

# U.S. Banking Credit Risk: From the 2008 Crisis to Q2 2025

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## **Executive Summary:**

- Credit risk in U.S. commercial banking peaked in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, improved steadily through the 2010s, and was buffered during COVID-19 by aggressive fiscal and monetary support.
- Post-crisis regulation (e.g., Dodd-Frank, CCAR, Basel III) materially raised capital and liquidity, improving system resilience while revealing vulnerabilities in selected mid-sized/regional banks.
- Risk concentrations remain in commercial real estate, leveraged lending, and certain consumer credit segments; non-bank intermediation (shadow banking/fintech) is a rising channel to monitor.
- Large banks exhibit stronger capitalization, diversified funding, and stress-test performance; smaller/regional banks face tighter net interest margins and localized exposure risks.
- Near-term outlook: localized stresses rather than system-wide instability; medium-term risks center on interest-rate normalization, CRE repricing, and spillovers from non-banks.
- Headline indicators confirm ongoing vulnerabilities. Net charge-off rates on credit cards remain above pre-pandemic averages (FDIC Quarterly Banking Profile, Q2 2025, Table IV-A). Commercial real estate past-due and non-accrual loans are at their highest level since 2014 (FDIC QBP, Q2 2025, Table II-C). Meanwhile, unrealized losses on securities and deposit-run sensitivity, highlighted in the Federal Reserve's April 2025 Financial Stability Report (pp. 7–

9), continue to pressure smaller and mid-sized banks. These quantitative markers frame the credit-risk landscape entering 2025.

### **Context & Scope:**

This report assesses credit risk and financial stability in the U.S. commercial banking sector from 2008 through 2023. It tracks directional trends across key risk indicators, summarizes regulatory developments, highlights risk concentrations, and distills implications for policymakers, bank management, investors, and corporate borrowers.

### **Data & Sources:**

- Publicly available supervisory and market sources were used to summarize directional trends (no confidential data).
- Federal Reserve (Financial Stability Report, H.8, Z.1; supervisory disclosures/stress test summaries)
- Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) – Quarterly Banking Profile, Call Reports
- Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) – Semiannual Risk Perspective
- Bank for International Settlements (BIS) – global credit/market indicators; Basel standards
- International Monetary Fund (IMF) – Global Financial Stability Report
- U.S. Treasury – Financial regulatory reports; FSOC updates
- Public bank filings and investor presentations (aggregate insights)

### **Methodology:**

Descriptive trend analysis of sector-level indicators; simple normalizations (y/y, rolling averages) and segmentation by bank size where relevant. Focus on directional insights rather than precise point estimates. Qualitative assessment of regulatory impacts (Dodd-Frank, CCAR, Basel III) and risk channels (CRE, leveraged loans,

consumer credit). Scenario framing considers interest-rate paths, asset-quality migration, and funding-cost dynamics. All results are derived from aggregate, publicly available supervisory publications (Federal Reserve Financial Stability Report, OCC Semiannual Risk Perspective, and FDIC Quarterly Banking Profile) without use of confidential bank-level data; scenarios are illustrative.

### **Key Risk Indicators – Definitions & Directional Trend (2008–2023):**

<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Definition (summary)</b>	<b>Directional Trend 2008→2023</b>
Non-performing loans (NPL)	Loans past due/non-accrual as % of total loans	Peak around 2009; steady decline through 2019; modest uptick around COVID; stable thereafter
Net charge-offs	Charge-offs net of recoveries as % of avg loans	Elevated post-GFC; declined materially in the 2010s; brief COVID uptick; contained
Allowance/coverage ratio	Loan-loss reserves relative to NPLs/loans	Strengthened with CECL adoption and conservative provisioning
Tier 1/CET1 capital	Risk-based capital adequacy measures	Higher post-crisis and stable at stronger levels
Leverage ratio	Capital to total exposures (non-risk-weighted)	Improved; more conservative balance sheets
Liquidity coverage / HQLA	High-quality liquid assets vs modeled outflows	Improved under Basel III liquidity standards
Loan growth mix	Sectoral composition of lending	Shift toward services/technology; caution in CRE/retail
Funding structure	Core deposits vs wholesale/market funding	Stable at large banks; sensitivity remains at smaller/regional banks

*Note: Deposit stability is higher at large banks, while smaller and regional banks showed outflows during the 2023 episode (Federal Reserve, Financial Stability Report, April 2025, pp. 14–16).*

### **Findings:**

- System-wide credit quality has improved since the GFC, with large banks demonstrating robust buffers and diversified income streams.
- Stress episodes (e.g., COVID, regional bank strains) revealed vulnerabilities in interest-rate risk management and concentrated sector exposures.
- Provisioning frameworks (including CECL) and supervisory stress testing improved loss-absorption capacity.
- Competitive dynamics and technology adoption are reshaping lending mix, underwriting standards, and cost structures.


