


NETWORKS OF CONTROL

Censorship and digital repression in the presidential elections

CONEXIÓN SEGURA Y LIBRE



VE SIN FILTRO

About VE sin Filtro

VE sin Filtro is a program dedicated to monitoring and documenting threats to the exercise of human rights in the digital environment in Venezuela, created by the digital human rights organization **Conexión Segura y Libre** (Free and Secure Online).

Since 2014 it has helped identify and circumvent media censorship and has pioneered the joint use of automated network measurements, volunteer-contributed tests, and network traffic analysis to document internet censorship. VE sin Filtro has used open-source investigations to examine restrictions on human rights online to attribute state-sponsored digital attacks in Venezuela.

With technical evidence and data analysis, it exposes and documents the extent of internet blocking and censorship, indiscriminate government surveillance and cyber-attacks against civil society.

Through constant monitoring, VE sin Filtro provides real-time updates on the state of the Internet in Venezuela. This work not only focuses on connectivity and unequal access to the Internet, but also on the monitoring of service interruptions, Internet shutdowns, attacks and blocks, with the purpose of protecting access to information, freedom of expression, privacy, security, education, participation, among other fundamental rights.

Conexión Segura y Libre offers emergency assistance to civil society organizations, journalists and independent media under attack or recently blocked; helping to resolve the incident and mitigating the impact of censorship; and provides support and training to activists, journalists and organizations, and develops recommendations and best practices to counter threats to their rights and safety.

Conexión Segura y Libre created **Noticias Sin Filtro**, a resilient anti-censorship newsreader to facilitate access to local independent news in Venezuela.

The VE sin Filtro program won the FRIDA Prize for a Free and Open Internet, awarded by LACNIC. Its work is considered in the reports of other Human Rights organizations and cited by Time, The Washington Post and El País.

Human rights restrictions documented by Conexión Segura y Libre have been cited by local and international organizations, as well as human rights bodies, to report abuses of power, censorship of content in the public interest, and the lack of policies ensuring equitable access to the Internet in Venezuela.

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Introduction

The whole presidential electoral process in Venezuela took place amid severe restrictions on digital civic space. Since before the electoral campaign, during election day on July 28, and in the days leading to the inauguration, we documented alarming levels of repression and intimidation facilitated by technology. These conditions worsened after the National Electoral Council (CNE) announced results that were not recognized nationally nor internationally.

Guarantees for the exercise of human rights on the internet decreased and there were obstacles to free and secure access to key websites and platforms for information and communication. These circumstances compromised access to information, association, participation and security of those who used digital platforms to express themselves.

Prior to July 28, at least 60 media outlets were blocked online, creating a weakened and restricted media ecosystem, which is particularly serious in an electoral context. This illegal and arbitrary practice, contrary to the principles that should govern the network, also affected political organizations, NGOs, activists and websites aimed at evading the censorship imposed in the country. During the electoral campaign and after the elections, blocks increased, including the imposition of restrictions on social networks and messaging applications.

This context of censorship made digital platforms crucial for participation and information strategies by various actors in the electoral process. Initiatives had already been documented during the opposition primaries (which took place in October 2023) to encourage citizen participation and complement traditional electoral activities, highlighting the impact of the digital environment in Venezuelan politics.

On the other hand, the days following the presidential elections were marked by massive repression throughout the country. The fact that the CNE proclaimed Nicolás Maduro as the winner¹ and that the results were rejected by the Venezuelan opposition, triggered a political crisis with protests violently quelled by the security forces. According to Monitor de

¹ CNN en Español. *The CNE proclaims Nicolás Maduro as the winner of the elections in Venezuela.* (2024, July 29). CNN en Español.
<https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2024/07/29/nicolas-maduro-gana-presidencia-venezuela-resultado-elecciones-orix>

Víctimas, 23 people died during these events,² while the NGO Foro Penal documented at least 2,062 arrests between July 29 and December 31,³ in what was a coordinated action by State forces.

In this context, Venezuelan authorities used social networks and public media to conduct harassment and intimidation campaigns. The post-electoral period was marked by the use of technology to monitor, persecute and expose government opponents.

VE sin Filtro documented and archived 270 cases of these practices, spread over two stages of the political crisis. The first, post-elections, mainly covered the period from July 28 to early November. The second, with the resumption of repression prior to the inauguration of Nicolás Maduro for his third term, took place between December 2024 and January 10, 2025.⁴

Some of the documented repressive practices include the publication of personal data of political opponents or demonstrators through official channels or accounts linked to the government, in order to harass them or obtain information that could facilitate their capture. The government also openly encouraged citizens to inform on neighbors⁵ who they considered to be involved in subversive activities.

Similarly, many of the arrests of demonstrators and political leaders were disseminated by these same media for intimidation and propaganda purposes, highlighting the campaign known as "Operation Tun Tun,"⁶ in which police and military agencies participated. In other cases, it was the citizens themselves who took it upon themselves to record the arrests and other evidence of political repression.

² Runrunes: Who are the victims of the post-electoral repression in Venezuela (2024, August 9). Runrunes.
<https://runrun.es/monitor-de-victimas/562215/quienes-son-las-victimas-de-la-represion-postelectoral-en-venezuela>

³ Foro Penal. (2025, February 24). REPORTE SOBRE LA REPRESIÓN EN VENEZUELA. AÑO 2024
<https://foropenal.com/reporte-sobre-la-represion-en-venezuela-ano-2024/>

⁴ BBC News World (2025, January 10). *Maduro is sworn in for the third time as president of Venezuela and the opposition accuses him of consolidating a "coup d'état". BBC Mundo.*
<https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cdrylkg8l6do>

⁵ CNN Español (2024, August 14). What is VenApp and why are they denouncing that it was used to persecute opponents in Venezuela? | CNN. CNN en Español.
<https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2024/08/14/venapp-aplicacion-venezuela-denuncia-perseguir-opositores-orix>

⁶ Hernández, A. (2024, August 6). *Qué es la "Operación Tun Tun" con la que los cuerpos de seguridad de Venezuela arrestan masivamente a manifestantes y opositores. BBC Mundo.*
<https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cly33kp1q19o>

All this occurred in a context of surveillance of publications made by citizens on social networks, especially those working in State institutions. In the case of public companies such as Venezolana de Televisión (VTV) or Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), this meant the dismissal of employees because of the messages shared on their social networks. Other documented surveillance strategies were using drones and cameras to monitor demonstrations called by the opposition, in addition to intimidating citizens.

The VE sin Filtro program documents human rights violations in the digital environment in Venezuela. During this electoral period, from the start of the campaign to after the inauguration, we conducted a detailed monitoring of the most relevant violations of human rights facilitated by digital technologies, documenting internet censorship, surveillance, cyberattacks, as well as repression and intimidation by security forces on social networks.

Internet blocks and censorship

During the electoral period in Venezuela, which spanned from the start of the campaign on July 4, 2024, through the July 28 elections, and extending to the day of the presidential inauguration on January 10, 2025, the country experienced an unprecedented wave of digital censorship.

We documented a total of 79 new cases of blocked websites or services that started during this period. This figure adds to the preexisting restrictions: at the start of the electoral campaign, 89 websites were already blocked, 52 of which belonged to news outlets.

From July 4, 2024 to January 31, 2025, the new blocks were applied primarily against censorship circumvention tools; public DNS servers; media; websites of civil society and human rights-related organizations; social networks; and, sites with political content critical of the government, particularly those dedicated to disseminating election results based on the vote tally sheets collected by the Venezuelan opposition.

Category	New Cases	Domains	Total Events	Deactivated Events
Anonymity and anti-censorship	29	30	221	12
Hosting and blogging	17	32	98	98
News	13	13	79	8
Human Rights	5	5	30	1
Social networks	4	12	289	220
Political criticism	4	5	34	3
Communication tools	3	4	27	19
Miscellaneous	2	2	2	2
Culture	1	2	4	4
Economy	1	1	6	0
TOTAL	79	106	790	367

Table 1: Documented blocks and events by category that started between July 4, 2024 and January 31, 2025.

Source: VE sin Filtro.

Of particular concern is the blocking of platforms such as X/Twitter, TikTok, Wikipedia; the encrypted messaging app Signal, the blocking of public DNS servers and new blocks against VPN websites, which are tools used to circumvent internet censorship. There were also large collateral impacts to platforms that were not the intended target of the blocking.

This pattern demonstrated the use of tactics to limit access to information and control public discourse.

Internet censorship in Venezuela is implemented by each Internet Service Provider (ISP) after receiving orders from the National Telecommunications Commission (CONATEL), in an opaque and *ex officio* process that does not follow international human rights standards. For years CONATEL has refused to respond to public requests for information about the blocks.

One pattern we observed is the progressive increase in censorship applied by smaller ISPs that previously did not apply these restrictions on the Internet or did so minimally. Similarly, in the period covered by this report we also observed an increase in the variety of blocking techniques used by each ISP.

Previously only CANTV, Venezuela's main internet provider and a state-owned company, along with Movistar, were the only ones to regularly apply HTTP/HTTPS blocking in addition to DNS blocking. The other ISPs applied DNS blocks, which do not require specialized equipment, but are also the easiest for users to evade.

The use of multiple blocking techniques, sometimes simultaneously, responds to the need to make them more effective and difficult to evade. It is important to consider that many users have configured their devices to use DNS servers other than those provided by the ISP to improve performance or precisely to evade blocking.

In order to differentiate blocking cases where a website or service is blocked by a number of different ISPs and blocking techniques, we individually identified the continued blocking of a provider, domain (example: vesinfiltro.org), IP address, or range of IP addresses. During this report we had to expand the number of ISPs monitored in order to document blocking events in this changing context.

Election-related Internet censorship did not cease during the inauguration. It extended weeks after the inauguration of Nicolás Maduro. During this period, protests were registered in various regions of the country, driven by social discontent and rejection of the results announced by the electoral authorities, which in addition to being unknown by broad sectors within the country, were also questioned internationally. In this context, the blocking of digital platforms and independent media continued to be a control mechanism to limit the dissemination of information, restrict freedom of expression and restrict the ability to organize and protest.

Censorship of the media, civil society organizations and social networks has produced fertile ground for disinformation and influence campaigns documented by other civil society organizations such as Probox and Cazadores de Fake News. These campaigns sought to

manipulate voters prior to the election and then to demotivate and confuse opposition voters about the calls for demonstrations.

Category	Abbreviation	Blocked domains by the start of campaign	Domains blocked at any point during the reporting period	Dominios bloqueados al final del periodo
Social Networking	GRP	1	12	10
Anonymization and circumvention tools	ANON	4	32	32
Communication Tools	HOST	0	32	0
Social Networking	COMT	0	4	1
Miscellaneous content	MISC	0	2	0
Political Criticism	POLR	14	18	18
Human Rights Issues	HUMR	5	11	10
News Media	NEWS	78	94	89
Economics	ECON	1	2	2
E-commerce	COMM	4	4	4
Culture	CULTR	0	2	0
Hate Speech	HATE	1	1	1
Pornography	PORN	8	8	8
Media sharing	MMED	3	3	3
Public Health	PUBH	2	2	2
TOTAL		121	227	180

Table 2: Domains blocked by category before the start of the election campaign (July 3, 2024). Domains blocked at any point during the reporting period (July 4, 2024 to January 31, 2025). Domains Blocked at the end of the reporting period (January 31, 2025)

Domains blocked before, during and after the period July 4, 2024 to January 31, 2025




Chart 1: Domains blocked by category before the start of the election campaign (July 3, 2024). Domains blocked at some point during the evaluated period (July 4, 2024 and January 31, 2025). Domains blocked at the end of the evaluated period (January 31, 2025).

Blocks during the election campaign

The election campaign officially began on July 4, 2024, in a pre-existing context of widespread internet censorship, especially against independent news media. In total we documented 14 new cases of websites blocked between July 4 and July 25, mainly affecting news portals, censorship circumvention tools and human rights organizations. This is evidence of the use of digital censorship in Venezuela as a political tool during the electoral process. A coordinated effort to limit access to essential information during a key moment for Venezuelan democracy.

The first blocks occurred on July 4 and affected fact-checking sites such as *Cazadores de Fake News*, *Es Paja* and the *Observatorio Venezolano de Fake News*. These sites, specialized in disproving false news, were blocked after publishing information related to the electoral context, in many cases associated with candidate Edmundo González and opposition leader María Corina Machado.

Among the fake news they debunked were claims such as "Edmundo González's son-in-law has a criminal investigation for drug trafficking in the United States"⁷ and "Pope Francis replaced Cardinal Baltazar Porras with Raúl Biord Castillo"⁸. The fact-checking work of these sites had been focusing on dismantling disinformation campaigns linked to the electoral process in order to prevent the proliferation of false news that could influence the electorate.

The three sites were blocked by the following Internet providers: Airtek, CANTV, Digitel, Inter, Movistar and Net Uno.

Domain	Category	Start date	End date	CANTV	Airtek	Digitel	Inter	Movistar	Netuno	Supercable
fakenewsvenezuela.org	NEWS	2024-07-04	Active	DNS + HTTPS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No
huntersdefakenews.info	NEWS	2024-07-04	Active	DNS + HTTPS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	No
www.espaja.com	NEWS	2024-07-04	Active	DNS + HTTPS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No

*Blocking event that was active, but ended and is currently inactive.

Table 3: Case of media blackouts initiated on July 4, 2024. Source: VE sin Filtro.

⁷ Paulino, C. M., & Almonte, C. R. (2024, July 3). It is false that Edmundo González's son-in-law has a criminal investigation for drug trafficking in the United States. *Fake News Hunters*. <https://www.cazadoresdefakenews.info/es-falso-que-el-yerno-de-edmundo-gonzalez-tiene-una-investigacion-criminal-por-narcotrafico-en-los-estados-unidos/>

⁸ Gil, V. (2024, July 4). ELECTIONS 2024 | Pope Francis replaced Cardinal Baltazar Porras with Raúl Biord Castillo? It's Straw. <https://espaja.com/verifications/elecciones-2024-papa-francisco-nombro-como-nuevo-cardenal-a-raul-biord-castillo/>

On July 12 and 16, respectively, the human rights organizations Espacio Público (espaciopublico.org) and IPYS (ipysvenezuela.org) also had their websites blocked.

Domain	Category	Start date	End date	CANTV	Airtek	Digitel	Inter	Movistar	Netuno	Supercable
ipysvenezuela.org	HUMR	2024-07-12	Active	DNS + HTTPS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No
espaciopublico.org	HUMR	2024-07-16	Active	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	No	No	No	No	No

*Blocking event that was active, but ended and is currently inactive.

Table 4: Case of blocks of HRD web pages initiated since July 12, 2024. Source: VE sin Filtro.

On July 22, following the publication of a flyer by the organization *Cazadores de Fake News*, several websites mentioned therein were blocked, including *Analítica*, *El Estímulo*, *Media Análisis*, *Tal Cual* and *VE sin Filtro*. That same day, the website *Runrunes* (runrun.es) was blocked by Airtek and Digitel, adding to the blocks it had previously had in CANTV and Net Uno. Then Inter activated a DNS block on July 23 and Movistar implemented DNS and HTTP/HTTPS blocks on July 27.

As a result, the ability of these organizations to report on human rights violations and press freedom in Venezuela was affected.

Domain	Category	Start date	End date	CANTV	Airtek	Digitel	Inter	Movistar	Netuno	Supercable
www.talcualdigital.com	NEWS	2024-07-22	Active	DNS + HTTPS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No
www.medianalisis.org	HUMR	2024-07-22	Active	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No
www.analitica.com	NEWS	2024-07-22	Active	DNS + HTTPS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No
elestimulo.com	NEWS	2024-07-22	Active	DNS + HTTPS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No
vesinfilter.com	HUMR	2024-07-22	Active	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No
runrun.es	NEWS	2024-07-22	Active	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No
www.noticierovenevision.net	NEWS	2024-07-22	Active	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No

*Blocking event that was active, but ended and is currently inactive.

Table 5: Blocks of HH.RR and news media websites initiated from July 22, 2024 to July 25, 2024. Source: VE sin Filtro.

On July 22 we also detected an HTTP/HTTPS block directed at the domain of *Noticiero Venevisión* (www.noticierovenevision.net), one of the largest traditional media in the country, by Airtek. On July 31, CANTV, Digitel, Inter and Net Uno applied additional DNS blocks, while Movistar added both DNS and HTTP/HTTPS blocks.

