAME='PASSWORD_REUSE_MAX';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> ALTER PROFILE DEFAULT LIMIT PASSWORD_REUSE_MAX 20;
```

5.6 Restrictions on password use (reuse) via a DB profile (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `password_reuse_time` setting determines the amount of time in days that must pass before the same password may be reused.

Rationale:

As reusing the same password after only a short period of time has passed makes the success of brute-force login attacks more likely, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT PROFILE, RESOURCE_NAME, LIMIT FROM DBA_PROFILES WHERE PROFILE='DEFAULT'AND
RESOURCE_NAME='PASSWORD_REUSE_TIME';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> ALTER PROFILE DEFAULT PASSWORD_REUSE_TIME 365;
```

5.7 Requirements for account locking (grace time) via a DB profile (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `password_grace_time` setting determines how many days can pass after the user's password expires before the user's login capability is automatically locked out.

Rationale:

As locking the user account after the expiration of the password change requirement's grace period can help prevent password-based attack against a forgotten or disused accounts, while still allowing the account and its information to be accessible by DBA intervention, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT PROFILE, RESOURCE_NAME, LIMIT FROM DBA_PROFILES WHERE PROFILE='DEFAULT'AND
RESOURCE_NAME='PASSWORD_GRACE_TIME';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> ALTER PROFILE DEFAULT PASSWORD_GRACE_TIME 5;
```

5.8 Requirements for limiting EXTERNAL user login capability (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `password='EXTERNAL'` setting determines whether or not a user can be authenticated by a remote OS to allow access to the database with full authorization.

Rationale:

As allowing remote OS authentication of a user to the database can potentially allow supposed "privileged users" to connect as "authenticated," even when the remote system is compromised, these logins should be disabled/restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT USERNAME FROM DBA_USERS WHERE AUTHENTICATION_TYPE='EXTERNAL';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> ALTER USER username IDENTIFIED BY password;
```

5.9 Requirement for setting the password verification function (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `password_verify_function` determines password settings requirements when a user password is changed at the SQL command prompt.

Rationale:

As requiring users to apply the 11gr2 security features in password creation, such as forcing mixed-case complexity, the blocking of simple combinations, and change/history settings can potentially thwart logins by unauthorized users, this function should be applied/enabled according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT PROFILE, RESOURCE_NAME FROM DBA_PROFILES WHERE
RESOURCE_NAME='PASSWORD_VERIFY_FUNCTION';
```

Remediation:

Change the 'utlpwdmg.sql' script to require users to apply the 'CIS_utlpwdmg.sql' requirements to new password creation from the SQL command line as given above by putting the following at the bottom of the file:

PASSWORD_GRACE_TIME 5

PASSWORD_REUSE_TIME 365

PASSWORD_REUSE_MAX 20

FAILED_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS 5

PASSWORD_LOCK_TIME 1

5.10 Rejected - Requirements for limiting user CPU resource allocations (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5
- Level 2 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `CPU_PER_SESSION` setting determines how much access time the user's request is granted for access to the CPU's resources; it is measured in hundredth of seconds.

Rationale:

As limiting the amount of time a request can access the CPU will help prevent poorly formed requests or intentional Denial-of-Service attacks from monopolizing CPU resources, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT PROFILE, RESOURCE_NAME, LIMIT FROM DBA_PROFILES WHERE
RESOURCE_NAME='CPU_PER_SESSION' AND PROFILE='DEFAULT';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> ALTER PROFILE DEFAULT LIMIT CPU_PER_SESSION 6000.
```

5.11 Rejected - Requirements for limiting System Global Area resources (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5
- Level 2 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `PRIVATE_SGA` (Private System Global Area) setting determines how large the maximum number integer bytes can grow to become in the private space of the SGA.

Rationale:

As limiting the size of the `PRIVATE_SGA` can help prevent memory resource exhaustion by poorly formed requests or intentional Denial-of-Service attacks, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT PROFILE, RESOURCE_NAME, LIMIT FROM DBA_PROFILES WHERE
RESOURCE_NAME='PRIVATE_SGA' AND PROFILE='DEFAULT';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL>  ALTER PROFILE DEFAULT LIMIT PRIVATE_SGA 25K;
```

5.12 Rejected - Requirements for limiting amount of disk-access per session (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5
- Level 2 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The LOGICAL_READS_PER_SESSION (Read limitations for disk access) setting determines the maximum number of database blocks that are allowed to be read per session.

Rationale:

As limiting the number of the LOGICAL_READS_PER_SESSION can help prevent memory resource exhaustion by poorly formed requests or intentional Denial-of-Service attacks, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT PROFILE, RESOURCE_NAME, LIMIT FROM DBA_PROFILES WHERE
RESOURCE_NAME='LOGICAL_READS_PER_SESSION' AND PROFILE='DEFAULT';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> ALTER PROFILE DEFAULT LIMIT LOGICAL_READS_PER_SESSION 50000;
```

5.13 Requirements for limiting the number of sessions per user (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 2 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The SESSIONS_PER_USER (Number of sessions allowed) determines the maximum number of user sessions that are allowed to be open concurrently.

Rationale:

As limiting the number of the SESSIONS_PER_USER can help prevent memory resource exhaustion by poorly formed requests or intentional Denial-of-Service attacks, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL>  SELECT PROFILE, RESOURCE_NAME, LIMIT FROM DBA_PROFILES WHERE
RESOURCE_NAME='SESSIONS_PER_USER' AND PROFILE='DEFAULT';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> ALTER PROFILE DEFAULT LIMIT SESSIONS_PER_USER 10;
```

5.14 Rejected - Requirements for limiting the connect time for users (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5
- Level 2 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `CONNECT_TIME` (Duration of user sessions) determines the maximum number of minutes that a user session, active or idle, can be maintained before it is closed.

Rationale:

As limiting the `CONNECT_TIME` can help prevent database resource exhaustion by abandoned sessions or intentional Denial-of-Service attacks, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT PROFILE, RESOURCE_NAME, LIMIT FROM DBA_PROFILES WHERE
RESOURCE_NAME='CONNECT_TIME' AND PROFILE='DEFAULT';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> ALTER PROFILE DEFAULT LIMIT CONNECT_TIME 60
```

5.15 Rejected - Requirements for limiting the idle time for users (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5
- Level 2 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `IDLE_TIME` (Duration of user sessions) determines the maximum number of minutes that a user session can be maintained without new input before it is closed.

Rationale:

As limiting the `IDLE_TIME` can help prevent database resource exhaustion by setting limits on apparently abandoned sessions or intentional Denial-of-Service attacks, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT PROFILE, RESOURCE_NAME, LIMIT FROM DBA_PROFILES WHERE
RESOURCE_NAME='IDLE_TIME' AND PROFILE='DEFAULT';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> ALTER PROFILE DEFAULT LIMIT IDLE_TIME  60
```

6 Oracle user access and authorization restrictions

The capability to use database resources at a given level, or user authorization rules, allows for user manipulation of the various parts of the Oracle database; these authorizations must be structured to block unauthorized use and/or corruption of vital data and services, by setting restrictions on user capabilities, particularly those of the user PUBLIC; these security measures help to ensure that successful logins cannot be easily redirected.

6.1 Default Public Privileges for Packages and Object Types

Revoke default public execute privileges from powerful packages and object types

6.1.1 Limiting user access to the DBMS_ADVISOR package (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database DBMS_ADVISOR package can be used to write files located on the server where the Oracle instance is installed.

Rationale:

As use of the `DBMS_ADVISOR` package could allow an unauthorized user to corrupt operating system files on the instance's host, use of this package should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS where TABLE_NAME='DBMS_ADVISOR' AND
GRANTEE ='PUBLIC'
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_ADVISOR FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/d_advis.htm

6.1.2 Privilege access for the DBMS_CRYPTO package (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The `DBMS_CRYPTO` settings provide a toolset that determines the strength of the encryption algorithm used to encrypt application data and is part of the SYS schema. The DES (56-bit key), 3DES (168-bit key), 3DES-2KEY (112-bit key), AES (128/192/256-bit keys), and RC4 are available.

Rationale:

As execution of these cryptography procedures by the user PUBLIC can potentially endanger portions of or all of the data storage, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS WHERE
TABLE_NAME='DBMS_CRYPTO';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_CRYPTO FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/d_crypto.htm#ARPLS664

6.1.3 Limiting user access to the DBMS_JAVA package (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database DBMS_JAVA package can xxx.

Rationale:

As use of the DBMS_JAVA package xxx.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS where TABLE_NAME='DBMS_JAVA' AND
GRANTEE = 'PUBLIC';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_JAVA FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/java.112/e10588/appendixa.htm#JJDEV13000

6.1.4 Limiting user access to the DBMS_JAVA_TEST package (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database DBMS_JAVA_TEST package can xxx.

Rationale:

As use of the DBMS_JAVA_TEST package xxx.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS where TABLE_NAME='DBMS_JAVA_TEST'
AND GRANTEE ='PUBLIC';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_JAVA_TEST FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://www.databasesecurity.com/HackingAurora.pdf

6.1.5 Limiting user access to the DBMS_JOB package (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database `DBMS_JOB` package schedules and manages the jobs sent to the job queue and has been superseded by the `DBMS_SCHEDULER` package, even though `DBMS_JOB` has been retained for backwards compatibility.

Rationale:

As use of the `DBMS_JOB` package could allow an unauthorized user to disable or overload the job queue and has been superseded by the `DBMS_SCHEDULER` package, this package should be disabled or restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS WHERE TABLE_NAME='DBMS_JOB' AND
GRANTEE='PUBLIC';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_JOB FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/d_job.htm

6.1.6 Limiting user access to the DBMS_LDAP package (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database `DBMS_LDAP` package can be used to create specially crafted error messages or send information via DNS to the outside.

Rationale:

As use of the `DBMS_LDAP` package xxx.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS where TABLE_NAME='DBMS_LDAP' AND
GRANTEE ='PUBLIC'
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_LDAP FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E23943_01/oid.1111/e10186/dbmsldap_ref.htm#OIMAD009

6.1.7 Limiting user access to the DBMS_LOB package (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database `DBMS_LOB` package provides subprograms that can manipulate and read/write on BLOBs, CLOBs, NCLOBs, BFILEs, and temporary LOBs.

Rationale:

As use of the `DBMS_LOB` package could allow an unauthorized user to manipulate BLOBs, CLOBs, NCLOBs, BFILEs, and temporary LOBs on the instance, either destroying data or causing a Denial-of-Service condition due to corruption of disk space, use of this package should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS where TABLE_NAME='DBMS_LOB' AND
GRANTEE = 'PUBLIC';
```

Remediation:

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_LOB FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/d_lob.htm

6.1.8 Privilege access for the DBMS_OBFUSCATION_TOOLKIT (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The `DBMS_OBFUSCATION_TOOLKIT` settings provide one of the tools that determine the strength of the encryption algorithm used to encrypt application data and is part of the SYS schema. The DES (56-bit key) and 3DES (168-bit key) are the only two types available.

Rationale:

As allowing the PUBLIC user privileges to access this capability can be potentially harm the data storage, this access should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS WHERE
TABLE_NAME='DBMS_OBFUSCATION_TOOLKIT';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_OBFUSCATION_TOOLKIT FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/d_obtool.htm#ARPLS028

6.1.9 Limit public access to the DBMS_RANDOM (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database `DBMS_RANDOM` package is used for generating random numbers but should not be used for cryptographic purposes.

