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Section-1

Sec 1

Direction (1-4): Study the following information and answer the questions that follow:

“Knowledge ... is the scandal of philosophy”, writes Barbara Herrnstein Smith. . . : no one, it would seem, knows quite what to do with the concept of knowing something or how to account for it. Can we be sure that we know what we believe we know?. . . Can we be certain that anything at all has being in the world beyond our perceptions?. . .

Herrnstein Smith's book claims we cannot. It presents an unapologetic, unrepentant defence of postmodern constructivist thought in a storm of attacks and denunciations by its traditionalist enemies. . . Herrnstein Smith introduces her work with a meticulous and challenging explanation. . . of the controversy and antagonisms, rising from polarised views about epistemologies:. . . the classical realist (or traditional) view versus the postmodern constructivist or pragmatist view. The former endorses a formalist approach [which]. . . embraces empirical and rational proofs, professing faith in an objective truth that is knowable. The latter argues the unknowability of “facts,” or at least a more fluid multiplicity of contingent events that interact in a dynamic, thus creating what we think we “know.” Herrnstein Smith refers to these two opposing views as mutually exclusive cultures, each of which pits itself mercilessly against the other in a struggle that is not always above board, polite, or moderate on either side. . .

In order to understand any phenomenon, Herrnstein Smith argues, one must make an effort to study the histories of its making. . . An entire chapter of her book is devoted to combating one of the most scathing critiques of postmodernism by its adversaries: the epithet of relativism is thoroughly examined, and its straw roots are exposed. Herrnstein Smith paraphrases this attack: if historical data are relative and truth subjective, then one “narrative” is as good as any other. The consequences of this would be that we may never label any action as right or wrong, leading obviously to a reluctance to take any moral action in the world. Herrnstein Smith shows this non sequitur up for its falsity, both logically and in content, since none of the accusations in it (nor in a myriad of other such anti-constructivist slogans) is consistent with postmodern or constructivist claims. She points out that such misinterpretations and exaggerations are often made but seldom documented.

As early as the 1920s and 1930s, Herrnstein Smith informs us, postmodern ideas were already being proposed in academic circles. She cites the work of Ludwik Fleck. . . to illustrate just how profoundly unstable science, empirical facts, objective observations, and indeed, the very foundations of our reality are. Reality is a part of us. She writes, “The specific features of what we interact with as reality are not prior and independent of those interactions but merge and acquire their specificity through them”. . . She employs Fleck's astute interpretation of the “Wasserman Reaction” to demonstrate how very random the scientific method really is, exposing what most of us have always taken for a relatively “objective” and single-minded pursuit, goal-oriented and pure (the traditional, empirical notion of reality) to be actually a series of good or bad luck events, lacking distinct focus, in which social, political, economic, and other contingent influences play as much of a defining role as scientific curiosity.

Q.1 [11831809]

According to the third paragraph of the passage, “An entire chapter of her book is devoted to combating one of the most scathing critiques of postmodernism by its adversaries: the epithet of relativism is thoroughly examined, and its straw roots are exposed.” Which one of the following most broadly captures the “straw roots” mentioned here?

1 ☐ All of the options listed here

2 ☐ the consequence of relativism is that there can be no moral truth

3 ☐ the root cause of the problem of relativism is often misrepresented

4 ☐ the accusations of relativism are inconsistent with postmodern claims

Solution:

Correct Answer : 4

Correct Answer – (4)

The author, in her book, challenges the traditionalists' approach to

Postmodernism. The passage goes on at length to showcase how the book refutes the charges labeled against Postmodernism. One of the sticks with which Postmodernism is beaten is that of relativism. As mentioned in the passage the traditionalists claim that ' . . . historical data are relative and truth subjective, then one "narrative" is as good as any other. The consequences of this would be that we may never label any action as right or wrong, leading obviously to a reluctance to take any moral action in the world. Herrnstein Smith shows this non sequitur up for its falsity, both logically and in content, since none of the accusations in it (nor in a myriad of other such anti-constructivist slogans) is consistent with postmodern or constructivist claims.' This makes (4) the correct choice.

Incorrect Answers:

(2) may be a correct statement but it contradicts the position of Postmodernism as the author contends in her book.

(3) goes beyond the scope of the passage.

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 Answer key/Solution

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Q.2 [11831809]

The author of the passage is most likely to support which one of the following statements?

1 ☐ For Herrnstein Smith, subjectivity in truth would lead us to a path where moral actions based on a definite truth are impossible.

2 ☐ For the classical realists, knowledge is something of a scandal in philosophy where it is impossible to be fully sure of what we know.

3 ☐ Herrnstein Smith showed us that the scientific method might not provide objective truth since non-scientific pursuits could corrupt it.

4 ☐ It is not an accurate claim that we cannot know for a certainty whether or not there is something out there beyond what we can perceive.

Solution:

Correct Answer : 3

Correct Answer – (3)

The passage mentions that 'how very random the scientific method really is, exposing what most of us have always taken for a relatively "objective" and single-minded pursuit, goal-oriented and pure (the traditional, empirical notion of reality) to be actually a series of good or bad luck events, lacking distinct focus, in which social, political, economic, and other contingent influences play as much of a defining role as scientific curiosity.' Also, the fact that she, 'argues the unknowability of "facts," or at least a more fluid multiplicity of contingent events that interact in a dynamic, thus creating what we think we "know." makes (3) the correct choice.

Incorrect Answers:

(1) – The passage states that, 'The consequences of this would be that we may never label any action as right or wrong, leading obviously to a reluctance to take any moral action in the world. Herrnstein Smith shows this non sequitur up for its falsity, both logically and in content, since none of the accusations in it (nor in a myriad of other such anti-constructivist slogans) is consistent with postmodern or constructivist claims. She points out that such misinterpretations and exaggerations are often made but seldom documented.'

(2) – The statement has not been connected to the classicists in the book and is a statement that the author wrote.

(4) - goes beyond the basic gist of what Smith is arguing in favour of.

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 Answer key/Solution

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Q.3 [11831809]

Which one of the following least accurately expresses the realist view and the pragmatic view, respectively?

1 ☐ truths correspond to facts; scepticism towards objective truth

2 ☐ objective truth is knowable; facts may not represent truth

3 ☐ truth is rational and empirical; truth is contingent on culture

4 ☐ truth is observable and verifiable; truth is a matter of perception

Solution:

Correct Answer : 3

Correct Answer – (3)

The passage mentions that the realist views and the pragmatist views are that, 'The former endorses a formalist approach [which] . . . embraces empirical and rational proofs, professing faith in an objective truth that is knowable. The latter argues the unknowability of "facts," or at least a more fluid multiplicity of contingent events that interact in a dynamic, thus creating what we think we "know."

It does not mention that truth is rational and empirical but that the realist approach is. Similarly, the pragmatists' view opposes the knowability of truth in the first place.

Incorrect Answers:

The other options mostly correctly adhere to the two views under discussion.

