HACKtheMACHINE SEATTLE

Advanced Challenge: Maritime Network Overview

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MARITIME SYSTEMS

OVERVIEW

Crewmembers who operate maritime vessels maintain an internal network to communicate within the ship and connectivity to shore installations and other vessels. Increased communication capabilities have also increased security concerns. Maritime vessels have specially tailored network systems.

Modern maritime vessels are *cyber physical systems* (CPSs), meaning they synergize computational and physical components. While CPSs provide greater usability and functionality, they also allow for more points of failure and as a result are vulnerable to attack. Technologies currently used in modern vessels include: Electronic Chart Display Information System (ECDIS), Automated Identification System (AIS), Automatic Radar Plotting Aid (Radar/ARPA), Compass (Electronic), Computerized Automatic Steering System, among many others. Vessels have both an internal network for intra-ship communication, and a network infrastructure for communicating inter-ship and with shore installations. A commercial ship's network includes the Voyage, Engineering, and Information Technology (IT) Networks. These networks are used to control Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) which in turn control the vessel.

VOYAGE NETWORK

The purpose of the voyage network is to help navigate the vessel. It includes systems such as the ECDIS (Electronic Chart Display and Information System), AIS (Automatic Identification System), Radar/Automatic Radar Plotting Aid, Compass, Voyage Data Recorder, and others. The voyage network gathers information from sensors and communications equipment, which are processed and then transmitted to a device that the crew can interface with. A ship's bridge will contain many of the interface devices for the voyage network.

Hardware in test bed: GPS, Radar, AIS, ECDIS (Navigation touch panel), Weather Station

ECDIS (ELECTRONIC CHART DISPLAY AND INFORMATION SYSTEM)

The ECDIS is part of the voyage network and is a computer-based navigation system. It collects, transmits, and integrates real-time information that allows the ship to be manned and controlled. ECDIS accomplishes this by continuously determining the vessel's position relative to land, charted objects, navigation aids, and unseen hazards. It utilizes information from a variety of other systems to include the Global Positioning System (GPS), radar, fathometer (a depth meter) and Automatic Identification Systems (AIS). While ECDIS helps a boat be manned with fewer crew, it is as vulnerable as its host machine. Attackers can potentially read, download, replace or delete any file on the machine hosting the ECDIS to include crucial navigational charts. The ECDIS system can also be used to pivot or gain access to other shipboard networks once it is compromised.

AIS (AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM)

AIS is an automated tracking system that must be fitted aboard international voyaging ships over a certain size, and to all passenger ships regardless of size. A 2013 estimate of the number of AIS equipped vessels was over 400,000, and that number is increasing annually. The AIS tracks the ship by exchanging data with other ships' AIS systems, with AIS base stations, and with satellite data. This information can then be displayed on the ship's ECDIS system. This data can include the vessel's identity, type, position, heading, and speed to shore stations.

RADAR/ARPA

While now a colloquial term, radar was coined by the U.S. Navy as an acronym, standing for Radio Detection and Ranging. Marine radars provide bearing (or direction) and distance of ships. Radars are vital for navigation and for avoiding collisions. An ARPA (Automatic Radar Plotting Aid) is a system that can automatically create tracks of objects to provide the crew with a visual representation of a tracked object's path. The radar and ECDIS system in the test bed are ARPA capable, though they may not be enabled due to safety reasons.

GPS (GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM)

Most modern vessels use a GPS receiver for position and heading information (i.e. as a compass). GPS uses information from a constellation of satellites to determine the receiver's location. A receiver utilizing two separate antennae and an internal gyroscope can combine location and motion information and act as an accurate compass. GPS can also effectively measure the vessel's pitch and roll, which are measurements of the vessel's rotational motions. However, GPS requires movement to act as an effective heading indicator. As with any receiver, GPS operates at certain frequencies and can be intentionally blocked, jammed, or interfered through specially configured radio frequency transmitters. While illegal, jamming devices are easily accessible and are low-cost. It is also possible for attackers to build their own.

