The Border of Lights Reader

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

Published by Amherst College Press

Paulino, Edward and Megan Jeanette Myers.
The Border of Lights Reader: Bearing Witness to Genocide in the Dominican Republic.
Amherst College Press, 2021.
Project MUSE. doi:10.1353/book.97422.

SECTION I

BEARING WITNESS

ACTIVIST AND ACADEMIC ESSAYS

Haitian-Dominican History and the 1937 Haitian Massacre

Richard Turits and Lauren Derby

> Out of the swamp the cane appears
> to haunt us, and we cut it down . . .
> The general sees the fields of sugar
> cane, lashed by rain and streaming.
> . . . He hears
> the Haitians sing without R's
> as they swing the great machetes:
> *Katalina,* they sing, *Katalina,*
> . . . He will
> order many, this time, to be killed . . .
>
> —RITA DOVE, "PARSLEY," 1983[1]

In the mid-1980s, poet Rita Dove was not alone in representing the Haitian Massacre as of a piece with another horror, that of the exploitation, intolerable living conditions, and denial of rights of Haitian and Haitian-descended cane cutters on Dominican sugar plantations. This is not surprising, given that these phenomena are intertwined parts of a long history of violent and brutal Dominican anti-Haitianism. Yet, through years of research on Haitian-Dominican relations, including oral histories and archival work conducted in the 1980s, we found that this analysis views the massacre through too presentist a lens, one that mistakenly fuses distinct histories of anti-Haitian horror that were the product of dissimilar forces and motivations. In this essay, we summarize findings from our larger work on these questions and discuss related insights from exciting new research by other scholars on Haitian-Dominican relations since the Haitian Revolution.

Contrary to the image offered in Rita Dove's powerful poem "Parsley," some 15,000 victims of the massacre ordered by the Dominican dictator, Rafael Trujillo, were not the country's cane cutters. Nor were they migrant laborers of any sort. There were no plantations in the relatively large northern provinces that bordered Haiti (a region known in the Dominican Republic as "the frontier") where the military killed thousands by machete during the first week of October 1937. Similarly, Dominican troops did not attack sugar

plantation workers several months later during a massive eviction and the murder of hundreds of ethnic Haitians in the southern frontier zones of the Dominican Republic. Most people of Haitian descent in the northern frontier areas of the country were small farmers, and, according to elderly people from the area whom we interviewed, the majority hailed from families that had lived in the region for generations. Those of Haitian descent living in the towns rather than more rural areas were typically money lenders, teachers, shoemakers, and other artisans—not plantation laborers. At the time, there were no restrictions in either law or practice on Haitian immigration to the Dominican Republic other than an annual fee imposed on migrants that was neither insignificant nor prohibitive.[2] Not only, then, were most people of Haitian descent living in the Dominican Republic Dominican citizens because they had been born in the country. In addition, their parents or earlier ancestors had come to the Dominican Republic legally, contrary to later assertions by anti-Haitian Dominican nationalists and recently the Dominican Supreme Court. Many also lived on land whose sovereignty was contested due to the lack of a ratified border treaty until 1936.[3]

Perhaps most contrary to common assumptions was that in the Dominican Republic's northern frontier provinces, where Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian descent made up a large part of the population,[4] Haitian-Dominican integration and cooperation, not differentiation and conflict, prevailed. In the pre-massacre years, not only was the physical boundary between Haiti and the Dominican Republic highly porous—in certain senses a political fiction given that people crossed freely between the two countries on a daily basis—but the distinction between "Haitians" and "Dominicans" in terms of culture, kinship, religion, and language was itself far from clear in the frontier. In researching the region where the 1937 massacre took place, we discovered a highly integrated, bicultural, transnational world, where cultural hybridity went together with a high degree of socioeconomic and demographic equality among Haitians and Dominicans. Most of the region's population, both Haitian and Dominican, lived independently through small-scale farming and by hunting and raising animals on collectively-used lands with ample woods available for all to clear and cultivate (as was the case still in much of the Dominican countryside in 1930).[5] Those of Haitian descent were probably on average more oriented around growing crops for the market and less around hunting and raising stock on the open range than those of solely Dominican descent. But this was not a socially significant difference. How then could this region have become the site of the most horrific form of differentiation imaginable, that of genocide? This question haunted many Haitian refugees who fled the Massacre and with whom we spoke in the 1980s. These refugees often expressed utter perplexity at what could have caused Trujillo to order this genocidal slaughter and destruction of the frontier community they had helped to build in the Dominican Republic. This question came to shape our research and analysis, as we dug simultaneously into the history of the pre-1937 Haitian-Dominican frontier world and into the horrors of the massacre itself.

