

UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DO PARANÁ

PROGRAMA DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO EM DESENVOLVIMENTO
ECONÔMICO

Disciplina: Economia do Trabalho

Professor: Victor Rodrigues de Oliveira

Carga horária total: 60 horas

Pré-requisito: Econometria

Nível: Mestrado/Doutorado

Horário: Segunda-feira (8h/12h)

Objetivo

A Economia do Trabalho foca em como os indivíduos tomam decisões que direta ou indiretamente se cruzam com o ambiente de trabalho, bem como em como essas decisões são valorizadas no mercado de trabalho. Diretamente, os economistas do trabalho estudam como os indivíduos procuram emprego, decidem quais ofertas de emprego aceitar, quanto esforço dedicam ao trabalho e como os indivíduos valorizam características do trabalho além do salário. Indiretamente, os economistas do trabalho estudam como os indivíduos investem em suas habilidades – seja através de programas de treinamento profissional ou educação – bem como o mercado de trabalho influencia o investimento em crianças e decisões matrimoniais.

Ementa

Oferta de trabalho (capítulo 1 – Cahuc)

1. Long, C. D. (1953). Impact of Effective Demand on the Labor Supply. *The American Economic Review*, 43(2), 458–467.
2. Lundberg, S. (1985). The Added Worker Effect. *Journal of Labor Economics*, 3(1), 11–37.
3. Heckman, J. (1974). Shadow Prices, Market Wages, and Labor Supply. *Econometrica*, 42(4), 679–694.
4. Heckman, J. J. (1979). Sample selection bias as a specification error. *Econometrica*, 47(1): 153-161.
5. Hall, R. E. (1980). Labor supply and aggregate fluctuations. *Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy*, volume 12, pages 7-33.
6. Blundell, R. & Macurdy, T. (1999). Labor supply: A review of alternative approaches. In: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), *Handbook of Labor Economics*, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1559-1695, Elsevier.
7. Lumsdaine, R. L. & Mitchell, O. L. (1999). New developments in the economic analysis of retirement. In: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), *Handbook of Labor Economics*, edition 1, volume 3, part C, chapter 49, pages 3261-3307, Elsevier.
8. Fernandes, R. & Felício, F. D. (2005). The entry of the wife into the labor force in response to the husband's unemployment: a study of the added worker effect in Brazilian metropolitan areas. *Economic Development and cultural change*, 53(4), 887-911.

9. Frijters, Paul, David W. Johnston, Manisha Shah & Michael A. Shields. (2009). To Work or Not to Work? Child Development and Maternal Labor Supply. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 1(3): 97–110.
10. Fitzpatrick, M. D. (2010). Preschoolers Enrolled and Mothers at Work? The Effects of Universal Prekindergarten. *Journal of Labor Economics*, 28(1): 51–85.
11. Keane, M. P. (2011). Labor Supply and Taxes: A Survey. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 49(4): 961–1075.
12. Keane, M. & Rogerson, R. (2012). Micro and Macro Labor Supply Elasticities: A Reassessment of Conventional Wisdom. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 50(2): 464–76.

Demanda por trabalho (capítulo 2 – Cahuc)

1. Hamermesh, D. S. (1976). Econometric Studies of Labor Demand and Their Application to Policy Analysis. *The Journal of Human Resources*, 11(4), 507–525.
2. Hamermesh, D. S. (1984). The Demand for Labor in the Long Run. National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper, n 1297.
3. Hamermesh, D. S. (1988). Labor Demand and the Structure of Adjustment Costs. National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper, n 2572.
4. Hamermesh, D. S. (1991). Labor Demand: What Do We Know? What Don't We Know? National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper, n 3890.
5. Hamermesh, D. S. & Pfann, G. A. (1996). Adjustment Costs in Factor Demand. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 34(3), 1264–1292.
6. Beaudry, P., Green, D. A. & Sand, B. M. (2018). In Search of Labor Demand. *American Economic Review*, 108(9): 2714–57.

