


CS 668:

Module 3.4:

Storing and Analyzing ATT&CK-Mapped Data




Considerations When Storing ATT&CK-Mapped Intel



- **Who's consuming it?**
 - Human or machine?
 - Requirements?
- **How will you provide context?**
 - Include full text?
- **How detailed will it be?**
 - Just a Technique, or a Procedure?
 - How will you capture that detail? (Free text?)
- **How will you link it to other intel?**
 - Incident, group, campaign, indicator...
- **How will you import and export data?**
 - Format?

The community is still figuring this out!

Ways to Store and Display ATT&CK-Mapped Intel



「(ツ)」



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Scheduled Task

Utilities such as `at` and `schtasks`, along with the Windows Task Scheduler, can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met to use RPC and file and printer sharing is turned on. Scheduling a task on a remote system typically required being a member of the Administrators group on the remote system.^[1]

An adversary may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence, to conduct remote execution as part of **Lateral Movement**, to gain SYSTEM privileges, or to run processes under the context of a specified account.

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Examples

- APT18 actors used the native `at` Windows task scheduler tool to use scheduled

Scheduled Task	
Technique	
ID	T1053
Tactic	Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Platform	Windows
Permissions Required	User, Administrator, SYSTEM
Effective Permissions	User, Administrator, SYSTEM
Data Sources	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Supports Remote	Yes
CAPEC ID	CAPEC-557
Contributors	Travis Smith, Tripwire, Leo Loopeek, @leoloopeek, Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security

Ways to Store and Display ATT&CK-Mapped Intel

Tags

tlp:white x

Unstructured x

osint:source-type="technical-report" x

dnc:malware-type="CoinMiner" x

+

Date

2018-11-13

Threat Level

Undefined

Analysis

Completed

Distribution

All communities ⓘ

Info

OSINT: WebCobra Malware Uses Victims' Computers to Mine Cryptocurrency

Published

Yes (2019-01-26 14:09:07)

#Attributes

44

First recorded change

2018-11-13 16:10:27

Last change

2018-11-13 16:10:27

Modification map

Sightings

0 (0) 🔧

13501: OSINT:....

Galaxies

Tool 🔍

+ CoinMiner 🔍 📋 🗑️

Attack Pattern 🔍

+ Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel 🔍 📋 🗑️

+ Command-Line Interface 🔍 📋 🗑️

+ Data from Local System 🔍 📋 🗑️

+ File and Directory Discovery 🔍 📋 🗑️

+ Query Registry 🔍 📋 🗑️

+ System Information Discovery 🔍 📋 🗑️

+ Process Discovery 🔍 📋 🗑️

+ System Time Discovery 🔍 📋 🗑️



Courtesy of Alexandre Dulaunoy

Ability to link to indicators and files



Courtesy of Alexandre Dulaunoy

Ways to Express and Store ATT&CK-Mapped Intel



ANOMALI

Sophisticated New Phishing Campaign Targets the C-Suite (February 5, 2019)

A new phishing campaign attempting to steal login credentials has been observed to be specifically targeting C-levels and executives in organisations, according to researchers from GreatHorn. ...

[Click here for Anomali recommendation](#)

MITRE ATT&CK: [MITRE ATT&CK] Spearphishing Link (T1192) | [MITRE ATT&CK] Trusted Relationship (T1199)

**Techniques at the
end of a report**

<https://www.anomali.com/blog/weekly-threat-briefing-google-spots-attacks-exploiting-ios-zero-day-flaws>

Ways to Express and Store ATT&CK-Mapped Intel



Analyzing Operation GhostSecret: Attack Seeks to Steal Data Worldwide


MITRE ATT&CK techniques

Techniques at the end of a report

- Exfiltration over control server channel: data is exfiltrated over the control server channel using a custom protocol
- Commonly used port: the attackers used common ports such as port 443 for control server communications
- Service execution: registers the implant as a service on the victim's machine
- Automated collection: the implant automatically collects data about the victim and sends it to the control server
- Data from local system: local system is discovered and data is gathered
- Process discovery: implants can list processes running on the system
- System time discovery: part of the data reconnaissance method, the system time is also sent to the control server
- File deletion: malware can wipe files indicated by the attacker