Rationale:

As assignment of use of the DBMS_RANDOM package can allow the unauthorized application of the random number-generating function, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS WHERE TABLE_NAME= 'DBMS_RANDOM' AND
GRANTEE='PUBLIC';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_BACKUP_RESTORE FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/d_random.htm

6.1.10 Limiting user access to the DBMS_SCHEDULER package (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database DBMS_SCHEDULER package schedules and manages the jobs .

Rationale:

As use of the DBMS_JOB package could allow an unauthorized user to disable or overload the job queue and has been superseded by the DBMS_SCHEDULER package, this package should be disabled or restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS WHERE TABLE_NAME='DBMS_SCHEDULER'
AND GRANTEE='PUBLIC';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SCHEDULER FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/d_sched.htm

6.1.11 Limiting user access to the DBMS_SQL package (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database `DBMS_SQL` package is shipped as undocumented and is used for replication and other products such as WebDB, providing cursor access as the user.

Rationale:

As use of the `DBMS_SQL` package could allow an unauthorized user to access the cursor during a operations, effectively gaining whatever user privileges are associated with it, use of this package should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS where TABLE_NAME='DBMS_SQL' and
GRANTEE='PUBLIC';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SQL FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/d_sql.htm

6.1.12 Limiting user access to the DBMS_XMLGEN package (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database `DBMS_XMLGEN` package xxx.

Rationale:

As use of the `DBMS_XMLGEN` package cxxx.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS where TABLE_NAME='DBMS_XMLGEN' AND
GRANTEE='PUBLIC';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XMLGEN FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/d_xmlgen.htm

6.1.13 Limiting user access to the DBMS_XMLQUERY package (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database `DBMS_XMLQUERY` package xxx.

Rationale:

As use of the `DBMS_XMLQUERY` package cxxx.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS where TABLE_NAME='DBMS_XMLQUERY'
AND GRANTEE='PUBLIC';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XMLQUERY FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/d_xmlque.htm

6.1.14 Limiting user access to the UTL_FILE package (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database `UTL_FILE` package can be used to read/write files located on the server where the Oracle instance is installed.

Rationale:

As use of the `UTL_FILE` package could allow an unauthorized user to corrupt operating system files on the instance's host, use of this package should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS where TABLE_NAME='UTL_FILE' AND
GRANTEE = ('PUBLIC');
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON UTL_FILE FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/u_file.htm#ARPLS70896

6.1.15 Limiting user access to the UTL_INADDR package (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database `UTL_INADDR` package can be used to create specially crafted error messages or send information via DNS to the outside.

Rationale:

As use of the `UTL_INADDR` package xxx.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS where TABLE_NAME='UTL_INADDR' AND
GRANTEE ='PUBLIC'
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON UTL_INADDR FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/u_inaddr.htm

6.1.16 Limiting user access to the UTL_TCP package (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database `UTL_TCP` package can be used to read/write file to TCP sockets on the server where the Oracle instance is installed.

Rationale:

As use of the `UTL_TCP` package could allow an unauthorized user to corrupt the TCP stream used for carry the protocols that communicate with the instance's external communications, use of this package should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS WHERE TABLE_NAME='UTL_TCP' AND
GRANTEE = 'PUBLIC';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON UTL_TCP FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/u_tcp.htm#ARPLS71533

6.1.17 Limiting user access to the UTL_MAIL package (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database `UTL_MAIL` package can be used to send email from the server where the Oracle instance is installed.

Rationale:

As use of the UTL_MAIL package could allow an unauthorized user to corrupt the SMTP function to accept or generate junk mail that can result in a Denial-of-Service condition due to network saturation, use of this package should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS where TABLE_NAME='UTL_MAIL' and
GRANTEE ='PUBLIC'
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON UTL_MAIL FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/u_mail.htm

6.1.18 Limiting user access to the UTL_SMTP package (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database UTL_SMTP package can be used to send email from the server where the Oracle instance is installed.

Rationale:

As use of the UTL_SMTP package could allow an unauthorized user to corrupt the SMTP function to accept or generate junk mail that can result in a Denial-of-Service condition due to network saturation, use of this package should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS where TABLE_NAME='UTL_SMTP' and
GRANTEE = 'PUBLIC';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON UTL_SMTP FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/u_smtp.htm

6.1.19 Limiting user access to the UTL_DBWS package (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database `UTL_DBWS` package can be used to read/write file to web-based applications on the server where the Oracle instance is installed.

Rationale:

As use of the `UTL_DBWS` package could allow an unauthorized user to corrupt the HTTP stream used for carry the protocols that communicate with the instance's web-based external communications, use of this package should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS where TABLE_NAME='UTL_DBWS' AND
GRANTEE ='PUBLIC';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON UTL_DBWS FROM 'PUBLIC';
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/B19306_01/appdev.102/b14258/u_dbws.htm

6.1.20 Limiting user access to the UTL_ORAMTS package (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database UTL_ORAMTS package can be used to read/write file to web-based applications on the server where the Oracle instance is installed.

Rationale:

As use of the UTL_ORAMTS package could allow an unauthorized user to corrupt the HTTP stream used for carry the protocols that communicate with the instance's web-based external communications, use of this package should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS where TABLE_NAME='UTL_ORAMTS' AND
GRANTEE ='PUBLIC';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON UTL_ORAMTS FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/win.112/e26104/recovery.htm#NTMTS139

6.1.21 Limiting user access to the UTL_HTTP package (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database UTL_HTTP package can be used to read/write file to web-based applications on the server where the Oracle instance is installed.

Rationale:

As use of the UTL_HTTP package could allow an unauthorized user to corrupt the HTTP stream used for carry the protocols that communicate with the instance's web-based external communications, use of this package should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS where TABLE_NAME='UTL_HTTP' AND
GRANTEE = 'PUBLIC';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON UTL_HTTP FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/u_http.htm

6.1.22 Limiting user access to the HTTPURITYPE (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database `HTTPURITYPE` object type can be used to perform HTTP-requests. This could be used to send information to the outside.

Rationale:

tbd.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS where TABLE_NAME='HTTPURITYPE' AND
GRANTEE ='PUBLIC' ;
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON HTTPURITYPE FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/t_dburi.htm#ARPLS71705

6.2 Non-Default Public Privileges for Packages and Object Types

Non-Default Public Privileges for Packages and Object Types

6.2.1 Limiting public user access to the DBMS_SYS_SQL package (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database DBMS_SYS_SQL package is shipped as undocumented and is used for replication and other products such as WebDB, providing cursor access as the user.

Rationale:

As use of the DBMS_SYS_SQL package could allow an unauthorized user to access the cursor during a operations, effectively gaining whatever user privileges are associated with it, use of this package should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS where TABLE_NAME='DBMS_SYS_SQL' and
grantee='PUBLIC';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SYS_SQL FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e16543/guidelines.htm#DBSEG499
2. http://asktom.oracle.com/pls/asktom/f?p=100:11:0::::P11_QUESTION_ID:1325202421535

6.2.2 Limit public access to the DBMS_BACKUP_RESTORE (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database DBMS_BACKUP_RESTORE package is used for applying PL/SQL commands to the native RMAN sequences.

Rationale:

As assignment of use of the DBMS_BACKUP_RESTORE package can allow to access file permissions on operating system level.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS WHERE TABLE_NAME= 'DBMS_BACKUP_RESTORE' and
grantee='PUBLIC';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_BACKUP_RESTORE FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://psoug.org/reference/dbms_backup_restore.html
2. http://davidalejomarcos.wordpress.com/2011/09/13/how-to-list-files-on-a-directory-from-oracle-database/

6.2.3 Limiting public user access to the DBMS_AQADM_SYSCALLS package (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database `DBMS_AQADM_SYSCALLS` package is shipped as undocumented and allows to run SQL commands as user SYS.

Rationale:

As use of the `DBMS_AQADM_SYSCALLS` package could allow an unauthorized user `to run SQL commands as user SYS.`

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS where
TABLE_NAME='DBMS_AQADM_SYSCALLS' and grantee='PUBLIC';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_AQADM_SYSCALLS FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://www.databasesecurity.com/dbsec/ohh-indirect-privilege-escalation.pdf

6.2.4 Limiting public user access to the DBMS_REPACT_SQL_UTL package (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database `DBMS_REPACT_SQL_UTL` package is shipped as undocumented and allows to run SQL commands as user SYS.

Rationale:

As use of the `DBMS_REPACT_SQL_UTL` package could allow an unauthorized user to run SQL commands as user SYS.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS where
TABLE_NAME='DBMS_REPACT_SQL_UTL' and grantee='PUBLIC';
```

Remediation:

SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_REPACT_SQL_UTL FROM PUBLIC;

References:

1. http://www.databasesecurity.com/dbsec/ohh-indirect-privilege-escalation.pdf

6.2.5 Limiting public user access to the INITJVMAUX package (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle database `INITJVMAUX` package is shipped as undocumented and allows to run SQL commands as user SYS.

Rationale:

As use of the `INITJVMAUX` package could allow an unauthorized user to run SQL commands as user SYS.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS where TABLE_NAME='INITJVMAUX' and
grantee='PUBLIC';
```

Remediation:

SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON INITJVMAUX FROM PUBLIC;

References:

1. http://www.databasesecurity.com/dbsec/ohh-indirect-privilege-escalation.pdf

6.2.6 Limiting public user access to the DBMS_STREAMS_ADM_UTL package (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle database `DBMS_STREAMS_ADM_UTL` package is shipped as undocumented and allows to run SQL commands as user SYS.

Rationale:

As use of the `DBMS_STREAMS_ADM_UTL` package could allow an unauthorized user to run SQL commands as user SYS.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS where
TABLE_NAME='DBMS_STREAMS_ADM_UTL' and grantee='PUBLIC';
```

Remediation:

SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_STREAMS_ADM_UTL FROM PUBLIC;

References:

1. http://www.databasesecurity.com/dbsec/ohh-indirect-privilege-escalation.pdf

6.2.7 Limiting public user access to the DBMS_AQADM_SYS package (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle database `DBMS_AQADM_SYS` package is shipped as undocumented and allows to run SQL commands as user SYS.

Rationale:

As use of the DBMS_AQADM_SYS package could allow an unauthorized user to run SQL commands as user SYS.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS where TABLE_NAME='DBMS_AQADM_SYS'
and grantee='PUBLIC';
```

Remediation:

SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_AQADM_SYSFROM PUBLIC;

References:

1. http://www.google.de/#hl=de&safe=off&sclient=psy-ab&q=DBMS_STREAMS_ADM_UTL&oq=DBMS_STREAMS_ADM_UTL&gs_l=serp.3..0i10i30.38260.38260.0.38463.1.1.0.0.0.0.105.105.0j1.1.0...0.0...1c.2.1.-46wqcQeow&pbx=1&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.r_cp.r_qf.&fp=2569366ac9a6532d&bpc

6.2.8 Limiting public user access to the DBMS_STREAMS_RPC package (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle database DBMS_STREAMS_RPC package is shipped as undocumented and allows to run SQL commands as user SYS.