It was not only the Massacre that made the pre-1937 community of Haitians and Dominicans in the Dominican Republic's frontier provinces so unexpected. It was also the long history of unabashed anti-Haitianism among urban elite Dominicans and Dominican intellectuals (since Dominican independence in the 1840s, at least).[6] Yet we discovered that,

in general, a giant gulf existed between elite urban Dominican worlds and popular rural society and between the national state and the countryside. Until the U.S. Occupation (1916-1924), the Dominican government had little reach into the vast rural interior and its highly dispersed population, and the state exercised particularly little control in the frontier regions bordering with Haiti. These regions had long been in many senses a stateless space, with a border across which people and goods flowed freely—despite continuous government efforts to regulate, tax, and monitor them.[7] This went hand in hand with intellectuals and other elite Dominicans' inability to impose ideas of a Dominican nation that excluded people of Haitian descent. There were status distinctions certainly in the northern frontier provinces of the Dominican Republic, as in all societies. Distinct Dominican and Haitian identities persisted, even among second and third-generation immigrants, and exoticist and negative stereotypes of Haitians circulated in this remote region.[8] Throughout the country, too, in this mostly Afro-descended and "mixed" nation, a prejudicial preoccupation with micro-distinctions of skin tone and other features prevailed, a colorist preoccupation analogous to that in many other twentieth-century Caribbean and Latin American nations. This mode of racism cast its shadow over both Haitians and Dominicans, the latter a population that had been overwhelmingly of African descent since the formation of the early sixteenth-century slave plantation economy in Spanish Santo Domingo.[9] Other forms of racism in the frontier provinces were, it seems, targeted specifically at people of Haitian descent, surely recent migrants above all. Historian Sabine Cadeau's dissertation, for instance, provides an important portrait of prejudicial treatment that Haitian migrants experienced in the frontier at the hands of local Dominican authorities.[10]

Nonetheless, what remains most striking is the high level of community and integration among Haitians and Dominicans in the pre-Massacre Dominican frontier. It seems, too, that this was not simply a product of the constant back-and-forth flow of people across the border and the many families, businesses, and lives that spanned its two sides. This entanglement also emerged out of shared historical experiences. Both Haitians and Dominicans were descendants mostly of enslaved Africans who seized their own freedom against the wishes and power of their owners. The enslaved people in the French colony of Saint Domingue overthrew the entire slave system through revolution in the 1790s, while the majority of those enslaved in the Spanish colony of Santo Domingo managed to escape to at least de facto freedom through individual flight by the late 1600s. And in the nineteenth century, both Haitians and Dominicans successfully battled for independence against colonial rulers long before other nations in the Caribbean. After independence, they were both governed mostly—or entirely in Haiti's case—by presidents of African descent. (In the Dominican Republic, this was the case only in the nineteenth century.) And perhaps, above all, in a region long dominated by plantations, both Haitians and Dominicans succeeded in resisting state and elite efforts to develop large-scale agriculture and to turn the majority of the population into wage laborers. Remarkably, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, most people across the island remained independent farmers and hunters with free access to land.[11]