COMPASS

Magnetic compasses have been used for bearing and heading information for millennia. They provide a reliable source of heading information that is not reliant on signal reception. Magnetic compasses align to the Earth's natural magnetic field, and any other external magnetic fields or large metal bodies such as ships. Digital compasses use the same concept to determine direction, except a magnetometer is utilized instead of a magnetized needle. These devices are cheap, efficient, and decently reliable. Shipboard digital compasses are commonly referred to as *fluxgate* compasses. Instead of a magnetic needle pointing to a heading, variations in an electronically generated magnetic field are measured and processed digitally to provide a heading. The heading sensor aboard the test bed is a fluxgate magnetic compass that also provides angular velocity data. It is connected to the navigation system via the NMEA2000 network.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY NETWORK

The IT network is administrative and allows the crew to conduct IT tasks. These tasks include but are not limited to: communication with shore installations for weather, scheduling, logistics, and maintenance; web surfing; email; and running client-server applications. This network typically allows users wireless access utilizing personal devices. The hardware in this network includes both wired (such as Ethernet) devices and wireless devices, which include personal electronics.

Hub: A network hub is a device that repeats information. It will broadcast information it receives to all open ports and thus to any device connected to those ports. The HUB101 device in the test bed can act as a hub. For more information, see the Ethernet/Lightweight Ethernet overview section.

Switch: A network switch will also keep MAC address records in a MAC table. This allows for the maximization of bandwidth for devices within the network. The HUB101 device in the test bed can also act as a switch. For more information, see the Ethernet/Lightweight Ethernet overview section.

Wi-Fi Modem/router: Most commonly referred to as just a "modem" or a "router" due to the ubiquity of Wi-Fi, these devices are *wireless access points* that are typically connected to a wired or cellular network. A typical device can service up to 30 clients within a range of approximately 100 meters. Ships that stay near shore can potentially

connect to 4G LTE networks for internet access. Any ship that ventures into international waters will typically require a satellite internet connection.

ENGINEERING NETWORK

The engineering network connects crew members to the ICS (Industrial Control Systems) onboard that actuate the ship's propulsion, steering, and auxiliary systems. While the voyage network provides the information, the engineering network provides the infrastructure link between the crew and the ship. It can include systems such as the Computerized Automatic Steering System.

Hardware in test bed: Auto pilot, linear actuators, depth, speed & temperature sensors, etc.

Computerized Automatic Steering System (Autopilot)

The purpose of the simplest autopilot is to lock the heading of a boat towards a predefined course. However, this simple task requires the autopilot system to be connected to and able to control many of the systems onboard the ship. To provide steering, the autopilot must be connected via the Control Area Network (CAN) to the ICS that controls rudder position. The autopilot also draws navigation and GPS information via the CAN network to provide course correction as the ship travels along its predefined course.

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TRUDI Instruments Diagram

GP330B GPS Receiver

Cradlepoint COR IBR1100 Modem/Router

WeatherStation 220WX Weather Sensor

PG-700 Heading Sensor

Radar Sensor DRS4D

FA50 AIS Transponder

GPA-017S GPS Antenna

FAB151D VHF Antenna

Insignia TV's

SiriusXM Satellite Weather Antenna

FAP7011 Autopilot Control

BBWX3 Satellite Weather Receiver

FI5002 NMEA2000 Junction Box

HUB101

TZtouch2

FAP7002 Autopilot Processor Unit

DST-200 Depth, Speed, Temperature Sensor

CreativeWerks LACT10P Actuator

Stereo Receiver

Bose 151 SE Environmental Speakers

FAP6112 Rudder Reference Unit (RRU)

NMEA 2000 backbone on the back side of TRUDI test bed

Figure 1: TRUDI 1.0

IT NETWORK OVERVIEW

IT NETWORK

The IT Network is for the crewmembers and passengers to conduct all manner of conventional information technology (IT) tasks. Crewmembers use the IT network on the ships to for communications such as weather, scheduling, logistics and maintenance. Both crew and passengers also conduct morale-related IT tasks that include surfing the web, sending email, and client-server applications. This network most often allows its users wireless access. The Maritime test bed is equipped with various devices that comprise its IT Network, which are: the Cradlepoint router, the Multi-Function Display, and the Ubuntu email server.