Rationale:

As use of the DBMS_STREAMS_RPC package could allow an unauthorized user to run SQL commands as user SYS.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS where TABLE_NAME='DBMS_STREAMS_RPC'
and grantee='PUBLIC';
```

Remediation:

SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_STREAMS_RPC FROM PUBLIC;

References:

1. http://www.databasesecurity.com/dbsec/ohh-indirect-privilege-escalation.pdf

6.2.9 Limiting public user access to the DBMS_AQADM_SYS package (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle database `DBMS_AQADM_SYS` package is shipped as undocumented and allows to run SQL commands as user SYS.

Rationale:

As use of the `DBMS_AQADM_SYS` package could allow any user to run SQL commands as user SYS.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS where TABLE_NAME='DBMS_AQADM_SYS'
and grantee='PUBLIC';
```

Remediation:

SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_AQADM_SYS FROM PUBLIC;

6.2.10 Limiting public user access to the DBMS_PRVTAQIM package (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle database `DBMS_PRVTAQIM` package is shipped as undocumented and allows to run SQL commands as user SYS.

Rationale:

As use of the `DBMS_PRVTAQIM` package could allow an unauthorized user to xxx.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS where TABLE_NAME='DBMS_PRVTAQIM'
and grantee='PUBLIC';
```

Remediation:

SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_PRVTAQIM FROM PUBLIC;

References:

1. http://www.databasesecurity.com/dbsec/ohh-indirect-privilege-escalation.pdf

6.2.11 Limiting public user access to the LTADM package (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle database `LTADM` package is shipped as undocumented and xxx

Rationale:

As use of the `LTADM` package could allow an unauthorized user to xxx.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS where TABLE_NAME='LTADM' and
grantee='PUBLIC';
```

Remediation:

SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON LTADM FROM PUBLIC;

References:

1. http://www.databasesecurity.com/dbsec/ohh-indirect-privilege-escalation.pdf

6.2.12 Limiting public user access to the WWV_DBMS_SQL package (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle database `WWV_DBMS_SQL` package is shipped as undocumented and allows Oracle Application Express to run dynamic SQL statements.

Rationale:

As use of the `WWV_DBMS_SQL` package could allow an unauthorized user to run SQL statements as Application Express (APEX) user.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS where TABLE_NAME='WWV_DBMS_SQL' and
grantee='PUBLIC';
```

Remediation:

SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON WWV_DBMS_SQL FROM PUBLIC;

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/install.112/e12196/trouble.htm#HTMIG267

6.2.13 Limiting public user access to the WWV_EXECUTE_IMMEDIATE package (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle database `WWV_EXECUTE_IMMEDIATE` package is shipped as undocumented and allows Oracle Application Express to run dynamic SQL statements.

Rationale:

As use of the `WWV_EXECUTE_IMMEDIATE` package could allow an unauthorized user to run SQL statements as Application Express (APEX) user.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS where
TABLE_NAME='WWV_EXECUTE_IMMEDIATE' and grantee='PUBLIC';
```

Remediation:

SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON WWV_EXECUTE_IMMEDIATE FROM PUBLIC;

References:

1. http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2008-1811
2. https://forums.oracle.com/forums/thread.jspa?threadID=953790

6.2.14 Limiting public user access to the DBMS_IJOB package (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle database `DBMS_IJOB` package is shipped as undocumented and allows to run database jobs in the context of another user.

Rationale:

As use of the DBMS_IJOB package could allow an attacker to change identities by using a different username to execute a database job.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS where TABLE_NAME='DBMS_IJOB' and
grantee='PUBLIC';
```

Remediation:

SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_IJOB FROM PUBLIC;

6.2.15 Limiting public user access to the DBMS_FILE_TRANSFER package (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle database `DBMS_FILE_TRANSFER` package allows to transfer files from one database server to another.

Rationale:

As use of the DBMS_FILE_TRANSFER package could allow to transfer files from one database server to another.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS where
TABLE_NAME='DBMS_FILE_TRANSFER' and GRANTEE='PUBLIC';
```

Remediation:

SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_FILE_TRANSFER FROM PUBLIC;

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/d_ftran.htm#ARPLS095

6.3 System Privileges

Revoke system privileges

6.3.1 Limiting users by restricting the SELECT ANY DICTIONARY privilege (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database `SELECT ANY DICTIONARY` privilege allows the designated user to access SYS schema objects.

Rationale:

The Oracle database `SELECT ANY DICTIONARY` privilege allows the designated user to access SYS schema objects. The Oracle password hashes are part of the SYS schema and can be selected using SELECT ANY DICTIONARY privileges.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS where PRIVILEGE='SELECT ANY
DICTIONARY' AND GRANTEE NOT IN
('DBA','DBSNMP','OEM_MONITOR','OLAPSYS','ORACLE_OCM','SYSMAN','WMSYS');
```

Remediation:

```
SQL>REVOKE SELECT_ANY_DICTIONARY from <USER/ROLE>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e16543/authorization.htm#BABHFJFJ
2. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/initparams157.htm#REFRN10133
3. http://arup.blogspot.de/2011/07/difference-between-select-any.html

6.3.2 Limiting users by restricting the SELECT ANY TABLE privilege (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database `SELECT ANY TABLE` privilege allows the designated user to open any table, except of SYS, to view it.

Rationale:

As assignment of the `SELECT ANY TABLE` privilege can allow the unauthorized viewing of sensitive data, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS where PRIVILEGE='SELECT_ANY_TABLE';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE SELECT_ANY_TABLE from <grantee>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e26088/statements_10002.htm#SQLRF01702

6.3.3 Limiting users by restricting the AUDIT SYSTEM privilege (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database `AUDIT SYSTEM` privilege allows the change auditing activities on the system.

Rationale:

As assignment of the `AUDIT SYSTEM` privilege can allow the unauthorized alteration of system audit activities, disabling the creation of audit trails, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS where
PRIVILEGE='AUDIT SYSTEM' AND GRANTEE NOT IN
('DBA','DATAPUMP_IMP_FULL_DATABASE','IMP_FULL_DATABASE','SYS');
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE AUDIT SYSTEM from <grantee>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e26088/statements_4007.htm#SQLRF01107

6.3.4 Limiting users by restricting the EXEMPT ACCESS POLICY (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database `EXEMPT ACCESS POLICY` keyword provides the user the capability to access all the table rows regardless of row-level security lockouts.

Rationale:

As assignment of the `EXEMPT ACCESS POLICY` privilege can allow an unauthorized user to potentially access/change confidential data, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT * FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS WHERE PRIVILEGE='EXEMPT ACCESS POLICY';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE EXEMPT ACCESS POLICY FROM <grantee>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e16543/auditing.htm#DBSEG419
2. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e16543/vpd.htm#DBSEG309

6.3.5 Limiting users by restricting the BECOME USER privilege (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database `BECOME USER` privilege allows the designated user to inherit the rights of another user.

Rationale:

As assignment of the `BECOME USER` privilege can allow the unauthorized use of another user's privileges, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS where PRIVILEGE='BECOME USER' AND
GRANTEE NOT IN ('DBA','SYS','IMP_FULL_DATABASE');
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE BECOME USER from <grantee>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/B19306_01/network.102/b14266/cfgaudit.htm

6.3.6 Limiting users by restricting the CREATE PROCEDURE privilege (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database `CREATE PROCEDURE` privilege allows the designated user to create a stored procedure that will fire when given the correct command sequence.

Rationale:

As assignment of the `CREATE PROCEDURE` privilege can lead to severe problems in unauthorized hands, such as rogue procedures facilitating data theft or Denial-of-Service by corrupting data tables, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS where PRIVILEGE='CREATE PROCEDURE'
and GRANTEE NOT IN (
'DBA','DBSNMP','MDSYS','OLAPSYS','OWB$CLIENT','OWBSYS','RECOVERY_CATALOG_OWNER','SPATI
AL_CSW_ADMIN_USR','SPATIAL_WFS_ADMIN_USR','SYS','APEX_030200','APEX_040000','APEX_0401
00','APEX_040200');
```

Remediation:

```
REVOKE CREATE_PROCEDURE from <grantee>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e26088/statements_6009.htm#SQLRF01309

6.3.7 Limiting users by restricting the ALTER SYSTEM privilege (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database `ALTER SYSTEM` privilege allows the designated user to dynamically alter the instance's running operations.

Rationale:

As assignment of the `ALTER SYSTEM` privilege can lead to severe problems, such as the instance's session being killed or the stopping of redo log recording, which would make transactions unrecoverable, this capability should be severely restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS WHERE PRIVILEGE='ALTER SYSTEM' and
GRANTEE NOT IN
('SYS','SYSTEM','APEX_030200','APEX_040000','APEX_040100','APEX_040200');
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE ALTER SYSTEM from <grantee>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e26088/statements_2014.htm#SQLRF00902

6.3.8 Limiting users by restricting the CREATE ANY LIBRARY privilege (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database `CREATE (ANY) LIBRARY` privilege allows the designated user to create objects that are associated to the shared libraries.

Rationale:

As assignment of the `CREATE (ANY) LIBRARY` privilege can allow the creation of numerous library-associated objects and potentially corrupt the libraries' integrity, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT * FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS where (PRIVILEGE='CREATE LIBRARY'
or PRIVILEGE='CREATE ANY LIBRARY') AND GRANTEE NOT IN ('SYS','SYSTEM','DBA');
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE CREATE LIBRARY FROM <grantee>;
SQL> REVOKE CREATE ANY LIBRARY FROM <grantee>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e26088/statements_6001.htm#SQLRF01301
2. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E18283_01/server.112/e17120/manproc007.htm

6.3.9 Limiting users by restricting GRANT ANY OBJECT PRIVILEGE (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database `GRANT ANY OBJECT PRIVILEGE` keyword provides the grantee the capability to grant access to any single or multiple combinations of objects to any grantee in the catalog of the database.

Rationale:

As authorization to use the `GRANT ANY OBJECT PRIVILEGE` capability can allow an unauthorized user to potentially access/change confidential data or damage the data catalog due to potential complete instance access, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT * FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS WHERE PRIVILEGE='GRANT ANY OBJECT PRIVILEGE' AND
GRANTEE NOT IN ('DBA','SYS','IMP_FULL_DATABASE','DATAPUMP_IMP_FULL_DATABASE');
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE GRANT ANY OBJECT PRIVILEGE FROM <grantee>
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e16543/authorization.htm#DBSEG99914

6.3.10 Limiting users by restricting GRANT ANY ROLE (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database `GRANT ANY ROLE` keyword provides the grantee the capability to grant any single role to any grantee in the catalog of the database.

Rationale:

As authorization to use the `GRANT ANY ROLE` capability can allow an unauthorized user to potentially access/change confidential data or damage the data catalog due to potential complete instance access, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT * FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS WHERE PRIVILEGE='GRANT ANY ROLE' AND GRANTEE NOT IN
('DBA','SYS','DATAPUMP_IMP_FULL_DATABASE','IMP_FULL_DATABASE','SPATIAL_WFS_ADMIN_USR',
'SPATIAL_CSW_ADMIN_USR');
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE GRANT ANY ROLE FROM <grantee>
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e16543/authorization.htm#DBSEG99903

6.3.11 Limiting users by restricting GRANT ANY PRIVILEGE (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database `GRANT ANY PRIVILEGE` keyword provides the grantee the capability to grant any single privilege to any item in the catalog of the database.

