# Topshelf

#### **Strategic ambiguity key to appeasing Somalia**

Gulaid Yusuf Idaan, 7-4-2024 A Legal and Diplomatic Analysis of Somaliland’s Quest for International Recognition, <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/07>

/04/a-legal-and-diplomatic-analysis-of-somalilands-quest-for-international-recognition/ //Wenzhuo

However, **Ethiopia refrains from** the provision of **formal recognition because it presents a risk of conflict with Somalia** and the Muslim influence in the region. Formal recognition of Somaliland would most likely anger Somalia. That **act would encircle an already unstable region besides upsetting Ethiopia’s** wider **exotic strategy** across the region. It, therefore, shows how **a delicately balanced approach is maintained** by regional powers while negotiating the tricky politics of state recognition. It **keeps them economically** and politically **engaged without** showing signs of all the way **recognition** for stabilizing the region and its strategic alliance.

#### **Somaliland is developing and attracting investment absent recognition**

Giacomo Togini, 12-3-2017, Development in Somaliland Despite Lack of Recognition, https://borgenproject.org/development-in-somaliland-recognition/ //wenzhuo

Despite being home to 3.5 million people and the ancient cities of Berbera and Zeila, the nation of Somaliland technically doesn’t exist. Since declaring independence in 1991, the northernmost corner of war-torn Somalia has operated as an unrecognized state. While its neighbors in East Africa struggle with autocracy or are outright failed states, Somaliland has built decades of political stability. Now, development in Somaliland is progressing. Somaliland held presidential elections on Nov. 13, a vote delayed two years due to a crippling drought made worse by the absence of international aid. Unlike the restricted elections held in neighboring Somalia earlier this year, Somaliland has held fully democratic elections since the early 2000s. Development in Somaliland extends to the electoral system: this year the country unveiled the world’s first-ever biometric voting system, using iris scanning technology to identify voters and avoid duplicate ballots. Hargeisa, **Somaliland**’s bustling capital, is **attracting small businesses** from the diaspora **as well as large corporations** to spur development in the country. Companies including **Coca-Cola and** Dubai-based **DP World are spurring development** in Somaliland, **announcing deals worth** a combined **$460 million to build a port** in the coastal city of Berbera **and a bottling plant** outside the capital. “It is clear that investors will play a critical part in the next chapter of Somaliland’s story, helping this dynamic economy to thrive and prosper and bolstering our bid for recognition,” wrote Somaliland’s Foreign Minister Dr. Saad Ali Shire in the *Financial Times*. The East African country’s international status remains a significant hurdle to further economic development in Somaliland, home to a young and fast-growing population. **While international partners** still **do not recognize** Somaliland’s **independence, organizations** including the World Bank are **investing in development projects** in the country. The **World Bank’s** Somaliland Business **Fund has provided over $20 million in grants** and matching funds to private businesses, supporting development in Somaliland and its agriculture, manufacturing and renewable energy industries. Still unrecognized and facing delays in its elections, Somaliland is by no means perfect. But its **ongoing political stability and** efforts to attract domestic and foreign **investment are putting it on a path of steady economic development**. *– Giacomo Tognini*

#### **Somaliland’s economy is growing.**

**Yusuf 24** [Shab’an H. Yusuf, May 28, 2024 , Saxafi Media, “The Economic Implications Of Somaliland-Ethiopia MoU: A Comprehensive Analysis”https://saxafimedia.com/economic-implications-somaliland-ethiopia-mou/]

Furthermore, **the economic performance of Somaliland is highlighted, showcasing its development** despite being an unrecognized territory within Somalia. The **private sector**, including **telecommunications, remittances, and livestock exports**, has played a significant role in **driving economic growth** and job creation. **The expansion of infrastructure, such as ports and road networks, has improved connectivity and facilitated trade in the region.** **In recent years, Somaliland’s economy has experienced growth, with increased investment in infrastructure, trade activities, and recovery** from the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic **contributing to a boost in real GDP. Inflation and exchange rate stability have been maintained, creating a favorable economic environment for investors in Somaliland.** Overall, the paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the economic landscape in Somaliland, the implications of the memorandum with Ethiopia, and the key factors driving economic growth in the region.

#### **Domestic programs alleviate poverty.**

**STC 20** [Save the Children is an international Organization, xx-xx-2020, "", No Publication, https://www.developmentpathways.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Scoping-and-Sector-Review-of-Social-Protection-in-Somaliland.pdf] DOA: 12-21-2024 //Ewan

The implementation of inclusive lifecycle **Social Protection schemes will have transformative impacts on** households’ consumption, **poverty and** inequality. The schemes will, in particular, **benefit the poorest households in Somaliland**, as per capita household consumption would increase by 14.3 per cent among the poorest 10 per cent of the population. Further, **the scheme** will **lead to a**n estimate **reduction in Somaliland’s poverty rate by 3.8 per cent and a reduction in the poverty gap by 7.1 per cent.** Higher impacts can be achieved if Somaliland were to achieve universal coverage of all children below the age of 18 years under the proposed system of lifecycle benefits. **This** would **lead to** an **average increase in per capita** **household consumption** in Somaliland **by 8.8 per cent**, **while the increase would be 24.5 per cent among the poorest** 10 per cent. The **poverty rate is estimated to reduce by 9.9 per cent** as a result, while the **poverty gap would reduce by 17 per cent.**

**The aff reignites Somaliland-Djibouti tensions.**

**Jama 24’**

Jama, July 3 2024, “Djibouti-Somaliland Tensions Escalate Over Ethiopia Partnership”, *The Somali Digest,* <https://thesomalidigest.com/djibouti-somaliland-tensions-escalate-over-ethiopia-partnership/>, //DS

The Horn of Africa is witnessing a significant shift in regional dynamics as Djibouti-Somaliland tensions reach new heights following the controversial Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed [between Somaliland and Ethiopia](https://thesomalidigest.com/somaliland-and-ethiopia-recognition-for-sea-access/) on January 1, 2024. This escalation, further intensified by Djibouti’s apparent endorsement of the Awdal State Movement (ASM), not only threatens the delicate balance of power in the region but also underscores the complex interplay of political, economic, and strategic interests that define interstate relations in this part of the world.

The root of the current Djibouti-Somaliland tensions can be traced back to the signing of the MoU between Somaliland and Ethiopia. This agreement, which proposes to exchange Ethiopian recognition of Somaliland’s independence for access to the port of Berbera, has sent shockwaves through the region, disrupting long-standing alliances and forcing countries to reassess their strategic positions.

Djibouti’s vocal opposition to this MoU is multifaceted. On one level, it represents a challenge to the status quo that has long benefited Djibouti. As the primary gateway for Ethiopian goods, Djibouti’s port has been a crucial source of revenue and strategic importance for the country. The prospect of Ethiopia gaining access to an alternative port in Berbera threatens to undermine this position, potentially dealing a significant blow to Djibouti’s economy and regional influence.

Moreover, the Djibouti-Somaliland tensions are exacerbated by the broader implications of the MoU for regional stability and the delicate balance of power. Djibouti, like many other countries in the region and the international community at large, has long adhered to the principle of Somalia’s territorial integrity. The potential recognition of Somaliland’s independence by Ethiopia not only challenges this principle but also sets a precedent that could have far-reaching consequences for other secessionist movements in the region.

Djibouti’s Strategic Maneuver

In what appears to be a calculated move to express its displeasure and exert pressure on Somaliland, Djibouti has recently hosted and given prominence to the Awdal State Movement during its Independence Day celebrations. The ASM, a unionist movement opposed to Somaliland’s secession from Somalia, was notably featured at the event, with its leader occupying a prominent position.