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 Answer key/Solution

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Q.4 [11831809]

“The specific features of what we interact with as reality are not prior and independent of those interactions but merge and acquire their specificity through them”. Which one of the following statements best reflects the argument being made in this sentence?

-
- 1 ☐ We perceive reality through our interactions, which creates the unique reality of the thing we perceive.
-

2 ☐ We have features that help us understand reality and create a notion of reality independent of what we perceive.

3 ☐ The specific features with which we interact with an independent reality acquire the meaning of that reality.

4 ☐ The reality, as we understand and perceive it, is created through interactive features that merge with the real.

Solution:

Correct Answer : 1

Correct Answer – (1)

The statement basically says that reality is not an independent object but one which takes shape based on the perceiver. This corresponds to (1) and is thus the correct answer.

 **Answer key/Solution**

Incorrect Answers:

(2) and (3) are incorrect as they speak of an independent reality, which simply does not exist according to the passage.

(4) The statement mentions a merging of perception with the object of perception and not interactive features.

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FeedBack

Direction (5-8): Study the following information and answer the questions that follow:

It takes two to make war, by whatever means, but it takes only one to make fascism against one's own people and/or against others. A definition of the essence of fascism has been given: coupling the pursuit of political goals with massive violence. We have democracy exactly to prevent that, a political game for the pursuit of political goals by nonviolent means and, more particularly, by getting the majority, as demonstrated by free and fair elections or referenda, on one's side. A wonderful innovation with a logical follow-up: nonviolence even when the majority oversteps lines or limits, for instance, as written into the codes of human rights.

The strong state, able and willing to display its force – including through the use of capital punishment – belongs to the essence of fascism. That means an absolute monopoly on power, including the power that does not come out of a gun, including nonviolent power. . . It means unlimited surveillance of one's own people and others, made possible by postmodern technology. What matters is fear: that people are afraid and abstain from protests and nonviolent action lest they are singled out for the ultimate punishment: extrajudicial execution. More important than actually checking everybody's email and web activity and listening to telephone calls is that people believe this is happening. The trick is to do so indiscriminately, not focusing on suspects only but making people feel that anyone is a potential suspect.

The even more basic trick is to make fascism compatible with democracy. There are many ways to achieve this alloy—first, a reductionist definition of democracy as multi-party national elections. Second, making the parties close to identical in matters of 'security', ready to use violence internationally or nationally. Third, privatizing the economy under the heading of 'freedom', the other bridging word, essentially granting the executive power over the judiciary, the police and the military – a move for which there is already manufactured consent. To arrive at that consent, a permanent crisis with a permanent enemy ready to hit is useful, but there are other approaches.

Just as a crisis defined as 'military' catapults the military into power, a crisis defined as 'economic' catapults capital into power. If the crisis is that the West has been outcompeted in the real economy, then the finance economy – the huge banks – start handling the trillions under the formula of freedom. If freedom is defined as the freedom to use the money to make more money and security as the force to kill the designated enemy wherever he is, then we get a military-financial complex, the successor to the military-industrial complex in de-industrializing societies. They know their enemies: peace movements and environment movements, threats to security and freedom, respectively, by not only casting doubts on killing, wealth, and inequality but also framing them as counter-productive. Both movements say that you are, in fact, producing insecurity and dictatorship. . .

So, here we are. Torture as enhanced investigation, de facto camps of concentration like Guantanamo, habeas corpus eliminated. Those who pull the veil aside—Julian Assange, Bradley Manning, Edward Snowden—are criminalized, not that building fascism. The old adage: when democracy is most needed, abolish it.

Q.5 [11831809]

The author lists all of the following as reasons for the infiltration of fascism in democracy EXCEPT:

- 1 ☐ the use of elections to declare the winner of a democratic process.
 - 2 ☐ the use of surveillance as a tool to create fear in the minds of people.
 - 3 ☐ all political parties have a similar notion about handling national security.
-

4 ○ providing power to the executive over other branches of government.

Solution:

Correct Answer : 1

Correct Answer – (1)

 Answer key/Solution

The given passage is a description of how a democracy can be thrown into clutches of fascism and what it can lead to. In the first paragraph, the author has described fascism and how democracy is a desirable alternative.

In the subsequent passages, the author has described how a democracy is turned into fascism and how it is made compatible with the existing democratic framework.

In the last paragraph, the author has argued that the financial and the economic frameworks of a democracy are utilized to overturn the fundamental pillars of a democratic system.

Author's tone:

Critical, disparaging, argumentative

1: The author has talked about results and objectives of free and fair elections only in the first paragraph while describing the advantages of democracy over fascism. And nowhere in the passage have elections been termed as a cause for the beginning of fascism.

Incorrect Answers:

2: It has been stated in the second paragraph: ...unlimited surveillance of one's own people and others, made possible by postmodern technology. What matters is fear: that people are afraid and abstain from protests and nonviolent action lest they are singled out...

3: It has been stated in the third paragraph: Second, making the parties close to identical in matters of 'security', ready to use violence internationally or nationally. 4: It has been stated in the third paragraph: ... privatizing the economy under the heading of 'freedom', the other bridging word, essentially granting the executive power over the judiciary, the police and the military – a move for which there is already manufactured consent.

Bookmark

FeedBack

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Just as a crisis defined as 'military' catapults the military into power, a crisis defined as 'economic' catapults capital into power. If the crisis is that the West has been outcompeted in the real economy, then the finance economy – the huge banks – start handling the trillions under the formula of freedom. If freedom is defined as the freedom to use the money to make more money and security as the force to kill the designated enemy wherever he is, then we get a military-financial complex, the successor to the military-industrial complex in de-industrializing societies. They know their enemies: peace movements and environment movements, threats to security and freedom, respectively, by not only casting doubts on killing, wealth, and inequality but also framing them as counter-productive. Both movements say that you are, in fact, producing insecurity and dictatorship. . .

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Q.6 [11831809]

From the passage, we can infer that the author is very likely in favour of:

1 ☐ nonviolent means of power

2 ☐ None of the options listed here

3 ☐ privatization of the economy

4 ☐ a holistic idea of democracy

Solution:

Correct Answer : 4

Correct Answer – (4)

 Answer key/Solution

4: As per the passage, holistic democracy would imply a democratic system that encourages individuals to grow and learn as a whole and facilitates mutual empowerment and fair participation by its citizens through their representatives. A certain preference for holistic democracy in the face of fascism is what the author's main idea is all about. The author has described the process of turning a thriving democracy into an authoritarian state, which leads to insecurity and dictatorship of the citizens. Largely, the author has presented a criticism of a fractured version of democracy (influenced by fascism). Therefore, the author has expressed a liking for a holistic democracy.

Incorrect Answers:

1: Refer to these statements from the passage: 'That means an absolute monopoly on power, including the power that does not come out of a gun, including nonviolent power. . . It means unlimited surveillance of one's own people and others, made possible by postmodern technology.' Through these statements, the author has claimed that a fascist regime; that is, an authoritarian government, secures all kinds of power in its control, and this includes non-violent power too. The author has further described this non-violent power, and, thus, presents this non-violent power with criticism. Therefore, the author will certainly not be in favour of non-violent power.

