

# “Wealth Distribution and Monetary Policy”

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# Introduction

How does wealth inequality shape the transmission of monetary policy to household consumption?

- Existing studies mostly emphasize the role of low-liquidity households.
- Most of these households are in the bottom 50% of the wealth distribution.
- In advanced economies wealth is highly concentrated at the top.
- Macroeconomic impact of top wealth groups?

## Contribution

- Use the joint distribution of income and wealth to quantify the impact of different wealth groups on the aggregate consumption response to MP.

### Methods:

- Quantitative HANK model.
- Calibrate and validate the model with US micro data (SCF and PSID).
- Leverage the model to analyze the impact of different wealth groups on:
  - Aggregate consumption response to monetary policy.
  - Transmission mechanism of monetary policy.

## Findings

1. Heterogeneous income and consumption responses across wealth groups:
  - Households at the tails of the wealth distribution exhibit the largest responses.
2. Top wealth groups substantially shape aggregate consumption response.
  - Top 10 explains more than one-third of the aggregate response.
  - Wealthy households show large responses to monetary policy shocks.
  - Have sizable consumption shares.
3. Top wealth groups matter for the propagation of monetary policy:
  - Interest income channel and persistence of labor income channel.

## Literature

- Quantitative work on monetary policy and household heterogeneity: Kaplan, Moll, and Violante (2018), Gornemann, Kuester, and Nakajima (2021), Auclert, Rognlie, and Straub (2020).
- Interactions between inequality and monetary policy: Luetticke (2021), Bilbiie, Kanzig, and Surico (2019), Auclert (2019).
- Literature on wealth inequality: Castañeda, Díaz-Giménez, and Ríos-Rull (2003), Poschke, Kaymak, and Leung (2021).
- Heterogeneous agent economies: Alves, Kaplan, Moll, and Violante (2020), Debortoli and Galì (2022), Bilbiie (2021).
- Empirical work on effects of monetary policy across wealth distribution: Holm, Paul, and Tischbirek (2020), Slacaleky, Tristani, and Violante (2020).

Model

## Households

- Markets are incomplete, given states  $x = (a, e, \rho)$  households solve

$$\max_{(c_t, n_t)} \mathbb{E}_0 \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} u(c_t, n_t) dt, \quad (\text{H.1})$$

$$\text{s.t. } da_t = (w_t e_t n_t + r_t a_t + d_t - c_t) dt,$$

$$a_t \geq -\phi.$$

- Let  $\psi_t$  be the cross-sectional distribution over the state space  $X$ .
- Total firms' profits  $D_t$  are distributed across households according to

$$d_t = \left( e_t / \int_X e_t d\psi_t \right) D_t.$$

- High-income households receive a larger share of profits.

## Firms

- The representative firm solve

$$\max_{Y_{it}} p_t Y_t - \int_0^1 p_{it} Y_{it} di, \quad \text{s.t.} \quad Y_t = \left( \int_0^1 Y_{it}^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} di \right)^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}}. \quad (\text{F.1})$$

- Input producers solve

$$\min_{K_{it}, N_{it}} w_t N_{it} + r_t^k K_{it}, \quad \text{s.t.} \quad Y_{it} = F(K_{it}, N_{it}), \quad (\text{F.2})$$

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\dot{p}_{it}} \quad & \int_0^\infty \left[ \exp\left(-\int_0^t i_s ds\right) \left( (p_{it} - m_{it}) Y_{it} - \Phi_t\left(\frac{\dot{p}_{it}}{p_{it}}\right) \right) \right] dt \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & Y_{it} = \left( \frac{p_{it}}{p_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon} Y_t. \end{aligned} \quad (\text{F.3})$$

- $\mu = \varepsilon/(\varepsilon - 1)$  with  $\varepsilon > 1$ ,  $m_{it}$ ,  $i_t$  are nominal marginal costs and interest rate.



## Financial sector and monetary policy

- The investment fund owns the economy capital stock  $K_t$
- The fund rents capital to the input producers and invests in new capital.
- Let  $\iota_t = I_t/K_t$ , the investment problem is

$$V_0 := \max_{\iota_t} \int_0^\infty \left[ \exp\left(-\int_0^t r_s ds\right) \left( (r_t^k - \iota_t)K_t - \chi_t(\iota_t) \right) \right] dt \quad (\text{F.4})$$

$$\text{s.t. } \dot{K}_t = (\iota_t - \delta)K_t.$$

- The market value of capital is given by  $V_t = q_t K_t$ .
- Taylor rule  $i_t = r + \phi_\pi \pi_t + v_t$  with an interest rate policy  $v_t = e^{-\eta t} v_0$ .