In fact, it was largely this peasant autonomy that drove the U.S. government to invade and occupy simultaneously the two sides of the island for many years, from 1915 to 1934

in Haiti and from 1916 to 1924 in the Dominican Republic. Through occupation, the U.S. government sought, and insisted on, establishing new central states that were both willing and able to act in ways that suited U.S. strategic and business interests. Past Haitian and Dominican leaders had attempted in vain to respond to the wishes and preoccupations of the U.S. government and U.S.-owned corporations on the island, concerns that Haitian and Dominican leaders shared for the most part. But they had largely been unable to do so. The police and military could not protect sugar plantations from banditry and extortion. Nor, U.S. leaders argued, could they be counted on to stop possible future European—in particular, then, German—military intrusions. During the U.S. occupations, U.S. leaders focused above all on creating powerful new militaries that would ensure "order" and serve U.S. interests. In both countries, these armed forces would support post-occupation dictators who ruled for decades in the twentieth century, Trujillo in the Dominican Republic from 1930-1961, and the Duvaliers in Haiti from 1957 to 1986.[12] It was thanks to the new militaries that the U.S. had built that Trujillo was able to execute the genocidal massacre in 1937.[13]

Since the publication of our work on the frontier world of the Dominican Republic, other scholars have uncovered new histories of collaboration and unity across the island that have prevailed beyond this frontier world. Two important recent works in this vein are Anne Eller's 2016 book *We Dream Together: Dominican Independence, Haiti, and the Fight for Caribbean Freedom* and Andrew Walker's 2018 dissertation "Strains of Unity: Emancipation, Property, and the Post-Revolutionary State in Haitian Santo Domingo, 1822-1844."[14] These works show that collaboration between Haitians and Dominicans characterized even the very moments that anti-Haitian Dominican intellectuals and some Dominicans at-large have claimed as the historic origin of Dominican anti-Haitianism, however incorrectly; that is, the Haitian "invasion" and "domination" of the Spanish-speaking side of the island in the early and mid-nineteenth century.

Elite Dominican intellectuals and others have long explained Dominican anti-Haitian sentiment as the justifiable outcome of the Haitian government ruling the Spanish-speaking side of the island between 1822 and 1844.[15] Of course, this argument was never logical. The Dominican Republic was first colonized by Spain in 1492, then briefly by France in the early 1800s, re-annexed for several years by Spain in the 1860s, militarily occupied and subjected to foreign government by the U.S. between 1916 and 1924, and invaded again by the U.S. in 1965. Yet we do not see similar prejudices against the French, Spanish, and Americans as against Haitians. Put even more simply, 1844 was a long time ago.

Furthermore, Eller and Walker show how Haitian annexation of the Spanish-speaking side of the island was more a unification than an occupation. Dominicans overall variously sought, accepted, and benefited from annexation in 1822. It was, technically, a military takeover at first, but it was embraced for the most part by the former Spanish subjects. Even though Dominican leaders had carried out a military coup and declared independence from Spain only a few weeks prior, there was substantial support for union with Haiti. Particularly in light of the conservative pro-slavery politics among Dominican independence leaders, those held in slavery (some 10 percent of society) perceived in Haitian rule the chance for liberty, and the overwhelming majority of Dominicans, who were of African descent, looked forward to racial equality.[16]

Over time, the Haitian annexation did produce escalating resistance and opposition among ordinary Dominicans, Walker stresses, but this was for economic, not cultural or imagined racial, reasons. Important works by Quisqueya Lora and María Cecilia Ulrickson substantiate these conclusions. Ranchers who composed a large part of the country's better-off population had seen in Haitian annexation prospects for free trade, which was especially attractive due to onerous taxes on cattle exports to Haiti imposed by Spanish colonial authorities in recent years. But for the Dominican majority, the Haitian state's promotion of large-scale agriculture collided with their aspirations and traditional mode of existence based on small farming and collective use of woods and pasture for hunting and stock raising. To most people's chagrin, Haitian authorities sought to impose cash-crop production and wage labor that would have taken away their economic autonomy, much as Spanish colonial leaders had earlier sought and failed to do. On both sides of the island, though the Haitian state pursued its model of export-oriented agriculture with the backing of many elite Dominicans as well as Haitians, Walker explains. And in the east, as in the west, the population overall resisted.[17]