Another important event was the blocking of Wikipedia domains the day before the election, which affected both the global version (www.wikipedia.org) and the Spanish version (es.wikipedia.org). These HTTPS blocks applied by providers Digitel and Net Uno are indicative of the level of control exercised over the flow of information in Venezuela. Although the restrictions were lifted on July 29, they demonstrate that there is an effort to further restrict access to independent information sources outside of government control.

Domain	Category	Start date	End date	CANTV	Airtek	Digitel	Inter	Movistar	Netuno	Supercable
www.wikipedia.org	CULTR	2024-07-27	2024-07-29	No	No	HTTPS*	No	No	HTTPS*	No
es.wikipedia.org	CULTR	2024-07-27	2024-07-29	No	No	HTTPS*	No	No	HTTPS*	No

*Blocking event that was active, but ended and is currently inactive.

Table 6: Wikipedia blocking case that started on July 27, 2024. Source: VE sin Filtro.

Censorship after the vote

The National Electoral Council (CNE) announced the first bulletin of results shortly before midnight on July 28 and opposition campaign groups, organized in the Comando Con Vzla, rallied in protest almost immediately. The blocks intensified after the announcement of a website dedicated to the publication of the electoral records that had been put together by the technical team of the opposition María Corina Machado and the Comando Con Vzla.⁹

The first site blocked was *Elecciones 2024 Venezuela* (elecciones2024venezuela.com), an election-focused news portal that was discussed in social media as the supposed place where the vote tallies would be published, although in reality it had no such purpose. Despite the confusion, the page was blocked by most of the main internet providers in the country: Airtek, CANTV, Digitel, Inter, Movistar and Net Uno as of 8 p.m. on July 29.

Shortly after, at 10:10 p.m. of the same day 29, the official domain of the opposition campaign with the results based on the tally sheets in their hands was published in X (formerly Twitter): resultadospresidencialesvenezuela2024.com.¹⁰ The site was also blocked by the same providers at 11 p.m. This triggered a quick response from the opposition, which, in order to evade censorship, launched a new domain: ganovzla.com. The domain appeared during the afternoon of July 30 and was intended for the dissemination of results and the vote tally sheets. However, it was also blocked within hours of publication.

Finally, on the night of July 30, a new site was launched: resultadosconvzla.com¹¹. This site focused on the results tabulated on the basis of the tally sheets that Comando Con Vzla had, but it met the same fate and was blocked by the internet providers. The pressure on these sites revealed once again a clear pattern of digital censorship in Venezuela.

⁹ VE sin Filtro (2024, August 1). *The presidential elections took place in a context of restriction of human rights on the Internet*. VE sin Filtro.

<https://vesinfiltro.org/noticias/2024-08-01-elecciones-presidenciales/>

¹⁰ Machado, M. C. [@MariaCorinaYA] (2024, July 29). Venezuelans, through this link you will be able to see how with your vote and your will, you changed the history of Venezuela. [Tweet]. X. Archived at Archive.is <https://archive.is/1vzSh>

¹¹ Machado, M. C. [@MariaCorinaYA] (2024, July 30). Edmundo won, Venezuela won  [Tweet]. X. Archived at Archive.is <https://archive.is/HohAK>

On July 31, the domain ganovzla.com was unblocked by CANTV for unknown reasons. However, all these incidents highlight how censorship, disinformation and internet blocks have played a crucial role in limiting access to key information during sensitive political processes, such as presidential elections.

The websites of *La Prensa Lara*, *The Wall Street Journal* and *Versión Final* were also blocked from July 31 to August 2, 2024.

Domain	Category	Start date	End date	CANTV	Airtek	Digitel	Inter	Movistar	Netuno	Supercable
elecciones2024venezuela.com	NEWS	2024-07-29	Active	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No
resultspresidentialresultsvenezuela2024.com	POLR	2024-07-29	Active	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No
ganovzla.com	POLR	2024-07-30	Active	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	No
resultsconvzla.com	POLR	2024-07-30	Active	DNS + HTTPS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No
www.ventevenezuela.org	POLR	2024-07-31	Active	HTTPS*	DNS	No	DNS	No	No	No
www.laprensalara.com.ve	NEWS	2024-07-31	Active	HTTPS*	HTTP/HTTPS	No	No	No	No	No
www.wsj.com	NEWS	2024-08-01	Active	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	No
versionfinal.com.ve	NEWS	2024-08-02	2024-08-14	HTTPS*	No	No	No	No	No	No

*Blocking event that was active, but ended and is currently inactive.

Table 7: Blocks of news media and political criticism websites initiated between July 29 and August 2, 2024. Source: VE sin Filtro.

On August 8, following an order from Nicolás Maduro ^{12 13}, the social network X (formerly Twitter) was blocked in Venezuela. This further weakened the already limited media space in the country, reducing the spaces in which citizens could search for and share information. Minutes after the announcement, nine domains, essential for the functioning of X, were blocked by Airtek, CANTV, Digitel, Inter, Movistar, Net Uno and Supercable.

On the same day, the secure messaging application Signal was also blocked by the same providers, beginning a new stage of restrictions on digital communications in Venezuela.

Domain	Category	Start date	End date	CANTV	Airtek	Digitel	Inter	Movistar	Netuno	Supercable
twitter.com	GRP	2024-08-08	Active	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS
x.com	GRP	2024-08-08	Active	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS
abs-0.twimg.com	GRP	2024-08-08	Active	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS
video-0.twimg.com	GRP	2024-08-08	Active	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS

¹² VE sin Filtro [@vesinfiltro] (2024, August 9). Follow the @X/Twitter blockade in Venezuela [Tweet]. X. Archived at Archive.is <https://archive.is/LREHS>

¹³ Redacción Mundo (2024, August 8). *Maduro backed down and will not remove WhatsApp in all of Venezuela, why?* Semana. <https://www.semana.com/mundo/articulo/maduro-se-echo-para-atras-y-no-quitará-whatsapp-en-toda-venezuela-por-que/202422/>

upload.twitter.com	GRP	2024-08-08	Active	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS
video.twimg.com	GRP	2024-08-08	Active	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS
abs.twimg.com	GRP	2024-08-08	Active	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS
api.twitter.com	GRP	2024-08-08	Active	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS
pbs.twimg.com	GRP	2024-08-08	Active	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS
signal.org	COMT	2024-08-08	Active	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS
www.reddit.com	GRP	2019-02-25	Active	HTTPS*	No	No	No	DNS	No	No

*Blocking event that was active, but ended and is currently inactive.

Table 8: Case of social networks and communication tools since August 8, 2024. Source: VE sin Filtro.

At around 10:30 p.m. on the same day, the Reddit site was subject to HTTPS blocking by the provider CANTV. The following day, Microsoft services that rely on the domains www.microsoft.com and teams.microsoft.com were also affected by an HTTPS blocking applied by CANTV.

On the same August 9, the Spanish version of the Statista portal (es.statista.com) was blocked by Airtek, CANTV, Digitel, Inter, Movistar and Net Uno. This portal is a source of data and statistics and its blocking makes it difficult to access information of global and regional relevance.

Simultaneously, multiple international media, TV and movie streaming platforms; and two popular e-commerce platforms in Venezuela, Binance (www.binance.com) and MercadoLibre Venezuela (www.mercadolibre.com.ve) were collaterally blocked by CANTV, affecting commercial and financial transactions over the Internet in the country. This blocking lasted until August 11 and was part of a broader measure that was the DNS blocking of AWS CloudFront, a key Content Delivery Network (CDN) service used by these and other platforms. The blocking of CloudFront had a broad impact, as numerous domains that rely on this service were temporarily inaccessible.

Among the large number of affected sites were international media outlets such as *ICIJ* (www.icij.org), *Los Angeles Times* (www.latimes.com), *Caracol Televisión* (www.caracoltv.com), *Christian Science Monitor* (www.csmonitor.com), *Drudge Report* (www.drudgereport.com) and *Daily Sabah* (www.dailysabah.com). In addition, entertainment platforms such as Disney+, Max, Amazon Prime Video and Epic Games also saw their service interrupted, affecting users of the state-owned Internet provider (CANTV) who were seeking access to entertainment and video game content.

The blocking is presumed to be an attempt to censor the platforms for publishing the opposition's voting tallies, due to several contextual factors. The timing of the blocking coincided with the first publications of the pages hosting the electoral records, suggesting a coordinated action to prevent the dissemination of this information. In addition, at least one of the initial platforms of the campaign command of María Corina Machado and Edmundo

González used Cloudfront. Likewise, no other websites of political relevance were identified as using the Cloudfront service at the time of the blocking.

The absence of other potential targets reinforces the idea that the block was a measure aimed at affecting the opposition's platforms for publishing the results and tally sheets. It's possible that the entire Cloudfront was intentionally blocked as a desperate measure to apply a restriction to support the change of domains used by sites with election data, or that those responsible for the blockade were unaware of its impact.

On August 11, 2024, mere hours after VE sin Filtro made public that the reason for the collateral blocking of the platforms was the block against AWS CloudFront, the restriction was lifted. The change suggests that media pressure and exposure of the block played a crucial role in its reversal.

Domain	Category	Start date	End date	CANTV	Airtek	Digitel	Inter	Movistar	Netuno	Supercable
www.microsoft.com	MISC	2024-08-09	2024-08-14	HTTPS*	No	No	No	No	No	No
teams.microsoft.com	COMT	2024-08-09	2024-08-14	HTTPS*	No	No	No	No	No	No
en.statista.com	ECON	2024-08-09	Active	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	No
www.binance.com	COMM	2024-08-09	2024-08-11	DNS	No	No	No	No	No	No
www.mercadolibre.com.ve	COMM	2024-08-09	2024-08-11	DNS	No	No	No	No	No	No
larepublica.pe	NEWS	2024-08-22	Active	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS
vendata.org	HUMR	2024-08-22	Active	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
www.demacedoniaconamor.com	POLR	2025-01-08	Active	DNS + TCP IP	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS
www.canva.com	MISC	2025-01-09	2025-01-10	DNS	No	No	No	No	No	No
telegram.org	COMT	2024-09-02	2025-01-11	DNS* + TCP IP*	TCP IP	DNS	DNS	HTTPS*	DNS	DNS
web.telegram.org	COMT	2025-01-10	2025-01-11	TCP IP	TCP IP	DNS	DNS	HTTPS*	DNS	DNS

*Blocking event that was active, but ended and is currently inactive.

Table 9: Blocking case initiated between August 9 and January 31, 2025. Source: VE sin Filtro.

At the end of August, on the 22nd, events began to block the Peruvian news website *La República* (larepublica.pe) and vendata.org, an open data website created by Transparencia Venezuela and IPYS Venezuela that facilitates access to Venezuelan public information.

On January 8, 2025 the website *De Macedonia Con Amor* was blocked on several internet providers. It is a page that compiles information and testimonies about the post-electoral events in Venezuela, this is a project of the Hacha y Machete collective. Then, on January 9, 2025, CANTV blocked the Canva platform for one day.

Change in CANTV's blocking methodology in August 2024

CANTV, Venezuela's leading provider of fixed residential internet connections—with 48% market share according to the latest official figures¹⁴—lifted all 43 HTTP/HTTPS blocks in August 2024. Affected sites included Reddit, Microsoft Teams, and media outlets such as La Prensa de Lara.

However, censorship persists: DNS-based blocks, which represent the majority, were not lifted. Of the 40 domains previously blocked via HTTPS, 30 remain inaccessible through DNS only. In total, CANTV continues to block more than 152 domains.

This change, which lacks an official explanation, could be the result of technical adjustments or errors in the censorship infrastructure. Although 12 domains were unblocked, widespread censorship remains in place as a strategy to restrict the rights to freedom of expression, access to information, association, among others.

Control of information remains key for the government in an electoral context. The temporary nature of the partial pause suggests that the blocks could be reactivated depending on the political climate.

DOMAIN	Category	CANTV	
		Previous status	Status (August 2024)
api.tunnelbear.com	ANON	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS
psiphon.ca	ANON	DNS + HTTPS	DNS
tunnelbear.com	ANON	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS
www.change.org	HUMR	DNS + HTTPS	DNS
albertonews.com	NEWS	DNS + HTTPS	DNS
diariolaregion.net	NEWS	DNS + HTTPS	DNS
elestimulo.com	NEWS	DNS + HTTPS	DNS
fakenewsvenezuela.org	NEWS	DNS + HTTPS	DNS
Impactovenezuela.com	NEWS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS
ipysvenezuela.org	NEWS	DNS + HTTPS	DNS
lamananadigital.com	NEWS	DNS + HTTPS	DNS
lapatilla.com	NEWS	DNS + HTTPS	DNS
monitoreamos.com	NEWS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS
noticiaaldia.com	NEWS	DNS + HTTPS	DNS
noticiaaldia.com	NEWS	DNS + HTTPS	DNS
dotdecorte.com	NEWS	DNS + HTTPS	DNS
vpitv.com	NEWS	DNS + HTTPS	DNS
www.analitica.com	NEWS	DNS + HTTPS	DNS
www.caraotadigital.net	NEWS	DNS + HTTPS	DNS
www.el-nacional.com	NEWS	DNS + HTTPS	DNS

¹⁴ CONATEL. TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR FIGURES IV QUARTER 2023. CONATEL https://conatel.gob.ve/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Presentacion_cifras_internet_-IV_2023.pdf

DOMAIN	Category	CANTV	
		Previous status	Status (August2024)
www.espaja.com	NEWS	DNS + HTTPS	DNS
www.lagranaldea.com	NEWS	DNS + HTTPS	DNS
www.lapatilla.com	NEWS	DNS + HTTPS	DNS
www.minuto30.com	NEWS	DNS + HTTPS	DNS
www.ntn24.com	NEWS	DNS + HTTPS	DNS
www.talcualdigital.com	NEWS	DNS + HTTPS	DNS
www.vpitv.com	NEWS	DNS + HTTPS	DNS
huntersdefakenews.info	POLR	DNS + HTTPS	DNS
hugocarvajal.com	POLR	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS
presidenciale.com	POLR	HTTPS	DNS
www.maduradas.com	POLR	DNS + HTTPS	DNS
www.jepvenezuela.com	HUMR	DNS + HTTPS	No
eldiario.com	NEWS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	No
evtvmiami.com	NEWS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	No
sumarium.es	NEWS	DNS + HTTPS	No
vivoplay.net	NEWS	HTTPS	No
www.adncaraota.com	NEWS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	No
www.b1lydns02io.com	NEWS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	No
www.aporrea.org	POLR	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	No
www.ventevezuela.org	POLR	HTTPS	No
en.insightcrime.org	POLR	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	No
vamosbien.com	POLR	DNS + HTTPS	No
www.insightcrime.org	POLR	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	No

Table 10: Blocking cases that changed the type of blocking applied by CANTV in August 2024. Source: VE sin Filtro.

Restricted access to the CNE website

After the election, the official website of the National Electoral Council (CNE), www.cne.gob.ve, which would contain the official results of the presidential election, was inaccessible from Venezuela and from abroad. Although normally we see blocking implemented by Internet Service Providers (ISP), in this case, the restrictions were imposed directly by the CNE, thus failing to comply with its responsibility to provide the public with election results and other information of national interest.

Initially, the site was inaccessible on several local internet providers, including Digitel, Net Uno, Airtek, Fibex and IPnet, as well as from international connections, as connection attempts would not reach the site's load balancers. Subsequently, the restrictions were extended to CANTV and other local ISPs.

The IP addresses associated with the CNE website are unreachable. At times, some were only accessible from specific networks. Eventually, authorities removed the DNS records required to resolve the domain's IP addresses, making the site completely inaccessible.




Image 1: Example results of accessibility measurements for IP address 200.11.144.25. Source: RIPE Atlas.



Image 2: Example results of accessibility measurements for IP address 190.9.130.15. Source: RIPE Atlas.




Image 3: Example results of accessibility measurements for IP address 200.44.45.9: RIPE Atlas.

These findings were verified through multiple independent measurements using RIPE Atlas, OONI Probe and ad-hoc measurements which allowed us to confirm the deliberate measures to make the site inaccessible by the CNE itself.

It's important to note that while the CNE website is typically used for publishing results and other official information, it is not involved in receiving transmissions from voting machines or in vote tabulation. Additionally, in the Venezuelan electoral system, voting machines print a vote tally sheet before being connected to the network to transmit votes. Additional copies are printed afterward and must match the first one.

This blocking raises serious doubts about the transparency and accessibility of electoral information in Venezuela, as it denies citizens their right to access essential official data at a critical moment in the electoral process.