Rationale:

As authorization to use the `GRANT ANY PRIVILEGE` capability can allow an unauthorized user to potentially access/change confidential data or damage the data catalog due to potential complete instance access, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT * FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS WHERE PRIVILEGE='GRANT ANY PRIVILEGE' AND GRANTEE NOT
IN ('DBA','SYS','IMP_FULL_DATABASE','DATAPUMP_IMP_FULL_DATABASE');
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE GRANT ANY PRIVILEGE FROM <grantee>
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e16543/authorization.htm#DBSEG99876

6.3.12 Limiting users by restricting GRANT ALL PRIVILEGES (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database `GRANT ALL PRIVILEGES` keyword provides the user the capability to grant all privileges to any item in the catalog of the database simultaneously.

Rationale:

As authorization to use the `GRANT ALL PRIVILEGES` capability can allow an unauthorized user to potentially access/change confidential data or damage the data catalog due to complete instance access, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT * FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS WHERE PRIVILEGE='GRANT_ALL_PRIVILEGES';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE GRANT ALL PRIVILEGES FROM <grantee>
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e16543/guidelines.htm#DBSEG500

6.4 Role Privileges

Revoke powerful roles

6.4.1 Limiting user authorizations for the DELETE_CATALOG_ROLE (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database `DELETE_CATALOG_ROLE` provides `DELETE` privileges for the records in the system's audit table (`AUD$`).

Rationale:

As permitting unauthorized access to the `DELETE_CATALOG_ROLE` can allow the destruction of audit records vital to the forensic investigation of unauthorized activities, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT *  FROM DBA_ROLE_PRIVS where granted_role='DELETE_CATALOG_ROLE' and
grantee not in ('DBA','SYS');
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE DELETE_CATALOG_ROLE FROM <Non-SYS grantee>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e16543/authorization.htm#DBSEG99873
2. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e16543/authorization.htm#DBSEG4414

6.4.2 Limiting user authorizations for the SELECT_CATALOG_ROLE (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database `SELECT_CATALOG_ROLE` provides `SELECT` privileges on all data dictionary views held in the `SYS` schema.

Rationale:

As permitting unauthorized access to the `SELECT_CATALOG_ROLE` can allow the disclosure of all dictionary data, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT *  FROM DBA_ROLE_PRIVS where granted_role='SELECT_CATALOG_ROLE' and
grantee not in ('DBA','SYS','IMP_FULL_DATABASE','EXP_FULL_DATABASE','OEM_MONITOR');
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE SELECT_CATALOG_ROLE FROM <Non-SYS grantee>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e16543/authorization.htm#DBSEG99873
2. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e16543/authorization.htm#DBSEG4414

6.4.3 Limiting user authorizations for the EXECUTE_CATALOG role (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database `EXECUTE_CATALOG_ROLE` provides `EXECUTE` privileges for a number of packages and procedures in the data dictionary in the `SYS` schema.

Rationale:

As permitting unauthorized access to the `EXECUTE_CATALOG_ROLE` can allow the disruption of operations by initialization of rogue procedures, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT *  FROM DBA_ROLE_PRIVS where granted_role='EXECUTE_CATALOG_ROLE' and
grantee not in ('DBA','SYS','IMP_FULL_DATABASE','EXP_FULL_DATABASE');
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE EXECUTE_CATALOG_ROLE FROM <Non-SYS grantee>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e16543/authorization.htm#DBSEG99873
2. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e16543/authorization.htm#DBSEG4414

6.4.4 Limiting users by restricting the DBA role (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database DBA role is the default database administrator role provided for the allocation of administrative privileges.

Rationale:

As assignment of the DBA role to an ordinary user can provide a great number of unnecessary privileges to that user and opens the door to data breaches, integrity violations, and Denial-of-Service conditions, application of this role should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, GRANTED_ROLE FROM DBA_ROLE_PRIVS WHERE GRANTED_ROLE='DBA' AND
GRANTEE NOT IN ('SYS','SYSTEM');
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE DBA from <grantee>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e16543/authorization.htm#DBSEG4414

6.5 Table and View privileges

Revoke table and view privileges

6.5.1 Limiting authorizations for the SYS.AUD$ table (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database SYS.AUD$ table contains all the audit records for the database of the non-Data Manipulation Language (DML) events, such as ALTER, DROP, CREATE, and so forth. (DML changes need trigger-based audit events to record data alterations.)

Rationale:

As permitting non-privileged users the authorization to manipulate the SYS_AUD$ table can allow distortion of the audit records, hiding unauthorized activities, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS WHERE TABLE_NAME='AUD$' and grantee
not in ('DELETE_CATALOG_ROLE');
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE ALL ON AUD$ FROM <grantee>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e16543/auditing.htm#CEGDGIAF

6.5.2 Limiting authorizations for the SYS.USER_HISTORY$ table (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database `SYS.USER_HISTORY$` table contains all the audit records for the user's password change history. (This table gets updated by password changes if the user has an assigned profile that has password reuse limit set, e.g., `PASSWORD_REUSE_TIME` set to other than `UNLIMITED`.)

Rationale:

As permitting non-privileged users the authorization to manipulate the records in the `SYS.USER_HISTORY$` table can allow distortion of the audit trail, potentially hiding unauthorized data confidentiality attacks or integrity changes, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS WHERE TABLE_NAME='USER_HISTORY$';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE ALL ON USER_HISTORY$ FROM <username>;
```

References:

1. http://marcel.vandewaters.nl/oracle/database-oracle/password-history-reusing-a-password

6.5.3 Limiting authorizations for the SYS.LINK$ table (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database `SYS.LINK$` table contains all the user's password information and data table link information.

Rationale:

As permitting non-privileged users to manipulate or view the `SYS.LINK$` table can allow capture of password information and/or corrupt the primary database linkages, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS WHERE TABLE_NAME='LINK$';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE ALL ON LINK$ FROM <grantee>;
```

6.5.4 Limiting authorizations for the SYS.USER$ table (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle database `SYS.USER$` table contains the users' hashed password information.

Rationale:

As permitting non-privileged users the authorization to open the `SYS.USER$` table can allow the capture of password hashes for the later application of password cracking algorithms to breach confidentiality, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS WHERE TABLE_NAME='USER$' and grantee
not in ('CTXSYS','XDB','APEX_030200', 'APEX_040000','APEX_040100','APEX_040200');
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE ALL ON SYS.USER$ FROM <username>;
```

References:

1. http://dba.stackexchange.com/questions/17513/what-do-the-columns-in-sys-user-represent

6.5.5 Rejected - Limiting authorizations for the SYS.SOURCE$ table (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database `SYS.SOURCE$` table contains the linkages between the OBJ$ (Object ID), LINE (Line Number), and SOURCE (Source code line).

Rationale:

As permitting users the authorization to manipulate the `SYS.USER$` table can render the references to source code in the data dictionary useless and destroy database integrity, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS WHERE TABLE_NAME='SOURCE$';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE ALL ON SYS.SOURCE$ FROM <username>;
```

6.5.6 Limiting user authorizations for the $X tables (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database $X tables are the SQL interface for viewing the database's memory allocations associated with database operations, such as the "cursor," as this process is operationalized in the SGA and the type and number of the tables can vary in number according to the database installation type.

Rationale:

As permitting users the authorization to manipulate the $X tables can expose sensitive database operations to interference or destruction, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS WHERE TABLE_NAME LIKE
('X$%') and owner not in ('XDB');
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE ALL ON X$ <table_name> FROM <grantee>;
```

References:

1. http://www.oracle-internals.com/?p=11

6.5.7 Limiting user authorizations for the DBA_% views (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database `DBA_` views show all information which is relevant to administrative accounts.

Rationale:

As permitting users the authorization to manipulate the `DBA_` views can expose sensitive data.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT * FROM dba_tab_privs WHERE TABLE_NAME LIKE 'DBA_%' grantee not in
('APEX_030200','APPQOSSYS','AQ_ADMINISTRATOR_ROLE','CTXSYS','EXFSYS','MDSYS','OLAP_XS_
ADMIN','OLAPSYS','ORDSYS','OWB$CLIENT','OWBSYS','SELECT_CATALOG_ROLE','WM_ADMIN_ROLE',
'WMSYS','XDBADMIN');
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE ALL ON DBA_<view_name> FROM <Non-DBA/SYS grantee>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25789/datadict.htm#autoId2

6.5.8 Limiting user authorizations for the $V_ views (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database $v_ views provide a continually updated look at internal database statistics, with 467 possible views in Oracle 11gr2, including all SQL statements running: The V$ views are sometimes referred to as "Dynamic performance views or tables" for this reason.

Rationale:

As permitting users the authorization to read the $v_ views can expose sensitive database operations that hold information that can facilitate system attacks, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE,PRIVILEGE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS WHERE TABLE_NAME LIKE
'V$_%' AND GRANTEE NOT IN ('DBA') and table_name not in ('V$OBJECT_USAGE');
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE ALL ON TABLENAME LIKE 'V$_' FROM <Non-DBA grantee>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25789/datadict.htm#CNCPT1220

6.5.9 Rejected - Limiting user authorizations for the $V synonym(s) (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database $v synonyms are the pointers used to access the $v_ views and provide a continually updated look at internal database statistics, with 467 possible views in Oracle 11gr2, including all SQL statements currently running: The $v_ views are sometimes referred to as "Dynamic performance views or tables" for this reason.

Rationale:

As permitting users the authorization to read the $V synonyms can expose sensitive database operations that hold information that can facilitate attacks, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE,PRIVILEGE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS WHERE TABLE_NAME LIKE
'V$_%' AND GRANTEE NOT IN ('SYS', 'DBA') ORDER BY 3;
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE ALL ON TABLE_NAME LIKE 'V$_' FROM <Non-SYS grantee>;
```

6.5.10 Limiting authorizations for the SCHEDULER$_CREDENTIAL table (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The Oracle database SCHEDULER$_CREDENTIAL table contains the database scheduler credential information.

Rationale:

As permitting non-privileged users the authorization to open the SYS.SCHEDULER$_CREDENTIAL table.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS WHERE
TABLE_NAME='SCHEDULER$_CREDENTIAL';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE ALL ON SYS.SCHEDULER$_CREDENTIAL FROM <username>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/d_sched.htm#ARPLS72292
2. http://berxblog.blogspot.de/2012/02/restore-dbmsschedulercreatecredential.html

6.5.11 Drop table sys.user$mig (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

The table sys.user$mig is created during the migration and contains the Oracle password hashes before the migration starts.

Rationale:

The table sys.user$mig is not deleted after the migration. An attacker could access this table containing the Oracle password hashes.

Audit:

select owner,table_name from all_tables where owner='SYS' and table_name='USER$MIG';

Remediation:

drop table sys.user$mig;

6.6 Other Privileges

Revoke other privileges

6.6.1 Access to ACL privileges (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

Review access to Oracle network ACLs.

Rationale:

Oracle network ACLs control who can connect to which port/ip.

Audit:

Remediation:

Revoke unneeded privileges.

6.7 Limiting user authorizations for the SYSTEM tablespace (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 2 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `SYSTEM` tablespace contains all the basic system objects for the database, such as the data dictionary tables.

