Project Allocation Algorithm

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1 Introduction and Overview

This algorithm is developed for project allotment to students. Here we deal with two sided preference i.e students have a project preference and each project has a student preference given by the faculty which floated the project. Our approach to this is to use the generalised version of Gale Shapley's algorithm.

2 Algorithm Implementation and Development

Set S represents students and set P represents projects.

```
Let S = \{S_1, S_2, ..., S_m\} where S_i = (id_i, preference_i) is the i^{th} student and m \in N
Let P = \{P_1, P_2, ..., P_n\} where P_i = (id_i, preference_i) is the i^{th} project and n \in N
A necessary condition for this algorithm to work is n \geq m.
```

2.1 Pseudo Code

Algorithm 1: Project Allocation

```
Require: n \ge m
  free \leftarrow S
  alloted \leftarrow []
  allocationMap \leftarrow \{\}
  while |allocationMap| \neq |S| do
     S_i \leftarrow free[0]
     P_i \leftarrow S_i[1][0]
     if \neg allocationMap.hasKey(P_i) then
        allocationMap \leftarrow \{P_i, S_i\}
        alloted.push(S_i)
        free - \{S_i\}
     else
        S_k \leftarrow allocationMap[P_i]
        S_{k,index} \leftarrow findIndex \ of \ S_k \ in \ P_j[1]
        S_{i,index} \leftarrow findIndex \ of \ S_i \ in \ P_i[1]
        if S_{k,index} > S_{i,index} then
           allocationMap \leftarrow P_i, S_i
           alloted - \{S_k\}
           free - \{S_i\}
           alloted.push(S_i)
           free.push(S_k)
        else
           Pop the first element of S_i[1]
        end if
     end if
  end while
```

3 Theoretical Background

Since this problem is similar to the admission problem (General case of Gale Shapley's algorithm) we can see that theorems also follow.

4 Computational Results

As we can see from the algorithm the worst case time complex sity is $O(n^2)$ as we have some loops inside the outer while loop.

5 Summary and Conclusions

Test run is pending.

References

[1] D.Gale, L.S.Shapley, *College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage*, Available at https://www.eecs.harvard.edu/cs286r/courses/fall09/papers/galeshapley.pdf.