Youtube block

On November 21, 2024, opposition leader María Corina Machado announced virtual event on Youtube, called: "Encuentro Internacional De Activistas" (International Meeting of Activists), set to take place on November 23, 2024 at 12:00 p.m., aimed at Venezuelan activists. This featured both María Corina Machado and Edmundo González.¹⁵

On November 23, 2024, the day of the event, Youtube was blocked by the state-owned

¹⁵ La Patilla (2024, November 21)Activists were invited to a virtual meeting with María Corina Machado and Edmundo Gonzalez. <https://www.lapatilla.com/2024/11/21/activistas-fueron-invitados-a-un-encuentro-virtual-con-maria-corina-machado-y-edmundo-gonzalez>

CANTV¹⁶ initially at 10:30 AM, then Inter, Movistar and G-network replicated this restriction at noon. G-Network was the provider that kept the restriction active for the longest time, for approximately 4 hours, coinciding this blocking incident with the "Encuentro Internacional De Activistas".

During this event it was announced that on December 1st, 2024 a "huge" protest would take place in order to express the discontent with respect to the swearing in of Nicolás Maduro in January.

Domain	Category	Start date	End date	CANTV	Airetek	Digitel	G-Network	Inter	Movistar	Netuno	Supercable
www.youtube.com	GRP	2024-11-23	2024-11-23	DNS	No	No	DNS	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS*	No	No

*Blocking event that was active, but ended and is currently inactive.

Table 11: YouTube blocking case initiated on November 23, 2024. Source: VE sin Filtro.



Chart 2: Timeline of YouTube blocking events. Source: VE sin Filtro.

Restrictions on censorship circumvention tools

Internet censorship during the election period in Venezuela not only focused on limiting access to the media, but also affected essential services such as VPNs and public DNS servers, necessary to circumvent these blocks. Before the start of the electoral process, the websites of VPN services Tunnelbear and Psiphon were already blocked. During the election campaign, Proton VPN was blocked, and soon after the election Windscribe was added to this list, both services were blocked after announcing that they would offer their services free of charge to Venezuela in response to the Internet censorship experienced in the country.

From July 4, 2024, to January 31, 2025, we documented 58 new cases of internet blocking targeting censorship circumvention tools: 26 VPN service websites, the Tor Project, and 30 public DNS servers.

¹⁶ VE sin Filtro [@vesinfiltro] (2024, November 23).  Today #23Nov @youtube was blocked for several hours by multiple #internetVE providers: CANTV, Movistar, Inter, and G-network [Tweet]. X. <https://x.com/vesinfiltro/status/1860403685647614320>

VPN blocking

VPNs are used by Venezuelans to circumvent internet censorship. Currently, blocking events are not only applied to sites that generate content, but also to tools that evade this censorship. A fact that evidences the effort to control access to information in the digital environment and ensure the effectiveness of these strategies.

The Tunnelbear and Psiphon websites have been blocked by some Venezuelan ISPs since 2020. Airtek joined the blocks before July 2024. In July 2024, blocks against Proton VPN and Windscribe started, just after they announced that their service would be free for users accessing the Internet from Venezuela.

On January 6, 2025, 26 censorship circumvention tool websites were blocked in Venezuela, and more ISPs began blocking previously restricted VPN sites. VPNs can usually be downloaded to mobile devices from each platform's app store, but desktop downloads are more commonly affected. Some tools experience issues with certain functionalities due to these blocks, while others remain unaffected.

Domain	Category	Start date	Cantv	Airtek	Cantv	Digitel	G-network	Inter	Movistar	Net One	Supercable
strongvpn.com	ANON	2025-01-10	DNS + TCP IP	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS + TCP IP	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
mulvad.net	ANON	2025-01-10	DNS + TCP IP	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS + TCP IP	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
pandavpnpro.com	ANON	2025-01-09	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	No	DNS
www.betternet.co	ANON	2025-01-09	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS*	No
browsec.com	ANON	2025-01-09	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No
hide.me	ANON	2025-01-09	DNS + TCP IP	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS + TCP IP	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
speedify.com	ANON	2025-01-09	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	No
torguard.net	ANON	2025-01-09	DNS + TCP IP	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS + TCP IP	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
ultravpn.com	ANON	2025-01-09	DNS + TCP IP	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS + TCP IP	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
www.cyberghostvpn.com	ANON	2025-01-09	DNS + TCP IP	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS + TCP IP	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
www.hola.org	ANON	2025-01-09	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	No	No
zoogvpn.com	ANON	2025-01-09	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	No	DNS	No
www.itopvpn.com	ANON	2025-01-08	No	HTTP/HTTPS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	No	DNS	No
www.urban-vpn.com	ANON	2025-01-08	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
www.vpnsuper.com	ANON	2025-01-08	No	No	No	No	DNS	No	No	No	No
www.ipvanish.com	ANON	2025-01-07	DNS + TCP IP	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS + TCP IP	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS*	DNS
nordvpn.com	ANON	2025-01-07	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	No	DNS
www.purevpn.com	ANON	2025-01-07	DNS + TCP IP	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS + TCP IP	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS*	DNS

Domain	Category	Start date	Cantv	Airtek	Cantv	Digitel	G-network	Inter	Movistar	Net One	Supercable
brave.com	ANON	2025-01-07	No	HTTP/HTTPS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
bridges.torproject.org	ANON	2025-01-07	No	No	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
surfshark.com	ANON	2025-01-06	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	No	DNS	No
www.expressvpn.com	ANON	2025-01-06	No	HTTP/HTTPS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	No
www.hotspotshield.com	ANON	2025-01-06	TCP IP	HTTP/HTTPS	TCP IP	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS*	No
www.torproject.org	ANON	2025-01-06	TCP IP	HTTP/HTTPS	TCP IP	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
psiphon.ca	ANON	2020-11-13	DNS + TCP IP	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS + TCP IP	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS
vpn-api.proton.me	ANON	2024-08-22	No	No	No	DNS	DNS*	DNS	No	No	No
windscribe.com	ANON	2024-07-31	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
protonvpn.com	ANON	2024-07-20	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	No	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS
tunnelbear.com	ANON	2019-02-18	HTTP/HTTPS + DNS*	HTTP/HTTPS	HTTP/HTTPS + DNS*	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS*	DNS

Table 12: Blocking case of Anonymity and anti-censorship tools initiated in January 2024. Source: VE sin Filtro.

Blocking of public DNS servers

Since January 6, restrictions were applied to DNS servers and as a result, around 30 public DNS were blocked. This measure started being applied mainly by the state-owned CANTV intermittently, starting on January 8 after midnight, for an average of eight hours.

This resulted in CANTV users, who used these servers to evade DNS blocks, to be unable to browse the internet and were in a practical sense left without connectivity. Effective internet access could be restored if users reverted to the default DNS provided by their internet service provider.

Google Public DNS, Cloudflare's 1.1.1.1, and Quad 9 were among those blocked. Currently, Cloudflare's public DNS server 1.1.1.1 is blocked by CANTV and Movistar, while it was blocked by Supercable between January 16 and 21, 2025.

Domain	Category	Start date	End date	CANTV	Airtek	Digitel	Inter	Movistar	Netuno	Supercable
1.0.0.1	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP	No	No	No	No	No	No
1.1.1.1	ANON	2025-01-04	active	TCP IP	No	No	No	TCP IP	No	TCP IP
8.8.4.4	HOST	2025-01-08	2025-01-11	TCP IP	No	No	No	No	No	No
8.8.8.8	HOST	2025-01-08	2025-01-11	TCP IP	No	No	No	No	No	No
149.112.112.112	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP	No	No	No	No	No	No
156.154.70.1	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP	No	No	No	No	No	No
156.154.71.1	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP	No	No	No	No	No	No
199.85.126.10	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP	No	No	No	No	No	No
199.85.126.20	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP	No	No	No	No	No	No
199.85.126.30	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP	No	No	No	No	No	No

Domain	Category	Start date	End date	CANTV	Airtek	Digitel	Inter	Movistar	Netuno	Supercable
199.85.127.10	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP	No	No	No	No	No	No
199.85.127.20	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP	No	No	No	No	No	No
199.85.127.30	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP	No	No	No	No	No	No
205.171.2.65	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP	No	No	No	No	No	No
205.171.3.65	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP	No	No	No	No	No	No
208.67.222.220	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP	No	No	No	No	No	No
208.67.222.222	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP	No	No	No	No	No	No
216.146.35.35	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP	No	No	No	No	No	No
216.146.36.36	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP	No	No	No	No	No	No
4.2.2.1	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP	No	No	No	No	No	No
4.2.2.2	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP	No	No	No	No	No	No
4.2.2.3	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP	No	No	No	No	No	No
45.90.28.230	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP	No	No	No	No	No	No
64.6.64.6	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP	No	No	No	No	No	No
64.6.65.6	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP	No	No	No	No	No	No
77.88.8.8	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP	No	No	No	No	No	No
8.20.247.20	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP	No	No	No	No	No	No
8.26.56.26	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP	No	No	No	No	No	No
84.200.69.80	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP	No	No	No	No	No	No
84.200.70.40	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP	No	No	No	No	No	No
9.9.9.9	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP	No	No	No	No	No	No
94.140.14.14	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP	No	No	No	No	No	No
94.140.15.15	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP	No	No	No	No	No	No

*Blocking event that was active, but ended and is currently inactive.

Table 13: Public DNS server blocking case that started from January 4, 2025. Source: VE sin Filtro.




Chart 3: Timeline of Cloudflare and Google public DNS server blocking events. Source: VE Unfiltered.

Start of 2025 without TikTok

For nearly a month (between January 7 and February 5, 2025), at least nine internet service providers were blocking the social network TikTok in Venezuela.

The first restrictions appeared on January 7 in Supercable¹⁷. Since then and until January 10, Cantv, Net Uno, Digitel, Movistar, G-network, Inter, V-Net and Airtek joined the list.

The type of blocking applied by providers Inter, Supercable and Digitel was DNS, Movistar and V-Net was HTTPS/HTTP. In this case, providers CANTV, Net Uno, G-Network and Airtek implemented the TCP IP blocking strategy. CANTV and Net Uno also applied DNS blocking.

The blocking pattern showed a daily occurrence between 12 midnight and 7 am (UTC-4), with some exceptions. One blocking event by Net Uno lasted nearly 16 days (383.15 hours), one by Supercable lasted over 8 days (199 hours) and three days and a half by CANTV (85.88 hours), based on OONI Probe measurements made by VE sin Filtro.

¹⁷ VE sin Filtro [@vesinfiltro] (2025, January 7).  Blocked TikTok for 6h early this morning at #Venezuela  [Tweet]. X. <https://x.com/vesinfiltro/status/1876631558754283825>

www.tiktok.com	CANTV	AIRTEK	Digitel	G-Network	Inter	Movistar	NetUno	Supercable	V-net
Type of Blocking	DNS + TCP IP	TCP IP	DNS	TCP IP	DNS	HTTPS/HTTP	DNS + TCP IP	DNS	HTTPS/HTTP
Blocking events	48	24	23	21	29	22	12	7	22
MAX duration of an event (h)	85.88	16.52	11.75	17.88	16.62	11.50	383.15	199	65
Total blocking hours	311.85	222.22	205.27	194.97	249.4	191.23	675.93	481.18	278.68
Days affected by blocking events	27	24	24	21	27	23	30	27	25
Average duration of events (h)	12.99	9.26	8.92	9.28	8.60	8.69	112.66	68.74	12.67
Average blocking duration per affected days (h)	11.55	9.26	8.55	9.28	9.24	8.31	22.53	17.82	11.15

Table 14: TikTok blocking case that started in January 2025. Source: VE sin Filtro.

In the case of Net Uno, TikTok was blocked for a total of 675.93 hours across twelve incidents affecting this ISP's customers—the longest cumulative blocking duration among the monitored ISPs. The second provider with the most hours of active blocking against TikTok was Supercable, reaching 481.18 hours across seven incidents, disrupting access for 27 days between January 7 and February 5.

The rest of the providers had a similar behavior of between 21 and 29 blocking events. CANTV had a total of 48 events because it applied two types of blocking simultaneously, with a shorter average duration (from 8.6 to 12.99 hours each event).




Chart 4: Duration of active blocks by ISP of the Tik Tok Case. Source: VE sin Filtro.

Total hours blocked by ISP

Source: VESinFiltro




Chart 5: Total cumulative hours of blocking by ISP of the Tik Tok blocking case. Source: VE sin Filtro.

Number of days affected and events

Source: VESinFiltro




Chart 6: Total days affected and events of the Tik Tok blocking case. Source: VE sin Filtro.

These blocks ended on February 5, when Net Uno, the last provider to do so, lifted the restrictions. Currently, the domain www.tiktok.com is not blocked by any ISP.




Chart 7: Timeline of blocking events for the Tik Tok case between January 7 and January 22, 2025. Source: VE sin Filtro.



Chart 8: Timeline of blocking events for the Tik Tok case between January 22 and February 5, 2025. Source: VE sin Filtro.

Background

On September 28, 2024 TikTok had also been blocked in the main internet providers in Venezuela. On that occasion, both the mobile app and the website were affected, depending on the provider. The blocking lasted seven hours in CANTV, Inter, Net Uno, Digitel, Movistar, Airtek and Thundernet, between 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. (UTC-4).¹⁸

Then, on December 30, the Supreme Court of Justice in its Constitutional Chamber, issued a sentence against TikTok and imposed a fine of US\$10 million to be paid to CONATEL. The app was accused of failing to adequately protect minors from potentially dangerous content. It also ordered TikTok to establish an office in Venezuela.

¹⁸ VE sin Filtro [@vesinfiltro] (2024, September 28).  Block tiktok.com in #Venezuela. [Tweet]. X. Archived at archive.is <https://archive.is/XletC>

The TikTok blocks limited access to information and the ability of citizens to express themselves freely, reducing the ability to participate in public debates and express their opinions.

The documented events occurred in a complex political context in Venezuela, in which the results of the July 2024 presidential elections, the legitimacy of the government to be sworn in again in January 2025, and accusations of restricting freedom of expression and censoring independent media have been questioned.

Traffic and connectivity drops

Access to the Internet, even having to circumvent censorship, is key to being informed, exercising human rights and being able to participate fully in an election. This especially in a context in which there is no independent media or critical opinion spaces on TV; in which the written press was razed to the ground and in which radio is extensively censored with hundreds of radio stations closed in the last few years.

At VE sin Filtro, we monitored connectivity throughout the electoral process, with a particularly detailed focus on July 27 and 29—before, during, and after the vote—as well as around January 10, the day Nicolás Maduro was sworn in for a new presidential term despite the contested official results. During this period, we did not identify any intentional internet cuts or nationwide shutdowns based on IODA (Internet Outage Detection and Analysis), Cloudflare Radar, and Google's traffic transparency reports.

However, Cloudflare Radar observed a drop in the amount of internet traffic in the days leading up to the election, compared to the previous week's traffic. On July 28, election day, traffic increased 35% at 5 a.m. local time (UTC-4), but then dropped to 23% after polling stations opened at 09:00 a.m. (UTC-4). These changes in traffic behavior could be due to the fact that the population was not going about their daily activities, was on the street, or was using offline channels to access information, which generated a decrease in traffic. The following day, traffic decreased by up to 28% compared to the previous week at 06:15 (UTC-4) and 18:45 (UTC-4). By Wednesday, July 31, traffic stabilized, showing less difference compared to the previous week.¹⁹




Image 4: Percentage variation of applications in Venezuela. Source: Cloudflare Radar.

¹⁹ Cloudflare Data Insights Team. (2024, June 6). Venezuela contested presidential election with a protests impact. *2024 Election Insights*. <https://radar.cloudflare.com/reports/elections-2024#id-10-venezuela-contested-presidential-election-with-a-protests-impact/>

In the days following the election, an internet outage was documented²⁰ during the early morning of August 1st that affected two of the main internet providers in Venezuela: CANTV and Movilnet, the mobile operator subsidiary of CANTV. The incident started at 4:40 a.m. (UTC-4) and lasted approximately one hour and 50 minutes. The impact was nationwide, reducing connectivity to 31%. The most affected states were Delta Amacuro with 0% connectivity, Trujillo with 1.5%, Apure with 6.7%, Bolívar with 7.7% and Tachira with 8%.²¹




Chart 9: Regional connectivity levels as of August 1, 2024.
Data source: IODA. Graph: VE sin Filtro. Published in X by @VESinFiltro.