Rationale:

As allowing any user other than SYS to use the SYSTEM tablespace can potentially allow disk resource exhaustion (Denial-of-Service) conditions to occur or data dictionary corruption, requiring a tablespace reconstruction from backups, authorization to use the SYSTEM tablespace should limited according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT USERNAME, DEFAULT_TABLESPACE FROM DBA_USERS WHERE
DEFAULT_TABLESPACE='SYSTEM' and username not in ('SYSTEM','SYS','MGMT_VIEW','OUTLN');
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> ALTER user DEFAULT_TABLESPACE tablename;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25494/create004.htm#ADMIN11092

6.8 Rejected - Limiting application/developer resources on a tablespace (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5
- Level 2 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The production tablespace(s) for users contains all the system space set aside for application users or developers to read/write data to the production database instance.

Rationale:

As allowing any application user or developer user unlimited write capability on an assigned tablespace can potentially allow a disk resource exhaustion (Denial-of-Service) condition, quotas for disk space should set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT USERNAME, TABLESPACE_NAME, BYTES, MAX_BYTES
FROM DBA_TS_QUOTAS WHERE MAX_BYTES = -1 AND TABLESPACE_NAME NOT LIKE 'SYS%' order by
1;

OR (To check for unlimited tablespace on a 'SYS'-type of table:

SQL> SELECT USERNAME, TABLESPACE_NAME, BYTES, MAX_BYTES
FROM DBA_TS_QUOTAS WHERE MAX_BYTES = -1 AND TABLESPACE_NAME  LIKE 'SYS%' order by 1;
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> ALTER USER <username> QUOTA <value> ON <tablespace_name>;
```

6.9 Rejected - Limiting authorizations for edition-based upgrade versioning (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle 11gr2 database can have multiple versions of required PL/SQL objects, views, synonyms and triggers within a single schema. This allows database upgrades without significant database down time.

Rationale:

As allowing a non-privileged user the capability to launch the `EDITION` sequence can potentially invalidate all of the PL/SQL code, with the exception of triggers, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE from DBA_SYS_PRIVS where PRIVILEGE LIKE'%EDITION' and
GRANTEE not in ('SYS','DBA');
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE <privilege> from <grantee> ;
```

6.10 Rejected - Limiting authorizations for the PERFSTAT.STATS$SQLTEXT table (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle database `PERFSTAT.STATS$SQL_SUMMAY` table contains the full text of all executed SQL statements.

Rationale:

As permitting users the authorization to read the `PERFSTAT.STATS$SQL_SUMMARY` table can expose sensitive information such as schema/tablespace names, user IDs, and valid queries/views, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS WHERE
TABLE_NAME='PERFSTAT.STATS$SQLTEXT';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE ALL ON PERFSTAT.STATS$SQLTEXT FROM <grantee>;
```

6.11 Rejected - Limiting authorizations to PERFSTAT.STATS$SQL_SUMMARY table (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle database PERFSTAT.STATS$SQL_SUMMARY table contains the full text of the STATSPACK-generated database activities, which, according to level and threshold setting, can include performance data, rollback data, and many other activity indicators.

Rationale:

As permitting users the authorization to read the PERFSTAT.STATS$SQL_SUMMARY table can expose sensitive information such as rollback information, schema/tablespace names, user IDs, and associated queries/views, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS WHERE
TABLE_NAME='STATS$SQLSUM';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE ALL ON PERFSTAT.STATS$SQLSUM FROM <grantee>;
```

6.12 Rejected - Limiting user authorizations for the ALL_SOURCE view (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle database ALL_SOURCE view describes the "Text source" of the stored objects available to the current user.

Rationale:

As permitting unauthorized viewing of a user's available text source can expose sensitive data, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE,PRIVILEGE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS WHERE
TABLE_NAME='ALL_SOURCE' AND GRANTEE NOT IN ('DBA') ORDER BY TABLE_NAME;
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE ALL ON ALL_SOURCE FROM <Non-DBA grantee>;
```

6.13 Rejected - Limiting user authorizations for the DBA_ROLES view (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle database `DBA_ROLES` view lists all the roles that exist in the database.

Rationale:

As permitting unauthorized access to the `DBA_ROLES` can allow the alteration of sensitive data or bring down the data instance, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE,PRIVILEGE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS WHERE
TABLE_NAME='DBA_ROLES';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE ALL ON DBA_ROLES FROM <Non-dba/SYS grantee>;
```

6.14 Rejected - Limiting user authorizations for the DBA_SYS_PRIVS view (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle database `DBA_SYS_PRIV` view lists the system privileges granted to users and roles that exist in the database.

Rationale:

As permitting unauthorized access to the `DBA_SYS_PRIV` view can allow the disclosure of sensitive data, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE,PRIVILEGE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS WHERE
TABLE_NAME='DBA_SYS_PRIVS';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE ALL ON DBA_SYS_PRIVS FROM <Non-SYS grantee>;
```

6.15 Rejected - Limiting user authorizations for the DBA_ROLE_PRIVS view (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle database `DBA_ROLE_PRIVS` view lists the privileges for all the roles that exist in the database.

Rationale:

As permitting unauthorized access to the `DBA_ROLE_PRIV` view can allow the disclosure of sensitive data, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE,PRIVILEGE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS WHERE
TABLE_NAME='DBA_ROLE_PRIVS';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE ALL ON DBA_ROLE_PRIV FROM <Non-SYS/DBA grantee>;
```

6.16 Rejected - Limiting user authorizations for the DBA_TAB_PRIV view (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle database `DBA_TAB_PRIV` view lists the user privileges for all the tables that exist in the database.

Rationale:

As permitting unauthorized access to the DBA_TAB_PRIV view can allow the disclosure of sensitive data, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE,PRIVILEGE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS WHERE
TABLE_NAME='DBA_ROLE_PRIVS';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE ALL ON DBA_ROLE_PRIVS FROM <Non-SYS/grantee>;
```

6.17 Rejected - Limiting user authorizations for the ROLE_ROLE_PRIVS view (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle database ROLE_ROLE_PRIVS view lists all the roles granted to other roles and is limited to the roles which the current user can access.

Rationale:

As permitting unauthorized access to the ROLE_ROLE_PRIVS view can allow the disclosure of sensitive data, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE,PRIVILEGE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS WHERE
TABLE_NAME='ROLE_ROLE_PRIVS';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE ALL ON ROLE_ROLE_PRIVS FROM <Non-SYS/DBA grantee>;
```

6.18 Rejected - Limiting user authorizations for the USER_TAB_PRIVS view (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle database `USER_TAB_PRIVS` view lists all the granted table privileges for all users in the database.

Rationale:

As permitting unauthorized access to the `USER_TAB_PRIVS` view can allow the disclosure of sensitive data, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE,PRIVILEGE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS WHERE
TABLE_NAME='USER_TAB_PRIVS';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE ALL ON USER_TAB_PRIVS FROM <Non-SYS/DBA grantee >;
```

6.19 Rejected - Limiting user authorizations for the USER_ROLE_PRIVS view (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle database `USER_ROLE_PRIVS` view lists all the granted role privileges for all users in the database.

Rationale:

As permitting unauthorized access to the `USER_ROLE_PRIVS` view can allow the disclosure of sensitive data, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE,PRIVILEGE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS WHERE
TABLE_NAME='USER_ROLE_PRIVS';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE ALL PRIVILEGES ON USER_ROLE_PRIVS FROM <Non-SYS grantee>;
```

6.20 Rejected - Limiting user authorizations for the RECOVERY_CATALOG_ OWNER (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle database `RECOVERY_CATALOG_OWNER` provides full privileges to the `RECOVERY CATALOG`, which is a database schema that tracks backups and stores the commands used for RMAN-based backup and recovery situations.

Rationale:

As permitting unauthorized access to the `RECOVERY_CATALOG_OWNER` can allow the covert or overt destruction of system backup data and procedures, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE,PRIVILEGE, TABLE_NAME FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS WHERE
TABLE_NAME='RECOVER_CATALOG_OWNER';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE ALL ON RECOVER_CATALOG_OWNER FROM <Non-SYS grantee>;
```

6.21 Rejected - Limiting basic user privileges to CREATE_SESSION (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle database `CREATE_SESSION` privilege provides basic connection capabilities for the standard "Application User" to establish a session with the database so that further specific privileges for DDL, written into the application routines, can take over; when running the "`select * from dba_sys_privs`" statement on a default installation of Oracle 11gr2 Enterprise, it can return more than 700 rows of privilege assignments.

Rationale:

As access to the gateway of myriad privileges beyond `CREATE SESSION` can allow an unauthorized user to potentially view confidential data or do harm to the database instance(s), CREATE SESSION privileges should be permitted as the only default permission, or restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT * FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS WHERE PRIVILEGE='CREATE SESSION' AND GRANTEE NOT IN
('DBA', 'SYS', 'SYSTEM') order by 1;
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE CREATE SESSION FROM <grantee>;
```

6.22 Limiting basic user privileges to restrict the ANY keyword (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle database `ANY` keyword provides the user the capability to alter any item in the catalog of the database.

Rationale:

As authorization to use the `ANY` expansion of a privilege can allow an unauthorized user to potentially change confidential data or damage the data catalog, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL>  SELECT * FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS WHERE PRIVILEGE LIKE '%ANY%' AND GRANTEE NOT IN
('AQ_ADMINISTRATOR_ROLE','DBA',
'DBSNMP','EXFSYS','EXP_FULL_DATABASE','IMP_FULL_DATABASE','DATAPUMP_IMP_FULL_DATABASE'
,'JAVADEBUGPRIV','MDSYS','OEM_MONITOR','OLAPSYS','OLAP_DBA','ORACLE_OCM','OWB$CLIENT',
'OWBSYS','SCHEDULER_ADMIN','SPATIAL_CSW_ADMIN_USR','SPATIAL_WFS_ADMIN_USR','SYS','SYSM
AN','SYSTEM','WMSYS','APEX_030200','APEX_040000','APEX_040100','APEX_040200');
```

Remediation:

```
REVOKE ALL ON '<ANY Privilege>' FROM <grantee>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e16543/authorization.htm#DBSEG99877

6.23 Limiting users by restricting the WITH_ADMIN privilege (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle database `WITH_ADMIN` privilege allows the designated user to grant another user the same privileges.

Rationale:

As assignment of the `WITH_ADMIN` privilege can allow the granting of a restricted privilege to an unauthorized user, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT * FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS WHERE ADMIN_OPTION='YES' and GRANTEE not in
('AQ_ADMINISTRATOR_ROLE','DBA','OWBSYS', 'SCHEDULER_ADMIN','SYS','SYSTEM','WMSYS')
ORDER BY 1;
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE <privilege> FROM <grantee>;
```

6.24 Limiting PUBLIC by restricting the WITH_GRANT (SELECT) privilege (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle database WITH_GRANT (SELECT) privilege allows the designated grantee to grant to another user the same privilege(s) to execute a command that the original grantee holds.

Rationale:

As assignment of the WITH_GRANT (SELECT) privilege to PUBLIC can allow the granting of a restricted privilege to an unauthorized user that permits viewing the contents potentially restricted data tables, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, TABLE_NAME, PRIVILEGE, GRANTABLE FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS WHERE
GRANTABLE='YES' AND GRANTEE='PUBLIC' AND PRIVILEGE='SELECT' order by 1,2;
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE SELECT from <grantee>;
```

6.25 Limiting PUBLIC by restricting the WITH_GRANT (EXECUTABLE) privilege (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle database WITH_GRANT (executable) privilege allows the designated grantee to grant to another user the same privilege(s) to execute a command that the original grantee holds.