CRADLEPOINT

Figure 2: Cradlepoint IBR1100

The Maritime test bed uses a Cradlepoint IBR1100 Series router. The router is a compact, ruggedized 3G/4G/LTE networking device designed for connectivity in the most challenging environments. This series has advanced its security, added Virtual Private Network (VPN) and stateful firewall features to protect sensitive data. The router provides internet connectivity to both crewmembers and passengers.

EMAIL SERVER

The email server is hosted on a standalone Linux-based PC. The host PC will connect to the IT network via Wi-Fi through the 1BR1100. The server is set up to simulate the crewmembers of our large civilian leisure craft or tugboat. While connected to the ship network, you can access the webmail server through: https://192.168.0.100/webmail

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ETHERNET/LIGHTWEIGHT ETHERNET

OVERVIEW

A LAN (Local Area Network) is generally confined to a limited geographic area such as a home, school, or small office building. Ethernet refers to the suite of technologies that are commonly utilized in LANs. Ethernet connections maintain backwards compatibility. The hardware connected via Ethernet within the test bed includes: FA50 AIS Transponder, Ethernet Hub101, Satellite Weather Receiver BBWX3, and the radar system.

HUBS/REPEATERS

A hub within a LAN acts as a repeater. While you may see the terms hub, switch, and router used interchangeably, they have different functionalities. A hub is a simple repeater that will *broadcast* to all of its ports. Essentially, all information that passes through the hub will go to every device connected to the hub. The HUB101 device within the test bed can act as a hub for all the devices connected via Ethernet.

SWITCHES

A switch is a device that keeps a record of MAC (Media Access Control) addresses of devices connected to it organized into a MAC table; it can identify the specific port that information is being sent to, allowing greater bandwidth allocation relative to a hub. The HUB101 device within the test bed can act as a switch, but will be configured as a hub.

LIGHTWEIGHT ETHERNET

IEC 61162, or Lightweight Ethernet is a set of standards for network communication aboard a ship via Ethernet capable devices. IEC 61162 Part 3 utilizes the NMEA2000 standard.

VULNERABILITIES

PHYSICAL ACCESS/CABLING

Most LANs are wired using Category 5 or 6 copper cabling with a maximum segment length of 100 meters. With a maximum segment length of 100 meters, larger networks require additional hardware like hubs and repeaters, which will then receive all the broadcast information. You will be given physical access to the switch. A malicious user could access a switch in a telecom closet as the basis of a maritime cyber-attack.

MAC FLOODING

In a MAC flooding attack, an attacker feeds many unique MAC addresses to the switch in an attempt to use up the limited memory used to store the MAC table. The intended effect of this being that once the legitimate MAC table is unusable, the switch will then broadcast incoming data to all ports, including the attacker's. Data capture utilizing packet analyzing software can then occur.

ARP SPOOFING

ARP spoofing involves sending a spoofed message attempting to associate the attacker's MAC address with a different IP address, causing the intentional misrouting of network traffic.

Figure 3: Example Maritime Ethernet Network

CONTROLLER AREA NETWORK (CAN)

OVERVIEW

The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus standard was initially developed for the automotive industry. Unlike serial communication protocols which provide one to one communication, the CAN bus allows for high data rate point-to-point transfers.

The Furuno FI5002 junction box in the test bed allows for access to the CAN bus. Devices on the CAN bus utilize the NMEA2000 proprietary communication standard for connecting marine devices and display units.

Examples of devices that can be connected to the NMEA2000 network onboard a ship include: GPS receivers; auto-pilot systems; depth, temperature and speed sensors; navigation devices; weather stations; and radars. This interconnectivity effectively allows the GPS and navigation systems to control the auto-pilot course corrections by bridging the voyage and engineering networks.