3: Refer to these statements from the passage: 'Third, privatizing the economy under the heading of 'freedom', the other bridging word, essentially granting the executive power over the judiciary, the police and the military – a move for which there is already manufactured consent.' Through these statements, the author has expressed a dislike towards privatization of economy.

Bookmark

FeedBack

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Q.7 [11831809]

The author mentions the "military-financial complex" to show that:

1 ☐ the freedom in a fascist regime is destroyed by using the complex relations between the military and finance.

2 ☐ in a fascist version of democracy, both military and finance- economy are used to create authoritarianism.

3 ☐ the military-financial complex substitutes for the military-industrial complex when there is de-industrialization.

4 ☐ there exists a framework within which an economy operates to create insecurity within the people under it.

Solution:

Correct Answer : 2

Correct Answer – (2)

 Answer key/Solution

2: Refer to these lines from the passage: 'If freedom is defined as the freedom to use the money to make more money and security as the force to kill the designated enemy wherever he is, then we get a military-financial complex.....say that you are, in fact, producing insecurity and dictatorship.' Through these statements, the author has stated that with an altered perspective about freedom regarding money and security, a democracy-turned-fascist system, by using the financial and the military infrastructure, kills the essence of democracy. Option 2 captures this purpose of the author correctly.

Incorrect Answers:

1: Option 1 does not emphasize the primary purpose correctly. The 'freedom' to use the money to make more money and 'freedom' security as the force to kill the designated enemy are used as a justification for establishing authoritarianism. The author wants to imply the destruction of a democratic system by the use of military and financial economy, not by any relation between the military and financial economy.

3: It is a narrow interpretation about the military-financial complex, and does not capture the destruction of democracy implied by the author.

4: This option misses out the context of military and financial economy in its implication.

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Direction (5-8): Study the following information and answer the questions that follow:

It takes two to make war, by whatever means, but it takes only one to make fascism against one's own people and/or against others. A definition of the essence of fascism has been given: coupling the pursuit of political goals with massive violence. We have democracy exactly to prevent that, a political game for the pursuit of political goals by nonviolent means and, more particularly, by getting the majority, as demonstrated by free and fair elections or referenda, on one's side. A wonderful innovation with a logical follow-up: nonviolence even when the majority oversteps lines or limits, for instance, as written into the codes of human rights.

The strong state, able and willing to display its force – including through the use of capital punishment – belongs to the essence of fascism. That means an absolute monopoly on power, including the power that does not come out of a gun, including nonviolent power. . . It means unlimited surveillance of one's own people and others, made possible by postmodern technology. What matters is fear: that people are afraid and abstain from protests and nonviolent action lest they are singled out for the ultimate punishment: extrajudicial execution. More important than actually checking everybody's email and web activity and listening to telephone calls is that people believe this is happening. The trick is to do so indiscriminately, not focusing on suspects only but making people feel that anyone is a potential suspect.

The even more basic trick is to make fascism compatible with democracy. There are many ways to achieve this alloy—first, a reductionist definition of democracy as multi-party national elections. Second, making the parties close to identical in matters of 'security', ready to use violence internationally or nationally. Third, privatizing the economy under the heading of 'freedom', the other bridging word, essentially granting the executive power over the judiciary, the police and the military – a move for which there is already manufactured consent. To arrive at that consent, a permanent crisis with a permanent enemy ready to hit is useful, but there are other approaches.

Just as a crisis defined as 'military' catapults the military into power, a crisis defined as 'economic' catapults capital into power. If the crisis is that the West has been outcompeted in the real economy, then the finance economy – the huge banks – start handling the trillions under the formula of freedom. If freedom is defined as the freedom to use the money to make more money and security as the force to kill the designated enemy wherever he is, then we get a military-financial complex, the successor to the military-industrial complex in de-industrializing societies. They know their enemies: peace movements and environment movements, threats to security and freedom, respectively, by not only casting doubts on killing, wealth, and inequality but also framing them as counter-productive. Both movements say that you are, in fact, producing insecurity and dictatorship. . .

So, here we are. Torture as enhanced investigation, de facto camps of concentration like Guantanamo, habeas corpus eliminated. Those who pull the veil aside—Julian Assange, Bradley Manning, Edward Snowden—are criminalized, not that building fascism. The old adage: when democracy is most needed, abolish it.

Q.8 [11831809]

The last sentence of the passage states, "The old adage: when democracy is most needed, abolish it." It can be inferred from the passage that the author most likely means that:

-
- 1 ☐ Democracy is subverted by fascism, and so democracy should no longer exist since it no longer serves its purpose.
-
- 2 ☐ Democracy is supposed to protect people from oppression, but a version of fascism in democracy is destroying it.
-

3 ☐ Democracy, during the old times, meant something; however, that is no longer the case, and we need to abolish it.

4 ☐ Democracy is most needed during our times; however, there are external forces that are operating to abolish it.

Solution:

Correct Answer : 2

Correct Answer – (2)

It might seem that, through the phrase 'abolish it', the author is suggesting a complete abolishment of democracy, but that will be an extreme and uncertain interpretation. Nowhere in the passage has the author argued for abolishment of democracy after it is taken over by fascism. Instead, the author has appreciated democracy for being an alternative to fascism (first paragraph). The overall tone and implication of the author has just indicated the destruction of democracy by the fascist forces. The author has mentioned 'The old adage: when democracy is most needed, abolish it' to state that a fascist version of democracy inflicts punishments upon the people it is supposed to protect. Option 2 encapsulates this implication of the author correctly.

Incorrect Answers:

1: Abolishment of democracy is not implied or stated in the passage.

3: Abolishment of democracy is not implied or stated in the passage.

4: Abolishment of democracy is not implied or stated in the passage.

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 Answer key/Solution

Direction (9-12): Study the following information and answer the questions that follow:

It is no easy task to survey the rapidly expanding literature on science and British imperialism. Quite apart from the difficulty of doing justice to existing scholarship, one must grapple with thorny, if not insurmountable, problems of definition. Although Britain began to establish its first colonies in North America in the sixteenth century, there was no concept of “empire”—as we understand it—until much later, perhaps not until the nineteenth century. Even the adjective “British” meant little to most inhabitants of the isles until well after the Act of Union of 1707. This immediately presents a problem for historians looking at the first centuries of colonial expansion, as most scientific work before the mid-nineteenth century was not conducted in formal colonies but under the auspices of corporations such as the English East India Company or individuals working independently of the state. In this respect, the British Empire stands in marked contrast to the French, where the state was actively involved in science from the eighteenth century.