This drop was observed in the data of multiple service providers and as a reduction in advertised IP address space, indicating a decrease in the number of observable IPv4 prefixes by peer networks—a BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) prefix drop visible in IODA.

²⁰ VE sin Filtro [@vesinfilro] (2024, August 1). 🚨 ALERT: for 1h 50min there was a cut in CANTV and Movilnet internet service. Starting at 4:40am and ending 6:20am Venezuela time [Tweet]. X. Archived at archive.is <https://archive.is/3y6GK>

²¹ VE sin Filtro [@vesinfilro] (2024, August 1). The impact on connectivity by state [Tweet]. X. <https://x.com/vesinfilro/status/181901358385583735>

Mobile vs. Desktop for AS8048 (CANTV)

Mobile device vs. desktop traffic distribution (excluding bot traffic)



 Cloudflare Radar

Last 24 hours | Aug 1 2024 14:30 UTC

Chart 10: CANTV Mobile and Desktop Traffic as seen by Cloudflare.
Source: Cloudflare.





Chart 11: Internet traffic to CANTV.
Source: Kentik. Published in X by @DougMadory

#reporteConectividad

2024-08-01

Fuente de los datos: IODA
Hora del gráfico en UTC

 VESINFIRO

@VEsinfiltro
vesinfiltro.com

Chart 12: Connectivity levels of CANTV and Movilnet as of August 1, 2024.

Data source: IODA. Graph: VE sin Filtro. Published in X by @VEsinFiltro

National blackout

On August 30 at 4:40 a.m. (UTC-4) there was a critical drop in internet connectivity (connectivity levels below 50%) nationwide, due to the absence of electricity service in the country. This incident left Venezuelans without internet connectivity for 20 hours and 50 minutes.²²

National connectivity levels dropped to 13.11%, and the most affected states were Delta Amacuro, Trujillo, Guárico, Barinas and Sucre. Internet providers with the lowest connectivity levels were Supercable, CANTV, Airtek and Inter.

²² VE sin Filtro [@vesinfiltro] [2024, August 30].  Strong nationwide blackout leaves #sinLuz a #Venezuela beginning at 4:40am (UTC-4) #30Aug [Tweet]. X.
<https://x.com/vesinfiltro/status/1829458666002526711/photo/1>




Chart 13: Regional connectivity levels on August 30, 2024.

Data source: IODA. Graph: VE sin Filtro. Published in X by @VESinFiltro.




Chart 14: Connectivity levels of the main ISPs on August 30, 2024.

Data source: IODA. Graph: VE sin Filtro. Published in X by @VESinFiltro.

Signal jammers and localized network interference

During the electoral campaign, political actors and participants denounced possible intentional actions aimed at hindering live transmissions of campaign events during the tours of opposition candidate Edmundo González Urrutia and María Corina Machado.

Due to the hyper-local nature of these possible interferences, it has not been possible to fully document them or determine with certainty that they were deliberate. However, these difficulties led the opposition campaign to use Starlink terminals to broadcast their street activities, especially outside of Caracas.

Allegations of interference became more evident after the elections, particularly in the context of the protests. Incidents were reported in which the internet connection appeared to be functioning normally until María Corina Machado attempted to address protesters and the general public via a live webcast using mobile data. It is common that in massive concentrations of people there are difficulties in the use of mobile telephony or internet due to the saturation of telecommunications antennas.

However, in some cases, several witnesses credibly stated that connectivity remained stable until María Corina was about to speak, at which point they experienced interruptions simultaneously. This coincidence makes the suspicion of deliberate interference reasonable, a hypothesis that we will continue to investigate.

_ Surveillance and digital security threats

The “Comanditos” phishing

More than one phishing campaign was launched to deceive supporters of María Corina Machado and Edmundo González Urrutia by distributing a fraudulent form designed to collect personal data and identify political opponents. These phishing campaigns falsely claimed to register individuals as part of "Comanditos," a grassroots organizational structure initiated by the opposition campaign to mobilize voters and safeguard the electoral process.

The form used in the most prominent phishing campaign was promoted through fake social media accounts and requested sensitive personal information beyond what was required in the official form. users to identify them or steal their data. VE sin Filtro, as well as other actors such as Cazadores de Fake News, issued warnings about the authenticity of the links, highlighting the increase of this type of attacks in political events in Venezuela. VE sin Filtro worked to have malicious profiles and links removed to limit the campaign's impact.

The malicious link bit.ly/Comandito - instead of bit.ly/Comanditos - was identified as redirecting to a replica of the original form hosted on Google Forms. The authentic form was intended to register "Comanditos" across the country as part of opposition candidate Edmundo Gonzalez's campaign strategy. However, the fake form forced users to share their email address and included an extra question: "Would you support street activities?" with the options "Yes" or "No". This phishing attempt had a clear purpose of collecting personal information.




Image 5: Tweets from @Comanditos_Vzla posting the malicious URL. Source: X.

In addition to the malicious URL, we also identified a Twitter/X account (@Comanditos_Vzla)²³, Instagram, TikTok, and a Telegram channel (t.me/comanditosconvzla) promoting this malicious URL.

At the same time, *Cazadores de Fake News* discovered a network of at least 45 fake accounts on X posing as opposition users. These accounts, active since September 2023, interacted with each other and with publications of figures such as María Corina Machado, but in reality they were controlled by pro-government actors. The network operated with the aim of disinformation, starting shortly before the opposition primaries and after the controversial resignation of the former rectors of the National Electoral Council.²⁴

Phishing has been repeatedly used at various scales by Venezuelan authorities and allied groups to target dissidents and individuals they perceive as adversaries. The largest and most sophisticated mass phishing attacks against opponents and dissidents are estimated

²³ Comanditos Con Vzla [@Comaditos_Vzla]. X's Profile of Comanditos Con Vzla. X. Archived at Archive.is <https://archive.is/8nhVY>

²⁴ Los Ilusionistas (2024, August 26). *Infiltrate, steal data, stigmatize and attack, the information offensive of the Maduro government against the opposition*. Fake News Hunters. <https://www.cazadores.info/infiltrar-robar-datos-estigmatizar-atacar/>

to have affected tens of thousands of people, as seen in the cases of voluntariosxvenezuela.com²⁵ in 2019 and Héroes de la Salud²⁶ in 2020.

State-sponsored phishing attacks have often been used to identify dissidents and opponents, to torpedo genuine initiatives by preventing citizens from participating, and as a tool for campaigns to generate distrust and intimidation.

Hacking of Primero Justicia party's campaign platform

On June 26, 2024, Diosdado Cabello, current Minister of Internal Relations, Justice and Peace, affirmed in the 482nd broadcast of his program *Con El Mazo Dando* that the web page comanditos.com had suffered a hacking and a leak of its database. Cabello shows on camera during the broadcast of the program a list with personal data of citizens containing names, national ID numbers and e-mails.

Cabello also assured that he had access to this information "through a group (sic), this is running all over the place (...) The confidentiality of your data has been given up by Maria Corina and her combo" in a statement with multiple falsehoods.

²⁵ VE sin Filtro (2019-02-15) Phishing impulsado por el gobierno de Venezuela pone en riesgo a activistas y usuarios de internet.

https://vesinfiltro.org/noticias/Phishing_impulsado_por_gobierno_de_Venezuela/

²⁶ VE sin Filtro (2020-04-26) Informe Preliminar: Phishing del gobierno de Maduro contra plataforma Héroes de la Salud. https://vesinfiltro.org/noticias/2020-04-26-phishing_heroes_salud



Image 6: Broadcast No. 482 of Con El Mazo Dando, June 26, 2024 (Image edited for privacy protection).

It is important to note that the web page comanditos.com was created and managed by the opposition party Primero Justicia as part of the efforts for the registration of volunteers during the presidential campaign. At the same time there was another system managed by the overall opposition campaign and the Vente Venezuela party led by Maria Corina Machado. The efforts of these "Comanditos" registries worked in parallel.


On the same day of the hacking claims by Diosdado Cabello, anonymous X/Twitter user @LaListaMachado claimed to be in possession of what they claim to be a leak. As in other occasions, parallel narratives mix hacking and leaking as the source of the data. A day later, on June 27, the same user shared links²⁷ to two documents with personal details hosted on the text storage platform paste.ec, similar to Pastebin.

The profile name "LaListaMachado" (The Machado List) is a reference to the Tascón list, a controversial database of Venezuelans who signed a petition requesting a recall election against Hugo Chávez. For years, it was used to fire those listed from public administration jobs, deny public services, passports, and subject them to other forms of discrimination²⁸. This reference has been previously used as a form of intimidation in connection with other phishing campaigns, including during the campaign against VoluntariosXVenezuela.

²⁷ Maria Corina 2.0 [@LaListaMachado] (2024, June 28). Here's a small part I managed to upload of those responsible for comanditos that the people of @VenteVenezuela leaked us.

[Tweet]. X. Archived at archive.is (<https://archive.is/aCqF9>)

²⁸ Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos CortIDH_CP-20/18 Español https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/comunicados/cp_20_18.pdf



The paste did not seem to be code, so it was not colorized. [Click here to force coloration](#)

Copy to clipboard View raw

Clone Download New Paste

COMANDITOS 2.0
parte 1 ,2 ,3 de 60

Database: comanditos

Rol	Cedula	Nombre Y Apellido	Correo Electronico	Telefono
Militante re	Commandito,41	Militante re	Militante re	Militante re

Expire the 06/04/2124

Image 7: Screenshot of one of the documents shared by the @LaListaMachado account on June 27, 2024. (Image edited for privacy protection).

These documents were quickly shared through X by other accounts related to the ruling party^{29 30}, affirming that the data leak was real, despite the denial by the opposition campaign, which assured that it had not suffered any hacking³¹. Subsequently, the account @LaListaMachado made public several users with their passwords belonging to an internal platform of the Primero Justicia party, known as SORE³². This system is where the registrations made in comanditos.com were administered, but not the registered comanditos in the main google form shared by the overall opposition campaign.

We cannot say what mechanisms were used to obtain the initial unauthorized access to the SORE system. However, we can confirm that the credentials exposed in social networks did allow successful authentication in the internal platform for Primero Justicia party militants and that they did have access to the information gathered from comanditos.com.

²⁹ Rondon Alejandro [@ArondonFT] (2024, June 28). If anyone wants to see the issue of the comanditos that today the opposition tried to say that it is a lie and is a montage of the Government here is the link, you can check it out 😊😊 [Tweet]. X. Archived at archive.is <https://archive.is/B1hE9>

³⁰ Urbaneja Indira [@INDIURBANEJA] (2024, June 28). @cazamosfakenews a Voluntad Popular account financed with US money, denies the data leak of @ComanditosVzla... how long will irresponsibility last? [Tweet]. X. Archived at archive.is <https://archive.is/OFHA6>

³¹Vente Venezuela (2024, June 28): Our comanditos are safe! FALSE hacking by the regime [Video]. YouTube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NqZPSkaiUpQ>

³² Maria Corina 2.0 [@LaListaMachado] (2024, June 28). They're passing hundreds of accesses also x the @ComanditosVzla groups 😊 [Tweet]. X. Archived at archive.is <https://archive.is/fAS9j>

We independently analyzed the data disclosed by Diosdado Cabello on television, as well as the information disseminated through social networks. When contrasting these leaks with the SORE database we found that the data came from that platform.

This incident not only represents a violation of the privacy of the citizens whose data was leaked, but also highlights broader human and digital rights concerns in the Venezuelan political context. Furthermore, the accusations and manipulation of information by government figures, such as Diosdado Cabello, evidence a pattern of persecution and delegitimization of opposition parties.

Surveillance technologies

In 2021 the Venezuelan government ordered the interception of more than 1.5 million Movistar Venezuela lines, affecting 21% of all user lines in the country. These interventions included the monitoring of calls, text messages, internet traffic or the location of cell phones; evidencing an indiscriminate use of state surveillance.

Similarly, the extensive presence of video surveillance cameras in Venezuelan cities, mainly from the VEN 911 system managed by the national government, mayoral camera systems, as well as other information and assistance systems controlled by the Venezuelan government raise doubts about their use for surveillance, monitoring and tracking protesters or locating dissidents.

Some official figures mention more than 30,000 cameras associated with the VEN 911 system installed by a consortium of Chinese companies including Huawei, CEIEC and ZTE³³, which operates in a non-transparent manner. It is presumed that these video surveillance systems have the capacity to monitor, track and record political activities and demonstrations, which could facilitate the identification and tracking of persons of interest to the security forces.

The exact capabilities of the systems installed in Venezuela are not public. However, we have documented the existence of license plate recognition cameras at the main entrances and exits of Caracas, as well as in other cities, allowing authorities to track the movement of vehicles. In addition, some armored vehicles and mobile command units of the National Police bearing VEN 911 logos incorporate video surveillance systems mounted on extendable poles, suggesting extensive real-time monitoring capabilities.

³³ Transparency Venezuela. VIDEO SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS AND EMERGENCY SERVICES IN VENEZUELA
<https://transparenciave.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Sistemas-de-videovigilancia-y-atenci%C3%B3n-de-emergencias-en-Venezuela-1.pdf>

The Huawei-CEIEC consortium has implemented similar systems in other countries, incorporating facial recognition technologies, surveillance drones and data integration with geolocation of targets. A New York Times report revealed³⁴ that in Ecuador, intelligence officials have direct access to ECU 911 transmissions, despite claims that it is only used for public security purposes.

A prominent case is that of the municipality of Chacao, in Caracas, which in December 2022 announced the implementation of a video surveillance system with facial recognition technology. To date, no details have been published on the scope of this technology, the associated policies and procedures, or which entities have access to the information collected. Likewise, it has not been confirmed whether this system is interconnected with VEN 911, despite public information requests processed by VE sin Filtro.

Although the exact extent of telecommunications interception during the electoral campaign and the post-electoral crisis could not be determined, the persecution of political and civil society actors suggests that these practices continue to be in use. The repression and harassment of opponents and human rights defenders reinforces the presumption of systematic surveillance by the State.

Another phenomenon documented was the use of drones to monitor the citizenry. We have registered at least 20 cases of publications in social networks in which the use of these devices is evidenced, mainly to obtain aerial shots of the rallies called by the opposition in Caracas and other cities. In general, the recordings of these drones have been disseminated by government spokespersons such as Diosdado Cabello or Jorge Arreaza; state media, such as Venezolana de Televisión or Telesur; and pro-government influencers.

We are struck by the ability of these drones to focus sharply from long distances on specific people, which could also serve to identify them. It is likely that showing the faces of those attending the marches is part of their intimidation strategy.

Several of these videos show aerial shots of opposition demonstrations, with emphasis on zooming in on people's faces. This is seen, for example, in a rally held on August 3 in Las Mercedes, Caracas, at the moment when María Corina Machado unveils herself to get on the truck used as a stage, despite arriving covered on a motorcycle precisely to avoid being identified by authorities. The government published similar videos of other marches called

³⁴

<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/24/technology/ecuador-surveillance-cameras-police-government.html>

by the opposition, such as those of August 17³⁵ and 28³⁶ in Caracas and other cities of the country.



Image 8: Publication made by the Vice President of the Government, Delcy Rodríguez, showing an aerial shot of a drone that flew over the opposition rally of August 3 in Las Mercedes, Caracas. The entire interface of the drone used can be seen. Source: X

We collected reports on social media according to which, between July 30 and August 3, 2024, drones flew over different areas of downtown Caracas at night. In these posts, the drones are clearly visible with multiple lights turned on, probably in search of protest hotspots and as an intimidation tactic. One of the drone sightings in the city occurred the night before María Corina Machado's rally in Las Mercedes, Caracas.³⁷

³⁵ Rueda, J. (2024, August 17). *Venezuelans demonstrate in Caracas and the world to claim opposition victory in elections*. Los Angeles Times. <https://www.latimes.com/espanol/internacional/articulo/2024-08-17/venezolanos-se-manifiestan-en-caracas-y-el-mundo-para-reclamar-victoria-de-oposicion-en-elecciones>

³⁶ Infobae (2024, August 28). "Acta mata sentencia": Venezuelans mobilize one month after the electoral fraud perpetrated by Nicolás Maduro. Infobae. <https://www.infobae.com/venezuela/2024/08/28/acta-mata-sentencia-los-venezolanos-se-movilizan-a-un-mes-del-fraude-electoral-perpetrado-por-nicolas-maduro/>

³⁷ Infobae. (2024, August 3). The Maduro regime deployed drones over Caracas to monitor and instill terror in citizens who go out to protest. Infobae. <https://www.infobae.com/venezuela/2024/08/03/el-regimen-de-maduro-desplego-drones-sobre-caracas-para-vigilar-e-infundir-temor-a-los-ciudadanos-que-salgan-a-protestar/>

We were able to capture the visible use of these surveillance technologies in opposition rallies, through publications made by government and leaders of the ruling party itself boasting of having recorded the marches, as well as in photos of the drones that we received from concerned citizens. Among the events recorded is that of August 3, as well as the so-called "Great World Protest" of August 17, where users in social networks also published photos of the person operating the drone in Valencia, Carabobo state. The government also published videos of the August 28 march in the municipality of Chacao.