Many Haitians and Dominicans ultimately refused to suffer the economic and political policies of the island's then president, Jean-Pierre Boyer, and, working together, they overthrew his government. In its place, some Dominicans envisaged a Haitian-Dominican confederation with a single and more liberal constitution, reducing the power of the president and the army and boosting that of the legislature.[18] It was when this liberal project failed to come to fruition that those on the Spanish-speaking side of the island moved definitively toward independence. This was achieved in 1844.

Yet not everyone on the Spanish-side of the island, Lora stresses, was on board right away with the transition to independence from Haiti. The Haitian government had freed a significant portion of the population from bondage and terminated the legal racial inequality that had prevailed during Spanish colonial rule. Annexation to Haiti had safeguarded those victories for the Afro-American majority, some of whom appear to have feared a return to the slave system and racial order that had prevailed under Spanish control. In the town of Monte Grande, for instance, local leaders refused to accept the new Dominican government until the president and vice-president negotiated an agreement there with "a group of people fearful of the intentions" of the new regime. Lora recounts that "Monte Grande had been home to an important population of slave origins, many of whom had been liberated in 1822." The day after the confrontation in Monte Grande, the government "issued a decree reiterating 'that slavery is gone forever from the territory of the Dominican Republic.'" Another independence leader, José María Imbert, declared that "everyone, of whatever color they may be, are brothers and free, and the Dominican Republic recognizes no distinctions among men based on color, but rather on their virtues."[19] Leaders of the new republic felt compelled to proclaim their commitment to universal freedom and racial equality, it seems, in order to ensure popular Dominican support for separation from Haiti. Seeming to dramatize elite white acquiescence to political reality, a few years later Buenaventura Báez, the son of a woman who had once been kept in bondage, became president.

After the island was again split politically in two, Haiti took both military and diplomatic actions to regain what was now the Dominican Republic. Haitian leaders were

driven, in part, by legitimate fears that an overseas power, now especially the United States, might gain control over the Dominican Republic and threaten or compromise Haitian sovereignty from there.[20] In 1851, Haiti reportedly proposed to Dominican leaders, through the British consulate, a type of Haitian-Dominican confederation under the Haitian flag. "But in this moment," Lora writes, a union ruled by Haiti "was unacceptable to the dominant sectors of the Dominican Republic."[21] In 1855, Haiti made its last attempt to annex the Dominican Republic with a botched and quickly repelled invasion of the country.[22] It was during this era that some state and church leaders, including President Báez, broadcast resentful and disparaging rhetoric against Haiti, surely in part to galvanize the Dominican population to oppose and, if necessary, fight militarily against Haitian re-annexation.[23]

In 1861, Haitian fears of an imperial power establishing itself on the island again became a reality when Spain recolonized the Dominican Republic. But while it had taken more than twenty years for Dominicans to rebel against Haitian rule, popular armed resistance was almost immediate against Spain. Contrary to the implications of the work of anti-Haitian Dominican intellectuals during the mid-twentieth century, Eller shows, race played a major role not in the fight for Dominican separation from Haiti in 1844 but rather in the revolution against Spanish annexation in 1863. One of Eller's most original contributions is her discovery of widely circulating rumors of Spanish plans to make slavery legal again in Santo Domingo and even to enslave some free Dominicans during the 1863 war against Spain. These rumors, she argues, were probably the most powerful rallying cry of this independence war, even while some of its leaders conceded that the threat of enslavement was not a literal one. That this rumor was so galvanizing speaks volumes to the ways this was a popular revolution made by and for people of African descent—indeed by a population composed largely of descendants of people who had escaped from slavery. It is also noteworthy that the Spanish ruling Santo Domingo were popularly referred to as "the whites," as U.S. occupiers would be fifty years later.[24]