Equilíbrio competitivo e diferencial compensatório de salários (capítulo 3 – Cahuc)

1. Rosen, S. (1986). The theory of equalizing differences. In: O. Ashenfelter & R. Layard (ed.), *Handbook of Labor Economics*, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 12, pages 641–692, Elsevier.
2. Kahn, L. M. (1998). Collective Bargaining and the Interindustry Wage Structure: International Evidence. *Economica*, 65(260), 507–534.
3. Acemoglu, D., Autor, D. H. & Lyle, D. (2004). Women, War, and Wages: The Effect of Female Labor Supply on the Wage Structure at Midcentury. *Journal of Political Economy*, 112(3), 497–551.
4. Gabaix, X. & Landier A. (2008) Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much? *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(1): 49–100.
5. Kniesner, T. J., Viscusi, W. P., Woock, C. & Ziliak, J. P. (2012). The Value of a Statistical Life: Evidence from Panel Data. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 94(1): 74–87.
6. Arunachalam, R. & Shah, M. (2013). Compensated for Life: Sex Work and Disease Risk. *The Journal of Human Resources*, 48(2), 345–369.

Capital humano (capítulo 4 – Cahuc)

1. Spence, M. (1973). Job Market Signaling. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 87(3), 355–374.
2. Angrist, J. D. & Krueger, A. B. (1991). Does Compulsory School Attendance Affect Schooling and Earnings? *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 106(4), 979–1014.
3. Card, D. & Krueger, A. B. (1992). Does School Quality Matter? Returns to Education and the Characteristics of Public Schools in the United States. *Journal of Political Economy*, 100(1), 1–40.

4. Foster, A. D. & Rosenzweig, M. R. (1996). Technical Change and Human-Capital Returns and Investments: Evidence from the Green Revolution. *American Economic Review*, 86(4): 931-953.
5. Card, D. (1999). The Causal Effect of Education on Earnings. In: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), *Handbook of Labor Economics*, edition 1, volume 3, part A, chapter 30, pages 1801-1863, Elsevier.
6. Acemoglu, D. & Angrist, J. (2000). How Large Are Human-Capital Externalities? Evidence from Compulsory Schooling Laws. *NBER Macroeconomics Annual*, 15, 9-59.
7. Goldin, C. (2001). The Human-Capital Century and American Leadership: Virtues of the Past. *The Journal of Economic History*, 61(2), 263-292.
8. Currie, J. & Moretti, E. (2003). Mother's Education and the Intergenerational Transmission of Human Capital: Evidence from College Openings. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 118(4): 1495-1532.
9. Lochner, L. & Moretti, E. (2004). The Effect of Education on Crime: Evidence from Prison Inmates, Arrests, and Self-Reports. *The American Economic Review*, 94(1), 155-189.
10. Milligan, K., Moretti, E. & Oreopoulos, P. (2004). Does education improve citizenship? Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom. *Journal of Public Economics*, 88(9-10): 1667-1695.
11. Heckman, J. J., Lochner, L. J. & Todd, P. E. (2006). Earnings Functions, Rates of Return and Treatment Effects: The Mincer Equation and Beyond. In: E. Hanushek & F. Welch (ed.), *Handbook of the Economics of Education*, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 307-458.
12. Hanushek, E. A. & Woessmann, L. (2007). The Role of School Improvement in Economic Development. NBER Working Papers 12832, National Bureau of Economic Research.
13. Hanushek, E. A. (2009). The economic value of education and cognitive skills. *Handbook of education policy research*, 39-56.
14. Heckman, J. J., Lochner, L. J. & Todd, P. E. (2008). Earnings Functions and Rates of Return. *Journal of Human Capital*, 2(1), 1-31.
15. Carneiro, P., Heckman, J. J. & Vytlačil, E. J. (2011). Estimating Marginal Returns to Education. *American Economic Review*, 101 (6): 2754-81.
16. Oreopoulos, P. & Salvanes, K. G. (2011). Priceless: The Nonpecuniary Benefits of Schooling. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 25 (1): 159-84.
17. Hanushek, E. A. & Rivkin, S. G. (2012). The distribution of teacher quality and implications for policy. *Annu. Rev. Econ.*, 4(1), 131-157.

Mercado imperfecto: job search (capítulo 5 – Cahuc)

1. Mortensen, D. T. (1986). Job search and labor market analysis. In: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), *Handbook of Labor Economics*, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 12, pages 849-919.
2. Atkinson, A. B. & Micklewright, J. (1991). Unemployment Compensation and Labor Market Transitions: A Critical Review. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 29(4), 1679-1727.
3. Abowd, J. M., Kramarz, F. & Margolis, D. N. (1999). High Wage Workers and High Wage Firms. *Econometrica*, 67(2), 251-333.
4. Cahuc, P., Postel-Vinay, F. & Robin, J.-M. (2006). Wage Bargaining with On-the-Job Search: Theory and Evidence. *Econometrica*, 74(2), 323-364.
5. Postel-Vinay, F. & Robin, J.-M. (2006). Microeconomic search-matching models and matched employer-employee data. SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03587666, HAL.
6. Boone, J., Fredriksson, P., Holmlund, B. & van Ours, J. C. (2007). Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions. *The Economic Journal*, 117(518), 399-421.