<https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/analyzing-operation-ghostsecret-attack-seeks-to-steal-data-worldwide/>

Ways to Express and Store ATT&CK-Mapped Intel



Growing Tensions Between U.S., DPRK Coincide with Higher Rate of CHOLLIMA Activity

Techniques Observed

- Persistence: New Service
- Defense Evasion: Masquerading
- Discovery: System Information Discovery, System Network Configuration Discovery, File and Directory Discovery
- Command and Control



Consistent with reporting trends across the community, OverWatch saw an increase in threat activity attributed to North Korea in 2017. For example, in mid-May, STARDUST CHOLLIMA actors exploited a web-facing SMB server belonging to a high-profile research institution located in the U.S. They leveraged access to install the following malicious DLL:

Techniques at the beginning of a report

<https://www.crowdstrike.com/resources/reports/2018-crowdstrike-global-threat-report-blurring-the-lines-between-statecraft-and-tradecraft/>

Ways to Express and Store ATT&CK-Mapped Intel

digital shadows_

Mitre ATT&CK™ and the Mueller GRU Indictment:
Lessons for Organizations

**Adding additional
info to an ATT&CK
technique**

MITRE ATT&CK Stage



1. Initial Access

GRU Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

Trusted Relationship


Mitigation Advice

- 3rd parties, such as suppliers and partner organizations, typically have privileged access via a trusted relationship into certain environments.
- These relationships can be abused by attackers to subvert security controls and gain unauthorized access into target environments.
- Managing trusted relationships, like supply chains, is an incredibly complex topic. The NCSC (National Cyber Security Center) has an excellent overview of this challenging topic.

<https://www.digitalshadows.com/blog-and-research/mitre-attck-and-the-mueller-gru-indictment-lessons-for-organizations/>

Ways to Express and Store ATT&CK-Mapped Intel

Recorded Future



**With
timestamps**

<https://www.recordedfuture.com/mitre-attack-framework/>

Ways to Express and Store ATT&CK-Mapped Intel

Machine readable

unit42

PLAYBOOK VIEWER

Technique: T1064: Scripting^{REFERENCE}

Description

Indicator Pattern

Sysget writes a batch script in the %TEMP% folder to clean up the original files and spawning a newly written winlogon.exe executable.

```
[process:command_line = '@echo off :t timeout 1 for /f %i in (\tasklist /FI "IMAGENAME eq [original_executable_name]" ^| find /v /c "\"' ) do set YO=%i if %%YO%%==4 goto :t del /F "[original_executable_path]" del /F "[tmp_file]" start /B cmd /c "[startup_winlogon.exe]" del /F "[self]" exit']
```

Linking techniques to indicators

Technique: T1071: Standard Application Layer Protocol^{REFERENCE}

Description

Indicator Pattern

C2 server communicates over HTTP and embeds data within the Cookie HTTP header.

```
[domain-name:value = '2014.zzux.com']
```

https://pan-unit42.github.io/playbook_viewer/

Ways to Express and Store ATT&CK-Mapped Intel



Component Object Model Hijacking

APT28 has used COM hijacking for persistence by replacing the legitimate `MMDeviceEnumerator` object with a payload.^[14]

<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007/>

What else could we do?