# Equilibrium

**Definition 1.** The equilibrium is  $(c_t, da_t, n_t), (K_t, N_t, Y_t, I_t, C_t, R_t), (r_t, r_t^k, q_t, w_t, \pi_t) :$

1. Households solve (H.1).
2. Firms solve (F.1), (F.2), (F.3), (F.4).
3. Markets clear

$$V_t = \int_X a_t d\psi_t,$$
$$N_t = \int_X e_t n_t d\psi_t.$$

4. Monetary policy follows a Taylor rule.
5. The sequence of distributions satisfies aggregate consistency conditions.

Recursive formulation using PDEs solved numerically with global methods.

# Parametrization

## Calibration strategy

- Two challenges:
  - Match wealth distribution including its Pareto tail.
  - Jointly match aggregate wealth holdings and average MPC.
- To match micro evidence combine:
  - Extraordinary earning states as in Castañeda, Díaz-Giménez, and Ríos-Rull (2003), Poschke, Kaymak, and Leung (2021).
  - Ex-ante heterogeneous discount rates  $\rho_1, \rho_2$  with proportions  $p_1, p_2$ .
- Functional forms: CRRA utility function, Cobb-Douglas production function, quadratic (investment and price) adjustment costs.

## Data

- Calibration is carried out at quarterly time frequency for the US economy.
- The main data source is the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) in 2004.<sup>1</sup>
- Earnings: wages and self-employment income.
- Wealth: net worth without home equity.

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<sup>1</sup>In particular, the extract from the SCF 2004 in [Kaplan, Moll, and Violante \(2018\)](#).

## Calibration

- Externally calibrated: Preferences, technology and New Keynesian block.
- Internally calibrated parameters:  $\rho_1, \rho_2, p_1, e_1, e_2, \lambda_1, \lambda_2, \theta_1, \kappa$ .
- Targeted moments:
  - Wealth-output ratio, aggregate return to wealth.
  - Gini coefficients of earnings, income, and wealth.
  - Top 0,1%,1% earning shares.
  - Overall fraction of low-liquidity households.
  - Peak of investment to output response about 2.

(table) (H2M)


## Model fit

Table 1: Targeted statistics

Targeted Statistics	Data	Model
Wealth-output ratio	2.55	2.8
Aggregate return on wealth	.065	.055
Fraction with $a = \phi$	0.3	0.27
Gini wealth	0.88	0.88
Gini earnings	0.59	0.59
Gini income	0.61	0.59
Top 0.1% earnings share	6	6
Top 1% earnings share	16	14



(model fit)

## Top shares






# Marginal distributions



## Capital income shares



- The model generates realistic capital income shares across wealth groups.
- Limitation: share of the top 1% in the model too high. (JointDist)

## Marginal propensities to consume



- Average fraction of a transfer consumed in a quarter or in a year
  - I find 13% over one quarter and 50% over a year out of a \$500 transfer.
  - Quantitative HANK models at lower bound of empirical estimates.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Respectively Gornemann, Kuester, and Nakajima (2021), Hagedorn, Manovskii, and Mitman (2019), Kaplan, Moll, and Violante (2018) find 15% (Q), 33% (Y), 12% (Q), 40% (Y), and 16% (Q) 33% (Y). These studies typically set a quarterly empirical benchmark 15%-25% out of transfers between \$500 and \$1000 (Parker, Souleles, Johnson, and McClelland (2013), Broda and Parker (2014), Fagereng, Holm, and Natvik (2021)).





# Quantitative Analysis

## Macro responses to monetary policy




- 25 basis point or 1% annualized interest rate cut,  $v_0 = -.0025$ .

# Heterogeneous responses to monetary policy





## Aggregate consumption



- Households at the top have a large impact on the aggregate response.
- The response at the top is 0.16% without the top 1%.

# Monetary policy transmission



$$dC_t = \int_0^\infty \frac{\partial C_t}{\partial r_s} dr_s ds + \int_0^\infty \frac{\partial C_t}{\partial w_s} dw_s ds.$$



# Conclusions

Main messages:

- Wealth concentration at the top matters for aggregate dynamics:
- Wealthy households substantial impact on aggregate consumption response.
- Top wealth groups shape transmission channels of monetary policy.

Extensions:

- Additional channels relevant at the top, e.g. dividends and capital gains.

Thank you!