7. Eckstein, Z. & van den Berg, G. J., (2007). Empirical labor search: A survey. *Journal of Econometrics*, Elsevier, 136(2): 531-564.
8. Boone, J., Sadrieh, A. & van Ours, J. C. (2009). Experiments on unemployment benefit sanctions and job search behavior. *European Economic Review*, 53(8): 937-951.
9. Krueger, A. B. & Mueller, A. I. (2012). The Lot of the Unemployed: A Time Perspective. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 10(4), 765-794.
10. Tatsiramos, K. & Van Ours, J. C. (2014). Labor market effects of unemployment insurance design. *Journal of Economic Surveys*, 28(2), 284-311.

Barganha coletiva (capítulo 7 – Cahuc)

1. Blair, D. H. & Crawford, D. L. (1984). Labor union objectives and collective bargaining. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 99(3), 547-566.
2. Carruth, A. A. & Oswald, A. J. (1985). Miners' wages in post-war Britain: An application of a model of trade union behaviour. *The Economic Journal*, 95(380), 1003-1020.
3. Boal, W. M. & Pencavel, J. (1994). The effects of labor unions on employment, wages, and days of operation: coal mining in West Virginia. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 109(1), 267-298.
4. Cramton, P., Gunderson, M. & Tracy, J. (1999). The effect of collective bargaining legislation on strikes and wages. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 81(3), 475-487.
5. Card, D. (2001). The effect of unions on wage inequality in the US labor market. *ILR Review*, 54(2), 296-315.
6. Blanchflower, D. G. & Bryson, A. (2003). Changes over time in union relative wage effects in the UK and the US revisited. *International handbook of trade unions*, 197-245.
7. DiNardo, J. & Lee, D. S. (2004). Economic impacts of new unionization on private sector employers: 1984-2001. *The quarterly journal of economics*, 119(4), 1383-1441.
8. Dustmann, C. & Schönberg, U. (2009). Training and union wages. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 91(2), 363-376.
9. Card, D., Lemieux, T. & Riddell, W. C. (2020). Unions and wage inequality: The roles of gender, skill and public sector employment. *Canadian Journal of Economics*, 53(1), 140-173.
10. Frandsen, B. R. (2021). The surprising impacts of unionization: Evidence from matched employer-employee data. *Journal of Labor Economics*, 39(4), 861-894.

Discriminação (capítulo 8 – Cahuc)

1. Arrow, K. J. (1998). What has economics to say about racial discrimination?. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 12(2), 91-100.
2. Altonji, J. G. & Blank, R. M. (1999). Race and gender in the labor market. *Handbook of Labor Economics*, 3, 3143-3259.
3. Foguel, M. (2006). Ensaio sobre Segregação no Mercado de Trabalho, Avaliação de Programas Sociais e Identificação Não-Paramétrica. Tese de Doutorado, UFF. (capítulo 1.3).
4. Marianne, B. (2011). New perspectives on gender. In *Handbook of labor economics* (Vol. 4, pp. 1543-1590). Elsevier.
5. G Jr, F. R. (2011). Racial inequality in the 21st century: The declining significance of discrimination. In *Handbook of labor economics* (Vol. 4, pp. 855-971). Elsevier.
6. Lang, K. & Lehmann, J. Y. K. (2012). Racial discrimination in the labor market: Theory and empirics. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 50(4), 959-1006.

Desemprego (capítulo 9 – Cahuc)