Full-Text Report

APT15 was also observed using Mimikatz to **dump credentials** and generate **Kerberos golden tickets**. This allowed the group to persist in the victim's network in the event of

<https://www.nccgroup.trust/us/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blog/2018/march/apt15-is-alive-and-strong-an-analysis-of-royalcli-and-royaldns/>

ATT&CK Technique

**Credential Dumping
(T1003)**


APT28 Techniques*

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control
Drive by Compromise	Apple crypt	.bash profile and .bashrc	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	Account Manipulation	Account discovery	Apple crypt	Audio Capture	Automated xfiltration	Commonly used port
exploit public facing Application	CM T	Accessibility features	Accessibility features	Binary adding	bash history	Application Window discovery	Application deployment software	Automated Collection	ata Compressed	Communication Through Removable Media
Hardware Additions	Command line Interface	AppCert s	AppCert s	IT obs	rule force	browser bookmark discovery	distributed Component b ect Model	Clipboard ata	ata ncrypted	Connection roxy
Replication Through Removable Media	Control panel Items	Appinit s	Appinit s	ypass ser Account Control	Credential dumping	file and irectory discovery	xploitation of Remote services	ata from Information Repositories	ata Transfer i e limits	Custom Command and Control rotocol
pearphishing Attachment	ynamic ata xchange	Application himming	Application himming	Clear Command history	Credentials in files	Network service canning	ogon cripts	ata from ocal ystem	xfiltration ver Alternative rotocol	Custom Cryptographic rotocol
pearphishing link	xecution through A I	Authentication hackage	ypass ser Account Control	ICM T	Credentials in Registry	Network hare discovery	ass the ash	ata from Network hared rive	xfiltration ver Command and Control Channel	ata ncoding
pearphishing via service	xecution through Module cad	IT obs	earch rder iacking	Code igning	xploitation for Credential Access	assword olicy discovery	ass the Ticket	ata from Removable Media	xfiltration ver ther Network Medium	ata bfuscation
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Trusted Relationship	raphical ser Interface	rowser xtensions	xploitation for rivilege scation	Component b ect Model iacking	ooking	ermission roups iscovery	Remote ile Copy	mail Collection	cheduled Transfer	atiback Channels
Valid Accounts	Install #	Change default ile Association	xtra Window Memory In action	C shadow	Input Capture	ermission iscovery	Remote services	Input Capture		Multi hop roxy
	aunchctl	Component firmware	ile ystem ermissions Weakness	ebfuscate ecode files o information	Input rompt	uery Registry	Replication Through Removable Media	Man in the browser		Multi tage Channels
	ocal ob scheduling	Component b ect Model iacking	ooking	isabling ecurity Tools	erberoasting	Remote ystem iscovery	hared Webroot	reen Capture		Multiband Communication
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	ower hell	ylib iacking	New service	ide oading	Network niffing	ystem Network Configuration iscovery	Third party software			Remote Access Tools
Regsvcs Regasm	xternal Remote services	ath Interception	xploitation for efense vasion	assword filter	ystem Network Connection iscovery	ystem wner ser iscovery	Windows Admin hares			Remote ile Copy
Regsvr	ile ystem ermissions Weakness	list Modification	xtra Window Memory In action	ivate eys	Replication Through Removable Media	ystem service iscovery	Windows Remote Management			andard Application ayer rotocol
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Third party software	ocal ob scheduling	Valid Accounts	Indicator Removal from Tools							
Trap	ogin Item	Web hell	Indicator Removal on ost							
Trusted developer utilities	ogon cripts		Indirect Command xecution							
ser xecution	A river		Install Root Certificate							
Windows Management Instrumentation	Modify xisting service		Install #							
Windows Remote Management	Netsh elper		aunchctl							
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	Re opened Applications		list Modification							
	Redundant Access		ort nocking							

*from open source reporting we've mapped

APT29 Techniques

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control
Drive by Compromise	Apple crypt	.bash profile and .bashrc	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	Account Manipulation	Account discovery	Apple crypt	Audio Capture	Automated xfiltration	Commonly sed ot
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Hardware Additions	Command line Interface	AppCert s	AppCert s	IT obs	route orce	rowser bookmark discovery	istributed Component b ect Model	Clipboard ata	ata ncrypted	Connection roxy
Replication Through Removable Media	Control anel Items	AppInit s	AppInit s	ypass ser Account Control	Credential umping	ile and irectory discovery	xploitation of Remote ervices	ata from Information Repositories	ata Transfer i e imits	Custom Command and Control rotocol
pearphishing Attachment	ynamic ata xchange	Authentication ackage	Application himming	Application himming	Clear Command istory	Credentials in iles	etwork ervice canning	ogon cripts	ata from ocal ystem	Custom Cryptographic rotocol
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	Regsvcs Regasm	xternal Remote ervices	ath Interception	xploitation for efense	assword filter	ystem Network Connection discovery	Windows Admin hares			Remote ile Copy
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	Third party software	ocal ob cheduling	Valid Accounts	Indicator Removal from Tools						
	Trap	ngin Item	Web hell	Indicator Removal on ost						
	Trusted developer tilities	ogon cripts		Indirect Command xecution						
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		Redundant Access		ort nocking						