An important element in the Dominican victory over Spain was that Haitians provided Dominican rebels with a haven across the border where they could gather arms and organize their forces. Eller highlights how such collaboration translated also into an impressive discourse of fraternity among Dominicans and Haitians in these years. Leading Dominican and Haitian figures spoke of Haitians and Dominicans as "two peoples composed of the same race," in the words of one Dominican writer at the time. Members of the provisional Dominican rebel government, Eller recounts, even "proposed an outright federation" between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The post-revolutionary Dominican government, though, tragically shifted course. Dominican leaders abandoned a politics of solidarity with Haiti, and old elite groups engaged only more strongly in racist critiques of both Haitians and the rural Dominican masses.[25]

It turns out, then, that Haitian-Dominican integration in the northern Dominican frontier provinces prior to the Massacre was not so exceptional in the long history of Haitian-Dominican relations. Collaboration more than conflict was the norm, it seems, until 1937. Dominican anti-Haitianism at the popular level developed as a major phenomenon only subsequently and in the context of the rapidly expanding dependence on Hai-

tian migrants to cut Dominican cane. Sugar plantations had taken over a large portion of the region immediately to the east of Santo Domingo (the provinces of San Pedro and La Romana) and a far smaller area in the southwest (Barahona) during the 1880-1930 period, but it was only during the U.S. occupations of Haiti and the Dominican Republic that migrant laborers from Haiti rather than the British and French Caribbean became the backbone of the sugar economy.

In this light, the origins of contemporary Dominican anti-Haitianism seem in many ways part of a global phenomenon. Since the late nineteenth century, agricultural firms have recruited immigrants to generate profits, and particularly to exploit them for difficult, low-paying jobs, while subjecting them to mistreatment and increasingly denying them rights.[26] In a vicious cycle, popular prejudices against migrants then flow from the resulting degradation and marginalization. Because migrants are employed on exploitative terms from which national workers may be somewhat protected, migrant laborers become prejudicially associated with those inferior conditions—a version of blaming the victim.[27] The extremity of popular Dominican anti-Haitianism in recent decades has reflected, then, as much as enabled the severity of Dominican abuse of Haitian-descended workers in this period. Both the genocidal violence of the Haitian Massacre and the brutal exploitation of Haitian-descended workers have in many ways led, we have argued in our work, to anti-Haitianism—certainly broadened and intensified it—even more than vice versa. Although the experiences of Haitians and Haitian-Dominicans in the northern Dominican frontier provinces and those of Haitian laborers on sugar plantations are not one and the same, they are linked in this way and often, as a result, tethered to one another in the popular imagination.

In 2013, the Dominican citizenship of a vast population of Haitian descent born in the Dominican Republic was revoked by the Dominican government. The Dominican Supreme Court has upheld this denial on grounds that few outside observers have found legally tenable. It asserted that their families had been admitted to the Dominican Republic only temporarily for seasonal work and that they were therefore legally excluded from birthright citizenship because their ancestors had been "in transit" at the time of their birth.[28] The casting off of great numbers of people of Haitian descent into statelessness and rightlessness continues to echo in contemporary history and not only in the Dominican Republic. Historian Naomi Paik has stressed, for instance, how by establishing what she calls "spatial exceptions" or "internal zones of exclusion," U.S. leaders have not infrequently placed large numbers of people altogether beyond rights, from the 1980s carceral quarantine of Haitian refugees to the United States to the contemporary use of private detention facilities without effective governmental oversight.[29]

The Dominican government's recent—and in truth unconstitutional—exclusion of people of Haitian descent from the Dominican nation and their rights to citizenship is a chilling repetition of aspects of Trujillo's genocidal violence in 1937. The Dominican courts have abrogated Haitian-Dominicans' legal existence, thus facilitating their hyper-exploitation, just as the 1937 Massacre literally abrogated people of Haitian descent lives and with it, deep histories of collaboration as well as conflict between Haitians and Dominicans.

