

Counting Abstraction

for the Verification of

Structured Parameterized Networks

Neven Villani¹, Marius Bozga¹, Radu Iosif¹, Arnaud Sangnier²


CAV'25 @ Zagreb

2025-07-25

¹VERIMAG, Univ. Grenoble Alpes, CNRS


²DIBRIS, Univ. di Genoa

- (automated) verification of networks
- challenge: size and architecture (communication topology)




- undecidable \Rightarrow abstraction


Token ring with resource




Token ring with resource




Token ring with resource




Token ring with resource




Token ring with resource




Token ring with resource



Token ring with resource



Token ring with resource



$$\forall n \geq 2$$

How would we automatically verify this ?

Techniques for non-finite-state systems...

Parameterized model checking of rendezvous systems

(B. Aminof, T. Kotek, S. Rubin, F. Spegni, H. Veith)

✗ not homogeneous (2 kinds of processes)

How would we automatically verify this ?

Techniques for non-finite-state systems...

Parameterized model checking of rendezvous systems


(B. Aminof, T. Kotek, S. Rubin, F. Spegni, H. Veith)

✗ not homogeneous (2 kinds of processes)

Parameterized Verification of Algorithms for Oblivious Robots on a Ring

(A. Sangnier, N. Sznajder, M. Potop-Butucaru, S. Tixeuil)

✗ not a standard architecture (clique, ring, star)



How would we automatically verify this ?

Techniques for non-finite-state systems...

Parameterized model checking of rendezvous systems


(B. Aminof, T. Kotek, S. Rubin, F. Spegni, H. Veith)

✗ not homogeneous (2 kinds of processes)

Parameterized Verification of Algorithms for Oblivious Robots on a Ring

(A. Sangnier, N. Sznajder, M. Potop-Butucaru, S. Tixeuil)

✗ not a standard architecture (clique, ring, star)



Parameterized Model Checking of Token-Passing Systems

(B. Aminof, S. Jacobs, A. Khalimov, S. Rubin)


✗ not a token-passing system (key and lock don't behave like tokens)


Framework requirements

We must be able to express

- an encoding of the **local behavior** of processes
- a description of the **interactions** and **architectures** of arbitrary size
- a **specification language** for safety properties


Framework






Interactions through composition


Framework





Interactions through composition





Interactions through composition












$$\begin{aligned} X \longrightarrow & \text{compose}(\text{rename}_{\text{left} \mapsto \text{mid}}(\text{copy}_{\text{send} \rightsquigarrow \text{acq}, \text{recv} \rightsquigarrow \text{rel}}(X)), \\ & \text{rename}_{\text{right} \mapsto \text{mid}}(\text{client})) \end{aligned}$$

Representable architectures

Encoded as a CFG for graphs¹ \implies families of bounded TW are representable (missing: ~~square grids~~, cliques²)



¹Graph Structure and Monadic Second Order Logic; by B. Courcelle, J. Engelfriet




²Verifying Parameterized Networks Specified by Vertex Replacement Graph Grammars; by A. Sangnier, R. Iosif, N. Villani @ NETYS'25

Safety specification

Safety properties

$\#(\text{🔑})$: number of tokens on 🔑

\sim number of clients who claim to own the key



$$\#(\text{🔑}) + \#(\text{🔒}) > 1$$

Proving safety \approx reachability problem in an infinite family of PNs

- **mutual exclusion**

“at most k processes can enter a critical section simultaneously”

- **uniqueness**

“the entire system contains at most k instances of a resource”

- **uncoverability**

“no process can reach a bad state”

Examples: leader election, semaphores, dining philosophers, ...

Missing: liveness, ~~deadlock freedom~~

An Abstraction Technique

Verification pipeline

An Abstraction Technique


```
Sys  $\rightarrow$  compose( $X$ , renameleft $\mapsto$ right, right $\mapsto$ left(client'))  
X  $\rightarrow$  compose(  
  renameleft $\mapsto$ mid(copysend $\leadsto$ acq, recv $\leadsto$ rel( $X$ )),  
  renameright $\mapsto$ mid(client)  
)  
X  $\rightarrow$  compose(copysend $\leadsto$ acq, recv $\leadsto$ rel(server), client)
```

Verification pipeline

```
Sys  $\rightarrow$  compose( $X$ , renameleft $\mapsto$ right, right $\mapsto$ left(client'))  
X  $\rightarrow$  compose(  
  renameleft $\mapsto$ mid(copysend $\leadsto$ acq, recv $\leadsto$ rel( $X$ )),  
  renameright $\mapsto$ mid(client)  
)  
X  $\rightarrow$  compose(copysend $\leadsto$ acq, recv $\leadsto$ rel(server), client)
```

language \rightarrow

infinite family of PNs




Verification pipeline

```
Sys  $\rightarrow$  compose(X, renameleft $\mapsto$ right, right $\mapsto$ left(client'))  
X  $\rightarrow$  compose(  
  renameleft $\mapsto$ mid(copysend $\leadsto$ acq, recv $\leadsto$ rel(X)),  
  renameright $\mapsto$ mid(client)  
)  
X  $\rightarrow$  compose(copysend $\leadsto$ acq, recv $\leadsto$ rel(server), client)
```