Overlay known gaps

APT28

APT29

Both groups

ATT&CK Navigator



- One option for getting started with storing and analyzing in a simple way
- Open source (JSON), so you can customize it
- Allows you you visualize data



ATT&CK Navigator Demo



Exercise : Comparing Layers in ATT&CK Navigator

- Docs you will need are at attack.mitre.org/training/cti under Exercise 4
 - Step-by-step instructions are in the “Comparing layers in Navigator”
 - Techniques are listed in the “APT39 and Cobalt Kitty techniques”
1. Open ATT&CK Navigator: <http://bit.ly/attacknav>
 2. Enter techniques from APT39 and Cobalt Kitty/OceanLotus into separate Navigator layers with a unique score for each layer’s techniques
 3. Combine the layers in Navigator to create a third layer
 4. Make your third layer look pretty
 5. Make a list of the techniques that overlap between the two groups

Exercise: Comparing Layers in ATT&CK Navigator



Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command And Control
Drive by Compromise	Apple script	.bash profile and .bashrc	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	Account Manipulation	Account Discovery	Apple script	Audio Capture	Automated exfiltration	Commonly used port
Exploit Public Facing Application	CM T	Accessibility features	Accessibility features	Binary adding	ash history	Application Window Discovery	Application Deployment	Automated Collection	ata Compressed	Communication Through Removable Media
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	ower hell	ylib i acking	ath Interception	ide oading	assword lter	ystem Network Configuration iscovery	Windows Admin hares			Remote ile Copy
	Regsvcs Regasm	xternal Remote ervices	list Modification	xploitation for efense vasion	ivate eys	ystem Network Connection iscovery	Windows Remote Management			Standard Application ayer ralocal
	Regsvr	ile system emissions Weakness	ort Monitors	xtra Window Memory In action	ecurityd Memory	ystem wher ser iscovery				Standard Cryptographic ralocal
	Rundll	idden files and irectories	rocess im action	ile eletion	Two actor Authentication Interception	ystem ervice iscovery				Standard Non Application ayer ralocal
	cheduled Task	ooking	cheduled Task	ile emissions Modification		ystem Time iscovery				ncommonly sed ort
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	igned binary roxy xecution	ernel Modules and xtensions	I story In action	idden files and irectories						
	igned cript roxy xecution	aunch Agent	tartup Items	idden sers						
	ource	aunch aemon	ude	idden Window						
	pace after filename	aunchctl	udo Caching	I TG NTR						
	Third party ofware	C A I Addition	alid Accounts	Image ile xecution ption s						
	Trap	deal ob scheduling	Web hell	Indicator locking						
	Trusted developer utilities	egin Item		Indicator Removal from Tools						
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	Windows Management Instrumentation	A river		Indirect Command xecution						
	Windows Remote Management	Modify xisting ervice		Install Root Certificate						
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		ort Monitors		Network hare Connection Removal						
		Re common		NT ile Attributes						
		Re opened Applications		Priscated files of Information						

APT39

OceanLotus

Both groups

Exercise: Comparing Layers in ATT&CK Navigator



- Here are the overlapping techniques:
 1. Spearphishing Attachment
 2. Spearphishing Link
 3. Scheduled Task
 4. Scripting
 5. User Execution
 6. Registry Run Keys/Startup Folder
 7. Network Service Scanning



End of Module 3.4