Images we received directly and publications in social networks allowed us to identify with a high degree of confidence the use of Enterprise series drones from Autel Robotics, for the government and large companies market. By evaluating the materials we consider very likely that the specific model is EVO Max N4 or T4.




Image 9: Zoom of María Corina Machado taken from the video published by Delcy Rodríguez in Image 8. Source: X

This high-performance quadcopter drone is not equivalent to models intended for enthusiasts or videographers. The manufacturer highlights its use for monitoring infrastructure works or for search and rescue work, as well as for security forces. Among its specifications are its powerful 10x zoom in 8k video, advanced night vision, thermal camera, the ability to operate in mesh with other units, its tolerance to electromagnetic interference and its ability to "navigate in GPS-denied environments". The manufacturer's website for the European Union states that public safety³⁸ is one of its main use cases.

³⁸ Autel Robotics(2023, September 23). Autel Robotics EVO MAX 4N [Sales Notice]. Autel. Archived at Archive.org
<https://web.archive.org/web/20230923231843/https://es.autelpilot.eu/products/autel-robotics-evo-max-4n>



Image 10: Still from a promotional video of an EVO Max 4N taken from the manufacturer's website. The text is part of the original video. Source: Autel Robotics.

The Bolivarian National Guard (GNB) has tested and likely operates Dragonfish VTOL UAV, a large fixed wing drone from the same manufacturer, something we identified before these events. This drone features fixed wings but is capable of vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL). The Pro version has a wingspan of over three meters ³⁹and is designed for various use cases, including surveillance and security. It is publicly known that the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) operate other drone models for defense purposes, including some domestically manufactured ones.

³⁹ Autel Robotics (2025, January 22) Autel Robotics Dragonfish Series
<https://web.archive.org/web/20250122234319/https://www.autelpilot.eu/pages/autel-dragonfish-series>




Image 11: Screen capture⁴⁰ from the Autel Robotics EU storefront showing an Autel Dragonfish system, describing it as “Industrial & military grade”, featuring operators in tactical gear. Source: Autel Robotics.

In addition to monitoring protests, these devices could also be used to spy on political dissidents. On January 7, María Corina Machado denounced the overflight of drones over the house of her mother, Corina Parisca, in Caracas.⁴¹ A similar situation was reported on November 23, 2024 at the Embassy of Argentina in Caracas, where five opponents are being held in asylum. One of them, Pedro Urruchurtu, denounced in his X account the use of drones to watch them during a siege by security forces, who, according to Urruchurtu, have cut public services such as electricity and internet, and also blocked the telephone signal in the surroundings.⁴²

Among other reports of the use of recorded surveillance technologies was the installation in early August of audio-activated cameras inside a hospital of the Venezuelan Social Security Institute (IVSS). The report we received directly from a complainant, who requested

⁴⁰ Autel Robotics. Autel Pilot <https://www.autelpilot.eu/>

⁴¹ Machado, M. C. [@MariaCorinaYA] (2025, January 7). ALERT Since a few hours ago, agents of the regime have surrounded my mom's house, have placed roadblocks throughout the urbanization and overflowed with drones. Also the electricity "went out" in the area [Tweet]. X. Archived at Archive.is <https://archive.is/5weYI>

⁴² Urruchurtu N., Pedro [@Urruchurtu] (2024, November 23). URGENT!!! DAET and SEBIN troops besiege the headquarters of the Argentine Embassy in Caracas, protected by Brazil. Now, they fly over drones and also block the mobile signal. Nov. 23, 7:35PM [Tweet]. X. Archived at Archive.is <https://archive.is/EDEYy>

anonymity, clarifies that their purpose, rather than security, is to spy on the conversations of staff and patients.

Similarly, we warned about the infiltration of opposition marches by government agents to record demonstrators for surveillance and propaganda purposes. An example of this was seen on August 28, when Cabello, at that time recently appointed as Minister of Interior, Justice and Peace, showed in his TV program *Con el Mazo Dando* the video of a person closely following leader María Corina Machado upon her arrival at the Lido Center in Caracas, when she was supposed to be incognito.



Image 12: Video shown by Diosdado Cabello in broadcast N°492 of *Con el Mazo Dando*, August 28, showing an infiltrator closely following María Corina Machado in the march of that day.

Category	Registered cases	Archived content	Definition
Registration of surveillance technologies	20	25	Images or direct complaints about the use of devices such as drones or cameras to monitor demonstrations or spy on the activities of their targets. Also records in which it is possible to capture the people who operate them.

Table 15: Number of cases registered in relation to the registration and use of surveillance technologies

Systematization of whistleblowing

The government has promoted among its supporters a denunciation campaign^{43 44} against people suspected of participating in alleged "terrorist activities" in their communities. To this end, Nicolás Maduro announced on July 30 that government application Ven App would enable an option to make this type of report.⁴⁵ Information campaigns were carried out in state media⁴⁶ to explain how to submit them, although they stopped being disseminated after Ven App was removed on July 31 from platforms such as App Store (iOS) and Play Store (Android)⁴⁷ in response to the use that was being made of the application.

⁴³ Caracas (AFP) (2024, August 7). "Let's go get them!": Maduro's campaign to expose "traitors" in Venezuela. *France24*.

<https://www.france24.com/es/minuto-a-minuto/20240807-vamos-por-ellos-la-campa%C3%B1a-de-maduro-para-delatar-traidores-en-venezuela>

⁴⁴ AFP. (2024, August 4). Nicolás Maduro calls to inform on opponents: 'Let's go get them!' *La Nación*. <https://www.nacion.com/el-mundo/politica/nicolas-maduro-llama-a-delatar-opositores-vamos/Y3HN OYGX4VE3NER75H57CKSIL4/story/>

⁴⁵ Maldita (2024, July 31). *VenApp, Venezuela's app to report problems with public services that Maduro wants to use to "denounce and go after those who have attacked the people"*. Maldita.es. <https://maldita.es/malditatecnologia/20240731/venapp-aplicacion-venezuela-maduro-denunciar-ciudadanos/>

⁴⁶ Ganaderos De Colombia [@ganaderosdecolombia] (2024, September 6) Who is the opposition leader? From #venezuela #libertad [Video]. Youtube. Archived at Archive.is <https://archive.is/nvvUY>

⁴⁷ EsPaja (2024, July 31). *Was VenApp removed from Google Play Store and Apple App Store in Venezuela?* EsPaja. <https://espaja.com/verifications/elecciones-2024-venapp-fue-eliminada-de-google-play-store-y-app-store-en-venezuela>




Image 13: Screenshots of the steps to make a report by Ven App. Source: @mov.nacionalcomandantaines (Instagram).

Nonetheless, security forces continued to encourage informing on opponents. On their Instagram accounts, Venezuela's investigative police force (CICPC) and the General Directorate of Military Counterintelligence (DGCIM) published telephone numbers for reporting via Telegram. The latter agency, on August 14, made a post emphasizing: "You can also be DGCIM. Report any irregularities you see in your community or sector." This post received 1,007 likes and was shared 57 times, while an Instagram post by Douglas Rico promoting Operation Tun Tun reached 2,739 likes and was shared nearly 2,000 times.



Image 14: Screenshots of posts urging the population to report dissidents. On the left, a number shared by the official account of the DGCIM; on the right, posted by the director of the CICPC, Douglas Rico. Source: Instagram (Image edited for privacy protection).

In addition to the reports, different users and pro-government groups have set up networks on platforms such as Telegram, X and TikTok to disseminate "Wanted" posters with the faces of people captured in protests. These groups have also shared photos and videos of protesters or local activists, requesting data to identify them or exchanging information about them.

These networks were especially active on Telegram between July 30 and August 6, although we found it difficult to locate them in the following weeks because several went private or were closed by the platform. Such is the case of the group "Caza Guarimbas", which reached more than 21 thousand members, according to an investigation by the journalistic alliance *Los Ilusionistas*⁴⁸. The group even created backup channels with names such as "ContraLasGuarimbas" and "CazaGuarimbasVe", all of which are currently closed.

However, the alliance notes that between July 30 and 31, the "Caza Guarimbas" group forwarded 86 messages to the official channel of the DAET (*Directorate of Strategic and Tactical Actions*) unit of the national police, the successor of the Special Actions Forces accused of extrajudicial executions.⁴⁹ This crossposting shows close cooperation in the exchange of information. Subsequently, the DAET created the group "SeBuscan" or Wanted, which is still operative, although at present the older messages in which they shared

⁴⁸ Los Ilusionistas (2024, October 28). "Tun Tun": The cyber repressive machinery of the Venezuelan government, exposed. *Fake News Hunters*. <https://www.cazadoresdefakenews.info/tun-tun-la-maquinaria-ciber-responsa-del-gobierno-de-venezuela-al-descubierto>

⁴⁹ UN Human Rights Council (25, September 2020) Report of the independent international fact-finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela <https://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/45/33>

photos of potential targets are no longer accessible, and the group is now used for sharing pro-government news. "Post here the faces of terrorists across the country, let's go get them", can still be read in the group's description.




Image 15: Description of the @SeBuscan group, dedicated to sharing information on people for capture. Source: Telegram

Also noteworthy is the case of the broadcasting channel "Denuncia a los guarimberos en tu comunidad" (Report Protesters in Your Community), currently active and which broadcasts both news from pro-government media and photos of people they consider alleged "fascists".



Image 16: Publication of the group "Denuncia a los guarimberos en tu comunidad" doxing protesters in Táchira.
 Source: Telegram (Image edited for privacy protection).

We were also able to document 11 cases of *doxing* (between July and October 2024), that is, actions in which personal or confidential information of individuals or organizations is published on the internet in a malicious manner. This occurred on platforms such as X and Instagram, mainly by anonymous accounts linked to chavismo and with a large number of followers. The main targets of these accounts have been local political leaders and activists, as well as users who posted anti-government videos.

For example, from the X accounts of Mamba Negra (@4F_mamba) and Foro Candanga (@ForoCandangaVzla) we registered at least 10 publications of this type, mostly aimed at revealing sensitive information such as addresses, telephone numbers and social networks of businessmen or public officials pointed out by them of having voted for the opposition or of supporting citizen protests.

They stand out mainly for the reach of users who see these publications. For example, a publication by @4F_mamba made on August 1, 2024 on X, in which he exposes the personal social networks of a protester had more than 66 thousand views, being reposted 747 times. This same account also revealed private information of singer Patricia Infante, whom it accused of being linked to the protests, in a post that had 83.5 thousand views and more

than a thousand reposts. The user @JhonnyNoticias replicated this information, having a reach of 21.7 thousand views.

We also found cases of Instagram accounts dedicated to *doxing* and defamation since before the elections, against political leaders, journalists and human rights defenders. One of them was the account @uncaminoporvenezuela, from which up to 10 publications went out harassing politicians and activists from Portuguesa state. We saw the same situation with the user @ricardocsalmuera, from which 16 publications were documented in which he revealed personal information of members of NGOs in the state of Táchira, in addition to threatening local politicians and their families.



Image 17: Post from the account @uncaminoporvenezuela harassing journalist Mariangel Moro in Portuguesa.
Source: Instagram (Image edited for privacy protection).




Image 18: Doxing and threats by the account @ricardocalsalmuera to the family of political leader Fernando Andrade Roa in Táchira. Source Instagram

Intimidation, persecution on social networks and display of detainees as propaganda

After the announcement of the official results proclaiming Nicolás Maduro as the winner of the elections, the opposition and the international community questioned the legitimacy of the results⁵⁰. This triggered protests in several cities of the country, as well as public rejection in social networks, mainly between July 29 and 30. In response, the government intensified its repression using technology and social networks to carry out campaigns of persecution and intimidation against protesters, political leaders and activists.

One of the most relevant campaigns used by the government and its followers was "Operation Tun Tun". Its name originally emerged in 2017⁵¹, coined by Diosdado Cabello to

⁵⁰ Voice of America (2024, July 29). Venezuelan opposition claims to have proof that it won elections with more than 6.2 million votes. Voice of America.

<https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/oposicion-venezolana-pruebas-elecciones-millones-votos/7717741.html>

⁵¹ Rodríguez, I. (2024, September 2). Operation "Tun-Tun": the delivery of State terrorism. Provea. <https://provea.org/opinion/operacion-tun-tun-el-delivery-del-terrorismo-de-estado/>

refer to the raids and arrests of opponents, "Tun Tun" being the onomatopoeia of knocking on the door, in this case by the security forces. A pattern that has been identified in reports by human rights organizations, such as the Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela of the United Nations Human Rights Council⁵², the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), among others⁵³

During the 2024 post-election protests, Operation Tun Tun was used again, now as an intense propaganda network on social networks in order to scare the population about the consequences of protesting in the streets or expressing themselves online.

We documented and archived posts, images and videos associated with Operation Tun Tun starting July 30. A significant amount of this material came from the TV program *Con el Mazo Dando* hosted by Diosdado Cabello himself, as well as his associated social media accounts, such as Telegram and Instagram, and was later reposted by other users. This campaign was also adopted by official accounts of several security forces, including the Bolivarian National Police (PNB), the General Directorate of Military Counterintelligence (DGCIM) regional and municipal police.

We have documented and archived more than 65 audiovisual pieces related to "Operation Tun Tun", most of them with the same typography and the slogan "No crying". We were thus able to classify two patterns in their content: the first consists of videos of demonstrators in protests and, after a cut, they are shown being captured and forced to confess to the crimes of which they are accused. These videos usually have a mocking tone, with sound effects or animations of bars closing in front of them.

⁵² United Nations Human Rights Council, international mission, international mission independent determination of the facts about the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (2024-10-14) Detailed findings of the independent international fact-finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. A/HRC/57/CRP.5
<https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session5>

⁵³IACHR (2024-12-27) VENEZUELA Serious human rights violations in connection with the elections. Doc. 253/24



Image 19: Typical editing of Operation Tun Tun used by the DGCIM in their videos on captures (Image edited for privacy protection).

The other type of "Operation Tun Tun" videos appeal directly to fear. In these, music from horror movies or other disturbing films is used, accompanied by threatening messages. Many use references to popular characters of this genre, such as Chucky from the *Child's Play* franchise; or Jigsaw, from the *Saw* saga. For example, on August 6, the official Instagram account of the DGCIM published a video of an armed official carrying one of these dolls with the phrase "Behave yourselves".

M/G Elio Estrada Paredes
@ElioEstrada18

La FANB en el estado Aragua, luego de investigaciones de campo y análisis de trazas telefónicas, logró la captura de González Díaz Rubén José, en la Calle Arismendi sector Colinas de San Joaquín de Turmero municipio Santiago Mariño, quien participó en diversas protestas y actos vandálicos contra los bienes nacionales de diferentes Centros Gubernamentales. Procedimiento notificado al Ministerio Público.

#MujeresPorLaPaz

[Translate post](#)



4:38 PM · Aug 2, 2024 · 37.5K Views



Image 20: Typography characteristic of Operation Tun Tun. Both were shared by State officials: GNB commander, Elio Estrada Paredes, on the left; and DGCIM DAE director, Alexander Granko Arteaga, on the right. Sources: X and Instagram

Security corps	Entity attached to the security corps	Number of registered cases	Definition
DGCIM	Special Affairs Division	23	
GNP	Strategic and Tactical Actions Direction	2	Total number of images, videos or publications registered in official accounts assigned to the security forces mentioned in the categories of: cases of intimidation or threat, cases of propaganda of detention, promotion of denunciation, cases of registration of detention, and cases of security deployment.
	Organized Crime Division	8	
	Strategic Intelligence Division	4	
	Anti-Kidnapping and Extortion Division	4	
	Criminal Investigations Division	7	
	Special Tactical Operations Unit	2	
GNB	Anti-Extortion and Kidnapping Command	15	
CICPC	Scientific, Criminal and Criminalistic Investigation Corps	1	

Security corps	Entity attached to the security corps	Number of registered cases	Definition
CPM	Municipal Police Force	4	

Table 16: Cases registered in social media accounts (Instagram, X and TikTok) of security forces between July 2024 and January 2025.