There is then the problem of “science” itself. Although historians have always acknowledged the changing face of science in the colonies, their concept of “science” in the early phases of colonization has tended toward anachronism. They have projected modern notions of science onto activities that are far better understood as natural philosophy, thereby wrenching explorations of nature from their proper context. The essentializing of colonial scientific work as colonial science has also led historians to portray it as more coordinated and unified than it usually was, ignoring dimensions of science that were not directed by the state or the East India Company. Moreover, colonial science is often seen as essentially different from science practised in noncolonial contexts. It is typically portrayed as a derivative, instrumentalist, and exploitative, with colonial scientists seen as mere fact gatherers, making few theoretical contributions in their own right. There is some substance to these claims, but they paint a very partial picture of scientific work in the British colonies. Recent research reveals a much richer tapestry, one that calls into question many of the basic assumptions that historians have made about science in the colonies and, indeed, the very notion of “colonial science.”

It is necessary to understand how the notion of “colonial science” came into being and how it has been refined over the years. An appropriate starting point is George Basalla’s seminal essay on “The Spread of Western Science” (1967), which had a formative influence on much historical scholarship on British science through to the 1980s. Writing at a time when modernization theory was in the ascendant, Basalla posited a universal model for the diffusion of Western science, from an initial phase of exploration—in which colonies provided raw data and materials for scientific analysis in the West—through to formal colonial dependence and, ultimately, to independence. However, by the 1970s, Marxist critiques of neocolonialism—particularly the work of “dependency” theorists such as Paul Baran, Andre Gunder Frank, and Immanuel Wallerstein—had generated a mood in which the role of science in colonial expansion was viewed more critically. Basalla’s chronology remained influential, but science came to be seen increasingly as an instrument of imperial control rather than the key to development.

Q.9 [11831809]

Which of the following statements about colonial science will the author agree with the least?

-
- 1 ☐ Colonial science is not as integrated as some modern historians believe it to be.
-
- 2 ☐ The modern notion of science is not the same as that of science during the colonial period.
-
- 3 ☐ There is some truth in the statement that colonial scientists were mere fact-gatherers.
-

4 ☐ Many of the scientific activities during colonial times were directed by the East India Company.

Solution:

Correct Answer : 4

Correct Answer – (4)

 Answer key/Solution

The statement given in option (4) is factually incorrect in the light of the passage.

Refer to the sentence, “The essentializing of colonial scientific work as colonial science has also led historians to portray it as more coordinated and unified than it usually was, ignoring dimensions of science that were not directed by the state or the East India Company.” Therefore, it is evident that there were dimensions of science that were not directed by the East India Company.

Incorrect Answers:

Option (1) cannot be the answer because colonial science is not integrated. Refer to the last paragraph where the definition of colonial science is given. Also, refer to the last 2 sentences of the 2nd paragraph where the author presents his observations about colonial science.

Option (2) is cannot be the answer because colonial science is “typically portrayed as a derivative, instrumentalist, and exploitative, with colonial scientists seen as mere fact gatherers” Refer to the 2nd paragraph. The definition of modern science is also given in the 2nd paragraph. Refer to sentence, “They have projected modern notions of science onto activities that are far better understood as natural philosophy, thereby wrenching explorations of nature from their proper context.” So, there is a difference between the two.

Option (3) cannot be the answer because it is true. Refer to the sentence, “... with colonial scientists seen as mere fact gatherers”

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Direction (9-12): Study the following information and answer the questions that follow:

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Q.10 [11831809]

The last paragraph implies each of the following EXCEPT that “colonial science”:

- 1 ☐ did not have a universal and collective understanding.
 - 2 ☐ seen by modernization theory to have a positive impact.
 - 3 ☐ for neocolonialism, it was parallel to the idea of imperialism.
-

4 ☐ was understood by some that can be fitted to a universal model.

Solution:

Correct Answer : 3

Correct Answer – (3)

 Answer key/Solution

Neocolonialism provides an alternative view of imperialism. Refer to the Marxist critics. Therefore, both neo-colonialism and imperialism can never be parallel narratives.

Incorrect Answers:

Option (1) cannot be the answer because it is true. Colonial science was viewed as an instrument of imperial control. Refer to the Marxist criticism of Colonial science.

Option (2) cannot be the answer. Refer to Basalla's views: "Basalla posited a universal model for the diffusion of Western science, from an initial phase of exploration—in which colonies provided raw data and materials for scientific analysis in the West—through to formal colonial dependence and, ultimately, to independence."

Option (4) cannot be the answer because of Basalla's view given in the last paragraph. Refer to: "Basalla posited a universal model"

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Direction (9-12): Study the following information and answer the questions that follow:

It is no easy task to survey the rapidly expanding literature on science and British imperialism. Quite apart from the difficulty of doing justice to existing scholarship, one must grapple with thorny, if not insurmountable, problems of definition. Although Britain began to establish its first colonies in North America in the sixteenth century, there was no concept of “empire”—as we understand it—until much later, perhaps not until the nineteenth century. Even the adjective “British” meant little to most inhabitants of the isles until well after the Act of Union of 1707. This immediately presents a problem for historians looking at the first centuries of colonial expansion, as most scientific work before the mid-nineteenth century was not conducted in formal colonies but under the auspices of corporations such as the English East India Company or individuals working independently of the state. In this respect, the British Empire stands in marked contrast to the French, where the state was actively involved in science from the eighteenth century.

There is then the problem of “science” itself. Although historians have always acknowledged the changing face of science in the colonies, their concept of “science” in the early phases of colonization has tended toward anachronism. They have projected modern notions of science onto activities that are far better understood as natural philosophy, thereby wrenching explorations of nature from their proper context. The essentializing of colonial scientific work as colonial science has also led historians to portray it as more coordinated and unified than it usually was, ignoring dimensions of science that were not directed by the state or the East India Company. Moreover, colonial science is often seen as essentially different from science practised in noncolonial contexts. It is typically portrayed as a derivative, instrumentalist, and exploitative, with colonial scientists seen as mere fact gatherers, making few theoretical contributions in their own right. There is some substance to these claims, but they paint a very partial picture of scientific work in the British colonies. Recent research reveals a much richer tapestry, one that calls into question many of the basic assumptions that historians have made about science in the colonies and, indeed, the very notion of “colonial science.”

It is necessary to understand how the notion of “colonial science” came into being and how it has been refined over the years. An appropriate starting point is George Basalla’s seminal essay on “The Spread of Western Science” (1967), which had a formative influence on much historical scholarship on British science through to the 1980s. Writing at a time when modernization theory was in the ascendant, Basalla posited a universal model for the diffusion of Western science, from an initial phase of exploration—in which colonies provided raw data and materials for scientific analysis in the West—through to formal colonial dependence and, ultimately, to independence. However, by the 1970s, Marxist critiques of neocolonialism—particularly the work of “dependency” theorists such as Paul Baran, Andre Gunder Frank, and Immanuel Wallerstein—had generated a mood in which the role of science in colonial expansion was viewed more critically. Basalla’s chronology remained influential, but science came to be seen increasingly as an instrument of imperial control rather than the key to development.

Q.11 [11831809]

Which one of the following sentences from the passage best captures the main concern of the passage?

-
- 1 ☐ “...one must grapple with thorny, if not insurmountable, problems of definition.”
-
- 2 ☐ “...but science came to be seen increasingly as an instrument of imperial control rather than the key to development.”
-
- 3 ☐ “...colonial science is often seen as essentially different from science practised in noncolonial contexts.”
-

4 ☐ "..., their concept of "science" in the early phases of colonization has tended toward anachronism."