CAN was designed without security or message authentication. With many modern vehicles containing more and more electronics, many critical systems are connected to the CAN network to reduce the amount of wiring required and allow for distributed feedback. For instance, the now infamous hack of a popular SUV via a zero-day exploit involved compromising the vehicle through the CAN bus. Through the wireless entertainment system, the hackers were able to send commands to compromise the dashboard, steering, brakes, and transmission. Most CAN hacking requires one to be directly plugged into the network, but hackers can pivot from wireless devices connected the CAN bus to critical systems. The laptop used to compromise the SUV was in a basement while the vehicle was driving on a highway quite some distance away.

CAN hardware and software analytical tools can be utilized onboard the NMEA2000 network. A NMEA2000 to USB converter cable is recommended, but not required.

Figure 4: NMEA2000 Maritime Network

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AUTOMATED IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM

OVERVIEW

The Automated Identification System (AIS) is an automated system used on ships to identify and locate other vessels.

HARDWARE

AIS transceivers periodically broadcast information about their position, speed, navigational status (anchored, underway, etc.) at regular intervals via VHF. The AIS transceiver is programmed with information about the vessel's characteristics and the location of the AIS's GPS receiver used to broadcast its location. Some information, such as the vessel's Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) identifier, is programmed into the transceiver upon installation. AIS base stations are shore-based typically used to relay AIS traffic to vessels. Buoy-based Aids to Navigation (AtoN) can also act as relays to extend network coverage. Class A AIS devices are vessel-mounted systems used mainly by large commercial vessels, have integrated displays and can receive all types of AIS messages. Class B AIS devices are also vessel-mounted but are targeted at commercial or leisure markets, being smaller and without an integrated display. The FA50 Transponder in this test bed is a Class B device. The VHF transmission power of a Class B device is restricted to between 2-5 watts, giving it a 5-10 mile range

BROADCAST INFORMATION

Class A transponders transmit messages at set intervals. See acronym list at the end of the document for help with any of the following acronyms.

- Message 1 (Every 2, 3, or 6 seconds if moving, 3 min if anchored): MMSI, UTC Time-Stamp, Position, Position Accuracy Flag, RAIM flag, COG, SOG, HDG, ROT, Navigation Status, Communication State
- Message 5 (Every 6 min): MMSI, IMO#, Call-sign, Name, Ship Type, Dimensions, Static Draft, Destination, ETA, EPFS type, Data Terminal availability, AIS version

Class B transponders transmit a similar set of messages.

- Message 18 (Every 30s, 3 min if anchored): MMSI, UTC Time-Stamp, Position, Position Accuracy Flag, RAIM flag, COG, SOG, HDG, Communication State, Type(SO/CS), Operating Mode, Availability of a Display, DSC Receiver, Full/Limited Bandwidth, Channel Management
- Message 24A&B (Every 6 min): MMSI, Call-Sign, Name, Ship Type, Dimensions, EPFS type, AIS version, Vendor ID

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Additionally, the information can be classified as static or dynamic. Static information is typically programmed into the device upon install onboard a ship. The dynamic information will change over time. Static:

- o MMSI
- o Call Sign & Ship's Name
- o Type of Ship
- o Location of antenna on ship
- Dynamic:
    - o Ship Position with accuracy indication and integrity status (from GPS)
    - o UTC
    - o COG
    - o SOG
    - o Heading

VULNERABILITIES

Hardware required: Marine VHF Radio (156.0-162.025 MHz)

Possible Exploit Scenarios:

- o Modify ship details: position, course, cargo, speed, name
- o Spoof "ghost" vessels recognizable as genuine vessels by receivers
- o Trigger false collision warning alerts
- o Falsify weather information
- o Impersonation of marine authorities
- o DOS attack

ACRONYM LIST

MMSI-Maritime Mobile Service Identity

RAIM-Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring

COG-Course over ground

SOG-Speed over ground

HDG-Heading

CS-Carrier Sense (Type of Class B transceiver)