Rationale:

As assignment of the WITH_GRANT (executable) privilege to PUBLIC can allow the granting of a restricted privilege to an unauthorized user, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, TABLE_NAME, PRIVILEGE, GRANTABLE FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS WHERE
GRANTABLE='YES' AND GRANTEE='PUBLIC' AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE' order by 1,2;
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE SELECT from <grantee>;
```

6.26 Rejected - Limiting users by restricting the CREATE privilege (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle database `CREATE` privilege allows the designated grantee to create tables, objects, and views.

Rationale:

As assignment of the CREATE privilege can allow the creation of numerous database objects and potentially lead to a Denial-of-Service condition, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT * FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS WHERE PRIVILEGE LIKE'CREATE%' AND GRANTEE NOT IN
('APPQOSSYS','AQ_ADMINISTRATOR_ROLE',
'CACHEADM','CONNECT','CTXSYS','DATAPUMP_EXP_FULL_DATABASE','DATAPUMP_IMP_FULL_DATABASE
','DBA','DBSNMP','EXFSYS','EXP_FULL_DATABASE','FLOWS_FILES','IMP_FULL_DATABASE','MGMT_
USER','MDSYS','OBE','OLAPSYS','OEM_ADVISOR','OEM_MONITOR','OLAP_DBA','OLAP_USER',
'OWBSYS','OWB$CLIENT','OWBSYS_AUDIT','OUTLN','RECOVERY_CATALOG_OWNER','RESOURCE','SCHE
DULER_ADMIN','SH','SPATIAL_CSW_ADMIN_USR','SPATIAL_WFS_ADMIN_USR','SYS','SYSMAN','SYST
EM','WMSYS','XDB','XDBEXT') ORDER BY 1;
```

Remediation:

```
REVOKE CREATE from <grantee>;
```

6.27 Rejected - Limiting users by restricting privileges on PUBLIC (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle database `PUBLIC` user privileges are granted to all users that connect successfully to the database instance.

Rationale:

As assignment of any privileges to `PUBLIC` can provide the ingress point for unauthorized attempts to manipulate the system, these capabilities should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, GRANTED_ROLE FROM DBA_ROLE_PRIVS where GRANTEE='PUBLIC';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE <granted_role> from <PUBLIC>;
```

6.28 Rejected - Limiting users by restricting the RESOURCE role (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle database RESOURCE role provides the user the `CREATE CLUSTER, CREATE INDEXTYPE, CREATE OPERATOR, CREATE PROCEDURE, CREATE SEQUENCE, CREATE TABLE, CREATE TRIGGER, CREATE TYPE` capabilities and is for compatibility with previous releases of Oracle Database.

Rationale:

As assignment of the `RESOURCE` role to a user can provide a great number of unnecessary privileges to ordinary users, application of this role should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SELECT * FROM DBA_ROLE_PRIVS where GRANTED_ROLE='RESOURCE';
```

Remediation:

```
REVOKE RESOURCE from <grantee>;
```

6.29 Rejected - Limit public access to views beginning with ALL_ (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle database `ALL_` prefix allows the designated user to view the totality of the database objects attached to the prefix.

Rationale:

As assignment of the `ALL_` prefix can allow access to view any object and potentially compromise database confidentiality/integrity, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT TABLE_NAME, PRIVILEGE, GRANTEE  FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS WHERE TABLE_NAME LIKE
('ALL_%') AND GRANTEE='PUBLIC';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE ALL ON ALL_<name> from <grantee>;
```

6.30 Rejected - Limit access to standard database roles (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The Oracle database `roles` are used for assigning one or more privileges or roles together administer user privileges on the database.

Rationale:

As the inappropriate assignment of user `roles` can allow unauthorized access to confidential information or violate database integrity, these capabilities should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT * FROM DBA_ROLES WHERE PASSWORD_REQUIRED='NO';
```

Remediation:

```
SQL. SET ROLE <role> IDENTIFIED BY <password>;
```

6.31 Limit direct privileges for proxy user (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

Do not grant privileges directly to proxy users

Rationale:

A proxy user should only have the ability to connect to the database.

Audit:

tbd

Remediation:

revoke privilege from <proxy_user>

6.32 Revoke execute any procedure from user OUTLN (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

Remove unneeded privileges from OUTLN

Rationale:

Migrated OUTLN users have more privileges than required.

Audit:

tbd

Remediation:

revoke EXECUTE ANY PROCEDURE from OUTLN;

6.33 Revoke execute any procedure from user DBSNMP (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.x on any platform

Description:

Remove unneeded privileges from DBSNMP

Rationale:

Migrated DBSNMP users have more privileges than required.

Audit:

tbd

Remediation:

revoke EXECUTE ANY PROCEDURE from DBSNMP;

7 Rejected - General Policies and Procedures

There are number of general policies that cross multiple database environments or platform tiers and would have a significant impact on the instance and system's security profile.

7.1 Prohibit the database accessing a Public network interface card (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

Directly accessible public Network Interface Cards (NIC) allow any Internet-based user to attempt connection access to database services , such as the Listener, through the standard ports, e.g. 1521.

Rationale:

As having the database services directly accessible from the Internets without a firewall filter and private IP addressing can facilitate unauthorized connections, which at *minimum* would lead to Denial-of-Service attacks, IP addressing on the database host should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
# /sbin/ifconfig -a (this will show attached NICs and loopback)

OR

# /sbin/ifconfig (adapter name, e.g 'hme0')

The private ip address result should be within the range of: 10.0.0.0-10.255.255.255,
172.16.0.0-172.31.255.255, or 192.168.0.0-192.168.255.255
```

Remediation:

```
# ifconfig (adapater) 192.168.168.168 netmask 255.255.255.0 up
```

7.2 Permissions for database creation scripts (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

When creating an Oracle database and its configuration elements, the user is given the options to either save the creation script, a `CREATE DATABASE` statement that is a SQL statement to be run as a temple, or run the setup immediately.

Rationale:

As having the database template SQL scripts, for example "prod_db.sql," accessible by unauthorized users can facilitate attacks against the database data dictionary and structure, access to these templates should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
$ ls -al $ORACLE_HOME/rdbms/admin/dbname.sql
```

Remediation:

```
$ chown oracle $ORACLE_HOME/rdbms/admin/dbname.sql
$ chgrp oracle $ORACLE_HOME/rdbms/admin/dbname.sql
$ chmod 644 $ORACLE_HOME/rdbms/admin/dbname.sql
```

7.3 Limit membership in the DBA users group (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

During the creation of an Oracle database and its data dictionary/connections, the most powerful database users are the default machine users SYS and SYSTEM. SYS can connect "as SYSDBA," taking on a role as with the same level of privileges as "root" in Unix" or "administrator" in Windows, making this user/role combination arguably the most powerful on the system. The "human" users who need to function as database administrators can be granted the "DBA" role, which contains by default all database system privileges and must have at least one user; these DBA privileges can also be subdivided and granted to new administrative DBA roles with fewer privileges, as well as having security administrators and network administrators.

Rationale:

As having the database's default DBA role assigned to all database administrators can lead to unintentional (and otherwise) access/damage to the instance, its data dictionary, and the data content, the full DBA role should subdivided among multiple administrators or be otherwise restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SQL> SELECT GRANTEE, GRANTED_ROLE FROM DBA_ROLE_PRIVS WHERE GRANTED_ROLE='DBA' AND
GRANTEE NOT IN ('SYS','SYSTEM');
```

```
GRANTEE                        GRANTED_ROLE
------------------------------ ------------------------------
PHPDEMO                        DBA
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> REVOKE DBA FROM <grantee>;
```

7.4 Remove the username "oracle" from software account ownership (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

During the creation of an Oracle database the username "oracle" is the default name assigned to the ownership of the Oracle software account.

Rationale:

As leaving the database's default account name value as the well-known value "oracle" can facilitate attacks by unauthorized users, this username should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
# cat /etc/passwd | grep oracle
# oracle:x:500:500:oracle:/home/oracle:/bin/bash
```

Remediation:

```
SQL> CREATE USER notorauser IDENTIFIED BY passwd;

OS (This useradd command can be expanded):
# useradd -c oracle sfwe account -d /home/oracle -G oinstall, osdba -s
```

```
/bin/bash  notorauser
```

8 Audit/Logging Policies and Procedures

The ability to audit system logs, to determine the result of user actions that have potentially resulted in the loss or violations of availability, confidentiality, and/or integrity is among the most important of all database security features. Decisions must be made regarding the breadth/depth of the logging activity, as greater detail produces larger log files. Measures must also be taken to protect the log files themselves, for these may be targeted for alteration or destruction to hide unauthorized activity. There are numerous command sequences for AUDIT, some of which are applicable to most database objects, such as CREATE, ALTER, DROP, while others are limited to a few database objects, such as GRANT, TRUNCATE,SET,SYSTEM AUDIT, and SYSTEM GRANT. The commands that apply to larger numbers of objects will be addressed object by object after the primary connection commands are dealt with.

8.1 Audit all CREATE SESSION (logon/logoff) activities (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The logging of all `CREATE SESSION` activities, the logon/logoff equivalent to remote database access , will provide an audit trail of user connection; this is the minimum privilege required to request access to run operations against the database.