This act has significantly heightened Djibouti-Somaliland tensions, drawing sharp rebuke from Somaliland’s leadership. President Muse Bihi of Somaliland has publicly spoken out against Djibouti’s actions, viewing them as a direct challenge to Somaliland’s claims of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Similarly, Somaliland’s Minister of Information has [accused Djibouti of harboring the ASM](https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=801270058859710&id=100069301685888&mibextid=7J6EjN&rdid=0Zxpns2FMIzGwivz), describing it as contrary to the spirit of brotherhood and cooperation that has historically characterized relations between Djibouti and Somaliland.

By providing a platform to the ASM, Djibouti is sending a clear message about its stance on Somaliland’s independence aspirations and its disapproval of the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU. This move not only intensifies Djibouti-Somaliland tensions but also introduces a new dynamic into the complex political landscape of the region, potentially emboldening other groups opposed to Somaliland’s independence claims.

Economic Implications

The economic dimension of the Djibouti-Somaliland tensions cannot be overstated. Djibouti’s economy is heavily dependent on its strategic location and its port facilities, which have long served as Ethiopia’s primary access to the sea. The port of Djibouti handles the vast majority of Ethiopia’s inbound trade, ab arrangement that has been a cornerstone of Djibouti’s economic strategy.

The Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU, by potentially diverting a significant portion of this trade to the port of Berbera, poses a direct threat to Djibouti’s economic interests. This economic imperative is a key driver of the Djibouti-Somaliland tensions, as Djibouti seeks to protect its position as the region’s primary maritime gateway.

Moreover, the Djibouti-Somaliland tensions highlight the fierce competition for infrastructure development and foreign investment in the region. Both Djibouti and Somaliland have been working to expand and modernize their port facilities, seeking to position themselves as key players in regional and global trade networks.

#### **Recognition greenlights other secessionist movements – destabilizing the region, reigniting proxy conflicts, drawing in middle powers – empirics**

Hagos **Gebereamlak**, 12-28-20**24**, "Ethiopia’s Recognition of Somaliland and the Repercussions for African Borders," Reporter Magazine, https://thereportermagazines.com/3214/, accessed 12-28-2024 //cy \*\*modified for problematic language

After gaining independence, African states largely adopted a policy of respecting the borders drawn during colonial times. This principle, known as ‘**Uti Possidetis’**, is enshrined **in Article 4 of the African Union Constitutive Act**, which calls for **the preservation of borders** as they existed at the time of independence. The goal of this policy has been to prevent disorder, chaos, and conflict across the continent. African countries have generally followed this principle**, fearing** that the recognition of **secessionist movements** could **set dangerous precedents**.

Although Somaliland was a separate British colony before merging with Somalia, the application of this principle may be complicated by the fact that it voluntarily joined Somalia shortly after gaining independence in 1960. Therefore, recognizing Somaliland’s independence today might be seen as **a challenge to the established principle of respecting colonial boundaries.**

If Ethiopia proceeds with recognizing Somaliland, it could compromise the long-standing principle of preserving colonial borders. This move might encourage other **secessionist movements across Africa** and lead to broader geopolitical **instability**. The recognition of Somaliland could serve as a **precedent, prompting** other groups topush for independence and potentially leading to a reshaping of the African political landscape.

Recognizing Somaliland could encourage secessionist movements and irredentist claims across the Horn of Africa, fueling instability in the region. There are already existing aspirations for independence in **several parts** of the Horn, and Somaliland’s recognition could embolden these movements.

In Ethiopia, for example, various regions, including **Tigray, Oromia, and the Somali region**, have elements advocating for greater autonomy or outright secession. Similar tendencies exist in **Sudan, Somalia, and Somaliland** itself. The complex ethnic landscape in the Horn of Africa further complicates these dynamics. For instance, **Somalis live across Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, and Somaliland,** while Afars inhabit **Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Eritrea**. Similarly**, Tigrayans and Oromos span multiple countries**, **creating fertile ground for secessionist and irredentist movements.**

The recognition of Somaliland might also inspire regions such as **Puntland and Jubaland** to seek independence from Somalia. These regions already enjoy a degree of autonomy, and Somaliland’s formal recognition could lead them to pursue a similar path.

Historically, Somalia has laid irredentist claims to Ethiopia’s Somali region (Ogaden), aiming to incorporate it into a “Greater Somalia.” If Ethiopia proceeds with recognizing Somaliland, it could **provoke retaliation** from Somalia, possibly leading to renewed claims over the Somali region of Ethiopia**. Somalia** couldalso **support secessionist movements** within Ethiopiaas a form of retaliation. In fact, Somalia’s Foreign Minister Ahmed Moalim Fiqi recently stated that if Ethiopia recognizes Somaliland, Somalia would consider backing Ethiopian rebels, essentially threatening to fuel internal conflicts in Ethiopia.

Historical Context of Tit-for-Tat Secessionist Support

**In the 1970s and 1980s**, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan engaged in a **vicious cycle** of supporting secessionist movements to destabilize each other. Somalia backed the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), which sought to secede the Ogaden region from Ethiopia, and the Somali Abo Liberation Front (SALF). Somalia also allowed the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) to establish offices and use Somali passports to further their causes.

Ethiopia, in turn, supported the Somali National Movement (SNM) in its fight against the Siad Barre regime, which later led to Somaliland’s declaration of independence. Ethiopia also aided the Somali Salvation Democratic Front, which established the autonomous region of Puntland. Meanwhile, Sudan supported various Ethiopian rebel groups, including the ELF, TPLF, and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). In retaliation, Ethiopia provided heavy support to the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), which eventually led to the secession of South Sudan.

This cycle of support **for rebel groups contributed to the downfall of the Derg regime in Ethiopia** and the **Siad Barre regime in Somalia**. It also led to the **fragmentation** of Somalia into Somaliland, Puntland, Jubaland, and other entities. Ethiopia’s involvement in Sudan similarly contributed to the eventual secession of Eritrea and South Sudan from Sudan.

There is a strong likelihood that this historical pattern of reciprocal support for secessionist movements will **reemerge**. Somalia may escalate its support for rebel groups in Ethiopia, particularly in regions like the Somali region, Oromia, and Tigray, where there are already existing tensions. This could fuel further instability in Ethiopia.

In response, Ethiopia might encourage independence movements in Puntland and Jubaland, supporting dissatisfied clans and tribes in Somalia to rebel or seek autonomy. This would **perpetuate a cycle of proxy conflicts**, destabilizing the Horn of Africa further and leading to **widespread insecurity**.

This reciprocal **destabilization** between Ethiopia and Somalia could **easily spread**, drawing in other regional actors and **intensifying** conflicts across the Horn of Africa. The region could find itself once again entangled in proxy wars, with various factions fighting for independence or control, supported by external powers.