SO-Self-Organizing (Type of Class B transceiver)

EPFS-Electronic Position Fixing System

ID-Identification

UTC-Coordinated Universal Time

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GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS)

OVERVIEW

GPS is an accurate and crucial positioning system whose capabilities are offered to anyone with a GPS receiver. There are four systems onboard the test bed with GPS receivers: The Furuno TZTouch2, the GP330B GPS Receiver, the FA50 AIS Transponder, and the 220WX Weather Station. The TZTouch2 is configured to use position data from the GP330B receiver.

GPS determines your location via the geometric concept known as triangulation. Triangulation involves knowing your distance from three established reference points. In terms of cell tower triangulation, the three established reference points would be three cell towers with the receiver being your cell phone. This provides an accuracy to about .75 km, with more reference points (such as a high density urban area) providing even greater accuracy. GPS on the other hand, utilizes satellites zipping around the Earth at roughly 14,000 km/hr. GPS receivers require connection to four satellites to provide latitude, longitude, altitude, and timing information as GPS satellites are moving reference points. With a little bit of math, your GPS receiver can then determine your three-dimensional position within about 10 meters.

VULNERABILITIES

JAMMING

As with any kind of receiver, GPS operates at certain frequencies and can be intentionally blocked, jammed or interfered with through specially configured radio frequency transmitters. While illegal, jamming devices are easily accessible and low-cost. It is also possible for attackers to build their own. Remember, there are four GPS enabled devices in the test bed. The TZTouch2 defaults to using information from the GP330B.

SPOOFING

By its very nature, the L1 (civilian) frequency is unencrypted due to the large user base. It contains no authentication or authorization. Thus, most commercial GPS receivers are subject to spoofing attacks. A spoofed GPS signal is recognized by the (unencrypted) GPS receiver as legitimate, yet it may contain altered or potentially dangerous information. With the right signal and timing, an attacker can change the GPS coordinates to report a different location, causing confusion and loss of bearing. An attacker can also slowly drift the position of the vessel to an alternate location, which could be potentially disastrous to an inattentive crew.


Figure 5: GPS System

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AUTOPILOT

OVERVIEW

Autopilot can also be useful in maritime applications. Modern vessels can be simple like a sailboat or incredibly sophisticated like aircraft carriers. Our test bed is to simulate a large civilian craft, and in turn it contains an autopilot system that will help the captain focus on other, more important tasks. Marine autopilot systems perform the same function as airborne systems in that it will activate the ICS in control of the rudder to keep the vessel on a predetermined course. A complete autopilot system involves three separate systems: a heading sensor, a central processing unit, and a drive unit.

Marine autopilot systems adjust the rudder orientation to steer the vessel towards the heading or waypoint set by the autopilot system. More sophisticated systems will integrate with GPS and other course plotting software or devices to provide more advanced autopilot features. A typical consumer-level unit will feature a control unit located near the helm that allows user interaction. This helm control unit is connected to a course computer unit that is in turn connected to an electronic control unit. These ECUs drive hydraulic pumps or actuators that turn the rudder in the indicated direction.

The helm control unit has a graphic display and will automatically adjust parameters such as speed, trim, draught and tide along your course. A user can input a reference heading for the autopilot to follow, or it can also be configured to perform port and starboard turns and to follow a course plotted by the navigation system. The FAP7011C has dual NMEA2000 and NMEA0183 bus interfaces. Most chart plotters utilize a combination of GPS data and a digital compass for heading and navigation information.


Figure 6: Maritime Autopilot System

PLC BASED FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM

OVERVIEW

A Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) is a device typically used in Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) to control a constant application with automation. PLCs control the constant application using inputs from a sensor. The Automation Direct P2000 PLC uses proprietary software to program a set of tag-based software instructions to execute once the sensor receives an input trigger.