Notes

1. Rita Dove, "Parsley," *Museum* (Pittsburgh: Carnegie Mellon University Press, 1983), reproduced at Poetry Foundation, https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/43355/parsley. For powerful fictional treatments of the Massacre, see also Edwidge Danticat, *The Farming of Bones: A Novel* (New York, NY: Soho Press, 1998); and René Philoctète, *Massacre River* (New York: New Directions, 2005).

2. The Trujillo government did make an increasing effort to enforce the migration tax and the identity card fee, making the latter obligatory for both citizens and migrants. And in 1937, prior to the Massacre, the central government developed a secret plan to target Haitian immigrants in the southwest who had not paid these fees for corvée labor–an obligation also imposed on, but in this case applied less stringently to, all Dominicans in lieu of cash payment for the road tax. But this secret plan was contested by local authorities and abandoned. See Amelia Hintzen's essay on this intriguing history, "'A Veil of Legality': The Contested History of Anti-Haitian Ideology under the Trujillo Dictatorship," *New West Indian Guide* 90 (Spring 2016): pp. 28-54. On the system of corvée labor imposed on Dominicans, see Richard Lee Turits, *Foundations of Despotism: Peasants, the Trujillo Regime, and Modernity in Dominican History* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), esp. pp. 13, 106-107, 300-301 n. 100.

3. Bridget Wooding, "Haitian Immigrants and Their Descendants Born in the Dominican Republic," *Oxford Research Encyclopedias: Latin America History,* William Beezley, ed., Oxford University Press, 2018, https://oxfordre.com/latinamericanhistory.

4. Indeed, ecclesiastical records indicate that the massacre wiped out two-thirds of the parish of Dajabón at first and as much as 90 percent in nearby areas, such as Loma de Cabrera. log book, October 1937, L'École des Frères, Ouanaminthe, Haiti.

5. For a treatment of this world, see Richard Lee Turits, "A World Destroyed, A Nation Imposed: The 1937 Haitian Massacre in the Dominican Republic," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 82, no. 3 (August 2002): pp. 589-635. See also a detailed oral historical account of the socioeconomic practices of this frontier society by a Haitian man living there in 1937, which was given fifty years later: Isil Nicolas, "An Oral History of a Massacre," in *The Haiti Reader: History, Culture, Politics*, ed. Laurent Dubois et al. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2020): pp. 267-75. For the original Kreyòl version of this testimony, see Lauren Derby and Richard Lee Turits "L'histoire orale d'un massacre: entretien avec Isil Nicolas Cour," in Lauren Derby and Richard Lee Turits, *Terreurs de frontière. Le massacre des Haïtiens en République Dominicaine en 1937*, edited and preface by Watson R. Denis (Port-au-Prince: Centre Challenges, 2021). On the rural economy and land tenure in the Dominican Republic at large in the early twentieth century, see Turits, *Foundations*.

6. This anti-Haitianism was variously driven by political convenience and, increasingly perhaps, racism against what elite Dominican figures considered the putative inferiority of popular practices associated with Africa (among both Haitians and Dominicans). See Anne Eller, *We Dream Together: Dominican Independence, Haiti, and the Fight for Caribbean Freedom* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), pp. 10, 31, 235-36; Turits, *Foundations*, p. 150. After the massacre, anti-Haitianism was made into an official discourse by the Trujillo regime through history texts authored by figures within his cabinet charged with justifying this genocidal slaughter to the Dominican public and the world at large, such as Joaquín Balaguer, *La isla al revés: Haití y el destino dominicano* (Santo Domingo: Fundación José Antonio Caro, 1983).