The already volatile situation in the Horn of Africa could be further complicated by the **spillover effects** of Middle Eastern geopolitics and the encroachment of regional powers. The intensifying rivalry between the US and China is leading to a diminishing presence and influence of both superpowers in the region. As they compete for global dominance, their potential withdrawal could **create a vacuum** that may be filled by **middle-sized powers** from the [West Asia] ~~Middle East,~~ including the **UAE, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Egypt.**

Somalia

#### **Recent negotiations have harmonized positions and de-escalated the risk of conflict between regional powers.**

**Zane 25** [Damian Zane, writer @ the BBC, 1-3-2025, Ethiopia-Somalia tension: Dispute resolved according to Somali foreign minister, BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c3vr4pqn2ego] tristan

The diplomatic dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia that had led to **tense** **regional** **relations** has been **resolved**, Somalia's foreign minister says.¶ Ahmed Moalim Fiqi's statement, carried by state TV, said Somalia had made no concessions. Ethiopia has not commented on the Somali claim, but said the two **countries** had **agreed** to "**strengthen** bilateral **relations**".¶ The two neighbours had been at loggerheads since last January when landlocked Ethiopia signed a maritime deal with the breakaway Somaliland, which Somalia considers as part of its territory.¶ Friday's statement follows a **visit** to **Somalia** by an **Ethiopian** **delegation** in the **latest** **sign** of **détente** after a **Turkey**-brokered **deal** announced last month.¶ Led by Ethiopian Defence Minister Aisha Mohammed, the visit focused on the future of the **African** **Union** (AU) **peacekeeping** **mission** in Somalia.¶ Ethiopia has thousands of troops stationed in Somalia which are not part of the AU force and it has not been clear what role they will play in the future.¶ In its statement, Ethiopia said the two **countries** had **agreed** to **collaborate** on the **mission**.¶ Throughout last year, tension was high after Ethiopia announced plans to build a naval base in Somaliland. The breakaway republic said the deal included a commitment for Ethiopia to officially recognise it as an independent country, but Addis Ababa never confirmed this.¶ At the time Somalia said it saw the deal as an act of "aggression" and an affront to its sovereignty.¶ Somaliland, which broke away from Somalia more than 30 years ago, has long been pushing for recognition.¶ Just weeks ago it would have been **unthinkable** for officials from Ethiopia's defence ministry to be **holding** **talks** in the Somali capital, Mogadishu.¶ **Relations** between the neighbours were **so** **bad**, there were **fears** a wider **regional** **feud** was brewing - with Ethiopia on one side and Egypt backing the Mogadishu government.¶ But as a result of Turkey's mediation, things have improved, with both countries agreeing to recognise each other's sovereignty.¶ According to the Ankara joint declaration of 12 December 2024, the Horn of Africa neighbours are to reconvene in February to hold "technical talks".¶ Until then, they are to strive to reach "mutually beneficial commercial arrangements" to ensure Ethiopia gains access to the sea "under Somalia's sovereignty".

#### **Recognition forces invasion**

**Hassan 24** [Abdillahi Hassan, Somali Journalist and Social Activist, 1-21-2024, Somalia will go to war with Somaliland, not Ethiopia, Somaliland, https://www.somaliland.com/news/somalia-will-go-to-war-with-somaliland-not-ethiopia/] leon + Aaron

Somalia Mourning Perceived Loss Opportunity ¶ To observers in Somaliland and beyond, it may seem like Somalia is throwing juvenile tantrums. **However**, it is **crucial** to **understand** that **Somalia’s reaction** is rooted in its **perception** of **recent successes** to “**bring Somaliland** back to **the fold**”. What **infuriated Somalia** the **most** is in **not** the **prospect** of **Ethiopia getting** an **access** to the sea as **President Mohamud** himself **hinted** at **his openess** to that **possibility**. **Rather** it is the **sense** of **an opportunity** to **submit Somaliland** to its **will** slipping **away** from **their hands** with the **possibilities** that this **deal opens** for **Somaliland**. ¶ This sense of a historic opportunity, however, is not the result of progress in the Hargeisa-Mogadishu dialogue; rather, they stem from setbacks plaguing President Muse Bihi’s administration in Somaliland and Mogadishu’s steps to capitalize on them. The president’s extended term in 2022 triggered a protracted political dispute, damaging his legitimacy and fostering deep polarization and mistrust in the country. That was compounded by losses in the eastern frontier conflict, where Somaliland’s army was expelled from strongholds near Las Anod after seven months of clashes. This the **Somalian government** abruptly **capitalized** on by **recognizing** the **administration** of **Las Anod** which claims **three regions** in **Somaliland** either **wholly** or **partially**. And finally, the **neglect** of **economic development** has finally **caught up** with the **country** and put **considerable strain** on its **strength**. ¶ In contrast to Muse’s setbacks, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s government achieved significant successes in the last quarter of the year, securing debt relief, East Africa Community membership, and the lifting of a long-standing weapons import ban. ¶ These factors have emboldened Mogadishu’s administration to deliver what they see as the final blow to Somaliland’s quest for independence on the negotiation table. ¶ **Bitter Confrontation** in **Djibouti** ¶ Flushed with this perceived advantage, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud met with Muse Bihi in Djibouti on December 28, 2023. Sources close to the negotiations describe a tense encounter, devoid of pleasantries, where Somalia asserted its perceived advantage. Confronting Bihi on his “lack of legitimacy” and control over all of Somaliland’s territory, Somalia **further issued** a **clear threat** of **destabilization** in Somaliland’s **western regions** by exploiting **clan cleavages**. **Insult** was **added** to **injury** when **Mohamud** demanded that **president Bihi** represent only his **personal interests** and **those** of his immediate **kin group** as “**there** were **no thing** as **Somaliland** to **speak off**”. ¶ Later statements from Somalia’s Minister of the Interior Ahmed Fiqi confirm this confrontational picture. Fiqi, addressing a rally in Mogadishu, stated that President Bihi’s faced tremendous challenges and that his hope was that the President would have resolved them by “surrender to” Somalia and continuing negotiations for reunification. In fact, the **Somali side** was so **smug** about **their advantage** in **Djibouti** that **Minister Fiqi** announced that **it was** a “**historic milestone** for the **unification** of **the country**”. ¶ Indeed, the **over-reaction** from **Mogadishu** was **nothing more** than **frustration over** the **loss** of **perceived opportunity**. They see that the man whose back was to the wall had escaped their entrapment. And **for that**, they are **willing** to **go** to **war**, not **against Ethiopia** as **Somalian officials** have **repeatedly stated**, but **against Somaliland**. **Somalia** is **too weak** to **maintain confrontation** with **Ethiopia** for **prolonged time**. For one, Somalia depends on a large contingent of Ethiopian forces to keep Al-Shabab at bay. There is **great difference** in the **resources** and **capacities** of the **two nations** at this **juncture**. Even a diplomatic feud with Ethiopia is a futile endeavor for Somalia in the long run as with the exception of the impotent Egypt, there is hardly **any country** that would **pick Somalia** over **Ethiopia**. ¶ Subterfuge and Subversion ¶ In contrast, Somaliland as the setbacks of the previous year demonstrate, has its flaws that could be exploited. Somalia knows these very well and was capitalizing on them before the MoU interrupted them. So, with all its bluster against Ethiopia, it’s Somaliland that will bear the brunt of Somalia’s attack on multiple fronts. ¶ Indeed, the first direct rebuttal of the MoU from Mogadishu was mobilizing “pro-union” politicians serving in Somalia’s parliament and government to condemn the deal. Apart from the rhetoric, the first concrete reaction was to turn back an Ethiopian plane from Hargeisa International Airport and claiming that a second plane, a Thai cargo carrier, was denied request to land in Hargeisa. These steps were quite the challenge to Somaliland’s claim of sovereignty over the land, air, and the representation of the people of the country. ¶ However, **Somalia’s fury** over **Somaliland’s** self-**determination** as **manifested** in the **signing** of the **M**emorandum **o**f **U**nderstanding **does not** end **there**. What follows the **legalese arguments** is **concerted efforts** to **challenge** Somaliland’s **de facto** sovereignty **over** the **land**. This **takes** the **form** of **subversion**, **destabilization** and **attempts** to **break** the **consensus** of **Somaliland’s majority** on the **independence project**. ¶ The first move in this regard sets the tone for Mogadishu’s approach to the Somaliland question from now onwards. Ahmed Fiqi, the face of the failed Djibouti meeting, conveyed a meeting with the “members of Awdal community” to work with the federal government in opposition to the MoU on January sixteenth. This was an obvious hint that Mogadishu would resort to stirring clan divisions to destabilize Somaliland. Another decision, not yet publicly disclosed but which parties privy to it reported, was the order to Federal officials hailing from Somaliland to start subversion activities with each official starting in their hometown. Sanaag region, where the Deputy Prime Minister comes from, is a prime target as per sources. However, a more willing partner for Mogadishu would be the rebel-led Las Anod administration. Reports indicate a high-level visit from Mogadishu leaders to Las Anod to coordinate to strengthen the Las Anod insurgency to export the disorder further west to Togdheer and Sanag regions. ¶ As **tensions escalate**, the long-deferred **confrontation** between **Somaliland** and **Somalia** over **self-determination** becomes inevitable, **risking** wider **regional involvement**. In this confrontation, **Somaliland suffers** from the **obvious disadvantage** of **being led** by a **divisive** and **quite incompetent** administration. However, as resilience is synonymous with Somaliland’s narrative, this will not be the first time it triumphed in adverse conditions. It is not Somaliland who we should fear for in this battle of wills, but the 20-year international effort to reinstall a state in Somalia.