A fire suppression system is a critical safety component on maritime vessels. It could help minimize the risk of casualty and severe damage to a ship in the event of a fire. The test system on TRUDI consists of a PLC, sensors, water pump, water tanks, and touchscreen status display to simulate an actual fire sprinkler system. The entire fire suppression system is housed in a Pelican case. The purpose of this addition is to learn and discover vulnerabilities associated with implementing such a system on a maritime network.

The PLC base for the Fire Suppression System is an Automation Direct P2-04B base with different modules attached to it. There is a P2-550 CPU Module, P2-08ND3-1 Input module, P2-08TD2S Output module, and a P2-01AC Power Supply to power the entire PLC unit. The PLC CPU module has 3 ethernet ports, with one for programming the device. The is an IR sensor, smoke sensor, a reservoir tank, holding tank, relays, a water pump, strobe light, and alarm. Once a sensor is tripped, the pump activates, and water is pumped from the reservoir tank to the holding tank. An alarm and strobe light will also trigger once the sensors detect a fire. A C-More EA9-T8CL Touch Screen will be utilized to display the status and test the Fire Suppression system. The available connections on the C-more display are an ethernet port, USB, and an RS485 port.


Figure 7: Fire Suppression System

WI-FI

OVERVIEW

Virtually any shop, airport or library offers Wi-Fi to its patrons. It is hard to go anywhere these days without being able to connect to a public or private wireless network. Internet access is a necessity in modern day society. Wi-Fi utilizes the IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) 802.11 network standard that comes in a variety of forms. The most common one used is 802.11n and is backwards compatible with 802.11a & b.

You will find that most places house a router, which both provides the internet services and access to the network. The router comes in varying sizes and capabilities as determined by the manufacturer. As a single device the router also contains a port for cable or DSL modem connection, a firewall, Ethernet hub and a wireless access point. Some people give access to their network to the public, which means that anybody can logon and off. However, it is common to protect your private wireless network by setting up a password.

Wi-Fi encryption has evolved over the years. Wired Equivalency Privacy (WEP) was once the standard for WAN security, but hackers exploited the vulnerabilities of this approach, rendering it unsecure to use. Systems that still employ WEP are susceptible to cyber-attacks and easily compromised. Most current devices use, Wi-Fi Protected Access Version 2 – Pre-Shared Key (WPA2-PSK), which is the successor to WEP and WPA. It has become the security standard for WAN security.

As with any sort of network, there are vulnerabilities that can be exploited in order to gain access and control of a system. Wi-Fi hacking has become increasingly popular over the last few years. Some vulnerabilities include:

Eavesdropping: A type of electronic attack where digital communications are intercepted by an individual for whom they are not intended.

Media Access Control (MAC) Address Spoofing: Copying a known MAC address to fool the network that the device that is being used belongs on the network.

Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) Spoofing: Sending false ARP messages over a network, which links the hackers MAC address with the Internet Protocol (IP) address of a legitimate device on the network.

Denial of Service (DoS): Any form of attack where hackers attempt to prevent legitimate users from accessing the service.

Wireless Phishing: Any technique used by a hacker to convince wireless network users to divulge sensitive information.

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WIRELESS HACKING TOOLS

The aforementioned vulnerabilities are some of the most popular attacks used by hackers to infiltrate and compromise Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs). Successful attacks can lead to stolen data, can compromise and/or degrade a system. Hackers are utilizing a wide range of tools in order to successfully exploit the vulnerabilities of Wi-Fi. Some of the current and most popular tools are:

- Aircrack
- AirSnort
- Cain & Abel
- Wi-Fi Pineapple
- LAN Turtle
- USB Rubber Ducky

TEST BED

Figure 8: Cradlepoint IBR1100

The Maritime test bed uses a Cradlepoint IBR1100 Series router. The router is a compact, ruggedized 3G/4G/LTE networking device designed for connectivity in the most challenging environments. This particular series has advanced its security, added Virtual Private Network (VPN) and stateful firewall features to protect sensitive data.


Figure 9: Maritime Wireless Network

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