Solution:

Correct Answer : 1

Correct Answer – (1)

Option (1) best expresses the main idea of the passage because the author's concern is with the definition of science and how science is explained/defined during and after colonial times.

Incorrect Answers:

Options (2), (3) and (4) are narrow in scope. They refer to individual concerns subservient to the main idea expressed in the passage. They don't signify the main concern of the author.

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 Answer key/Solution

Direction (9-12): Study the following information and answer the questions that follow:

It is no easy task to survey the rapidly expanding literature on science and British imperialism. Quite apart from the difficulty of doing justice to existing scholarship, one must grapple with thorny, if not insurmountable, problems of definition. Although Britain began to establish its first colonies in North America in the sixteenth century, there was no concept of “empire”—as we understand it—until much later, perhaps not until the nineteenth century. Even the adjective “British” meant little to most inhabitants of the isles until well after the Act of Union of 1707. This immediately presents a problem for historians looking at the first centuries of colonial expansion, as most scientific work before the mid-nineteenth century was not conducted in formal colonies but under the auspices of corporations such as the English East India Company or individuals working independently of the state. In this respect, the British Empire stands in marked contrast to the French, where the state was actively involved in science from the eighteenth century.

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Q.12 [11831809]

“Recent research reveals a much richer tapestry, one that calls into question many of the basic assumptions that historians have made about science in the colonies and, indeed, the very notion of “colonial science.”” Which of the following would the author most likely accept as a correct assumption?

-
- 1 ☐ The notion of science applied to colonial science can be based on the idea of science during the early phase of colonization.
-

2 ☐ Colonial science can be considered a fluid idea which can be studied without projecting modern concerns onto past events.

3 ☐ The current literature on colonial science can be evaluated in such a manner to get a comprehensive understanding of colonial science.

4 ☐ The basic premise for the understanding of colonial science can be gathered by reviewing literature based on modernization theory.

Solution:

Correct Answer : 2

Correct Answer – (2)

There is a gap between modern scope of science and the past. This is the main concern of the passage. Refer to: "... very partial picture of scientific work in the British colonies." Note the word 'partial'.

Incorrect Answers:

The other options do not provide the correct definition of the quoted sentence.

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 Answer key/Solution

Direction (13-16): Study the following information and answer the questions that follow:

Ghosts are not renowned for their sense of humour. As Charles Lamb (he of the undeconstructed tales from Shakespeare) put it; 'Can a ghost laugh, or shake his gaunt sides, when you are pleasant with him?' But the ghost of the theorist of farcical returns might well be something of an exception. At any rate, one can't help thinking that, were the personal spirit of Marx to be in any position to take note of his conjurings in the pages of ***Specters of Marx***, it might be a little tickled in its gaunt ribs, inclined even to give vent to some hollow-sounding cries of mirth. For there is surely an element of irony about this supposedly overdue encounter between Derrida and Marx: namely, that it may be the cause - and this conference is itself confirming of the suspicion - of a certain rehabilitation of Marx.

I say 'certain' because we must add 'in the academy', or 'in philosophy'. The rehabilitation may prove somewhat local and limited, but nonetheless its peculiarity should not pass entirely without comment. That the deconstructive turn in philosophy which looked to be exorcizing Marx, and which was certainly interpreted by many as wanting to do so, may be that which conjures him forth again and puts him back into philosophical vogue; that it may only be through the authorization of Derrida that Marx may return from the shadowy wings of the academy to centre stage and even be allowed a speaking part: this is an odd turnabout, maybe even a bit spooky, certainly a funny business. Derrida is right that there are several spirits of Marx, including some we may want finally to put to rest. But one which we should surely continue to summon is that which invites philosophy to be sensitive to its context and effects, and to see the humour in some of its own inversions. Regrettably, Derrida's return to Marx is too little haunted by this spirit of self-appraisal.

But how far, in any case, is this coming back to Marx a genuinely new event, how far a revenant of Derrida's earlier deferrings of the engagement with the ethical and the political - which have always taken the form, in fact, not so much of a postponement or a confident 'don't call me, I'll call you', but of what one might call a politely tentative gesturing towards a possible handshake with the nettle.

Three aspects of ***Specters of Marx*** seem noteworthy here. In the first place, it offers a definite statement of political affiliation. Derrida makes plain his distance from the celebrants of the demise of Marxism and from all those who would echo Fukuyama's triumphalist prophecies about the 'end of history'. He is very ready to acknowledge that if we measure the out-of-jointness of our times by the degree of human misery already occurred or in the offing, then our times are indeed askew. In his ten indictments of global capitalism, he also makes it very clear that he subscribes to a broadly Marxist view of the sources of the disorder.

Q.13 [11831809]

Based on the information provided in the passage, all of the following can be inferred about Derrida EXCEPT:

- 1 ☐ Derrida believes that there are certain aspects or interpretations of Marx's ideology that could be done away with.
 - 2 ☐ Through his work, Derrida has established his disagreement with those who celebrate the end of Marx and his ideology.
 - 3 ☐ Derrida has stated that he subscribes to a broadly Marxist view of the sources of the problems arising out of global capitalism.
-

4 ☐ Derrida has made fun of Fukuyama and other philosophers who have prophesized about the end of history and time.

Solution:

Correct Answer : 4

Correct Answer: (4)

Nowhere is it mentioned that Derrida has made fun of Fukuyama or those who have prophesized the end of history.

 Answer key/Solution

Incorrect Answers:

1 – Can be inferred from: “Derrida is right that there are several spirits of Marx, including some we may want finally to put to rest.”

2 – Can be inferred from: “In the first place, it offers a definite statement of political affiliation. Derrida makes plain his distance from the celebrants of the demise of Marxism and from all those who would echo Fukuyama’s triumphalist prophecies about the ‘end of history’.

3 – Can be inferred from: “In his ten indictments of global capitalism, he also makes it very clear that he subscribes to a broadly Marxist view of the sources of the disorder.”

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FeedBack

Direction (13-16): Study the following information and answer the questions that follow:

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I say 'certain' because we must add 'in the academy', or 'in philosophy'. The rehabilitation may prove somewhat local and limited, but nonetheless its peculiarity should not pass entirely without comment. That the deconstructive turn in philosophy which looked to be exorcizing Marx, and which was certainly interpreted by many as wanting to do so, may be that which conjures him forth again and puts him back into philosophical vogue; that it may only be through the authorization of Derrida that Marx may return from the shadowy wings of the academy to centre stage and even be allowed a speaking part: this is an odd turnabout, maybe even a bit spooky, certainly a funny business. Derrida is right that there are several spirits of Marx, including some we may want finally to put to rest. But one which we should surely continue to summon is that which invites philosophy to be sensitive to its context and effects, and to see the humour in some of its own inversions. Regrettably, Derrida's return to Marx is too little haunted by this spirit of self-appraisal.