Exhibition of detainees as propaganda

The exhibition on social networks of people detained in the context of the post-election protests became a common practice by different police and military agencies. Among the security forces that replicated these campaigns on X, Instagram and TikTok, the PNB stands out, especially its attached departments such as the Division Against Organized Crime (DCDO), the Directorate of Strategic and Tactical Actions (DAET) or the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DIP). We also observe it in municipal police accounts, such as that of Valencia, Carabobo state.

In the cases studied of publications on detainees in protests, it was observed that several used the same edition and style as Operation Tun Tun, although incorporating elements such as the logos of the Public Prosecutor's Office and the Ministry of Interior, Justice and Peace. In addition, images of the Great Mission Cuadrantes de Paz and the campaign "Together for Life and Peace" were used. In the case of the regional delegations of the DCDO in Carabobo and Cojedes⁵⁴, they did directly publish videos promoting "Operation Tun Tun" on their TikTok accounts.

During the documentation process, we reviewed 55 cases of arrests (occurring between July 2024 and January 2025) carried out by security forces in which they were used in social networks for propaganda purposes. Of that sample, 27 were related to "Operation Tun Tun," either by using all of its characteristic audiovisual elements, or by containing mentions of it in tags or the description of the post.

Several of the videos we analyzed show the moment when the patrol cars arrive at the defendant's house for his arrest, and how he is taken to the police headquarters by several armed and hooded agents. Many include recordings of the detainee in close-up, in which they are not only made to confess their alleged crime (which is usually "incitement to hatred," "vandalism" and/or "terrorism"), but also ask for forgiveness from the government or Nicolás Maduro and incriminate some political leader or party.

⁵⁴ dcdo_cojedes [@DCDO_COJEDES] (2024, August 8) Operation TUN TUN WITHOUT CRYING!!!. Tiktok. Archived at Archive.is <https://archive.ph/Uhnwv>



Image 21: Use of Chucky, from the Child's Play movies, as a symbol of Operation Tun Tun in an official DGCIM publication. Source: Instagram (Image edited for privacy protection).

As of August, with the appeasement of the protests called by the opposition⁵⁵, the amount of intimidating propaganda and arrests in the accounts of security agencies was reduced. However, some officials continued to make mention of "Operation Tun Tun" at certain times. For example, on September 25, 2024, Diosdado Cabello assured in *Con el Mazo Dando* that he had obtained the database of people who donated money to the Ya Casi Venezuela platform directed by the American Erik Prince⁵⁶. He also announced a special operation to locate and arrest them. "An Operation Tun Tun is coming for those who gave money there", said.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Paredes, N. (2024, August 9). "As if there was a curfew": the radical change in Caracas after the elections and protests. BBC Mundo. <https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c4gq57y4gj40>

⁵⁶ El Nacional (2024, September 11). Ya Casi Venezuela: what is the alleged plan that seeks to put an end to Maduro's government about? El Nacional. <https://www.elnacional.com/venezuela/ya-casi-venezuela-de-que-se-trata-el-presunto-plan-que-busca-poner-fin-al-gobierno-de-maduro/>

⁵⁷ Globovisión [@globovision] (2025, September 25). #EnVideo 🔴 | Minister Cabello announced a special operation to locate those involved who have donated money to the "Ya casi Venezuela" campaign which is backed by gringo mercenary Erik Prince and aims to raise money for conspiratorial actions against Venezuela. [Tweet]. X. Archived at Archive.is <https://archive.is/qpB31>

In December, after the announcement of opposition leader Edmundo Gonzalez to return to Venezuela for the presidential inauguration⁵⁸, the intimidating videos related to "Operation Tun Tun" reappeared. This resumption of the campaign continued even after January 10, 2025.

For example, on January 12, the director of the DAE published on his Instagram account a video of the arrest of a woman who days before had rebuked the Argentinean influencer Michelo in a nightclub in Caracas for his closeness to the government⁵⁹. The woman, whose identity was never made public, was arrested in Carúpano (Sucre state) by agents of the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN) and was later forced to apologize in a video with the characteristic editing of "Operation Tun Tun"⁶⁰.



Image 22: Video shared by the DGCIM with the arrest of the woman who publicly rebuked the Argentinean influencer Michelo. Source: Instagram (Image edited for privacy protection).

Regarding the exhibition of political detainees, we also highlight the video of the arrest of Roalmi Cabeza, a motorcyclist of opposition leader María Corina Machado. On January 9, Machado denounced that she was assaulted and temporarily detained by officials who

⁵⁸ Infobae. (2024, October 4). *Edmundo González will return to Venezuela on January 10 and does not rule out an earlier return: "If Maduro brings forward Christmas, I can bring forward my return".* Infobae. <https://www.infobae.com/espana/2024/10/04/edmundo-gonzalez-se-reivindica-como-presidente-electo-y-cita-la-transicion-espanola-como-ejemplo-para-venezuela/>

⁵⁹ Why is it trending? [@estendenciacvz] (2025, January 13). "Michelo" is trending because he was faced by a woman in a night bar in Caracas [Tweet]. X. Archived at Archive.is <https://archive.is/gwfG3>

⁶⁰ Editorial staff NTN24. (2025, January 13). *A young woman is arrested and forced to record a video for confronting the Argentine influencer Michelo 2.0 in Caracas.* NTN24. <https://www.ntn24.com/noticias-actualidad/detienen-y-obligan-a-grabar-video-a-una-joven-por-encarar-al-influencer-argentino-michelo-2-0-en-caracas-532987>

ambushed her when she was leaving a rally in Élice street in Chacao, Caracas⁶¹. During the attack, she claimed that Cabeza was shot in the leg and was later detained by the hooded agents.⁶²

The government initially denied its involvement in the incident; however, on January 13, the Ministry of Interior, Justice and Peace published on its social networks the video of a raid carried out by the PNB in a hotel, where they allegedly found Cabeza in custody and proceeded to arrest him. The video was simultaneously disseminated by the accounts of *Con el Mazo Dando*.

Category	Documented cases	Publications or archived content	Definition
Capture propaganda	55	66	Display of detained persons on social networks for propaganda purposes by police or military agencies.
Intimidation and threats	53	55	Publications intended to intimidate citizens or directly threaten specific individuals.
Cellular phone review	18	21	Phone searches by officials of individuals without their consent in search of compromising messages.
Institutional harassment	4	4	Cases of dismissal of public employees for political reasons after reviewing their activity in social networks.
Other complaints in networks	7	7	Isolated publications that were documented as being of interest, but do not fit exactly with the patterns studied in this report.

Table 17: Number of cases registered in relation to the display of detainees as propaganda, cell phone searches, institutional harassment and other complaints reported in networks.

⁶¹ Editorial staff NTN24 (2025, January 10). "I was abruptly pulled off a motorcycle and mounted on another": María Corina Machado gives details of her arrest by the PNB. NTN24. <https://www.ntn24.com/noticias-actualidad/fui-bruscamente-arrancada-de-una-moto-y-montada-en-otra-maria-corina-machado-da-detalles-de-su-detencion-a-cargo-de-la-pnb-532645>

⁶² Machado, M. C. [@MariaCorinaYA] (2025, January 10). January 10, 2025 We will do whatever it takes to reinstate the Constitution [Tweet]. X. Archived at Archive.is <https://archive.is/QnsDZ>

Phone content checks and intimidation

During the most intense days of the post-electoral protests, there were numerous reports on social media about police and military officers, and even pro-government groups, who stopped citizens in the street to check their phones.⁶³ These publications coincide with complaints we have received directly. The illegal searches have the purpose of looking for photos and videos of the demonstrations, conversations or any content against the government with which they could justify their immediate arrest. The reports indicate that most of the cases occurred in police checkpoints,⁶⁴ as well as in police operations in popular sectors or intercepting passersby on public roads. There were also reports of these practices in airports and State institutions.

We recorded 18 such complaints. Some were sent to us privately, while others were collected from platforms such as X. We acknowledge the challenges in verifying these testimonies, as many users later deleted their posts, expressed fear of providing further information, or were coerced after these searches. On multiple occasions, individuals who contacted us requested that their cases not be documented due to fear. As a result, we believe there is underreporting driven by fear.

In a video posted on TikTok on August 2, La Guaira police officers are seen detaining young people who were passing through the Parada Pachado sector. There, one of the agents openly stated that he was checking their phones in search of "compromising messages."

⁶³ Infobae. (2024, August 29). Venezuelan NGO Provea alerts that police and military check cell phones "illegally". Infobae.

<https://www.infobae.com/america/agencias/2024/08/29/ong-venezolana-provea-alerta-que-policias-y-militares-revisan-celulares-de-forma-ilegal/>

⁶⁴ Electoral Observation Network (2024, November 12). In Venezuela, the alcabalas are born in bulk. Electoral Observation Network.

<https://www.redobservacion.org/2024/11/13/en-venezuela-las-alcabalas-nacen-a-granel/>



Image 23: Capture of a video showing La Guaira Police officers checking cell phones at a checkpoint. Source: TikTok

In another complaint made by the National Union of Press Workers (SNTP) about the dismissal of at least 40 employees of VTV and Radio Nacional de Venezuela (RN)⁶⁵. Although in this case their phones were not directly searched, it does evidence a monitoring by the authorities of the publications and stories of their workers on social networks and platforms such as WhatsApp. We know that there are also unverified reports of similar dismissals in other state institutions.

With the deployment of security forces throughout the country in the context of the presidential inauguration on January 10, telephone checks were resumed in the police stations.⁶⁶ We received at least two reports of people who were detained on Francisco de Miranda Avenue in Caracas on different dates, one in the Los Ruices sector and the other in El Marques. The officers coerced the victims to unlock their phones and enter WhatsApp,

⁶⁵ El Diario (2024, August 15). SNTP denounced "illegal" dismissals against public media workers. El Diario.

<https://eldiario.com/2024/08/15/sntp-denuncio-despidos-ilegales-trabajadores-medios-publicos/>

⁶⁶ Editorial staff NTN24. (2025, February 6). "Alcabalas fantasma": cunden denuncias sobre policías que extorsionan por "mensajes sospechosos" en teléfonos de transeúntes. NTN24.
<https://www.ntn24.com/noticias-actualidad/alcabalas-fantasma-cunden-denuncias-sobre-policias-que-extorsionan-por-mensajes-sospechosos-en-telefonos-de-transeuntes-537652>

where they searched for keywords such as "María Corina", "Edmundo", "Maduro", among others. They threatened people with being taken to El Helicoide detention center⁶⁷ if they found compromising messages.

One of the complainants said that, when he was detained by the police, he initially refused to show the officers the chats on his phone, stating that it was a violation of his privacy. The official's response was: "Here you no longer have privacy, or do you prefer that I take you [arrested]?"

We also highlight a case published on X on January 18, reporting the arrest of an individual after being denounced by a former contact—someone to whom he had sold a phone a year earlier⁶⁸. Apparently, this contact saw messages insulting Diosdado Cabello in the victim's WhatsApp status updates, saved them, and forwarded them to the authorities. Later, he messaged the victim to arrange another sale, but when the victim arrived at the agreed location, he was approached by several officers and arrested.

All this is part of various intimidation practices that have been recorded on the internet. Many come from official channels such as the Instagram accounts of the DIP, DGCIM and PNB, and some publications directly contain threatening messages aimed at intimidating citizens. In total, we counted 53 cases of intimidation and threats coming from pro-government political actors.

On August 9, the DGCIM's Instagram account posted a quote from Cuban politician and poet José Martí: "When the homeland is in danger, everything is permitted, except not defending it." They have also addressed messages to officials from their own ranks, such as one posted on August 20: "May necessity not turn you into a traitor, because we all have needs, but we have few loyalties."

On August 17, the second commander of the PNB, Miguel Domínguez, published an Instagram story offering "free transportation to Tocorón only one way", a well-known prison, for those attending the "Great World Protest" called by the opposition. That same day, political leader Luis Ratti also made a call in X to all mayors and governors to prevent the rallies. "Operation Tun Tun today," he wrote.

⁶⁷ Pelayo, A. (2023, July 1). *Así es el Helicoide, el mayor centro de torturas de Venezuela*. The Objective. <https://theobjective.com/internacional/2023-07-01/memoria-viva-helicoide-venezuela/>

⁶⁸ Sequera S., Enderson [@endsequera] “🚨🚨 DENUNCIA 🚨🚨 Así opera la persecución y los sapos en Venezuela 👇👇 <https://t.co/OPwDQqd83m>” [Tweet]. X. Archivado en archive.is <https://archive.is/A6kfA>




Image 24: Story published in the account of the second commander of the PNB, Miguel Domínguez. Source: Instagram

Intimidation practices are not limited to state agencies, but have also extended to their followers. On August 9, it was reported in X that several houses in the parish of 23 de Enero, in Caracas, had been marked by pro-government collectives to point out families that participated in protests and *cacerolazos*⁶⁹ (loudly banging pans as a form of protest). This was later verified by journalists⁷⁰ who documented the fear of its inhabitants of possible reprisals.

⁶⁹ Pozzebon, S & John, T. (2024, August 15). *They mark with a black X the doors of the residences of Maduro's opponents in Venezuela*. CNN en Español.

<https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2024/08/15/marca-x-negra-puertas-opositores-maduro-venezuela-trax>

⁷⁰ Crónica Uno (2024, August 14). *In 23 de Enero they consider that the markings on houses and businesses are to "put fear" in the community*. Crónica Uno.

<https://cronica.uno/en-el-23-de-enero-consideran-que-las-marcas-en-casas-y-comercios-son-para-meter-miedo-a-la-comunidad>



Image 25: Image taken on August 14 by the portal Crónica Uno of marked stores in the parish 23 de Enero in Caracas.



Image 26: Image taken on August 11 by the portal El Pitazo of marked houses in the parish 23 de Enero.

We have also documented pro-government accounts that have published images and messages inciting the dismissal of opposition public workers or the arrest of María Corina Machado and Edmundo González, among other leaders of the United Democratic Platform.

Security deployments

Both in the electoral context of July 28, as well as in the weeks prior to January 10, 2025, in several Venezuelan cities there was an excessive presence of security agencies in the streets. Whether on patrol or stationed in public spaces, these deployments were characterized for exhibiting elements that went beyond the conventional ones to maintain public order, with armed and hooded officers and armored military vehicles, as well as intelligence agencies such as the SEBIN and the DGCIM taking a leading role in these deployments.

This phenomenon did not go unnoticed in social networks, where the military and police agencies themselves promoted their activities as a demonstration of strength and control of the situation, in addition to discouraging any attempt to reactivate the protests. In fact, after the post-election riots in July, institutions such as the PNB and the DGCIM made frequent videos of their tours through popular sectors. An example of this were the videos of the patrols of the Special Tactical Operations Unit (UOTE) of the PNB with armored vehicles in the Cota 905 neighborhood of Caracas.




Image 27: Deployment of UOTE officers in the Cota 905 neighborhood of Caracas on August 1, 2024. Source: Instagram

These videos were frequently shared by high-ranking officials of the security agencies. Unlike the videos of Operation Tun Tun, these materials are characterized by the use of music and edits with a more epic character, as if seeking to highlight the heroism of the officers in the street, accompanied by more institutional slogans. However, other videos were also found with a more threatening tone and horror music, as in the case of organizations such as the DAE.

These videos peaked between July 30 and early September, when these operations decreased in intensity. It would not be until months later, already in the context of the swearing-in of Nicolás Maduro, that a massive military and police presence would be seen again on the streets⁷¹. The first records of this second large deployment that we were able to find occurred on December 29, 2024, when the director of the DGCIM shared on Instagram photos of officers of that agency guarding stations of the Caracas Metro.

After January 1, the presence of heavily armed agents in the streets became much more notorious, with users disseminating on social networks images of the roadblocks installed in the main streets of the city, as well as in squares, on street corners and in the Caracas Metro and Los Teques Metro systems.⁷² These were mainly concentrated in the center, where the same director of the DGCIM shared photos accompanied by other military personnel on January 5⁷³. Most of the documented pieces show the presence of DGCIM and DAET agents guarding these areas.