#### **In the eyes of Somalia, the cost of inaction would outweigh any harm of attacking.**

**SC 24** [No Author, 1-8-2024, Somali President's Desperation Escalates: Issues Threats to Ethiopia and Somaliland over MoU, Takes Off for Eritrea, Somaliland Chronicle, https://somalilandchronicle.com/2024/01/08/somali-presidents-desperation-escalates-issues-threats-to-ethiopia-and-somaliland-over-mou-takes-off-for-eritrea/] tristan

In a recent speech, President Hassan Sh Mohamoud of the Federal Republic of **Somalia** **asserted** that his **country** is **ready** to **defend** its **sovereignty** using **every** available **means**. This declaration directly corresponds to the recent Memorandum of Understanding between the Republic of Somaliland and the Federal Government of Ethiopia. The agreement encompasses the establishment of an Ethiopian naval base in the Red Sea, as well as the recognition of Somaliland as Africa’s 55th state and the initiation of significant economic cooperation between the two nations. ¶ “Do not push us. Do not push us into knocking on doors we have not knocked on before. We will defend our state, cooperate with anyone to defend it.” ¶ Hassan Sh Mohamoud, President of the Federal Republic of Somalia. ¶ The Somali government has issued multiple statements objecting the MoU and accusing Ethiopia on infringing on its sovereignty and territorial integrity. In addition to the Somali President’s hawkish and hinting of use of force to stop the deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland, other government **officials** including the spokesman for Somalia’s Ministry of Defense have threatened to **wage** **war** on **Somaliland** and Ethiopia. ¶ The potential Ethiopian naval base in Somaliland has sparked outrage from the **Somali** President. **Framing** it as an “**existential** **threat**” and rushing laws to void the memorandum of understanding between the two neighboring countries requires a closer look. Despite lacking international recognition, Somaliland has functioned as an independent entity since 1991, raising questions about the “true nature” of the **perceived** **threat** by the **Somali** **government** and its **allies**, including **Egypt** and **Djibouti**. The **Somali government’s** anxieties seem **focused** less **on** immediate territorial violation and more on the potential **Ethiopia**n recognition of Somaliland. This **recognition** could effectively **erase** **Somalia’s** territorial **claim**, granting Somaliland the coveted 55th seat in the African Union, solidifying its independence and providing Ethiopia access to the strategic Red Sea.

#### **Somalia has the capabilities.**

**CS 20** [No Author, 9-24-2020, With an eye on Taiwan, China arms Somalia against Somaliland, Somaliland Current, https://www.somalilandcurrent.com/with-an-eye-on-taiwan-china-arms-somalia-against-somaliland/] leon

According to reports dated September 19, **almost** a **week** after **Somaliland** opened its **representative office** in **Taiwan**, China **delivered** ‘**large-scale**’ **military aid** to **Somalia**. The **gesture** came with a **message** impelling **Somalia** to **retaliate** against **Somaliland**, which **refused** to **kneel** to **China’s command** and **established** commercial **ties** with **Taiwan**. ¶ As per a Somali-language news report, the **addition** of **Chinese muscle** to **Somalia** has rung major **warning bells** for **Somaliland**, with its **diplomats** fearing **possible conflicts** between the **two nations** on the **behest** of **imperialist China**.

#### **War would be devastating.**

**Norwich University 23** [No Author, 8-xx-2023, Five Major African Wars and Conflicts of the Twentieth Century, Norwich University, https://online.norwich.edu/online/about/resource-library/five-major-african-wars-and-conflicts-twentieth-century] BZ \*\* date retrieved from source code\*\*

Somali Civil War—1991 ¶ Armed conflicts in Africa during the twentieth century caused an enormous loss of human life, the collapse of socio-economic systems, and the degradation of health and education services across the continent. From the Nigerian Civil War to the Somali Civil War, these 20th Century conflicts submitted civilians to intense physical and psychological trauma that negatively impacted development throughout many African nations. To understand the magnitude and scope of inflicted trauma, and in order to prevent its recurrence, military historians and students should consider the following five significant African wars and conflicts of the 20th Century. ¶ In 1991, a coup ousted dictator Mohammed Siad Barre, President of the Somali Democratic Republic. This shift in the balance of power sparked a twenty-plus-year civil war that killed as many as **one million** Somalis via violence, famine or disease. Following Barre’s removal from power, the Somali Democratic Republic divided into two opposing parties, the Somali National Movement in the North and the United Somali Congress of the South. This separation made it difficult to achieve control of the conflicting factions because no one ruling entity was recognized by all Somalis; those living in the north would not recognize authority from the southern faction, and those in the south opposed leadership from the Somalis in the north. The lack of a central government forced the U.S. to close its embassy that same year. ¶ The United Nations and the United States became heavily involved in the conflict from 1992 to 1995, sending military forces and humanitarian aid to the country. The United States officially ended its involvement in Somalia in 1994 due to the lack of a foreseeable resolution and financial costs in excess of $1.7 billion. The Somali Civil War’s large death toll and protracted conflict could possibly have been avoided with earlier humanitarian action, according to a 1999 report commissioned by then-United Nations’ Secretary-General Kofi Annan. However, the heavy fighting between the warlords **obstructed** timely U.S. relief efforts in Somalia.