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Q.14 [11831809]

How does the author view Derrida's earlier engagements with the ethical and the political?

-
- 1 ☐ A possible collaboration with a wise group.
-
- 2 ☐ An assertive and overt expression of postponement.
-
- 3 ☐ An unpleasant collaboration, which can result in pain.
-
- 4 ☐ A reluctant collaboration which can prove profitable.
-

Solution:

Correct Answer : 3

Correct Answer: (3)

Refer to the last lines in paragraph 3 “one might call a politely tentative gesturing towards a possible handshake with the nettle”. This makes option (3) correct. The word ‘nettle’ means a prickly/stinging plant.

Incorrect Answers:

1 – This has been an unpleasant and reluctant association at best.

2 – This is what it has not been.

4 – There is no reference to the possibility of future profitability.

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 Answer key/Solution

Direction (13-16): Study the following information and answer the questions that follow:

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I say 'certain' because we must add 'in the academy', or 'in philosophy'. The rehabilitation may prove somewhat local and limited, but nonetheless its peculiarity should not pass entirely without comment. That the deconstructive turn in philosophy which looked to be exorcizing Marx, and which was certainly interpreted by many as wanting to do so, may be that which conjures him forth again and puts him back into philosophical vogue; that it may only be through the authorization of Derrida that Marx may return from the shadowy wings of the academy to centre stage and even be allowed a speaking part: this is an odd turnabout, maybe even a bit spooky, certainly a funny business. Derrida is right that there are several spirits of Marx, including some we may want finally to put to rest. But one which we should surely continue to summon is that which invites philosophy to be sensitive to its context and effects, and to see the humour in some of its own inversions. Regrettably, Derrida's return to Marx is too little haunted by this spirit of self-appraisal.

But how far, in any case, is this coming back to Marx a genuinely new event, how far a revenant of Derrida's earlier deferrings of the engagement with the ethical and the political - which have always taken the form, in fact, not so much of a postponement or a confident 'don't call me, I'll call you', but of what one might call a politely tentative gesturing towards a possible handshake with the nettle.

Three aspects of ***Specters of Marx*** seem noteworthy here. In the first place, it offers a definite statement of political affiliation. Derrida makes plain his distance from the celebrants of the demise of Marxism and from all those who would echo Fukuyama's triumphalist prophecies about the 'end of history'. He is very ready to acknowledge that if we measure the out-of-jointness of our times by the degree of human misery already occurred or in the offing, then our times are indeed askew. In his ten indictments of global capitalism, he also makes it very clear that he subscribes to a broadly Marxist view of the sources of the disorder.

Q.15 [11831809]

The author would most likely agree with which of the following?

-
- 1 ☐ Despite opposing some Marxist ideas, Derrida's writings hint at a revival of Marx.
-
- 2 ☐ These days we experience an equal amount of misery as we did in the past as well.
-
- 3 ☐ The roots of our present disorder can be traced back reasonably accurately by Marxist views.
-
- 4 ☐ Derrida never indicated that he would come back to conform with some of Marx's views.
-

Solution:

Correct Answer : 1

Correct Answer: (1)

Refer to the lines in the first paragraph " *For there is surely an element of irony...a certain rehabilitation of Marx*". This makes option (1) something the author would agree with.

Incorrect Answers:

Options (2) and (3) are Derrida's views in paragraph 4. The author has not supported these views explicitly.

Option (4) is incorrect as the author questions Derrida in paragraph 3 " *But how far, in any case, is this coming back to Marx a genuinely new event*" – which means that this coming to Marx by Derrida may not be an entirely new thing. Also, Derrida has given some indication earlier of ' *a handshake*'. Refer to the last lines of paragraph 2.

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 Answer key/Solution

Direction (13-16): Study the following information and answer the questions that follow:

Ghosts are not renowned for their sense of humour. As Charles Lamb (he of the undeconstructed tales from Shakespeare) put it; 'Can a ghost laugh, or shake his gaunt sides, when you are pleasant with him?' But the ghost of the theorist of farcical returns might well be something of an exception. At any rate, one can't help thinking that, were the personal spirit of Marx to be in any position to take note of his conjurings in the pages of ***Specters of Marx***, it might be a little tickled in its gaunt ribs, inclined even to give vent to some hollow-sounding cries of mirth. For there is surely an element of irony about this supposedly overdue encounter between Derrida and Marx: namely, that it may be the cause - and this conference is itself confirming of the suspicion - of a certain rehabilitation of Marx.

I say 'certain' because we must add 'in the academy', or 'in philosophy'. The rehabilitation may prove somewhat local and limited, but nonetheless its peculiarity should not pass entirely without comment. That the deconstructive turn in philosophy which looked to be exorcizing Marx, and which was certainly interpreted by many as wanting to do so, may be that which conjures him forth again and puts him back into philosophical vogue; that it may only be through the authorization of Derrida that Marx may return from the shadowy wings of the academy to centre stage and even be allowed a speaking part: this is an odd turnabout, maybe even a bit spooky, certainly a funny business. Derrida is right that there are several spirits of Marx, including some we may want finally to put to rest. But one which we should surely continue to summon is that which invites philosophy to be sensitive to its context and effects, and to see the humour in some of its own inversions. Regrettably, Derrida's return to Marx is too little haunted by this spirit of self-appraisal.

But how far, in any case, is this coming back to Marx a genuinely new event, how far a revenant of Derrida's earlier deferrings of the engagement with the ethical and the political - which have always taken the form, in fact, not so much of a postponement or a confident 'don't call me, I'll call you', but of what one might call a politely tentative gesturing towards a possible handshake with the nettle.

Three aspects of ***Specters of Marx*** seem noteworthy here. In the first place, it offers a definite statement of political affiliation. Derrida makes plain his distance from the celebrants of the demise of Marxism and from all those who would echo Fukuyama's triumphalist prophecies about the 'end of history'. He is very ready to acknowledge that if we measure the out-of-jointness of our times by the degree of human misery already occurred or in the offing, then our times are indeed askew. In his ten indictments of global capitalism, he also makes it very clear that he subscribes to a broadly Marxist view of the sources of the disorder.

Q.16 [11831809]

Where could the passage have been taken from?

-
- 1 ☐ A book review of ***Specters of Marx***
-
- 2 ☐ A newspaper article highlighting Derrida's best work
-
- 3 ☐ A speech or presentation on ***Specters of Marx***
-
- 4 ☐ A book on political ideologies
-

Solution:

Correct Answer : 3

Correct Answer: (3)

The main subject being discussed in the passage is '*Specters of Marx*'.

Therefore, options (2) and (4) can be eliminated as the scope of these options is too broad. Option (1) would also not be appropriate as the author is focussed more on the ideas in the book rather than evaluating the book. Option (3) is best suited as the author seems to be bringing ideas from the book and then discussing them at length.

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 Answer key/Solution

Q.17 [11831809]

Directions for question (17): The four sentences (labelled 1, 2, 3, and 4) given in this question, when properly sequenced, form a coherent paragraph. Decide on the proper order for the sentences and key in this sequence of four numbers as your answer.