1. Solow, R. M. (1980). On Theories of Unemployment. *American Economic Review*, 70(1): 1-11.
2. Petrongolo, B. & Pissarides, C. A. (2001). Looking into the black box: A survey of the matching function. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 39(2), 390-431.
3. Hall, R. E. (2003). Modern theory of unemployment fluctuations: Empirics and policy applications. *American Economic Review*, 93(2), 145-150.
4. Davis, S. J., Faberman, R. J. & Haltiwanger, J. (2006). The flow approach to labor markets: new data sources and micro-macro links. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 20(3), 3-26.
5. Pissarides, C. A. 2011. Equilibrium in the Labor Market with Search Frictions. *American Economic Review*, 101(4): 1092-1105.
6. Rogerson, R. & Shimer, R. (2011). Search in macroeconomic models of the labor market. In *Handbook of labor economics* (Vol. 4, pp. 619-700). Elsevier.
7. Elsby, M. W., Hobijn, B. & Şahin, A. (2013). Unemployment Dynamics in the OECD. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 95(2), 530-548.
8. Landais, Camille, Pascal Michaillat, and Emmanuel Saez. 2018. A Macroeconomic Approach to Optimal Unemployment Insurance: Theory. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 10(2): 152-81.
9. Haltiwanger, J. C., Hyatt, H. R., Kahn, L. B. & McEntarfer, E. (2018). Cyclical job ladders by firm size and firm wage. *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 10(2), 52-85.
10. Haltiwanger, J., Hyatt, H. & McEntarfer, E. (2018). Who moves up the job ladder?. *Journal of Labor Economics*, 36(S1), S301-S336.

Progresso tecnológico, desemprego e desigualdade (capítulo 10 – Cahuc)

1. Mortensen, D. T. & Pissarides, C. A. (1998). Technological progress, job creation, and job destruction. *Review of Economic Dynamics*, 1(4), 733-753.
2. Costinot, A. & Vogel, J. (2010). Matching and inequality in the world economy. *Journal of Political Economy*, 118(4), 747-786.
3. Acemoglu, D. & Autor, D. (2011). Skills, tasks and technologies: Implications for employment and earnings. In *Handbook of labor economics* (Vol. 4, pp. 1043-1171). Elsevier.
4. Autor, D. H. & Dorn, D. (2013). The growth of low-skill service jobs and the polarization of the US labor market. *American Economic Review*, 103(5), 1553-1597.
5. Acemoglu, D. & Restrepo, P. (2019). Automation and new tasks: How technology displaces and reinstates labor. *Journal of economic perspectives*, 33(2), 3-30.
6. Autor, D., Dorn, D., Katz, L. F., Patterson, C. & Van Reenen, J. (2020). The fall of the labor share and the rise of superstar firms. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 135(2), 645-709.
7. Restrepo, P. (2023). Automation: Theory, Evidence, and Outlook. NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES, Working Paper 31910.

Informalidade

1. Ulyssea, G. (2004a). Informalidade no Mercado de Trabalho Brasileiro: uma resenha da literatura. Tese. PUC-Rio.
2. Ulyssea, G. (2004b). Instituições e a Informalidade no Mercado de Trabalho: uma análise formal. Tese. PUC-Rio.
3. Ulyssea, G. (2004c). Mudanças Institucionais e a Informalidade no Mercado de Trabalho Brasileiro: Simulando os Impactos de Políticas. Tese. PUC-Rio.
4. Ulyssea, G. (2006). Informalidade no mercado de trabalho brasileiro: uma resenha da literatura. *Revista de Economia Política*, 26(104): 596-618.

5. Ulyssea, G. (2018). Firms, informality, and development: Theory and evidence from Brazil. *American Economic Review*, 108(8), 2015-2047.
6. Gerard, F. & Gonzaga, G. (2021). Informal labor and the efficiency cost of social programs: Evidence from unemployment insurance in Brazil. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 13(3), 167-206.

Bibliografia

1. Cahuc, P., Carcillo, S. & Zylberger, A. (2014). *Labor Economics*. Cambridge, MIT Press.
2. Borjas, G. (2007). *Labor Economics*. New York, McGraw-Hill.
3. Bazen, S. (2010). *Econometric Methods for Labour Economics*. Oxford.

Descrição das atividades e recursos a serem empregados

As aulas serão expositivas com debates e demonstrações dos resultados teóricos. É esperado que o aluno interessado em participar desta disciplina tenha em sala de aula uma postura ativa ou pelo menos curiosa para que o conteúdo do curso seja enriquecedor para suas ideias e visão de mundo. A disciplina terá um enfoque teórico e aplicado.

Cronograma de atividades

A avaliação será composta por duas atividades:

1. Seminário de um tema correlato a um dos tópicos vistos em aula. Tema de livre escolha do aluno.
2. A entrega ao final do semestre de uma revisão de literatura (*survey*) acerca de um dos tópicos estudados em sala. Entregas parciais deverão ser realizadas em 02/09, 30/09, 21/10 e 18/11.