Civil War

#### **Somaliland tensions have de-escalated, but recognition remains a flashpoint for violence**

Omar Mahmoud, 12-11-2024, Somaliland’s Peaceful Handover Withstands Neighbourhood Strains, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somaliland/somalilands-peaceful-handover-withstands-neighbourhood-strains //wenzhuo

What happened? **Somaliland** held its long-awaited presidential **election** in mid-November, **ending in** victory for the opposition and a swift concession by the incumbent. The vote and its aftermath underlined Somaliland’s standing as a consolidating democracy with a reputation for political **stability** while the **peaceful transfer of power** marked a welcome outcome in the Horn of Africa, where such handovers are a rare occurrence. That said, the run-up to the vote was far from smooth, due to rising internal tensions and an unresolved conflict in the east. The harassment of government critics and the concentration of political power in the hands of a single clan also fuel concerns as to the degree of openness in Somaliland’s political system. Somaliland unilaterally declared independence from Somalia in 1991. Over the last three decades it has developed many of the trappings of a state, including its own currency, security forces and civilian administration in the capital, Hargeisa. Even so, Mogadishu rejects Somaliland’s independence and no country has recognised it. At the same time, its reputation for orderly polls and relatively consensual politics has come under strain recently, and disputes among politicians caused a two-year delay of the presidential vote. In the end, Somaliland’s institutions and political establishment largely withstood the stress test. The results saw Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Cirro”, leader of the Waddani party, secure the presidency with 64 per cent of the vote, defeating incumbent Muse Bihi of the Kulmiye party. Approximately 53 per cent of registered voters turned out – lower than the previous presidential election in 2017, when 64 per cent of those registered voted. This was partly because polls did not take place in most of conflict-hit Sool and parts of Sanaag, both of which lie in the east. What are the main political divides in Somaliland? Voters largely cast their ballots along clan lines, revealing the continuing dominance of these loyalties in Somaliland while also raising doubts as to the diversity and fairness of political representation. Politics in Somaliland is dominated by members of the Isaaq clan family. A number of clans exist within the Isaaq, but three main ones – the Garhajis, Haber Jeclo and Haber Awal – have the greatest political prominence. Other, non-Isaaq clans reside in Somaliland’s western and eastern regions. In the western region of Awdal, members of the Dir clan family have long complained of marginalisation by the Isaaq. In the east, members of the Darod clan family, comprising Dhulbahante and Warsengeli clans, have mostly rejected inclusion in Somaliland, favouring instead a closer relationship with Mogadishu or neighbouring Puntland, a semi-autonomous state in northern Somalia with which they share close clan ties. These frictions were at the heart of the conflict that erupted between the Somaliland administration and the Dhulbahante in Sool in 2023 (for more on this, see below). The past two Somaliland presidents – Bihi and his predecessor Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud, or “Silanyo” – were swept to victory by a Haber Awal-Haber Jeclo clan alliance, under the Kulmiye party. This fractured in 2024, with many Haber Jeclo turning against the incumbent. Instead, they voted for Waddani and its candidate Cirro, complaining that Bihi favoured his Haber Awal clan when in power. Prominent members of the Haber Jeclo clan also argued they had suffered most from the conflict in Sool which erupted during Bihi’s presidency, given that their homelands are on the front lines and many prisoners of war captured by Dhulbahante militias hail from their clan. Alongside the presidential polls, Somaliland’s political organisations also contested elections to determine which of them would be permitted to compete as parties in future polls, with Somaliland’s political system licensing only three parties for up to ten years each. This system, in which political associations that want to become parties are subjected to a popular vote, is designed to avoid the proliferation of parties representing specific clans. Kulmiye and Waddani retained their official standing for the third and second time respectively. They are joined by a new party, Kaah, led by veteran politician Mohamoud Hashi Abdi, previously a member of Kulmiye. All three of these parties are headed by leaders from the Haber Jeclo – a first in Somaliland politics. What were the challenges leading up to the polls? The last few years have been difficult for Somaliland, sullying its reputation as a relative beacon of stability and democratic progress in the Horn of Africa. First, presidential and local council elections had been delayed for several years due to domestic political tensions. When the licenses for Somaliland’s three permitted parties expired in late 2022, there was also little clarity on how or when the next slate of parties would be chosen. Presidential polls were due in November 2022, but confusion over the elections for licensed parties delayed the timetable: the government insisted on holding the party polls before the presidential contest, while the opposition argued the reverse should be the case. A compromise was hammered out in August 2023, paving the way for a joint presidential and party election in November 2024 after a two-year delay. The agreement came after violent clashes between government forces and protesters in major cities in August 2022 as well as a short-lived clan-based rebellion near the town of Burco, the region’s second-largest city, in mid-2023. Secondly, the conflict in Sool between the Somaliland government and Dhulbahante clan militias dented Somaliland’s reputation for internal stability. Members of Somaliland’s Isaaq clan led the agitation for independence from Somalia following years of insurgency against the country’s strongman ruler Siad Barre, who held power in Mogadishu from 1969 to 1991. But the majority of Sool’s population are Dhulbahante, a community that belongs to a non-Isaaq family, the Darod. The **desire for independence** is **not shared by all communities** in the territory claimed by Somaliland, and **the outbreak of violence demonstrated this**. In early 2023, Dhulbahante elders and elites formed the Sool, Sanaag and Cayn-Khatumo (SSC-K) administration in Sool region, representing the clan, along with Fiqishine and Madiban clans in the area. The administration led the campaign to expel Somaliland forces in August 2023, and has since declared itself part of Somalia rather than Somaliland. The immediate inception of the conflict in Sool can be traced to the assassination of a Dhulbahante opposition member in Las Anod, the region’s administrative capital, in December 2022. Protesters gathered in the town after the assassination, complaining that the Somaliland authorities had not made enough effort to stop the repeated killings of civic leaders. Police moved in to disperse the demonstrators, using excessive force. A full-fledged insurgency ensued. The Somaliland military and Dhulbahante clan militias, backed up by other related clans, fought a fierce war between February and August 2023 in which more than 150,000 civilians were displaced, many of them fleeing to Ethiopia. Somaliland forces fell back to the town of Oog in August 2023, where they remain. **Fighting has not restarted since, although** troops remain deployed on the front lines. Coupled with the lack of engagement between Sool, Sanaag and Cayn-Khatumo and the Somaliland government, the **risk of the conflict reigniting remains**. Thirdly, outgoing President **Bihi**’s moves to achieve the first-ever foreign recognition of Somaliland also helped shape the outcome of the election. In January 2024, he hastily **signed** a **m**emorandum **o**f **u**nderstanding **with Ethiopia**n Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed which reportedly stated that Ethiopia could lease land on the Somaliland coast to build a naval base, in exchange for Addis Ababa providing official recognition of the administration as a sovereign state. The agreement sparked a regional uproar: Somalia condemned it as a violation of its sovereignty and subsequently demanded that all Ethiopian forces deployed in the country depart. (Ethiopia has troops there as part of the African Union mission and on a bilateral basis in support of Mogadishu’s fight against Al-Shabaab militants.) The reactions within Somaliland were more equivocal. Some hailed it as a bold step towards securing independence. Others, however, criticised the lack of transparency, as well as the prospect of Ethiopia establishing a military installation on soil inhabited by ethnic Somalis, many of whom regard the country as a regional rival. Others viewed the agreement as no more than a ploy by Bihi to strengthen his flagging political prospects through an appeal to Somaliland nationalism. With Ethiopia facing concerted diplomatic pushback, the **deal** has as of **yet had** **no meaningful effect in practice**. But it remains a source of contention – particularly in the Horn of Africa – and the mere existence of the memorandum of understanding contributed to a tense pre-electoral environment**. No**ne of these **controversies**, however, **managed to override** the **smooth** conduct of **elections,** demonstrating Somaliland leaders’ commitment to the ballot box and sustaining the progress that the region has made toward developing democratic institutions. The National Electoral Commission and Supreme Court in particular showed leadership and independence during the electoral process. Bihi’s administration, meanwhile, successfully oversaw logistical challenges and refrained from manipulating the vote. **What should be the incoming administration’s domestic priorities?** The conclusion of the elections is an opportunity for Somaliland to move on from an electoral process that concluded peacefully while also exposing the extent of its divisions. Somaliland’s new leadership faces a clutch of major challenges. Its domestic politics are increasingly fractious; the relationship with the Dhulbahante clan (and the frozen conflict in Sool) remains tense; and the memorandum of understanding with Ethiopia continues to stir diplomatic bickering. Meanwhile, electoral democracy itself could face a new threat as the benefits of holding political power and the costs of losing it rise due to mounting foreign investment in Somaliland, giving top government officials far greater economic sway and access to financial resources. Important economic developments include the 2016 arrangement for the DP World logistics company, based in the United Arab Emirates, to manage and expand Somaliland’s main port of Berbera. This will allow Somaliland to profit from an important trade route linking states in the Horn of Africa to the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea shipping lanes. But for now, successful polls, and a smooth transfer of power, **will** go some way to **cool**ing **domestic political tensions** and redressing the reputational damage Somaliland suffered as a result of the delayed polls and conflict in Sool. Incoming President Cirro – a long-time opposition leader who was speaker of Somaliland’s lower house from 2005 to 2017 – should take the **opportunity to prioritise dialogue and de-escalation**, moving on from the aggressive and antagonistic approaches that have prevailed over the last few years in Somaliland. To minimise post-election tensions, the incoming administration should demonstrate its commitment to governing on behalf of all Somalilanders, rather than just the communities that form its clan-based coalition. A first step would be to ensure that ministerial appointments in the new administration reflect a wide range of clans, not simply those that are most politically dominant, while also including more women’s voices to counter the marked gender bias in Somaliland’s political establishment. The new administration should also work to respect civil liberties and reverse recent efforts to curb these, a trend that has been manifested in the rising number of arrests of journalists and opposition politicians, including the detention of a member of parliament during the pre-electoral period. Long overdue reforms to the political system should be another priority. Long overdue reforms to the political system should be another priority. One important step would be to devise a new way to select representatives to the Guurti, the parliament’s upper house. Its current members were picked in the late 1990s and have long since exceeded their original six-year mandate. Many clan elders who were initially chosen have died and their successors, who mostly inherited the roles, often lack a similar level of public influence or interest in reaching compromise with political rivals. Not unlike the Guurti, mandate extensions are common across Somaliland – all branches of elected government (presidency, parliament, local councils) have previously seen terms of office extended. The new administration could beef up its democratic credentials by sticking to constitutionally-mandated term limits. More broadly, the new administration should also seek ways to boost the inclusiveness of Somaliland’s political system. This will not be easy. Dialogue with communities that feel underrepresented, particularly non-Isaaq communities like the Gadabursi and Issa in the west and the Dhulbahante and Warsengeli in the east, is critically important. The Dhulbahante have effectively abandoned the Somaliland project, and prefer to see themselves as part of Somalia. Talks between both sides on the subject of releasing prisoners of war would be a sensible first step to avoid a resumption of conflict between the Dhulbahante and the Somaliland government, and could pave the way to more substantive discussions on their future relationship. In recent weeks, clan conflict has also flared in Erigabo, capital of Sanaag region, which had been a model of civic tranquillity despite the city’s diverse population. Dialogue sponsored by the new government could help calm tensions before they escalate further. How should the government approach its foreign relations? Two key issues are set to dominate Somaliland’s foreign relations: the status of the memorandum of understanding with Ethiopia, and Somaliland’s ties with Mogadishu. Relations between Somaliland and the Somali government had been improving prior to the signing of the memorandum. Toning down bellicose rhetoric deployed by both sides since the deal with Ethiopia was announced in January 2024 could help the two governments get back on the road to dialogue. There is a potential window of opportunity ahead of Somalia’s next elections in May 2026, in part because Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud may want to demonstrate progress on the Somaliland issue before his mandate expires. The memorandum of understanding will be tricky to navigate. If implemented, it would represent a breakthrough for foreign recognition of Somaliland, but could also spark a backlash in the region, particularly from Mogadishu. One approach could be for Somaliland and Ethiopia to focus on commercial aspects of the agreement – which are easier to put into effect immediately and less controversial. This would mean linking the revamped infrastructure around Berbera port to the Ethiopian market by improving the transport network connecting Ethiopia and Somaliland, while also finalising a bilateral trade agreement that had been under discussion prior to the memorandum of understanding. Somalia has noted it has no objection to Ethiopia and Somaliland deepening their commercial ties. At the same time, wider discussion between states in the Horn of Africa is needed to address the unresolved questions that the memorandum highlighted: namely, Ethiopia’s limited sea access and Somaliland’s legal status. Another potential flashpoint surfaced in the aftermath of the U.S. election. Although not an official publication of incoming U.S. President Donald Trump’s campaign, the Project 2025 conservative manifesto issued by some of his allies makes the case for official recognition of Somaliland. It argues that such a step would reward the entity for its relative stability, while also countering what the document’s authors describe as neighbouring Djibouti’s pro-Beijing orientation. (Djibouti hosts a major Chinese naval base located a stone’s throw away from a large U.S. base; its decision to grant China basing rights in 2016 irritated Washington.) On paper, **Somaliland** would welcome official **recognition** by a great power. But if this is done unilaterally and with no major diplomatic spadework in advance, it **would** also **supercharge tensions** between Somaliland and Somalia, particularly along the contested boundary with Puntland. It would likewise **prompt furious objections** from Mogadishu’s allies in the region, such as Djibouti and Eritrea, as well as their friends farther afield, including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar and Egypt – further dividing the wider region. Navigating the issue of recognition will be an especially nettlesome challenge for Cirro. All parties – particularly the incoming U.S. administration – should avoid rushing into decisions that **could create new fault-lines** in the Horn of Africa. Washington should rather prioritise the resumption of dialogue between Mogadishu and Hargeisa, with regional backing, through sustained diplomacy and diplomatic pressure, in order to move toward a lasting solution.