Rationale:

As the logging of user connections to the database via logon/logoff activity can provide forensic evidence of the initiation of a pattern of unauthorized activities, this capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='CREATE
SESSION';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT CREATE SESSION;
```

8.2 Audit all CREATE USER object activities/requests (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `USER` object for the Oracle database is a specification of an object which is an account through which either a human or an application can connect to, via a JDBC or log into, via a CLI, and interact with the database instance according to the roles and privileges allotted to account.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation, alteration, or dropping of a USER can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of suspect/unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='CREATE
USER';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT CREATE USER BY ACCESS;
```

8.3 Audit all ALTER USER object activities/requests (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `USER` object for the Oracle database is a specification of an object which is an account through which either a human or an application can connect to, via a JDBC or log into, via a

CLI, and interact with the database instance according to the roles and privileges allotted to account.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation, alteration, or dropping of a USER can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of suspect/unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='ALTER
USER';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT ALTER USER BY ACCESS;
```

8.4 Audit all DROP USER object activities/requests (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `USER` object for the Oracle database is a specification of an object which is an account through which either a human or an application can connect to, via a JDBC or log into, via a CLI, and interact with the database instance according to the roles and privileges allotted to account.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation, alteration, or dropping of a USER can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of suspect/unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='DROP
USER';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT DROP USER BY ACCESS;
```

8.5 Audit all user CREATE ROLE activities/requests (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `ROLE` object allows for the creation of a set of privileges that can be granted to users/ other roles, both for application connection and database administrative purposes.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation, alteration, setting or dropping of a `ROLE` can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of suspect/unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='CREATE
ROLE';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT CREATE ROLE BY ACCESS;
```

8.6 Audit all user ALTER ROLE activities/requests (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `ROLE` object allows for the creation of a set of privileges that can be granted to users/ other roles, both for application connection and database administrative purposes.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation, alteration, setting or dropping of a `ROLE` can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of suspect/unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='ALTER
ROLE';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT ALTER ANY ROLE BY ACCESS;
```

8.7 Audit all user DROP ROLE activities/requests (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The ROLE object allows for the creation of a set of privileges that can be granted to users/ other roles, both for application connection and database administrative purposes.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation, alteration, setting or dropping of a ROLE can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of suspect/unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='DROP
ROLE';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT DROP ANY ROLE BY ACCESS;
```

8.8 Audit all user GRANT ROLE activities/requests (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The ROLE object allows for the creation of a set of privileges that can be granted to users/ other roles, both for application connection and database administrative purposes.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation, alteration, setting or dropping of a ROLE can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of suspect/unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='GRANT ANY
ROLE';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT GRANT ANY ROLE BY ACCESS;
```

8.9 Audit all user CREATE PROFILE activities/requests (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `PROFILE` object allows for the creation of a set of database resource limits that can be assigned to a user, so that that user cannot exceed those resource limitations.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation, alteration, or dropping of a `PROFILE` can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='CREATE
PROFILE';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT CREATE PROFILE BY ACCESS;
```

8.10 Audit all user ALTER PROFILE activities/requests (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `PROFILE` object allows for the creation of a set of database resource limits that can be assigned to a user, so that that user cannot exceed those resource limitations.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation, alteration, or dropping of a `PROFILE` can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='ALTER
PROFILE';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT ALTER PROFILE BY ACCESS;
```

8.11 Audit all user DROP PROFILE activities/requests (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The PROFILE object allows for the creation of a set of database resource limits that can be assigned to a user, so that that user cannot exceed those resource limitations.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation, alteration, or dropping of a PROFILE can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='DROP
PROFILE;
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT DROP PROFILE BY ACCESS;
```

8.12 Audit all user CREATE DATABASE LINK activities/requests (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

All create database links should be audited.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation or dropping of a DATABASE LINK can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select * from dba_stmt_audit_opts where audit_option='DATABASE LINK' or audit_option
like 'CREATE DATABASE LINK'
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT CREATE DATABASE LINK BY ACCESS;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e26088/statements_4007.htm#SQLRF01107

8.13 Audit all user ALTER DATABASE LINK activities/requests (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

All alter database links should be audited.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation or dropping of a `DATABASE LINK` can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select * from dba_stmt_audit_opts where audit_option='DATABASE LINK' or audit_option
like 'ALTER DATABASE LINK'
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT ALTER DATABASE LINK BY ACCESS;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e26088/statements_4007.htm#SQLRF01107

8.14 Audit all user DROP DATABASE LINK activities/requests (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

All drop database links should be audited.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation or dropping of a `DATABASE LINK` can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select * from dba_stmt_audit_opts where audit_option='DATABASE LINK' or audit_option
like 'DROP DATABASE LINK'
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT DROP DATABASE LINK BY ACCESS;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e26088/statements_4007.htm#SQLRF01107

8.15 Audit all user CREATE PUBLIC DATABASE LINK activities/requests (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `PUBLIC DATABASE LINK` object allows for the creation of a public link for an application-based "user" to access the database for connections/session creation .

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation, alteration, or dropping of a `PUBLIC DATABASE LINK` can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select * from dba_stmt_audit_opts where audit_option='PUBLIC DATABASE LINK' or
audit_option like 'CREATE PUBLIC DATABASE LINK'
```

Remediation:

```
audit create public database link;
```

8.16 Audit all user ALTER PUBLIC DATABASE LINK activities/requests (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `PUBLIC DATABASE LINK` object allows for the creation of a public link for an application-based "user" to access the database for connections/session creation .

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation, alteration, or dropping of a PUBLIC DATABASE LINK can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select * from dba_stmt_audit_opts where audit_option='DATABASE LINK' or audit_option
like 'ALTER PUBLIC DATABASE LINK'
```

Remediation:

```
audit alter public database link;
```

8.17 Audit all user DROP PUBLIC DATABASE LINK activities/requests (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The PUBLIC DATABASE LINK object allows for the creation of a public link for an application-based "user" to access the database for connections/session creation .

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation, alteration, or dropping of a PUBLIC DATABASE LINK can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select * from dba_stmt_audit_opts where audit_option='PUBLIC DATABASE LINK' or
audit_option like 'DROP PUBLIC DATABASE LINK';
```

Remediation:

```
audit drop public database link;
```

8.18 Audit all user CREATE PUBLIC SYNONYM activities/requests (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `PUBLIC SYNONYM` object allows for the creation of an alternate description of an object and public synonyms are accessible by all users that have the appropriate privileges to the underlying object.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation or dropping of a `PUBLIC SYNONYM` can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select * from dba_stmt_audit_opts where audit_option='PUBLIC SYNONYM' or audit_option
like 'CREATE PUBLIC SYNONYM';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT CREATE PUBLIC SYNONYM BY ACCESS;
```

8.19 Audit all user DROP PUBLIC SYNONYM activities/requests (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `PUBLIC SYNONYM` object allows for the creation of an alternate description of an object and public synonyms are accessible by all users that have the appropriate privileges to the underlying object.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation or dropping of a `PUBLIC SYNONYM` can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select * from dba_stmt_audit_opts where audit_option='PUBLIC SYNONYM' or audit_option
like 'DROP PUBLIC SYNONYM';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT DROP PUBLIC SYNONYM BY ACCESS;
```

8.20 Audit all user CREATE SYNONYOM activities/requests (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The SYNONYM operation allows for the creation of a an alternative name for a database object such as a Java class schema object, materialized view, operator, package, procedure, sequence, stored function, table, view, user-defined object type, even another synonym; this synonym puts a dependency on its target and is rendered invalid if the target object is changed/dropped.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation or dropping of a SYNONYM can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of suspect/unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select * from dba_stmt_audit_opts where audit_option='SYNONYM' or audit_option like
'CREATE SYNONYM';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT CREATE SYNONYM BY ACCESS;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e26088/statements_4007.htm#SQLRF01107

8.21 Audit all user DROP SYNONYOM activities/requests (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The SYNONYM operation allows for the creation of a an alternative name for a database object such as a Java class schema object, materialized view, operator, package, procedure, sequence, stored function, table, view, user-defined object type, even another synonym; this synonym puts a dependency on its target and is rendered invalid if the target object is changed/dropped.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation or dropping of a SYNONYM can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of suspect/unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select * from dba_stmt_audit_opts where audit_option='SYNONYM' ;
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT SYNONYM BY ACCESS;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e26088/statements_4007.htm#SQLRF01107

8.22 Audit all user CREATE ANY DIRECTORY activities/requests (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The DIRECTORY object allows for the creation of a directory object that specifies an alias for a directory on the server file system, where the external binary file LOBs (BFILEs)/ table data are located.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation or dropping of a DIRECTORY can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select * from dba_stmt_audit_opts where audit_option='DIRECTORY' or audit_option like
'CREATE ANY DIRECTORY';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT CREATE ANY DIRECTORY BY ACCESS;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e26088/statements_4007.htm#SQLRF01107

8.23 Audit all user DROP ANY DIRECTORY activities/requests (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `DIRECTORY` object allows for the creation of a directory object that specifies an alias for a directory on the server file system, where the external binary file LOBs (BFILEs)/ table data are located.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation or dropping of a DIRECTORY can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select * from dba_stmt_audit_opts where audit_option='DIRECTORY' or audit_option like
'DROP ANY DIRECTORY';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT DROP ANY DIRECTORY BY ACCESS;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e26088/statements_4007.htm#SQLRF01107

8.24 Audit all user GRANT ANY DIRECTORY activities/requests (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `DIRECTORY` object allows for the creation of a directory object that specifies an alias for a directory on the server file system, where the external binary file LOBs (BFILEs)/ table data are located.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation or dropping of a DIRECTORY can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select * from dba_stmt_audit_opts where audit_option='GRANT DIRECTORY';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT GRANT DIRECTORY BY ACCESS;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e26088/statements_4007.htm#SQLRF01107

8.25 Audit all user SELECT ANY DICTIONARY activities/requests (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `SELECT ANY DICTIONARY` capability allows the user to view the definitions of all schema objects in the database.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the capability to access the description of all schema objects in the database can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SELECT * FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE AUDIT_OPTION='SELECT ANY DICTIONARY';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT SELECT ANY DICTIONARY BY ACCESS;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e26088/statements_4007.htm#SQLRF01107

8.26 Audit all user GRANT ANY OBJECT PRIVILEGE activities/requests (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `GRANT ANY OBJECT PRIVILEGE` allows for the granting of any OBJECT privilege, which includes directories, flashbacks, mining models, etc.

Rationale:

As the logging of privilege grants that can lead to the creation, alteration, or dropping of tables, users and other critical system components is critical to forensic investigations, this audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select * from DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS where privilege='GRANT ANY OBJECT PRIVILEGE';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT GRANT ANY OBJECT PRIVILEGE BY ACCESS;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e26088/statements_4007.htm#SQLRF01107

8.27 Audit all user GRANT ANY PRIVILEGE activities/requests (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `GRANT ANY PRIVILEGE` allows for the granting of any privilege, including those at the DBA level, so that the entire range of DBA capabilities is open to to the grantee.

Rationale:

As the logging of privilege grants that can lead to the creation, alteration, or dropping of tables, users and other critical system components, this audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select * from DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS where privilege='GRANT ANY PRIVILEGE';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT GRANT ANY PRIVILEGE BY ACCESS;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e26088/statements_4007.htm#SQLRF01107

8.28 Audit all user CREATE PROCEDURE activities/requests (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `AUDIT PROCEDURE` audit command allows for the tracking a number of user activities, including the:

`FUNCTION`, the creation/dropping of a standalone stored function or a "Call specification" that is like a procedure, except functions return values to its original environment and can be in Java or other 3GL languages;

`LIBRARY`, which is the creation/dropping of a schema object associated with an operating-system shared library;

`PACKAGE`, which is the creation/dropping of a locally stored collection of related procedures, functions, and potentially other program objects stored together; and

`PROCEDURE`, which is the creation/dropping of a procedure--this is a subprogram that performs a specified action that is stored in the database.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation, alteration, or dropping of a PROCEDURE and its related activities can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of unauthorized activities, this audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='CREATE
PROCEDURE';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT CREATE PROCEDURE BY ACCESS;
```

8.29 Audit all user CREATE ANY PROCEDURE activities/requests (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `AUDIT CREATE ANY PROCEDURE` command is auditing the creation of procedures in other schema.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation, alteration, or dropping of a PROCEDURE and its related activities can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of unauthorized activities, this audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select * from dba_stmt_audit_opts where audit_option like 'CREATE ANY PROCEDURE'
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT CREATE ANY PROCEDURE BY ACCESS;
```