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# Appendices

Table 2: Model parameters

Parameter	Description	Value	Source
<i>Households</i>			
$\gamma$	CRRA/Inverse IES	1	External
$\nu$	Frisch elasticity of labor supply	1	External
$\rho_1, \rho_2$	Individual discount rates (p.a.)	8%, 14%	Internally calibrated
$\phi$	Borrowing limit	0.5	External
$\lambda_e$	Arrival rate normal states	1	External
$\nu_e$	Mean reversion coeff.	0.0263	External
$\sigma_e$	S. d. of innovations	0.2	External
$\theta_1$	Transition probability to $e_1$	0.6	Internally calibrated
$\lambda_1$	Arrival rate top states	0.00045	Internally calibrated
$\lambda_2$	Arrival rate leave top states	0.8	Internally calibrated
$e_1, e_2$	Top earnings states	50, 350	Internally calibrated
$p_1$	Fraction of patient types	0.1	Internally calibrated



Table 3: Model parameters

Parameter	Description	Value	Source
<i>Firms and policy</i>			
$\theta$	Capital elasticity	0.33	External
$\delta$	Depreciation rate (p.a.)	5%	External
$\Psi$	Price adjustment cost	100	PC slope of 0.1
$\varepsilon$	Intermediate goods elasticity	10	Profit share of 0.1
$\kappa$	Investment adjustment cost	16	Internally calibrated
$\phi_\pi$	Taylor coeff.	1.25	External

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## **Variables definition**

- Assets: durables net of real estate, deposits, bonds, public and private equity.
- Liabilities: overdraft debt and consumer credit.
- Earnings: wages and business income.
- Income: sum of earnings, interest and dividend income, and capital gains.
- Consumption: food at home and away from home, trips, recreation activities, education, child care, health, clothing, insurance, and utilities.

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## Low-liquidity households

- Let  $b$  be liquid asset holdings,  $y$  monthly income,  $\phi = y$ .
- A low liquidity household has either

$$b \geq 0 \quad \text{and} \quad b \leq y/2,$$

$$b < 0 \quad \text{and} \quad b \leq y/2 - \phi = -y/2.$$

- Capture kinks in budget set around zero and  $\phi$ .
- $1/2$  is due to the assumption that resources are consumed at constant rate.
- Overstate low-liquidity households if use before tax income.
- Understate low-liquidity households if start period with positive savings.

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## Low-liquidity households across the wealth distribution

	Bottom 30	Bottom 50	Next 40	Top 10
Between shares	47	71	25	4
Within shares	70	50	20	13

- I find that in the SCF 36% of the households are liquidity constrained.<sup>3</sup>
- Shares of low-liquidity households between and within each wealth decile.
- These numbers do not substantially change if I include home equity.


<sup>3</sup>[Aguiar, Bils, and Boar \(2021\)](#) using PSID find 40%, [Weidner, Kaplan, and Violante \(2014\)](#) find 30%.

# Labor income process

Labor income risk  $e_t$  follows a Poisson process:



- Households switch between normal states
  - Arrival rate  $\lambda_e$ , conditional distribution  $F_e$ , stationary distribution  $\phi_e$ .
  - $F_e$  is characterized by a stochastic transition matrix.
  - This matrix follows from an AR(1) process with parameters  $1 - \nu_e, \sigma_e$ .
- Jumps from normal states to extraordinary states  $e_1, e_2$ 
  - Arrival rate  $\lambda_1$  and transition probabilities  $\theta_1, \theta_2$ .
  - Switch back to normal at rate  $\lambda_2$  and draw a new state from  $\phi_e$ .

# Income dynamics



- The estimated kurtosis is around 9 in the model and 17.8 in the data.

# Wealth distribution



- Wealth relative to average earnings.
- Fraction households close to  $a = 0$  approximately 26% in model and data.

## Wealth distribution

Wealth statistics	Data	Model	Wealth statistics	Data	Model
Mean wealth	4.2	4.7	90th percentile	7.3	8
Median wealth	0.3	0.2	95th percentile	14.2	14.9
75th percentile	2	2.2	99th percentile	66.8	58.8



## Model fit

The discount rates  $\rho_1, \rho_2$  imply respectively



- Discount factors of 0.98, 0.96.
- Each preference type represent 10%, 90% of the population.

Labor income process:

- Top states  $e_1, e_2$  are 27, 193 times the average of the process.
- Only 0.03%, 0.02% of the households are in these states.

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# Joint distributions



- The model generates realistic joint distributions.
- Limitations: shares of the top 1% and consumption at the bottom.

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