#### **Consensus over independence is mixed and tense – empirics prove violence will occur**

The Economist, 6-13-2024, The president of Somaliland is bargaining for recognition, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2024/06/13/the-president-of-somaliland-is-bargaining-for-recognition //wenzhuo

Mr **Bihi** also **has critics at home**. His defence minister resigned after the deal was announced, saying that Ethiopia is an enemy. Plain-clothes security **officers in Hargeisa** raided a TV station and **detained journalists** who were hosting a live debate about it; a pop star was arrested after questioning the agreement in song. (The government says neither arrest was related to the deal.) Moustafa Ahmad, a researcher in Hargeisa, says that **popular feeling is “very mixed**”, combining excitement about recognition, concern about transparency and scepticism about whether Ethiopia will honour its side of the bargain. Meanwhile, in the eastern town of Las Anod, the **push for statehood faces** its biggest **challenge** since the formative years of the 1990s. **People there have long felt ambivalent about independence**, which they say has **disproportionately benefited** the majority **Isaaq clan.** Last year leaders in **Las Anod declared they wanted to be part of Somalia** instead. Mr **Bihi tried to shell the city into submission**, as more than 100,000 people fled from their homes, only for his army to have been forced to retreat last August. That was “a humiliation”, says Mahmoud Adam Jama (known as Galaal) of the opposition Waddani party. “[**Somaliland**’s] argument was that we control the territory,” he sighs. “Now we don’t.” Mr Bihi swats away suggestions that he has been **too heavy-handed**, saying that internal strife is “a stage that all countries go through”. His argument is unlikely to win over critics ahead of the elections in November. In its short history, Somaliland has done better than many nations at forging a degree of consensus and stability. But as it chases **recognition** abroad, there is still **hard work** to be done **at home.**

to Somaliland, we cannot pretend that the deadly outcome of possible U.S. policy missteps is unknown.