⁷¹ El Pitazo (2025, January 3). *Caracas militarized: security forces guard downtown and east a week before #10Ene*. El Pitazo.
<https://elpitazo.net/gran-caracas/fuerzas-del-estado-vigilan-el-centro-y-este-de-caracas-a-una-semana-del-10-de-enero>

⁷² Crónica Uno (2025, January 6) *Four days before the inauguration, police surveillance continues in the streets of Caracas*. Crónica Uno.
<https://cronica.uno/a-cuatro-dias-de-la-toma-de-posesion-continua-vigilancia-policial-en-calles-de-caracas>

⁷³ El Líbero (2025, January 8). *In charge of torture in the Maduro regime directs security in Caracas on the eve of key days*. El Líbero.
<https://ellibero.cl/actualidad/encargado-de-las-torturas-en-el-regimen-de-maduro-dirige-la-seguridad-en-caracas-en-la-vispera-del-dia-clave>



Image 28: Capture of a video shared by Alexander Granko Arteaga of the DGCIM deployment in the Caracas Metro on December 29. Source: Instagram

The deployment was not limited to Caracas. Similar operations were seen in several cities of the country, as well as in highways and toll booths, in which colectivos and pro-government groups also joined. In several of these roadblocks, officials handed out "Wanted" flyers with the image of Edmundo Gonzalez. On January 8, the ruling party carried out a day of mobilization in which caravans of motorcycles traveled through Caracas from Petare to downtown, escorted by the PNB. We also recorded videos of motorists gathering that day on the Autopista Regional del Centro, at the Tazón toll.

For the national protest called by María Corina Machado on January 9, users reported that the concentration points⁷⁴ announced in cities such as Caracas, Maracaibo, Valencia and Maracay were taken over by the PNB and the Bolivarian National Guard (GNB), which did not allow protesters to gather.⁷⁵ Finally, after the swearing in of Maduro, the DGCIM posted on Instagram on January 12 an institutional video on the deployment of the DAE in Caracas,

⁷⁴ Infobae (2025, January 9). *The Maduro regime militarized Caracas and blocked the streets prior to the beginning of the opposition march.* Infobae.

<https://www.infobae.com/venezuela/2025/01/09/el-regimen-de-maduro-militarizo-caracas-y-bloqueo-las-calles-previo-al-inicio-de-la-marcha-opositora>

⁷⁵ Crónica Uno (2025, January 9). *Repression and aggressions to journalists marked opposition rallies in the regions.* Crónica Uno.

<https://cronica.uno/agresiones-y-represion-marcaron-protesta-de-la-oposicion>

with an audio of the speech "Hoy tenemos patria, que nadie se equivocen", by former President Hugo Chávez.



Image 29: DGCIM post published after the swearing in of Nicolás Maduro with images of their deployments in Caracas. Source: Instagram (Image edited for privacy protection).

Category	Documented cases	Publications or archived content	Definition
Detention record	38	38	Images or publications made by witnesses of the moment a person is arrested. Also recordings or live transmissions made by the victim himself before his capture.
Attack log	14	18	Audiovisual records showing aggressions or repression by security forces against citizens, as well as frustrated arrest attempts.
Security deployment	19	21	Images and videos shared by users or by the security agencies themselves showing massive patrolling operations or deployment of officers in the streets in the context of the post-election protests.

Table 18: Number of documented cases in relation to records of attack, detention and deployment by state security forces between July 2024 and January 2025.

Records of repression

In addition to the audiovisual pieces made by the security agencies themselves, we note that, both before and after the elections, many arbitrary detentions and attacks were captured in photos and videos by witnesses, and even by the victims themselves. This has allowed to have records of the repression against political dissidents.

We see that the persecution is mainly focused on political leaders, activists and party militants, in addition to citizens involved in the protests or who participated as electoral witnesses and table members in the elections. A count by the Alianza Rebelde Investiga (ARI) showed that 246 political leaders and activists were arbitrarily detained between July 28, 2024 and January 20, 2025⁷⁶, of which 70 have already been released. In addition to 23 press workers and thousands of related citizens.

From a sample of 38 cases we studied, we observed that many of the detainees were searched in their homes or workplaces by hooded officers without presenting a warrant from the Prosecutor's Office, although others were also intercepted in the street or leaving a political activity and forced into vehicles without license plates.

In cases such as that of the national coordinator of Voluntad Popular, Freddy Superlano, arrested on July 30 together with his collaborators in Caracas, the videos were taken by witnesses⁷⁷. In another case, it was the national coordinator of Convergencia, Biaggio Pilieri, arrested on August 27 after participating in an event at the Lido shopping center, who recorded the vehicles pursuing him minutes before being caught.⁷⁸

On August 6, the coordinator of Vente Venezuela in Portuguesa state, María Oropeza, transmitted live on her Instagram account the moment when officials of the DGCIM forcibly entered her house to arrest her⁷⁹. The same organization then used the recording to edit a video of "Operation Tun Tun" with terror music and showing Oropeza's capture at the end.

⁷⁶ Alianza Rebelde Investiga (2025, January 12). 221 politicians, 23 journalists and 6 human rights activists have been detained since July 28. El Pitazo.
<https://elpitazo.net/alianzas/221-politicos-23-periodistas-y-seis-activistas-de-dd-hh-han-sido-detenido-s-desde-el-28-de-julio>

⁷⁷ Infobae. (2024, July 30). The Maduro regime kidnapped Venezuelan opposition leader Freddy Superlano in Caracas. *Infobae*.
<https://www.infobae.com/venezuela/2024/07/30/el-regimen-de-maduro-detuvo-al-dirigente-opositor-venezolano-freddy-superlano>

⁷⁸ Infobae. (2024, August 28). After the massive opposition protest in Caracas, the Maduro regime kidnapped the leaders Biagio and Jesús Pilieri. *Infobae*.
<https://www.infobae.com/venezuela/2024/08/28/tras-la-masiva-protesta-opositora-en-caracas-el-regimen-de-maduro-secuestro-al-dirigente-biagio-pilieri>

⁷⁹ Infobae. (2024, August 8). *The chilling video with which the Maduro regime terrorizes Venezuelans and mocks the leader María Oropeza and the opposition*. *Infobae*.
<https://www.infobae.com/venezuela/2024/08/08/el-escalofriante-video-con-el-que-el-regimen-de-maduro-atemoriza-a-los-venezolanos-y-se-burla-de-la-dirigente-maria-oropeza-y-de-la-oposicion>



Image 30: Capture of a video of "Operation Tun Tun" published by the DGCIM with the capture of leader María Oropeza in Portuguesa. Photo: Instagram

LGBTIQ+ rights activist Koddy Campos also live-streamed on Instagram how DAET agents attempted to break the window of his house in La Vega parish (Caracas)⁸⁰ on August 9. The entire discussion between Campos and the officers, who did not have a search warrant, was recorded on video.

"If you're a standing citizen, open your door and talk to the police as if nothing happened," said one of the officers to Campos, who demanded to be shown the arrest warrant against him. "I don't need a warrant to talk to you," the officer insisted. After an hour, the agents left

⁸⁰ Infobae. (2024, August 10). Agents of Nicolas Maduro's dictatorship attempted to raid the home of an LGBT activist in western Caracas. Infobae.

<https://www.infobae.com/venezuela/2024/08/10/agentes-de-la-dictadura-de-nicolas-maduro-intentar-on-allanar-la-vivienda-de-un-activista-lgbt-al-oeste-de-caracas>

and Campos had to leave his home, as neighbors alerted him that pro-government groups were heading there. "They are going to shoot at my house and I do not want to expose my neighbors", denounced the activist before leaving.



Image 31: Capture of the live transmission made by activist Koddy Campos in which agents are seen in front of his house in La Vega parish in Caracas. Source: Instagram

In the material reviewed we have seen at least 14 records of attacks, that is, cases in which physical aggressions, attempts at detention or generalized repression by the security forces are seen, and in which patterns of harassment and harassment, surveillance with patrols without license plates, among others, are also repeated.

An additional form of intimidation has been the mass cancellation of passports of journalists and human rights activists who have published information critical of the government in the electoral context.⁸¹ The status of passports can be consulted on a State portal, but activists who attempted to leave the country without knowing that their documents had been annulled were victims of content review and confiscation of their electronic devices, forced disappearance, detentions and other human rights violations.⁸²

⁸¹ Public Space (2024, November 27). *Passports annulled: the piece that overturns a string of human rights*. Espacio Público.

<https://espaciopublico.org/pasaportes-anulados-la-pieza-que-derriba-una-seguidilla-de-derechos-humanos>

⁸² Goodman, J. & García, R. (2024, August 8). *Disappearance of aid worker at airport stokes fears of repression in Venezuela*. Los Angeles Times.

In what was a new escalation of repression in Venezuela, the organization Foro Penal warned that between January 1 and 12, 83 people were arrested for political reasons,⁸³ among them a teenager and a foreign citizen. These arrests peaked on January 9, during the deployments of security forces against demonstrators in the national protest called by the opposition, with 16 detainees.⁸⁴

From that day we compiled videos documenting attacks against demonstrators, such as the case of a woman shot in the leg in a shopping center on Bolívar Avenue in Maracay (Aragua), allegedly by gunshots fired by colectivos.⁸⁵ Also the arrest of people who were sheltering in a supermarket in San Diego (Carabobo).

We highlight the arrest of Tirso Narcise,⁸⁶ a 76 year old professor of a baseball academy, who can be seen in a video taken by a witness how he was beaten and arrested by hooded motorcyclists on January 9 on Ayacucho Avenue in Maracay, near one of the opposition rally points. Likewise, in Maracaibo (Zulia), the moment in which the GNB took away journalist Leandro Palmar, detained together with his technician Belises Cubillán⁸⁷ was recorded on video.

<https://www.latimes.com/espanol/internacional/story/2024-08-08/la-desaparicion-de-una-cooperante-en-un-aeropuerto-aviva-el-temor-a-la-represion-en-venezuela>

⁸³ Foro Penal [@ForoPenal] (2025, January 12). #12E Balance de Detenidos Políticos en Venezuela del 1ro al 12 de enero 2025 [Tweet]. X. Archived at archive.is <https://archive.is/5D6T6>

⁸⁴ El Nacional (2025, January 10). *Foro Penal registered 16 detainees in protests on January 9*. El Nacional.
<https://www.elnacional.com/venezuela/foro-penal-registro-16-detenidos-en-protestas-del-9-de-enero>

⁸⁵ La Patilla (2025, January 9). *A woman wounded by projectile left by colectivos on Bolívar Ave. in Maracay this #9Jan*. La Patilla.
<https://www.lapatilla.com/2025/01/09/una-mujer-herida-por-proyectil-dejo-paso-de-colectivos-por-la-av-bolivar-de-maracay-este-9ene>

⁸⁶ Crónica Uno (2025, January 16). *Demand release of baseball coach Tirso Narcise in Maracay*. Crónica Uno. <https://cronica.uno/exigen-liberacion-de-entrenador-de-beisbol-tirso-narcise-en-maracay>

⁸⁷ Efecto Cocuyo (2025, January 11). *CNP Zulia rejects detention of journalist Leandro Palmar*. Efecto Cocuyo.
<https://efectococuyo.com/la-humanidad/cnp-zulia-rechaza-detencion-de-periodista-leandro-palmar>




Image 32: On the left, video still of the arrest of Tirso Narcise in Maracay, Aragua. Right, video still of the arrest of Leandro Palmar in Maracaibo, Zulia. Sources: X and TikTok

In Caracas, after giving a speech at a rally in Chacao, María Corina Machado was assaulted by officers of the PNB while she was traveling on a motorcycle through the Altamira distributor.⁸⁸ After a couple of hours of disappearance, a video on social networks began to be disseminated in which the opposition leader stated that she was fine and had been released by her captors. However, the video was not published in her official account nor by Comando Con Vzla. Instead, it was originally circulated in Telegram groups and accounts linked to the ruling party. Machado later confirmed that the video had been taken by one of the officials shortly before she was released.

All this highlights the importance of documenting any type of irregularity or attack, as it has not only allowed in some cases the officials to desist in their actions, but also leaves a strong testimony of the human rights violations perpetrated in recent months in Venezuela.

⁸⁸ La Hora de Venezuela (2025, January 25). #LaHoraDeVenezuela | Audiovisual work explains how the arrest of María Corina Machado went. El Pitazo. <https://elpitazo.net/politica/lahoradevenezuela-trabajo-audiovisual-explica-como-fue-la-detencion-de-maria-corina-machado/>

Conclusions

The presidential electoral process in Venezuela was marked by systematic digital censorship and strong mechanisms of repression that seriously compromised access to information, freedom of expression, and political rights of citizens. Throughout the months leading up to, during, and after the elections, targeted blocks were implemented against media outlets, civil society organizations, and censorship circumvention tools, creating a restricted and controlled digital ecosystem.

The actions documented in this report demonstrate that Venezuelan authorities used internet access and digital technologies as tools of censorship, surveillance, and political repression, with the aim of limiting citizens' ability to inform themselves, organize and mobilize. The escalation in digital censorship included the imposition of blocks on at least 79 web portals, affecting media outlets, social networks and communication platforms, further restricting the circulation of information critical of the government. Along with these restrictions, the blocking of censorship circumvention tools, such as VPNs and public DNS servers, evidenced a deliberate strategy to hinder any attempt to avoid the restrictions.

At the same time, there were campaigns of harassment and intimidation on social networks, as well as the use of surveillance technologies to monitor and intimidate political opponents, activists and journalists. Digital censorship was part of a broader pattern of state repression, which included the persecution of protesters, arbitrary arrests, systematization of denunciation and the use of the Internet for the public display of detainees as political propaganda.

Internet censorship did not end with the electoral process or the presidential inauguration but continued for weeks afterward amid protests and social discontent. In this context, the government employed digital restrictions as a tool to control the public narrative and suppress dissenting voices.

Surveillance and cyberattacks targeting opposition parties and dissidents during the elections represent an alarming escalation of an established pattern. This includes the dissemination of personal data obtained through these attacks as part of broader intimidation tactics.

This report highlights a deeply entrenched pattern of state control over access to information and digital spaces, which intensifies during periods of political tension. It also documents the widespread human rights violations facilitated by technology.