7. In much of the central frontier region, such as Bánica and Elías Piña, we have observed something analogous in recent years, with only sporadic state control over the movement of people and goods across the border beyond the few official checkpoints.

8. See Lauren Derby, "Haitians, Magic, and Money: *Raza* and Society in the Haitian-Dominican Borderlands, 1900–1937," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 36, No. 3 (July 1994): pp. 488-526.

9. As the sugar and later ginger economies declined and ultimately collapsed during the first half of

the seventeenth century, the enslaved escaped in massive numbers, most into the island's vast untamed lands and hills. Their flight to freedom launched a perhaps unique trajectory in the African diaspora: a nation forged primarily by free people of African descent in a colonial society with a comparatively poor white elite, but also with continuing racial slavery—on a smaller scale—and elaborate racist laws and legal racial inequality. Richard Lee Turits, "Par-delà les plantations. Question raciale et identités collectives à Santo Domingo." *Genèses* (Paris) 66 (March 2007), esp. pp. 52-53, 59-62; Juana Gil-Bermejo García, *La española: Anotaciones históricas, 1600-1650* (Sevilla: Escuela de estudios hispano-americanos; 1983), 63-64, 63n23, 66; Michel-Rolph Trouillot, "Culture, Color, and Politics in Haiti." On colorism in the Dominican Republic, see also Ginetta Candelario, *Black Behind the Ears, Dominican Racial Identity from Museums to Beauty Shops* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007); David Howard, *Coloring the Nation: Race and Ethnicity in the Dominican Republic* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), pp. 85-90; H. Hoetink, *Caribbean Race Relations: A Study of Two Variants* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971). On colorism elsewhere in the Caribbean and Latin America, see Colin A. Palmer, "Identity, Race, and Black Power in Independent Jamaica," in *The Modern Caribbean*, ed. Franklin W. Knight and Colin A. Palmer (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1989), pp. 112-114, 124-126; Jack Alexander, "The Culture of Race in Middle-Class Kingston, Jamaica," *American Ethnologist* 4, no. 3 (Aug. 1977); Clara Rodríguez, "Challenging Racial Hegemony: Puerto Ricans in the United States" in *Race*, ed. Steven Gregory and Roger Sanjek (New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1996), pp. 131-145 and 146-174; Edward Telles, "Mixed and Unequal: New Perspectives on Brazilian Ethnoracial Relations," *Pigmentocracies: Ethnicity, Race, and Color in Latin America* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2014), pp. 172-217. For interpretations of race and racism in terms of constructs of *mestizaje* in diverse Latin American spaces, see Norman E. Whitten and Arlene Torres, "Introduction," *Blackness in Latin America: Social Dynamics and Cultural Transformations*, vol. 1, ed. Norman E. Whitten and Arlene Torres (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), pp. 3-33.

10. See Sabine Cadeau, "Natives of the Border: Ethnic Haitians and the Law in the Dominican Republic, 1920-1961" (PhD dissertation, Univ. of Chicago, 2015). Superb new research has been done in recent years on the Haitian Massacre, the frontier provinces, and anti-Haitianism in the Dominican Republic, such as Edward Paulino, *Dividing Hispaniola: The Dominican Republic's Border Campaign Against Haiti, 1930-1961* (Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 2016) and Lorgia García-Peña, *The Borders of Dominicanidad: Race, Nation, and Archives of Contradiction* (Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 2016). See also *Masacre de 1937, 80 años después: Reconstruyendo la memoria*, ed. Matías Bosch Carcuro (Santo Domingo: Fundación Juan Bosch, 2018).

11. Richard Lee Turits, "Slavery and the Pursuit of Freedom in Sixteenth-Century Santo Domingo," *Oxford Research Encyclopedias: Latin American History*, 2019; Domingo Fernández Domingo Fernández Navarrete, "Relación de las ciudades, villas y lugares de la isla de Sancto Domingo y Española," April 30, 1681, in *Clío* (May-June 1934), 91-95; Turits, "Par-delà les plantations"; Laurent Dubois and Richard Lee Turits, *Freedom Roots: Histories from the Caribbean* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 2019), chaps. 2 and 4; Turits, *Foundations*, chaps. 1-3.