#### **Anti-Secessionists in Eastern Somaliland will backlash violently in response to recognition**

Markus Virgil Hoehne, 05-07-2021, Somaliland: 30 Years of De Facto Statehood, and No End In Sight, https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/somaliland-30-years-de-facto-statehood-and-no-end-sight-30363 //wenzhuo

**Somaliland**'s success story **rests** heavily **on** the will of the members of the **Isaaq clan**-family to break away from the rest of Somalia. **However,** the **territory** of the secessionist republic is **also inhabited by members of other clans who have different political orientations**. Members of the **Darood clan**-family in eastern Somaliland, in the regions Sool and Sanaag, early on took a stand **against secession**. Most of them did not participate in the constitutional referendum and in the subsequent elections. As a result, Somaliland has largely become a “mono-clan state” today: all important offices in the country are held by members of the most populous Isaaq clan-family. A smaller group from the west of the country participates as well, but its elites are confined to the deputy positions. From the early 2000s onward, **armed resistance formed in the east.** The more **Somaliland troops tried to take control** of the area, the more **bitter**ly local **clan militias fought against them**. The locals received support from Puntland, an autonomous state in northeast Somalia. Today, the overwhelming majority of people in the center and the west of Somaliland are in favor of independence. Here, the country has developed impressively regarding infrastructure, private businesses and in the educational sector over the last 15 years. Consequently, international aid organizations and state agencies for development cooperation increasingly engaged – short of international recognition. Hargeysa developed into a real capital, at eye-level with major east African cities. The eastern parts of the country, however, are not yet at peace; **Somaliland only exercises limited control** there and occasionally, its troops meet with armed resistance. This is also where part of the former colonial border runs. From an international legal perspective, it would be important that Hargeysa controls this border effectively. However, **local militias** in cooperation with Puntland are preventing this. Their **goal is to strengthen Somali unity**.

#### **Civil war reverts any benefits of the aff**

International Crisis Group, 5-19-2023, Time for Somaliland and the Dhulbahante to Talk, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somaliland/time-somaliland-and-dhulbahante-talk //wenzhuo

**Somaliland has much to lose from** a protracted **conflict in Las Anod**. Somaliland’s **pursuit of international recognition revolves around** its efforts to build democratic institutions and secure long-term **stability**. It has put significant effort into cultivating supporters in the U.S. Congress and UK parliament. Yet the Las Anod **conflict threatens to undermine** these **endeavours,** particularly when coupled with electoral delays relating to the forthcoming presidential poll. Politicians have thus far failed to reach consensus on the timing and sequencing of either that election or another vote to licence the three parties that will be allowed to participate in the country’s politics for the next ten years. President Bihi has overstayed his mandate – he is operating under an extension that the opposition does not recognise – and the political parties’ term limits have expired as well. The one-two punch of **fighting** in Sool and electoral uncertainty appears to **have** had **a chilling effect on** Hargeisa’s **external engagement**. It appears that foreign **government contacts** with Somaliland **have already diminished**, particularly with regard to opportunities for security cooperation **with the U.S. and UK.**

#### **Past conflicts proves Somaliland would be devastated by civil war – deaths, econ collapse, famine**

Ismail Ahmed, 1999, https://cja.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/Heritage\_of\_war\_\_\_state\_collapse.pdf //wenzhuo

The impact of the **war in Somaliland** Loss of life and displacement of population The number of deaths in the northern towns has been estimated at around 100 000.23 Up to 50 000 people are believed to have lost their lives in the capital city, Hargeisa, as a result of summary executions, aerial bombardments and ground attacks carried out by government troops.24 Gersony, who conducted one of the ®rst investigations for the US State Department, maintains that the troops conducted **systematic attacks against** the **civilian** population.25 Some of the more brutal acts occurred in rural villages and were carried out by special troops known as the `Isaaq Exterminating Wing’ (Dabar-goynta Isaaqa) who were believed to have been recruited from among the Ogaden refugees. Targeting herders and farmers perceived as being af®liated with the SNM, they destroyed or poisoned wellsÐ vital for the pastoral economyÐ seized livestock and burned down entire villages to deprive the rural population of its basic means of livelihood. Loss of livelihoods Although the exact number of animals lost as a result of the war is still unknown, it is estimated that more then **half of** the country’ s total **livestock** population was **killed** either directly or indirectly. The troops also destroyed water sources by blowing up or draining water reservoirs. In some areas open wells were poisoned, while others were contaminated with corpses.26 The extensive planting of mines in rural areas was also partly responsible for animal losses. Another contributing factor was the distress sale of livestock by pastoralists. The war also disrupted the merchant-based network that transmitted remittances from Gulf states. **Crop production** was even more **devastated** by the war since all farmers were forced to abandon cultivation for the four years of con¯ ict. Social and economic costs The war **destroyed market centres** while mining of transport routes virtually shut down trade. This was accompanied by the **closure of the Berbera port** for animal exports from the second half of 1988 to 1991. An average of 1.2 million animals used to be exported per annum through Berbera.27 Because market exchange was 119 ISMAIL I AHMED & REGINALD HERBOLD GREEN central to the survival of rural households, the closure of Berbera port and the collapse of local markets for meat had a devastating effect, forcing many to dispose of large numbers of their animals. Ironically, the community insurance and transfer systems that had originally played important roles in the collective coping strategies of households triggered social crisis during the war. There was a sudden increase in the social obligations, forcing many households to sell their assets. The blood money payment, for instance, which played an important role in preventing and containing localised con¯ icts, also forced many households to liquidate some or all of their productive assets. Because neither the SNM nor the Ethiopian authorities controlled the refugee camps there was massive violence and lawlessness, caused in part by the proliferation of light weapons. As a result there were many deaths and injuries attributed to freelance bandits. The absence of central authority meant that these had to be settled through traditional means of compensation. Because of a fear that any internal con¯ ict would hinder their common struggle against the regime, the council of elders had constituted emergency laws demanding any outstanding blood money to be settled within a short period of time. Arrears in blood money payments forced many households to default on payments for the ®rst time, jeopardising the functioning of the whole system. A further social obligation which households had to meet during the war was contribution to the war effort. Two types of contributions were required from individual households: a male member was required to join the SNM forces, in addition to making a payment of one sheep (or its equivalent in cash) at least once a year. These obligations were strictly applied during the war. The crisis had a differential impact on men and women among the rural households. While comparatively less severe in the north than the south, the threat of physical violence contributed everywhere to a heightened sense of insecurity. There was a signi®cant increase in the number and type of tasks performed by women during the crisis. As men became increasingly involved in the community-level activities associated with the war, the burden of labour shifted to tasks such as queuing up for food rations, fetching water from distant sources and engaging in petty trading to supplement their incomes. Famine and loss of life and livelihoods Even after their defeat, the remnants of BarreÂ’s forces maintained a strong base in the inter-riverine region for nearly a year, destroying villages and crops. Animals were killed or stolen, forcing hundreds of farmers to ¯ ee to the regional capital Baidoa which later became the epicentre of the 1991±92 famine. With the exception of Mogadishu, this region suffered the most severe devastation. As a result, `the inter-riverine people were trapped between Aideed’s forces in the north, BarreÂ’ s in southwest, and Morgan’ sÐ BarreÂ’s son-in lawÐ in the south, in what became known as the ª triangle of deathº . Baidoa, the capital of the region became also known as the ª city of the walking deadº .’ 28 **At the height of the civil war** in 1991±92 a major drought hit the area, leading to a devastating famine which **killed** between 300 000 and **500 000** 29 and **affected** as many as **three million.** The large number of deaths resulted from 120 THE HERITAGE OF WAR AND STATE COLLAPSE IN SOMALIA AND SOMALILAND the outbreak of infectious diseases as thousands of people gathered in relief camps. Population displacement and economic costs The war in the south created a huge displacement of people, **uprooting** an estimated **1.7 million**, over one-third of the entire population in the south.30 As many as a quarter of a million people from rural areas poured into Mogadishu, where aid agencies had set up relief camps. As the war in Mogadishu and the surrounding areas intensi®ed, most of the city residents and internal refugees were displaced, again creating massive ¯ ows of moving populations. Heavy ®ghting along the surrounding state borders prevented most of them from ¯ eeing to Ethiopia and Kenya. The residual services and institutions that had survived the radical erosion of the late BarreÂyears collapsed in the ensuing civil war. **Key infrastructure**, essential for economic activities, such as water and power generators, re®neries, air and sea ports, telecommunications installations, bridges and parts of most tarmac road **were destroyed** or ceased to function because of non-maintenance which has been an endemic Somali problem even in peacetime. **Schools and hospitals were targeted** during the initial factional ®ghting in Mogadishu and surrounding areas. What was not destroyed in the war was looted and shipped to surrounding countries