language

infinite family of PNs



safety

$$\#(\text{key}) + \#(\text{lock}) > 1$$

Verification pipeline


```

Sys  $\rightarrow$  compose( $X$ , renameleft $\mapsto$ right, right $\mapsto$ left(client'))
X  $\rightarrow$  compose(
  renameleft $\mapsto$ mid(copysend $\leadsto$ acq, recv $\leadsto$ rel( $X$ )),
  renameright $\mapsto$ mid(client)
)
X  $\rightarrow$  compose(copysend $\leadsto$ acq, recv $\leadsto$ rel(server), client)

```

language \rightarrow

infinite family of PNs



~~safety~~




undecidable!

$$\#(\text{key}) + \#(\text{lock}) > 1$$

Verification pipeline

An Abstraction Technique

```
Sys → compose(X, renameleft→right, right→left(client'))  
X → compose(  
  renameleft→mid(copysend↔acq, recv↔rel(X)),  
  renameright→mid(client)  
)  
X → compose(copysend↔acq, recv↔rel(server), client)
```



~~safety~~

undecidable!

$\#(\text{key}) + \#(\text{lock}) > 1$


Verification pipeline

An Abstraction Technique


```
Sys  $\rightarrow$  compose( $X$ , renameleft $\mapsto$ right, right $\mapsto$ left(client'))  
X  $\rightarrow$  compose(  
  renameleft $\mapsto$ mid(copysend $\leadsto$ acq, recv $\leadsto$ rel( $X$ )),  
  renameright $\mapsto$ mid(client)  
)  
X  $\rightarrow$  compose(copysend $\leadsto$ acq, recv $\leadsto$ rel(server), client)
```

language

infinite family of PNs



abstraction



finite PN

\supseteq

e.g. LoLA



~~safety~~

undecidable!

$$\#(\text{key}) + \#(\text{lock}) > 1$$



Folding abstraction

An Abstraction Technique





Folding abstraction

An Abstraction Technique




Folding abstraction

An Abstraction Technique




Folding abstraction

An Abstraction Technique




fold
→




Implementing fold

An Abstraction Technique




Implementing fold

An Abstraction Technique




Implementing fold

An Abstraction Technique




fold
→

←--
⊆




Implementing fold

An Abstraction Technique




fold
→
←--
⊆




Folded system

An Abstraction Technique



Folded system

An Abstraction Technique



$$\text{Sys} \longrightarrow \text{compose}\left(X, \text{rename}_{\text{left} \mapsto \text{right}, \text{right} \mapsto \text{left}}(\text{client}')\right)$$
$$\begin{aligned} X \longrightarrow & \text{compose}\left(\right. \\ & \text{rename}_{\text{left} \mapsto \text{mid}}\left(\text{copy}_{\text{send} \rightsquigarrow \text{acq}, \text{recv} \rightsquigarrow \text{rel}}(X)\right), \\ & \text{rename}_{\text{right} \mapsto \text{mid}}(\text{client}) \\ & \left. \right) \end{aligned}$$
$$X \longrightarrow \text{compose}\left(\text{copy}_{\text{send} \rightsquigarrow \text{acq}, \text{recv} \rightsquigarrow \text{rel}}(\text{server}), \text{client}\right)$$


$\text{Sys} \longrightarrow \text{compose}(\mathbf{X}, \text{rename}_{\text{left} \mapsto \text{right}, \text{right} \mapsto \text{left}}(\text{client}'))$

$\mathbf{X} \longrightarrow \text{compose}(\text{rename}_{\text{left} \mapsto \text{mid}}(\text{copy}_{\text{send} \rightsquigarrow \text{acq}, \text{recv} \rightsquigarrow \text{rel}}(\mathbf{X})), \text{rename}_{\text{right} \mapsto \text{mid}}(\text{client}))$
)

$\mathbf{X} \longrightarrow \text{compose}(\text{copy}_{\text{send} \rightsquigarrow \text{acq}, \text{recv} \rightsquigarrow \text{rel}}(\text{server}), \text{client})$

Initial marking


From the grammar


$$\text{Sys} \longrightarrow X, \text{client}'$$
$$X \longrightarrow X, \text{client}$$
$$X \longrightarrow \text{server}, \text{client}$$


An Abstraction Technique

Initial marking


From the grammar


$$\text{Sys} \longrightarrow X, \text{client}'$$
$$X \longrightarrow X, \text{client}$$
$$X \longrightarrow \text{server}, \text{client}$$




Finite abstract system

An Abstraction Technique





Conclusion

Refinements

Partial unfolding, boolean contracts

A decidable restriction

Pebble-Passing Systems

- multiple process types, multiple tokens
- processes only record the presence of a token

(similar to but incomparable with Token-Passing Systems)

Coverability of a control state is **2EXPTIME** and **PSPACE-hard**