- (1) As many as three billion people across developing countries – including India, sub-Saharan Africa and southeast Asia – consume palm oil due to relatively low prices and its neutral taste / odour profile.
 - (2) The thrust of the problem is that despite the environmental challenges associated with it, palm oil continues to sustain the developing world.
 - (3) Oil palm is a valuable economic crop and a source of employment across developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and it allows small landholders to participate in the cash economy and helps improve living standards of the local community.
 - (4) The most prominent factors that have made palm oil a success and also brought with them well-documented environmental and social challenges are links to deforestation, labour rights and damaging effects on the environment, particularly when the crop is grown unsustainably.
-

Solution:

Correct Answer : 3421

3421

 Answer key/Solution

The main idea of the paragraph is that how despite the environmental challenges linked with palm oil crop, it proves to be economically beneficial for both its growers and the consumers.

The logical flow of the idea of the paragraph is to mention palm oil as an economically valuable crop that raises the living standards of people where it is grown and also it benefits the consumers of palm oil even though it comes with a cost on the environment.

3 – It initiates the topic of the benefits of growing palm oil.

4 – It introduces the environmental challenges posed by the cultivation of palm oil.

2 – benefits of palm oil, especially for developing countries is mentioned.

1 – Further benefits of palm oil are explained.

The paragraph from which the question was created:

Oil palm is a valuable economic crop and a source of employment across developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. It allows small landholders to participate in the cash economy and helps improve living standards of the local community. The factors that have made palm oil a success have also brought with them well-documented environmental and social challenges. The most prominent among these are links to deforestation, labour rights and damaging effects on the environment, particularly when the crop is grown unsustainably. The thrust of the problem is that despite the environmental challenges associated with it, palm oil continues to sustain the developing world. As many as three billion people across developing countries – including India, sub-Saharan Africa and southeast Asia – consume palm oil due to relatively low prices and its neutral taste / odour profile.

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Q.18 [11831809]

Directions for question (18): The four sentences (labelled 1, 2, 3, and 4) given in this question, when properly sequenced, form a coherent paragraph. Decide on the proper order for the sentences and key in this sequence of four numbers as your answer.

(1) Using the Internet for financial tasks or for acquiring health-related information had indirect effects on well-being through engagement in a wider range of activities, but was unrelated to loneliness.

(2) Using data from three waves of the New Zealand Health, Work, and Retirement Study, Szabo, Allen, Stephens, and Alpass (2018) tested a longitudinal mediation model focused on how loneliness and social engagement affect the relationship between Internet use and well-being.

(3) It was found that using the Internet to connect with family and friends indirectly affected well-being by decreasing loneliness and increasing social engagement.

(4) While there is evidence that Internet use can support well-being, not every form of engagement affects well-being the same way.

Solution:

Correct Answer : 4231

4231

 Answer key/Solution

The main idea of the paragraph is to mention that well-being can be supported by Internet use, despite the fact that not all engagements affect the well-being in the same manner.

The logical flow of the paragraph is to mention that Internet use can support well-being, and loneliness and social engagement affects the relationship between Internet use and well-being.

4 – It initiates the topic of the evidence that Internet use can support well-being. It also says that not every form of engagement affects well-being in the same way.

2 – It talks about the data that show how loneliness and social engagement affect the relationship between Internet use and well-being.

3 – It talks about the positive aspect of using the Internet.

1 – It adds more information on effects of using of the Internet

The paragraph from which the question was created:

[There have been edits made to the original paragraph]

While there is evidence that Internet use can support well-being, not every form of engagement affects well-being the same way. Using data from three waves of the New Zealand Health, Work, and Retirement Study, Szabo, Allen, Stephens, and Alpass (2018) tested a longitudinal mediation model focused on how loneliness and social engagement affect the relationship between Internet use and well-being. They found that using the Internet to connect with family and friends indirectly affected well-being by decreasing loneliness and increasing social engagement. Using the Internet for financial tasks or for acquiring health-related information had indirect effects on well-being through engagement in a wider range of activities, but was unrelated to loneliness.

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Q.19 [11831809]

Directions for question (19): The passage given below is followed by four summaries. Choose the option that best captures the author's position.

Faith in progress is deep within our culture. We have been taught to believe that our lives are better than the lives of those who came before us. The ideology of modern economics suggests that material progress has yielded enhanced satisfaction and well-being. But much of our confidence about our own well-being comes from the assumption that our lives are easier than those of earlier generations. I have already disputed the notion that we work less than medieval peasants, however poor they may have been. The field research of anthropologists gives another view of the conventional wisdom.

1 ☐ Your country can also be the land of opportunity according to conventional wisdom.

2 ☐ Not only the East, but the West also deserves to be prosperous and progressive.

3 ☐ The belief that our lives are easier than those of our earlier generations might be misplaced.

4 ☐ People envy the medieval way of life, which, ironically, was bereft of extravagance.

Solution:

Correct Answer : 3

Correct Answer: 3

 Answer key/Solution

'We have been taught to believe that our lives are better than the lives of those who came before us.....comes from the assumption that our lives are easier than those of earlier generations.' We base our belief on the assumption that people in earlier generations and those living primitively have an 'inferior standard of living'.

Incorrect Answers:

None of the other options address the topic being discussed.

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Q.20 [11831809]

Directions for question (20): Five sentences related to a topic are given below. Four of them can be put together to form a meaningful and coherent short paragraph. Identify the odd one out.

- (1) The researchers analyzed data donated by 915 demographically diverse users to understand what videos they encountered online.
 - (2) Understanding that audiences for extremist content are concentrated, is exactly the sort of information that policy makers would need to fight the spread of extremism and associated violence.
 - (3) Researchers working with the Anti-Defamation League to understand extremist content on YouTube show why panels are such useful research tools.
 - (4) In the months the study covered, 9.2 percent of YouTube users encountered at least one extremist or nationalist video online, which suggests that these videos are disturbingly common, but far from universally viewed.
 - (5) More than 90 percent of the extremist-content views on YouTube came from a small group of users who had answered demographic-survey questions in a way that identified them as high in racial or gender resentment.
-

Solution:

Correct Answer : 2

2

 Answer key/Solution

The main purpose of the passage is to show the findings of the researchers working with the Anti-Defamation League who try to understand extremist content on YouTube and its audience.

Sentence 2 is odd because it talks about the need for the policy makers to understand that audiences for extremist content are concentrated and this information would help them to fight the spread of extremism and violence.

The correct sequence of the sentences is 3145. [Mind you, you need not get this order correct. The task in odd sentence question is to get the odd sentence]

Original paragraph:

Researchers working with the Anti-Defamation League to understand extremist content on YouTube show why panels are such useful research tools. The researchers analyzed data donated by 915 demographically diverse users to understand what videos they encountered online. In the months the study covered, 9.2 percent of YouTube users encountered at least one extremist or nationalist video online, which suggests that these videos are disturbingly common, but far from universally viewed. What's perhaps most interesting about the ADL study is that more than 90 percent of the extremist-content views on YouTube came from a small group of users who had answered demographic-survey questions in a way that identified them as high in racial or gender resentment.