### **Regulatory Landscape & Impact:**

Post-crisis reforms (Dodd-Frank, enhanced prudential standards, CCAR/DFAST stress tests) and Basel III capital/liquidity requirements materially increased resilience. Tailoring of rules by bank size altered compliance burdens and supervisory focus. The evolving dialogue on liquidity risk, interest-rate risk in the banking book (IRRBB), and resolution planning continues to shape risk appetites.

### **Sectoral Exposures & Concentrations:**

- Commercial Real Estate (CRE): refinancing risk amid higher rates; pockets of office-sector weakness in select metros.

**Figure1: CRE past-due and non-accrual loans (% of total CRE loans). Source: FDIC QBP, Q2 2025**



### Credit Risk Dynamics, 2023–2025:


- **Deposit runs and liquidity:** Failures of several mid-sized banks in 2023 exposed vulnerabilities from high levels of uninsured deposits.
- **Interest-rate risk in the banking book:** Unrealized losses on securities portfolios (notably Treasuries and MBS) remain a pressure point.
- **CRE refinancing stress:** Office and multifamily segments face refinancing risk as loans mature into higher-rate environments.

*(Sources: Federal Reserve Financial Stability Report, April 2025, pp. 7–12; FDIC Quarterly Banking Profile, Q2 2025, Table II-C; OCC Semiannual Risk Perspective, Spring 2025, p. 5.)*

- **Leveraged Lending:** covenant-lite structures and refinancing walls are watch items under tighter credit conditions.

- **Consumer Credit:** normalization of delinquencies from unusually low pandemic levels; sensitivity in subprime segments.

**Figure 2: Credit card net charge-off rates vs. pre-pandemic average. Source: FDIC QBP, Q2 2025.**



- **SME Lending:** tighter underwriting standards; heterogeneity across regions and industries.

### Implications for Stakeholders:

**Policymakers & Regulators:** Maintain vigilant supervision of liquidity and interest-rate risk; monitor non-bank credit channels and interconnections.

**Bank Management:** Prioritize asset-liability management, deposit stability, and CRE/leveraged-loan risk governance; invest in data and stress capabilities.

**Investors & Analysts:** Focus on asset-quality migration, provisioning adequacy, funding costs, and sensitivity to stress assumptions.

**Corporates & SMEs:** Expect more selective credit conditions; strengthen disclosures and resilience narratives to support access to capital.

### **Forward-Looking Risks & Scenarios (2025–2030):**

- Persistently higher rates pushing up funding costs and pressuring asset quality.
- CRE repricing and localized stress at regional banks with concentrated exposures.
- Consumer credit normalization toward pre-pandemic delinquency levels.
- Non-bank spillovers (shadow banking/fintech) and cyber/operational risks.
- Macro shocks (commodity/geo-political) testing market liquidity and risk transfer.

### **Basel III “Endgame” Update (2025 status):**

- U.S. agencies (Federal Reserve, OCC, FDIC) re-proposed Basel III Endgame rules in July 2025, with implementation timelines stretching into 2026–2028.
- Key adjustments include revised standardized risk weights, more risk-sensitive trading book measures, and stricter operational-risk capital.

Industry response: banks warn of overstated capital needs and potential credit supply tightening; regulators emphasize resilience gains.

*(Sources: Federal Reserve press release, July 2025; Risk.net reporting, Aug 2025.)*

### **Conclusion:**

- U.S. banking is structurally more resilient than in 2008, with stronger capital, liquidity, and supervisory frameworks.
- System-wide instability appears unlikely in the near term.

- Pockets of risk persist in CRE, leveraged loans, and rate-sensitive funding.
- Sustained financial stability depends on disciplined risk governance and continued regulatory vigilance.

### **Limitations & Assumptions:**

This report summarizes directional trends using public, sector-level sources; it does not rely on confidential supervisory data. Quantitative statements are indicative, not precise estimates; bank-level heterogeneity may differ materially from aggregate patterns. Scenario discussions are illustrative and not forecasts.

### **References:**

*Federal Reserve (Financial Stability Report; H.8; supervisory disclosures).*

*FDIC (Quarterly Banking Profile; Call Reports).*

*OCC (Semiannual Risk Perspective).*

*IMF (Global Financial Stability Report).*

*BIS (Basel III; global credit indicators).*

*U.S. Treasury/FSOC (Annual/periodic stability assessments).*

*Selected public bank filings/investor presentations.*