12. Dubois and Turits, *Freedom Roots*. See also Peter Hudson, *Bankers and Empire: How Wall Street Colonized the Caribbean* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017).

13. See Turits, "A World Destroyed." On the Trujillo regime, see Turits, *Foundations*, and Lauren Derby, *The Dictator's Seduction: Politics and the Popular Imagination in the Era of Trujillo* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009).

14. Anne Eller, *We Dream Together: Dominican Independence, Haiti, and the Fight for Caribbean Freedom* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016); Andrew J. Walker, "Strains of Unity: Emancipation, Property, and the Post-Revolutionary State in Haitian Santo Domingo, 1822–1844" (PhD diss., Univ. of Michigan, 2018).

15. See, for instance, Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi, *Invasiones haitianas de 1801, 1805 y 1822* (Ciudad Trujillo: Editora del Caribe, 1955) and Manuel de Jesús Troncoso de la Concha, *La ocupación de Santo Domingo por Haití* (Ciudad Trujillo: La Nación, 1942).

16. Walker and Eller's work draws upon and substantiates the portraits of popular backing for Haitian annexation on the Spanish-speaking side of the island offered by the important Haitian intellectual Jean Price-Mars in the 1950s and by Dominican historians Emilio Cordero Michel and Franklyn Franco the following decade. See Jean Price-Mars, *La República de Haití y la República Dominicana: Diversos aspectos de un problema histórico, geográfico y etnológico* (Port-au-Prince: publisher not identified, 1953, 1958; Emilio Cordero Michel, *La revolución haitiana y Santo Domingo* (Santo Domingo: Editora Nacional, 1968); Franklyn Franco, *Los negros, los mulatos y la nación dominicana* (Santo Domingo: Editora Nacional, 1969, 1984). The first full-length treatment of the annexation period was Frank Moya Pons, *La dominación haitiana: 1822-1844*. Santiago, Dominican Republic: Univ. Católica Madre y Maestra, 1978). Those Dominicans who opposed annexation surely made the decision not to resist with arms for two reasons: lack of popular support for resistance and the strength and prestige of the Haitian armed forces that had defeated all the major armies of Europe (British and Spanish as well as French) during the Haitian Revolution.

17. Price-Mars, *La República de Haití*, esp. pp. 141-142; María Cecilia Ulrickson, "'Esclavos que fueron' in Santo Domingo, 1768-1844" (PhD diss., University of Notre Dame, 2018), chapter 5, esp. p. 182; Quisqueya Lora H., *Transición de la esclavitud al trabajo libre en Santo Domingo: El caso de Higüey* (Santo Domingo: Academia Dominicana de la Historia, 2012). On the traditional way of life and aspirations of the Dominican peasantry for free access to land and for a counter-plantation economy and society, see Turits, *Foundations*, chapters 1 & 2.

18. Eller, *We Dream Together*, p. 25.

19. Quisqueya Lora H., "La construcción de Haití en el imaginario dominicano del siglo XIX," in *República Dominicana y Haití: El derecho a vivir*," ed. Juan Bosch et al. (Santo Domingo: Fundación Juan Bosch, 2014), 188-189 [quotations]; Víctor M. Puente Adames, "José María Imbert, líder de la 'Batalla' de Santiago," *El Caribe*, March 26, 2021.

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21. Lora H., "La construcción de Haití," 200.

22. Dubois, *Haití*, 148-49.

23. Lora H., "La construcción de Haití," 174-75, 182-185.

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26. Edward D. Melillo, "The First Green Revolution: Debt Peonage and the Making of the Nitrogen Fertilizer Trade, 1840-1930," *American Historical Review* 117, No. 4 (October 2012): pp. 1028-1060.

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