8.30 Audit all user ALTER ANY PROCEDURE activities/requests (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `AUDIT ALTER ANY PROCEDURE` command is auditing the alteration of procedures in other schema.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation, alteration, or dropping of a PROCEDURE and its related activities can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of unauthorized activities, this audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select * from dba_stmt_audit_opts where audit_option like 'ALTER ANY PROCEDURE';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT ALTER ANY PROCEDURE BY ACCESS;
```

8.31 Audit all user DROP ANY PROCEDURE activities/requests (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `AUDIT DROP ANY PROCEDURE` command is auditing the creation of procedures in other schema.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation, alteration, or dropping of a PROCEDURE and its related activities can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of unauthorized activities, this audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select * from dba_stmt_audit_opts where audit_option like 'DROP ANY PROCEDURE';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT DROP ANY PROCEDURE BY ACCESS;
```

8.32 Audit all user CREATE ANY LIBRARY activities/requests (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `AUDIT CREATE ANY LIBRARY` command is auditing the creation of libraries.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation, alteration, or dropping of a PROCEDURE and its related activities can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of unauthorized activities, this audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
select * from dba_stmt_audit_opts where audit_option='PROCEDURE' or audit_option like
'CREATE ANY LIBRARY' or audit_option like 'CREATE LIBRARY';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT CREATE ANY LIBRARY BY ACCESS;
```

8.33 Audit all user DROP ANY LIBRARY activities/requests (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `AUDIT PROCEDURE` audit command allows for the tracking a number of user activities, including the:

`FUNCTION`, the creation/dropping of a standalone stored function or a "Call specification" that is like a procedure, except functions return values to its original environment and can be in Java or other 3GL languages;

`LIBRARY`, which is the creation/dropping of a schema object associated with an operating-system shared library;

`PACKAGE`, which is the creation/dropping of a locally stored collection of related procedures, functions, and potentially other program objects stored together; and

`PROCEDURE`, which is the creation/dropping of a procedure--this is a subprogram that performs a specified action that is stored in the database.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation, alteration, or dropping of a PROCEDURE and its related activities can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of unauthorized activities, this audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='DROP ANY
LIBRARY';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT DROP ANY LIBRARY BY ACCESS;
```

8.34 Audit all user CREATE ANY TRIGGER activities/requests (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

Auditing CREATE ANY TRIGGER allows to monitor who is creating trigger in other schema.

Rationale:

Trigger in other schema can be used to escalate privileges.

Audit:

```
SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='CREATE
ANY TRIGGER';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT CREATE ANY TRIGGER BY ACCESS;
```

8.35 Audit all user ALTER ANY TRIGGER activities/requests (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

Auditing ALTER ANY TRIGGER allows to monitor who is altering trigger code in other schema.

Rationale:

Trigger in other schema can be used to escalate privileges.

Audit:

```
SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='ALTER ANY
TRIGGER';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT ALTER ANY TRIGGER BY ACCESS;
```

8.36 Audit all user DROP ANY TRIGGER activities/requests (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

Auditing DROP ANY TRIGGER allows to monitor who is dropping trigger in other schema.

Rationale:

Dropping Trigger in other schema can be used to remove restrictions on a schema or an object.

Audit:

```
SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='DROP ANY
TRIGGER';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT DROP ANY TRIGGER BY ACCESS;
```

8.37 Set AUDIT ALL ON SYS.AUD$ activities (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The logging of attempts to alter the audit trail in the `SYS.AUD$` table (open for read/update/delete/view) will provide a record of any activities that may indicate unauthorized attempts to access the audit trail.

Rationale:

As the logging of attempts to alter the `SYS.AUD$` table can provide forensic evidence of the initiation of a pattern of unauthorized activities, this logging capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SELECT * from DBA_OBJ_AUDIT_OPTS where OBJECT_NAME='AUD$';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT ALL on SYS.AUD$ BY ACCESS;
```

8.38 Rejected - Audit all SELECT ANY TRANSACTION activities (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The logging of all `SELECT ANY TRANSACTION` (open for read/ view) shows the contents of the `FLASHBACK_TRANSACTION_QUERY` view, which can view all data in the database, including past data.

Rationale:

As the logging of `SELECT ANY TRANSACTION` command can provide forensic evidence on the initiation of a pattern of unauthorized activities, this logging capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SELECT * FROM DBA_OBJ_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE OBJECT_NAME='< SELECT ANY TRANSACTION >';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT SELECT ANY TRANSACTION;
```

8.39 Rejected - Audit all user CONTEXT activities/requests (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `CONTEXT` object allows for the creation of a set of application-defined attributes that can validate and/or secure a specific application.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation, replacement, or dropping of a `CONTEXT` can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='CREATE
CONTEXT'

SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='DROP
CONTEXT'
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT CONTEXT BY ACCESS WHENEVER NOT SUCCESSFUL;
```

8.40 Rejected - Audit all user DIMENSION activities/requests (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The DIMENSION defines a parent-child relationship between pairs of column sets, where all of the columns of a given column set must come from the same table, but can be the source columns can come from different tables.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation, alteration, or dropping of a DIMENSION can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='CREATE
DIMENSION';

SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='ALTER
DIMENSION';

SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='DROP
DIMENSION';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT DIMENSION BY ACCESS;
```

8.41 Rejected - Audit all user INDEX activities/requests (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The INDEX object allows for the creation of a column (or columns) that reference data in a given data table, to increase the speed of data retrieval.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation, alter, or replacement of an INDEX can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='CREATE
INDEX';

SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='ALTER
INDEX';

SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='DROP
INDEX';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT CREATE ANY INDEX BY ACCESS;

AUDIT ALTER ANY INDEX BY ACCESS;

AUDIT DROP ANY INDEX BY ACCESS;
```

8.42 Rejected - Audit all user MATERIALIZED VIEW activities/requests (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `MATERIALIZED VIEW` object allows for the creation of a "Materialized view," which is a database object that can consist of the results gleaned from a query against data tables, views, or other materialized views.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation, alteration, or dropping of a `MATERIALIZED VIEW` can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of unauthorized activities, this audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='CREATE
MATERIALIZED VIEW';

SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='ALTER
MATERIALIZED VIEW';

SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='DROP
MATERIALIZED VIEW';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT CREATE ANY MATERIALIZED VIEW BY ACCESS;

AUDIT ALTER ANY MATERIALIZED VIEW BY ACCESS;

AUDIT DROP ANY MATERIALIZED VIEW BY ACCESS;
```

8.43 Rejected - Audit all user ROLLBACK SEGMENT activities/requests (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `ROLLBACK SEGMENT` object allows for the creation of an object that the Oracle Database will use to store whatever data is required to undo, changes made by prior transactions.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation, alteration, or dropping of a `ROLLBACK SEGMENT` can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of suspect/unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='CREATE
ROLLBACK SEGMENT';

SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='ALTER
ROLLBACK SEGMENT';

SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='DROP
ROLLBACK SEGMENT';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT CREATE ROLLBACK SEGMENT BY ACCESS;

AUDIT ALTER ROLLBACK SEGMENT BY ACCESS;

AUDIT DROP ROLLBACK SEGMENT BY ACCESS;
```

8.44 Rejected - Audit all user SEQUENCE activities/requests (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `SEQUENCE` operation allows for the creation of a database object that allows multiple users to generate unique integers that can be used to create primary key values automatically.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation or dropping of a `SEQUENCE` can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of suspect/unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='CREATE
SEQUENCE';
```

```
SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='DROP
SEQUENCE';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT SEQUENCE BY ACCESS WHENEVER NOT SUCCESSFUL;
```

8.45 Rejected - Audit all user TABLE activities/requests (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `TABLE` object is the "base" of the relational database and holds user/schema data that is used as the source to create relationships between the data inside. (This data can be stored as alphanumeric or binary.)

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation, truncation, or dropping of a `TABLE` can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of suspect/unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='CREATE
TABLE';

SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='TRUNCATE
TABLE';

SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='DROP ANY
TABLE';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT TABLE BY ACCESS;
```

8.46 Rejected - Audit all user TABLESPACE activities/requests (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `TABLESPACE` object is a *logical* unit that holds indexes and/or tables of user/schema data in a *physical* location on a disk. The tablespace functions as the bridge or connection between the database itself and the physical file system which holds the table(s) or index(es).

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation, truncation, or dropping of a `TABLESPACE` can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of suspect/unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='CREATE
TABLESPACE';

SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='TRUNCATE
TABLESPACE';

SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='DROP
TABLESPACE';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT TABLESPACE BY ACCESS;

AUDIT CREATE TABLESPACE BY ACCESS;

AUDIT DROP TABLESPACE BY ACCESS;
```

8.47 Rejected - Audit all user TYPE activities/requests (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `TYPE` object for the Oracle database is specifications of an object type, which can be a SQLJ object type, a named varying array (varray), a nested table type, object reference types, or even an incomplete object type.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation, alteration, or dropping of a `TYPE` can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of suspect/unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='CREATE
TYPE';

SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='CREATE
TYPE BODY';

SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='ALTER
TYPE';

SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='DROP
TYPE';

SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='DROP TYPE
BODY';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT CREATE ANY TYPE BY ACCESS;

AUDIT ALTER ANY TYPE BY ACCESS;
AUDIT DROP ANY TYPE BY ACCESS;
```

8.48 Rejected - Audit all VIEW object activities/requests (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `VIEW` object for the Oracle database is a logical table that has been created from a compilation of one or more base tables or views, which is equal in sensitivity to the source data, but still contains no original data, only that has come from its input sources.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation, alteration, or dropping of a `VIEW` can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of suspect/unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='CREATE
VIEW';

SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='ALTER
VIEW';

SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='DROP
VIEW';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT CREATE VIEW BY ACCESS;

AUDIT ALTER VIEW BY ACCESS;

AUDIT DROP VIEW BY ACCESS;
```

8.49 Rejected - Audit all unsuccessful table SELECT activities (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The logging of unsuccessful attempts to `SELECT` (open for read/update/delete/view) various tables audit will provide an audit trail of user connection activities that may indicate unauthorized attempts to access the data tables.

Rationale:

As the logging of unsuccessful attempts to initiate a `SELECT` command can provide forensic evidence of the initiation of a pattern of unauthorized activities, this logging capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SELECT * FROM DBA_OBJ_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE OBJECT_NAME='<OBJECT_NAME>';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT SELECT ON TABLE WHENEVER NOT SUCCESSFUL
```

8.50 Rejected - Audit all user CLUSTER activities/requests (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - 11.2 on Oracle Linux 5

Description:

The `CLUSTER` privilege provides for the creation of interconnected computers/servers that appear as if they are one, increasing resource availability for a single instance.

Rationale:

As the logging of user connections to the database for the purpose of the creation, alteration, dropping, or truncation of a `CLUSTER` can provide forensic evidence of the initiation of a pattern of unauthorized activities, this capability should be audited according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

```
SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='CREATE
CLUSTER';

SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='ALTER
CLUSTER';

SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='DROP ANY
```

```
CLUSTER';

SELECT USER_NAME, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE PRIVILEGE='TRUNCATE
CLUSTER';
```

Remediation:

```
AUDIT CLUSTER BY ACCESS;

AUDIT ALTER ANY CLUSTER BY ACCESS;

AUDIT DROP ANY CLUSTER BY ACCESS;
AUDIT TRUNCATE ANY CLUSTER BY ACCESS;
```

Appendix: Change History

Date	Version	Changes for this version
11-15-2012	1.0.0	Initial release.