_Annex 1**Blocking events that began between July 2024 and January 2025**

Dominio	Categoría	Fecha de inicio	Fecha de fin	CANTV	Airtek	Digitel	G-Network	Inter	Movistar	Netuno	Supercable
www.tiktok.com	GRP	2024-09-28	2025-02-05	DNS* + TCP IP*	TCP IP* + HTTP/HTTPS*	DNS*	TCP IP*	DNS*	HTTP/HTTPS*	DNS* + TCP IP*	DNS*
149.112.112.112	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
156.154.70.1	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
156.154.71.1	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
199.85.126.10	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
199.85.126.20	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
199.85.126.30	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
199.85.127.10	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
199.85.127.20	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
199.85.127.30	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
205.171.2.65	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
205.171.3.65	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
208.67.222.220	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
208.67.222.222	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
216.146.35.35	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No

Dominio	Categoría	Fecha de inicio	Fecha de fin	CANTV	Airtek	Digitel	G-Network	Inter	Movistar	Netuno	Supercable
216.146.36.36	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
4.2.2.1	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
4.2.2.2	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
4.2.2.3	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
45.90.28.230	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
64.6.64.6	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
64.6.65.6	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
77.88.8.8	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
8.20.247.20	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
8.26.56.26	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
84.200.69.80	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
84.200.70.40	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
9.9.9.9	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
94.140.14.14	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
94.140.15.15	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
8.8.4.4	HOST	2025-01-08	2025-01-11	TCP IP*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
8.8.8.8	HOST	2025-01-08	2025-01-11	TCP IP*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
1.0.0.1	HOST	2025-01-09	2025-01-11	TCP IP*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
1.1.1.1	ANON	2025-01-04	2025-01-21	TCP IP	No	No	No	No	TCP IP	No	TCP IP*
strongvpn.com	ANON	2025-01-10	Activo	DNS + TCP IP	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
nullvad.net	ANON	2025-01-10	Activo	DNS + TCP IP	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
pandavpnpro.com	ANON	2025-01-09	Activo	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	No	DNS

Dominio	Categoría	Fecha de inicio	Fecha de fin	CANTV	Airtek	Digitel	G-Network	Inter	Movistar	Netuno	Supercable
www.betternet.co	ANON	2025-01-09	Activo	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS*	No
browsec.com	ANON	2025-01-09	Activo	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No
hide.me	ANON	2025-01-09	Activo	DNS + TCP IP	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
speedify.com	ANON	2025-01-09	Activo	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	No
torguard.net	ANON	2025-01-09	Activo	DNS + TCP IP	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
ultravpn.com	ANON	2025-01-09	Activo	DNS + TCP IP	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
www.cyberghostvpn.com	ANON	2025-01-09	Activo	DNS + TCP IP	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
www.hola.org	ANON	2025-01-09	Activo	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	No	No
zoogvpn.com	ANON	2025-01-09	Activo	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	No	DNS	No
www.itopvpn.com	ANON	2025-01-08	Activo	No	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	No	DNS	No
www.urban-vpn.com	ANON	2025-01-08	Activo	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
www.vpnsuper.com	ANON	2025-01-08	Activo	No	No	No	DNS	No	No	No	No
www.ipvanish.com	ANON	2025-01-07	Activo	DNS + TCP IP	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS*	DNS
nordvpn.com	ANON	2025-01-07	Activo	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	No	DNS
www.purevpn.com	ANON	2025-01-07	Activo	DNS + TCP IP	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS*	DNS
brave.com	ANON	2025-01-07	Activo	No	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
bridges.torproject.org	ANON	2025-01-07	Activo	No	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
surfshark.com	ANON	2025-01-06	Activo	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	No	DNS	No
www.expressvpn.com	ANON	2025-01-06	Activo	No	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	No
www.hotspotshield.com	ANON	2025-01-06	Activo	TCP IP	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS*	No
www.torproject.org	ANON	2025-01-06	Activo	TCP IP	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
psiphon.ca	ANON	2020-11-13	Activo	DNS + TCP IP	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS

Dominio	Categoría	Fecha de inicio	Fecha de fin	CANTV	Airtek	Digitel	G-Network	Inter	Movistar	Netuno	Supercable
vpn-api.proton.me	ANON	2024-08-22	Activo	No	No	DNS	DNS*	DNS	No	No	No
windscribe.com	ANON	2024-07-31	Activo	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
protonvpn.com	ANON	2024-07-20	Activo	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS
tunnelbear.com	ANON	2019-02-18	Activo	HTTP/HTTPS + DNS*	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS*	DNS
telegram.org	COMT	2024-09-02	2025-01-11	DNS* + TCP IP*	TCP IP*	DNS*	TCP IP*	DNS*	HTTPS*	DNS*	DNS*
web.telegram.org	COMT	2025-01-10	2025-01-11	TCP IP*	TCP IP*	DNS*	TCP IP*	DNS*	HTTPS*	DNS*	DNS*
www.canva.com	MISC	2025-01-09	2025-01-10	DNS*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
www.demacedoniaconamor.com	POLR	2025-01-08	Activo	DNS + TCP IP	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS
www.youtube.com	GRP	2024-11-23	2024-11-23	DNS*	No	No	DNS*	DNS*	HTTPS*	No	No
vendata.org	HUMR	2024-08-22	Activo	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
larepublica.pe	NEWS	2024-08-22	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	No	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS
signal.org	COMT	2024-08-08	Activo	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS
es.statista.com	ECON	2024-08-09	Activo	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	No
abs-0.twimg.com	GRP	2024-08-08	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	No	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS
video-0.twimg.com	GRP	2024-08-08	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	No	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS
upload.twitter.com	GRP	2024-08-08	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	No	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS
video.twimg.com	GRP	2024-08-08	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	No	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS
abs.twimg.com	GRP	2024-08-08	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	No	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS
teams.microsoft.com	COMT	2024-08-09	2024-08-14	HTTPS*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
www.microsoft.com	MISC	2024-08-09	2024-08-14	HTTPS*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
api.twitter.com	GRP	2024-08-08	Activo	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS
pbs.twimg.com	GRP	2024-08-08	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	No	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS

Dominio	Categoría	Fecha de inicio	Fecha de fin	CANTV	Airtek	Digitel	G-Network	Inter	Movistar	Netuno	Supercable
www.reddit.com	GRP	2019-02-25	Activo	HTTPS*	No	No	No	No	DNS	No	No
twitter.com	GRP	2024-08-08	Activo	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS
x.com	GRP	2024-08-08	Activo	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS
www.wsj.com	NEWS	2024-08-01	Activo	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	No
versionfinal.com.ve	NEWS	2024-08-02	2024-08-14	HTTPS*	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
ganovzla.com	POLR	2024-07-30	Activo	DNS*	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	No
resultadosconvzla.com	POLR	2024-07-30	Activo	DNS + HTTPS*	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No
elecciones2024venezuela.com	NEWS	2024-07-29	Activo	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No
www.laprensalaria.com.ve	NEWS	2024-07-31	Activo	HTTPS*	HTTP/HTTPS	No	No	No	No	No	No
www.ventevedezuela.org	POLR	2024-04-22	Activo	DNS*	DNS	No	No	DNS	No	No	No
resultadospresidencialesvenezuela2024.com	POLR	2024-07-29	Activo	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No
www.wikipedia.org	CULTR	2024-07-27	2024-07-29	No	No	HTTPS*	No	No	No	HTTPS*	No
es.wikipedia.org	CULTR	2024-07-27	2024-07-29	No	No	HTTPS*	No	No	No	HTTPS*	No
www.noticierovenepvision.net	NEWS	2024-07-22	Activo	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No
runrun.es	NEWS	2024-07-22	Activo	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	No	No
elestimulo.com	NEWS	2024-07-22	Activo	DNS + HTTPS*	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No
vesinfiltro.com	HUMR	2024-07-22	Activo	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No
www.analitica.com	NEWS	2024-07-22	Activo	DNS + HTTPS*	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No
www.medianalisis.org	HUMR	2024-07-22	Activo	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No
www.talcualdigital.com	NEWS	2024-07-22	Activo	DNS + HTTPS*	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No
espaciopublico.ong	HUMR	2024-07-16	Activo	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	No	No	No	No	No	No
fakenewsvenezuela.org	NEWS	2024-07-04	Activo	DNS + HTTPS*	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No

Dominio	Categoría	Fecha de inicio	Fecha de fin	CANTV	Airtek	Digitel	G-Network	Inter	Movistar	Netuno	Supercable
ipysvenezuela.org	HUMR	2024-07-12	Activo	DNS + HTTPS*	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No
cazadoresdefakenews.info	NEWS	2024-07-04	Activo	DNS + HTTPS*	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	No
www.espaja.com	NEWS	2024-07-04	Activo	DNS + HTTPS*	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No

*Evento de bloqueo que finalizó y actualmente no está activa esa técnica de bloqueo..

Annex 2

Blocking events active prior to July 2024, selected categories

Dominio	Categoría	Fecha de inicio	Fecha de fin	CANTV	Airtek	Digitel	Inter	Movistar	Netuno	Supercable
www.airtm.io	COMM	2020-06-11	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
www.airtm0.com	COMM	2020-08-03	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
airtm.com	COMM	2020-08-20	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS
www.airtm.com	COMM	2020-08-26	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
aguacateverde1.blogspot.com	ECON	2020-04-07	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS
quelacreo.com	HATE	2020-04-07	Activo	DNS + HTTPS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
www.change.org	HUMR	2019-02-28	Activo	DNS + HTTPS*	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	No
miconvive.com	HUMR	2020-05-18	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
miconvive.org	HUMR	2020-05-18	Activo	DNS	No	No	No	No	No	No
www.jepvenezuela.com	HUMR	2022-06-06	2024-08-14	DNS* + HTTPS*	No	No	No	No	No	No
salariodignovzla.com	HUMR	2023-04-26	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	No	No
observatoriodefinanzas.com	HUMR	2023-05-03	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	No	No
zello.com	MMED	2018-12-31	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	No	DNS	No	No
livestream.com	MMED	2021-02-10	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	No	DNS	DNS
soundcloud.com	MMED	2021-02-10	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS
dolartoday.com	NEWS	2016-01-01	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
vpitv.com	NEWS	2017-04-07	Activo	DNS + HTTPS*	No	DNS	DNS	No	DNS	No

Dominio	Categoría	Fecha de inicio	Fecha de fin	CANTV	Airtek	Digitel	Inter	Movistar	Netuno	Supercable
www.vpitv.com	NEWS	2017-04-07	Activo	DNS + HTTPS*	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
liberal-venezolano.blogspot.com	NEWS	2017-09-30	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
vivoplay.net	NEWS	2017-09-30	Activo	HTTPS*	No	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	No
dolarparalelo.biz	NEWS	2017-10-14	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	No	No	DNS	No
elpitazo.com	NEWS	2018-01-01	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS
elpitazo.info	NEWS	2018-01-01	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS
elpitazo.net	NEWS	2018-01-01	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
noticiaaldia.com	NEWS	2018-03-09	Activo	DNS + HTTPS*	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
alekboyd.blogspot.co.uk	NEWS	2018-04-05	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS
maduradas.com	NEWS	2018-06-22	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS
minuto30.com	NEWS	2018-07-01	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
www.infobae.com	NEWS	2018-07-01	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
noticias.com	NEWS	2018-07-18	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS
www.minuto30.com	NEWS	2018-08-15	Activo	DNS + HTTPS*	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
www.infobae.media	NEWS	2019-02-02	Activo	DNS + HTTPS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
www.eltiempo.com	NEWS	2019-02-23	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
www.2001.com.ve	NEWS	2019-03-01	Activo	DNS	No	No	No	No	No	No
noticiasvenezuela.org	NEWS	2019-03-19	Activo	No	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
dollarparalelovenezuela.com	NEWS	2019-08-04	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS
www.aguacateverde.com	NEWS	2019-10-01	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS
dollarparalelovenezuela.com	NEWS	2019-10-04	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	No	No	DNS	No
dollar.nu	NEWS	2019-11-16	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS

Dominio	Categoría	Fecha de inicio	Fecha de fin	CANTV	Airtek	Digitel	Inter	Movistar	Netuno	Supercable
www.ntn24.com	NEWS	2019-12-01	Activo	DNS + HTTPS*	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
noticialedia.com	NEWS	2020-01-22	Activo	DNS + HTTPS*	No	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
cronica.uno	NEWS	2020-02-01	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
efectococuyo.com	NEWS	2020-02-01	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
evtv.online	NEWS	2020-02-01	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
evtvMiami.com	NEWS	2020-02-01	Activo	DNS* + HTTP/HTTPS*	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
puntodecorte.com	NEWS	2020-02-02	Activo	DNS + HTTPS*	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
www.tvvenezuela.tv	NEWS	2020-02-03	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
albertonews.com	NEWS	2020-04-01	Activo	DNS + HTTPS*	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
awsveanews.com	NEWS	2020-04-01	Activo	DNS	No	No	No	No	No	DNS
b1tly4n3s.com	NEWS	2020-04-01	Activo	DNS	No	No	No	No	No	DNS
www.b1tlydns02io.com	NEWS	2020-04-01	Activo	DNS* + HTTP/HTTPS*	No	No	No	No	No	DNS
dolarparalelo.net	NEWS	2020-04-07	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS
dolarparalelo.org	NEWS	2020-04-07	Activo	DNS + HTTPS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
dolarparalelo.tk	NEWS	2020-04-07	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS
www.noticierodigital.com	NEWS	2020-07-08	Activo	DNS	No	No	No	No	No	No
www.maduradas.com	NEWS	2020-07-30	Activo	DNS + HTTPS*	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	No
monitoreamos.com	NEWS	2020-09-16	Activo	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS*	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
armando.info	NEWS	2020-10-12	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	No	DNS
infob.ae	NEWS	2020-10-15	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	HTTP	DNS	DNS	DNS
6topoder.com	NEWS	2020-12-03	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
diariolaregion.net	NEWS	2020-12-07	Activo	DNS + HTTPS*	No	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS

Dominio	Categoría	Fecha de inicio	Fecha de fin	CANTV	Airtek	Digitel	Inter	Movistar	Netuno	Supercable
venezuelaaldia.com	NEWS	2020-12-07	Activo	No	No	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	No
www.venezuelaaldia.com	NEWS	2020-12-09	Activo	No	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
analisis24.com	NEWS	2020-12-10	Activo	No	No	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	No
bit.ly/venezuela911	NEWS	2021-01-01	Activo	No	No	No	No	HTTP	No	No
alekboyd.blogspot.com	NEWS	2021-01-27	Activo	No	No	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	No
alnavio.com	NEWS	2021-01-27	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
dolartoday.info	NEWS	2021-01-27	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
dolartoday.org	NEWS	2021-01-27	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
eldolarparalelo.info	NEWS	2021-01-27	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
antena3internacional.com	NEWS	2021-02-10	Activo	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	No	No	No	No	No	No
www.aporrea.org	NEWS	2021-02-10	Activo	DNS* + HTTP/HTTPS*	No	No	No	No	No	No
www.caraotadigital.net	NEWS	2021-02-11	Activo	DNS + HTTPS*	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
lapatilla.com	NEWS	2021-03-04	Activo	DNS + HTTPS*	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
www.lapatilla.com	NEWS	2021-03-04	Activo	DNS + HTTPS*	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
caraotadigital.news	NEWS	2021-06-01	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
caraotadigital.xyz	NEWS	2021-06-01	Activo	DNS + HTTPS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
lamananadigital.com	NEWS	2021-10-22	Activo	DNS + HTTPS*	No	No	No	No	No	No
www.opinionynoticias.com	NEWS	2021-11-29	Activo	No	No	No	No	HTTP/HTTPS	No	No
primerinforme.com	NEWS	2022-02-09	Activo	DNS	No	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
www.el-nacional.com	NEWS	2022-02-11	Activo	DNS + HTTPS*	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
www.elnacional.com	NEWS	2022-02-11	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
sumarium.es	NEWS	2022-12-09	Activo	DNS* + HTTPS*	No	No	No	No	No	No

Dominio	Categoría	Fecha de inicio	Fecha de fin	CANTV	Airtek	Digitel	Inter	Movistar	Netuno	Supercable
www.adncaraota.com	NEWS	2022-12-09	Activo	DNS* + HTTP/HTTPS*	No	No	No	No	No	No
noticiaypunto.com	NEWS	2022-12-22	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS
eldiario.com	NEWS	2023-01-25	Activo	DNS* + HTTP/HTTPS*	No	No	No	No	No	No
focoinformativo.com	NEWS	2023-04-18	Activo	No	No	No	No	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	No	No
www.el-carabobeno.com	NEWS	2023-11-08	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	HTTPS	DNS	No
ww1.6topoder.com	NEWS	2023-11-28	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	No	No	No
ww38.dollarparalelovenezuela.com	NEWS	2023-11-28	Activo	No	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
elpolitico.com	NEWS	2024-03-04	Activo	DNS + HTTP*	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	No
Impactovenezuela.com	NEWS	2024-03-06	Activo	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS*	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	No
www.semana.com	NEWS	2024-03-12	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	No
www.lagranaldea.com	NEWS	2024-05-18	Activo	DNS + HTTPS*	No	DNS	DNS	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	No
vdebate.blogspot.com	POLR	2017-09-30	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
venezuelaaidlive.com	POLR	2019-02-22	Activo	No	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
infodio.com	POLR	2019-04-22	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
teleconsulta.presidenciate.org	POLR	2020-04-15	Activo	No	No	No	No	DNS	No	No
presidenciate.com	POLR	2020-12-08	Activo	DNS + HTTPS*	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
pvenezuela.com	POLR	2021-01-27	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
www.mdivenezuela.org	POLR	2021-07-14	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	No	DNS
d1zjwmfdso4x7i.cloudfront.net	POLR	2021-10-19	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	No	No
d3l0kj5h9z9zs.cloudfront.net	POLR	2021-10-19	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	No	DNS	No	No
hugocarvajal.com	POLR	2021-10-19	Activo	DNS + HTTP/HTTPS*	No	No	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
buscadorphimaria2023.com	POLR	2023-09-07	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	DNS	HTTP/HTTPS	DNS	DNS

Dominio	Categoría	Fecha de inicio	Fecha de fin	CANTV	Airtek	Digitel	Inter	Movistar	Netuno	Supercable
comisiondeprimariave.org	POLR	2023-10-14	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	No	DNS	No	No
lavenezueladelencuentro.com	POLR	2023-10-22	Activo	DNS	No	DNS	No	DNS	No	No
medicos.presidenciave.org	PUBH	2020-08-25	Activo	No	No	No	No	DNS	No	No
coronavirusvenezuela.info	PUBH	2020-11-30	Activo	DNS + HTTPS	No	DNS	HTTP	DNS	DNS	HTTP

*Evento de bloqueo que finalizó y actualmente no está activa esa técnica de bloqueo.