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**AU mediation empirically denied**

Antonio **Cascais**, 5-25-20**23**, "Is the AU failing in its role as a mediator? – DW – 05/25/2023," dw, https://www.dw.com/en/is-the-african-union-at-risk-of-failing-in-its-role-as-a-mediator/a-65730521, accessed 12-29-2024 //cy

No peace, no security

Sixty years later, however, its successor organization, the African Union (AU), has repeatedly come under fire for failing to achieve that objective.

Nuvunga agrees, saying that "(t)oday, the African Union is an organization that primarily represents the interests of the powerful. **It is toothless and ineffective,** and it repeatedly proves itself **incapable of ensuring prosperity, security, and peace for all Africans."**

Many in Africa share this criticism: Various civil society groups have **attacked the AU** on a regular basis for **failing to fulfill its chief objective of ensuring peace** and security on the continent.

Nuvunga says there are **countless** examples for this, especially in the present, highlighting that the AU has not been resolute enough in addressing the crises in Sudan, Tigray, or the Sahel.

The AU also keeps postponing bringing any resolution to the crisis in Cabo Delgado, a region in the northern part of Mozambique, which faces a jihadist insurgency: "There are **armed conflicts in about 20 countries in Africa**. However, the African Union seems not to feel responsible. It appears **overwhelmed**."

**And so, Somaliland peace predicated by limiting foreign involvement—recognition uniquely destroys foundation of their fragile stability—**

Cindy **Horst**, Feb 14, 20**19**, “State formation and economic development in post-war Somaliland: the impact of the private sector in an unrecognised state”, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14678802.2019.1561621//sugar

In this article, we have shown that understanding the role of corporate actors in post- war peace-building and state formation requires a nuanced analysis of the complex ways in which these actors can have both positive and negative effects. **We have argued that any argument on the potential contributions of international corporate actors in post-war contexts needs to be contextualised within an analysis of the political and economic roles of local business elites during and after violent conflict**. This is **particularly the case in hybrid political orders like the one in Somaliland. Somaliland in practice operates as a hybrid political order where a range of state and non-state entities are connected and intertwined in complex ways. Local business elites have impacted state formation after war by lobbying against a range of regulations, providing the government with loans and contributions rather than paying sufficient taxes, and by hindering the development of sound financial institutions. They have also played a role in preventing or resolving violent conflict at crucial stages in Somaliland’s recent history.** Yet, the success of lobbying activities has led to de facto protectionism, limiting access by foreign ventures to the Somaliland market. While such protectionism may have negatively impacted economic development and growth opportunities, the example of recent engagement by DP World in the Berbera port suggests a more complex picture. On the one hand, DP World’s port investment has challenged the delicate balance between a range of formal and informal stakeholders in Somaliland’s post-war hybrid governance and may potentially improve the country’s economic stagnation, which has been rejoiced by many Somalilanders. On the other hand, DP World’s presence and activities risk importing **foreign power dynamics** into the local context. Further, **DP World’s activities risk escalating local tensions by creating power imbalances between clans. As we have argued, the Somaliland state has become less concerned with internal accountability to domestic non-state actors and rather focuses on external accountability towards foreign businesses and governments. This threatens the fragile balance currently existing where different power-holders in Somaliland hold each other in check and power balances between clans are delicately managed through Somaliland’s hybrid political order.** Somaliland’s lack of formal international recognition discourages foreign investment and constricts trading, has led to minimal external support for peace-building and political reconstruction and until recently meant no bilateral donor assistance.84 **However, as a consequence the government has been more accountable to a range of local power-holders as resources** cannot simply be taken by force without risking renewed violent conflict. The impact of foreign investors operating in Somaliland cannot be fully predicted just yet, but our analysis of DP World’s operations at Berbera port tell a cautionary tale of the complex dynamics that come into play when foreign business actors engage in post-war contexts. **Local stakeholders – including business elite, politicians, clan elders and religious leaders – had to renegotiate the delicate balance of a hybrid political order in light of DP World’s substantial business investments and interests, which introduced new institutions and actors and risks of renewed conflict. The Somaliland case teaches us that foreign business investment in fragile contexts is certainly not the magic bullet that the B4P paradigm presents it to be.**

#### **The world bank is predatory**

**BWP 23** [Bretton Woods Project; No quals; 07-19-2023; "Word Bank promotes agricultural corporations at cost of food security in Africa," Bretton Woods Project https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2023/07/word-bank-promotes-agricultural-corporations-at-cost-of-food-security-in-africa/] sumzom

**New research** published by the **UK**-based Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD) shows how the **World Bank** is harming **farmers** in **Africa** through its **agricultural policies**, by promoting regulations that support the expansion of **commercial markets** for **hybrid seeds**, **fertilisers** and **pesticides**. Through seed certification laws and subsidy programmes, the Bank has advocated for **national laws** that can make it illegal for **local communities** to **propagate, grow, exchange and sell their own seeds**, instead encouraging farmers to buy **hybrid seeds** and **fertilisers** in the**commercial seed market**. This means farmers become more **dependent** on outside **interventions** and expensive goods(see Observer Spring 2020).

The report shows this approach is **ineffective** in **reducing poverty** and **increasing food security**, particularly for **women**, as they have less access to finance to buy seeds in commercial markets. This is the result of the Bank’s **flawed metrics**, which measure the success by **greater participation** of the **private sector** (see Observer Spring 2019), instead of measuring **poverty reduction**. “The World Bank is funded by taxpayer money. Its purpose is to **tackle poverty** and **reduce food insecurity.** Yet, it seems the main thing they care about is making it easier for **giant corporations** to sell **expensive seeds** and **fertilisers**”, highlighted  Dario Kenner, CAFOD’s lead analyst on sustainable economic development.

In contrast to this industrialised agricultural model, the report encourages the World Bank to support alternative models, based on agroecological principles that involve shifting public finance, scaling up investment in crop diversity, supporting participatory plant breeding, community seed banks and other community level initiatives to protect and build crop diversity