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Q.21 [11831809]

Directions for question (21): The four sentences (labelled 1, 2, 3, and 4) given in this question, when properly sequenced, form a coherent paragraph. Decide on the proper order for the sentences and key in this sequence of four numbers as your answer.

- (1) As of 2011, 3.5 million pounds of neonics were applied to 127 million acres of crops, double the amount five years earlier.
 - (2) Because neonics can stick around in soil and water for years, they are essentially uncontrollable and are pervasive throughout the United States.
 - (3) The use of neonic pesticides has soared in recent years, and populations of bees and other critical pollinators have experienced sharp decline.
 - (4) Unlike traditional pesticides, neonics are completely absorbed by a plant, becoming part of its pollen, nectar, leaves, and roots—making the entire thing toxic.
-

Solution:

Correct Answer : 3142

3142

 Answer key/Solution

The main idea of the paragraph is that the neonic pesticides have turned out to be environmentally hazardous.

The logical flow of the ideas of the paragraph is that the use of neonic pesticides has increased remarkably in recent years and how unlike traditional pesticides, neonics have affected the environment because of their toxicity.

3 - It initiates the topic of discussion on the increase in the use of neonic pesticides in recent years and their effects on bees.

1 – The unprecedented use of neonics is shown in the form of data.

4 – Neonics are compared with traditional pesticides, thereby highlighting the harmful effects of neonics on a plant.

2 – Neonics are shown as uncontrollable and pervasive because they stick around in soil and water for years.

The paragraph from which the question was created:

The use of neonic pesticides has soared in recent years, and populations of bees and other critical pollinators have experienced sharp decline. As of 2011, 3.5 million pounds of neonics were applied to 127 million acres of crops, double the amount five years earlier. And unlike traditional pesticides, neonics are completely absorbed by a plant, becoming part of its pollen, nectar, leaves, and roots—making the entire thing toxic. And because neonics can stick around in soil and water for years, they are essentially uncontrollable and are pervasive throughout the United States.

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Q.22 [11831809]

Directions for question (22): The passage given below is followed by four summaries. Choose the option that best captures the author's position.

Ethics are supposed to provide us with 'moral principles' or universal rules that tell us what to do. Many people, for example, are passionate adherents of the moral principle of utilitarianism: "Everyone is obligated to do whatever will achieve the greatest good for the greatest number". Others are just as devoted to the basic principle of Immanuel Kant: "Everyone is obligated to act only in ways that respect the human dignity and moral rights of all persons."

1 ☐ Utilitarianism focuses on the consequences rather than the motive or intrinsic nature of an action.

2 ☐ Kant emphasizes the existence of an absolute moral law as the categorical imperative for everyone.

3 ☐ Ethics are a matter of individual choice and their main aim is to provide guiding principles that tell us what to do.

4 ○ A holistic view towards ethics involves balancing the two theories, keeping individual goals in mind while dealing with the society at large.

Solution:

Correct Answer : 3

Correct Answer: 3

 Answer key/Solution

This is the answer as people are free to follow the interpretation of ethics that they are comfortable with, as can be derived from the paragraph.

Incorrect Answers:

(1) and (2) - express the two schools of thought separately.

(4) - is an idealistic situation; one which is a consequence rather than a summary.

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Q.23 [11831809]

Directions for question (23): Five jumbled up sentences related to a topic is given below. Four of them can be put together to form a coherent paragraph. Identify the odd one out and key in the number of the sentence as your answer.

- (1) At a moment when sophisticated agreements and protocols deepen market integration, state borders increasingly harden against unwanted human entry.
 - (2) The contradictions and conflicts between the notions of statehood that underpin the entire international system and the opportunities and threats of increasingly open national boundaries have been forced into the open.
 - (3) By combining information on the built environment at border crossings (barriers, buildings, inspection lanes), along state perimeters (fences, walls) and within a border zones (police stations within 30 kilometers of the border) it is possible to detect where borders have been officially reinforced.
 - (4) States must provide public goods – schools, rule of law, basic welfare provisions – within their territories, even as they cope with perceived external threats and increasing economic interdependence.
 - (5) Far from creating certainty and clarity, borders are now places associated with immense anxiety. <
-

Solution:

Correct Answer : 3

3

 Answer key/Solution

The main purpose of the passage is to understand what statehood actually means in the present world and how national borders work both as places of opportunities and external threat.

3 is the odd one out because it talks about how it is possible to detect where borders have been reinforced. The order of the paragraph is 2415.

Original paragraph:

As a result, the contradictions and conflicts between the notions of statehood that underpin the entire international system and the opportunities and threats of increasingly open national boundaries have been forced into the open. States must provide public goods – schools, rule of law, basic welfare provisions – within their territories, even as they cope with perceived external threats and increasing economic interdependence. At a moment when sophisticated agreements and protocols deepen market integration, state borders increasingly harden against unwanted human entry. Far from creating certainty and clarity, borders are now places associated with immense anxiety.

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Q.24 [11831809]

Directions for question (24): The passage given below is followed by four summaries. Choose the option that best captures the author's position.

Someone's probably told you before that something you thought, felt or feared was 'all in your mind'. I'm here to tell you something else: there's no such thing as the mind and nothing is mental. I call this the 'no mind thesis'. The no-mind thesis is entirely compatible with the idea that people are conscious, and that they think, feel, believe, desire and so on. What it's not compatible with is the notion that being conscious, thinking, feeling, believing, desiring and so on are mental, part of the mind, or done by the mind. The no-mind thesis doesn't mean that people are 'merely bodies'. Instead, it means that, when faced with a whole person, we shouldn't think that they can be divided into a 'mind' and a 'body', or that their properties can be neatly carved up between the 'mental' and the 'non-mental'.

-
- 1 ☐ The terms mind and mental can be used in many ways and can carry many different meanings, sometimes indicating a relationship to psychiatry or something else entirely.
-
- 2 ☐ The terms 'mind' and 'mental' are abstract concepts and people cannot be demarcated into distinct categories of 'mental' and 'non-mental'.
-
- 3 ☐ The problem of miscommunication, stemming from the messiness of the ideas of the mind and the mental can be detrimental for the wellbeing of an individual.
-
- 4 ☐ When people talk about 'the mind' and 'the mental' in psychiatry, it is to be asked, 'What exactly do they mean?' as in reality, these are very vague notions.
-

Solution:

Correct Answer : 2

2

[🔍 Answer key/Solution](#)

The author of the passage does not believe in the ideas of the mind and the mental. Therefore, option (2) is the most appropriate summary of the given paragraph.

Incorrect answers:

1. Option (1) can be a corollary to the given paragraph but it does not summarise the paragraph.
3. Option (3) is incorrect because it brings in the topic of miscommunication that is not there in the paragraph.
4. Option (4) is incorrect because the paragraph doesn't focus on the meanings of 'mind' and mental'

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